EDITED BY MARK BEESON
AND NICK BISLEY

Issues in 21st Century

WORLD POLITICS

3rd Edition

Issues in 21st Century World Politics

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Third Edition

Edited by

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and
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Issues in 21st Century World Politics: An Introduction

MARK BEESON AND NICK BISLEY

This is the third time we have edited *Issues in 21st Century World Politics*. Each time we have done so, there has been some seemingly monumental 'issue' or other that seemed remarkable as we were editing the book. This edition is no different. Indeed, there is no shortage of things happening in the world at the time of writing (early 2016) that have potentially major implications for the future of the international system. There is a very real chance that the American electorate could put Donald Trump, a reality TV star with no political experience, into the White House, reinforcing the sense that US political system has serious structural flaws. This also reflects a broader trend towards insurgent populism across the democratic world, with the election of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines one of the most notable examples. Established political processes and practices seem to be unable to deliver, and unpredictable and dangerous politics seems to be the order of the day. Even as China undertakes a brash and confident foreign policy asserting large and destabilizing claims in the South China Sea, its economy faces very significant headwinds. Some analysts think that a serious financial crisis is a distinct possibility in the world's second largest economy. Britain's surprising vote to leave the EU is likely to badly damage the broader European project while the ongoing problems in Syria and Crimea underscore the deep-seated political and social fissures in Southwest Asia.

The very way we think about the conduct of, and possibilities for, international relations (IR) seems somehow more fluid and uncertain than usual. Before we even begin to try and itemize some of the potentially more consequential of these many and varied developments, therefore, it might be worth stepping back a little and trying to decide whether there really *is* something different and distinctive about the way the twenty-first century is unfolding.

No doubt everyone thinks the times they live in are remarkable and special in some way. It is only with the benefit of hindsight that we can see that some events really were significant turning points in history and that the times that produced them were especially significant as a consequence. In the twentieth century, two world wars, the greatest depression the world has ever known and – more positively – the ending of the Cold War, surely qualify as special moments in history

that have had long-lasting effects. Perhaps less well recognized now, but likely to be so in the future, was the rapprochement between the US and China that made possible the economic reforms that created the greatest human development achievement in history.

But what about the twenty-first century? Is there anything that really sets it apart from other times? Are there events that are really so significant that they can be thought of as transformational moments akin to 1989? The answer is the somewhat unsatisfactory both 'yes' and 'no'.

On the one hand, we have September 11. The fact that we don't actually need to remind the reader that this was the date of the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 is itself significant. Even if the events themselves weren't that epochal in terms of casualties or in their material impact on the target country, they were spectacular examples of 'propaganda by the deed'. More importantly, they prompted the United States to fundamentally reorient its foreign and defense policy for almost a decade to focus on the rather nebulous idea of a 'global war on terror'. On the other hand, these events also highlight something novel about the contemporary era, perhaps. Although it is hard to imagine more dramatic events, not least because of the way they were beamed around the world in real time, their consequences were rather slower to unfold. Indeed, it is possible to argue that they are still resonating throughout the international system generally – the United States' role within it more particularly (Acharya 2014b).

A further important feature of the first couple of decades of the twenty-first century has been the rise and apparent decline of the US as the world's first, global unipolar actor (Layne 2012). At century's opening, the US confidently bestrode the world, unchallenged by any country or force and at the top of virtually all global measures of power and influence. A decade or so on, bloodied by wars that had not gone to plan in Iraq and Afghanistan, economically undercut by the worst recession since the 1930s, US power and influence seemed at a low ebb, with prominent scholars asking whether American global dominance had gone for good (e.g. Nye 2015). What are we to make of this roller coaster of great power experience? Is it a result of distinctly American circumstances or are there deeper forces at play that tell us something about the state of world politics?

One of the clichés of contemporary life is that the pace of events has increased and their impact is more diffuse and realized in many places simultaneously. The remarkably truncated nature of America's unipolar moment – which some still think continues (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016) – is perhaps the most consequential manifestation of this possibility. Not only has American power clearly diminished relative to others, but the impact of this change is also being felt around the world in different ways. First, the old order that the US helped to build in the wake of World War II is changing and quite possibly even disintegrating (Bremmer 2012). There are many possible explanations for the differences in the way that global politics occurs these days, as Beeson notes in Chapter 6, but one of the most important has undoubtedly been the rise of new powers with different ideas about the way the world ought to be

organized – as Bisley explains in Chapter 1. The second point to emphasize, therefore, is that while the old order may be crumbling, we do not yet have a new order to take its place.

The key question to ask in the context of a discussion about twenty-first century politics and IR is whether recent developments are an aberration or a return to 'normal': was the era of American hegemony a unique, possibly unrepeatable historical anomaly? We have, after all, only had two real hegemonic powers in recent times, so in a basic sense they are the exception rather than the rule (Clark 2011). Are we are now returning to something more like the historical norm, in which power is shared among a greater number of states with a wider variety of cultural norms and experiences? Does this mean that some of the other critically important manifestations of this period may also unravel at the same time?

It is worth remembering that the European Union (EU) was one of the most important institutional and political creations to emerge from this period of American dominance. Is it a coincidence that the EU is also experiencing truly existential challenges at a moment when the US is a less effective international actor? It is also important to recognize that the current immigration crisis that threatens to overwhelm the EU was triggered by the civil war in Syria, which was in turn a consequence of America's disastrous intervention in the Middle East. And that, of course, takes us back to September 11. If the EU does succumb to the various crises that are currently undermining its authority, capacity and solidarity (Nixon 2016), it will be a major blow for the very idea of sustainable international cooperation.

Even if we concede that the pace of change in international politics might seem to be accelerating – a possibility China's meteoric and transformational rise seems to confirm – does this make this era any different from others? After all, the rise and fall of states, even empires, has been core business for IR scholarship from its inception. Perhaps it is the kind of change and not necessarily its velocity on which we should focus more. Even though this volume is not principally focused on theory, it is worth noting in passing that the way scholars of IR understand their subject matter has undergone significant change as well (Dunne et al. 2013). It is surely no coincidence that 'constructivist' approaches, which emphasize norms and ideas in the social construction of IR, came to prominence in the aftermath of the Cold War's ending.

It is hard to conceive of a more 'structured' international environment than the one that endured during the Cold War's bipolar stand-off between the US and the former Soviet Union. It is unsurprising and even appropriate, perhaps, that the way that we think about the international system should reflect this. And yet many 'realists' contend that nothing significant about the world has changed. The same sorts of dynamics that Thucydides examined and described in the Peloponnesian War more than two thousand years ago are still at work today: states rely on their own efforts to survive in a system that remains anarchical in essence. Indeed, the current debate about the possible relevance and existence of a so-called 'Thucydides trap' between the US and China is illustrative of the

timeless propensity for conflict which realists claim is international politics' most important feature (Allison 2015). Power, primarily the material sort, is everything. When things turn nasty, as they inevitably will, according to realists, good intentions, noble principles and a sense of solidarity with other states and peoples will be the first casualties. The current travails afflicting the EU look likely to put this thesis to an unwelcome test. At this stage, it appears that the realists are likely to be vindicated (Münchau 2016).

But even if there are some patterns of human behavior that appear to recur across time and space, does this mean that today's world really is like Ancient Greece? It seems instinctively unlikely and there are good grounds for trusting this instinct. First, there really are profoundly important differences between our time and Thucydides'. There are even striking and noteworthy differences between today's international system and the one that was established in the aftermath of the Second World War. Paradoxically enough, while the US is nothing like as unchallenged or pre-eminent as it was then, the international order that it helped to establish has become more entrenched and pervasive in the intervening period (Agnew 2005). There is virtually no part of the world that is now *not* part of the global economy, even if there are major differences in the way countries participate and different ideas about how it ought to be run. The key question now is about the durability of this order. Does the international system have self-sustaining properties that mean some of its most important, institutionalized features will persist in the face of major shocks (Ikenberry 2011) or is it prone to possible dissolution (Kupchan 2014)?

This is not idle speculation. The other remarkable feature of the current historical moment is that war – or more specifically, inter-state war – is not quite as inconceivable as it once was. There has been no shortage of conflict in the world recently, but nearly all of it occurred within national borders – even if such borders had rather a notional quality and existed primarily as legal fictions. Inter-state war has been very rare over the last few decades (Pinker 2012). Suddenly, however, the prospect of inter-state conflict in Asia, the Middle East or even Europe is not as fanciful as it once was. Even if no rational state actually desires such an outcome the possibility of miscalculation, accident or simply the unexpected concatenation of events may overwhelm the best-laid plans and calculations (Rice 2015).

The apparent inability of policymakers to cope with and respond to major, often unprecedented challenges that cannot be addressed or confined within national borders has undermined confidence in political elites everywhere (Hay 2007). Ironically, this may be an even bigger problem for democracies where public sentiment can have a more immediate impact on domestic and even foreign policy. Angela Merkel's diminished domestic status in the wake of her decisive actions during the recent immigration crisis is a stark illustration of how unpredictable and volatile the politics around these sorts of issues can be (Rachman 2015), and of the way internal politics can affect external relations. True, this may be a unique set of circumstances, but given the EU's talismanic status in debates about what can go right and wrong in efforts to cooperate across national

borders, the stakes and consequences could hardly be greater. The emergence of radical populists such as Donald Trump are a dramatic reminder that even the most established of democracies are not immune to demagoguery in uncertain times (Kagan 2016).

Some other contemporary challenges may be less immediate but they may ultimately have an even greater impact on the international system in ways that could set this era apart from every other that has preceded it. The quintessential case in point in this context, of course, is climate change, a 'wicked problem' that illustrates a number of seemingly uniquely contemporary problems and generates some rather apocalyptic predictions (Dyer 2010). In addition to the decline in confidence in elected officials within so many democracies, there has been a similar decline in the standing of science and expertise (Fischer 2009). This is partly because so much of the debate around climate change has become politicized and prey to vested interests (Goeminne 2012). But conservative commentators in particular see such developments as a consequence of a more generalized loss of confidence in 'Western values' in the face of a range of new problems (Sheridan 2016). The most dramatic of these threats and problems is a radical, religiously inspired fundamentalist challenge emanating primarily from a Middle Eastern region that has become the literal and metaphorical graveyard of so many external interventions.

The failure of the so-called Arab Spring to take hold was a major setback for hopes about the possibility, let alone the inevitability, of a democratic future throughout the world (Davis 2011). Nobody talks about the end of history anymore. Muddling through from day to day seems to be the height of many policymakers' ambitions, especially democratic ones. The only real exceptions in this regard are authoritarian leaders such as Turkey's Tayyip Recep Erdoğan, Russia's Vladimir Putin or China's Xi Jinping. In China's case the government may actually have the capacity to follow through on some of the grandiose rhetoric and create projects like the so-called 'Belt and Road' initiative that is designed to provide better connectivity between Europe and Asia. If it does it will mark a major transformation in links between the continents and China's place as a pivotal actor within the evolving international order (Beeson and Li 2016).

Indeed, if there's one thing we might think we can confidently predict about the twenty-first century it is that China will play an increasingly big part in determining what it looks like. This is another potentially epochal change, but at this stage it is far from clear whether this will prove to be a positive or negative force. It is not simply that China's leadership is still authoritarian and thus presents yet another implicit challenge to the embattled extant order, but China's own prospects are not as assured as some believe. A range of significant challenges relating to the environment, growing inequality and corruption among others threaten the legitimacy of its unelected government. A social convulsion in China of the sort that have been such a feature of its history would be something else that might be thought to set the current era apart and make its developmental trajectory especially uncertain (Shambaugh 2016).

It is in the context of this fluid and evolving background that the current volume's chapters have been written. While some 'issues' have a familiar feel to them, others have been transformed or are entirely new. The book's first chapter examines the return of geopolitics as a defining feature of world politics. For much of the post-Cold War period scholars tended to discount the idea that state action was driven by calculations of relative power involving a competitive logic for strategic advantage. In this chapter Bisley explores the return of geopolitics as a core motive force in world politics, how it operates and what its revival means for the international system. In the second chapter Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Thomas Waldman examine the place of war in contemporary world politics. They explore the continuing challenges that advanced states have in using war as a tool of statecraft as well as the ways in which war has evolved in response to these problems. They also discuss the ways in which the growing unease about the use of force has emboldened the emerging powers and is likely to continue to destabilize world politics in the future.

One of the most striking features of the current era is the extent to which states and societies have become vulnerable to a wide range of challenges that do not conform to the old idea of a security threat. In the past, the sources of insecurity were thought to derive from the military power of other states; today the range of sources is much wider. So not only do infectious diseases, transnational criminal networks, irregular population movements and the environment pose existential threats, but the way we think about who is threatened has also broadened as well. In Chapter 3, Alastair Cook explores these non-traditional security (NTS) challenges, the efforts that have been undertaken to manage them and their implications for world politics. Although, categorically, terrorism is in many respects the quintessential NTS challenge, its scale and significance warrants its own chapter. In the book's fourth chapter, Andrew Phillips examines global terrorism. In the previous edition of this book, terrorism appeared to have been on an ebb tide with Al-Qaeda badly degraded and other groups similarly constrained. The emergence of ISIS as a hugely successful force in Iraq and Syria as well as its sophisticated use of social media has reinvigorated terrorism as a significant issue in world politics and challenged established practices of coping with it. In Chapter 4, Phillips examines terrorism's history, its current significance and likely evolution, concluding that it remains a resilient threat not only to states and peoples, but to international order more broadly.

In Sean Starrs' entirely new chapter he explains the role played by international organizations (IOs) in the contemporary international system. In Chapter 5, Starrs discusses whether IOs can actually transcend the often narrow national interests of their creators to perform a truly supranational role. Although he is unconvinced about the prospects, he is more optimistic about the potential for change from 'below'. Some of the issues highlighted by Starrs also feature prominently in Mark Beeson's discussion of globalization and governance, and their impact on the state. As Beeson makes clear in Chapter 6, although globalization remains a vital force in contemporary world politics, the state retains its place as the most powerful single actor on the global stage. Even though the forces of

globalization prompt states to cooperate more with one another, they are tending to do so much more at the regional than at the global level. The role and importance of regionalism in world politics is the focus of Chapter 7. Here, Louise Fawcett explores economic, security-based, environmental and social forms of regionalism and the part played by regional structures in the complex array of overlapping state and non-state forms of cooperation.

In Chapter 8, Aidan Hehir assesses the place of international law in the current order. He begins by examining the perceived weakness of that order, reflected in the sense of change and instability discussed in many of the other chapters in the book. The chapter contests the idea that international law is a 'weaker' version of its 'strong' domestic counterpart, and suggests it is instead better understood as an important part of the way in which international politics is undertaken. John Hutchinson is another new contributor to this series, although in his case he considers a familiar theme: nationalism. As Hutchinson makes clear in Chapter 9, nationalism is once again an increasingly important determinant of political outcomes, as the difficulties currently confronting the EU remind us. In this context, Hutchinson's chapter is an important complement to the chapters by Starrs and Beeson, as he describes the ways in which nationalist forces are coming to terms with the sorts of transnational pressures that are described elsewhere.

In Chapter 10, David Gordon and Matthew Paterson explore the complex politics of climate change. Not only is it one of the most profound and challenging issues, it reflects in many respects the core underlying dilemmas of modern politics. It is a problem whose resolution is almost entirely contrary to the statist conception of politics, authority and responsibility that lies at the heart of the international system. How is it possible to coordinate the action of over 190 states who conceive of themselves as having no higher authority and who have unique conceptions of their interests, when many of them, in combating climate change, would be worse off in the short term? The nature of modern finance and the sorts of recurrent economic crises that have become so commonplace also seems to run counter to many of the preceding arguments that put the state as the key actor. But as Giulia Mennillo and Tim Sinclair make clear in Chapter 11, states are ultimately still responsible for the way the international economic system operates, even if they choose to be less directly involved in such processes. As the authors point out, the way we think about such problems is an important determinant of how we collectively respond to them.

Questions of gender have taken on a growing prominence in world politics. This refers both to the increasing recognition by states, IOs and others of the differential experiences of men and women as well as the way in which we understand what gender is and how it operates. In the twelfth chapter, Laura Sjoberg and Natalia Fontoura examine the salience of gender as both an issue in world politics and as a way of approaching IR more broadly.

Even though China's economic development has improved the life chances of more people more rapidly than at any other point in human history, one of world politics' most significant features is its remarkable levels of economic inequality.

Not only do there continue to be very significant gaps between the world's most affluent and its poorest countries, but the gaps within countries between the haves and have-nots are also in some cases greater than they have ever been. India's economic expansion is among the more notable, yet the gap between rich and poor is one of the biggest in the world. Ray Kiely examines this phenomenon in Chapter 13. Here he explains why inequality and underdevelopment continue in spite of the economic growth driven by globalization, what impact this has on the international system and what steps can be taken to try to address these broader issues.

Europe's refugee crisis in 2015–2016 was prompted by the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq and is probably that continent's biggest humanitarian disaster since 1945. But it is only the most visible part of what many think is a period of significant migration. Anne Hammerstad examines the dynamics of population movement and their impact on contemporary world politics in Chapter 14. In contrast to earlier versions of this book, in which a degree of caution was urged about hyperbolic claims about migration, in terms of sheer numbers and impact on politics the current population displacements are described as of immense importance.

The potential for civil society and other non-state actors to play a more prominent role in international affairs is the central focus of another new contribution by Kelly Gerard and Sky Croeser. Focusing primarily on social movements, Gerard and Croeser argue in Chapter 15 that political processes can no longer be adequately understood without taking account of an array of non-state actors that are exerting an increasing influence, albeit one that is difficult to easily quantify at times.

One of the more striking features of the international system has been the resilience of authoritarian and non-democratic regimes, despite the hopes and even expectations of some prominent commentators in the West. But as William Case points out in Chapter 16, the book's final substantive chapter, achieving sustained democratic transitions remains a difficult challenge and one that has not been helped by the problems afflicting the United States itself.

Rising Powers and the Return of Geopolitics

NICK BISLEY

On March 18, 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula, the first coercive transformation of a European border since 1945. The liberal dream of a post-conflict Europe is over, a dream ignited by the remarkable transformation of Europe's international relations (IR) after 1945. The Cold War nuclear balance and European institutions appeared to end what had appeared endemic, the use of violent conflict to advance national interests. Of all the world's regions, the one that had been so war-prone had become peaceful. Even in the aftermath of the Cold War and the horrors of the Yugoslav conflict, the liberally inclined could comfort themselves that it was ultimately a civil conflict in which a federal state broke apart into its constituent republics. States using military muscle to change the map appeared to have been banished. Some thought that Europe represented proof that laws, institutions and norms, whether those of the European Union (EU) or the United Nations (UN), could fundamentally change the way states behave. The gloomy realist who insisted that no amount of well-intentioned legalese could change the primacy of power was said to be proven definitively wrong. Some, evidently unaware of the constantly transformative nature of modern social life, thought that history, understood as the struggle of ideas over the optimum way of organizing political and economic affairs, had come to an end (e.g. Fukuyama 1992).

The thuggish invasion of Crimea, justified by a rag bag set of claims of varying degrees of implausibility, including the bizarre proposition that it was an anti-fascist counter coup to defend Russians abroad, punctured the bubble of liberal self-delusion. A strategically important chunk of a European-oriented former Soviet Republic was seized by the state next door which remains to this day the occupying force. This is only the most obvious example of the ways in which a group of newly empowered and confident states are unsettling the prevailing ways of doing things and are beginning to transform core aspects of world politics. As large, confident and capable states begin to assert themselves they are posing profound questions not only about basic material aspects of the strategic balance in the three most important regions in world politics, Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. They are also beginning to pose more fundamental questions about the structural underpinnings of the prevailing international order. In the West, scholars and policymakers alike have largely (although not unanimously)

liked to think that rules and not power have been the prevailing force shaping international affairs over recent decades. The actions of many emerging powers, Russia, China, India, Iran, Turkey and indeed Japan, seem to presage change to a world in which power and jockeying for influence will play a more determinative role than it has in the recent past. And although we continue to live in a world in which high-intensity inter-state war is unlikely, Crimea is thought by some to be a leading-edge indicator of dangerous emerging trends.

This chapter casts a critical eye over these claims and assesses the extent to which a set of emerging powers is bringing geopolitics back as a dominant force in world politics. The chapter is in two main parts. The first introduces the rising powers whose actions and attributes are thought to be bringing geopolitics back to the game of world politics. The second then considers the extent to which a new geopolitics is abroad in world politics. In arguing that we do need to take seriously the idea that a good number of important states include a geopolitical logic in the way they approach the world, the section also emphasizes the distinctive qualities of twenty-first-century geopolitics. In this chapter geopolitics refers to a particularly competitive approach to statecraft in which considerations of relative power understood in traditional terms play a dominant role. The chapter concludes with some reflections of the implications of the new geopolitics for the broader dynamics of contemporary world politics.

The disruptors

For at least a decade and in some cases longer (Brown et al. 1999), scholars and analysts of world politics have focused extensively on the rapid economic transformation of China, India and Brazil as well as Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia and others. It has become increasingly apparent that power and influence in the world is shifting away from the North Atlantic shores where it has been overwhelmingly concentrated for the past 300 years or so. Many of the basic facts are well understood. China is the world's second largest economy in aggregate terms (it is already its largest if you account for differences in purchasing power) and likely to overhaul the US over the next few years even with a slowing rate of growth.

India is going to become the world's most populous state within a generation or two, while strong economic development in places like Brazil, Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa prompted financial analysts to drew attention to the prospects in emerging markets. Perhaps most famously, Jim O'Neill, then of Goldman Sachs, identified Brazil, India, Russia and China as the best prospects for growth and economic return (O'Neill 2001). The scale of economic transformation in these countries and its impact on the global economy prompted a range of diplomatic initiatives. The BRIC countries (Brazil, India, Russia and China), since joined by South Africa, formed a political grouping complete with annual summit; at the global level a range of new mechanisms have been developed to reflect the shifts in the global economy and how it functions (see Beeson, Chapter 6), with the G20 the most important and visible of these changes.

With perhaps the exception of China, interest in emerging powers in world politics has focused primarily on their implications for the global economy and its governance. China has garnered plenty of attention on the political and strategic front in relation to its possible rivalry with the US, but it has not been until relatively recently that enough states have been acting in ways to prompt some to discern that a pattern of conduct is emerging in which a geopolitical logic is increasingly evident.

Of the rising powers who are most closely associated with a new kind of geopolitics one should distinguish between two groups. The first group are the really large powers that already have a tangible global influence. Here China is joined by a newly ambitious Russia and a demographically supercharged India. These are states that are physically large in the sense both that they have very substantial geographic reach and large populations. China and India alone account for nearly a third of the total human population. Equally, these large states are located in strategically significant places. Russia's expanses are unparalleled and it is the only truly Eurasian power. China's mass dominates East Asia and, as Indian naval officers love to remind people, the Indian Ocean is the only one of the world's oceans named for a country. One of the reasons Brazil is likely always to be of second-tier importance is due to its relative geographic isolation, to say nothing of such a thinly populated place as Australia.

Notwithstanding the often staggering reality of these countries' scale, size is not the only reason for their renewed importance. Indeed, for a long period of time size and scale of human population was thought to be a problem rather than an advantage. What makes these states so significant now is the link between the latent potential that scale brings when it is paired with capability and will. As these countries have become increasingly economically well endowed (although for quite different reasons), they now have resources to allow them to act in ways that previously they were not. For example, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) had defending China territorially as its primary focus. Its ability, and indeed its need, to project force beyond its borders was essentially non-existent. It is now one of the world's top military spenders and is developing a wide range of force projection capabilities, from aircraft carriers to attack submarines. But perhaps the most important facet of these major powers is their confidence and ambition. Russia, China and India are states that want to change aspects of the international environment to better suit their interests and identity. And it is the combination of these facets, the political will to change, the capability to act on these aims and the scale of resources which can be put to the task, which means there is the very real prospect of significant disruption to the game of IR.

The other group entails states whose actions are of consequence to questions of power and order at the regional level but lack the heft and scale to be of global significance. Here one sees the actions of Iran, Turkey and Japan as the most regularly alluded to although one could also include South Korea, Nigeria, Mexico and Indonesia on the list. While these states lack the obvious scale of the major players, they remain significant in resources (understood here to refer both to population as well as natural resources such as oil).

Equally, they are located in strategically significant parts of the world. But this smaller group shares with its larger confrères ambition, will and capacity. That is, these are states who perceive that the existing circumstances in their local area require some changes to better suit their needs. Taken together, the two groups represent a small but significant number of members of the international system. And they are behaving in ways which are prompting a revival of a kind of geopolitics which at least some more liberally inclined scholars and analysts had thought was anachronistic. Due to their relative importance the chapter will focus primarily on this first group.

Geopolitics 2.0?

So what are they doing that is disruptive and why do we call it geopolitics? In some cases they chafe against a regional balance of power they feel is stacked against them, in other cases they are opportunistically advancing their interests, while in yet others they are reacting to what they perceive to be shifts in the global balance of power. Some even go so far as to argue that many of these emerging powers nurse a grievance against the prevailing order (Mead 2014), seeing it as a Western product suiting Western interests and values, and that emerging powers may seek to overturn or recast that order. Before beginning an analysis of just what it is that the emerging powers are doing to disrupt the existing patterns of power it is necessary to explain what is meant by geopolitics.

Geopolitics is normally narrowly defined in the academic literature as the field of IR that studies the ways in which geography influences the dynamics of international politics (Agnew 2003). This ranges from more quantitative studies that explore the relationship between physical attributes (such as proximity, shared borders) to conflict, to the ways in which physical geography influences patterns of conduct at the international level and much in between. In this chapter I am using the term in the broader sense in which it refers to a particular kind of statecraft.

Central to this type statecraft are considerations of material power with a strong emphasis on conventional military force in driving state action. States have always been driven by multiple sets of motives and ideas, these include ideological, moral, ethical and legal factors. But geopolitics reflects a priority put on material forms of power and in particular conventional military forms over other considerations. But this alone is not sufficient to distinguish geopolitics from other types of statecraft. The primacy of power in political decision making must also be matched by a competitive logic that is linked to a larger strategic ambition. That ambition may be expansive or reactive, but without both a larger goal and an interactive quality dominated by considerations of power and influence one can not be said to have geopolitics at play.

A particularly pernicious aspect of geopolitics is the way in which non-military policy options become servants of a larger strategic ambition. So not only will states jostle and position themselves using the tools of material

power, they will also compete through indirect means. One particularly prominent example of this at present is the way in which states have been using free trade agreements as pawns in larger strategic games (Wesley 2015). Australia's signature of one such agreement with the US was openly described by government and observers as a reward for cleaving close to the US in the lead up to the Iraq War, while more recently the relatively rapid conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multilateral trade agreement between 12 countries from across the Pacific Ocean, has been openly presented as an effort to reduce China's influence in the region. President Obama stated this on October 5, 2015, when in a speech exhorting the benefits of the TPP he asserted that 'we can't let countries like China write the rules of the global economy' (Obama 2015).

Geopolitics was, of course, a dominant force in world politics for much of the twentieth century. The jostling among Europe's great powers that proved so combustible in 1914 was geopolitics in its most obvious form. Equally, the Cold War was, notwithstanding its important ideological dimensions, strongly shaped by this kind of strategic logic. Indeed, it is a good example of the ways in which geopolitics can intersect with other motive forces. And while it reflects a primacy of considerations of power it does not necessarily mean the complete eclipse of other factors shaping decision making. But with the Cold War's demise, the acceleration of globalization caused both by technological advances, a permissive policy context and the integration of China, India and Russia properly into the global economy, it seemed that geopolitics might be banished. Indeed, the power of liberal norms embedded in the UN system and the golden straitjacket of economic interdependence led many to think that not only was geopolitics something of interest only to antiquarians but that major power war was a thing of the past (Mueller 1989). Even when global terrorism visited Western consciousness after the attacks of September 2001 with all its psychological trauma and strategic overreach by the US and some of its allies, the challenge it presented seemed more to the policing side of the security-statecraft spectrum (see Phillips, Chapter 4). It did not dent the underlying idea that, at least among states if not unruly transnational gadflies, the logic of shared economic interests, a commitment to basic laws and rules and a growing unease about the use of force more broadly had pushed geopolitics to one side. Rather than being driven by crude calculations of power, so many thought, states were being prompted by more complex, sophisticated and ultimately liberal considerations.

Although it might be exaggerating slightly to say that in the post-Cold War period geopolitics had disappeared entirely from the scene, India's acquisition of nuclear weapons followed swiftly by Pakistan's successful testing of a device in 1998, China's bravado toward Taiwan and the Western allies' containment of Saddam Hussein's Iraq after being repulsed from its invasion of Kuwait, were all clear examples of geopolitics at play. But these appeared to be exceptions rather than the norm. They were the final echoes of an old way of doing things that, once resolved, would finally disappear.

Yet as global economic power has shifted, and perhaps most importantly, as US global power and geostrategic reach has been perceived to have weakened, geopolitics looks to have become a more prominent part of world politics. Russia's invasion of Crimea is perhaps the most commonly cited example. But to this can be added a whole range of other exhibits, the least of which relates to the way the US and Russia are approaching the catastrophic civil war in Syria. Here considerations from both major powers are much less to do with the specific aspects of that tragic conflict than they are about how their actions will influence their interests in the region and their position in relation to each other's broader aims in the Middle East. But it is not only the larger powers that are exhibiting this tendency: Iran is plainly expanding its influence not only through traditional non-government proxies but in Iraq and beyond to broaden its strategic influence in its own vicinity. Add to that its astute bargaining in relation to its nuclear weapon strategy and Iran seems to be acting geopolitically. China's activities in relation to disputed territories in the East and South China Sea as well as the development of close relations with Russia are further examples. For some, the most grandiose example of Chinese geopolitics is its expansive 'Belt and Road' initiative. The aim to develop land- and sea-based infrastructure to connect China to Europe is taken by many not at face value – described by the Communist Party as a 'win-win' venture in development, infrastructure and economic opportunity – but as an overt attempt to expand its strategic influence in Central Asia and beyond. The initiative has been described by some as 'Mackinder meets Mao', referring to Halford Mackinder, the British scholar, widely regarded as launching the study of geopolitics as a distinctive scholarly venture (Mackinder 1996 [1919]). To this one can add Japan's military modernization initiative to expand its military capacity and to defend its broader interests, India's ambitions to develop military power and strategic alignments to advance its interests and, of course, the reaction to these moves by the US, its allies and partners. Together with a broader sense of jockeying and competition for influence in Asia, the Middle East and in Europe's periphery, geopolitics is plainly back as a significant influence in contemporary world politics.

Types of geopolitics in the twenty-first century

Given the space constraints of this chapter I cannot examine the full set of activities undertaken by the rising powers and the competitive dynamics at play across the world. Instead I will explore the common themes or patterns of the new geopolitics that have become evident over the past half-decade or are emerging and likely to become of regional or global significance in the near- to medium-term future. Among these one can identify three main groups that are representative of the revival of geopolitics, which are occurring in sufficient quantity – that is, they are not unique – and which are of broader significance to regional international orders and the overarching international system.

Growing local influence

Perhaps the most obvious and widespread example of this is the steps emerging powers are taking to expand their strategic influence in their immediate locality. In the first instance this involves states that have growing economic capacity dedicating resources, both military and diplomatic, to increase their capacity to shape political outcomes to their advantage in their vicinity. Many of these emerging states have been on the wrong side of imperialism and conflict and thus have righting historical wrongs as a longer-term ambition. As they have become more affluent and capable, countries like China and India are more able to advance their claims over Taiwan, Kashmir and other disputed territories. But here I mean more than applying growing national power to territorial disputes that have long existed. Rather, it refers to explicit efforts to expand strategic influence around their borders. In some cases this entails acting in ways to make the political and economic environment in nearby countries conducive to their interests. Iran's activities in Iraq, Russia's interventions in a number of post-Soviet republics and China's charm offensive in Southeast Asia are some of the more prominent examples of this sort of activity.

So why are these states trying to increase their influence? The move is not simply fed by basic capacity or a general tendency of states to seek to expand as they become more powerful. Rather, much of this is motivated by two specific aims. The first relates to traditional concerns about security and threats. In almost all cases the actions of emerging powers in this geopolitical sense is prompted by a desire to reduce their sense of vulnerability or to manage risk. China has become increasingly active in the East and South China Sea and while most of the media and policy attention has been focused on disputed territories in these seas, the broader claims are only one part of China's actions. China is creating artificial islands in the South China Sea not only as an effort to right historical wrongs, but also to expand its capacity to defend its interests. It should be seen as part and parcel of its broader military modernization campaign involving the development of an aircraft carrier capability, attack submarines and latest generation fighter jets through which China wants to be able to better defend itself. The sea is seen as particularly important to China not only because of the historical claims and the importance of nationalism to the Chinese Communist Party, but also because China increasingly depends for its economic success (and thus the stability of its political and economic system) on flows of energy, commodities and goods that travel by sea (Jakobson 2014).

Ambition is the other motive that appears to lie behind the growing efforts to increase strategic influence. These states are taking steps not only to defend themselves and advance their interests, they want to have a greater influence over their regions. In many cases this is not a new ambition. For example, many argue that China has long sought to be able to protect its interests beyond its borders and to shape its region to its advantage, but in the past it has not been able to do so. As Princeton University's Aaron Friedberg observes:

> The recent increase in Chinese assertiveness does not reflect a change in over-all objectives, nor a wholesale abandonment of the previously existing strategy. Rather it is a result of increasingly favourable leadership assessments of the nation's relative power and of the threats and opportunities that it confronts. (Friedberg 2015: 143)

In Russia's case, its ambitions do not have the same degree of longevity as the political system has been formed into almost a one-man autocracy. Although the underlying motives of Putin's foreign policy are complex (Marten 2015) and far more tied to domestic circumstances than many observers recognize, nonetheless Russia's actions do speak to larger ambitions for influence in the world. Indeed, one of the notable features of the new geopolitics is the ways in which emerging powers appear to be influenced by old-fashioned notions of spheres of influence, buffer states and strategic equilibrium. Here ideas shaped by ambition, capacity and security converge around a model of statecraft which gives power and strate-gic machinations a much more prominent role.

New power alignments

The second kind of geopolitical positioning that is beginning to become evident, although it remains in its early phases, involves establishing new alignments among states in response to shifting patterns of power. If the first category of activity related to actions in the immediate vicinity of rising powers, this sec-ond is broader both in geographic scope and its strategic concept. For the bulk of the Cold War period and indeed well into the post-Cold War era, American military predominance has prevailed in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. US power was projected in different ways in those regions. The US deployed military assets to each of them but on top of these it organized the strategic bal-ance through a multilateral alliance structure in Europe, through bilateral alli-ances in Asia and through patron client links to key powers in the Middle East. In each key region, the distribution of military power has been relatively stable over the long term. The rising powers have begun to develop and expand their military capabilities, particularly their ability to project force, which is shifting the military balance from its old patterns. China, India, Japan and Russia, as well as many others, are increasing their arms expenditure but also doing more to be able to advance their interests more broadly. To be clear, this does not yet entail the fundamental transformation of the strategic balance in any of the three major theaters, however, in all three we have seen action taken that plainly is not the preferred strategic outcome of the previously dominant power. That China could build islands in the South China Sea, that Russia could annex Crimea and that the Syrian conflict would become the destabilizing catastrophe that it is are indicative of the weakening of the capacity of the old distribution of power to sta-bilize those regions. If primacy entails being able to secure strategic outcomes to your advantage, then things are changing rapidly in all three of America's core areas of interest.

New organizational possibilities

The other feature of the new geopolitics is the exploration of new alignments in parts of the world in which the strategic landscape is shifting. Under the charismatic leadership of PM Modi, India has begun an activist phase in its foreign and strategic policy, developing partners that are intended to help advance India's economic development ambitions as well as its longer-term strategic goals. At one level this seems to be largely driven by China's rise. Many countries who have engaged with India have done so out of a desire to use its size and scale to advance its own strategic agenda, perhaps most famously the US aim to cultivate India as a means of containing China (Hall 2014). Equally, India and Japan are cultivating closer relations similarly motivated by a desire to help each other limit China's influence. But India is doing more than just being antagonistic toward China. The People's Republic is a vital trade partner for India and if it is to make good on its economic reform agenda it will need to become a large investor in India. Indeed, some hold the view that many have in Washington and elsewhere, that because India is a democracy it can be relied upon not to side with or develop close relations toward China. Yet this belief is likely to be misplaced. Over the longer run India plainly does not want to be part of a regional international order in which it is not the dominant power, nor does it want a global order in which the US is the paramount power. In the words of two leading American scholars, there is a good chance that 'a more powerful India will vigorously pursue its own interests, and many of those interests will be closer to China's than to those of the United States' (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2013: 126). China and Russia are rekindling an interest in strategic collaboration, while Iran's creative diplomacy seeks not just a way out of the sanctions corner but new relationships to project influence.

This activity also involves states seeking to develop new international institutions to project their interests and values and to align them with others. China has been the most active in this area. This first manifested in its leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Established in 2001, it was intended both to stabilize the post-Soviet Central Asian states' borderlands and combat problems associated with porous borders such as transnational terrorism and narcotic trafficking. But it was also intended to consolidate China's influence in the region and to help strengthen the domestic political circumstances of those states in ways conducive to China's interests. But it is by no means the only example of this: China has led the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), it has established the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), it was crucial to the creation of the BRICS bank and is creating a number of mechanisms to support the 'Belt and Road' initiative. Other initiatives bringing together emerging powers include the BRICS summit, IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), the G77 and, of course, the G20 which provides emerging countries with a much greater stake in governance questions than the old Bretton Woods institutions.

Emerging powers are creating new institutions in part because they feel excluded from or marginalized within existing mechanisms. Whether in the antiquated representation of emerging economies in International Monetary Fund (IMF) decision making or in Asia's security architecture, emerging powers increasingly feel that many of these institutions do not advance their larger interests. Equally, and perhaps more importantly, they see new institutions as a means to develop new agendas, address their specific problems and underpin their influence in ways otherwise unavailable to them.

In short, in efforts to expand their strategic influence, in their changes to the prevailing strategic balance and in the creation of new alignments as well as new institutions, the rising powers are acting geopolitically and doing so in ways that are of ever greater importance for world politics. Perhaps one of the perennial questions in the field of IR is how rising powers act in relation to dominant powers, with interest in power transition theory regaining popularity in the light of China's rise and the prospects of a looming contest with the United States (Chan 2008). With these kinds of geopolitics once again part of the menu of policy choice among emerging powers, are we seeing a confirmation of the ideas of those who think clashes between great powers are part of the timeless logic of world politics?

It is certainly too early to see in the kind of competitive jostling for influence and advantage any clear-cut indications that a clash of the kind that realists like John Mearsheimer or power transition theorists like Henry Organski expect. But one does see evidence of at least some aspects of revisionism in their conduct. When looking at categories of states in international politics much effort has been paid to develop taxonomies based on size, scale and influence. In particular, scholars have been interested the idea that there are a small number of large powers which, due to their significant scale and power, have a distinctive managerial role in world politics (see Bisley 2012). Others have spent time identifying the distinctive attributes of a lesser group of middle powers which, while of smaller stature, also have a distinct role (Cooper et al. 1993). But size and scale are not the only way of distinguishing states: one can also point to attitudes and approach as a marker. Of particular relevance to this chapter is the distinction between states that accept the status quo and are content to pursue their interests without seeking major changes in the form or function of international politics and a second group of states that are dissatisfied with at least some aspects of the international environment and want to revise it as they do not feel that they can find satisfaction until those revisions are made. A third and more radical group are revolutionary states that want to change fundamental aspects of the larger system. At the present time there is no evidence that any of the rising powers are revolutionary states in any proper sense of the word. Indeed, such states are only infrequently evident in international affairs (see Halliday 1999).

Can we discern revisionist tendencies in the emerging powers or is it reasonable to conclude that their aims can be largely accommodated within the system as it is currently configured? While this assessment is necessarily partial as the process is very much in its infancy, nonetheless it is clear that at least some of the

emerging powers have aims that are revisionist, understood in the sense that they wish to change at least some aspects of the prevailing international order. China is perhaps the most obvious candidate here, having an evident ambition to be the pre-eminent power in Asia, in which it is not only secure within its borders and respected for its standing but is able to secure the flow of energy, commodities and goods on which its economy depends from predation. As Belgian scholar Jonathan Holslag puts it, 'the effect of fulfilling its great ambition would be to fundamentally change the international order by making China the most powerful country in Asia' (Holslag 2014: 113). But interpreting any country's actual ambition is always difficult; in a country as vast and politically opaque as China this is doubly so. In contrast, some see China as seeking changes to aspects of the prevailing order but not the scale of change that more expansive assessments claim. As US-based scholars Randy Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu put it, 'China seeks a gradual modification of Pax Americana, not a direct challenge to it' (Schweller and Pu 2011). But it is reasonable to conclude that China's geopolitical positioning represents the desire to revise at least some aspects of its international environment.

Russia is the other main candidate for revisionist status. Some argue that Putin has designs to recreate the geopolitical presence of the Soviet Union (Mead 2014), while others see a larger and more disturbing ambition. Prominent French strategist François Heisbourg makes this plain:

> Revisionist Russia emerges as a largely unpredictable player, which no longer gives prime importance to abiding (even in appearance) by international law, with a neo-imperial vision in the form of the Eurasian project and an across the board enmity for Western institutions in Europe and Western values in the world. (Heisbourg 2015: 34)

In many respects Russia is more openly challenging the basic map of power and influence in Europe as well as the broader structure of the international system than China or any other emerging power. However, its undiversified economy, fragile political system and its relative isolation tends to lead many to consider it less of a long-term challenge than the People's Republic.

Twenty-first-century geopolitics

It is thus plain that geopolitics is back and it is a large-scale challenge to the prevailing settings in key parts of the world, most obviously Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. But before concluding this chapter it is worth reflecting on the ways in which geopolitics today is different from the way it has been executed in the past. These relate to globalization, the normative and institutional setting of world politics and the domestic constraints that emerging powers face.

One of the most striking and distinctive features of contemporary world politics is the extent to which globalization binds together so many disparate

parts of the world (see Beeson, Chapter 6). Through networks of production, investment and consumption, as well as the flows of ideas and people, states and peoples across the planet are bound up in webs of complex interdependence. And although there have been previous experiences with globalization, the level, reach and scope of the current period is unparalleled. It is this multifaceted set of connections, providing both mutual benefits but also mutual vulnerabilities, that makes the contemporary iteration of geopolitics quite different from previous eras. During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Union and the United States essentially existed on separate economic planets. Strategic considerations naturally had primacy because there was no competing set of interests at play in either Washington or Moscow. Today, political elites in Beijing, Tehran, Washington or Delhi are acutely aware of the extent to which their broader national ambition is beholden to economic forces and interests beyond their control. The bilateral relationship of the US and China is the strongest example of this trend (Beeson and Li 2015). From a purely geopolitical point of view they are increasingly rivals for influence in Asia. Yet they are one another's most important economic partner. The US is the most important market for Chinese exports while China is the biggest single overseas purchaser of US Treasury bonds. China is, to a large degree, funding the current US budget deficit. This prompted Hillary Clinton to wonder aloud how to deal toughly with your banker in a conversation with then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, reported through the WikiLeaks exposé (MacAskill 2010). But this does not mean that China has all the advantage; indeed the opposite is the case as, being heavy lenders, they are in turn dependent on the US economy. At this stage globalization is having a moderating influence on geopolitics and may yet constrain its worst excesses, yet Germany and Britain were one another's most important economic partners in 1914 and that did not prevent World War I.

A second way in which geopolitics is likely to be different relates to the normative and institutional context of world politics. Since 1945, relations between states have been formally governed by the UN Charter which established a legal and procedural basis for inter-state relations. And while this has never completely dominated the conduct or policy thinking of all states, particularly the most powerful, it has, over a long period of time, provided a very important framework that has become a key part of how all states approach their international dealings. Even the most cynical state acting in ways contrary to the underlying values and ideals of the system has at the very least to frame its actions in relation to the system. Perhaps the most important normative consequence of the UN-focused order has been the proscription on the use of force and the dramatic effect this has had on conventional warfare. During the time of its existence, the UN order has overseen a dramatic reduction not only of conventional war among states but also a significant decline in the numbers of people killed in conflict. This has created quite a debate among scholars and commentators as to the reasons (e.g. Pinker 2012); however, the empirical fact in international politics is unarguable. States are less likely to fight each other now than at any point in modern history. It seems reasonable to conclude that the shift in attitudes toward the use of force

and the legal-procedural aspects of contemporary world politics will mean that geopolitics is less likely to drive relations into a conflictual mode.

Traditionally, geopolitics was a classically realist-oriented approach to international affairs. Not only was it state centric and focused on questions of national interest understood in terms of military power, it was a game played at the international level. Domestic questions were subordinate to geopolitics except inasmuch as they provided the material foundations for external activity. This is avowedly not now the case. In many respects domestic politics is a key driver of much of the new geopolitics. Yet while there are elements of a new nationalism fanning the flames of this more assertive activity, the importance of domestic politics means that we need also to focus on the domestic circumstances of the emerging powers. One of the most significant aspects of these emerging powers is that although they have been remarkably successful in a relatively short period of time, they are all also facing very significant domestic challenges. Of course, in a group as large and diverse as these states it is difficult to generalize – China faces problems from its environment, managing a change to its economic model and growing concerns about corruption to name but three, while Russia has problems with its overdependence on hydrocarbons, its stunted human development and structural corruption – nonetheless they are all countries in which there are significant domestic frailties and in which the domestic will always take precedence over the international.

Taken together these three contextual factors give geopolitics in the twenty-first century a very different hue from when it last was a dominant feature on the international landscape. Overall, they are likely to have a constraining effect on geopolitics but they will also add further layers of complexity to the management of relations among the emerging powers and those already in a position of advantage in the system.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, geopolitics is very much back on the menu in world politics; indeed, it is probably the case that it never disappeared to the extent to which the more liberally inclined might have thought. Yet it is much more obviously a key factor shaping how states act and it is influencing the thinking of large, increasingly powerful and important players.

At the broadest level, the revival of geopolitics adds further uncertainty about just how the changing international order will be governed. Although I have noted that geopolitics is likely to be constrained by the normative foundations of the current order we cannot be confident that the old order will prevail in the long run. This is especially so given that even though the emerging powers have very different interests and perspectives – there is no prospect of the rising powers collaborating in a long-term strategic way due to these differences – they do all view the old order as something which they did not create and, to varying degrees, does not support their interests. In the more immediate term, the revival of geopolitics

indicates that power is becoming an increasingly important force shaping how world politics operate and that those who think that laws and rules should have the dominant role will need to take steps to protect and advance that role. And while few would question that interests have always been a fundamental driver of state conduct, the new geopolitics reminds us that there is a continuing pertinence to the realist dictum that states understand interests in terms of power. That is not to say that power is the only currency in the contemporary world – the complex interplay between the economic and the strategic defies any easy ranking or indeed separation of these two priorities – rather, it is to emphasize that students and practitioners of IR must recognize that questions of power and influence understood in old-fashioned military terms continue to be very salient.

Finally, the new geopolitics underscores the return of scale as a key national attribute. During the long period of Western domination of world affairs, roughly over the past 200 years, the link between power, influence and scale was broken. Western powers, most obviously Britain, were tiny in demographic and geographic terms, yet they were able to dominate vast swathes of the planet through the advantages of industrialization. Prior to that time, there was a straight connection between power and influence: to be a player of the highest order you needed to be large. Today, as the rising powers have become part of the global economy, industrialized and increasingly urbanized, scale is once again a crucial part of world politics. Equally, it means that it is unlikely that any one state is ever likely to have the kind of global influence and dominance that the US enjoyed for the bulk of the past 70 years or so.

Guide to further reading

To gain a sense of the original way in which geopolitics was thought to shape world politics, see the writings of British scholar and public servant Sir Halford Mackinder (1996 [1919]). For a seminal work representing the argument of liberal ideas that world politics had moved beyond recurrent contests over power see Fukuyama (1992), while Ikenberry (2011) sets out a systematic and exhaustive account of the liberal world order established by the United States. The emerging powers and their approach to IR have fostered a wide-ranging literature. Former editor of the *Economist*, Bill Emmott, examines implications for the world of the rivalry between three countries that have not been simultaneously powerful in the modern period: India, China and Japan (2008). Malone's (2011) work on India and Mankoff's study of Russia (2009) explore the foreign policy and worldview of these two key powers. George Washington University's Elliott School hosts the 'Rising Powers Initiative' which examines the foreign policies and outlooks of Asia's emerging powers and is an excellent up-to-date resource: www.risingpowersinitiative.org. The debate about the emerging powers and revival of geopolitics is fast moving and key policy-focused journals should be consulted for the latest material. The best of these are: *Foreign Affairs*, *The National Interest*, *Washington Quarterly*, *International Affairs* and *Survival*.

Ways of War in the Twenty-First Century

CAROLINE KENNEDY-PIPE AND THOMAS WALDMAN

After the end of the Cold War, contradictory trends in warfare became apparent. For many scholars during the 1990s, the demise of the Soviet Union had brought about a new world order in which international politics had taken on a more optimistic shape. Some scholars even expressed the sentiment that war itself had been unlearnt and had passed into history alongside other arcane practices such as duelling and slavery (Mueller 1995). It became commonplace to argue that hard military power had been replaced by 'soft' forms power (Keohane and Nye 1998). Thus it appeared the scholarly community was hopeful that peaceful modes of transformations would dominate international relations (IR). However, any idea that war had gone away proved illusory. Throughout the 1990s, civil and ethnic wars proliferated across the globe.

These 'new wars', characterized by ethnic cleansing, identity politics and endemic violence, demanded action, maybe even military action on humanitarian grounds. It was immediately apparent, though, that the Western powers preferred to not engage with these wars directly and sought to avoid military action, especially after the ill-fated US intervention in Somalia in 1993. However, when bloody conflict erupted in both Rwanda and in the Balkans, intervention appeared imperative, not out of limited state interest but out of humanitarianism. This was the case in the Balkan Wars and the sequel war against Serbia in the 1990s. While Western powers prided themselves on the defeat of Serbia and the liberation of Kosovo (Blair 2010), the manner in which the conflicts were waged was especially striking. The Kosovo War did not lead to a single combat fatality on the Western side. This and the mode of war from the air led to the label 'Virtual War' (Ignatieff 2001). Liberal states preferred to wage war at a distance with as few sacrifices for their troops and as little disruption as possible for domestic politics. There were, though, of course, many casualties on the other side from ethnic cleansing but some casualties were also caused by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign against Serbia.

This in itself was not novel. Civilian casualties have always formed part of the ugly tapestry of war. Yet by the end of the twentieth century, civilians, as opposed to 'regular' troops, were unquestionably bearing the brunt of conflict (Black 2004). We had, it appeared, moved from total wars such as in 1914 and again in

1939 through the nuclear age to an era of selective war or wars of choice for the great powers. These were also wars that had a moral purpose: war was premised on humanitarian intervention and conscience (Wheeler 2006). These wars were on the whole fought from the air and waged with a manifest technological superiority. War was short, sharp and distant, at least for Western states.

The events of 9/11 transformed the context of war. Rather than forgetting war, states such as the US and the UK proved enthusiastic for military action against not just those who had perpetrated the terrorist attacks but those deemed unsettling to international order and Western interests. Hence, with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a traditional type of warfare returned – that of boots on the ground. Even so, the opening episodes in these wars appeared to confirm earlier trends: the Afghan campaign reflected in many ways the Kosovo War, fought by the West largely from the air with the added involvement of special operations teams to hunt down al-Qaeda. Iraq involved a larger military deployment but again air power was crucial. Planners expected a short, decisive campaign with relatively little serious resistance – in the first phase at least this proved largely correct. We should note here, though, the damage inflicted on civilians during the initial American bombing campaign in Afghanistan. Collateral damage was unforgiving.

It was only when both these wars began to falter that large numbers of boots were put on the ground for a sustained period and with significant losses for Western states. The '9/11 wars' as they were dubbed did not prove easy (Burke 2011) because, as we go on to argue, these wars were, despite expectations, in essence 'new' wars. The insurgents in Iraq and in Afghanistan have transformed these wars into the type of quagmire where troops encounter the brutality of not just insurgency (a type of warfare actually quite familiar to the US, France and the UK) but endemic violence waged by a confusing and ever-changing variety of substate actors. The disintegration of Iraq in particular after Western intervention has provided the breeding ground for ISIS, multiple militias and criminal gangs. This occurred in full view of observers and policymakers in the West. So how did it happen?

The evolution of the interaction of liberal states with these new wars can be broken down into five rough phases. First, the early 1990s witnessed an uneasy confrontation with the new wars. Not least the United States proved initially unwilling to intervene directly in either Bosnia or Rwanda. Second, and around the turn of the millennium, the combination of growing humanitarian sentiment encouraging action and the seemingly endless possibilities implied by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) suggested a possible solution: that of humanitarian wars fought at a distance. Third, the early stages of the 9/11 wars witnessed the return of more traditional forms of war and a keen awareness of the utility of force as demonstrated in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. So humanitarian intervention seemed to be replaced by short, sharp, effective wars of national interest (or alliance solidarity) prompted by conventional motivations relating to state security. These wars, exploiting the opportunities provided by defense transformation, could be executed with little risk to Western forces. But,

fourth, Western forces found themselves caught up in the wars they had spent the 1990s trying to keep at a distance. The result was a rediscovery of counter-insurgency doctrine and practice as embodied in the so-called twin surges in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. A fifth phase has involved a retreat from putting 'boots on the ground' and a reversion to the trend of the late 1990s. There is, however, a new context. The IED (Improvised Explosive Device) and its widespread and effective use by the insurgents along with suicide bombers and hostile populations pressured coalition forces to shift their mode of operations both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. After more than a decade of war and increasing casualties on all sides this has led to an emergent paradigm that we dub 'war at a distance'. The hope is to keep 'boots off the ground' and find alternative ways of countering and killing opponents. This trend is exemplified by the widespread use of drones and has become characteristic of the second Obama Administration.

The desire not to commit manpower on the ground was reinforced during the so-called 'Arab Spring'. The uprisings across the Arab world against brutal and corrupt leaderships such as the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 were characterized in the West by a willingness to encourage the overthrow of the regimes without committing significant military power other than small special operations teams and intelligence units. In the Libyan action therefore, like Kosovo, there were few casualties for the United States or the European powers. The conflict in Syria since 2011 has also been characterized by an American reluctance to commit 'ordinary' troops, but to utilize strategic and tactical bombing as well as an overt encouragement of rebel groups. Note, though, there has been a long-standing ambition within some circles for the United States to 'do more' militarily to prevent the abuse, displacement and killing of the civilian population (Slaughter 2012).

The way of war is now, as it was in Kosovo, increasingly defined by military action at a distance. The increasing use of drones in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Syria as well as the reliance on local forces and private security contractors, demonstrates a preference for technology and a reliance on surrogate forces over national sacrifice. The chapter argues that we will continue to see at least two contradictory trends in war. This is, first, that liberal powers are loath to sacrifice service personnel and, second, that opponents increasingly find novel ways to exploit the technology gap and the weak spots of democratic states. One important characteristic of this is that opponents now refuse to stay 'in theater' to be hunted down and killed. Insurgents are mobile, crossing borders to urban environments and indeed are quite often embedded within Western states. While suicide bombers will continue to operate in Kabul and Baghdad other insurgents and, as we have seen in 2015 and 2016, radicals may and do prefer to find targets in Brussels and Paris.

Given all of the above, we argue that democracies will find it increasingly difficult to use traditional military methods to achieve foreign policy objectives. So the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which have characterized the early years of this century will be viewed as aberrations, and we will see an attempt to rely on technological fixes, local proxies, private military contractors and special

forces. National sacrifice is an increasingly unpopular sentiment and democratic states lack the durability, finance and political commitment to wage these new wars. The challenge, however, is that contemporary wars and their consequences transcend national borders. 'Blowback' from military expeditions has both international but also domestic consequences. One feature of this blowback is that revisionist states such as Putin's Russia do not fear Western military action in response to the redrawing of borders such as in Crimea or, as with China's recent actions, an extensive rewriting of maritime claims in the South China Sea. These are what we call New Cold Wars.

New wars

While the end of the Cold War did not bring about the kind of 'New World Order' which the first President Bush envisaged, it certainly marked the closing chapter of the old order. What have usefully, if controversially, been described by Mary Kaldor as 'new wars' (Kaldor 2012), flared up or morphed out of earlier frozen conflicts. Just how 'new' these wars were in historical terms, given their eerie similarity to the religious wars Europe experienced in the first half of the seventeenth century (Münkler 2005), need not distract us here, but for Western militaries the problems they posed were certainly not like those they had spent the last half-century preparing for. Nuclear stalemate and conventional war in Europe quickly seemed outdated; although perhaps one of the greatest mistakes of the 1990s was to misunderstand the nature of Russia – a point to which we will return. Gray described the conflicts of the 1990s as 'in-the-face personally primitive and postmodern. Chechnya, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia comprised a ghastly combination of Homer and Tom Clancy' (Gray 1999: 168). Other commentators spoke of 'destructured conflict' (Shawcross 2000).

These new conflicts displayed a disturbing mix of characteristics: seemingly inconclusive and intractable; often identity-based; a mixture of old and new (primitive and modern); more guerrilla raids and massacres than set-piece confrontations between clearly identifiable armed groups; battle lines were blurred with high levels of collusion between supposed antagonists. Violence was often directed at civilians in the form of massacre, mutilations and rape. Child soldiers, mercenaries, arms dealers and criminal gangs all littered the landscape of these conflicts. Conflicts such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Chechnya, Sri Lanka and Nepal were characteristic of this period.

With the United Nations (UN) at least in theory no longer constrained by the great power politics of the Cold War and a growing global 24-hour media relaying images of suffering from these conflict zones, the pressure among populations in the West to 'do something' increased. Humanitarian actors flooded into these zones of conflict: aid workers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), peacekeepers, provided a distinctive feature of the 1990s wars. But military and political responses remained uncertain in these 'wars amongst the people' (Smith 2007: 267). A series of questions were posed over not just if, but how, to intervene.

Peacekeeping and intervention proved problematic as was witnessed both with the US intervention in Somalia and the obvious failure of will to defend the people of Srebrenica during the Balkan Wars.

The perils of doing nothing were laid bare in Rwanda when around a million people were slaughtered. So, the West ignored new wars for the most part, largely dismissing them as the atavistic eruptions of innate tribalism in the Third World or seeing them as unconnected to their own strategic concerns. This was apart perhaps for those conflicts closer to home or where colonial legacies prompted involvement, as for the UK in Sierra Leone and the US in Liberia. The huge and destructive wars in sub-Saharan Africa were considered largely out of bounds or beyond the capabilities of Western military forces.

However, a number of trends evident through the 1990s prompted policymakers to shape a response to the chaos apparently continuing unabated around the globe. Western military institutions began to seriously reflect on the experiences of the early 1990s, specifically of Bosnia and the use of air power above Iraq in 'no-fly-zones' to contain and deter Saddam. New technologies, encapsulated in the RMA, seemed to hold out the possibility of risk-free but effective warfare. It was thought that the West could, where certain conditions were met, intervene to rescue societies from themselves by employing advanced weaponry and sophisticated communications technology. This became the solution to some but not all of the atrocities of the 1990s. Humanitarian wars were fought with financial cost but little or no risk to Western soldiers, utilizing the latest technology and satisfying a mounting urge to respond to the slaughter (Ignatieff 2001). Yet this response remained highly selective – the West was by no means suggesting it could respond wherever crimes against humanity were being perpetrated. While it might have had an answer to Serbia's nationalistic campaign in Kosovo, the intractable and brutal civil wars in the heart of Africa represented a different order of problem and one with which the West showed little enthusiasm to engage. Given the trends of the 1990s, some commentators went so far as to suggest that war had become a 'spectator sport' (McInnes 2002). Much of this was transformed by the attacks on the United States homeland on 9/11.

The 9/11 wars

The phrase 'war on terror' is not one that was dreamt up by George W. Bush. It was used as early as the nineteenth century to refer to fighting attempts by anarchists to assassinate political leaders. After the attacks of 9/11, President Bush, however, resurrected the term and argued that the 'war on terror' would begin with the group which had perpetrated 9/11, al-Qaeda, but would be accompanied by a wider war against the enemies of the United States. This wider war was used not just to justify the use of military force in Afghanistan and Iraq but also underpinned a series of controversial activities including extraordinary rendition and the use of torture at detention facilities in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. So

these wars of the early twenty-first century rendered permissible a range of activities which had been prohibited after 1945, even if they were not accepted by all.

Initially, both the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq suggested that Western militaries would prevail rapidly. Those two very different campaigns were fought, at least initially, with remarkable flair and efficiency. Despite the warnings and doubts of some commentators, the campaigns proved relatively unproblematic to conduct. In many ways, the 2001 Afghan incursion laid the ground for Iraq – what political and legal concerns surrounded the removal of Saddam were offset by the confirmation of a notable level of military effectiveness displayed in the decisive victory over the Taliban (Aylwin-Foster 2005).

After 9/11, the US cooperated with the Northern Alliance in a bid to depose the Taliban which had sheltered and supported al-Qaeda (Burke 2011). The radical mullahs in Afghanistan had offered sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda (Giustozzi 2009). In the last few months of 2001, the US delivered 767 tonnes of supplies and $70 million to equip and fund some 50,000 militiamen from the Northern Alliance to fight and remove the Taliban from Kabul. The US air force proved decisive in this first phase. B-52s launched assaults on the caves of Tora Bora, dropping Daisy Cutter bombs on to the insurgents below. Bin Laden later recounted how the mujahideen had attempted to dig themselves into trenches to avoid losses (Wright 2006). American Special Forces hunted al-Qaeda through the country's east.

While requiring much greater concentrations of force and thousands of troops on the ground, the 2003 Iraq War seemed to underline Western military dominance when employed in wars for national interest, however contested those supposed 'interests' might be. Iraq was much more problematic in the political realm. The decision to make war over Iraq's putative weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program split the Western alliance, with relationships between Washington and its allies more fractious than they had been for many years (Kagan 2003). But, for neoconservative ideologues, this objection would amount to a footnote in the long sweep of history once the military deposed a hated regime. It was hoped that a democratic Iraq would herald a period of peace and stability in the Middle East, not to mention a steady supply of oil to the American economy (Muttitt 2011).

Afghanistan and Iraq were purportedly wars of necessity. In both cases, the agility, flexibility and superiority of Western military forces in defeating a regular enemy was displayed. Yet, in both arenas the nature of the wars evolved. In Iraq, the 'descent into chaos' was relatively rapid. As John Nagl puts it, 'what was supposed to be a cakewalk became a rebellion exacerbated by mistakes' (Nagl 2011) – before long, the US found itself in the midst of emergent civil wars. Iraq between 2004 and 2007 was a hellish place. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan – as the West's gaze was firmly fixed on the chaos unfolding in Mesopotamia – the Taliban which had indeed been ejected from Kabul was infiltrating provinces in the south and east of the country. What had started and continued from the 1990s as wars waged with air power, special forces and general 'shock and awe' rapidly turned into arenas of civil war, insurgency and overt and covert intervention by other powers such as Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iraq and Afghanistan

Events in both Iraq and Afghanistan did not play out according to the script. What were meant to be post-conflict state-building scenarios typified by gradual stabilization and democratic consolidation moved in the opposite direction. Iraq was beset by the bewildering specters of sectarian strife, death squads, beheadings, suicide attacks and wholesale human rights abuses (Ricks 2009). In essence, new wars had arrived in these two countries. Coalition forces found themselves up to the neck in the quicksand of post-modern conflict: the very scenario the West had tried its best to avoid in the 1990s. Of course, the 9/11 wars were also fuelled by resistance to perceived occupation, but this only served to heighten passions. Western forces, finding themselves embroiled in conflicts they did not fully understand, searched for solutions in works that had barely been dusted off since the 1970s; these were the classics of counter-insurgency. Drawing inspiration from these texts, but revising them for a very different age, the US Army's new Field Manual on Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, essentially took on the status of Holy Writ and General David Petraeus – one of its lead authors – assumed command (Ricks 2009).

The subsequent Iraq surge between 2006 and 2008 became, at the time, the exemplar of how to fight modern war (Gentile 2013). An important point is that whatever gains it achieved were ultimately offset by the political decision to withdraw troops completely in 2011. This gave the new leaders of Iraq space and opportunity to reverse many of the policies instituted during the surge, thus alienating the Sunni population. This in turn provided the fertile ground for the emergence and rise of the Islamic State (IS) group (Kilcullen 2014). This group established a grip on parts of Iraq and Syria as well as gaining a foothold in Afghanistan, Yemen and India. At the time, however, with the situation deteriorating throughout the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan, it was only a really a matter of time before the book and its prophet moved east to repeat the supposed successes of the Iraqi Sunni triangle.

Counter-insurgency is certainly not for the faint-hearted and the twin surges of Iraq in 2006 and Afghanistan in 2009–2010 suggested that the war-at-a-distance, risk-free paradigm of the 1990s had been discarded and 'real' war had returned. The contrast with the half-hearted efforts of the 1990s was palpable. The fighting in, for instance, the Iraqi city of Fallujah or Afghanistan's remote Korengal Valley was but the most stark manifestations of this return to visceral warfare (McCarthy and Beaumont 2004). These deployments underlined the renewed willingness of Western states to commit troops and put them in harm's way. This undoubtedly reflected the sense to which strategic interest, however considered, had found its way back into war post 9/11, as well as the extent to which, as Clausewitz might have had it, the passions of the American people had been aroused by the 9/11 attacks (Waldman 2012).

Yet 'nothing fails like success' and the Iraq model set the scene for the failures of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Not only were the counter-insurgency lessons from Iraq highly tentative, and as noted above, increasingly controversial,

the Afghanistan context presented deep challenges. First, many groups in Pakistan continued to provide extensive support as well as sanctuary to Afghan insurgents (M. Waldman 2010). Second, the regime the West was supporting in Kabul, and essentially attempting to win the Afghan people over to, was patently ineffective, corrupt and predatory. Considering that FM 3-24 had held that the primary objective of any counter-insurgency (COIN) operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government, the situation was not promising (US Army Marine Corps 2007). What we witnessed was the death of counter-insurgency.

The death of COIN

In Afghanistan, by 2005, the war was problematic on a number of counts and by the time that President Obama was elected there was a widespread view that the US was, if not losing that war, then certainly not winning it. The Taliban and associated insurgent groups had proved resilient, resourceful and operationally flexible. Indeed, it had become a 'smarter insurgent' force (O'Hanlon 2010). Rather than engaging in large-scale assaults on foreign forces, the targets were changed to smaller, more vulnerable enclaves. These tactics proved lethal with the widespread use of roadside bombs and suicide missions. Initial attacks were increasingly combined with the use of small arms. The attack in Kabul in April 2016 using a car bomb and gunmen was characteristic of the evolution of Taliban tactics. The Taliban in general eschewed attacks on civilians and concentrated attention on 'foreign' troops and Afghan security personnel.

The Obama response to the Taliban resurgence was to repeat what had seemed to be the success of the Iraqi surge with some 30,000 additional troops. Under General Stanley McChrystal the strategy was to implement a limited degree of state building, placing the onus on Afghan forces to eventually control territory in the south and the east of the country. Building institutions at the national and at the subnational level was designed primarily to win the population over to the government by providing civilians with enhanced security and better services. McChrystal also emphasized a strategy of limiting casualties in a bid to win over more of the population. This general was later sacked for his criticism of President Obama and policy in Afghanistan (*Rolling Stone* 2010)

Counter-insurgency in the Afghan theater, despite the much vaunted experience of the Americans and British, certainly proved unable to bring about easy victories. Indeed, after more than ten years, the decision to 'draw down' troops in Afghanistan demonstrated that the Western powers preferred not to prolong the presence of boots on the ground. The Obama surge had become highly contested and the political calculus began to change, due to election considerations, economic woes and mounting casualties sacrificed for increasingly uncertain objectives. This ambivalence became more pronounced after Bin Laden was assassinated by US Special Forces in May 2011 in Pakistan where he had been

hiding for a considerable period. The assassination raised a whole host of questions about the US–Pakistan relationship (Hersh 2015).

Under Obama there was a degree of fatigue at the ongoing and seemingly inconclusive war. With 100,000 troops deployed, fewer than half of Americans supported the war (CNN Politics 2011). Allies proved far from durable as casualties and costs mounted. While it is true that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan involved some 40 countries, by 2012, many had left or indicated the intention to do so.

It was clear that a genuine appetite for counter-insurgency had diminished. This was evidenced by the increasing reliance on force protection, a retreat into fortified outposts, the use of drones, special forces and private military corporations. It also became apparent that the very real gains the troop surge allowed in the south were offset by insurgent intensification in the east. The year 2010 in Afghanistan was an exceptionally bloody one for the United States alone, with 499 American dead, 5,182 wounded (Congressional Research Service 2011) and a notable increase in Afghan casualties (Pijhwok Afghan News 2012). The cost of the 9/11 wars, a decade after the terrorist attacks on the United States, was estimated to be $300 trillion dollars (*New York Times* 2011).

The perfect storm of contextual determinants weighing against the chances of successful execution of COIN was powerfully on display in Afghanistan. A distinct lack of political and strategic direction has meant that an overwhelmingly kinetic and militarized approach, guided by considerations of casualty avoidance, has served to intensify the conflict and undermine exploratory moves in relation to negotiations with the Taliban. The military dominated decision making and inevitably sought military solutions to problems that are overwhelmingly political in nature: as Paul Cornish argues, counter-insurgency 'must be political first, political last, political always' (Cornish 2009). Deriving from the almost universal military proclivity to seek solutions through technological elixirs and 'magic bullets', the military domination of policy and strategy led to an approach focused on attrition and material factors over more nuanced, sophisticated political and diplomatic solutions. The increasing reliance of the United States on drone technology remains a clear manifestation of a desire to resolve what remain essentially political issues with a short sharp fix that ignores not only some parts of international law but also the broader strategic picture. Yet drones proved beguiling.

Drone chic

Drones were initially used for reconnaissance purposes, but began to be increasingly used in combat missions after President Bush's Secret Memorandum of Notification authorized the CIA to kill members of al-Qaeda in what was rather quaintly termed 'anticipatory self-defence' (Millson and Herman 2015).

As P. W. Singer correctly emphasized, the introduction of unmanned systems to the battlefield doesn't change simply how we fight, but for the first time changes who fights at the most fundamental level. It transforms the very agent of war, rather than just its capabilities (Singer 2009: 330–333). The growing sophistication

of drone technology and the increasing use of it promote the assumption among many that drones are adding to the 'de-humanization of war', as Christopher Coker might put it (Coker 2013). What are the potential consequences of this? The first point is that in practice, drones are a very blunt weapon. Although 'our' forces may be safe from the tragedies of war, those in zones of conflict are not. As the growth in so-called 'collateral damage' as a result of US drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq and Syria has shown, the technology is not always good at sorting out the combatant wheat from the non-combatant chaff. When it fails to do so the political – as well as the human – consequences can be very severe (Caputi 2012).

Hence, it has been documented that in Iraq and Syria, between August 2014 and April 2016, a minimum of 2,569 civilians were killed by coalition air strikes (including drone and so-called precision strikes) in the fight against ISIS (AirWars 2016). Thus, Ignatieff's warning that we mis-describe war when '[w]e see war as a surgical scalpel and not a bloodstained sword' remains pertinent (Ignatieff 2001: 215).

With the end of the Cold War came a prevailing view that ideology had ended and at a deeper level it meant that politics was reduced to a form of moralism – a view associated with Michael Oakeshott. Nowhere, we argue, is this clearer than in the 'moralistic' nature of the drone debate – the prevailing wisdom is that not only does the use of drones keep 'boots off the ground' but at little cost to ourselves we can through this technology obliterate our foes.

Yet this hides a significant problem. The utilization of drones provides an excuse that, although wars may be 'lost' and original political objectives unfulfilled, somehow drones deliver what could not be accomplished through conventional war and the deployment of militaries – that is, the defeat of the enemy. But – and this is what needs further investigation – drones are *tactical* devices and cannot substitute for an overarching and coherent strategy. Sir Hew Strachan has for a number of years argued that there is a 'lost art' to strategy (Strachan 2013). We agree. The current challenge is that political leaders envisage drones as strategic – that is, as game-changing technology that can not only alter the battle space but almost alone achieve political ends.

So there is confusion here. Drones can indeed kill people in increasing numbers but do little to address the underlying causes of conflict or the attraction of the terrorist cause. In fact although it may be possible to decapitate the leadership of insurgent groups in the short term, as David Galula pragmatically pointed out many years ago, in most insurgent groups there are many others willing to take the place of those killed or assassinated precisely because the 'hearts and minds' of the people have not been won (Galula 2006). Indeed, alienation occurs and grievances proliferate. As perhaps one of the most serious commentators on war, Basil Liddell Hart, suggested, the humanization of war rested on the enlightened realization that the spread of death and destruction endangers the victor's own future prosperity and reputation (Danchev 1998). In more contemporary language – there is blowback (Shane 2015).

As David Kilcullen, one of the most astute contemporary commentators on counter-terrorism, pointed out in his testimony to Congress in April 2009, drone strikes often 'giv[e] rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists' (quoted in McManus 2009). In other words, he argues that the political costs of using the technology may well outweigh any military benefits. Thus, to put it charitably, even at the practical political level it would seem that drones are a double-edged sword. This issue is raised very obviously through the use of drones now, but will become more pressing still when the next generation of drones appears – which if reports are to be believed will be completely autonomous and not controlled by remote operators (Singer 2009).

In his book on 'post human war' in the twenty-first century, Coker (2013) points out that we are witnessing the slow elimination of the characteristics that have marked out the idea of the Warrior over the centuries and across cultures. The idea of the Warrior, he suggests (echoing a phrase of Michael Ignatieff) is inseparable from the idea of 'the Warrior's honor'. But the point is how to fight against insurgents and terrorists playing by a different set of rules in a range of complex environments that includes Western cities.

Blowback

Therefore, the confrontations with new wars over the last 20 years have been sobering. There is a palpable sense of exhaustion and frustration among policymakers and soldiers in the West; a situation not dissimilar to the compassion fatigue of the mid-1990s as Ignatieff phrased it (Ignatieff 1998). Combined with warnings of strategic overstretch and, in America, the existence of a bloated defense establishment sticking out like a sore thumb in an age of austerity, politicians and soldiers could do with a 'holiday from history' to rest and recuperate from a period of tireless activity. Yet, as the 1990s demonstrated, withdrawal and inaction are hardly options in an era when Western populations – confronted daily with media reports of conflict around the world – demand their representatives intervene to put a halt to injustice, suffering and violence. Perhaps this is true; however, a happy coincidence has been observed by some commentators keen to note the decline in the number of civil and ethnic conflicts over the last two decades. These trends are certainly to be welcomed and the optimism generated by renewed emphasis on conflict prevention among Western states and international institutions is perhaps warranted. If substate conflict and the need for Western intervention really is fading into obsolescence, the American global policeman and supporting retinue will not only be able to take pause to rest, but could soon be out of a job: a rosy outlook for cash-strapped governments, perhaps less so for beltway defense contractors and mercenaries.

However, a number of developments suggest the West cannot wave goodbye to the new wars this century just yet. The observed decline in the number of conflicts cannot hide the burning reality of the many new wars that rage unabated in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and that show little sign of imminent resolution. Instances of conflict in Kenya, Nigeria, and even more serious conflict in Syria,

are redolent of a world pervaded by political, ethnic and tribal tensions and the profound failures of the 9/11 wars to state build.

Furthermore, in a global age, the militant groups, criminal gangs and pirates operating on the fringes of the civilized world repeatedly confront Westerners in multiple contexts: crews on ships navigating the Indian Ocean, consultants in north-east Nigeria, aid workers in Somalia. The activities of pirates operating across thousands of miles of water not only pose a considerable threat to commercial activities globally but point to the ingenuity of these actors who target the material and human resources of wealthy states (Gettleman 2008). In this way, the West will constantly find itself having to respond to the effects of regional instability, civil conflict and state failure. Also, as articulated in various Western government policy papers with increasing amplitude over the last two decades, there has been a realization that these wars represent not only threats to the human security of local populations, but also compromise our own security and interests, whether in the form of creating breeding grounds for terrorist groups like IS, the supply of narcotics onto our streets, human trafficking, disruption of energy supplies, nuclear proliferation or more general as threats to regional and international security. The West is not immune, as we know from the attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, to these forms of conflict.

Predicaments

Counter-insurgency has been shown to be a hazardous military road to take. Western states will most likely find themselves embroiled in an era of clandestine war, special operations, counter-terrorism, secretive intelligence operations and proxy conflicts involving the training and equipping of foreign armed forces or rebel groups tentatively aligned with the West. The use of force for security reasons will likely be supplemented by humanitarian interventions characterized by precision bombing, no-fly zones, naval blockades and covert action, often followed by multilateral peace operations and security sector reform programs. These deployments will be accompanied by a wider array of counter-piracy, hostage-rescue, defense diplomacy and other smaller-scale missions. Putting such operations into practice will require investment in hugely expensive technologies, the management of a network of outposts and secure bases from which to house teams of trainers, advisors and specialists, as well as complex contractual arrangements with an array of private organizations.

Prominent events in recent years certainly point to the future: anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa; the special forces raid which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden; the US military advisors sent to assist in the hunt for Ugandan war criminal Joseph Kony; the failed British Special Boat Service hostage-rescue raid in northern Nigeria in March 2012; the expansion of America's Africa command and security sector programs throughout the continent; the continuing drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal regions; and much more. The difficulties encountered in some of these examples suggests this type of war by no means offers neat and easy answers to strategic problems.

Patterns of wars

These conclusions, we think, reflect not simply the legacy of two difficult, costly wars fought over the first decade of the twenty-first century. They are that, but more importantly they derive from deeper, more fundamental patterns that pre-date the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, wars which only served to con-solidate underlying realities. These trends are rooted in a certain attitude to war that is unique to liberal societies, and which has been compounded as a result of profound changes in modern popular attitudes to the use of force.

A dominant feature of modern Western culture is the profound 'debelliciza-tion' of society. The perception of war as a virtuous activity was gradually del-egitimized during the twentieth century and although war continued to fascinate, it was no longer deemed desirable. These attitudes were consolidated through post-war social trends of mass consumerism, shrinking family sizes, the decline of civic militarism, democratization, redefinitions of masculinity and the growth of an individualistic youth culture (Waldman 2007). Other cultural patterns include the growing concern for human rights and the emergence of prosperity as a dominant socio-political value. Such popular norms have increased restrictions on when and how war is waged.

Also, as militaries have become increasingly professionalized, societies have diminishing contact with them, thus further separating publics from the experi-ence of conflict, contributing to what has been termed a Revolution in Attitudes towards the Military (Black 2004). Advances in science and medicine have led to a rejection of fatalism and a greater reluctance to accept the hazards of con-flict: a fact embodied in the growing casualty sensitivity of Western publics, par-ticularly when the justice and probability of success are in question (Gelpi et al. 2005/2006), or when the war is one of choice rather than necessity. Further, even though war directly affects only small proportions of Western society in a post-conscription age, the media saturation of modern wars has meant the suffering of grieving families, of wounded soldiers and those who experience ongoing psy-chological problems on their return are relayed to millions in intimate, agonizing detail. So, any greater acceptance of military sacrifice due to professionalization has been offset by the media impact.

No doubt Western states will take to the battlefield again – especially where state interest appears to demand action on security grounds – hoping the use of large-scale force will solve whatever pressing problem they are confronted with. In some cases an Iraq-style campaign may serve objectives, but as Rupert Smith and others have pointed out, such campaigns are less and less likely in an age of war amongst the people (Smith 2007). Furthermore, given the trends outlined above, not only will the large-scale deployment of forces prove harder to effect but the pressures to find alternative solutions is only increas-ing. For most Western states, counter-insurgency wars like those fought in Iraq and Afghanistan will be rare and increasingly hard to countenance, justify and sustain. With low-level, irregular and 'small' wars (rather than national wars of interest) likely dominating the strategic landscape, the kind of large-scale wars

of the 2000s are not likely to be a regular feature of the twenty-first century. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has put it:

> historians will see 9/11 as the catalyst for the end of twentieth-century warfare: large-scale, multi-year deployments requiring conquest, control and long-term stabilisation and reconstruction of foreign territory … The second Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan are ending boots-on-the-ground wars of counter-insurgency and regime change. (Slaughter 2011)

New wars and New Cold Wars?

The terrorist attacks on Paris and Brussels by ISIS symbolized the effects of 'blowback'. Attacks on civilians engaged in normal activities by suicide bombers and gunmen brought in to cities in Europe what had in many ways become ordinary for those caught up in Iraq, Libya and Syria. The emergence of IS after the Iraq War and the establishment of a caliphate carved out of the Middle East has been profoundly shocking for citizens who wish war to be in the past. More importantly, the evidence of transnational fighters and supporters moving from advanced and sophisticated urban cities such as London into war zones have called into question much of the liberal democratic agenda such as multiculturalism. To reiterate a point made earlier in this chapter, although the end of the Cold War effectively saw off communism as a threat, religious sentiment of a radicalized type has proved attractive and effective at stoking conflict in the Middle East and in European states themselves. The attacks on Paris were as shocking and unexpected as the attacks of 9/11.

But there is something else happening to the great powers of Europe and across the Atlantic. At a time when war weariness is indeed a feature of life there is the possibility of a return of Cold War politics. Russia has proved itself since the turn of the century to be a revisionist power. The intervention in Georgia in 2008 was a prelude to the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Ukraine. Western responses have been largely ineffective and predicated upon avoiding military conflict. Sanctions and diplomacy are the preferred method of dealing with the great powers of Russia and China. Yet the ability of these methods of seeing off the challenges of these emerging powers is questionable at best. A new era of war beckons.

Guide to further reading

One of the best accounts on the consequences of 9/11 both militarily and politically is to be found in *The 9/11 Wars* (Burke 2011), while an impressive account of how al-Qaeda came to attack the United States is to be found in *The Looming Tower* (Wright 2006). For a detailed assessment of the conduct and command of the Western powers in Iraq see *The Gamble* (Ricks 2009). Perhaps the most

authoritative account of the impact of technology on future battlefields and the prospects for a revolution in military affairs is *Wired For War* (Singer 2009). To understand the complex nature of soldiering amongst the new wars of the 1990s, see *The Warrior's Honor* (Ignatieff 1998) and also *Blood and Belonging Journeys into the New Nationalism* (Ignatieff 1993). To really understand the complex nature of politics within Afghanistan see *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan* (Giustozzi 2009). For a scathing account of American failure in Afghanistan see Gian Gentile, *Wrong Turn* (Gentile 2013), while for predictions about the nature of future challenges and arenas of conflict in the coming century see Black 2004. For more on the drone debate see *Wired for War* (Singer 2009), *Virtuous Drones* (Kennedy and Rogers 2015) and for casualty statistics see (AirWars.org). Clausewitz's writings provide a steady objective lens through which to view all the complex contortions of contemporary war; for a clear exposition of his central theoretical device, see *War, Clausewitz and the Trinity* (Waldman 2012). On the rise of ISIS in Iraq see *Blood Year* (Kilcullen 2014).

Non-traditional Security and World Politics

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Introduction

Worldwide, people witness devastation caused by floods, earthquakes, storms, heatwaves and drought that affected 107 million people across 94 countries in 2014 alone (IFRC 2015). We see infectious disease outbreaks like Ebola in West Africa, which claimed the lives of 8,600 people in 2014 (IFRC 2015); the Fukushima triple disaster that claimed the lives of over 18,000 people in 2011 (McCurry 2015); the piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa peaking in 2007–2008; the continuing reality of human trafficking; and the impact of the food price crisis of 2007–2008. These crises create widespread political and economic instability in both the developed and developing worlds.

Crises like these continue to illustrate that security can no longer be limited to traditional concerns of maintaining and protecting national borders against external military intervention, but must also include non-traditional security (NTS) threats. These NTS threats are defined as challenges to the survival and well-being of societies that arise out of primarily non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, trafficking in persons, drug trafficking and transnational crime. These dangers are often transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive – political, economic and social – responses as well as the humanitarian use of military force (NTS-Asia, cited in Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006: 6). Necessarily, the study of NTS concerns goes beyond borders to focus on multiple levels of governance – local, non-state, state, regional and global – as sites of cooperation and positions of responsibility.

NTS issues are not new but understanding them as a security threat emerged in the post-Cold War era when global leaders acknowledged the multidimensional nature of security. Most notably, in 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released its annual report which identified human security as a concern for human life and dignity. This created new debates around the definition and limits of security and the resulting approach came to define much

of the 1990s with the United Nations (UN) and its agencies coordinating a large number of initiatives to address human security challenges the world over.

The 1994 UNDP Report identified four characteristics of human security: it is a universal concern, the components are interdependent, it is easier to achieve through early prevention, and it is people-centered. The report included seven categories which formed the main list of threats to human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP 1994). Emanating from the UNDP, the Human Security framework involves a more holistic and longer-term approach to security that focuses on the individual or societal level of analysis. Many scholars question the human security approach, arguing instead that the state should be the central unit of analysis in the international system and that the focus of security studies should be on 'deliberate threats (primarily, if not exclusively, of a military nature)' to the state, which allows, at most, only a limited broadening of the security concept (Alagappa 1998: 11 and 28). The development of the NTS concept bridges the divide between these competing conceptions of security. The approaches taken by scholars broadly fit within the paradigms of realism, liberalism and critical security studies. These three approaches often appear as a geopolitical, geo-strategic or state-centric approach; a human security approach; or a critical security approach.

This chapter is concerned with four selected NTS issues: infectious diseases, transnational crime, energy security and food security. However, this is not a comprehensive list of NTS issues, which also includes, for example, climate change and irregular migration. These issues are covered independently as chapters in their own right elsewhere in this volume. As this chapter will demonstrate, NTS issues are often linked to one another. For example, the use of arable farmland for biofuel production instead of crop cultivation may increase energy security, but may also negatively affect food security.

This chapter now turns to the four key NTS issues of infectious diseases, transnational crime, energy security and food security. Each section will assess the transformation of these issues into distinctive security threats and their impact on contemporary world politics. In particular, the sections will answer four key questions: (1) How can the NTS threat be distinguished from other features of world politics? (2) Why is it of particular salience? (3) How has its history shaped its contemporary form? (4) How can we make sense of the issue? Each section will conclude by examining the issue's dynamics and its future in world politics. Ultimately this investigation will highlight the dominant framing of an NTS issue to demonstrate the actors involved, the approaches taken to address it and the implications it has for how we rethink security in contemporary world politics.

Infectious diseases

The end of the Cold War saw the spread of neoliberal economic development and the further advancement of technology, which increased awareness of

current affairs around the world and brought a diverse range of issues to the global stage, making them appear closer in proximity and in real time. Advances in technology and the ease of travel and trade increased the movement of people and goods across the world, which heightened states' and societies' vulnerabilities to the spread of infectious diseases and the emergence of bio-terrorism. These vulnerabilities were particularly acute in developing countries where national sovereignty was closely guarded, state capacity was weak and there was an existential threat to societal well-being and the stability of the state. This falls within the developmental state approach that anchored national security on development (Beeson 2004).

The prominence of health security as a concept became particularly salient in the 2000s, but there are many other earlier cases of disease outbreaks affecting the security of states and societies. From the devastation of the great Aztec and Inca civilizations by smallpox introduced by the European settlers (Hopkins 1983 in Rushton 2016: 175) to the global pandemic of HIV/AIDS in the 1990s and early 2000s, the vulnerability of human society to disease seems to be a perennial experience. At its first meeting of the new millennium, the UN Security Council met to discuss the impact of AIDS on peace and security. Six months later, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1308, stressing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if not monitored, 'may pose a risk to stability and security' (McInnes 2006: 315).

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s the threat of infectious diseases gained prominence in security discourses in the West with many countries beginning to frame the spread of infectious diseases in national security terms (Davies 2008: 298). However, it was not until the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in Asia that health security came to prominence in its own right in world politics. SARS illustrated the weakness of the global health system and the vulnerability of increasingly globalized societies, particularly in Asia. In the aftermath of the SARS epidemic, the international regulatory response was to put a much greater emphasis on building the capacity of national surveillance and verification systems.

This global prominence of health security in the early 2000s prompted a shift towards a more cooperative approach among many states and organizations. Typical of this was the World Health Organization's (WHO's) decision to reorientate its strategy from 'health work' to 'global health security' (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2013: 15). This shift saw a move away from state-centric priorities to an international health security framework of standardized core capacities to prevent, or at the very least, minimize, the severity of an infectious disease epidemic (Churchill-Page 2007). Since the year 2000, several other infectious disease outbreaks have had implications worldwide besides the 2003 SARS epidemic.

In 2009, the A (H1N1) influenza virus epidemic affected almost all regions of the world. This was followed by the Haiti cholera outbreak in 2010–2011, which reminded the world of that disease's persistence and its very rapid transmission. More recently in 2013, the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa showed the dramatic impact such diseases can have on the state. The Ebola

virus affected workforces so badly that it curtailed the ability of government to carry out its core functions. It also showed how the response could disrupt societal relations when particular social, political, religious or ethnic groups were prioritized or discriminated against in receipt of treatment. In 2015, the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in South Korea demonstrated the interconnectivity between the Middle East and East Asia. With the increase in global travel, it became apparent that a transnational approach to NTS was needed as all these outbreaks were framed as potential or actual threats to global health security.

However, while infectious diseases are now firmly framed as global security threats, the number of deaths due to infectious diseases, including parasitic diseases and respiratory infections, fell from 12.1 million in 2000 to 9.5 million in 2012. Furthermore, the proportion of deaths due to infectious diseases fell from 23% to 17% (WHO 2015b). Likewise, with HIV/AIDS, there were an estimated 35.3 million people living with HIV worldwide in 2012. While this was an increase on previous years, it was due to more people receiving antiretroviral therapy. The number of new HIV infections in 2012 was 2.3 million, showing a 33% decline since 2001 (UNAIDS 2013). Linking the HIV/AIDS pandemic to security is controversial because some scholars argue that securitization allows states to prioritize funding for elites and militaries over vulnerable populations and further discourage efforts to normalize social perceptions of HIV/AIDS (Elbe 2006: 119). Yet, infectious diseases remain a major global health security concern for several reasons.

First, infectious diseases disproportionately affect younger people than do other diseases – an estimated 26% worldwide of years of life lost. This is calculated by using an average of the number of years someone would have lived had they not died prematurely (WHO 2006). Second, infectious diseases weigh more heavily on certain regions than others. In Africa they account for 50% of years of life lost compared to the Eastern Mediterranean where they account for 27%. The three most affected WHO regions account for 81% of all deaths and 89% of all years of life lost due to infectious and parasitic diseases worldwide (WHO 2015b).

Third, emerging infectious diseases – of which 60% are zoonotic, that is they have origins in animals but are transmitted to humans – impose a significant burden on both health systems and economies (WHO 2015b). This is of particular concern now interconnectivity between global economies means that there are increasing correlations with other NTS factors, such as irregular migration, climate change, population growth, and urbanization. Finally, the global health security threat of infectious diseases is compounded by increased antimicrobial resistance further challenging efforts to control them (WHO 2015b).

The emergence of health as an NTS issue over the past 30 years was consolidated when the direct causal link was made between infectious diseases and state and societal instability. During this time, HIV/AIDS, SARS, H1N1, cholera, MERS and Ebola outbreaks have highlighted both the causal links to state and societal stability and the transboundary nature of the threat, which raised the

profile of health into an NTS issue firmly in security discourse and on the global policy agenda as having a significant impact in world politics today.

The emergence of health security has not generated a uniform approach but rather two broad competing approaches. First, the geopolitical, geo-strategic or state-centric approach, which can be characterized as a health sovereignty approach, sees health security as a means to reassert national boundaries and to use the threat of infectious disease to impose strict border controls, as well as to empower security and military personnel to monitor and administer domestic control. Second, the global health security approach, which contests the health sovereignty approach and instead argues for the need for greater cooperation across and between different levels of global governance, the need to empower an international agency to regulate health security (in this case the WHO) and the need to build capacity at the national level for more effective infectious disease surveillance measures. Overall, the global health security approach remains the most salient in the security discourse on infectious diseases.

However, as an approach it fails to substantively address key challenges posed by critical security scholars in that it does not empower people and communities but rather allows for responsibility to be shirked by those in positions to administer better health security (or health work). Furthermore, the creation of unaccountable global institutions and the increase in technocratic approaches to real-world problems distances global institutions and the debates in world politics away from those they affect. This democratic deficit increases as outbreaks and responses become more complex. In sum, while infectious diseases are identified as an NTS issue, addressing this insecurity remains contested in world politics.

Transnational crime

Transnational crime has emerged as a key issue in world politics and is now firmly part of the global security dialogue as states and societies face irregular migration and maritime security threats among other issues. In 1974, the then United Nations Crime and Criminal Justice branch first used the term 'transnational crime' to refer to particular illegal acts that cross international borders. However, it was not until the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted in 2000 that an attempt was made to offer a more precise definition. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) notes in its definition that the Convention characterizes 'organized crime groups' most particularly by their profit-driven nature and the seriousness of the crime. The transnational element is broadly defined as an offence committed in more than one state, crimes in one state committed by groups that operate in more than one state, and crimes committed in one state that has substantial effects in another state (UNODC 2016). The convention mandated the UNODC to oversee the convention and its three protocols on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking of Firearms and came into force in 2003. Under this definition, the UN identified 18 crimes including:

> money laundering, illicit drug trafficking, corruption and bribery of public officials and of party official and elected representatives as defined in national legislation, infiltration of legal business, fraudulent bankruptcy, insurance fraud, computer crime, theft of intellectual property, illicit traffic in arms, terrorist activities, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy, hijacking on land, trafficking in persons, trade in human body parts, theft of art and cultural objects, environmental crime, and other offences committed by organized criminal groups.
> (Caballero-Anthony and Hangzo 2010: 1)

International conventions form part of the body of international law along with treaty law that are regarded as 'hard law', which contractually binds state signatories. This ensures that the contents of the convention are enforceable in those states and that those governments will bring their national legislation into line with the contents of the convention. As a result, the establishment of an international convention is regarded as a substantive measure to try to address an issue. The establishment of a UN Office signifies a mechanism through which to monitor and assist compliance with the convention and any protocols. Therefore, the presence of an international convention recognizes an issue as of global importance and one for the UN to address as a potential threat to global peace and security.

The UN Convention against Transnational Crime shows the severity of transnational crime, the need for international cooperation and its clear identity as a global NTS threat. Within the security and international relations IR discourse, there are two main approaches to combat transnational crime. The first and most dominant approach focuses on 'multi-crime groups of professional criminals', and the other focuses on the role of the 'illegal market'. The first approach is a more geopolitical or state-centric approach that focuses on law and order through empowering national institutions to implement laws within their own jurisdiction, and to cooperate with other national jurisdictions where necessary. The second approach focuses on the flow of people and the role of the market beyond the nation-state. It focuses on the movement of people and money around the world, which often pays scant regard to national boundaries. This approach is holistic in nature and looks at the root causes for the transnational criminal activity and attempts to address them through focusing on vulnerable communities (Caballero-Anthony and Hangzo 2010). While both approaches exist, just what it is that is being threatened by transnational crime remains contested. Indeed, critical security scholarship argues against further securitization or criminalization because it pushes people affected by the crime further into the black market.

Whichever of these approaches is taken, it is now widely recognized that transnational crime constitutes an NTS issue that affects human security and relations between states and societies in world politics. Trafficking in persons is one of the high-profile transnational crimes that has widespread public awareness. As the UNODC 2014 'Global Report on Trafficking in Persons' notes, the crime of people trafficking is a global phenomenon which affects every region in the world as countries constitute a country of origin, transit or destination for trafficked

persons. However, the report notes that richer countries attract trafficked persons from different regions, whereas poorer countries are mainly affected by internal or intra-regional trafficking flows (UNODC 2014: 7).

The two most common forms of trafficking in persons are for sexual exploitation and labor. In 2011, trafficking for sexual exploitation was estimated to be 53% and trafficking for labor purposes was estimated to be 40% of the total (UNODC 2014: 9). There is also an increasing trend in trafficking for other reasons such as the trafficking of children for armed combat, for petty crime or forced begging. These emerging areas of trafficking in persons vary from continent to continent around the world. Trafficking for sexual exploitation is the main form identified in Europe and Central Asia, whereas forced labor constitutes the main form in East Asia and the Pacific; in the Americas both forms of exploitation are identified on a near-equal basis (UNODC 2014: 9).

Since the UN Protocol against Trafficking in Persons came into effect in 2003, more than 90% of signatory countries have criminalized trafficking in persons. However, challenges remain as many of the countries that enacted legislation to combat trafficking in persons retain laws that are difficult to enforce through poor design or do not fund their law enforcement agencies adequately. Around 10% of signatory states still lack the necessary legislation to combat trafficking in persons, which leaves some two billion people without the protection outlined in the UN Protocol (UNODC 2014: 12).

For those with national legislation, only four in 10 countries reported 10 or more annual convictions, and 15% reported no convictions at all (UNODC 2014: 13). Over the past decade three types of traffickers have begun to emerge: small local operators, medium sub-regional operators and large transregional operators (UNODC 2014: 14). These operations reflect the dynamics of trafficking in persons from the local to national, sub-regional and global levels, which consequently identifies transnational crime as multilevel in nature and as a significant challenge to national and international institutions.

Sea piracy constitutes a second key transnational crime and NTS issue because the threat is from a non-state actor outside a state's territory. Sea piracy threatens maritime security by jeopardizing the safety and well-being of seafarers, as well as the security of commerce and navigation. The results of this threat include: loss of life, physical harm or hostage-taking of seafarers, disruptions to commerce and navigation, financial losses to ship owners, increased insurance premiums and security costs, increased costs to consumers and producers, and damage to the marine environment (UNOCD 2012). The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime further covers maritime crime that includes 'the use of the high seas to perpetrate transnational organized crimes such as smuggling of persons or illicit substances' (UNODC 2015). As over 90% of global trade is carried by sea, the economic effects are particularly significant. While the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime covers maritime crime, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982 and came into force in 1996, established a comprehensive legal regime covering all aspects of the seas and oceans. This convention illustrates the transnational dynamic of the global security architecture and the global commons of the high seas. As the high seas

fall outside the bounds of the international state system it is a notable example of where international cooperation is needed in world politics.

The different approaches to maritime security reflect the varied threat levels that sea piracy poses to international peace and security. The militarized or traditional security approach faces notable obstacles in the lack of sufficient enforcement mechanisms for intervening forces. The transnational dynamic is further illustrated through the development of a regional piracy prosecution model in the Indian Ocean with assistance from UNODC, in response to the high levels of piracy off the Horn of Africa in 2007–2008. For example, this model sees the development of national legislation criminalizing sea piracy and allows prosecuting states to formalize transfer agreements with naval forces who operate in the Indian Ocean such as Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius and the Seychelles and are willing to prosecute sea piracy cases (UNODC 2015). This has seen sea piracy around the Horn of Africa drop significantly from 237 incidents in 2011 to 15 in 2013 (IMB 2015). However, the multidimensional approach taken by interested states saw an additional focus on capacity-building activities in regional states like Somalia, which accounted for the drop in attacks. Thus, a transnational approach that focuses strategies at different levels of governance appears to be particularly effective at managing this NTS issue.

The transnational approach recognized not only that traditional enforcement measures needed to be put in place but also that sea piracy was a symptom of the breakdown of Somalia's political system and that there was a need to develop state capacity (World Bank 2013). The first six months of 2015 saw no reported sea piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia, or the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea or Arabian Sea. However, sea pirate attacks in Southeast Asia reached a 12-year high in the same period. Indonesia accounted for 54 incidents but of a markedly different nature. Rather than the high-profile sea piracy seen in the Indian Ocean, Indonesian attacks accounted for low-scale piracy where ships were boarded and the crew were held at knife point to gain access to money or goods (Johnson 2015). The fluctuations in the number and scale of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa and in Southeast Asia illustrate the need to develop holistic responses to maritime security, reinforcing the need for a cooperative and multi-layered approach to find a sustainable solution.

Through the examples of trafficking in persons and sea piracy, it is evident that transnational crime does pose a NTS threat to global peace and security. However, the case of sea piracy also illustrated the role of the military in NTS where surge and enforcement capacity is utilized in the absence of political security in Somalia. While the source of the security threat was non-military in nature, as a non-state armed actor pirates pose a significant direct NTS threat to both seafarers and commercial activity.

Energy security

Nation-states have long framed energy as a security issue. However, energy understood from an NTS perspective broadens the understanding of energy

security to include the implications for society and people. Historically, many wars have been fought between states over access to natural resources to fuel economic development. However, the geopolitical or state-centric approach often overlooks the attempts to influence just what it is that constitutes energy security. This raises the question: for whom has energy been securitized? The securitization of energy has a long history of being framed solely as a geo-political or statist security issue (Hashimoto and Bozhilova 2013). Yet understanding energy as an NTS issue and applying a transnational approach is much more recent. Indeed, in the 1994 UNDP Report on New Dimensions of Security, energy security, like health security, is absent from the conceptualization of human security. However, the construction of energy security as an NTS issue uncovers the implications it has for both state and society. It offers an alternative approach to energy security to the geopolitical, geo-strategic or state-centric approach.

Given the location of the birth of human security in the UNDP, it is firmly linked to the notion of sustainable development. As such, this alternative understanding of energy security seeks to address more fundamental questions over the longer-term challenges to more equitable energy access. To better understand the emergence of energy security as an NTS issue this section assesses two international institutions established to regulate energy.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) was established in 1974 'to help countries coordinate a collective response to major disruptions in the supply of oil such as the crisis of 1973–1974' (Scott 1994). This global institution falls outside of the UN system and is 'an autonomous organisation that examines the full spectrum of energy issues and advocates policies that will enhance reliability, affordability and sustainability of energy in its 29 member countries and beyond' (Scott 1994). Even more tellingly about the origins of the geo-strategic approach to energy security, the membership of the organization is limited to developed countries that can demonstrate they are net oil importers that have reserves of 90 days of the previous year's average net oil imports to which the government has immediate access if needed.

Likewise, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), another international institution created in 1957 'in response to the deep fears and expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy'. Again, while it has a larger membership than IEA with 81 member countries which approved the IAEA Statute in 1956, it falls outside of the UN system and the realm of global governance as seen through the UN. Both these institutions were created out of a sense of state insecurity, in the first instance felt by developed countries that were dependent on oil imports to maintain their economy and that faced economic collapse should access dry up. In the second instance, it was felt by countries who were insecure about the dual use of the development of nuclear energy for both civilian and military purposes, or, simply put, the development of nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons.

However, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) published 'Our Common Future' in 1987, also known as the Brundtland Report, in which the term 'sustainable development' was coined

to mean development that meets today's needs without compromising future generations to meet their own needs (WCED 1987). It was at this point that the understanding of energy security broadened and actors began to offer a non-traditional approach by linking energy to other 'new' security issues. Then five years later the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) committed signatories to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, based on the premise that global warming exists and man-made CO_2 emissions caused it. It was followed two years later with the 1994 UNDP Report that launched the concept of human security. The UNDP Report identified the environmental security threat of nuclear disasters like the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, which saw an explosion and fire at the nuclear power plant release large quantities of radioactive particles into the atmosphere and spread over Europe and the Western USSR with 31 deaths during the accident and longer-term effects still unclear.

While the security threat posed by nuclear energy was acute, the global movement to address climate change identified a chronic energy security threat brought on by states' and societies' dependence on fossil fuels. Throughout the 1990s the link between energy security and environmental security became interdependent through sustainable development. However, while the impact of the use of fossil fuels on environmental security became clearer the sustainable development debate continued. There was reluctance by developing states to forgo what they saw as their sovereign right to economic development that the developed world had already achieved. Many developing states saw the pursuit of alternative energy sources to fuel their economies as inadequate to achieve their development goals. Indeed, the ongoing fractious negotiations within the UNFCCC continue today (see Gordon and Paterson, Chapter 10). The most recent COP-21 meeting held in Paris, 2015, reached agreement after long negotiations 'to set a goal to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius and to drive efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels' (UNFCCC 2015). This global agreement can only be achieved at the national level assisted by multilateral arrangements, once again highlighting the need for a transnational approach.

In Southeast Asia, electricity generation by source in 2011 was gas 44%, coal 32%, renewables (hydro, geothermal, bioenergy and others) 14% and oil 10%. If the current plans proceed, then by 2035 this regional energy mix will have altered to coal 48%, gas 28%, renewables (hydro, geothermal, bioenergy and others) 20%, oil 2% and nuclear 2% (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2014: 1). Key questions now remain unanswered as to whether plans such as these in the developing world will meet the obligations agreed at COP-21 in Paris.

As states and societies pursue energy security, its interdependence with other security issues, most notably here with environmental security, and its transnational dimension will shape the debate on energy security in world politics. In concurrence with other NTS issues, the dominant approaches to energy security revolve around geopolitical, geo-strategic or state-centric and transnational approaches. Realist arguments are often articulated as energy independence in contrast to the more global security or liberal internationalist approach, which

promotes energy interdependence, interdependence with other security issues and the need for international cooperation (Luft and Korin 2009).

However, the critical approach to security unpacks these arguments to better understand whose energy security is being pursued and at what cost to whom. It is with this approach that the researcher uncovers the societal impact of energy security and identifies who the main beneficiaries are of particular energy security practices. In the coming months and years, the debates over the sustainability of energy security will continue but it is clear from the current global climate of world politics that energy security has emerged into the discourse as a NTS issue. Energy security has garnered particular salience in contemporary world politics with its association with sustainable development and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Food security

Food emerged as a NTS issue in the aftermath of the Cold War and was identified as one of the seven pillars of human security by the 1994 UNDP Report New Dimensions in Security. In the 1994 Report, Mahbub ul Haq defined food security as 'the means for all people at all times to have both physical and economic access to basic food' and that food security is an entitlement (UNDP 1994: 27). Within the human security definition, food security is an intrinsic but not sufficient condition of security because of its universal and interdependent nature. Ul Haq further pointed out in the 1994 report that the overall availability of food in the world is not the problem; rather the problem is often poor distribution and lack of purchasing power by people and communities (UNDP 1994: 27). This understanding of food security focuses on the security of households and social groups using the individual as the principal level of analysis.

However, the substantive meaning of food security emerged after the Second World War with the establishment of the UN system. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) was established in 1945 as a permanent organization for food and agricultural development. Subsequently, in 1960 US President Dwight Eisenhower proposed to the UN General Assembly that the UN establish a mechanism to provide food aid. As a result, in 1963 the World Food Programme (WFP) was also established as part of the UN system.

Initially established for three years, the WFP began operations immediately with three significant missions. It began work in the aftermath of the 1962 Buin Zahra earthquake in Iran, which killed over 12,000 people, injured over 2,500 people and made over 21,000 houses uninhabitable (USGS 2009). This was followed by Tropical Storm Harriet in October 1962 that caused a landfall in Thailand, killed over 800 people and displaced over 10,000 people (Vongvisessomjai 2009: 216). Concurrently, the WFP was also tasked with assisting a newly independent Algeria which was resettling five million refugees (WFP 2016). All three mirrored the acute strand of food security, while chronic issues of food security were overseen by the FAO.

However, it was not until 1994 that the WFP executive board agreed a mission statement that reflected its role to provide food aid as one of the many instruments 'to promote food security'. Subsequently, in 1999, the executive board resolved to support development as well as emergency activities, which operationalized the two human security foundational components of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' for the organization.

Alongside the WFP, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was established by the UN in 1977 as a major outcome of the 1974 World Food Conference to finance agricultural development projects primarily for food production in developing countries. The conference also recognized that famine was not solely created by inadequate food production but was rather a consequence of structural problems relating to poverty and recommended adoption of an international undertaking on food security in the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition (UN 1974).

While the ground was laid for the global governance of food security at the UN, food security per se was not fully defined until the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome, Italy, which resolved that food security was a condition 'when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and health life' (FAO 2006). The FAO definition therefore may be interpreted to mean that food security can only be achieved if the three basic dimensions of: (1) food availability; (2) physical and economic access to food; and (3) food utilization (diversity or nutritional value) are simultaneously met in an effort to provide stability, a term often used independently as a unifying dimension by the FAO (Teng and Lassa 2016: 116). While this approach dominates the food security discourse in world politics, it is by no means alone.

A geopolitical, geo-strategic or state-centric approach to food security focuses on the 'strategies of powerful interests, including states, to secure and maximise their control over food supplies and food producing resources' (Sheppard 2012: 195). It is in this sense that many actors utilize the language of food security to ensure their continued benefit at the expense of others. In the case of countries, a government may take control over arable land from the local owners or tenant farmers in a nation-wide effort to become food independent or in the pursuit of sovereignty over national food security. Government intervention in the use of farmland is not limited to a focus on particular foods but also other products like biofuel as part of an effort to alter its national energy mix.

This may take the form of nationalization of farmlands or establishment of particular economic zones reserved for specialist producers in the name of attaining food security. Likewise, multinational corporations also use the language of food security which range from corporatization and amalgamation of farmlands to the pursuit of revenues from patented inputs (Shepherd 2012: 198). One response was the food sovereignty approach that came from civil society groups like La Via Campesina, which argues for people to take control over their own food and its provenance, with a focus on localization and democratic empowerment (Shepherd 2012: 198; Lassa 2014). However, like food security before it, this

approach's terms can be appropriated and articulated by governments or other powerful actors for their own interest. This has taken place in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, where most recently the newly elected Indonesian President Joko Widowo hailed Indonesia's food sovereignty which would guarantee it produces enough rice of its own to ensure it is not dependent on rice imports (Lassa and Shrestha 2014), no matter how impractical, after the 2007–2008 Food Price Crisis experience.

In the 2007–2008 Food Price Crisis, food prices increased by 1.5% a month and saw the number of people with chronic hunger in the world rise by an estimated 75 million. This brought the number of undernourished people to a staggering 923 million mostly in the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific (FAO in Teng and Lassa 2016). As a result, a series of food riots broke out in over 40 countries which demonstrated the acute impacts that chronic food insecurity can create for states and societies (Kuntjoro et al. 2013). The Food Price Crisis of 2007–2008 also highlighted the high levels of interdependence of world food trade and the absence of substantive cooperative arrangements to ensure food access and supply. It also demonstrated the impact of other NTS issues on food security such as the impact of biofuels on food production in the developing world. In the Asia-Pacific, these challenges are found in the perpetuation of agrarian mythologies, the push back against economic integration of rice markets, and regulatory barriers to adopting GM crops (Ewing 2013). Like other NTS issues, food security is appropriated by various actors for its own ends. While this contestation continues, it is roundly accepted that food security is an important NTS issue for states and societies and is now an important part of world politics.

Conclusion

Over the past 50 years, NTS issues have emerged to stake out an important part of the broader policy and scholarly debate about security. NTS is a key concept to understand where climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, trafficking in persons, drug trafficking and transnational crime impact the security of states and societies. This chapter has identified key bids and influences on the development and priority given to NTS in global debates on security, and the importance of assessing security at multiple levels of analysis (local, non-state, state, regional and global).

While there are different motivations for particular issues to become NTS threats, this chapter has focused on identifying the three broad approaches that broadly fit within the paradigms of realism, liberalism and critical security studies. These three often take a geopolitical or state-centric approach; a human security approach; or a critical security approach. Within each particular debate there are emerging frames that signify particular leanings, such as food sovereignty or food security, distinguishing the realists from the liberals.

However, it is not always clear-cut. In this particular case, for example, food sovereignty emerged as a response to global neoliberal policies as a means to empower farmers and others who lost out to multinational corporations. The term has subsequently been appropriated by governments in developing countries to justify nationalistic policies to 'rally around the flag' rather than empower their farmers. It is therefore important to reflect on who is using what term and for what ends, if we are to better understand why and how particular issues emerge on to the security agenda. As we approach the 2020s we will undoubtedly see the appropriation of more security terms for different ends. It is therefore incumbent upon us to question and investigate the motivations and debates between different actors if we are to gain a better grasp of NTS issues in world politics.

Guide to further reading

Since the beginning of the new millennium, NTS studies has emerged as an area of scholarship. In 2006, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Amitav Acharya and Ralf Emmers edited a volume titled *Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation* published by Ashgate (London), which provides a comprehensive analysis of the security environment in Asia but importantly focuses on the development of NTS challenges. As the field developed, a network of think tanks and scholars in Asia came together to form the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security (NTS-Asia) with funding from the Ford Foundation. Its website (http://rsis-ntsasia.org/) provides a useful database of research articles and policy think pieces on NTS issues. For more recent critical scholarship on NTS, Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones wrote *Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation* published by Cambridge University Press in 2015. For more current affairs on particular NTS issues, there is a wealth of reports and articles on IRIN (www.irinnews.org) which provides coverage of emergency events in development. Other useful resources include official government documents like the *Findings from Select Federal Reports: The National Security Implications of a Changing Climate* published by the US White House in May 2015. Given the cross-cutting nature of NTS studies, many of the leading International Relations and Security Studies journals cover the subject area but in particular *Asian Survey, Cooperation and Conflict, International Studies Quarterly*, *Pacific Review* and *Security Dialogue* have published notable articles on NTS.

Chapter 4

Global Terrorism

ANDREW PHILLIPS

On September 11, 2001, history resumed. A mere 12 years earlier, the rubble of the Berlin wall had seemed to mark a grand historical terminus. With communism following fascism into oblivion, political theorist Francis Fukuyama speculated about the possible 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1989), with the defeat of America's last remaining totalitarian adversary supposedly heralding capitalist democracies' universal triumph. But by 2001, the World Trade Center's ruins invited a far darker assessment of history's course. On 9/11, 19 hijackers exploited the very openness and technological sophistication of liberal societies to inflict more destruction on the US mainland than had any of America's state-based adversaries in the twentieth century. The events of 9/11 immediately hastened a profound transformation in the foreign policies of the US and its closest allies. Dismissed by many as a second-order concern in the 1990s, since 9/11 global terrorism is now recognized as one of the most potent threats to international security. In particular, the failure of the 'Arab Spring' and the rise of the Islamic State (IS) have catapulted global jihadist terrorism to renewed prominence, highlighting its status as an especially enduring, virulent and resilient threat to international order. The nature of the global terrorist threat, its historical evolution, contemporary import and prospective significance, form the subjects of this chapter.

Global terrorism defined

I define terrorism as acts of violence (or threats of violence) that deliberately target non-combatants to advance perpetrators' political goals. Terrorism is a form of compellence, whereby terrorists seek to leverage the distress evoked by indiscriminate violence against non-combatants to extort changes in their adversaries' conduct. Terrorism can refer to the activities of state as well as non-state actors, as demonstrated in the 'terror bombing' of civilian population centers both sides undertook in World War II to compel their opponents to sue for peace. In its contemporary usage, however, terrorism typically refers to actions undertaken by non-state actors, for example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA's) use of terrorism in the British Isles to compel London to acquiesce to the six counties' integration into the Republic of Ireland.

Terrorism is intentionally provocative in transgressing moral and legal norms preserving non-combatant immunity. But it is almost always driven by actors pursuing coherent political goals. As such, terrorism is a form of violent 'political communication' (Wight 2015: 3). It is distinct from other forms of contention, such as civil disobedience, in its calculated challenge to the state's attempt to maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence (Wight 2015: 5). It is also distinguishable from commercially motivated forms of non-state international violence, such as piracy, mercenarism and transnational organized crime, in its explicitly political motivations.

Terrorism is above all else a coercive 'critique of existing political arrangements' (Wight 2015: 3), which harnesses spectacular atrocities against non-combatants both to communicate grievances and also to coerce concessions from political opponents. While frequently employed in conjunction with other forms of organized violence, terrorism is additionally distinguishable from both conventional warfare and guerrilla warfare. Terrorism's frequent characterization as a 'weapon of the weak' captures the truth that terrorism is most often embraced by those who have no possibility of prevailing against their opponents in a conventional war (Crenshaw 1981: 387). From the Napoleonic revolution in warfare onwards, state actors have sought victory either through a decisive battle of annihilation (Bond 1996: 43) or by relentless attrition (Gray 2007: 81). Both strategies give advantage to protagonists endowed with great material strength. Conversely, terrorism relies on strategies of provocation, polarization and exhaustion. Atrocities aim to goad governments into disproportionate responses to terrorist violence; to polarize populations into pro- and anti-government factions; and eventually to exhaust governments into capitulating to the terrorists' demands (Crenshaw 1981: 387; Harmon 2001: 44).

In its emphasis on corroding the enemy's will to resist through protracted armed struggle, terrorism shares affinities with guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, terrorism remains distinguishable from guerrilla warfare by its disproportionate reliance on highly publicized atrocities to influence target audiences. Guerrilla warfare routinely involves the cultivation of a mass base of popular support in 'liberated' rural base areas and the incremental expansion of guerrillas' geographic reach and popular appeal over time, with victory expected to materialize once the guerrillas secure sufficient mass support and military wherewithal to defeat government forces in conventional combat (Hoffman 2002: 22). Conversely, terrorists typically try to exploit the anonymity of urban environments and the opportunities for publicity that mass media offers to perpetrate shocking acts of 'propaganda by the deed'. In undertaking high-visibility acts of violence such as hijacking airliners, bombing public places or assassinating public officials, terrorists hope to dramatize governmental impotence, intimidate rival ethnic or religious communities, and energize popular support behind their cause (Hoffman 2002: 20). The urban terrorist and the rural-based guerrilla thus embody different styles of asymmetric warfare. They employ different strategies to mobilize popular support. And terrorists accord far great prominence to highly publicized atrocities as a means of communicating grievances and influencing

allies and adversaries. In practice, however, these forms of violence have historically overlapped to a strong degree, as recently evident in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Finally, any definitional overview of terrorism must acknowledge its increasingly transnational character under conditions of globalization (Cronin 2002/2003). As transportation and communication technologies have facilitated transnational flows of money, *materiel*, people and ideas, a greater proportion of terrorist activities have acquired a global dimension. Separatists with geographically limited agendas such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) thus made extensive use of diaspora financing in the 1990s, while prosecuting insurgencies that remained predominantly confined to their homeland (Gunaratna 2003: 208). The increasing ease with which locally oriented terrorists have been able to access transnational support networks has considerably increased their resilience in the face of government repression (Adamson 2005: 33). Nevertheless, it has been terrorists such as al-Qaeda and IS, which are global not only in their mobilization of resources, but also in their choice of targets and in the scope of their political ambitions, that have aroused the greatest public consternation. Consequently, I focus mainly on this form of global terrorism for the rest of this chapter.

The historical evolution of global terrorism

Far from emerging only with the Cold War's end, global terrorism has existed from at least the last quarter of the nineteenth century. A consideration of David Rapoport's four waves of 'rebel terror' (Rapoport 2001) illustrates this point. Global terrorism's origins can be traced to the anarchist terrorism that convulsed Western Europe, North America and Tsarist Russia from 1880 to 1914 (Rapoport 2001: 419). Facilitated by factors as diverse as the invention of dynamite, the rise of mass circulation newspapers and the wrenching social changes accompanying rapid industrialization, the anarchists' campaign of violence marked the Western public's first sustained exposure to modern terrorism. While insignificant by today's standards, the casualties anarchists inflicted in venues as diverse as cafés, parliaments, theaters and stock exchanges terrified the middle classes (Jensen 2004: 135). The resulting scapegoating of immigrant communities on the basis of largely imagined international anarchist conspiracies provided a foretaste of the polarizing effects of terrorism that would recur in subsequent decades (Jensen 2004: 143).

The anarchist wave of terrorism sputtered into history after World War I, but was succeeded by a wave of anti-colonial terrorism that spanned the twentieth century's middle decades. Unlike anarchist terrorists, who fought to overturn all formal systems of government, anti-colonial terrorists sought the more modest goal of winning national self-determination in territories then subject to foreign rule. While terrorism featured in various wars of decolonization in Africa and Asia, it was in the Middle East that terrorism featured most prominently, playing

a critical role in the National Liberation Front's (NLF) successful campaign for Algerian independence, and in the Palestinians' quest for an independent state. Of all the exponents of anti-colonial terrorism, the Palestinians were the most active globally, exploiting the enhanced mobility provided by international air travel and the propaganda opportunities provided by television to fight Israel on a global stage (Hoffman 1998: 67). The murder of 11 Israeli athletes by Black September at the Munich Olympics in 1972 provided the most notorious testament to the effectiveness of this new form of warfare. Global revulsion at the terrorists' atrocities notwithstanding, the Munich massacre catapulted the Palestinian cause to worldwide prominence, and ultimately yielded Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) the prize of widespread diplomatic recognition as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people (Hoffman 1998: 75).

Reflecting the strength of anti-colonial sentiment generally and the contentious nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict specifically, anti-colonial terrorism failed to generate a coordinated response from the international community. Contrarily, the third wave of terror, which struck Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, spurred the development of wide-ranging counter-terrorism measures that bear comparison with analogous initiatives that have developed globally since 9/11. Drawing tactical inspiration from the Palestinians and ideological inspiration from Mao and Lenin, extreme Leftist terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Group and the Italian Red Brigades perpetrated a series of hijackings, kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations from the late 1960s (Rapoport 2001: 421). Hoping to expel the American military presence in Western Europe and to overturn capitalism, the chief legacy of these terrorists was rather to inadvertently spur on enhanced international counter-terrorism cooperation. Like their anarchist predecessors, the radicals of the 1960s and 1970s underestimated the resilience of the established order while overestimating the transformative potential of 'propaganda by the deed' (Hoffman 1998: 83).

The fourth wave of terror dates from the late 1970s, and differs from its predecessors by dint of its religious-ideological hue. The origins of global jihadist terrorism lie in an ongoing crisis of governmental legitimacy that began to engulf large swathes of the Islamic world in the 1970s and 1980s (Doran 2002: 27). During this period, popular frustration mounted towards dictatorships such as that of Anwar Sadat in Egypt and Zia al Huq in Pakistan. These and other repressive regimes had failed to meet their citizens' aspirations, and had become reliant on the US for regime security (Clarke 2004: 36–39; Bronson 2006: 125–128). This crisis of legitimacy coincided with the growth of US involvement in the Greater Middle East to fill the power vacuum created by Britain's post-1968 withdrawal. It also coincided with the growth of politically engaged forms of religious fundamentalism in the Islamic world, a trend that accelerated in 1979 with the Islamic revolution in Iran and the onset of the anti-Soviet *jihad* following the Red Army's invasion of Afghanistan (Kepel 2003: 93–95).

Global jihadist terrorism thus emerged out of the intersection of localized crises of legitimacy, increasing superpower involvement in the Muslim world and the contemporaneous rise of politicized forms of Islamic identity. Their

worldviews forged in the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, jihadists such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri beheld a global Islamic community (or *ummah*) being victimized by apostate local tyrants (the 'near' enemy) ruling at the behest of their infidel Western sponsors (the 'far' enemy). For bin Laden and others, the emancipation of the *ummah* could come only once the tyrants had been overthrown and their Western sponsors ejected from Muslim lands (Doran 2002: 31–33). This would permit the destruction of Israel (the 'Zionist entity') and the unification of the *ummah* under the banner of a global caliphate ruled by *sharia* law (al-Zawahiri 2005).

To this end, al-Qaeda from the 1990s launched a series of terrorist attacks aimed at goading the West into an unwinnable war that would precipitate the collapse of its 'apostate' clients throughout the Muslim world. These provocations eventually succeeded in hastening the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Thereafter, al-Qaeda's subsequent efforts to commandeer local insurgencies met with limited immediate success. But the Middle East's later descent into chaos following the failure of the 'Arab Spring' gave global jihadists a lease of new life. In particular, IS has combined techniques of conventional and guerrilla warfare with terrorism to build an embryonic caliphate across swathes of Iraq and Syria. This has generated a qualitatively different threat to al-Qaeda, which remains depleted but far from defunct. The contemporary significance of the global jihadist threat, and its prospective implications for international order, form the focus for the remaining discussion.

The contemporary significance of global terrorism

The post-9/11 decade

The 9/11 attacks imbued global terrorism with a historically unprecedented importance. In the years immediately following the attacks, the struggle against jihadist terrorism emerged as a dominant feature of world politics, characterized by a contradictory mixture of international cooperation and confrontation. On the one hand, the immediate post-9/11 period saw a flurry of initiatives aimed at suppressing the threats posed by the entwined challenges of global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Heupel 2008: 8). In contrast to its earlier lackadaisical efforts to curb global terrorism, the United Nations Security Council swiftly passed resolutions imposing binding obligations on member states to refrain from providing material sponsorship to terrorists (Rosand 2003: 334). Parallel to this prohibition, the Security Council also imposed positive duties to prevent terrorists from either acquiring WMD or using member states' territory for purposes of either sanctuary or transit (Heupel 2008: 14). With the codification of these norms and the establishment of standing organizations within the UN (e.g. the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the 1540 Committee) to monitor compliance and assist member states in meeting their obligations, the international community's capacity to resist global terrorism was significantly strengthened.

The system-strengthening initiatives sketched above were spearheaded by the US, but were overshadowed by the more confrontational and revolutionary strand of American foreign policy that also emerged after 9/11. Seized by the urgency of the terrorist challenge and exasperated by the perceived inadequacy of existing collective security institutions, the Bush Administration embraced a strongly uni-lateralist foreign policy agenda after 9/11, proclaiming the need for pre-emptive strikes and 'regime change' as necessary expedients to prevent the uncontrolled spread of WMD to both 'rogue' states and terrorists (National Security Strategy 2002: 15). The endorsement of preventive war in particular aroused alarm inter-nationally, given that it dovetailed with pre-existing neoconservative aspirations to indefinitely preserve America's status as the world's only superpower. More controversial still were attempts to 'drain the swamp' of sentiment for jihadist terrorism through the promotion of a 'forward strategy of freedom' in the Middle East. This strategy of armed democracy promotion reached its apogee with the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, a gambit that perversely reinvigorated the global jihadist movement (National Intelligence Estimate 2006: 2), while simultaneously absorbing American attention for the remainder of the Bush Administration.

In the short term, the Iraq invasion significantly increased strains between the US and many of its traditional Western European and Middle Eastern allies. Europeans fretted about the dangerous precedent that they saw being established with the Iraq invasion, which had proceeded without the express consent of the UN Security Council (Gordon and Shapiro 2004: 170). Middle Eastern allies such as Saudi Arabia meanwhile opposed the invasion, both due to an understandable wariness regarding the Administration's democracy promotion agenda, and also on the basis of prescient fears of the war's potential to destabilize the Middle East and further radicalize domestic Islamist dissidents (Record 2004: 94). By contrast, China made no concerted effort to thwart American plans in Iraq, rather capitalizing on the post 9/11 rapprochement between the two countries to continue its 'peaceful rise' (Gries 2005: 402). Its opposition to the Iraq War notwithstand-ing, Russia's relations with the US also improved momentarily after 9/11 (Herd and Akerman 2002: 358), with mass casualty attacks by Chechen separatists in Moscow (2002) and Beslan (2004) reinforcing perceptions of a shared interest in suppressing Islamist terrorism in all its forms.

Global terrorism's impact on world politics after 9/11 was thus decisively influenced by the reactions that al-Qaeda's provocation yielded from the US, and by the responses that these reactions in turn elicited from other countries. In the short term, the revolutionary turn in US foreign policy strained its traditional alliances, while counter-terrorist concerns provided a focal point for coopera-tion with countries such as Russia and China that the Bush Administration had formerly seen as strategic competitors. But while counter-terrorism concerns lost none of their urgency during the Administration's second term, by then older pat-terns of cooperation and rivalry had begun to re-assert themselves. While most of America's NATO allies remained aloof from the Iraq War, mass casualty attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) as well as numerous foiled terror plots in Germany (2001, 2007), Britain (2006 and 2007) and elsewhere highlighted the

continuing danger posed to Western societies by transnational jihadist terrorism. NATO's assumption of a lead role in prosecuting the struggle against the Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants in Afghanistan further bolstered Western unity in the face of the jihadist threat, while also demonstrating the alliance's capacity to adapt to the challenges of the radically changed security environment of the post-Cold War period. At the same time, the expansion of Western influence in Central and South Asia from 2001 onwards as part of the 'war on terror' aroused both Russian and Chinese suspicions, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) strenuously backing Uzbekistan's demands for the closure of recently established American bases in that country in 2005 (Olcott 2005: 331).

The Arab Spring and the jihadist resurgence

Notwithstanding jihadism's complex role in aggravating international tensions and redefining the global security agenda in the early to mid-2000s, a decade after 9/11 policymakers were cautiously optimistic about the prospects for containing and eventually defeating the jihadist threat. In particular, the United States' assassination of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011 eliminated America's main bête noire, and marked a significant weakening of al-Qaeda. Beyond bin Laden's iconic role as a figurehead for jihadism, a large number of jihadists had sworn a personal oath of fealty (*bayat*) to him (Hoffman 2015: 77), not automatically transferrable to his successors. Bin Laden's death therefore threatened the unity of an organization already weakened by sustained Western counter-terrorism efforts. That Ayman al-Zawahiri – bin Laden's divisive and decidedly less charismatic deputy – immediately succeeded him portended further difficulties for an already beleaguered movement.

The 'Arab Spring', which roiled the Arab world from December 2010 onwards, appeared to present an even greater challenge for the jihadists. The fall of autocracies in countries including Tunisia, Egypt and Libya seemed to anticipate a dramatic shift towards greater political pluralism in many Middle Eastern societies. The success of mass protest movements in toppling long-established dictatorships at first seemed to confound a key tenet of the jihadist narrative. Jihadists had long claimed that the alliance between the 'near enemy' (apostate local regimes) and the 'far enemy' (the West) made meaningful political change in the Middle East impossible, unless pursued through a global jihad targeting local dictators and their Western sponsors (Gerges 2005). Jihadists consequently first seemed wrong-footed by the apparent success of broad-based popular opposition movements (Hoffman 2015: 78), which suggested the possibility of meaningful political reform without recourse to jihadist extremism.

Despite early hopes that the 'Arab Spring' would marginalize the jihadists, however, the swift failure of reform efforts ultimately provided a new window of opportunity for extremism in the Middle East and beyond. With Tunisia as the sole exception, liberal hopes were elsewhere quickly quashed. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's brief taste of executive power rapidly yielded to renewed tyranny under the al-Sisi dictatorship. Libya meanwhile descended

into chaos following Gaddafi's ouster, as competing jihadist and non-jihadist factions struggled for power. Following the United States' drawdown in Iraq, the Shi'ite-dominated al-Maliki government ostentatiously failed to reintegrate Sunnis into the political process, al-Maliki preferring to hoard power among his co-religionists than attempt a broader national reconciliation (Phillips 2014: 495). Instability in Yemen meanwhile provided a further foothold for jihadist extremists (Jordan 2014: 29).

But it was the Syrian civil war from 2011 onwards which proved most critical to reviving jihadism's fortunes. Ruled by the Assad dynasty (themselves members of the minority Alawite sect) from 1969, Syria was an exemplar of the brittle form of tyranny that had elsewhere proved so vulnerable to popular mobilization in the early months of the 'Arab Spring'. Nevertheless, the Assad regime proved more tenacious than many of its neighbors. Enjoying Russia's steadfast backing, Assad proved too tough to topple, but too weak to crush the proliferating factions that sought his overthrow. Adding further complexity to the struggle, the Syrian civil war soon emerged as a proxy contest for regional power between Iran and the Gulf states (Hanna and Kaye 2015: 182). Their involvement exacerbated sectarian hostility and provided further openings for jihadist extremists.

The Syrian war injected new life into the jihadist movement. But the new opportunities it presented for expansion brought also renewed possibilities for fragmentation. Among jihadists, a long-standing tension divided proponents of global jihad (most notoriously al-Qaeda) from extremists more focused on consolidating their power within regional or even local contexts. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, al-Qaeda sought to bridge this gap by attempting to subsume local jihadist struggles within a global war against the 'Zionist–Crusader' alliance, promising that striking the 'far enemy' was a crucial precursor to overthrowing local 'apostate' rulers (Gerges 2005). In an effort to broaden al-Qaeda's appeal as much as possible, bin Laden and his followers generally downplayed the Sunni–Shi'ite sectarian divide (Celso 2015: 25), while declaring their ultimate goal to be the establishment of a global caliphate encompassing all the Muslim community (the *ummah*) within a single political unit.

The Syrian civil war provided al-Qaeda with a new foothold in the Levant, with the emergence of a new al-Qaeda affiliate in *Jabhat al-Nusra* (Hoffman 2015: 78). Nevertheless, al-Qaeda's limited ability to direct its affiliates, and the leadership's perceived remoteness from the struggle, fomented conditions for disunity and defection. From February 2014, this was realized in the emergence of a new rival to al-Qaeda's pre-eminence among jihadists in Syria, in the form of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, otherwise known as ISIS (and later, either *Daesh* or the Islamic State). The complex origins of ISIS are beyond the scope of this chapter, but can be traced to the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Qaeda in Iraq (later the Islamic State of Iraq) founded by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during the American occupation of Iraq in the 2000s (Celso 2015: 37). What is most pertinent to this discussion is the distinctiveness of IS from al-Qaeda, in its political goals, organizational structure and tactics.

For al-Qaeda, the goal of establishing a caliphate encompassing the global *ummah* was a distant aspiration, which would be realized only following the defeat of the 'Zionist–Crusader' alliance and the collapse of its associated puppet regimes in Muslim-majority countries. Conversely, establishing a stem-land for the caliphate has been a far more immediate priority for IS's followers. From their February 2006 bombing of the symbolically important Shi'ite Al-Askari mosque in Iraq, the Sunni radicals that would evolve into IS evinced a genocidal hatred of Shi'ites (Gerges 2014: 339; Celso 2015: 37), which merely escalated with the opening of hostilities in Syria. For IS, carving out an exclusively Sunni caliphate from the ruins of Iraq and Syria was an urgent and seemingly achievable objective.

The Syrian civil war and the al-Maliki regime's failure to reconcile with Iraq's Sunnis provided IS with short-term opportunities pursue this aim, which it did so in the northern summer of 2014 through a combination of terrorism and conventional military offensives. By June of that year, IS leader Abu Bakr Al–Baghdadi felt sufficiently confident to declare himself a new caliph, ruling over a revived caliphate encompassing swathes of Syria and central Iraq (Hoffman 2015: 81–82). Ensconced in its new jihadist capital of Raqqa in Syria, IS began the task of constructing a new jihadist state, while simultaneously sponsoring regional IS 'provinces' (*vilayets*) across a swathe of countries from Libya to Afghanistan (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2016).

Whereas al-Qaeda at its peak had contented itself with enjoying safe haven in Afghanistan under the Taliban's protection (from 1996 to 2001), IS represents a qualitatively new evolution in jihadist terrorism. Specifically, IS combines established features of a global terrorist network alongside a sustained effort to construct a proto-caliphate organized at least in part as a centrally governed territorial state (Cronin 2015). Al-Qaeda abjured the challenges of jihadist state-building. Conversely, IS has attempted to build a jihadist utopia. It has sought to impose its own brutal and idiosyncratic misreading of Islam on captive populations in Syria and Iraq, while proclaiming its success in destroying the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement, under which the French and British divided up the Arab world into different states following the Ottoman Empire's collapse in World War I (Hoffman 2015: 81–82).

Tactically, too, IS differs meaningfully from al-Qaeda. Though al-Qaeda developed an embryonic conventional warfare capability known as Brigade 055 during its residence in Afghanistan (1996–2001), it did so primarily to provide local military support to its patron, the Taliban (Rubin 2002: xv–xvi). Notwithstanding this niche contribution, from the late 1990s the bulk of al-Qaeda's energies were devoted to planning mass casualty attacks against Western targets, with a view to provoking the 'far enemy' into a series of unwinnable conflicts against al-Qaeda and other jihadists that would end in the West's exhaustion and defeat (Gerges 2005). By contrast, IS has been far more versatile in its tactics. Both within Iraq and Syria and beyond, mass casualty terrorist attacks have formed an important part of IS's repertoire in polarizing communities, provoking opponents and terrifying civilian populations into submission. Unlike al-Qaeda, however,

IS has combined these asymmetric tactics with conventional maneuver warfare, the latter including the combined use of mobile light infantry, heavy artillery and tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) to conquer huge swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq (Fromson and Simon 2015: 9–16). Indeed, it is IS's combined mastery of conventional as well as unconventional warfare that has enabled it to acquire increasingly state-like characteristics, which have distinguished it in size, sophistication and lethality from all pre-existing jihadist terrorist entities.

Its distinctiveness aside, the IS caliphate's long-term prospects for success remain doubtful. Though IS successfully wrested leadership of the jihadist cause from al-Qaeda through establishing the caliphate, throughout late 2015 and early 2016 it experienced significant military reversals in the face of stiffening local and international opposition. Confronting increased Western military pressure (primarily in the form of limited airstrikes), IS increasingly borrowed from al-Qaeda's playbook, claiming credit for terrorist assaults on the West such as the attack on Paris on November 13, 2015, and the Brussels terrorist attacks of March 22, 2016. Both the Paris and Brussels attacks were apparently driven by IS's external operations wing, rather than by self-radicalizing actors plotting independently of IS (Calimachi 2016). That IS even maintains an active external operations wing is testament to its tactical virtuosity, and unquestioned resolve to employ long-distance coercion to punish the West for its leadership of the anti-IS coalition. Nevertheless, against IS's interests, such attacks merely fortified Western resolve and attacks on IS. Western retaliation had helped to contribute to the loss of an estimated 14% of IS territory by late 2015 (Peçanha and Watkins 2015). This trend continued in early 2016, further jeopardizing the caliphate's survival. Finally, while IS has sought through social media to construct a 'winner's narrative' of relentless expansion, beyond Libya it has generally failed to consolidate overseas 'provinces' in the face of heavy local resistance from competing jihadist outfits (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2016).

These qualifications aside, as a hybrid cross between global terror network and an embryonic state, IS constitutes a genuinely novel multidimensional threat to international order (Phillips 2014). Through its mastery of social media, IS has succeeded in propagating violent extremism among disaffected migrant populations in the Western world, to a far greater degree than earlier jihadist networks. 'Lone wolf' attacks like the Sydney Lindt café siege (December 2014) and the San Bernadino attack (December 2015) have succeeded in polarizing Western societies to a degree far disproportionate to the admittedly tragic material damage they have caused. For IS, such attacks have proved a particularly effective means of undermining unity in open multicultural societies, at no direct expense to IS itself. That most of these attacks have been inspired by self-radicalizing individuals (rather than being directly IS-sponsored) carries the advantages of terrorizing IS's enemies while further fortifying its assumed status as the true vanguard of the global jihadist movement.

Alongside diaspora radicalization, the birth of IS has moreover further amplified the trend towards increased foreign fighter mobilization, on a scale which

dwarfs that seen in previous conflicts. Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, some 30,000 foreign fighters have fought there (Byman 2016: 79). This far exceeds the total for previous conflicts involving jihadist foreign fighters, whether the original anti-Soviet jihad in 1980s Afghanistan, the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s, or the Western-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s (on historic Muslim foreign fighter mobilization figures, see Hegghammer 2010/2011: 61). Certainly, not all of these foreign fighters have flocked to the ranks of IS. Nevertheless, the risk of combat-hardened foreign fighters inciting violence on their return to home societies has already been realized, and continues to pre-occupy counter-terrorism authorities. Together with the challenges of resisting diaspora radicalization, the foreign fighter phenomenon dramatizes the degree to which globalization has made open societies more permeable and more vulnerable to violent non-state actors than ever before.

The massive population movements that violence in Syria and Iraq has produced add a final layer of complexity to the evolving jihadist terrorist threat. IS remains resolutely committed to a program of sectarian cleansing aimed at purging the caliphate of Shi'ites and non-Muslim religious minorities. This commitment, alongside IS's ostentatious use of atrocity crimes to terrorize its targets, has contributed to the largest refugee flows to Europe since the 1940s (DePillas et al. 2015). The resulting strain on recipient societies has aggravated anti-immigrant sentiment, feeding into an increasingly poisonous political polarization within Western societies. Since 2001, popular perceptions of Muslim 'invasion' have grown more prominent, nourishing far-right parties and pushing governments to adopt tougher homeland security measures and more restrictive immigration policies. A major second-order strategic effect of the rise of IS has been to exacerbate these tendencies, in so doing threatening the very traditions of toleration and openness that Western societies swore to defend when they first declared a 'war on terror' on 9/11.

The future significance of global terrorism for international order

Since the Arab Spring, the threat of jihadist terrorism has proved extraordinarily resilient and adaptive. The success of IS in particular has put paid to earlier confident predictions of jihadism's defeat in the near to medium term. Instead, the movement has mutated, in the case of IS combining a traditional focus on global terrorism with advanced efforts at state building, underwritten in Iraq and Syria at least by a maturing capacity for conventional offensive military operations (Jasper and Moreland 2014). IS's recent reversals on the battlefield, combined with the growing alienation its penchant for terror has evoked across large swathes of the Islamic world, do give cause for cautious optimism that the movement will still suffer long-term strategic defeat. Nevertheless, jihadism's alarming capacity for reinvention compels us to consider in greater detail the structural forces accounting for the movement's extraordinary resilience and adaptability.

In the first instance, the rise of IS has dramatized the enduring brittleness of most Middle Eastern polities, and the larger fragility of the post-Ottoman regional order that developed in the region after the First World War. Since the Ottoman Empire's collapse, a succession of local autocrats have dominated the region, secure in their support by external sponsors. From the post-World War I period through to the 1956 Suez crisis, a combination of British and French power underwrote the post-Ottoman order, only to thereafter be swept away by a combination of pan-Arabism and imperial decline. The United States and the Soviet Union later assumed the role of external patrons, before the United States assumed a more obtrusive and exclusive role of off-shore order builder following the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991.

With the advent of the Arab Spring, and in the context also of the United States' ongoing rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and away from other arenas, the delicate stability of the post-Ottoman order is now disintegrating. The apparent failure of popular opposition movements in many Arab countries has left space open for a resurgent jihadist threat, while simultaneously exposing the underlying fragility of incumbent autocracies. Meanwhile, accelerating efforts globally to shift towards a low-carbon economy have the potential to further unsettle the already fragile oil-rich petro-monarchies of the Persian Gulf (Ulrichsen 2015: 134), which, from the 1979 Iranian revolution, have been among the West's most reliable local security clients. Iran's prospective resurgence has meanwhile inflamed Sunni–Shi'ite sectarian hostilities across the region, while also sharpening the geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Hanna and Kaye 2015: 183).

This weakening of the post-Ottoman order has intersected with a more general decline in the willingness and capacity of external sponsors to attempt to uphold regional stability. Consumed by the 'Eurozone crisis', the European Union (EU) has lacked the interest and the capability to intervene decisively in the Middle East. Instead, Europeans currently regard regional order challenges primarily through the lens of irregular migration concerns. Notwithstanding the conspicuous (and likely unsustainable) generosity of Germany (Hann 2015), many European polities have increasingly reverted to a 'Fortress Europe' mentality, maintaining hyper-vigilance against migrant flows generated from the ongoing wars in Syria and Iraq.

Following its disastrous foray into Iraq from 2003 onwards, the United States has also become far warier of ongoing Middle Eastern entanglements. Throughout the Obama Administration, the White House sought to avoid the interventionist excesses of its immediate predecessor. Whereas George W. Bush sought to transform the Middle East through his 'forward strategy of freedom', the Obama Administration sought primarily to disentangle itself from the Iraq quagmire, and to pursue its counter-terrorism goals through the far less politically risky recourse to drone warfare (Boyle 2013: 2). The ongoing political and economic fallout of the 'Great Recession' preoccupied the Obama Administration, constraining America's limited resources for exercising global leadership. China's ongoing rise, and increasingly overt efforts to challenge US primacy in the Western Pacific, meanwhile nudged America's foreign policy focus further away from the

Middle East. The result of these trends was a reduction in America's willingness and capacity to pay the Middle East sustained attention, and an attenuation of America's post-1991 role as the region's primary external security patron.

European introversion and America's newfound aversion to Middle Eastern entanglements have together undercut external support for local regimes. Notwithstanding President Erdogan's so-called 'neo-Ottoman' foreign policy (Taşpinar 2012: 128), Turkey meanwhile lacks the capacity and the region-wide credibility to fill the role of off-shore order builder vacated by the West, while other external contenders (e.g. China) have likewise shown little interest in assuming this role. The combination of domestic state fragility and declining external interest and capacity to underwrite regional order has therefore fostered conditions of renewed instability, giving jihadism a new lease of life.

Cutting across both of these trends, finally, is a more general recalibration in the balance of power between state and non-state actors, which globalization has made possible. States continue to dominate world politics, and in important ways the 'war on terror' has provided a powerful warrant for the further strengthening of state power within the international system, as we will see below. Nevertheless, both the 'Arab Spring' and the jihadist resurgence have shown the far greater capacities for collective mobilization among non-state actors that globalization has made possible. In particular, the rapid spread of digital media technologies has dramatically lowered the coordination costs involved in mobilizing territorially dispersed constituencies (Hoffman 2015: 79). As IS's success in long-distance radicalization has demonstrated, the spread of such technologies has also made it far easier than ever before for disaffected radicals to craft and disseminate emotive and visually arresting counter-narratives to undermine incumbent power structures. This has given anti-systemic actors a global reach, as well as an unprecedented capacity to manipulate group identities and tap into the cultural anxieties that globalization continues to engender (Hoffman 2015: 79).

The endemic weakness of many Middle Eastern states, Western strategic retrenchment and the enhanced mobilization capacities non-state actors now enjoy under conditions of globalization together help account for jihadism's resurgence in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. As the passage of time grants us the wisdom of hindsight, it is now clear that the United States' catastrophic overreach with the 2003 Iraq invasion gave the jihadist cause a tremendous boost, likely ensuring its survival for at least a generation. Against this grim reality, however, we must still acknowledge that the jihadist dream of a world-encompassing caliphate remains a distant chimera which is unlikely to be realized. Even if IS somehow manages to survive, it remains an impoverished statelet, surrounded by enemies impatient for its destruction. More generally, the extremism and existential bellicosity of IS precludes its winning support from the vast majority of the world's Muslims. The ongoing fratricidal rivalries within the jihadist movement – evident in IS's failure to consolidate its overseas 'provinces' and in the blood feud between al-Qaeda and IS – further limit jihadism's future as a viable and coherent force in world politics (Byman 2016: 83–84).

Nevertheless, even if we can confidently wager that jihadism will eventually join preceding waves of 'rebel terror' in the dustbin of history, it behoves us to recognize that the 'war on terror' has profoundly shaped twenty-first-century international politics, in ways that will endure for decades after jihadism's defeat. On this point, a brief contrast between the 'end of history' Francis Fukuyama confidently forecast following the Cold War and the world we now inhabit is instructive.

Against the expectations of Fukuyama and his liberal fellow thinkers, the post-9/11 era has, first, seen a vigorous reassertion of state power in both the developed and the developing world. Far from atrophying in an age of globalization, the state's powers of policing and surveillance have dramatically grown in response to post-9/11 counter-terrorism concerns. Democratic societies have witnessed significant curtailments of civil liberties to suppress the terror threat, while autocrats have meanwhile seized on the 'war on terror' as an all-purpose pretext for clamping down on all forms of dissent. State powers to regulate and supervise religious beliefs and practices have likewise expanded, alongside more concerted efforts to codify the nature of the relationship between faith and state identity. In secular societies, where religion has long been regarded as a matter of private conviction and where there has also existed an institutionalized separation between church and state, this encroachment of state power into the 'private' domain has proved particularly controversial. The interminable French 'headscarves affair' provides merely the more dramatic instances of this development. Since as far back as 1989, French society has been polarized by a perceived tension, between the French state's secular self-definition and commitment to enforcing *laïcité* in public spaces (e.g. state schools), and some French Muslims' countervailing demands to express their religious identity through wearing distinctive clothing (the hijab). This tension has merely intensified since the onset of the 'war on terror', with the passage of a so-called 'veil law' in 2004 forbidding the wearing of any clothing signifying an obvious religious affiliation in public schools. The ensuing societal polarization has been particularly acute, given that France is home to Western Europe's largest population of Muslims. But it is illustrative of a more general trend, towards a divisive cultural politics that will continue to attend the efforts of traditionally 'post-religious' societies to reconcile respect for cultural diversity with their commitment to maintaining a predominantly secular public sphere (Roy 2007: 26–28).

Following the post-9/11 decade, the continued strengthening of a rules-based international order along liberal lines also now appears far from guaranteed. In particular, the 'war on terror' leaves as one of its legacies an increasingly permissive attitude towards the use of force on the part of Western democracies, and a correspondingly weakened commitment to the maintenance of an international order founded on respect for principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Historically, material constraints on Western military power prevented the sustained projection of force into the African and Asian interior until the mid-nineteenth century (Black 2005: 131). From the mid-twentieth century onwards, the UN system of collective security institutionalized norms of sovereign equality and

non-intervention at a global level, providing weak states with a robust if admittedly imperfect guard against armed encroachments on their territory by the great powers (Cohen 2006: 492). In the twenty-first century, military innovations such as pilot-less drones and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have again conferred upon strong powers the ability to project force swiftly and easily into weaker states. Simultaneously, counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation anxieties have also provided strong states with compelling grounds for unilaterally abridging norms of non-intervention in the name of assuring their citizens' safety from terrorist attack (Nichols 2005: 8–12). In a world where many states lack the capacity and sometimes the political will necessary to suppress terrorist activity within their borders, strong states have proved more likely to resort to armed self-help to compensate for such local shortfalls in capacity and resolve. This trend is likely only to intensify as the West increases its dependence on drones as the arm of decision in counter-terrorism operations (Boyle 2013), potentially further weakening international constraints on the use of violence while simultaneously exacerbating political instability in fragile states in the process (Hudson et al. 2011: 129–130).

Finally, and most importantly, the decade-long diversion of Western resources and attention to prosecute the 'war on terror' has significantly hastened American hegemonic decline, and with it also the ongoing power shift from West to East. This transition was inevitable in the long run. But the 'war on terror' has dramatically brought forward the time at which the Western democracies will be compelled to accept an autocratic China as an equal partner in managing the global order. While proponents of the 'end of history' thesis once confidently predicted that democracy and market capitalism would triumph everywhere following the Cold War's end, it is now clear that this prediction was implicitly predicated on the premise that liberalism's Western state sponsors would indefinitely remain globally pre-eminent.

Instead, it now appears far more likely that an indebted and depleted West will by necessity share global leadership with an economically strong and unapologetically autocratic China for the foreseeable future. Future chroniclers of the early twenty-first century will no doubt note the supreme irony that a nominally Marxist atheist dictatorship proved to be the ultimate beneficiary of the global clash between liberal internationalism and radical Islamic revivalism. As the seemingly endless 'war on terror' rolls on, an interim assessment of its legacy for international order confirms a truth first evident on that terrible Tuesday in September – history has most assuredly resumed.

Guide to further reading

Excellent general introductions to the study of terrorism include Hoffman (2002) and Crenshaw (1981). Rapoport (2001) provides a succinct overview of the history of modern terrorism, while Jensen (2004) is helpful for understanding the often neglected 'first wave' of anarchist terrorism. Hoffman (1998) provides an

indispensable overview of the renewed internationalization of terrorism from the late 1960s, while Adamson (2005) and Cronin (2002/2003) provide cogent analyses of the complex and evolving relationship between global terrorism and globalization. More recently, Wight (2015) provides an excellent revisionist account of terrorism's nature and evolution, which situates terrorism within the broader context of an analysis of the historically contingent relationship between political authority and organized violence in world politics.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq throughout the 2000s saw transnational jihadist terrorism feature ever more conspicuously in insurgent conflicts in these countries, a theme that is explored in both Kilcullen (2005) and Phillips (2009). Nichols (2005) meanwhile provides an interesting perspective on the systemic implications of global terrorism, according particular emphasis to its impact on the rules governing the use of force in world politics.

Finally, both al-Qaeda's resilience and the transformations in jihadism that the rise of ISIS has wrought have been subject to a range of excellent analyses. Hoffman (2015) provides the best concise overview of al-Qaeda's evolution over the course of America's ongoing wars on terrorism, while Mendelsohn (2016) provides a compelling analysis of the evolving relationship between al-Qaeda and its various franchises. Fawaz Gerges (2005) has meanwhile provided the definitive analysis of al-Qaeda's evolving ideology from the 1990s to the immediate post-9/11 period. Gerges (2014) also offers a good bite-size overview of the evolution of ISIS as exemplar of the 'third wave' of jihadism that has emerged in the wake of the war in Syria. A more recent and comprehensive overview of ISIS's development can be found in Stern and Berger (2016).

International Organizations: Can They Break Free from States?

SEAN STARRS

Collectively, international organizations (IOs) are one of the core actors in international relations (IR), especially since the dawn of the post-World War II era. There is not a day that goes by without some IO or another making the nightly news somewhere in the world. There are by now thousands of IOs seemingly covering every issue and region of the globe, including Antarctica and the oceans – and even outer space. Some are well known and have multi-billion dollar budgets with thousands of staff, such as the United Nations (UN), while others are more obscure, but nevertheless provide an important forum for IR, such as the International Seabed Authority. A key issue for the twenty-first century in relation to IOs is whether any of them are really autonomous from their member states, especially the most powerful ones? Are they at best a forum for member states to interact and negotiate with each other to advance common interests, at worst a tool of the powerful to impose their interests upon the rest? To put it another way, are there any significant IOs that have been able to move beyond *inter*nationalism to become *supra*national (*between* and *above* nation-states, respectively) in their governance? Can IOs break free from states?

This issue has various important implications, not least of which is the very effectiveness of the IOs to operate and perform their mandates in the first place. And since the mandates of most IOs, including the most prominent ones, proclaim to relate in one way or another to advancing human welfare globally, this issue concerns us all. This is especially the case since many of the world's problems, from global poverty to war and the industrial destruction of the environment, cannot be solved by a single nation-state, no matter how powerful. We therefore have a collective, perhaps supranational, interest in overcoming parochial national interest, so that IOs can address the world's problems unshackled by mundane inter-state/elite politics. Thus, can IOs operate *above*, and perhaps even *against*, the core interests of states, including the most powerful? In this regard we are referring to the United States in particular, under whose hegemony many of today's principal IOs were created, as we shall discuss below.

This chapter will tackle the issue of whether IOs can break free from states in four sections. The 'Background and history' section will provide a general background and history of IOs that is relevant for the twenty-first century. Many

of the most significant IOs today were established in the 1940s under the auspices of American hegemony, as mentioned. It is therefore important to understand the context in which these IOs were created, in order to assess whether this context is changing in the twenty-first century. The next two sections will go into more depth concerning two major IOs that are often held up as examples of being the most successful at becoming supranational, and therefore the most independent from particular nation-states: the UN; and the European Union (EU) (coupled with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)). These two sections will discuss a variety of issues from global poverty and war to financial crises, in order to assess how successful they have been in breaking free from states. NATO will be discussed along with the EU because one of the key tests of the EU as an independent supranational actor in IR is whether it can muster collective military power vis-à-vis non-EU actors. The fourth section will discuss the recent rise of China-centered IOs such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) (otherwise known as the 'BRICS Bank'), especially in the aftermath of the 2008 Wall Street crash. That they are considered 'China-centered' already alludes to their dependence on a certain state, but we will address their prospects for breaking free from another state – the United States – and their potential for creating an alternative world order.

Background and history

We should first clarify what is meant by 'international organization'. Usually this term refers to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), but for some it also extends to international non-governmental organizations (international NGOs). This chapter shall employ the narrower conception, since NGOs can be a rather different beast with a host of separate issues. One reason is because NGOs explicitly strive to play an advocacy role for a particular issue *independent* of governments (and sometimes *against* governments). Whether or not this is possible for IGOs is still an open question (and is generally not the original intent in the establishment of IGOs). IOs should also be distinguished from treaties, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the latter of which *is* an IO), the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), since a treaty does not have a stand-alone organizational structure with a headquarters, dedicated staff and so on that could potentially grant it autonomy from member states. Strictly speaking, the same could be said about loose groupings such as the G7 and G20, but often these are included in discussions of IOs – hence these distinctions are not set in stone.

Some notable IOs from the nineteenth century still exist today, such as the International Telecommunication (originally Telegraph) Union founded in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union founded in 1874 – both of which were folded into the UN as specialized agencies in the 1940s. It is during this period in the closing years of the Second World War and into the 1950s that the great bulk

of the largest IOs in the early twenty-first century have their origins, from the UN, Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank), and NATO to the EU (in its precursor, the European Coal and Steel Community established in 1951 and then the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1957), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (its precursor, Organisation for European Economic Co-operation), and the WTO (its precursor, GATT). This can be considered the first wave of IOs in the post-World War II era, largely established and curated under the umbrella of American hegemony, as discussed below.

The second wave of IOs was born of a changing world order in the 1960s and 1970s, what some characterized as the decline of American hegemony (Kindleberger 1969; Rosecrance 1976; Cox 1987), or more specifically, a rising tide of national liberation struggles in mainly Africa and Asia and subsequent decolonization (Amin et al. 1982; Prashad 2007) – what could be considered the first rise of the 'Third World' (counterpoised with the current rise of 'emerging markets', discussed below). The most important IO in this wave is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), established in 1961 (with origins in the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia) and spearheaded by five countries – Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia – in order to chart a development path not beholden to either of the two superpowers at that time, the Soviet Union and the United States. Rather, NAM championed an independent state-led national development free from foreign (i.e. Great Power) interference, especially in its calls for a 'New International Economic Order' in the 1970s. Parallel to NAM with similar goals was the formation of the Group of 77 (G77) in 1964.

While NAM still exists today with 120 member states, it largely ran out of steam by the mid-1980s. There were a number of reasons, but fragmentation in the face of the Third World debt crisis and the ascent of 'free market' ideology, what some term 'neoliberalism', played a major role in quashing a unified Third World movement for national state-led development. This was counterpoised by the establishment of Western-led, often informal, organizations in the 1970s, such as the Trilateral Commission and Group of Seven (G7), in addition to a restructuring in the role of the IMF and World Bank to deal more with the Third World. The consolidation of these Western-centric IOs was partly in response to the successful post-war reconstruction and revival of Western Europe and Japan, giving them a seat at the table of global governance (even if the US remained 'first among equals'), and partly in response to national independence movements around the world, especially those that were anti-capitalist, including in the West itself in the 1960s and 1970s.

One significant IO from this era that remains relevant today, however, is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), founded in 1960. OPEC was founded in the context of rising Arab nationalism and socialism, and specifically the attempt to wrest control of domestic oil production and prices from Western transnational corporations (TNCs) (what were then called the 'Seven Sisters'). OPEC's most dramatic global impact was the 1973–1974 oil embargo against countries (including the United States) that supported Israel during the

1973 Arab–Israeli War in which a coalition of Arab countries led by Egypt and Syria attempted to regain territory lost to Israel in 1967. Today, however – while OPEC remains relevant since oil continues to be the most important globally traded commodity – it is no longer a coherent geopolitical actor vis-à-vis the United States. As in the rest of the Third World, fragmentation ensued, especially with the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, the First Gulf War in 1990–1991 (which helped to tie Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states closer to the United States), and the Second Gulf War from 2003, which annihilated Iraq as an independent actor (and later, in 2011, Libya). Also, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was established by the West in 1974 in the aftermath of the oil crisis in order to counter future supply shocks, namely from OPEC.

By the 1990s, a third wave of IOs emerged with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and with the resurgence of Anglo-American 'free market' ideology led by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. With the collapse of state-led communism and the reform of other forms of national development (such as the developmental state in North east Asia), a more or less liberal global capitalism dramatically expanded – ushering in what many refer to as the age of 'globalization' (see Beeson, Chapter 6). Most important in this wave is the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the culmination of four decades of freer trade negotiations led by the United States via GATT. As a striking sign of the new era of capitalist globalization, China – one of the primary anti-capitalist states of the twentieth century – joined the WTO in 2001 (Russia finally joined in 2012). Also notable is the earlier creation of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 to likewise promote freer trade in that region.

Coupled with these new IOs was the consolidation and expansion of certain existing Western-centric IOs, such as the EU, NATO and the OECD. The EEC transformed into the EU in 1993, marking significant progress in European integration and supranationalism. NATO also expanded in this period, and indeed its opening to Eastern European member states was often a precursor to joining the EU (more on the EU and NATO in the third section). The OECD, often seen as a 'rich nations club', also expanded, to include Mexico in 1994 and Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and South Korea in 1996. Moreover, the IMF (in conjunction with the US Treasury Department) played a reinvigorated role in managing a series of financial crises in the 1990s in especially Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin America (Stiglitz 2002; Blustein 2003). While all these IOs in the third wave are diverse in their mandates, they all share a generally Western-centric perspective on governing world order, especially in their promotion of neoliberal capitalism as a growth model.

The fourth wave emerged as a possible challenge to the Western-centric world order with the second rise of the Third World – or what is now popularly seen in depoliticized terms as 'emerging markets'. This wave arose in the aftermath of the 2008 Wall Street crash and ensuing global financial crisis and Great Recession, and is focused upon the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), but most of all China. The latter has spearheaded a number of initiatives,

from the earlier Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, and more recently the AIIB, NDB and the Silk Road Fund. In contrast to the second wave, however, the anti-West (and certainly anti-capitalist) rhetoric is much more toned down. Either way, as key members of the BRICS are now facing increasing economic pressures since around 2013, the success of the fourth wave in presenting an alternative to the Western-centric world order is still an open question, and we shall return to it in the fourth section.

Underpinning these four waves over the past seven decades is the question of whether American hegemony is declining or not. It is almost universally recognized that the first wave was established in the context of American hegemony. The United States had two primary, inter-related, goals: (1) to maintain and expand a globalizing capitalism centered upon the United States, unshackled by great power territorial rivalry; and (2) to defeat anti-capitalist struggle, as well as those that sought national economic development independent from the West. By the 1960s and 1970s, it seemed that there were increasing obstacles towards these goals – some of which have been mentioned above, in addition to the Vietnam War and the rise of US current account deficits and resultant end of dollar-gold convertibility in 1971. By the 1980s, conventional wisdom swung towards conceptualizing the decline of the United States, with some exceptions (Russett 1985; Strange 1987), and the various IOs created in the second wave (especially NAM and OPEC) were often used as evidence of American decline. Nevertheless, the nationalist and socialist impetus in the second wave was largely overturned by the 1980s, and conventional wisdom swung 180 degrees during the 1990s, with many characterizing the US as the world's only superpower (Huntington 1999; Kennedy 1999).

The key question then for the current era is, as Christopher Layne (2012) puts it, whether 'this time it's for real' for American decline. On the one hand, the world in the twenty-first century is now more open to American business than ever before (certainly more than during the supposed height of American hegemony in the 1950s), and virtually all challengers to global capitalism have been vanquished. There are no meaningful state-level challenges and what remains are relatively low-level social movements which flare up occasionally, such as the Occupy movement. On the other hand, certain formerly Third World nations are indeed making some attempts to carve a more independent niche for themselves within global capitalism, as some more or less embrace a state capitalist model as opposed to the 'free market' – most of all China. If this is the case then an increasingly multipolar world could allow more space for IOs to break free from states, especially the United States. Let us now turn to two of the most successful IOs in this regard: the UN and EU.

The United Nations – intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism

The UN has become the most globally expansive IO ever created. It is also one of the most successful, celebrating its 70th birthday in 2015, and long

outliving its predecessor, the League of Nations, established in 1920 and officially ending in 1946 but essentially being nullified by the beginning of the Second World War. The UN currently has 193 member states (from an original 51 in 1945), of which all are represented in the General Assembly, along with five permanent members of the Security Council (and 10 rotating members), and a plethora of issue-specific organizations and initiatives. It is the latter that render the UN a hybrid organization, one that is firmly intergovernmental in the structure of the General Assembly and Security Council, but also with the beginnings of supranationalism in the many ancillary organizations, from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) to UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) to the ILO (International Labour Organization), from UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) to the World Food Programme (WFP). The former is the realm of inter-state interests and conflict, the latter is the realm of a cosmopolitan vision of protecting human rights and advancing human development. These two divergent visions sometimes lead to tension and even dysfunction. Both sides, however, will likely remain for as long as nation-states and the UN remains.

What is the goal of the UN? Having been established in the immediate aftermath of the most destructive war the world had ever seen, unsurprisingly the UN's primary purpose, according to Chapter 1, Article 1, Section 1 of the UN Charter (2016a), is:

> To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

The founding members also recognized that what would later be called 'human development' is necessary to maintaining what Chapter 1, Article 1, Section 2 calls 'universal peace'. Thus, Chapter 1, Article 1, Section 3 calls for the UN:

> To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. (ibid.)

Over the past seven decades, how successful has the UN been in achieving these goals? Or in the context of this chapter's problematic, has the UN been able to rise above the parochial power interests of states in general, and the most powerful state in particular?

It is estimated over 70 million people were slaughtered during the Second World War. Clearly there has not been a World War III of similarly genocidal

proportions. It would be overly optimistic, however, to even partly ascribe this success to the UN, simply because the UN was unsuccessful in preventing a number of 'breaches of the peace' in which millions of people died, from the Korean War of 1950–1953 to the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, from the 1980s Iran–Iraq War and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, among many other smaller wars and counter-insurgencies. In fact, none of these wars, with the exception of the Korean War, were approved by the UN Security Council, which is supposed to be the ultimate arbiter of the use of force in international law. Rather, it seems that the UN cannot prevent states from going to war, especially the most powerful ones.

American administrations, long before George W. Bush's 2003 invasion of Iraq, have argued that the United States is the 'exceptional nation' over which no IO should have control. When Nicaragua won its International Court of Justice (ICJ, part of the UN system) case against the United States in 1986 for reparations relating to US state-sponsored terrorism in its support of the *Contras* (ICJ 1986), the United States simply used its Security Council veto five times, and when the UN General Assembly called for 'immediate compliance' with the ICJ ruling (UN 1986), the US simply ignored it. In fact, while the Soviet Union accounted for an astonishing 80 of 83 vetoes (96%) in the UN Security Council from 1946 to 1970, the United States has accounted for 76 of 109 vetoes (70%) post-1970 (author's calculations from UN Library 2016) – representing a significant contrarian to the international community. The US even vetoed UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's second term against opposition from US allies, in part because he protested NATO's bombing of Bosnia (Holbrooke 1999: 202). The UN hardly has any control over its most powerful member.

What of protection of human rights, another key goal of the UN? In 1948 the UN General Assembly passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2016b), a majestic document that represents the first global enshrinement of basic rights to which all of humanity is inherently entitled. But this cosmopolitan ideal has run up against the central contradiction of the UN, that it is also intergovernmental; which is founded upon respect for sovereignty and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. This contradiction will likely remain for as long as nation-states remain. The primary implication of this is that the UN has no real authority to enforce the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially since the highest decision-making body, the Security Council, is subject to national veto, as discussed above. In any case, virtually every member state contravenes one article or another of the Declaration – for example, the universal right for employment (Article 23) and adequate food and shelter (Article 25) – and there is no objective measure to assess whether human rights around the world are 'improving' or not. Not even slavery has been eradicated in the contemporary era (Cox et al. 2013). Even so, the Universal Declaration is a vital document that presents an ideal towards which we should struggle, and is certainly better than not having such an ideal at all.

As for eradicating poverty and advancing human development, the UN's success has been more ambiguous. For example, some hail the UN Millennium Development Goals as being successful (Sachs 2012), while others find their very design to be a failure (Fehling et al. 2013). One problem is how to measure poverty and determining what is a 'liveable' wage. There tends to be an overemphasis on rising income in the development literature, which can easily be negated by declining social welfare subsidies, especially healthcare. Another problem is how to deal with inequality, which has been rising dramatically since the 1980s largely due to an increasing share of income going to owners of capital instead of labor (Piketty 2014). Moreover, it is possible that some rise *at the expense* of others. For example, the export-driven rise of the Chinese middle class has been on the backs of over 200 million migrant workers with very few rights and access to social welfare in urban areas due to their rural household registration (Chan 2012), which leads them to work under super-exploitative conditions.

What is certain, however, is that a number of specialized UN agencies do in fact make life better for millions. UNHCR aids the lives of 13 million forcibly displaced persons around the world. The UN WFP (2016) 'reaches more than 80 million people with food assistance in 75 countries each year', including emergency disaster aid. The UN World Health Organization (WHO) is credited with eradicating smallpox by the late 1970s, and is active around the world addressing all manner of health issues. One of the newest UN specialized agencies, established in 2011, is the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women). In addition, various UN agencies are often some of the best sources of data and research in their respective fields, such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and have made important contributions to various issues surrounding international development and the environment, from UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) to the concept of 'sustainable development'.

In any case, while these agencies are primarily funded by member states, they have a fair degree of freedom in their operations, as long as they do not challenge the core interests of the most powerful member states, and capitalism more generally. Critical scholars often focus on this latter point, and some argue that certain UN agencies in fact serve the interests of capital at the expense of the poor, especially the World Bank (Cammack 2004). But for the purposes of this chapter's key issue, these specialized UN agencies probably come closest to being the most supranational organizations in the world, in terms of their global remit. The UN's primary contender for having the most advanced supranational governance, the EU, to which we now turn, is inherently regional.

The European Union and NATO

The EU is the world's premiere example of a supranational IO. After decades of increasing integration, the EU now encompasses certain institutions and policy areas at a supranational level with which member states are expected to comply.

The European Commission decides EU-wide agriculture, competition and fisheries policies with which all member states (and firms) must comply, and when a measure passes a majority in the European Parliament, all member states must implement it. The European Court of Justice has EU-wide jurisdiction over its member states. The EU also represents all member states at international trade negotiations and at such IOs as the G20, UN and WTO, even if some member states still maintain their own delegation. Those member states that use the euro as legal tender (collectively known as the Eurozone) have ceded their capacity to inflate the national money supply and devalue their currencies, and must follow the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB).

Nevertheless, there are significant areas in which the EU's supranationalism has probably reached its limits, from defense and foreign, to industrial and social welfare policies. A recurring theme since the 1950s, especially from French officials, was a desire to create a 'European Defense Force' separate from NATO. President Charles de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO in 1967 in an attempt to maintain an independent foreign and security policy from what was always the dominant power in NATO, the United States (traditionally accounting for around three quarters of NATO's military spending). This is largely also why de Gaulle vetoed the accession of the United Kingdom, twice, to the EEC in 1963 and 1967, as he accused the UK of being a Trojan horse for the United States in Europe, due to the long-standing UK–US 'special relationship' in business, cultural, diplomatic, migrant and security relations. By the 1990s and 2000s, however, with US-led NATO interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the US ensured that no serious EU-wide military contender could arise – and certainly none that could collectively challenge the United States.

NATO also became the de facto entry gate for subsequent EU membership for former Eastern Bloc countries, beginning with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999. For them, joining 'the West' after the fall of the Iron Curtain entailed joining both NATO *and* the EU, in that order – thereby reaffirming, intertwining and arguably strengthening the security role of the United States in Europe. Thus, by the twenty-first century, efforts towards a European Defense Force independent of NATO has largely been abandoned. France formally rejoined NATO in 2009, and in 2011 performed joint operations with the US in the NATO bombing of Libya. While there are still occasionally some calls for an EU-wide military, for example from EU Commission President Juncker as a response to increasing tensions with Russia (Sparrow 2015), these are qualified by making clear that such a force should not compete with NATO.

The events surrounding the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 probably spelled the final death knell to any EU-wide alternative, let alone contender, to NATO, and hence any potential EU-wide challenge to American military power – at least for the foreseeable future. Over the last and first few months of 2002 and 2003, respectively, as the war drums were beating louder and louder in Washington DC and in American network media, anti-war protests around the world were getting larger (including in the United States itself), culminating in the largest anti-war demonstration ever, when an estimated 10 million marched around the

world on February 15, 2003. Some EU member states also attempted to resist the impending US-led invasion of Iraq, most notably France and Germany. France continually threatened to use its veto power in the UN Security Council, against the active lobbying of US Secretary of State Colin Powell and others. But there were also EU member states that supported and participated in the US-led 'coalition of the willing', such as Italy, Spain, Poland and, most of all, the UK. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was US President George Bush's leading cheerleader domestically and internationally, including in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

For these reasons, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld could infamously proclaim that there was now an 'Old' and 'New Europe', the former not aligned with US foreign policy and therefore ostensibly becoming irrelevant in international affairs. A neoconservative commentator encapsulated the war-mongering mood in Washington DC as he characterized the US as from Mars and Europe from Venus (Kagan 2003), borrowing the title from a bestselling relationship self-help book purportedly characterizing the differences between men and women, respectively. Whichever label one uses, it was clear that the world's only super-power was highly capable of driving a stake through the heart of the EU, preventing unified opposition to global American military supremacy. To top it off, by May 2003 France and Germany no longer argued that the invasion was illegal, and instead voted to pass UN Security Council Resolution 1483, sanctioning the US and UK as occupying powers of Iraq (thereby effectively legitimizing the invasion). Once the United States obliterated the Iraqi government, France and Germany dropped their resistance and jumped on the bandwagon.

National politics also resurfaced during the Eurozone, and especially Greek, debt crises. This reveals that not only can the world's sole superpower stir division amongst EU member states, but that these member states are perfectly capable of stirring deep divides amongst themselves without any help from Uncle Sam. The US even sought to promote stimulus measures instead of austerity but to no avail. The deepest divide is between creditor/surplus and debtor/deficit member states, most prominently represented by Germany and Greece, respectively. Popular narratives in the press and between various political forces can be generalized as follows (Fidler 2015): (1) Germany is either hard-working, financially disciplined and worthy of its wealth, or a hegemon imposing its will to suck debtor countries dry to bail out German banks that conducted excessively risky investments before the 2008 Wall Street crash; and (2) Greece is either lazy, corrupt and financially irresponsible, or the most blatant victim of contemporary German imperialism and the frontline in the battle against austerity in the EU. Regardless of which narrative is closer to the truth, this dichotomization in popular and elite circles (even if a caricature) is relevant because it demonstrates the limits of EU-wide unity and solidarity when political economies are still predominantly nationally oriented – despite the decades-long consolidation of EU-wide supranational institutions and governance structures. That is, the capacity to raise revenue via taxation and sovereign debt, and to engage in such expenditures as deposit insurance for banks, as well as pensions and social welfare, are still

organized nationally in the Eurozone, rendering them subject to national politics and international conflict.

The heightened tensions between Germany and Greece seriously put into question the future of continued EU integration, for example in July 2015 when Germany floated the idea of Greece exiting the Eurozone (nicknamed 'Grexit') in order to return to its national currency and devalue its way out of its massive sovereign debt (Irwin 2015). The integrity of a currency union assumes that each state's debt is as good as any other's, but if one can exit the union and effectively default, this implies, in this case, that German debt is safer than Greek debt. Member state succession has been a taboo topic in EU treaty negotiations, as the assumption was always towards 'an ever closer union', but this taboo has been broken on numerous occasions since 2009 in the context of how to deal with the Eurozone crisis. Indeed, a British exit ('Brexit') from the EU itself (which never joined the Eurozone) is also on the table, after Prime Minister David Cameron's referendum in 2016 on continued British membership of the EU. Hence, after decades, continued EU integration and increasing supranationalism is no longer a given: on multiple occasions since the onset of the Eurozone crisis in 2009, observers, political elites and investors seriously broached the topic of EU disintegration – or at the very least a return to the primacy of nation-state sovereignty.

For these reasons, after just over a decade since its creation, the integrity of the euro is tarnished and its future no longer unquestioned. Given that doubts have been raised over the very viability of the euro – let alone whether Eurozone members would be able to agree on the creation of 'eurobonds' funded by a supranational taxation policy in order to conduct EU-wide bank bail outs – it is unlikely that the EU can challenge the role of the US dollar as global reserve and transactions currency, which is a core component of American financial hegemony. More generally, no other concentration of power can play a similar role of backstop for global capitalism, as its ultimate guarantor. Certainly no IO can conceivably play this role of American hegemony in the contemporary era. But what of the foreseeable future? Does the rise of China-centered IOs present a possible alternative?

China-centered international organizations

From the very name of this heading, China-centered IOs are unlikely to break free from their core sponsor, the Chinese state. This will probably be the case for as long as the Chinese Communist Party maintains power in China. But can the Chinese state break free from the IOs that were established under the aegis of American hegemony and present an alternative to the world order that these IOs serve to maintain, that is, a more or less liberal global capitalism? In the midst and aftermath of the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression, there were calls for new policies and regulations, and even for a new financial, or at least monetary, international order. China was perhaps the most persistent in making these calls, with the governor of the Peoples' Bank of China (Zhou 2009)

publicly calling for a reduced international role for the US dollar, and increasing the role of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights. Brazil's Finance Minister Mantega was more accusatory (Wolf 2010), charging the US with starting a 'currency war' via quantitative easing (which was not explicitly designed to devalue the US dollar, but would be the predictable consequence).

In the context of these debates and accusations essentially decrying American hegemony in global finance, some of the largest non-Western countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – joined together and inaugurated an annual BRICS summit in an effort to promote greater South–South cooperation. These calls led to what this chapter terms the fourth wave of IOs. Note that this wave is distinct from the second wave in that these post-2008 IOs and gatherings are almost never explicitly anti-capitalist. Rather, their calls for greater South–South cooperation are to gain a seat at the table of global governance in global capitalism, without challenging the existence of the latter. Indeed, they continue to diplomatically and financially support the core IOs with their origins in the first wave 70 years ago: the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. In fact China is one of the most active WTO member states in terms of bringing trade cases against others for adjudication (and is also a regular target of other members' cases).

Nevertheless, the fourth wave is significant in that there are now headline-grabbing IOs – namely the New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), headquartered in Shanghai and Beijing, China, respectively – that were not established under American hegemony, and are often interpreted as a challenge to the latter. The NDB is still very new – established in 2015 – so it is too early to say whether it has the potential to challenge the World Bank in the medium to long term. It is relevant to note, however, that Article 1 of the NDB's Agreement (2014) states its purpose as 'complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development', rather than challenging them. In this case, while NDB loans may have few of the extensive conditionalities tied to IMF and World Bank loans, the latter international financial institutions (IFIs) do not seem to be going out of business anytime soon. In fact, the IMF's global role has been enhanced by the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, after some concerns in the first years of the twenty-first century that the IMF was becoming increasingly maligned, especially in Latin America with the rise of several leftist governments. But the IMF surged into action around the world, including in the Eurozone, and China certainly continues to take the IMF seriously. In 2009 China pledged an increase of up to $50 billion in IMF funding (IMF 2013), and in 2014–2015 made significant lobbying efforts to include its currency in the IMF's Special Drawing Rights as part of its ongoing efforts to boost its credibility and role in global finance.

From the perspective of offering an alternative to the American-centered system, the AIIB is more significant due to the circumstances of its establishment. The United States lobbied its allies to refuse to join the AIIB, but some of its closest allies, such as Australia, Germany, France, the Netherlands, South Korea and, most of all, Britain, joined anyway in 2015. This marks possibly the first

major rift in the West in relation to the rise of China – or to put it more bluntly, the first time key American allies such as Britain and South Korea have gone against American policy concerning Asian geopolitics, instead apparently siding with China. Surely this is one of the most embarrassing diplomatic flops suffered by the United States in East Asia since the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam in 1975. Naturally, many commentators see this as stark evidence of the decline of American hegemony in the face of the rise of China.

One scholar (Hung 2009, 2015), however, argues that China's initiative in creating the AIIB is actually a sign of Chinese retreat from bilateral aid relations. For over a decade China has been offering vast sums of loans on a bilateral basis (over $650 billion from 2001 to 2011), especially to countries in Africa. But these loans are invariably attached to the condition of awarding the infrastructure projects to Chinese state-owned enterprises, which even bring their own Chinese workforce. More and more African elites, from South Africa to Zambia, Angola to Nigeria, have characterized these Chinese bilateral loans as neo-colonialism. It is partially in this context that China is now reversing its insistence on bilateral relations and is creating multilateral financial institutions to improve its image and gain greater acceptance and legitimacy. This is especially important in Asia as China's escalating actions since 2012 in asserting its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas has backfired and soured relations with its various neighbors. Moreover, China needs the AIIB to be rated triple-A in order to access cheap and easier financing (Zhao 2015). China's own sovereign credit rating is AA-, so the inclusion of Germany, Switzerland and the UK, among others, will help to shore up the AIIB's credibility.

In any case, it is unclear how a vehicle for infrastructure investment, whether the NDB or the AIIB, seriously challenges the IMF and World Bank – let alone American hegemony in global capitalism. Even if all contracts are exclusively awarded to Chinese state-owned enterprises, which seems unlikely since other nations are involved (57 member states in the case of the AIIB, including the most technologically advanced nations in Europe), these infrastructure projects, once completed, would ostensibly be open for all firms to use, including American firms. Moreover, while infrastructure is crucial for the wheels of global capitalism to turn, what is more important for economic hegemony is developing lead TNCs at the pinnacle of advanced technology and knowledge that actually use this infrastructure: in this regard, Western, and in particular American, firms continue to dominate (Starrs 2013, 2014).

Thus, trillions of dollars will be invested in Asian infrastructure in future decades, and some of this will be financed by the World Bank, some by the Asian Development Bank, and some by the NDB and AIIB. While they may occasionally compete with each other over loans, there is certainly enough demand in infrastructure development for all these IFIs to coexist and even cooperate. The AIIB and Asian Development Bank (led by America's closest ally in East Asia, Japan) have indeed announced that they will cooperate managerially and financially on projects (ADB 2015). Either way, it should be stressed that financing from IFIs (including the IMF and World Bank) pales in comparison to financing by private

foreign capital, which follows the rhythms of American economic policy in part due to the continued dominance of Wall Street, the US dollar and the US Treasury Bill. The World Bank has estimated that the US government's quantitative easing accounted for roughly '60 per cent of the increase in capital flows into developing countries between 2009 and 2013' (Atkins 2014). This reaffirms and reinforces the central role that the United States plays in global capitalism, rendering it difficult for IOs to break free from states in general, and the United States in particular.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored a key issue in twenty-first-century world politics: can IOs evolve from intergovernmental governance towards supranationalism, and break free from states? Across the four waves of newly established IOs since the 1940s, the two IOs that are most commonly regarded as being the furthest down the path of supranationalism are the UN and the EU. But this chapter has shown that these IOs have limits to their supranationalism, especially when it comes to the core interests of the most powerful member states. In short, while the UN and EU operate at a more or less supranational level across a number of key issue areas – and offer an important space for the discussion and negotiation of collective problems – these IOs cannot contravene what the most powerful states consider their core interests. In this sense, IOs cannot supplant the state, as the latter is still the locus of concentrated power in world order.

It does not bode well for the capacity of IOs to elevate the advancement of human welfare above the mundane power politics of states when the IOs today which are most often regarded as challenging American hegemony are themselves centered upon a particular state, China. This is the case even if these China-centered IOs present an alternative world order in the foreseeable future, which this chapter argues that they do not. To challenge the role that the United States plays as guarantor and guardian of global capitalism, these or any other IOs must offer a coherent and credible alternative that overcomes the power politics of their intergovernmentalism. Otherwise they will likely remain divided in the face of American hegemony, which no state can challenge alone, including China. For these reasons, if IOs cannot break free from states on their own, then it is the people within states themselves that must restructure these states – including the United States – to increase the possibility of transforming IOs such that we may transcend parochial power interests and address global problems collectively.

Guide to further reading

For an expansive introduction to the study of IOs, see Weiss and Wilkinson's (2014) edited volume, *International Organizations and Global Governance*. For a realist argument concerning why IOs will never be able to challenge state

power, see Mearsheimer's (1994/1995) 'The False Promise of International Institutions'. For a liberal rejoinder, see Keohane and Martin's (1995) 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory'. For a more recent update on the liberal argument, see Ikenberry's (2014) 'The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order'. For a debate on whether IOs can promote world peace, see Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom's (2004) 'Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?' and Pevehouse and Russett's (2006) 'Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace'. On the central contradiction in the structure of the UN, see Cronin's (2002) 'The Two Faces of the United Nations: Between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism'. For a general theorization of the EU, see Pollack's (2005) 'Theorizing the European Union'. On the role that NATO has played in integrating the former Eastern Bloc into the EU and the West more generally, see Gheciu's (2005) 'Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the "New Europe"'. On the EU's relevance as a model for East Asia, see Beeson and Stone's (2013) 'The European Union Model's Influence in Asia after the Global Financial Crisis'. On the UN and the World Bank's different approaches to alleviating global poverty, see Joshi and O'Dell's (2013) 'Global Governance and Development Ideology: The United Nations and the World Bank on the Left-Right Spectrum'. On whether IOs can deal with climate change, see Etsy's (2009) 'Revitalizing Global Environmental Governance for Climate Change', as well as the rest of that special issue of *Global Governance.* On whether there is a fundamental shift in the world order in which IOs operate after the global financial crisis and the continued rise of emerging markets, see Brooks and Wohlforth's (2016) 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position', Cammack's (2012) 'The G20, the Crisis, and the Rise of Global Developmental Liberalism', Stuenkel's (2013) 'The Financial Crisis, Contested Legitimacy, and the Genesis of Intra-BRICS Cooperation' and Wade's (2011) 'Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF'. And finally, on challenges to IOs from below, see McNally's (2006) *Another World is Possible: Globalization and Anti-Capitalism.*

Chapter 6

Globalization and Governance

MARK BEESON

Of all the issues that will challenge policymakers in the twenty-first century, none is more important than the fate of the state. The state, after all, is at the center of national politics and power, and still remains the most consequential actor in the international system – or some states do, at least. As we shall see, while all states are subject to an array of forces we can conveniently package under the heading of 'globalization', not all states were created equal. On the contrary, one of the more important debates in contemporary international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE) is about the capacity of states to manage national affairs at a time of greater international economic integration and political interdependence. This is not simply an academic debate either: national living standards and overall security are increasingly determined by the state's interaction with the wider international system within which it is embedded.

This chapter details some of the more important manifestations and consequences of the interaction between individual nation-states and the structures, organizations and institutions that constitute the international system. As such, the subsequent discussion complements the more detailed analysis of specific international organizations (IOs) provided by Sean Starrs in Chapter 5. The intention here is briefly to map the evolution of the state as a domestic and international actor, before considering the impact of globalization on state capacity, autonomy and legitimacy. One of the most striking and paradoxical features of this story is the way that the state has become embedded in an international order that it has been instrumental in creating, and yet which has impinged on its sovereignty and ability to act independently (Cerny 1995).

The challenge for individual states – or more accurately, the policymakers and leaders who act on their behalf – in such an environment is to obtain the best outcomes they can from a national perspective while simultaneously contributing to the new modes of international interaction and cooperation upon which they have increasingly come to rely. These patterns of coordinated international action have their own buzzword: global governance. While global governance may still be 'poorly done and poorly understood' at times (Murphy 2000), it is an important – possibly indispensable – part of the evolving world order. The simple reality is that if human beings are to actually address key problems such as climate change (see Paterson and Gordon, Chapter 10), then some form of institutionalized cooperation is essential. After initially sketching the rise of the state,

therefore, I provide an overview of the globalization debate, before considering whether states have the capacity to create something resembling a truly global form of governance.

The rise and reconfiguration of the state

If students of IR can remember one date at the end of their studies, it is generally 1648. The Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War, is invariably seen as the birth of the modern state form. The key claim to historical significance resides in the fact that the Treaty helped establish the idea of a mutually constitutive system of states, each distinguished by independent sovereignty and authority within national borders. While it is clear that this is something of an arbitrary periodization and artificial distinction, given that the establishment of independent sovereign states was the outcome of a long-running historical process (Teschke 2003), the symbolism of 1648 is important, nevertheless. For the next 400 years or so, the nation-state would become the dominant, increasingly ubiquitous and most effective way of organizing and concentrating both administrative and coercive power. Indeed, so successful was the nation-state in this regard that it swept away all competitors and became the default form of political organization across the world (Giddens 1985; Spruyt 1994).

It is worth emphasizing at the outset, however, that there was nothing inevitable or teleological about the triumph of the state and its emergence in Western Europe; nor is there any guarantee that it will endure indefinitely. On the contrary, despite the fact that none of us have any direct experience of any alternative form of political order, the apparent naturalness of the state form is a product of specific historical circumstances that may prove to be the exception rather than the rule. But before we begin to think about the forces that may be undermining or reconfiguring the state, it is useful to remind ourselves of the qualities that propelled its rise and that of the West more generally.

The triumph of the West

To understand what Charles Tilly (1984) called 'big structures and large processes', it helps to take a long view. One of the more striking features of 'recent' human history has been the ascendancy of the West. The story of the rise of the West has been told many times (McNeil 1982), but it is worth emphasizing both how remarkable and how unexpected it was, as well as the factors that underpinned it. One thousand years ago the proverbial observer from Mars might have been forgiven for thinking that China would have inevitably become the world's dominant power – even after 1648. After all, China had the world's oldest continuing civilization and was the largest area of economic activity as recently as the mid-nineteenth century. Crucially, however, China did not develop the institutions that allowed capitalism to flourish and drive social change as it did in Western Europe (Wong 1997). This failure is all the more striking given that Francis

Fukuyama (2011) claims China developed a centralized state through conquest and war – an interaction that would confer important and enduring advantages on the proto-states of Europe.

As China is currently reassuming a position at the center of world affairs and beginning to exert an influence on rapidly changing patterns of international interaction, these issues are of more than historical curiosity. Europe's transformation from a feudal backwater to a dynamic capitalist economic system was a consequence of a unique set of historical circumstances in which the interplay of economic and coercive forces helped to consolidate the state form (Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1994). While the people of Western Europe may not have realized that they were effectively inventing the modern state and capitalism four or five hundred years ago that is precisely what they did. The question now is whether the 'collective action problems' they were attempting to solve then – political survival, conquest, economic development – are still essentially the same, as some would have us believe (Jervis 1998; Mearsheimer 2001), or whether we collectively face different problems in different circumstances, that will of necessity generate different forms of political order and conduct

There is an important contemporary debate about the nature of 'good' economic governance that is underpinned by a set of theoretical and normative assumptions. A key idea in this context is that appropriate and effective institutions are crucial determinants of economic development: without the 'right' institutions economic development is difficult if not impossible (North et al. 2009). This possibility has been central to some of the more influential explanations of the rise of the West: Europeans established institutions that encouraged trade and facilitated capital accumulation in a way that other parts of the world did not (North and Thomas 1973). According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 68) 'poor countries are poor because those that have power make choices that create poverty'. In other words, politics – in the form of predatory elites – stops different geographically demarcated societies from establishing institutions that will facilitate economic development. In this context the state remains critical.

The state debate

There are many types of states. The most common designation these days, perhaps, is between those states that have the capacity to act effectively and those that are failing. Along this continuum there is a good deal of variety, but even the most competent states come in different sizes. Norway or Singapore may be better run in some ways than the United States, which has recently become a byword for political dysfunction and polarization (Hacker and Pierson 2010), but America continues to matter in a way smaller states do not. Realist scholars are certainly right about one thing, at least: size continues to matter. The reason we are all so interested in China – and why its influence has grown so rapidly – is primarily because it has become the world's second largest economy.

China also reminds us of another enduring reality: there are many ways of organizing the internal architecture of states and the way that ruling elites

seek to manage economic activity. As we shall see, different ideas about economic management, at both the domestic and international levels, remain one of the sharpest points of distinction between different countries. Even in a supposedly global era there are very different ideas about the appropriate role of the state in such processes. Indeed, Reus-Smit (1999) argues that the 'moral purpose of the state' is a contingent reflection of culture and history that varies across time and space. At this stage, however, it is important to recognize that the way that states are organized – especially as far as their relationships with the underpinning societies in which they are embedded are concerned – is a crucial determinant of national prosperity and security (Migdal 2001).

Much of this debate revolves around generic questions of 'state capacity' (Skocpol 1985; Kohli 2004), or the ability of governments to actually put their preferred policies into action. Even at the domestic level policy implementation is complex and contested: not only is there a question of whether state officials have the expertise to devise policy, but there is the additional challenge of dealing with powerful vested interests who may oppose change. The simple reality is that policy change – whether the domestic or the international variety – always creates winners and losers. Some states, however, have greater amounts of what Michael Mann (1993: 59) described as 'infrastructural power', or the power to 'penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions'.

Peter Evans (1995) made a similar point in his influential discussion of embedded autonomy, in which he suggested that some states have a greater capacity to coordinate and act through society to achieve policy goals. The possibility that states may have different capacities – and even desires – to try and implement different sorts of policies raises a series of questions that are especially germane to the current discussion. First, if some 'varieties of capitalism' are actually more effective and successful, as a growing number of observers claim (Hall and Soskice 2001; Beeson 2013), what happens when these models compete on the international stage? Will individual states try to promote their 'model' and the domestic interests it currently supports and possibly advantages? Second, even if we accept that some ways of organizing political and economic activities are likely to prove more successful than others, can such differences actually be sustained in an era distinguished by growing levels of international integration? In other words, will international competitive pressures encourage a process of policy convergence or emulation as actors recognize 'best practice' (Dobbin et al. 2007)? Alternatively, will powerful states retain the capacity to shape not only their own domestic practices, but also those of the international system more generally?

In short, will global governance reflect the preferences of the powerful rather than optimal policy responses to collective action problems at the international level? Before we can begin to answer such questions we need to consider what constraints or opportunities 'globalization' presents to individual states.

The age of globalization

If ever a word seemed to capture the spirit of an era, it is globalization. Other words such as 'interdependence' had also become prominent thanks to the pioneering work of Keohane and Nye (1977), but none have come close to globalization's ubiquity or apparent ability to capture the multidimensional, omnipresent nature of forces that are apparently transforming the international system. Since the 1990s in particular, it has become difficult to find scholarly articles that don't make reference to globalization in some form or other and its possible impact on politics, economics, security and even human consciousness. Inevitably, however, there has been a critical backlash with some scholars questioning the accuracy and usefulness of a term that apparently says so much with such brevity (Hirst and Thompson 1996). Before we consider such criticisms, it is important to try and spell out what it means and why it became so popular.

What's in a name?

Even though globalization as an idea has only become prominent over the last few decades, some scholars argue that if we take it to mean greater interconnectedness at a global level, then something like globalization has been around for hundreds of years (Frank and Gills 1996). Migration has been one of the most important and dynamic forces in human history. It still is, as recent events in Europe remind us. The European experience is also a reminder of the possible importance of political borders. Whatever we may think about the desirability or otherwise of borders as a social fact, there is no doubt that they have become more important and tightly demarcated over time. As we have already seen, sovereign control over, and authority in, a specific political space is one of the defining characteristics of individual nation-states. Globalization has consequently always represented a potential challenge to political leaders whose authority is based on a national frame of reference.

Clearly, the nature of this challenge has changed over time. One of the more striking features of the contemporary era has been the remarkable decline in the incidence of inter-state war (Russett and Oneal 1998). Given the importance that the dynamics of conflict, conquest and survival played in the formation of the European nation-state this is a potentially important – not to say welcome – development. We may not like war much, but there is little doubt that it has played a critical role in shaping the modern world and our expectations of how the state should behave and even about ourselves as individual human actors. Indeed, many observers of a realist disposition believe that human nature is the immutable driving force of international politics. It is not necessary to agree with such claims to recognize that violence has been a key element of the historical evolution of human societies and of the international system of states (Schweller 2014).

Seen in this context, it is no coincidence, perhaps, that the idea of globalization became so prominent during the 1990s when geoeconomics seemed to have

trumped geopolitics. In the aftermath of the Cold War's end the world abruptly shifted from a bipolar order to what some saw as a stable, durable era of American unipolarity (Wohlforth 1999). We now know, of course, that the era of unchallenged American primacy was remarkably short-lived and concomitant expectations about the 'end of history' were premature to say the least. What matters for our purposes is that the very idea of globalization seemed to capture the spirit of the time as the attention of policymakers during the 1990s began to focus on national *economic* competitiveness, rather than traditional security concerns and threats. In this context, discussions of globalization began to focus more intently on the economic and political dimensions of the evolving order and their possible implications for state authority and capacity (Lake 2010). As is often the way in the social sciences, there was no universal agreement on what they might be.

The globalization debate

While there may not have been universal agreement about the impact of globalization, there has been greater consensus on some of its possible underlying properties. One widely cited contribution to a rapidly expanding literature succinctly captures the salient points:

> a processes (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.
> (Held et al. 1999b: 16)

Human interactions have been speeding up and becoming institutionally denser; they also routinely transcend national and even regional boundaries. Put simply, the commonsensical idea that the world's a more interconnected and 'smaller' place looks correct. The scholarly literature has attempted to impose a little more specificity on what threatens to become an unwieldy, imprecise and contentious subject matter.

Some of the component parts of processes associated with globalization have become emblematic of the new order. The computer and the shipping container, for example, have become vital cogs in an increasingly transnational economic order. One of the most important features of economic globalization has been the capacity to disaggregate the production process, relocating elements of manufacturing activities to take advantage of lower employment costs, resources and access to end markets (Dicken 2011). The establishment of production networks and value chains that transcend national borders has been one of the most important and distinctive aspects of this process. But organizing something as complex as 'factory Asia', for example, requires technologically sophisticated logistical capabilities and an ability to transport components cheaply and reliably (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 2015). This is precisely what has developed over the last few

decades and it has transformed both the way transnational corporations (TNCs) organize their businesses and their relationships with host governments.

One of the reasons that the idea of globalization evokes such diverse opinions is that it has so many dimensions and they impinge differently on different actors. Many corporations in the private sector have clearly benefited from their enhanced ability to take advantage of different production locations around the world (Yeung 2009). As a consequence, individual nation-states find themselves in a competition to attract potentially mobile foreign investment. This is a relatively novel challenge for any government, but it is an especially difficult problem for the governments of smaller states who may be much less powerful international actors than the massive corporations with which they seek to engage (Barnet and Cavanagh 1995).

In order to lure TNCs, national governments may find themselves locked in a potentially zero-sum competition with other, similarly positioned rival states (Rudra 2008). The need to offer inducements such as tax holidays and non-unionized workforces has encouraged the growth of special economic zones in many developing countries. While this may provide investment and jobs, it may not lead to the sort of industrial 'deepening' that will underpin sustainable and widespread economic development. This is why state 'intervention' and industry policies remain part of the economic toolkit of the successful late-industrializing states in East Asia (Lin 2012; Beeson 2014). Even established, successful industrialized nations frequently feel compelled to offer incentives to attract key industries that might otherwise locate elsewhere or leave. The departure of the car manufacturing industry from Australia is a classic example of the consequences that withdrawing industry support may have.

States and markets

As a consequence of these sorts of developments in what is sometimes described as the 'real economy' what might be described as the balance of power between private sector actors and the state has in many cases shifted decisively towards TNCs in particular and footloose international capital more generally. Adding to the difficulties faced by individual governments is the fact that it is increasingly difficult to tax effectively TNCs that are able to utilize tax minimization strategies such as transfer pricing and profit shifting (Bartelsman and Beetsma 2003). At one level this is a 'technical' problem and relates to the difficulty of understanding, much less combating, the elaborate avoidance schemes designed by the richly rewarded teams of lawyers and accountants that work for powerful TNCs. At another level, however, states are – to some extent, at least – the architects of their own problems. TNCs operate in, and take advantage of, a regulatory environment that has been created by states.

While it is true that some states have played a much more prominent role in such processes than others, the basic claim remains: TNCs and other actors in the international system are still reliant on states to solve collective action problems and to provide the sort of regulatory environment that actually allows cross-border

commerce to take place securely. Despite the fact that private sector actors have assumed a much more prominent role in providing important elements of the institutional environment within which they operate, states continue to underpin what Bell and Hindmoor (2009: 191) call a form of hierarchical 'metagovernance'. Even where states have apparently shifted authority for some governance arrangements to the private sector, they still provide the underlying foundations of legality and security upon which such arrangements rely. No issue area better illustrates the complex interplay of the private and public sectors, or the continuing role of the state, more than the financial sector.

In Chapter 11 Mennillo and Sinclair explain how and why financial crises have become such a recurring and destabilizing feature of the IR landscape. What is not always sufficiently appreciated, however, is the fact that states themselves were instrumental in creating the very international institutional architecture and regulatory environment that is now causing them such problems.

The creation of huge, structurally important financial markets could not have happened in quite the way that it did without the active participation of some of the more powerful states of the era (Andrews 1994; Helleiner 1994). Not only did the United States play by far the dominant role in establishing the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, but it also created the conditions that ultimately led to its transformation (Pauly 1997).

The erosion of what Ruggie (1982) famously described as 'embedded liberalism' captures something important and enduring about the way the international system operates, especially in the economic arena. The sort of national economic sovereignty that was part of the immediate post-war order has been significantly reduced by the growth of financial markets, greater flows of mobile capital and an ideologically inspired belief that markets were better than states when it came to determining major economic outcomes (Evans 1997). The very idea that there is any longer such a thing as a discrete 'national economy' that states can manage has been called into question as the transnationalization and cross-border integration of economic processes blurs economic boundaries (Sturgeon and Gereffi 2009). The idea that there is a distinct 'national economic interest' has become little more than a politically mandatory rhetorical flourish. States consequently find themselves sandwiched between potentially incompatible domestic and international pressures over which they have a limited capacity to exert influence. Whether policymakers like it or not, though, their ability to shape the expectations of nationally based populations is increasingly determined by, and reliant on, external relationships of global governance.

Global governance

The possibility that human life might be governed or made orderly has been a core concern of analysts of political activity since ancient Greece. For much of the intervening period a preoccupation with understanding the role of national political systems and, more recently, the role of the state became prominent. Even

those scholars who focused primarily on the world of IR generally assumed that the state was the key actor in such processes. Indeed, for many scholars of a realist persuasion, the lessons drawn by Thucydides in his analysis of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) remain as relevant today as they were in his own time. And yet even a cursory examination of today's 'global' order suggests that there is much that is profoundly different about the way the international system operates and about its constituent parts. The key conceptual question that emerges as a consequence is whether we need new tools and theories to understand the way the world currently works.

The assumption that states exist in an anarchical self-help system that places a premium on survival no longer looks analytically compelling. At the very least it is strikingly at odds with the idea that governance is about establishing and institutionalizing the 'rules of the game' so that actors know how to behave in any given set of circumstances (March and Olsen 1989; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). There is a very large literature that explores the role of institutions in providing the sort of formal and informal frameworks that allow complex social networks and relations to develop. Without such institutions a range of human activities from billiards to banking would not be possible. The distinguishing feature of the latter these days, of course, is that it no longer occurs within a national framework. In other words, to solve some collective action problems cooperation and coordination across national borders have become a functional necessity.

What is most noteworthy about the evolution of governance in recent times is the existence of what James Rosenau famously described as 'governance without government'. In this formulation, global order refers to 'those routinized arrangements through which world politics gets from one moment in time to the next' (Rosenau 1992: 5). The crucial insight and claim here was not just that politics occurs at a level beyond that of individual nation-states, but that there is a growing institutional infrastructure that is composed of other actors as well as states that potentially permits behaving in a predictable and orderly fashion at the international level. In other words, while states undoubtedly remain important, global order or governance involves a growing array of non-state actors, which both facilitate and determine patterns of transnational interaction.

It is the existence and growth of non-state actors in activities that were formerly the preserve of states or which occurred primarily within national borders that is generally taken to define the era of possible global governance. I say possible because, as I noted at the outset, many observers are unconvinced about the effectiveness and/or the extent of global governance. Such views cannot be dismissed out of hand. On the contrary, Daniel Drezner (2007) makes the very salient point that the great powers still play a very prominent role in deciding precisely *which* rules of the game will apply in any issue area at any time. This is why the creation of the post-war international order under the auspices of American hegemony was not only an expression of its power, but also of its values (Latham 1997). It is also why possible challenges to America's ideational and institutional dominance are such potentially significant developments.

Nevertheless, it is also clear that many of the activities and responsibilities that were formerly the jealously protected prerogatives of sovereign states have now been passed on, or taken up, by non-state actors. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) have detailed the extraordinary number of business organizations, corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 'epistemic communities' that are involved in actually running or providing the rationale for different forms of regulation and coordination outside of the state. Importantly, they suggested that conduct need not be enforced or rule bound to be susceptible to effective governance. In other words, actors may act and institutions may operate because they subscribe to particular norms about the way that they *ought* to behave. In this context, the remarkable growth in the number and density of NGOs in particular has attracted a good deal of analytical attention as one of the key features of global governance (Boli and Thomas 1999).

Another distinctive feature of evolving patterns of governance at the international level is the number of new organizations that enjoy a degree of authority and legitimacy that has been traditionally associated with states (Cutler et al. 1999). Indeed, in yet another noteworthy development that has contributed to the relative decline of the state, domestic politics – in democratic states, at least – has become a byword for dysfunction and disengagement as far as much of the population is concerned (Hay 2007). There are some further paradoxical aspects of this evolving order. On the one hand, some states have given responsibility to key aspects of the policymaking process to unelected technocrats who are judged to have the requisite expertise to manage a particular issue area. The rise of independent central banks with responsibility for monetary policy is one of the most important exemplars of this possibility (Solomon 1995).

On the other hand, however, the very fact that such people are unelected raises important questions about their legitimacy and accountability (Keohane et al. 2009). In liberal democracies formal accountability is a fundamental element of the political system, even if it is realized imperfectly at times. The fact that powerful bureaucrats exercise so much power either domestically or – even more controversially – internationally has led to widespread criticisms about the content and origins of the policy paradigms to which they subscribe. The most visible examples of this possibility have been the long-standing criticisms of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which are frequently depicted as little more than agents of American imperialism (Wade 2003b). While it is clear that the United States has exercised a disproportionate influence over the way these organizations act and the ideas they promote, it is not clear how easily the United States or any other state can exercise power and control over such agencies.

Power and contestation in global governance

Although debate about the impacts and even desirability of global – or more realistically, perhaps, regional – governance remains inconclusive, there is more agreement about its possible constituent parts. Thomas Weiss provides one of the

best overviews of the debate and a broadly indicative formulation of the overall phenomenon. According to Weiss, global governance refers to the

> collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve… it is the combination of the informal and formal values, rules, norms, procedures, practices, policies and organizations of various types that often provides a surprising and desirable degree of global order, stability, and predictability. (Weiss 2013: 32)

The important points to stress here are about the collaborative nature of possible responses to problems that individual states cannot solve or provide for when acting alone. And yet while we may be able to agree on who or what some of the more important drivers, principles and actors in processes associated with global governance actually are, working out who has the power and capacity to really make a difference remains a much more complex task. One of the most influential attempts to make sense of the way global governance actually happens has been developed by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval, who usefully distinguish between different forms of power in the international system.

For Barnett and Duvall power is manifest through social relations and can be direct or diffuse. 'Compulsory power' is direct and refers to the way that some actors have power over others. Great powers typically have greater material resources than smaller powers and can coerce or cajole compliance. Such hierarchical relations of domination and subordination have been a long-standing part of the international system, even if one that has not always been recognized in much mainstream IR scholarship (Hobson and Sharman 2005). And yet this sort of 'structural power', which refers to the 'determination of social capacities and interests', is one of the defining characteristics of any interaction between actors with different material and even ideational assets (Barnett and Duval 2005: 18). Indeed, some actors are consequently able to utilize a form of 'institutional power', which refers to more indirect and diffuse forms of influence, and is one of the distinctive features of the modern international system. As we have seen, IFIs and a range of other increasingly important actors can influence and constrain the conduct of notionally sovereign states at a distance through indirect forms of influence.

What Barnett and Duvall (2005: 20) call 'productive power' is, perhaps, the most distinctive feature of the contemporary system and emblematic of new forms of governance. Productive power refers to

> the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general scope. Conceptually, the move is away from structures, per se, to systems of signification and meaning … to networks of social forces perpetually shaping one another.

This conceptualization is in sympathy with, and reflective of, broader trends in IR scholarship that are sensitive to a shift in the relative importance of material and

ideational power (Checkel 1998). One of the most important features of the contemporary international system in this regard is that inter-state war has become extremely rare (Pinker 2012). Persuading, rather than coercing, other states into compliance is much more common in today's world, as scholars working in a broadly Marxist tradition have pointed out for many years (Cox 1987). While there is still an abundance of violence and a growing list of new security threats in the world, as the chapters by Kennedy-Pipe and Waldman and Phillips make clear in this volume, the key dynamics among the world's most 'developed' economies and polities has not been one in which the direct application of coercive or structural power has been paramount. On the contrary, and despite the ending of the Cold War and its virulent ideological struggles, some of the most important contemporary international contests occur in the ideational realm and manifest themselves in the contest over the construction of institutions and organizations that effectively constitute the mechanisms and constituent parts of global governance (Mastanduno 2009; Vestergaard and Wade 2015).

The contest to define the international institutional architecture, its possible role and the principles it subscribes to, promises to be one of the most important issues of the twenty-first century.

Is global governance feasible? What would it look like?

Globalization presents novel challenges, especially for states. The state's unchallenged authority and capacities are no longer assured. For some states, of course, they never were. But even if we recognize that some states have been much more influential in shaping the international system and the rules, norms and practices that seek to govern it, the reality is that all states are more conscious of, and constrained by, 'external' influence and limitations than they have ever been before. Indeed, for some observers, it is the state itself that is the principal site of political transformation as it is reshaped by processes we associate with globalization and global governance. Shahar Hameri and Lee Jones argue that the widely held idea that there is currently a 'crisis of global governance' misses the new ways in which powerful agencies interact and influence state actions. Consequently they argue that the influence of transnational actors

> is exercised not through the zero-sum transfer of sovereign authority from states to supranational agencies, but through cultivating institutional changes within states themselves. Thus, international institutions are not governing global problems directly, but neither are they necessarily defunct merely because multilateral negotiations are deadlocked. Rather, they have shifted in purpose from coordinating intergovernmental action to harmonizing policies, institutions and procedures across state borders. (Hameiri and Jones forthcoming)

Plainly, there is something in this. The European Union (EU) remains the benchmark for demonstrating just how far states can go in not only 'pooling' hitherto

sacrosanct sovereignty, but also in how extensively they are willing to reconfigure the internal architecture of states (Majone 1997; Sabel and Zeitlin 2010). The EU has already developed deeply interconnected transboundary mechanisms with which to coordinate its actions in ways that are strikingly at odds with much mainstream IR theory. And yet the EU also serves as a painful and prominent reminder of the limits to such cooperation: when faced by a seemingly unending series of economic and social crises, the EU also demonstrates that there are still important, seemingly non-negotiable limits to how much states are actually willing to cooperate for the greater good (Hall 2012; Webber 2014).

Of the many possible consequences of the EU's problems, none is potentially greater than its declining influence as a model to be emulated (Beeson and Stone 2013). It is hard to overstate the symbolic importance of the EU in this regard: it remains the benchmark against which successful regional and even global cooperation is measured. If the EU breaks up or is significantly modified and diminished as a result of the current crop of crises, then it is not unreasonable to assume that the prospects for global governance as a feasible goal will also be badly affected. This would be a very significant historical development at any time, but it is especially significant at a time when there are a number of 'rising powers' with very different ideas about the way the world might be run (see Bisley, Chapter 1).

Two points are worth emphasizing in this context. First, a number of the most prominent states that are currently playing a growing role in the international system are authoritarian (Gat 2007). There is currently an important debate about whether the rising powers will be 'socialized' into accepting the rules, norms and principles of the extant system, or whether they will seek to change it to reflect their own values and further their own interests (Ikenberry 2008; Johnston 2008). On this question the jury, as they say, is still out. What we can say, however, is that there are very different ideas about how economic and political activities in particular ought to be organized (Beeson and Li 2015). The second point to make, therefore, is that because the 'Western' model appears to be experiencing so many problems in places like the EU and the United States this has reinforced the perception that there are alternative models of political and economic organization; in China's case, at least, they appear to have been remarkably successful.

In this context China's rise is especially significant because it provides an alternative vision to the increasingly discredited 'Washington consensus'. Indeed, China is playing a more influential role in the existing international order and even developing new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with which to promote its own ideas and interests (Dollar 2015). It is not necessary to think such developments are desirable or that the alternative Chinese vision is attractive or sustainable to recognize that it is likely to present a challenge to the extant way of doing things. If the influence of 'the West' is consequently in decline then the nature of global governance will reflect this shift in the underlying structural distribution of power. The question will be whether China or any of the other rising powers can translate this material weight into some form of institutionalized productive power and transform the way governance occurs at the global level.

Concluding remarks

Global governance remains a work in progress, and one primarily confined to the political and economic arenas. Although there is growing literature of 'security governance', this has tended to be realized at the regional level at best, and the most prominent exemplar thus far has been the beleaguered EU (Kirchner and Sperling 2007). Indeed, the re-emergence of geopolitics on Europe's borders and the disintegration of order across much of the Middle East serve as a reminder of just how limited the reach of effective transnational governance actually is, and just how decisive the role of the state remains. Without a functioning state there is little possibility of creating the political or institutional space in which international cooperation and coordination can be realized. And yet the simple existence of state capacity is no guarantee that international cooperation is likely to occur either. On the contrary, not only are there a number of 'rogue' states in the world with little interest in international cooperation – especially on 'Western' terms – but even supposedly prominent members of the so-called 'international community', such as Russia, seem intent on undermining rather than supporting the international system.

Given recent events it is all too easy to despair of the prospects for global governance, and much else besides. And yet some of the smartest contemporary IR scholars think that world government is not only normatively desirable (Cabrera 2006), but actually inevitable (Wendt 2003). Inspiring as some of these thinkers undoubtedly are, realists have a point when they suggest that we should look at the world as it is, rather than as it ought to be. Even here there are cautious grounds for optimism, however. Economic interdependence – one of the foundations and drivers of global governance – really does seem to have changed the way that states conduct foreign policy (Gartzke 2007). True, the so-called 'national interest' may be at the rhetorical forefront of such processes, but policymakers everywhere seem to realize that they have much to lose by jeopardizing patterns of cooperation and integration that have underpinned a post-war international order that has delivered prosperity and stability to large parts of the planet. These are important achievements and they owe much to an institutionalized international order. We forget that at our peril.

Guide to further reading

The late James Rosenau made a number of seminal contributions to debates in this area including the ground-breaking edited collection *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* and 'Governance in the Twenty-first Century' (1995). An accessible and very good overview of the debates is provided by Thomas Weiss, *Global Governance: Why? What? Whither?* (2013). Philip Cerny has provided good overviews of this topic in earlier editions of this book, as well as in 'Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action' (1995). An important argument about the continuing importance of the state is made by Daniel Drezner in *All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes* (2007).

Chapter 7

Regions and Regionalism

LOUISE FAWCETT

This chapter considers the meaning and significance of regions and regionalism and their roles in international politics today. It does so by first considering how regionalism as a concept has come to be defined and understood, and by exploring its characteristics and contours in European and non-European settings. The chapter then tracks the major developments in the history and theory of regionalism. It is particularly concerned to illustrate regionalism as a global process, one that is not uniquely associated with any single regional experience. In that sense it seeks to move beyond a commonly held Eurocentric bias in studies of regionalism and consider regional processes in Latin America, Africa and Asia. In highlighting its contemporary significance it qualifies the notion that regionalism has experienced exponential growth since the end of the Cold War – a point brought sharply into focus by the continuing crisis of the European Union (EU). Rather, it argues that regionalism today needs to be understood as part of a complex architecture of multilateralism.

Distinguishing features

The question under discussion in this chapter is the role of world regions and regionalism – understood as regional organizations, policies and understandings – in international politics. Regions and regionalism undoubtedly present themselves as important aspects of international politics in the twenty-first century, as evidenced by the large number of regional associations in existence around the world and their increasingly diverse range of activities. Most states of the world, with few exceptions, are members of at least half a dozen regional organizations. A brief snapshot of the world of regionalism reveals multiple examples of economic cooperation in the form of preferential or free trade areas; security regionalism in the form of non-proliferation treaties or peace operations; as well a political cooperation over environmental, employment or human rights issues. Cooperation in such areas is visible in regions all over the world, from the South Pacific to the North Atlantic, from Scandinavia to Southern Africa.

However, against this picture of proliferation, one that has caused authors to speak of the 'global politics of regionalism' (Farrell et al. 2005) lies a more complex multilateral architecture of governance. Regional association is part of a

shifting web of overlapping, formal and informal multilateral structures involving states and non-state actors. Claims that the world has become more 'regionalized', particularly since the Cold War's ending, or that the state or multilateral organization has given way to the greater power and attractiveness of regionalism have proved unfounded or premature. Even the flagship of regional integration, the EU, whose early promise was reflected in the slogan 'ever closer union' has floundered amid economic and political crises of such magnitude, that in 2016 its very future lies in doubt. At best we can argue, uncontroversially, that regionalism has come to occupy a very significant place in international politics but that place is fluid and contested and one that is shared by a range of other actors and organizations, both regional and global, state and non-state.

The above point is well illustrated by the multiple and overlapping global and regional associations of states (and non-state actors) which exist today, some competitive, some complementary. Any given Latin American state, for example, will be part of the United Nations (UN) family the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), possibly also the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), or World Trade Organization (WTO) but also a host of smaller associations, whether the Andean Community (CAN), or the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) to name just a few possibilities. Colombia, in 2016, was a member of 12 different regional organizations alone. These different associations reflect the varied interests, identities and personalities of states, and the importance states accord to regional as opposed to wider multilateral structure will vary according to issue area and circumstances. Indeed, states will cherry pick from a menu of regional and global organizations depending on the issue area.

In international relations (IR), regions are best understood as interdependent geographical units, often states; and the related politics of regionalism is therefore those common policies and understandings agreed upon by members of these units. Regionalization is a related but distinct term often used to refer to less formal, often undirected economic and social activity within a particular region; it may precede or flow from regionalism itself (Fawcett 2005: 24–25; Hurrell 1995: 40–41). Although many different definitions and interpretations of regions, regionalism and regionalization have been offered over the years, with adjustments made to incorporate more informal or formal processes, state and non-state actors, this basic formula which draws in part on the early work of Joseph Nye on comparative regionalism has stood the test of time and is probably still the one most cited or drawn upon by subsequent authors (Nye 1968: vii).

Though regions and regionalisms cannot be isolated to any particular historical period – within any imperial or state system a region or regions may enjoy particular significance – they have featured most prominently in international politics since 1945 (Fawcett 1995). This is unsurprising, partly because of the newness of the discipline: IR did not exist as a subject of independent study until the early twentieth century and at that time international regions were little theorized as a separate category of analysis, though their potential ordering properties had started to come under scrutiny in the works of a scholar like Karl

Polanyi (Dale 2016: 19). It is also unsurprising, given the growth of international organization (IO) in this period and the parallel concerns of powerful states in promoting their own regional interests after the Second World War. British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, for example, proposed that any IO should be underpinned by 'regional councils', arguing that 'it was only the countries directly affected by a dispute that could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to effect a settlement' (Kimball 1984: 225). This idea – though it has led to the criticism of partiality – has influenced the processes of regionalism since. Informed by debates around the foundation of the UN and by the parallel development of first Arab, American, European, and somewhat later, African and Asian institutions, their importance, whether in measured in terms of economic, political or social activity, grew steadily throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

While the Cold War was seen as a brake on regionalism and IO generally, because cooperation tended to revolve around the two Cold War blocs, the ending of the Cold War was viewed as an important turning point in the development and expansion of regionalism, ushering in a period dubbed 'new regionalism'. In removing the effects of Cold War bipolarity, it further empowered regional actors, giving them more autonomy while strengthening IO generally. In this way the Cold War's ending, together with the processes of globalization, accelerated the rise of today's rising powers, helping to complete a process of maturation since independence, and making them increasingly important regional actors. As Barry Buzan commented in respect of regional security patterns: 'The shift away from bipolarity towards a more polycentric power structure at the system level cannot but have profound consequences for regional security' (Buzan 1991: 208). The growth and development of regional organizations, though uneven, has continued into the twenty-first century, as witnessed by the increase in their numbers; their vastly expanded range of activities; and the growth of scholarly interest in the practices of an increasingly diverse group of regional and cross regional organizations (Borzel and Risse 2016: 623–630).

Regional organizations, and their names suggest this, are usually based upon geographical regions: the Organization of American States, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South Pacific Forum, mostly comprising neighboring, or at least proximate states, they need not be strictly geographical constructions. Organizations based upon other common variables that transcend geographical regions like a shared imperial history and trading patterns (in the case of the Commonwealth) or religion (in the case of the Islamic Conference Organization – ICO) are also referred to as regional; so is the cross-regional North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Further, they need not necessarily be composed only of states. One feature of regional developments since the ending of the Cold War, and studies of so-called 'new' regionalism associated with this period attest, is precisely that the state may

not be the only or even necessarily the most important actor in designing and driving regional policies: 'On the contrary, the new regionalism is characterized by its multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions' (Sodebaum 2003: 1–2). One example of non-state-based regionalism is the phenomenon of the cross-border region, or growth triangle, reflecting increased interactions across state borders (Perkmann and Sum 2002). Another example of the increasing role of non-state actors in regional processes is the influence that NGOs have in helping to define regional agendas, whether in respect of human rights (as in Southeast Asia) or the environment (as in Europe).

Without disregarding the importance of such phenomena, it is nonetheless a claim of this chapter that the state should still be seen as the main 'gatekeeper' of regionalism (Russet and Oneal: 1998), and that state-based regional organization, whether or not based on strict geographical regions, is the most helpful way to understand its contemporary significance. Even if non-state actors contribute to the design and construction of regional policies, it is the member states of regional organizations that are largely responsible for the delivery and implementation of such policies. Moreover, it is often the strongest states in regional organizations that are their most active promoters, suggesting how considerations of state power are closely related to explanations for regionalism.

Another distinguishing and empowering feature of regional organizations is their recognition by universal multilateral institutions. The League Covenant (in Article 22) and the UN Charter (see Chapter VIII especially Articles 51–54) both accorded formal status to regional 'understandings' and agencies. In the former case this recognition was limited and the only regional understanding mentioned was the Monroe Doctrine, which afforded the US a particular relationship in respect to South America (Zimmern 1945: 522). Whatever the founders' intentions regarding the development of these universal organizations, the language of their charters highlights how regionalism was always envisioned as a global process. In the case of the UN, the provision was much wider, admitting the delegation, by the Security Council, under certain circumstances, of its Chapter VII powers. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) also, despite its commitment to fostering a multilateral trading system, made provision, in Article 24, for regional arrangements, provided they did not discriminate against non-members. This official international sanctioning was important, giving regionalism a firm basis in international law. Arguably the success of regionalism has depended, in part, on its wider legitimization by the UN, though this does not imply that regional organizations have always operated within the letter of the UN Charter – NATO's intervention in the former Yugoslavia is one example – or enjoyed the capabilities to do so.

In a Cold War environment, the scope for IO to develop was limited, particularly among newly independent developing countries, who were more

concerned about state and nation building and without the necessary resources to develop regional association. It was six states of Western Europe, following the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which oversaw the establishment of the flagship regional organization, the European Economic Community (EEC), later the EU, which became the point of reference for many subsequent regional projects. Security regionalism, in Western Europe at least, was provided by NATO which was underwritten by the US. Not only did the existence of NATO greatly facilitate the ongoing processes of economic integration, it too became a model for security regionalism around the world. In this way, regionalism, in its early days, was often represented by the European project and its North Atlantic security accompaniment, with little attention paid to non-European areas. Some of the most famous works on regionalism, as suggested by the title of the work by Ernst Haas *The Uniting of Europe* reflect precisely on the European experience after the Second World War (Haas 1958). And many other world regions emerging in the post-World War II period tried to emulate the European experience, in the construction of customs unions and free trade areas as their acronyms, like CARICOM, NAFTA and LAFTA, suggest.

While the initial focus on Europe has, to some extent, remained, this overlooks the wider world of regionalism both before and since 1945, not least the fact that developing countries increasingly came to see regionalism as a source of collective identity and a safeguard against powerful external actors and quickly developed their own regional repertoires. A central claim of this chapter, therefore, is that though Europe was very important as an example and point of reference as to how integration might proceed, it was not, as often implied, the only example of how regions might develop and consolidate for the purposes of promoting common interests and policies. By the late twentieth century it was clear even to those who had failed to take non-European regionalisms seriously that that there were multiple regionalisms both complementary to and competitive with the European model. And these regionalisms also had a global reach. In this respect we need to take seriously the call to move beyond Eurocentrism (Telo et al. 2015) or to decenter regionalism by considering multiple alternative 'regional worlds' (Acharya 2014b: 79–105). This is particularly appropriate at a time when the European project itself is in the midst of a prolonged crisis and its early ambitions appear under threat. Consider the two recent statements below regarding twenty-first-century developments in Africa and Asia:

Africa, which was not long ago discarded as a hopeless and irrelevant region, has become a new 'frontier' for global trade, investment and the conduct of international relations. (Bach 2016: preface)

[I]t is in Asia that debates on regional architectures have been particularly vibrant among scholars and policy makers. (Brennan and Murray 2015: 17)

Regionalism's importance

This story of the globalization of regionalism already points to its contemporary salience. By the twenty-first century regional organizations were increasingly regarded as an important, if not an integral part of the global governance architecture, though their importance relative to states and other multilateral actors is still debated. International regionalism, as distinct from regionalism as a sub-state phenomenon, however, is firmly established in the vocabulary of IR Some have argued that we are moving from a world of states into a more regionalized world (Van Langenhove 2011: 2); others that we are living in a 'world of regions' – particularly apparent since the end of the Cold War. A world of regions can be interpreted as simply reflecting the existence of a more multipolar world with the corresponding rise of a variety of regional powers of roughly equal stature; a more decentered world in the sense of where great powers are more regionally focused Buzan (2011), or where power has shifted away from the European and North Atlantic cores (Acharya 2014b); or in the sense of Peter Katzenstein's idea of regions existing under US unipolarity, or what he calls 'the US imperium' (Katzenstein 2005). All these interpretations, however, point to the conclusion that the region is a particularly useful unit of analysis. Others argue that the region is less useful, either because regions are analytically diverse and abstract concepts, but also because the region as a unit of analysis is ultimately less significant than either the state or the wider international system. Evidence for this kind of argument would point to state power, resilience and autonomy which has proved remarkable and defies the constraints of regional institutions. States repeatedly show a propensity to act self-interestedly and not to cooperate at times of crisis (as the Eurozone crisis has illustrated) or to respond to the pull of a wider multilateral institutional architecture containing hegemonic powers like the US. This could explain the appeal of cross-cutting multilateral groups like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TRIPP).

In examining the above positions this chapter supports the claim that regions are useful and meaningful units of analysis in twenty-first-century politics, and that there is an important distinction to be made between the global and regional level and their contrasting – and overlapping – structures of governance. Regional organizations are therefore worthy of serious independent study. Using social science terms it may be argued that regions, or their product, regional organizations, are independent variables that help to explain different outcomes in world politics. For example, the actions of African organizations – like ECOWAS in West Africa – can contribute to conflict resolution (Adebayo 2002); Latin American and European institutions promote democracy consolidation (Pevehouse 2002: 612); Asian institutions, like the ASEAN family, support a broad consensus on security issues which has contributed to a more secure regional order (Haake 2007). The region and regional organization may not be the only, or necessarily the most important, variables here, but they play a significant independent role.

In support of the above assumption about regionalism's contemporary importance is the large literature that examines regional organizations and their roles, or the politics regionalism, from a variety of perspectives. Though the volume of publications may not, in itself, be a good indicator, the amount of academic work and effort that has gone into their study is suggestive. Without detailing the wider literature on regionalism since 1945 here (see 'Guide to further reading') in the period 2015–2016 alone there were a number of books, including some large collected volumes, dedicated to their study. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism* (a comprehensive overview of 27 chapters) appeared in early 2016 (Borzel and Risse), as did Frederik Sodebaum's *Rethinking Regionalism* (2016). In *Inter-regionalism and the European Union,* Telo, Fawcett and Ponjaert (2015) take a critical look at how the European experience has traveled and been received globally. On specific regions, Daniel Bach's (2016) *Regionalism in Africa* explores new developments on that continent; while *Drivers of Regional Integration* compares the European and Asian experiences (Brennan and Murray 2015). These recent examples built upon a wider literature which has addressed the first and second waves of regionalism respectively as discussed in the historical section below.

The story of regionalism does not end with the incremental rise of regional organizations and their acknowledged importance in scholarly debates. Their evolution has been far from linear, their spread uneven and their overall position contested by scholars and policymakers. But their relevance and contribution to international order is not questioned. Most believe that it is desirable and appropriate that regional organizations take some responsibility for their regions in matters relating to trade, security and development and that IOs like the UN or WTO will need buttressing, a point made forcefully by former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, in a post-Cold War document 'An Agenda for Peace' (1992). The reform of African organizations after the Cold War reflects the relative decline of great power interests in Africa after the Cold War, the efforts by African states to generate solutions to African problems and new international interest in the enhancing the capacity of regional organizations to deal with the pressing economic and security problems of the continent. However, on the downside, there is also intense speculation about the future of the flagship EU following a prolonged economic (and political) crisis in the Eurozone which started in 2008. Linked to the wider global financial crisis, its effects in the recently expanded EU were particularly profound, contributing to the possibility of first, a Greek exit from the Eurozone in 2015, and second a British exit from the EU itself in 2016. Since 2015, another equally serious and not unrelated crisis was posed to the EU's very identity and purpose by the rising pressures of migration, in part the product of the fallout from the Arab uprisings, which the EU had failed both to predict and adequately address. And Europe is not the only region facing a crisis of identity. Latin America faces different pressures – from the pull to greater alignment with the North, to greater autonomy and reorientation towards the South (Fawcett and Serrano 2005). Since regions are social and political constructions, their orientation is not fixed but fluid: they must operate within a complex and evolving set of international, transnational, domestic and subnational pressures.

History and theory

Regions and the processes of regionalism or regional integration are studied theoretically and empirically by describing their main features and activities and by isolating those factors, which contribute to regional cooperation and improved security and welfare among the member states of any given organization. Much energy has gone into designing and applying theoretical explanations which provide the best fit for explaining the process of integration in different regions and across different issue areas (Hurrell 1995). Such theories draw on a wider body of IR theory and consider the neo-liberal and neo-realist positions in particular, the first conceiving of the possibilities of cooperation under certain supportive conditions, the second unconvinced of anything but short-term episodes of cooperation reflecting the self-interest of states and their pursuit of relative gains (Baldwin 1993). Constructivists, in contrast, consider that 'the building blocs of international reality are ideational as well as material' (Ruggie 1998: 33) an idea which can be fruitfully applied to international cooperation, particularly in thinking about why regional organizations might be attractive. Many theories have focused explicitly on economic integration – indeed for a considerable period economic integration was held to be synonymous with regionalism – and European integration in particular (Mansfield and Milner 1997).

There is also an important subset of theories applied to regionalism of which neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are the most important (Haas 1958; Hoffman 1964). Neo-functionalism describes an incremental process of functional cooperation with spillovers occurring across different issue areas – from economics to politics – such that states will eventually transfer their loyalties to a new sovereign body. The EU, at various stages of its history, has provided the best, though imperfect, illustration of the workings of neo-functionalism, though attempts have been made (less successfully) to apply the theory to other regions, like South America, notably to the expansion of Mercosur (Malamud and Schmitter 2011). Intergovernmentalism focuses on national governments as the most important actors in integration processes – an approach close to realism which also fits well with parts of the European story but also regionalism in other parts of the world like Southeast Asia, where national (as opposed to supranational) interests have tended to predominate. Liberal intergovernmentalism, associated with the work of Andrew Moravscik (1998), goes further in highlighting how the domestic preferences of states, or state elites, are an important factor in negotiating regional treaties.

Regions are also studied comparatively by considering which variables can best explain a wider set of cases. Walter Mattli (1999), for example, has examined the demand-supply conditions for integration by focusing on the role of economic elites. Scholars are right in noting, however, that the role of comparison is underdeveloped (De Lombaerde et al. 2010; Brennan and Murray 2015; Borzel and Risse 2016). They are less often studied historically. This is

a shortcoming for while the precise effects of history are admittedly hard to measure, a great deal about the contemporary importance of regions can be learned from studying their histories and comparing them (Fawcett 2004; Sodebaum 2016). History also helps to inform theory, since theoretical explanations for regionalism have also tended to follow major trends in regional histories – neo-functionalism is a good example as it appeared to fit well as an early explanation for what was happening in Europe (Bache et al. 2011: 10). And when the integration project started to falter in the 1960s, neo-functionalism gave way to intergovernmentalism as a dominant explanation which focused principally on the interests of national governments alongside the workings of the international system (Bache et al. 2011: 11).

Every world region has a past in which ideas about whether and how to cooperate were developed under a particular set of conditions. And that past, without exception, continues to inform present experience, dictating 'logics of appropriateness'. Hence, any theoretical explanation which fails to provide some historical and indeed geographical context somehow misses the mark. 'The history of place' is therefore a central accompaniment to the study of regionalism (Beeson 2009: 5). In this regard both a constructivist lens – showing how and whose ideas matter to developing regionalism – and a historical institutionalist approach, which illustrates how history informs regional pathways, are helpful if not essential accompaniments to understanding (Pierson 2004).

The history of the Americas is a good place to demonstrate this point. American regionalism, which dates from the early nineteenth century, has been fed by quite particular ideas of how the post-independence Americas – both North and South – should view the international order and their emerging position within that order (Fawcett 2005). Such ideas persist in the language of both hegemonic and anti-hegemonic regionalism as suggested by the FTAA and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) respectively. African and Arab regionalism, in turn, were built upon the fertile bases of pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism incorporating shared ideas about a possible postcolonial African or African order and so on (Murithi 2005: 2; Dawisha 2003). This does not mean that African or Arab regionalism can only be understood by reference to their historical and colonial experiences, but it means that we must include serious consideration of those experiences in order to understand their trajectory. The long-standing reluctance of Arab states to accept the principle of intervention in states' domestic affairs, or the slogan 'African solutions to African problems' is testament to this. In this respect, and using the language of constructivism in IR theory, independent of the important material considerations which impact on state conduct, there is a great deal to be said about the manner in which regions are constructed and which underlying ideas and beliefs inform the process. To turn to another prominent example, understanding the development of European institutions since the Second World War is impossible without considering prior patterns of cooperation and conflict and the need to build upon the former and overcome the latter

by developing a common set of policies and practices. Full justice cannot be done to the rich and diverse histories of different regionalisms across the long twenti- eth and short twenty-first centuries, so a short illustrative section must suffice to demonstrate their establishment and trajectory.

As should be clear from the above, while much of both the theoretical and empirical focus on regionalism has been upon Europe, regionalism has always been a global process with formal European institutions (the EEC) themselves following the prior development of American and Arab institu- tions (OAS and League of Arab States). And despite some important ante- cedents as noted, the post-World War II world provides the most compelling starting point for a study of contemporary regionalism because of the relative novelty of IO, the expansion of international society through decoloniza- tion and the legitimacy afforded to regional organizations by the UN and other multilateral bodies. While prior regional histories fed into the new organizations, post-World War II regionalisms were clustered around three main, if overlapping types, focusing respectively on security cooperation (like NATO), economic integration (like the EEC) or a mixture of the two in the so-called 'multi-purpose' often continent-wide organization (like the Organization of African Unity or today's AU). The divides are not so neat, as economic organizations soon came to combine economic with some political and security mechanisms as the EEC/EU case showed; nor did security coop- eration occur in a vacuum with a common security language often reflecting other areas of interdependence. While multipurpose organizations aspired to both, they often performed better in one area than another. The League of Arab States (LAS) was able to determine a common position of opposition to the state Israel, but not to agree on an Arab Free Trade Area – a project that remains incomplete to this day. This point also shows that security coopera- tion was not necessarily harder to achieve than economic integration. The latter process responded to particular supply and demand conditions which were simply absent in a number of developing countries where levels of inter- regional trade, for example, were low.

In general, early regionalisms, at least outside Europe and the North Atlantic area, were regarded as unsuccessful in terms of delivery on security or economic cooperation. 'Integration' in the sense of a shift in decision-making authority from a state to a supranational institution, did not mostly occur, or only at a lim- ited level. However, an alternative perspective suggests that rather than failure this period should be seen as one where states learned to value regionalism as a mechanism for cooperation, to foster regional identities and lay down structures for future development. For example, the possibility of balancing stronger powers via a regional organization was one that gained hold: whether in Africa or Europe or the Americas. Regional organizations provided weaker states with voice and some lobbying potential – they also allowed for some internal accountability. Thus the Cold War rather than being seen as a desert for regional cooperation outside the European context was one which revealed multiple possibilities and pathways.

And these pathways extended beyond the Cold War, or emerged even before its ending. Just as the early Cold War provided a selective arena for regional institution building and learning, the late Cold War also saw some freeing up of regions in terms of the expansion of activities into new spheres. The period from the late 1960s saw the rise of a number of sub-regional (as opposed to continental) organizations, reflecting a new security dynamics and demand for regionalism. ASEAN (founded in 1967) emerged as a sovereignty nurturing and consensus building organization; ECOWAS (1975) responded to the changing security and economic environment in West Africa; in the Gulf, the GCC (1981) formed in direct response to the threats posed by the Iran revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq War. The later Cold War also saw the appearance of a pan-European security organization, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE), and a pan-Islamic organization, the ICO. All the above organizations, despite emerging in a restrictive Cold War framework, remain highly relevant and part of the regional economic and security architecture today and demonstrate the heterogeneous nature of regional projects. The CSCE was an important organization in reintegrating the USSR/Russia into European security.

To the above picture must be include developments within Western Europe itself which flowed from Europe's earlier experiences and represented a new direction and mission for the European project after its disappointing performance in the 1970s. Its reinvigoration was marked first by the Single European Act (1986), membership expansion and the Treaty on European Union or Maastricht Treaty (1992). By the time of the latter, the end of the Cold War had intervened and this event, in itself, constituted a critical turning point, marking the start of an era of new regionalism in a more globalized world, characterized by quantitative and qualitative changes (Hettne et al. 1999). Not only did new institutions emerge, old organizations expanded while revising and upgrading their charters, and embracing new agendas and actors.

Not all regarded Europe's regrowth and its consequences in an entirely positive light, since it was perceived as potentially threatening to the emergence of a multilateral liberal trading order. It sparked a debate about the tensions between the forces of globalization and regionalization and the relationship between the two. The European project generated competitive region building elsewhere – NAFTA was a good example, as was APEC. Amid such debates, 'new' regionalism developed as a fertile and multidimensional project, many of whose features transcended state-to-state relations or economic bloc building. The post-Cold War period was therefore one of region building and new scholarship with regionalism expanding into ever-new domains (Fawcett 2004). While some of these domains were an extension of earlier efforts to better integrate regional economies and again the European example was important here (Breslin and Higgott 2000), others were a response to a new security order in which the removal of superpower 'overlay' led regions and regional powers to take more control of their security affairs (Buzan and Weaver 2003). Some examples were the Commonwealth of Independent States – Russia's answer to the break-up of the USSR, ASEAN + 3 and the ASEAN Regional Forum – an expansion of ASEAN's narrow remit, or

Mercosur. Still others, like the reformed African Union, sought further to redefine regional identity in a globalizing world.

Despite the high level of interest generated by new regionalism, it did not deliver on the expectations of its proponents, or indeed the fears of its critics. On the one hand, regional organizations were not a panacea for regional order, nor were they necessarily a pathway or an obstacle to global order. The case of Africa, with its multiple peace operations, illustrates how regional organizations could play an important role in regional conflicts, but required the additional support of strong states and international institutions like the UN. Such organizations did not herald the decline of states or state power: in fact many regions witnessed the consolidation of a regional hegemon (like the US in NATO previously) which sought to manage and direct regional affairs – Nigeria in ECOWAS is one example. Some regions, in contrast, saw little sustained institutional development post-Cold War. The Middle East is a good example of a region where new regionalism had relatively little impact and the region's security dilemmas and outward-looking economies persisted well beyond the Cold War (Fawcett 2016). On the other hand, surveying the range of security activities of a number of regional organizations – from peace operations to non-proliferation of dangerous weapons to anti-terrorist measures, it can be seen that they – alongside the UN – continue to play crucial roles in supporting a multilateral security architecture.

Regionalism today and its future

Following on from the brief historical and theoretical discussion above, which are the most important contemporary dynamics of regionalism in world politics today? Which features of regionalism are most compelling and which are its possible future pathways? On the one hand there is no doubt that there has been a steady increase in different types and activities of regionalism. Regionalism, with its variegated institutional architecture, is here to stay. The difficulty with new regionalism, however, lies in determining what its relative importance really is, how new it is, and whether it represents a real break with the past. Theorists of new regionalism have acknowledged that the predicted trajectory and potential of their object of study have not been fulfilled, whether in terms of transcending state power or sustained regionalization (Nolte 2016). In answering this question it is useful to consider the contours of contemporary regionalism, but also to reflect on what these experiences show us regarding prior assumptions.

Regionalism and globalization

First, the debate regarding the relationship between globalization and regionalization, both of which were seen as characteristics of the 'new global era' and in which regionalism was seen as a potential competitor to globalization, is largely over, or has lost much of its power. Regionalism is undoubtedly part of the new global era; the relationship between regionalization and globalization is complex

and evolving but the two are not fundamentally in competition. The stepping stone/stumbling block claim of the 1980s and 1990s, or the idea that a revitalized EU represented a 'fortress' were overstated. The liberal internationalist or cosmopolitan arguments that accompanied globalization (like early arguments about the UN or the League of Nations) idealized the possibilities of global governance and placed regionalism as a competitor. It is more appropriate to see the two as part of variegated multilateral architecture in which global, regional, domestic and transnational patterns coexist, sometimes competing, sometimes complementing each other. This is kind of messy multilateralism, if more complex, is not wholly dissimilar to that which emerged after World War II (Ruggie 1998), albeit embracing a far wider range of actors; (Acharya 2014b).

Regionalism and the primacy of economics

Regionalism was, for a long time, dominated by discussions about economics and the possibilities of improving welfare through economic integration, and much of the early literature, on the progression from regional trade agreements to free trade areas and customs unions (Belassa 1961), reflected this. This state of affairs ignored the parallel developments in regional security that took place alongside the United Nations Charter provision and the rise of regional organizations that represented and expressed regional identity and purpose above and beyond the prescriptions of integration theorists. The passage of time has revealed regionalism to be a multidimensional process encompassing multiple issue areas (Mansfield and Solingen 2010). The construction of regions and regional organizations, the expression of identity politics and the patterns of security regionalism defy explanations that focus on economic logics. Security regionalism, embracing peace operations, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation have proved to be just as important as the construction of welfare-enhancing economic communities (Tavares 2009). In this respect the prior neglect of the role of ideas and security understandings among non-Western regionalisms has obscured the reality that regionalism has always been a multidimensional project without boundaries imposed by issue area or geography.

Regionalism and Europe

Just as regionalism cannot be limited to any single issue area, its variegated architecture shows emphatically a world that is no longer dominated by Europe or the West, or by scholars reflecting upon the experience of these regions. The chapter started with quotes about Africa and Asia, demonstrating the importance of new developments in these regions. This is not to say that models of cooperation, integration, and more, recently, inter-regionalism have not had a Eurocentric quality, or that Europe is still not a admired model, or indeed that much of the scholarship on regionalism is not Western-centered or inspired by Western academia: it is! The institutional design of many regional organizations still closely mirrors that of the EU as the reformed African Union, with its African Parliament and Peer

Review Mechanism. However, regionalism has moved beyond its early European home into new domains. Some regionalisms are explicitly anti-Western or anti-hegemonic like ALBA – a postcolonial project drawing on early ideas about sovereignty and autonomy in the Americas; UNASUR likewise offers an alternative perspective on a security community in the Americas. The influence of hegemonic power (or hegemonic institutions) remains but its expressions are ever more varied and reflective of new or 'rising' powers and their agendas. Further, given the ongoing crisis in the EU, which has led to predictions of its weakening or even its demise, it is particularly appropriate to reflect upon the European experience and its wider relevance to the world of regionalism and global governance, as discussed below.

'New' regionalism and the future

The expanding remit and diversity of regionalism does not mean its success as a global ordering project. Rather, it is a wake-up call to at best a partly regionalized world. The twenty-first century has been witness to the limits to regionalism whether in terms of its relationship to states, globalization or other multilateral bodies, or as a project in itself. While some regionalisms have enjoyed upward trajectories, the overall picture is mixed with fragmentation among the most integrated, and limited integration among the less cohesive groups. If crisis has proved formative in institutional start-up and development, it has also demonstrated the obstacles to further integration (Fioramonti 2012). In other words, the overall capacity of regionalism in different settings remains constrained. This is not just an observation about the EU, which has faced some of its most difficult challenges in recent years: from the Eurozone crisis which commenced in 2008, the threat of 'Grexit' in 2015, the immigration crisis and finally the issue of 'Brexit' in 2016. This is the contemporary reality of the European experiment in integration and one whose lessons will not be lost on other observers. Western Europe, so long an aspiration for Europeans and others, is facing an existential challenge such that one-time apologists, like Jan Zielonka (2014) now consider it 'doomed'. This is also reflected in the new, more skeptical note in studies of inter-regionalism, which have hitherto focused principally on the European export of the theory and practice of regionalism (Telo et al. 2015). To the European case we can add the multiple setbacks or relative lack of progress in core areas elsewhere: institutional fragmentation in Latin America (Malamud and Giardini 2012); in Africa the difficulty of creating a common security architecture (Vines 2013) and in the Middle East where the slow development of regionalism since independence has been further arrested by events since the Arab Spring. The Asian region has shown some hopeful signs, for example the signature of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 – and is the site of important debates – but has witnessed few moves towards deeper integration. Despite the growth of functional cooperation in many different issue areas, the incremental process of deeper integration envisaged by the founders of the European project remains illusory.

Conclusion

The above analysis, which has focused on both the opportunities but also some of the limitations of contemporary regionalism in different settings, does not necessarily indicate the failure of regionalism as a project or a new downward trajectory. It does, however, mean that idealism about 'new' (or old) regionalism needs to be tempered. In a reflective work published in 2016, one of the leading authors of the new regionalism school, Frederik Sodebaum, concurs that regionalism requires serious 'rethinking', not least that regionalism or regionalization cannot only be associated with a borderless or states-free world. Meanwhile, the conclusion to the large multi-author volume on regionalism ends on a positive note calling for 'three cheers' for comparative regionalism (Borzel and Risse 2016). While it is true that studies of regionalism have come a long way since the European-centered literature of the 1960s, and there is much more rigorous analysis of comparative regionalism, the success of regionalism as a project remains ambiguous. It is likely that regionalism, like the regions that constitute and flow from its activities, will remain a feature of world politics well into the foreseeable future. It is not a 'stepping stone' to a more united world, but nor is it a 'stumbling block' to international cooperation as regional skeptics once supposed. As such it is an integral part of and inextricably merged with the present complex multilateral structures (Prantl 2013: 14–16). Its contours and parameters will reshape and change responding to new economic, social and security challenges. History shows how its path has been an evolutionary one, waxing and waning in different international as well as domestic environments depending on the interests and strategies of key players. It is also constantly adapting to meet new challenges: regional organizations today have repertoires that include environmental protection; migration regimes and human rights provision – as recently witnessed in the ASEAN Charter. Similarly, new theoretical explanations will be devised and old ones reviewed and refined. New pathways and theories respond in turn to new events, crises and evolving spheres of action.

If we just consider just how much change has occurred since 1945 when regionalism was associated, first, with the security provision outlined in the UN Charter and second, with the growth and development of the EU, we can appreciate its overall evolution and speculate about its prospects. While the relationship between the UN and regions and regionalism has remained largely constant in the sense that regionalism is still closely bound to and empowered by Charter definitions and practices, its remit has vastly expanded, particularly where the former 'Third World' is concerned (De Lombaerde et al. 2012). This is particularly evident in the area of peace operations where regional organizations have taken on important roles. Moreover, the model and predominance of Europe in debates about the political economy of regionalism has also shifted considerably, as this chapter has argued. This is particularly apparent in the current crisis in the Eurozone and the ongoing political fragmentation visible over the migration crisis and debates about the impact of a British exit. It is not that Europe doesn't matter in the debates about regionalism, far from it. Those who are skeptical

of Eurocentrism should beware of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Europe's experience is, and will remain, a central point of reference. However, it has become increasingly clear that regions are created to serve many different purposes and to suit the interests of different actors according to time and place. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO's) robust anti-terrorist, or cyber-security framework, belongs to an era where terrorism and the threats of nationalist/separatist movements are viewed as particularly acute in Central Asia. This was not an organization born of the desire to mimic the European experience of economic integration nor to conform to any Western security order. While many regional organizations share a general position of seeking to consolidate their members' autonomy and relative influence on the global stage, the manner in which they do so and mechanisms they choose to employ will vary considerably: 'Regional orders are made of multiple details and changing contingencies, of security dilemmas and economic interdependence, of relations between democracies and autocracies, of war and peace' (Solingen 1998: xi).

Guide to further reading

There is a growing literature on regionalism reflecting major developments in the field. From early works focusing on the European experience (Haas 1958) to comparative studies (Nye 1968) there was a major boom in the literature following Cold War which saw overviews of new and old regionalism like Fawcett and Hurrell (1995); Gamble and Payne (1996); Mansfield and Milner (1997); Farrell et al. (2005); Sodebaum and Shaw edited an important text on *Theories of New Regionalism* (2003); Acharya and Johnstone (2007) compared different institutional designs. On specific regions, developments in Asia are well covered in Beeson (2009); the Americas in Fawcett and Serrano (2005); a recent work on Africa is Bach (2016). On Europe Ben Rosamund (2000) remains an excellent introduction to theory and practice of European integration. Finally, there are two recent multi-author edited handbooks with wide coverage of different regions and issues: *Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalism* (Shaw et al. 2011); and the *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism* (Borzel and Risse 2016).

Chapter 8

International Law and World Politics

AIDAN HEHIR

The end of the Cold War led to great optimism about the future capacity of the UN to regulate inter-state relations (Berdal 2003: 9; Barnett 2010: 21; Chesterman 2011: 2). With the end of the 'Superpower Standoff' – which had severely restricted the ability of the Security Council to enforce the vast corpus of international laws ratified since 1945 – we had, according to Geoffrey Robertson, entered 'the age of enforcement' (2000: xvii). Indeed, the 'happy nineties' (Kaldor 2003: 149) appeared to some to evidence the growing dominance of international law over traditional realpolitik; indicatively, Human Rights Watch's *World Report 2000* presented a very favorable analysis of the international community's 'new willingness' to uphold international law, and heralded 'a new era for the human rights movement' (Human Rights Watch 2000).

This optimism has, however, largely dissipated; indicatively, Human Rights Watch's *World Report 2015* presented a distinctly gloomy analysis of international affairs, with Executive Director Ken Roth warning, 'The world has not seen this much tumult for a generation […] Sometimes it can seem as if the world is unraveling' (Human Rights Watch 2015a: 1). Contemporary international politics certainly appears to be dominated by the flagrant violation of international law and the exercise of raw power in the pursuit of self-interest; in the wake of events such as Russia's annexation of Crimea, the conflict in Syria, Europe's response to the refugee crisis, and terrorism perpetrated by ISIS and Boko Haram, the role of international law has often recently appeared not only impotent, but irrelevant.

In this chapter I seek to help explain why international law has appeared to be so weak by examining the structural configuration of the international legal order. This configuration, I argue, constitutionally sanctions the politicization of international law and thus enables the inconsistent enforcement, cynical manipulation and unpunished violation of international law that we so regularly observe. I then argue, however, that while the imperfections of the present international legal order are readily apparent, this order is deemed to serve certain key functions whilst fulfilling particular normative aims. In the final section I argue that international law is best conceived of not as analogous to (and hence weaker than) domestic legal systems, but rather as an institutionally and normative bounded discursive framework; one which need not be deemed immutable.

Before undertaking this analysis of the nature of the international legal order, I begin by appraising the contemporary malaise afflicting international law

'The unraveling of the international order'

If the most basic normative goal of law is to foster order and stability, the maelstrom of contemporary crises suggests international law is failing markedly. The consensus certainly seems to be that the world is experiencing a definite increase in violations of international law and the worst levels of violence seen for over 20 years (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015). A report by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published in 2015 described the 'rapid acceleration' of 'spiralling crises' as evidence of a 'paradigm change' characterized by 'an unchecked slide' into a new era of violence and human suffering (UNHCR 2015c). Likewise, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, President of the International Crisis Group, declared we are witnessing 'the unraveling of the international order' (Guéhenno 2015), while Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, warned, 'Instability is spreading. Suffering is growing. No country can remain untouched' (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 2015). These dire diagnoses were echoed in reports from other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) published in 2016, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House (Amnesty International 2016; Freedom House 2016).

Violence has recently erupted or escalated in the Central African Republic, Myanmar, Israel, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, Libya, Kenya, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, North Korea, and Iraq (Ban 2015: 3). The crisis in Syria, however, has dominated international headlines since it began in 2011, inducing widespread despair and cynicism. The conflict has been marked by an array of wilful violations of international law including war crimes, crimes against humanity, the widespread use of chemical weapons, the mistreatment of refugees, covert arms supplies from abroad, external military intervention, and terrorism. The response from the UN Security Council has been lamentably weak and, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, a causal factor in the loss of 'hundreds of thousands of lives' (Pillay 2014).

The international response to the refugee crisis which escalated dramatically in late 2014 – caused in large part by the conflict in Syria – also raised significant concerns over the willingness of states to abide by their international legal commitments; the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights described Europe's response as 'simply disastrous' (Council of Europe 2015) while the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights accused some European states of committing 'systemic violations of human rights' in their treatment of refugees (Calamur 2015).

The strange paradox about this degenerative trend is that this has occurred at a time when international law is more developed, expansive and high profile than ever before. Prior to World War I the international system was essentially devoid of international laws and international institutions; the United Nations

(UN), the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) were literally unheard of. International organizations (IOs) of this nature, and the legal systems they regulate, were little more than aspirations occasionally iterated by those invariably deemed to be idealists (Armstrong et al. 2007: 34–68). How can it be that, despite a series of profound developments in the international legal order, the contemporary world evidences the depressing trends now routinely noted?

'It is time to enforce them'

In late 2015 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon lamented that in the face of the myriad contemporary crises and challenges 'the world has responded with disturbing paralysis'. Reflecting on what he described as 'routine' violations of international law he appealed, 'Enough is enough. Even war has rules. It is time to enforce them' (Miles 2015). This appeal to 'enforce' existing laws is illustrative of the paradox that plagues the efficacy of international law; it is not that international laws don't exist, nor that there is a lack of international legal institutions, but rather that the *means* by which international law is enforced is fundamentally flawed. Genocide, for example, was formally outlawed in the 1948 Genocide Convention yet genocides have subsequently been perpetrated, at times with impunity (Milanović 2006: 571; Gallagher 2013: 2). Indeed, in 2001, the then Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan described the 1948 Genocide Convention as a 'dead letter' (Annan 2001). While the convention proscribed the practice and called on the international community to prevent and/or halt its committal, the decision to respond remained a matter of politics; states merely have a 'discretionary entitlement' to act rather than a legal duty (Berman 2007: 161). To illustrate, the cases below highlight contemporary violations of international law on three levels; intra-state, inter-state and trans-state.

Mass protests took place in Bahrain in early 2011 when people demanded democracy and the removal of the corrupt Khalifa Monarchy. In response, the Bahrain security forces, with the military support of Gulf allies – particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar – engaged in 'brutal repression' (International Crisis Group 2011: 1). In the aftermath pro-democracy leaders and supporters were rounded up, and, variously, detained without trial, tortured and killed. The response from the international community at the time was negligible; neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly issued a statement on the situation (Hehir 2015). Despite the Bahrain government's subsequent acceptance of the recommendations contained in an unflinchingly critical independent report into the treatment of protesters, the government continues to oppress the population. In November 2015, Human Rights Watch published a report detailing the continued widespread and systematic use of torture by the Bahrain government which, they noted, violated a number of international treaties and conventions (2015b). To date Bahrain has not incurred any legal censure.

In February 2014, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled the capital Kiev to escape thousands of protesters demanding closer ties with the EU and

widespread political reform. Within a matter of days Russian troops were deployed to Crimea and by early March, Russia exercised de facto control over the territory, having driven Ukrainian armed forces from the peninsula. On March 16 a referendum on accession to Russia was held without the presence of independent international observers or the consent of the Ukrainian government. With 96.77% voting for accession, Crimea became part of Russia. While Russia's jurisdiction over Crimea is recognized by only a few states, the 'annexation' of Crimea is, effectively, a fait accompli. In Eastern Ukraine, meanwhile, violence continues to rage between the Ukraine military and separatists supported from Moscow. While many states condemned the annexation of Crimea and the military action in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has not been punished or censured by any international bodies, although a regional entity, the EU, did apply unilateral sanctions against Russia in July 2014.

The UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005 which in 2009 issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, detailing allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Sudanese government. Yet, in June 2015 President al-Bashir flew to South Africa to attend an African Union Summit. While South Africa, along with 33 other African states, is a member of the ICC, President Zuma greeted President al-Bashir warmly; images of the two men locked in a jovial embrace were broadcast around the world to illustrate various reports lamenting the impotence of the ICC and international transnational justice more broadly (Kersten 2015). President al-Bashir returned to Sudan where he was greeted by cheering crowds at Khartoum airport and the ICC's warrant for his arrest remains outstanding.

Politics and the enforcement of international law

Each of these different cases highlights a common theme which has consistently impeded the effectiveness of international law; the influence of politics on the enforcement of international law. Each case shows that while we can (relatively) incontrovertibly say that laws were broken, enforcing the law and punishing violations is problematic. In the case of Bahrain, while myriad human rights bodies have condemned Bahrain for its systematic violation of its citizen's human rights, the Security Council has never once mentioned the situation (Hehir 2015). It's not hard to work out why; both the US and the UK have extensive political, economic and military links with Bahrain. As both are permanent members of the Security Council the chances of the Security Council passing a resolution condemning Bahrain or imposing punitive sanctions are distinctly remote. Likewise, the Security Council will obviously never sanction Russia because Russia is also a veto-wielding Permanent Member of the Council; while inter-state aggression of the kind witnessed in 2014 is a violation of the most basic tenets of sovereignty, Russia's legal powers and not inconsiderable military might effectively shielded it from censure. In the case of President al-Bashir, while the ICC commands the

support of 123 states it has no independent means by which it can arrest suspects or compel states to do so on its behalf. In the absence of anything like a global police force, the ICC is, therefore, essentially dependent upon the political will of governments to enable it to detain suspected war criminals (Cooper and Kohler 2009: 257).

These cases, and many others like them, have, of course, led to questions being raised about the very existence of international law; if international law is inconsistently enforced and routinely violated without punitive redress can it be called law at all? If the consistent, apolitical enforcement of law is 'the essential stage in any legal procedure' without which 'any further progress on the way to the pacification of the world is absolutely excluded' (Kelsen 1972: 13), then surely, one may conclude, despite the exponential growth in international laws and institutions, we still live in a 'lawless world' (Sands 2006).

Power and international law

These cases and their implications are of little surprise to those who view the international system as a realm of perennial contestation where power trumps both morality and law (Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Walzer 2006: xx–xxi). In contrast to the development of centralized legal orders within sovereign states, the international system has long been deemed 'anarchical' in the sense that it lacks an overarching governing body with the constitutional right, and military capacity, to regulate and enforce binding laws. In the international system states cannot rely upon external support or protection and as a result 'power is the currency of international politics' (Mearsheimer 2013: 72).

In light of the myriad international laws that exist, however, it is difficult to see how we can continue to describe the system as 'anarchical'; yet, the obvious politicization of the enforcement of international law means the system arguably remains 'primitive', as Hans Kelsen described it when it was initially established (1945: 338). If a fundamental tenet of law is the separation of the executive and judiciary then clearly the manner in which international law is enforced compromises this and thus, while there are myriad international laws, the fact that their enforcement depends on political will means the presumption of anarchy retains a degree of salience. While all states are official legal equals, as Colin Warbrick notes, 'The actual capacity of a state to influence the law making processes or to obtain compliance with its legal rights is in large measure proportionate to the resources available to the state' (2006: 223). If the 'resources' of states determine their treatment under international law then naturally this compromises the fundamental legal requirement of equality under the law.

The selective adherence to, and inconsistent enforcement of, international law coheres with those who have always maintained that international law (and indeed domestic law) reflects the interests of the powerful, and is designed to facilitate the perpetuation of a particular hierarchy (Bull 2002: 53; Koskenniemi 2001: 166; Orford 2009). 'Law' certainly does not fall from the sky; it is developed through political institutions by actors with interests. It is, therefore, naïve

to imagine that any legal system is immune from bias or the influence of particular interests, and capable of being enforced without concessions to power. The powers of the Permanent Five Members of the Security Council (P5) certainly compromise any notion that post-1945 all states were suddenly equal; while Article 2.1 recognizes sovereign equality, the provisions of Chapter V imbue the P5 with manifestly exceptional powers to determine when and how to enforce international law. The five states afforded the power to exercise this mandate clearly weren't chosen at random or because of their moral rectitude; they were the leading representatives from the victorious Allied powers. This arrangement, Gerry Simpson argues, constitutes a form of 'legalised hegemony' (2004: 68).

The justifications for the extraordinary powers afforded to the P5 in 1945 remain largely the same today; order can only be maintained if the most powerful states are constitutionally recognized as the arbiters of disputes and judges of law's applicability in any given situation (Bourantonis 2007: 6). This means, of course, that the international legal system – in contrast to the norm domestically – is characterized by an explicit union between power, politics and law. The P5 thus constitutes, according to Nigel White, 'a realist core in an institutionalist framework – a political core in a legal regime' (2004: 666). While many domestic legal systems – including those in democratic states – have long been accused of serving the interests of the powerful, the international legal order constitutionally enshrines this; the influence of power on international law is not a theory or allegation, it is an overt fact. What then, is the normative basis upon which this constitutional configuration is based?

Imperfect order or anarchy?

In his 1651 book *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes' seminal prescriptions on the need for centralized authority within states were based on his presumption that order was always preferable to anarchy. Hobbes, and many others since, advocated a system designed primarily to achieve stability, predictability and the minimization of violence, rather than the pursuit of justice. While a particular governmental system may, therefore, be characterized by a degree of injustice and social hierarchy, this is deemed preferable to the absence of governance which would lead, in Hobbes' famous terms, to 'a warre of every man against every man' (1968: 188).

Naturally, this preference for order demands a means by which this order is coercively maintained; it is, therefore, fundamentally predicated on a power asymmetry whereby those with a preponderance of power have exclusive authority to employ their might so as to maintain obedience amongst those subject to the prevailing governance system. In Weber's terms the state thus constitutes a 'human community that successfully claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory' (quoted in Gerth and Mills 1991: 78, my emphasis). Clearly, the nature of the modern democratic state evidences an evolutionary shift towards the view that the government must have popular legitimacy

as well as a preponderance of coercive power, but this shift has occurred over the course of hundreds of years and still arguably constitutes a work in progress.

At the international level, the logic underpinning Hobbesian notions of the benefits of order over anarchy prevails. The delegation of extraordinary power to the P5 in 1945 constituted a clear admission that while relations between states required a degree of international oversight, the international system could not suddenly move from one characterized by anarchy – in the sense that states were free from formal legal restrictions – to one based purely on legal principles of equality, judicial independence and the Weberian notion of the delegation of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force to a centralized, trans-state authority. Therefore, while the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century impelled a desire for more robust international laws and institutions, the new system was designed to work with, rather than against, the realities of power politics (Briggs 1945: 70).

This can, of course, be decried as an unacceptable conflation of power and law but it is worth considering the nature of international politics in 1945; to have attempted to create an international legal system analogous to the normative conception of a legitimate domestic legal system would have been simply impossible. It is worth remembering that in the aftermath of World War II expectations as to the future of international relations (IR) were extremely low; ensuring that another major war between the great powers did not occur was, in this context, a revolutionary aspiration. To that end, the aim was to create a system designed to stop major inter-state war, to, in essence, ensure a modicum of order (Bosco 2009: 10–39). Attempting to restrain powerful states, to subjugate them to a more powerful international body, would have been politically and practically impossible; had this been a sine qua non, the negotiations on the nature of the new international system would have collapsed and anarchy, with its attendant dangers, would have reigned (Cassese 2005: 41–44). The powerful states in 1945, as indeed at any time in history, were certainly not willing to sign away their primacy by creating a body with the legal power and military capacity to significantly impede their respective agendas; as noted by Martti Koskenniemi, 'an empire is never an advocate of an international law that can seem only an obstacle to its ambitions' (2001: 34).

The origins of the contemporary international legal order, therefore, explain the configuration of the present system. While this system very obviously constitutionally enshrines the politicization of law enforcement and formally privileges the powerful elite, this configuration was not conceived without some normative pretensions, namely preventing major war between the great powers. Of course, as evidenced by the three cases discussed earlier, the constitutional concession to power has come at a price; international law is routinely selectively enforced, and, in particular, the welfare of individuals has often come a distant second to geopolitical machinations (Bowring 2008; Mertus 2009: 98). That said, as noted previously, the legal order is still in its infancy; contemporary domestic judicial systems heralded as exemplars of law's normative aims have all evolved over hundreds of years and thus it can be argued that our expectations as to international

law's efficacy must be tempered by an understanding of its short history. Therefore, an accurate assessment of international law requires an analysis of its evolutionary trajectory as well as its contemporary influence and limitations.

The growing influence of international law?

Given the origins, aims and relative infancy of the contemporary international legal order, analyses of its contemporary influence must be careful not to judge efficacy on the basis of unrealistic expectations. The international legal system is fundamentally designed to maintain order between states; specifically, to minimize sources of contestation that may impel inter-state aggression and to provide a forum within which disputes can be discussed without jeopardizing peaceful relations between the great powers. Of course, in the contemporary era expectations as to what the international legal system should regulate have expanded exponentially to include issues such as human rights, climate change and development, which were simply not part of the original remit (Weiss 2009: 1).

Those who criticize international law often do so by comparing it detrimentally with domestic law; this, it is claimed, is simply a flawed comparison (Henkin 1990: 250). Domestic legal systems benefit from the obviously hierarchical configuration within states and the coercive organs of the state, namely the police and the army. These features facilitate compliance, enforcement and punishment by virtue of their coercive power, both real and latent. International law is, however, horizontal in nature with states acting as both subjects and architects of the law. The enforcement of international law is further compromised by the absence of any international force comparable to the domestic police and army; in the absence of a global police force or army, the coercive enforcement of international law requires the willingness of individual states to deploy their military. Such decisions are, by definition, prey to political exigencies and strategic logic; states will not employ force against allies, nor, of course, will they go to war against more powerful foes (Wheeler and Morris 2007).

By virtue of these profound differences with domestic law, international law should be judged, it is argued, on whether it can, 'facilitate the interaction between these legal equals (states) rather than control or compel them in imitation of the control and compulsion that national law exerts over its subjects' (Dixon 2007: 2). If we assess international law's record on facilitating peaceful relations between states, we find that international law *is* respected in the vast majority of cases.

Were international law as insignificant as is often suggested, the world – particularly the modern globalized world – would simply grind to a halt. This is in large part because law facilitates rather than merely proscribes and, crucially, reflects collective norms which states have an interest in upholding (Koskenniemi 2006: 65). These include myriad issues which have a profound effect on inter-state relations – from travel to the postal service – which occur daily without

significant contestation. It is important to remember that when states abide by international law this rarely makes the news; indicatively Peter Malanczuk argues, 'Spectacular cases of violation of international law, which attract the attention of the media more than regular conduct, are exceptional and should not be confused with the ordinary course of business between states' (2006: 6). Even beyond issues like trade and travel, international law often facilitates or compels initiatives in emotive, high-profile areas such as human rights, without attracting attention. By definition, the successful application of international law in the area of human rights protection means something *does not happen*; that a particular state abided by its international legal commitments and *did not* commit crimes against humanity rarely attracts attention, whereas violations provoke outrage. The constraint ostensibly exercised by international law is, therefore, almost by definition imperceptible and thus often unrecognized (Akhavan 2005: 11). When, indeed, do we actually see states desist from taking certain action because to do so would be illegal? Verifying such compliant behavior is by definition difficult and certainly of limited newsworthiness, yet conversely, overt derogations from the law are clear and attract international attention.

Of course, the fact that states routinely adhere to the majority of international laws does not necessarily negate the argument that international law's role is limited; many still contend that law's role *is* limited with respects to the ostensibly more important issues of international security and justice. Indeed, the idea that the international legal system created in the wake of World War II can be credited with the subsequent absence of war between the great powers is disputed by those who argue that military logic – particularly the nuclear balance of power – was the 'real' reason behind the (relative) order that has since prevailed (Snidal 1991). Order has therefore been maintained because power, not law, continues to determine state conduct; the relative distribution of power has not facilitated aggression between the great powers, but it still remains a feature of their relations with lesser powers (Bowring 2008: 1; Chomsky 2011). Purveyors of this view, of course, point to cases such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Russia's annexation of Crimea as evidence of the timeless applicability of the Athenian maxim retold by Thucydides, 'The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept' (1972: 402).

Yet, while there have been myriad examples of law's failings since the new legal framework was established in 1945, comparatively it can be argued that the contemporary era constitutes an improvement. Prior to the many legal developments which occurred in the twentieth century – chief among them the establishment of the UN – the international system was more disorderly, as there were far fewer restrictions on using force; state conduct was 'regulated' more directly by the relative distribution of power and the more malleable, and inherently subjective, natural law. Indeed, according to Alex Bellamy, 'Positive international law [...] derived as a response to the endemic abuse of natural law' (2004: 141). The UN is, in this vein, credited by some with playing a key causal role in the diminution – though certainly not the elimination – of the influence of raw power on international affairs (Chesterman and Byers 2003).

Additionally, Sir Arthur Watts points to the fact that, 'virtually without exception states seek always to offer a legal justification for their actions'. Illustratively, even Saddam Hussein claimed that his invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was legal. This trend, Watts argues, is of great significance as it, 'demonstrates the value attached by states to compliance with international law' (2001: 7). Why, indeed, would states claim that their actions were/are legal if legality was irrelevant? The US and the UK have continued to claim that the invasion of Iraq *was* legal. The Iraq Inquiry – commonly referred to as the Chilcot Inquiry – established by the British government in 2009 spent years and millions of pounds seeking to establish the legality of the decision to invade Iraq. Key actors involved in the decision in 2003 – most notably former Prime Minister Tony Blair – testified to robustly defend the legality of the invasion. If international law was irrelevant, why, one might well ask, would they bother? Similarly, why has Bahrain continued to claim adherence to international human rights laws domestically? Why, too, did Russia claim that the annexation of Crimea was lawful?

Of course not everyone agrees that the tendency to articulate legal justifications constitutes evidence of international law's importance; legal justifications may be little more than 'high-sounding tokenism' (Watts 2001: 8), the articulation of which degrades rather than affirms international law. Indicatively, Sudan's description of the responsibility of states under international law to protect their citizens from atrocity crimes as 'a sublime principle to which we all aspire' at the very time that the government was engaged in systematic brutality in Darfur, hardly counts as evidence of international law's influence (Sudan 2009). Unless, of course, one considers this to be part of an evolutionary process which initially involves the emergence of at least universal rhetorical support for existing laws which eventually, despite occasional hypocritical violations, constrains state behavior (Dunne and Gelber 2014).

International law, therefore, ensures that those who profess to recognize it become, as Luke Glanville argues, 'rhetorically entrapped' and thus regardless of their military or economic power they are compelled to behave in ways which are occasionally inconvenient (2011: 471). In this vein, the fact that today no state representative will publicly declare that they are legally entitled to do whatever they want to those living within their territory is seen as progress, even if the state does go on to oppress its people (Evans 2015). A state's avowal of support for international law can be seen, therefore, to facilitate and legitimize the condemnation of the subsequent violation of this law and can ultimately lead to significant change; Mary Kaldor, indeed, argued that the end of the oppressive communist regimes in Eastern Europe had much to do with the fact that during the 1980s these regimes – following Gorbachev's lead – began to affirm human rights declarations thereby legitimizing public debates on these issues which ultimately doomed the regimes (2003: 50).

This, indeed, leads to a particular justification – and indeed explanation – for international law's efficacy, namely that, while the formal mechanisms for enforcing international law are weak and highly politicized, the existence of treaties and rules has an effect on state action as it creates a delineated framework

for legitimization (Hurd 2008: 79). No state, or statesman, wishes to be seen to violate international law lest they be perceived more generally as a pariah; action, therefore, is designed to cohere with the prevailing legal framework, even by the most powerful states (Cassese 2005: 155).

Thus, David Armstrong and Theo Farrell argue that an 'alternative way of thinking about international law might be as a site of legitimation for state action'. Rather than international law and its institutions constituting something analogous to domestic legal systems, they argue,

> it might be more useful to view them as political spaces where states engage in normatively bounded deliberation about legitimate action. These sites are normatively bounded in the sense that state reasoning, deliberation and action is constituted and constrained by pre-existing norms that shape social identities and situations. (Armstrong and Farrell 2005: 7)

The norms prevalent in these 'political spaces' do overtly challenge, albeit occasionally, the influence of raw power.

This realm where international law influences practice has grown and evolved. Andrew Hurrell argues that the evolutionary trajectory of international law has been characterized by a 'shift away from a system in which international law was made by the strong for the strong [...] towards a system in which norm creation becomes an increasingly complex and pluralist process' (2005: 18). A feature of modern times has been, what Sir Arthur Watts describes as a 'judicial climate change', namely a 'greater willingness on the part of the international community to impose strong judicial structures on itself' (2001: 14). The establishment of the ICC, for example, arguably constitutes an example of the tempering of power. The ICC – almost inconceivable 25 years ago – was born from initiatives undertaken by states from the developing world acting within the constitutionally egalitarian General Assembly against often extremely aggressive opposition from the modern great powers; the US in particular sought – ultimately unsuccessfully – to block the court's establishment (Weller 2002). While Russia, China and the US have yet to ratify the Rome Statute, the ICC exists and the Security Council has twice referred cases to the court – Darfur (Sudan) in 2005 and Libya in 2011 – despite the negative stance adopted by these three permanent members of the Council. Of course, the ICC has in recent years come under increasing criticism for its failure to look beyond Africa and a seemingly politically motivated determination to ignore Western criminality (Branch 2011).

There is, therefore, little doubt but that power continues to influence the application and influence of international law. This fact has to temper any appraisal of international law's role but crucially it should not obscure the real-world influence of international law or induce fatalism. While Kelsen characterized the international legal system established in 1945 is as 'primitive', he considered this to be but a developmental stage rather than an immutable reality (1945: 338). In judging international law's influence in the contemporary era, therefore, we should be

mindful of the evolution which preceded it. If we compare law's role in IR in 1945 to that of today can we identify progress?

While we may certainly identify many high-profile instances in the contemporary era where law failed to influence events positively, there are many other examples of international law's new vitality. As an illustration, was it conceivable in 1945 that the government of the UK would be prevented from deporting a foreigner suspected of terrorism by a European court based in Strasbourg, as was the case with respect to Abu Qatada in 2012? Could we have imagined that former heads of state such as Slobodan Milošević and Charles Taylor would be tried by international courts? That a court such as the ICC would come into existence? Was it conceivable during the dark days of the Cold War that the Security Council would sanction a collective military intervention against a regime because it was violating its people's human rights, as was the case with respect to Libya in 2011? Since 1991 to an unprecedented extent the agenda of the Security Council, and public debates on the issues of the day more generally, have been concerned with issues of legality, specifically what constitutes lawful conduct for states both in terms of their internal and external affairs. While in itself this is not evidence of law's pre-eminence it is certainly illustrative of law's new vitality and a potential harbinger of a more mature international legal order.

Conclusion

Recent high-profile violations of international law at the intra-state, inter-state and trans-state level, when viewed collectively, appear to show a very weak international legal order prey to political interference. As myriad reports from an array of reputable NGOs and think tanks in 2015 testified, the current trajectory of international affairs is towards increased violence and the marginalization of international law.

Yet, as Helen Charlesworth and David Kennedy note, international law has always been in a state of 'crisis' with commentators, lawyers and statesmen habitually lamenting its ineffectiveness; they note, 'We always feel as though there is something peculiarly challenging and significant about this moment in international law' (2009: 405) and thus the contemporary fear expressed in many quarters about the diminishing influence of international law may well be the norm rather than unique to the contemporary era.

Therefore, imperfect though international law manifestly is, it is worth concluding with two observations that should at least be considered when reflecting on international law's utility. Given recent events and the prominence today afforded to both the ICC and the Security Council in particular, it is no longer tenable to dismiss international law entirely; the notion that international politics is singularly influenced by power with no role for law or norms is surely an exaggeration. While we must accept that international law continues to play a secondary role to raw power, it nonetheless plays *a* role; as Malanczuk wrote, 'the role of international law in IR has always been limited, but it is rarely insignificant'

(2006: 4). It is important, therefore, when seeking to understand the factors that shape contemporary IR, to determine the nature of international law's significance, identify the areas where it is influential, and assess whether this influence can be increased, and how.

Finally, related to this latter point, it is worth recalling Koskenniemi's observation that international law, 'exists as a promise of justice and thus as encouragement for political transformation' (2006: 69). Lest we adhere to the tenets of anarchism we must agree with the basic premise that the normative goal of law – domestic *and* international – is to enable peaceful societal interaction and protect personal freedom. Frustration with the existing international legal system should, therefore, compel the observer to seek and suggest alternatives rather than induce fatalism. A world without international law is surely an unattractive proposition, and the appetite for greater respect for existing international laws – particularly those related to human rights and inter-state aggression – has only increased in the post-Cold War era. Human history testifies to the fact that ineffective systems eventually come to be replaced and that progressive change (sadly) often comes only in the wake of pronounced failures.

Guide to further reading

There are a number of excellent textbooks outlining the nature of international law which go beyond narrow technical details (Cassese 2005; Malanczuk 2006; Dixon 2007). Many canonical historical figures have written extensively on law's normative rationale, such as Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf and Emmerich de Vattel, but for more succinct commentaries see Watts (2001) and Koskenniemi (2006). For more on the relationship between IR and international law see Chesterman (2002), Simpson (2004), Armstrong, Farrell and Maiguashca (2005), Hurd (2007), Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert (2007), Orford (2009) and Hehir, Kuhrt and Mumford (2011).

Chapter 9

Nationalism and Identity

JOHN HUTCHINSON

Introduction

Nationalism is the primary legitimator of political identities in the modern world. The major forum of humanity – the United Nations (UN) – is an organization of purported nation-states. Yet in his classic study Eric Hobsbawm (1992: 191) declared that nationalism is no longer a global political program and the history of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century would have to be written in largely supranational and infranational terms. In the nineteenth century, nationalism was an important historical force in the developed world, combining nation-states with a national economy that formed a building block of the world economy; similarly, national liberation movements after 1945 played a progressive function as they were unificatory, internationalist (in opposing ethnic tribalism) and emancipatory (ibid.: 169). However, the rise of the European Union (EU) and a host of international organizations (IOs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank show the limits of state sovereignty in the contemporary world. In its separatist and populist forms nationalism has regressed to being a politics of identity, expressing a hunger to belong. Its goals of making political and ethnographic boundaries are unrealizable in a world of global economic disruptions and mass migration. It is a symptom of the disorientation produced by such changes, offering no diagnosis, let alone a treatment of problems that can be tackled at a higher level (ibid.: 177).

Hobsbawm articulates many assumptions in contemporary scholarship about nationalism: that its goals are primarily nation-statehood, that such states must be culturally homogeneous, and that such units were key drivers of world politics in the nineteenth century yet are increasingly irrelevant in a globally interdependent world. Against this I will argue, first, that nationalism emerged within global networks and indeed it is out of the challenges of globalization that both nationalism and nation-states have crystallized. Second, nation-states have never been culturally homogeneous: where they are effective, they are driven by a dominant *ethnie*. Third, Hobsbawm's model is (like that of Gellner 1983), underestimating the importance of military factors in the formation of nation-states. Related to this, the inter*national order* is relatively recent, dating from the end of the Second World War, arising from the successive disintegration of empires in war. Many of

the problems of the contemporary world derive from the transitions from empire to nation-states. Finally, nationalism is never simply about the achievement of state power, contrary to many interpretations. The appeal of nationalism is to offer a sense of identity both at the individual and collective level that promises to create coherence in a world of unpredictable global changes. To achieve their goals, nationalists have always operated at multiple levels – populist communitarian, state, trans-state (diasporic and Pan), regional and inter-state. Although nation-states vary in their capacity to regulate transnational processes, they remain essential units in world governance.

Before discussing these claims, let me offer some definitions. Globalization here refers to the emergence of inter-regional networks and systems of interaction and exchange that widen, intensify and accelerate the interconnectedness between the populations of the world, which might be economic, political, cultural, military or ecological. Here I draw on David Held, who maintains that one must speak of this interconnectedness in organizational terms, through its infrastructures, the institutions that regularize interactions, patterns of stratification and modes of interaction (Held et al. 1999: 16–20, 27).

Nations are considered as relatively novel politicized communities resting on conceptions of popular sovereignty, the possession of a consolidated territory and a distinctive historic culture. They are also communities of sentiment often built on ethnic cultures which predate the modern period (cf. Smith 1999: 12–14). A case can be made for the premodernity of some nations, but the world of nations and nation-states is a recent phenomenon. *Nation-states* are not necessarily homogenous. Most contain cultural minorities of various kinds, but state institutions are used to express the preferences and interests of a dominant cultural group. *Nationalism* is defined as a post-eighteenth-century ideology dedicated to the creation or defense of the nation. It is a modern surrogate religion that in a desacralized world offers individuals a means of overcoming contingency and death by identifying with an 'ancient' community (the nation) that, according to historical legend, has regularly survived disasters. This identity is tied to three central demands: securing the distinctive character of the national community, exclusive rights over the national territory or homeland, and the maintenance of self-governing institutions, usually (though not always) in the form of a state.

Nationalism and nation-states in historical context

If we accept David Held's conceptualization of globalization, then it has long preceded the era of nationalism, whether we have in mind frameworks of markets, empires or religious civilizations (Bayly 2002; Hopkins 2002). Indeed, as nationalists emerged during the nineteenth century *within* these broader frameworks, they struggled to form often scattered populations into solidary nations and nation-states. Because of this challenging environment, to secure their goals of creating distinctive and united homeland and self-governing populations,

nationalists have needed, from early on, to muster networks *beyond* the territorial state. They mobilized diasporic populations to support an 'enslaved' homeland (as in Greek independence struggles); they sought to create through various Pan movements blocs of affiliated communities against dominant powers, in Central Europe (Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism), in Africa (Pan-Africanism) and the Middle East (Pan-Arabism); and they later lobbied at international level (for example, the Paris Peace Conference) for recognition by the great powers. They have also been willing to establish federal or confederal states (Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia), though not without tensions.

Second, nations not only originated within global networks and processes; they can be said to be in part *products* of such processes, and draw on older historical experiences derived from them to negotiate external threats. These included the European military revolution of the later Middle Ages (borrowing innovative technologies from China and elsewhere) that privileged the rise of centralized territorial states worldwide (Tilly 1992; Parker 1996); the struggles of the Counter Reformation for universal religious primacy in which populations came to see themselves as endowed with a divine mission; and later wars between imperial powers (e.g. Spain, France and Britain) for world supremacy. Out of such conflicts, including the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, came the foundation myths and heroes from which many modern national identities crystallized. Because populations can be subject over time to many such experiences, nations tend to have multiple and layered pasts which frame their often competing concepts of homeland, geopolitics, friend–foe relations, cultural exclusiveness and historical destiny that orient their policies in the present.

However, even as nation-states became established in the nineteenth century they remained entwined within broader networks: the idea of a golden age of self-contained, homogeneous and sovereign nation-states is a myth. All but a few contain cultural minorities: indeed Andreas Wimmer (2002) has argued that nation-states are built on ethnic exclusion (usually of majorities against minorities). Moreover, throughout the modern period, states, whether they were long-established empires or indeed avowedly nation-states, periodically were shaken or even destroyed by unforeseen exogenous events that cut across their boundaries such as warfare, economic crises, ideological movements and migrations. Nation-state formation coincided with the expansion of transnational capitalism, and the permeability of state frontiers to the movement of goods, capital and people in the period 1870–1914 was not surpassed until after the Second World War (Milward 1997: 11). In many countries the agricultural sector shrank, producing a loss of self-sufficiency in food production and rural depopulation. The era of national states was marked by extensive immigrations and the largest emigrations in European history (of some 40 million people between 1851 and 1920) (Woodruff 1973: 700–701). Recurring economic dislocations led to rival internationalist ideologies (revolutionary socialism) and imperial competition between the great powers led to crises such as world wars, class revolutions (e.g. Bolshevik) and further population movements, resulting in a sense of threat to national territory, identity, solidarity or independence. At this point we see nationalist revivals, looking back

to history to provide new maps of collective identity and restructure political and economic institutions and programs (see Hutchinson 2005: ch. 4): Nationalism, then, is an *episodic* phenomenon that waxes and wanes in relation to unpredictable and diverse challenges.

When we consider the role of nationalism in world politics, we have to recognize that warfare has been one of the fundamental catalysts of nation-state formation and of the current international state system, and that the world of nation-states is recently recent. When the UN was founded in 1945 it had 51 member states, whereas it now has 193. The shift from a world of empire to one of purportedly nation-states came about through 'waves of war' between imperial powers, in which the language of national self-determination was employed by rival sides to encourage national and ethnic minorities to revolt against their imperial rulers, producing paranoia, ethnic persecutions and genocide (Wimmer 2013; Hutchinson 2017: ch. 3). The First World War destroyed the Habsburg, Ottoman and Romanov Empires, the Second World War led to the decolonization of Asia and Africa, and the military-fiscal costs of the Cold War were a significant factor in the collapse of the USSR. Successor political units were shaped by the kind of empire from which they emerged and the nature of their emergence in conflict or otherwise. The empires differed considerably on the degree to which they furnished administrative structures, systems of communications and economic institutions that enabled populations to compete in the modern world (Barkey 1997). The new states also varied in their ethnographic legacies and the geopolitical and economic environment into which they were thrown.

Nonetheless, what Aviel Roshwald (2001) argues with respect to the First World War applies more generally: war catapulted many nationalist movements into positions of state authority before the necessary cultural and institutional framework was able to develop. The process of breaking away was disorderly and the weak political units have struggled to cope with an often threatening security and economic environment that could lead to irredentist and separatist conflicts and ethnic cleansing. This was the legacy of the First World War, and although the absorption of most of the new states in the Soviet sphere of interest after 1945 'froze' these problems, they have re-emerged after the latter's collapse. Rapid decolonization after 1945 in Africa and the Middle East resulted in states with often arbitrary political boundaries, little 'national' solidarity, weak administrative structures and underdeveloped industries that left them vulnerable to a combination of external interferences by rival parties during the Cold War and internal revolts.

For this reason, Hobsbawm can argue that nationalism is increasingly irrelevant in articulating solutions to the intermeshed problems of the modern world, pointing to the proliferation of international institutions since 1945. These include the UN (1945), which, under its Charter, outlawed war between states, except under special circumstances, and truncated the right of self-determination, now redefined in statist terms to refer to the rights of political units to maintain their territorial integrity without external interference (Higgins 1994: ch. 7). The UN also established conventions in 1948 that obliged its members to advance

principles of human rights and prevent crimes against humanity. The new post-1945 economy is also regulated by bodies such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the IMF and the World Bank; by legal organizations such as the UN, the International Court at the Hague; by regional associations of states such as the EU and North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); and by a global civil society of transnational non-governmental agencies, advancing solutions to human rights abuses. As nationalism becomes detached from the nation-state, so we observe the new political salience of diaspora communities as economic and ideological actors.

In the next sections I will assess claims that nationalism is becoming irrelevant in the regulation of international security, economic management and geopolitics, and that global perspectives are coming to override national frames of reference in tackling a widening range of planetary problems, including nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, long-distance economic migrations and refugee flows, and climate change.

Contemporary nationalism and security issues

The world wars might seem to represent the end of the European nation-states as sovereign actors after the loss of empire and the rise of the US and the USSR as superpowers of continental scale and proponents of rival universalist ideologies. Inter-state war, previously one of the mechanisms of national reproduction, was now outlawed under the UN Charter, except under special circumstances. Recoiling from the experiences of total war, blamed on nationalist rivalries between the great powers, the major European states formed the EU with the aim of converting the continent into a zone of peace and democratic progress (d'Appolonia 2002). This revulsion against nationalism has been accompanied by a rapid decline in expenditures devoted to the military and rise in those geared towards social welfare. Its adherents claim the EU as a realization of a new international politics of reconciliation and the overcoming of nationalism, begun by the agreement of two historic rivals, France and (West) Germany, to cooperate in building a new Europe.

The memory of the Holocaust has also played an increasingly important role in the validation of the European project (Levy and Sznaider 2002). Although the need for atonement was felt most intensely in Germany, after the end of the Cold War public trials of ex-Nazis in many European countries, including France and Austria, compelled a public acknowlegment of extensive collaboration in sustaining the German war effort and the removal and killing of Jews (Beker 2010). Bernhard Giesen (2003) proposes that trauma has become the basis of a new European identity and that Europe's means of mastering its violent nationalist past by rituals of apology and restitution provides a model for overcoming historic conflicts worldwide. Such restititutive models also offer a more humble and pacific alternative to the militaristic and messianic US in the global advancement of human rights and democracy.

Western nation-states continue to wage war, and in spite of the overhang of imperial guilt have felt required to engage in many overseas interventions when confronted by the security problems of many of the new postcolonial states in Africa and Asia that have a global reach. The collapse of Soviet bloc in the 1990s inspired hopes of a harmonious new world order, but it triggered state disintegration and ethnic cleansings in the Balkans and elsewhere that produced waves of refugees that destabilized surrounding states. However, interventionist wars are justified not on nationalist grounds but under universalist mandates such as UN principles of the Responsibility to Protect, formulated after the Rwanda genocides in 2005.

It is argued such peacekeeping wars of international coalitions are unlike the previous existential conflicts that inspired mass nationalist passions. The tasks of intervening states and their militaries, it is argued, are not territorial conquest and glory, but conflict resolution and peacekeeping. These are wars of choice rather than of obvious national defense. Shaw (2005) argues a new form of risk-transfer war has developed in Iraq and Afghanistan that avoids entanglement in asymmetrical conflicts and minimizes the military and civilian losses that could undermine the legitimacy of the interventions. This includes a targeting of enemy combatants with high-precision weapons, a shift of risks of ground combat to local allies where possible, and the avoidance of direct and visible civilian killing, through indirect and less visible forms of long-distance weaponry such as drones.

The security problems are in large part provoked by the proliferation of intra-state conflicts in the rest of the world, which Mary Kaldor (2006), using the term 'new wars', distinguished from previous Clausewitzian inter-state wars. Whereas the latter, she argues, resulted in a stabilization of territorial borders and a centralization of political authority out of which the concept of nationality and citizenship emerged, these new wars fragment states into ethnic units. The new context is of a proliferation of weak states that lack internal legitimacy in a world subject to global processes that they are powerless to regulate. Internal struggles cannot be described as civil wars since there is little concept of state, citizenship or borders. Moreover, external actors (competing ideological blocs, large-scale diasporas and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) intervene to keep these conflicts going indefinitely. A global arms trade supplying inexpensive kalshnikovs, makes decentralized guerrilla struggles cheap to run. The result has been the sustaining of protracted low-intensity warfare that would repeatedly flare up. Kaldor and Herfried Münkler (2005) claim that the grand ideological narratives of nationalism no longer apply in a global world. These are identity wars where ethnic classifications are used by predatory leaders as a means of subverting the state or in the process of achieving (communal) ethnic cleansing. Kaldor argues that the major task to be addressed by international peacekeeping missions is the breakdown of legitimacy, and we need a new cosmopolitan politics to reconstruct this in the zones of war.

Finally, it is arguable there has developed worldwide a new traumatic mode of remembrance undermining romantic nationalist conceptions with consequences for international politics. A problem facing Western governments in a

post-imperial world is the growing suspicion of the military narratives of Western nation-states and an awareness of the victims of war that erodes the heroic ethos on which collective sacrifice for the nation depends. This loss of faith in the capacity of civic patriotism to invest death on the battlefield with meaning is reflected in memorials such as the Vietnam Wall, where the focus is on individual mortality and loss (Edkins 2003: ch. 3). In Britain, too, there has been a shift from didactic official monumentalism to a memorialization that is local, 'non-political' and performative. Anthony King has observed that military press releases set the dead as individuals closely knit to families and bound by professional loyalties to soldier comrades (King 2010). This erosion of a sense of national collective is increased by the recent multicultural character of Western societies, whose composition is shaped by immigrants from former colonies who tend to be critical of heroic imperial progress stories. Concerns about social cohesion may come to place limits on future overseas military interventions.

This cult of victimhood is particularly visible in the mass of national states that have arisen from the comparatively recent collapse of empires in the twentieth century. Although the achievement of independence produced heroic liberation myths, many of these new states defined their identities in terms of centuries of subjugation, martyrdom and victimhood. Independence and its aftermath was frequently accompanied by civil wars and ethnic cleansings as nationalists dealt with 'the unfinished business' of unwelcome minorities on their soil or of unrealized irredentist agendas. After 1945, as they entered or re-entered an international order governed by human rights norms, many new (and not so new) states with compromised pasts struggled to overcome pariah status in the international community and faced pressures to confess to events that threatened to contaminate key founding myths. Turkey's denial of the Armenian Genocide (a crucial event in the carving of a national state out of the Ottoman Empire) as well as its treatment of the Kurds has been used as a justification for delay in accession talks with the EU. Serbia, seeking admittance to the EU, is expected to demonstrate its commitment to European norms and repudiate a past of ethnic persecutions. There is pressure on conflict-torn countries like Rwanda when seeking international aid to demonstrate programs of transitional justice and/or truth commissions which imply a mutual willingness to renounce exclusive claims over the past and accept the historical sufferings of the 'other'.

Although all this suggests that national identity and state formation are being transformed in much of the world, there is little evidence that they are being eroded in the security area. The demilitarization of Western Europe is arguably a special case, made possible by the US nuclear umbrella and now challenged by Russia's recent invasion of the Ukraine. Power politics allied to nationalism continues in large parts of the world, between the US and the rising power of China, between India and Pakistan in conflict over Kashmir, between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf. Whereas memories of the Second World War encouraged a politics of reconciliation in Western Europe, in Asia the perceived unwillingness of Japanese governments to apologize for war crimes has heightened nationalist tensions with Korea and China, expressed in territorial disputes over the Senkaku islands.

What of claims that universal norms are superseding national with respect to military interventions by nation-states (for reasons other than of self-defense)? Such actions now require the support of a mandate either from the UN or international law and also an international coalition of states. Levy and Sznaider (2004: 147–150) maintain a key role was played by the universalization of memory of the Holocaust. This was transformed from an epochal moment in the Jewish–Gentile historical relationship during the 1960s. From the 1990s it provided moral foundations for the transition from a world of national sovereignty towards a more global civil society of which the recent proliferation of human rights regimes is the manifestation (ibid.: 155). There is also new attention paid to the victims of war. After the Rwanda massacres the UN formulated in 2005 the Responsibility to Protect principles. Although not legally binding, these asserted that sovereignty is not a right, but a responsibility, one which should be enforced by the international community through sanctions and in the last resort military intervention in cases of genocide.

Nonetheless, international military action may reinforce the salience of nationalism as a legitimating force. Cheyney Ryan makes an important distinction between reasons that justify and those that motivate action (Ryan 2014: 126–128). The former may be couched in universalist terms (e.g. the prevention of genocide), notably to the international community. But effective interventions are made by coalitions of *nation-state*s who seek to mobilize support among their population by appeals to national interests, ideal and material (e.g. security). The two, of course, can and are frequently combined – calls for a 'new liberal imperialism' to tame dictators and genocidal regimes or to demand leadership in the spread of democracy tacitly evoke older national civilizing missions (cf. Cooper 2002).

International coalitions, in spite of their difficulties, can strengthen national identities. Japanese and German leaders (the latter in the case of Kosovo) have been able to 'normalize' their nation-states by justifying military expeditions abroad, previously forbidden under their respective constitutions, as part of their international obligations. Coalitions create significant challenges for militaries: the problems of divided commands and separate forces answering to national governments. But they may also strengthen national identifications among their publics – when invidious comparisons are made with the contributions of other nations or when complaints are made that their nation is being drawn into an unnecessary conflict by a hegemonic power (the US).

The goals themselves, when they envisage the construction of state institutions based on civic conceptions and new neutral symbols of territorial nationhood, tend to reinforce assumptions that the global political norm is nation-statehood. It is doubtful that nations themselves (on which most successful states are built) can be engineered by external agents. Nations are, in the eyes of their adherents, autochthonous. If nations arise from interventions it will generally be in resistance to them.

Admittedly many of the intra-state wars in Africa seem to demonstrate the failures of nationalism to construct stable collective identities. However, claims that these are (limited and instrumentalized) identity wars founder on the inability to

easily divorce identity from ideological politics. Elsewhere, the so-called decentralized Balkan wars of genocide in 1990s (on which Kaldor's 'new wars' thesis was based) were highly organized nationalist campaigns that relied on state structures (Malešević 2010: 325). They were powerful agents of nation-state building, mobilizing popular movements in the homelands and producing a legacy of historical memories that were used to legitimize the new polities. Diaspora movements (especially the Croatian diaspora in Canada and the US), so far undermining state formation, played a key role, rather in the manner of their historical precursors in the Jewish and Irish diasporas. After independence the Croatian diaspora uniquely were guaranteed seats in the Croatian parliament (Brkanic 2016).

Charles King makes similar points about the half dozen or so 'small wars' of the 1990s, dubbed the wars of Soviet succession in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Chechnya and Tajikistan (King 2004). The separatists in each case engaged in criminality, benefiting from untaxed trade and production flowing through the war zones. By the early 2000s, however, they had created state-like structures able to establish armed forces, administer the territory, educate their population and sustain local economies as well as the recognized states to which they were nominally affiliated. These were relatively successful cases of not just state- but also nation-building, in which intellectuals joined political leaders to create national histories and festivals, a process reinforced by the myths generated in the aftermath of the collective conflicts (King 2004: 147–149, 164–166).

It is by no means obvious that overt great power nationalism has been banished from international politics. The new post-Soviet context is of an increasingly multipolar world (rather like the long nineteenth century) in which we find a series of powerful states building their militaries to challenge US hegemony in what they see in their 'natural' spheres of influence, Russia in the Ukraine, China in the East China Sea, Iran in the Middle East, each appealing in different ways to a sense of national mission.

Outside the great states the politics of victimhood may reinforce nationalist claims. Claims of victimhood have been taken up by the powerless, by indigenous peoples, descendants of former slaves and survivors of genocide, appealing to international 'public opinion' to press Western governments into a recognition and redress of grievances (see Barzan 2000). The notion of 'trauma' tied to collective victimhood, however, is misleading when it suggests the notion of a breach of meaning arising out of overwhelming experiences that produces broken peoples unable to come to terms with their pasts. A claim of 'victimhood' is often a strategic *choice* (is an exercise of agency) and in the past has been linked with religious eschatologies that interpret apparent disaster as being ordained by God or history to confirm one's chosenness as a people, in the cases of the Jews and of the Serbs (as descendants of Prince Lazar who deliberately chose martyrdom with the promise of a heavenly reward). 'Victimhood' may be constructed to co-exist with heroic narratives, sometimes in tension with and sometimes reinforcing the latter. The constructed aspect is manifest in the changing interpretations of the mass murder of the Jews. At first the survivors of what became named as the

Holocaust were regarded as objects of shame in Israel by Zionists. They counterposed the passive surrender of the religious Orthodox diaspora to the military heroism of the Israeli nation-builders and also to the resistance of the Zealots against the might of the Roman Empire in the myth of the Massada (Zerubavel 1994). Over time it was taken up by Zionists to justify a separate homeland for the Jewish people as the only protection against a hostile Gentile world and, later, Israeli defense and territorial policies. Rashmi Singh argues that in the Palestinian case the early narrative was of (passive) collective victimhood of Palestinians expelled and displaced from their land in 1948. A later narrative was superimposed on this about the (active) heroism of secular nationalist guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). These in turn, as Islamist movements became more prominent, have been construed as martyrs for the cause (Singh 2014: 262–263).

Constructing one's nation as a victim can also be a ploy of political elites to divert popular attention from poor performances. African nationalists cited centuries of European intervention in Africa from the time of the slave trade to later colonization to excuse their inability to meet the expectations of their populations and to obtain as recompense foreign aid from the West. It has also been employed by the political elites of powerful nations. In China, nationalists from the early twentieth century employed the concept of 'a century of humiliation' inflicted on the 'Middle Kingdom' to heighten a sense of bitterness at the loss of territories and the unjust treaties imposed by European imperial powers and Japan dating from the Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860). This was directed initially against an impotent imperial regime, but could be canalized by later governments. Thus, although official commemorations of 'humiliation' were played down after the victory of Chinese communists and expulsion of the Japanese in 1945, they were revived after the Tiananmen Square massacres to unite the population around the communist regime's ambitions to recover first Hong Kong and then Taiwan (Callahan 2004).

Such self-victimization tends to reinforce exclusive ethnic conceptions of nationality. Populations which perceive themselves as victims are often blind to the oppressed status of other groups. One example is the prolonged unwillingness of Eastern Europeans, suffering under first Nazi and then Soviet occupation, to acknowledge their complicity in the lethal culture of anti-semitism and murder (cf. Himka and Michlic 2013). Indeed, attempts by peace-making historical revisionists to deconstruct hegemonic myths and explore their intolerant consequences may stir up a backlash in populations resentful of having founding or legitimation myths questioned. The claims of 'truth' and insecure collective identities are generally at odds. Even where international pressure is powerful, it may not result in more than formal allegiance to change. As part of the Serbian state's drive for membership of the EU, it has reconstructed public rituals and its history textbooks to present Serbian national emergence as part of European modernity, but this has been interpreted as an elaborate process of 'impression management', offering different meanings to international as opposed to domestic audiences (David 2014).

Nationalism, non-military challenges and global institutions

What of other global challenges to the nation-state in the contemporary world? Of these there are many: Michael Mann (1997) identified the following – capitalism, environmental dangers, identity politics and post-nuclear geopolitics. It is not possible here to discuss all of these. One can, however, make the following points. As Michael Mann observes, few networks extending beyond the territory of the nation-state are truly global. Most are transnational, international or macro-regional. In examining if the nation-state is thereby being weakened, Mann answers with a qualified no, though there are regional variations. He argues (1997: 476–478) that capitalism is still nurtured within nation-state structures with over 80% of world production still for the domestic market, a proportion that has not changed since the late nineteenth century, and that the world economy is dominated by the US, Japan and European nation-states. Others agree that the nation-state still has autonomous capacities in economic policy (see Weiss 1998), and bilateral agreements between states on trading, cultural and military policies remain significant.

   Global and transnational institutions play a more important role in setting the rules of the game in world affairs. Stein Tønnessen (2004) concedes that nation-states in an open market economy have lost some of their power to tax and regulate business, especially transnational corporations (TNCs), and that national elites are now more occupied with negotiations in international institutions (such as GATT) to secure the interests of their polity. However, what we see instead is a more complex multilevel nationalist politics. To a degree, there is nothing new in this, as I have earlier observed. Nationalists have long operated beyond as well as below the nation-state to achieve their objectives, in mobilizing regional, diaspora and Pan networks, and the rise of international institutions to regulate the conduct of war was itself a creation of liberal nationalists (Howard 2011).

   There appear to be two caveats to this. The first is the example of a regional organization like the EU that seems to be increasingly eroding the economic autonomy of European nation-states. Milward earlier had argued that the EU represented the rescue of the European nation-state after the ruins of the Second World War, as a common market enabled full employment policies and the establishment of welfare states that bound the mass of the people to their state as never before. However, since the Maastrich Treaty there has been an unprecedented ceding of sovereignty in a series of fields, notably the establishment of the common currency, and pressures to establish fiscal coordination. Mann suggests that this is offset by the strengthening of states in the spheres of population control, health and education. One might also observe that the evidence of loss of national economy autonomy is ambiguous. The driver of 'more Europe' is a dominant nation-state (Germany) which is seen by others as acting as an imperial nation-state with the consequence that the very pressure for fiscal integration is generating powerful populist nationalisms throughout Europe demanding a return of

national powers. The EU's current inability to resolve the current migration crises and decisions by national governments to suspend the Schengen agreement, a cornerstone of the Union, raises questions about its future direction.

A second caveat is the relative weakness of many postcolonial states (in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America) in the face of global pressures. We have already noted the inability of many such states to exercise a Weberian control of violence over their territory (in discussing new wars) but this is also reflected in weak controls over multinational companies, inability to negotiate fair access to developed markets and so forth.

Action on the global scale is required for such inequities to be addressed. But it is also true that without the formal possession of a nation-state, the capacities of populations to make claims on a world stage are limited. So far there is little evidence of a global consciousness superseding national interests; rather, national interests are being secured through multiple global (and regional) agencies. In this regard, small-to-medium-sized powers such as Ireland, Australia and Sweden view participation in organizations such as the UN as an effective means of achieving their national goals. Successive Secretary-Generals have looked for support to NGOs, as embodiments of an emerging global civil society, to advance the causes of peace and development (Carrette 2013). There has been an explosion of transnational agencies (such as NGOs, scientific networks) pressing nation-states on environmental and human rights issues, but they, if anything, strengthen nation-states, because in order to secure their goals they have to persuade at the nation-state level or through international agreement.

Of course, the UN by its very name reflects the fact that it is an inter-nation-state rather than a global forum. The increasing significance of these institutions also generates national struggles to capture them. The great powers such as the US and China show no willingness to subordinate national interests to 'world opinion'. The rise of international institutions has made the political games of national elites more complex rather than subsuming them into larger entities. National actors can play off different levels of power in order to maximize their autonomy. The global military reach of the US, made possible by technology, is welcomed by many states, both in Europe and Asia, as a balance against over-mighty neighbors (Russia and China); some nation-states (e.g. France) have viewed the EU as a means of checking the dominance of the US; and non-state nations (e.g. Catalans) consider the EU as reducing their dependence on their nation-state. In turn, political elites also use national interest arguments to persuade populations to support measures of economic globalization: in the 1990s appeals to nationalism in Japan overrode sectoral resistances to neoliberal reforms aimed at reviving a moribund economy (Hall 2005; Helleiner 2005). The difficulties of operating on different political levels may intensify nationalism: Tønnessen (2004) suggests that as state elites become preoccupied with the global or the regional stage, they are likely to alienate themselves from their national societies and to face nationalist challengers from below, as we see from the rise of populist nationalism in Europe.

The very capture of rule-making global institutions by Western nation-states, particularly after the Soviet collapse, has reinforced nationalism in the states of the developing world. As we have noted, threatened by internal cleavages they are ill-equipped to withstand transnational economic pressures or to prevent a global arms trade that sustains internal insurgents (Münkler 2005). One might expect their political leaders to be strong supporters of global governance. However, the policies and memberships of global political and economic institutions have provoked resistance in Asia, Africa and Latin America because they are perceived to reflect 'Western', in particular US, interests and values – in justifying military intervention into particular 'failed states', regulating the terms of trade and determining access to nuclear technology.

For them globalization is associated with Americanization, that is to say with covert nationalist and neo-imperialist agendas that create further stratifications between rich and poor. China has sought to tap a widespread anti-Americanism by invoking a neo-Confucianism, emphasizing harmonious cooperation, as a non-exclusionary principle of world order superior to the competitive messianism of the West (Zheng 1999: ch. 4). Similarly, the hegemony of the secular West has triggered hostility in large sections of the Muslim world. Religions, such as Islam (and evangelical Protestantism), their reach extended by modern communication systems, remain among the most potent globalizing agents and offer a rival vision to that of secular modernity. A sense of humiliation at the weakness of their once great Islamic military and economic civilization before the upstart West, and the failure of secular nationalist regimes to free their populations from Western neo-colonialism, have resulted in the rise of a wave of religious revivalist and religious nationalist movements (Juergensmeyer 1993: chs. 1, 2). The rise of ISIS, which espouses a return to a universal caliphate, exposes the thin roots of territorial nationalism in regions such as the Middle East, but this is on the whole in states such as Iraq and Syria, which were Western colonial inventions and which have imploded, in part because of foreign interventions. In practice, Islamist movements like Hamas and Hezbollah, rather than supplanting nationalism have generally intensified it, by mobilizing neo-traditionalist populism to more specific territorial goals. In short, current global currents are perceived to come with their own ethnocultural assumptions, and they provoke countervailing visions, and in turn rival nationalisms.

Finally, the enabling conditions of a Western-dominated global order, already under challenge, now seem to be fading. Even before the current financial crisis, which some have viewed as (economic) de-globalization, US military and economic dominance was threatened not just by the ascension of China but by fiscal burdens of world power and its geopolitical overstretch in the Middle East and Asia. The sense of instability that global interconnectedness can bring is now at the heart of the developed world since the 9/11 attacks on the US. In response, there has been an ethnocentric reaction in the West to the expansion of inter-regional migration of peoples (especially to those from Muslim countries) expressed in fears of 'a battle of civilizations'. Scholars can now envisage a shift from a unipolar to multipolar world politics, to economic

protectionism, mounting struggles for resource security and new regional struggles (de Wijk 2010). Such increasing contestation over the rules of the game within transnational institutions would make the management of issues such as nuclear proliferation and climate change more difficult, leading to heightened tensions between neighbors and even in new forms of nationalism – 'hydronationalism', as conflicts over water resources erupt between Jordan and Israel, and India and Bangladesh.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Hobsbawm is right to suggest that identity issues remain central to nationalism and that, in a world of ever greater interconnectedness, nation-states engage in much more pooling of sovereignty with other states and non-state actors. In the contemporary world, national elites, to achieve their goals, must cooperate within an unstable environment that involves balancing global and regional networks (such as the EU). As we have seen, nationalists have always operated through broader networks. Contemporary national politicians do face problems novel in their range and scale, and devote more energy beyond the state level. That said, there is little evidence that international institutions are developing a popular legitimacy capable of overriding national loyalties. Rather, they are sites of contention where we see competing concepts of the global at work. In the developed world, then, there is no fundamental revision of the nation-state; in the developing world one of the main goals of populations will be to achieve an effective nation-state, although this is likely to be a slow and uncertain process.

Globalization may now be of greater intensity but it continues to take multiple forms, creating further unpredictabilities. What Ernest Gellner (1964) argued with respect to modernization, that it is uneven, also applies to globalization. States and populations face different challenges and vary in the resources they have to deal with them. This requires local as well as general solutions that allow national agents a measure of autonomy, particularly if they can draw on cultural crystallizations of earlier globalizations for models of collective action. Nationalism by itself is not enough and the experiences of globalization can also work against nation formation, for without collective heritages and institutions, creating a cohesive and self-confident national community will be difficult. But the incentives to try remain, because only through membership of a nation-state can populations effectively participate in a global world.

Finally, the contemporary global dispensation may be breaking down, as we enter a period of new multipolar rivalries, and Western assumptions that lie behind so much of the scholarship on the subject have to be questioned. In this era of uncertainty, nation-states are likely to remain potent actors, and nationalism will gain traction because of its promise to answer the existential anxieties that inevitably arise. So, far from envisaging the end of the political nation, we are likely to see its resurgence.

Guide to further reading

The literature on nationalism is very extensive; the following works provide further details on the issues discussed in this chapter. Bell (2006) provides a wide range of essays exploring the role of memory and trauma and its interplay with nationalism. Breuilly's (2013) handbook has detailed essays on many topics; chapters by James Mayall, Richard Caplan and Jürgen Osterhammel are particularly recommended. See Helleiner and Pickel (2005) for work on economic nationalism, Hall and Malešević (2013) and Scheipers (2014) on the links between nationalism and war. Smith's seminal work on nations and nationalism in an age of globalization retains its salience (1995) while Juergensmeyer (2001) is an excellent study of religious violence and nationalism.

Chapter 10

Climate Change

DAVID GORDON AND MATTHEW PATERSON

In late 2015, one of the largest diplomatic meetings in global history concluded in Paris. Over 40,000 delegates from countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), research institutes, business organizations and many more, had been there to either negotiate an international treaty, to lobby and protest to get that treaty to be better according to some criteria held by the lobbyists or protesters, or to follow and track the negotiations and politics more generally. Given the size of the meeting, we might think it was something on the traditional 'high politics' agenda – security, terrorism, perhaps the global economy. But this meeting was about climate change, and was scheduled to produce a treaty that might enable states and other actors to improve a global response that has so far proved highly inadequate. Climate change has itself arguably become an issue of 'high politics' – regarded as a national security issue in many states, and certainly central to many aspects of the trajectory of the global economy.

The size of this and other UN climate change summits reflects one of the main themes we explore in this chapter – the complexity of climate change as an international political issue and the huge range of actors, governmental and non-governmental, that come to take an interest in the issue. Climate change is the result of the emissions of a small number of gases – carbon dioxide (CO_2), methane, and nitrous oxide principally as well as other trace gases – and their accumulation in the atmosphere. Whereas the presence of these greenhouse gases (GHGs) has traditionally served a useful purpose, by regulating the earth's temperature and rendering it much warmer than it might otherwise be, from the mid-nineteenth century on there has been a rapid build-up of GHGs. From a starting point of roughly 280 parts per million (ppm) in the late eighteenth century, the earth's atmosphere has a current concentration of 399 ppm. There has been a corresponding increase in global temperature over this period. The earth's average temperature has increased 0.7°C since 1990 (it is largely understood that the oceans have served as a climatic buffer of sorts by absorbing large amounts of increased atmospheric heat over this period of time; see, for example, Rhein et al. 2013) and is projected to increase between 1.1°C and 6.4°C by 2100 in the absence of an aggressive policy response, with scientists in broad consensus that anything beyond a 1.5°C increase in global temperature constitutes a dangerous threat to human society.

GHGs have extraordinarily diverse sources, principally because CO_2, which accounts for around 75% of climate change, is emitted from almost any activity using energy based on fossil fuels (for an excellent overview of the basic science of climate change see Dessler and Parson 2009). Fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) remain at the base of the vast majority of economic activity worldwide, and thus all economic sectors and social groups have some sort of stake in climate change. This is one aspect of why climate change has achieved such salience on the international agenda: to deal with it touches all aspects of economic activity, and an effective governance response threatens various entrenched interests. But this heightened salience also comes from the impacts of climate change itself. These include significant sea-level rise, changes in rainfall patterns that increase the probability of both drought and flooding, the frequency and/or intensity of extreme weather events (windstorms, heatwaves, rainfall), and shifting global patterns of disease. All have the potential to produce massive disruption to human societies round the world, through increased mortality, radical changes in agricultural zones, increases in migration from areas that become uninhabitable, and perhaps conflicts over key resources like water. These are, moreover, not only future projections: the World Health Organization (WHO) (2015a) estimates that around 150,000 people already die annually because of climate change impacts, while others have argued that some of the recent major civil conflicts (in Sudan and Syria, for example) have had climate change impacts as one of their contributing causes (UNEP 2007; Gleick 2014). Should global average temperatures rise unchecked towards the high end of plausible paths, towards 5 or 6°C above pre-industrial levels, these impacts threaten to cause the entire collapse of human societies. Delaying action to limit emissions will both reduce the chance of avoiding this sort of outcome (since positive feedbacks in the climate system are likely to kick in at some point), and increase significantly the economic costs of achieving those emissions reductions, since large amounts of existing infrastructure will need to be simply abandoned.

The other key aspect that has kept the salience of climate change high on the international agenda is the particular quality of global inequalities involved. Emissions levels vary enormously across the world on a per capita basis, leading to significant diplomatic conflict over the responsibility of different countries to limit their emissions. These emissions levels have also, however, been changing rapidly, with relatively stable emissions in many (but not all) high-emitting rich countries, and rapidly growing emissions in large developing countries like India and China. Regarding climate impacts, those already bearing the brunt of such impacts are primarily to be found in poor countries, most especially small low-lying ones (the Maldives, Kiribati, and so on) but more broadly those particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise and desertification but who have played little to no role in producing climate change. The issue thus raises acute questions of global justice that have made the negotiations particularly difficult to resolve but have nevertheless kept the issue high on the international agenda.

This chapter aims to chart the principal dynamics of climate change – how it got onto the global agenda, what the principal attempts to govern it have been,

and what plausible futures it has over the coming decades. But to start, we ask the question: what type of issue is climate change? Or rather, how has it been and how can it be framed as an issue in world politics? Our premise here is that it is useful to see different perspectives on this question not in terms of whether they are 'correct', given many perspectives may provide good analytical accounts of climate politics, but rather regarding how useful they are at orienting us towards fruitful types of intervention to respond to climate change as a problem.

From collective action to complexity and transformation

The classic framing of climate change is as a collective action problem. The opening two sentences of the chapter on international cooperation in the most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN's scientific advisory body on the issue, states that:

> Due to global mixing of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, anthropogenic climate change is a global commons problem. For this reason, international cooperation is necessary to achieve significant progress in mitigating climate change. (Stavins et al. 2014: 1007)

Many standard accounts of climate change politics start with similar propositions (e.g. Ward 1993; Soroos 1994; Aldy and Stavins 2007). It is the formalized version of the popular environmentalist slogan 'the earth is one, the world is not'. Technically, the commons problem that the IPCC refers to above means that it has two types of condition, known as 'jointness of supply' and 'indivisibility of benefits'. With respect to the former, no one can individually solve the climate problem; as to the latter, no one can be excluded from the benefits of a stable climate. In combination these qualities produce a collective action problem since, while it requires the participation of all actors to resolve it, or at the very least a great many of them, there are powerful incentives for actors to free ride on the actions of others. The ideal strategy for each actor, after all, is that everyone else reduces their emissions to zero while they get to keep burning cheap fossil fuels as normal.

This basic framing has produced a great many important analyses of the international politics of climate change. Whenever someone refers to climate change in terms of how to promote better international cooperation, this is the underlying frame of climate change they are deploying. For example there has been a huge literature on the Kyoto Protocol, the UN's treaty of 1997 that established for the first time legally binding targets for industrialized states to reduce their emissions, and on what sort of treaty should replace it after its principal obligations expired in 2012 (Grubb et al. 1999; Oberthür and Ott 1999; Victor 2004; Aldy and Stavins 2007).

Theoretically, this perspective has generated much material using game theory to understand and to model climate negotiations (Ward 1993, 1996; Grundig 2009;

Finus and Caprarros 2015). This is an approach that enables us to focus on key dynamics of cooperation, such as: what type of game is it (prisoner's dilemma, chicken, stag hunt) and what are the dynamics we can expect from that game structure; how do we design institutions or negotiating strategies to get round free-rider problems; is it better to have negotiations with small numbers of key actors or all the actors involved? Much of the way that people have thought about organizing the international negotiations or designing an international treaty has been done with these themes drawn from game theory in mind.

But we should pause and take note of two particular themes that have emerged in the last few paragraphs. First, the term 'actors' became 'states', as the framing of climate change as a collective action problem leads us to look for a single type of actor that interacts with another. In principle you could combine different types of actor in a model of cooperation, but in practice people don't do this, and the state-centric vision of world politics then shapes how the logic of collective action is understood. Second, and perhaps more subtly, 'cooperation' becomes the goal, treated as an end in itself. Whether or not cooperation is adequate to the challenge of climate change becomes a secondary question, treated as one of 'implementation' or 'effectiveness' (Princen 2003). The primary goal of this way of framing climate change is therefore to understand the process of inter*state* cooperation on climate change.

But while this is the dominant way of framing climate change as an issue in world politics, there are others. In particular, over the last decades two related terms have become commonplace in discussions of climate change, and established themselves as important for understanding climate change politics: complexity and transition. The first posits a system comprised of complex interactions between multiple and diverse agents, and between agents and the broader social, economic, cultural and physical systems in which they are embedded. Complexity thus points analysis towards the need to understand climate politics as involving multiple levels and types of actors whose interactions are not predictable in linear ways. Transition (sometimes transformation), on the other hand, turns our attention to the end goal more clearly – not a minor adjustment, where cooperation might be sufficient, but rather what is the most radical overhaul of the sociotechnical fabric of the global economy and everyday life ever self-consciously pursued by human societies.

The idea of complexity has a long history in ecological science, information technology and mathematics. A complexity frame challenges the premise of analytic decomposition, and instead starts from the notion that systems must be addressed in their entirety. Complex systems are thus characterized by processes that cannot be reduced to the effects of individual units within the system but by the pattern of interaction: complex systems have what is known as emergent causality – effects *emerge* out of the interactions within the system rather than from the agency of any individual unit. This has two important implications. First, it requires a different means of thinking about stability, which results from the particular ways in which actors, institutions, and ideas are interwoven and arranged. Complex systems are generally stable over short periods of time, due

to phenomena with well-known names such as path dependence, rising returns to scale and lock-in. However, a complexity perspective also points towards the inherent dynamism of complex systems, and the many ways in which such systems can change rapidly and in non-linear or unexpected ways, in processes captured popularly as 'tipping points'. Uncertainty, innovation, and experimentation open the door to destabilization, and seemingly small interventions can have system-altering effects (Hoffmann 2010).

The notion of complex systems has been long used to understand the character of the climate system itself. But it has been used over the last ten years or so also as a frame for thinking about the dynamics of the social system that has generated climate change and the political problem of responding to climate change. Two specific propositions are important here.

First, the problem of climate change is the product of a relatively stable 'socio-technical regime' centered on fossil fuel use. Over the last two centuries, the global economy has been underpinned first by coal, then by oil and natural gas, as the central energy sources for more or less all economic activity. The industries that generate and use these energy sources have stable investment patterns and business practices centered on the use of fossil fuels and practices in daily life (driving, heating homes, cooking, etc.) similarly embed fossil fuel use. These interlocking features between technology, economy, politics and culture mean that the fossil fuel regime is often characterized as 'locked-in' (Unruh 2000), alternatives to fossil fuels are crowded out, and the challenge is thus to find ways of disrupting and transitioning away from carbon lock-in. This is what is referred to commonly in this literature, and popularized by a number of social movements and initiatives, as 'transition' to a low-carbon society (e.g. Shove and Walker 2010; Aiken 2012; Geels 2014).

Second, if the challenge is to generate tipping points to a different socio-technical regime not premised on fossil fuels, the social system is itself nevertheless characterized by complexity. That is to say, there are many different actors and processes involved, interacting and producing effects in ways that are often unpredictable. In contrast to the collective action approach, which privileges one site of action (the sovereign state), a complexity approach offers two alternative insights. First, it situates inter-state negotiations within a broader context of socio-technical stasis and directs attention towards the manner in which such international coordination (through formal agreements or treaties, for example) can contribute to destabilizing the existing socio-technical regime and supporting a more sustainable alternative. Second, it orients analysis towards the myriad forms of actor on climate change, acting often in radically different ways, the political struggles that take place in and around diverse interventions that aim to challenge the socio-technical status quo, and how such actions might combine to constitute a systemic tipping point. Two applications of such an approach can help to illustrate its analytic purchase and implications.

Levin et al. (2012) usefully characterize climate change as a 'superwicked problem'. By this they mean that: 'time is running out; those who cause the problem also seek to provide a solution; the central authority needed to address them

is weak or non-existent; and irrational discounting occurs that pushes responses into the future' (Levin et al. 2012: 124). Note that these include the collective action problem, in that the effect of the 'no single site of decision-making' point is that cooperation among actors is necessary. But the analysis cannot be reduced to this. For Levin et al., the central implication for thinking about climate policy and governance is the need to generate policy tools that 'constrain our future selves' (2012: 123). Because of the 'irrational discounting' problem, interventions need to be able to work even despite future irrational decisions by policymakers or other social actors, and thus generate path-dependent processes favoring low-carbon development.

Hoffmann (2010), on the other hand, has applied a complexity approach with a slightly different twist. We discuss a number of the specific empirical examples below, but want to highlight here Hoffmann's argument that the general logic of responses to climate change is thus one of experimentation. Each actor within the complex system – say city manager, institutional investor or state negotiator – sees the problem from their own perspective, has certain types of resources or capacities, is subject to specific types of political pressure, and, when they seek to act on climate change, does so in specific ways. They are not in a position to act as 'sovereigns' and because of the complex nature of the system, cannot be sure of the effects of their actions. So they experiment – they try things out, see what their effects are (including how it brings them into contact with others in the system) and move on, ratcheting up their actions if they seem useful, moving onto something else if not or if other opportunities present themselves. But climate change as an issue in world politics is then an effect of all this experimental activity combined.

From international to global responses

Above, we seek to have sketched two broad ways that responses to climate change in world politics may be understood. Here we seek to show that such responses have indeed moved from an initial focus on national governments and international treaties, and have over the last 15 years come to encompass a much broader range of actors seeking to govern climate change in many different ways. Broadly, we think it is useful to understand the dynamic here as a shift from a multilateral regime centered on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to what has been termed variously a 'regime complex' (Keohane and Victor 2011), 'transnational climate change governance' (Bulkeley et al. 2014) or a 'global climate governance landscape' (Betsill et al. 2015).

Climate change got onto the political agenda during the 1980s because of the interaction between two distinct processes (for more details on this history see Paterson 1996, ch. 2; Weart 2008). On the one hand, an 'epistemic community' (Haas 1990) of climate scientists connected via IOs, notably the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), engaged in a sustained attempt from the World Climate Conference of 1979 onwards to generate a consensus

of existing knowledge on climate science and produced (among themselves) a strong consensus by 1985 at a conference in Villach, Austria that if present trends of emissions of greenhouse gases were to continue, then some degree of global warming was more or less inevitable and that its social effects would be largely negative. On the other hand, 1988 saw a large number of devastating weather-related events, of which the most important in political terms was the drought across the US mid-west. Policy entrepreneurs from the climate science community, notably James Hansen in the US and Jim Bruce in Canada, were able to mobilize the consensus amongst the WMO-centered community of scientists in order to politicize climate change and make it an object of public debates. In June 1988, Hansen gave testimony to the US Congress stating that he thought the drought was solid enough evidence that 'the greenhouse effect is here' (Paterson 1996: 1), while Bruce organized, in the same month, what became the first global policy conference on climate change (the 'Toronto conference') which generated the first proposal to start reducing emissions.

The early response was rapid. Over the next three years, the IPCC was formed and produced its first report confirming the previous scientific consensus (although with a much wider range of scientists involved); many industrialized countries set targets, usually to stabilize their GHG emissions at 1990 levels by 2000; and negotiations started within the UN system that would produce the UNFCCC which was formally adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. At the same time many of the principal political faultlines that persist today were established: between industrialized and developing countries over responsibilities to reduce emissions, as well as flows of finance and technology; between energy exporting countries and others; between those countries particularly vulnerable to climate impacts and others; and between industrialized countries over how to organize their response in an international treaty (for a contemporary analysis of these fractures, see Paterson and Grubb 1992).

The UNFCCC has since become the cornerstone of the interstate response to climate change. It remains the only site where international climate change law is established, even if other treaties produce rules relevant to climate change. The focus of political attention is still very much on the ability of states to produce an overarching treaty within which states' responses are institutionalized.

The original convention did have a target to limits emissions in it, albeit a relatively weak one. Article 4.2 establishes, in a vague and convoluted manner, the aim that industrialized countries would stabilize their GHG emissions at 1990 levels by 2000, although this was never regarded as a legally binding target, merely an aspirational goal. But the FCCC is more important for the institutional processes it established and a number of key norms it entrenched. Of the latter, the most important is the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (United Nations 1992: Article 3.1) which expresses the North–South debate mentioned above and resolves it by establishing that industrialized countries (who become termed 'Annex I countries' in UNFCCC parlance) have the responsibility to take the lead in addressing climate change. Institutionally, the UNFCCC

established, among other things, a number of processes for regularly reporting on emissions and their trends, evaluating the need for further action and feeding scientific developments into the negotiations.

Soon after UNFCCC entered into force in 1994, parties agreed that the provisions of the convention regarding emissions reductions were 'inadequate', and began to negotiate a further agreement to reduce emissions more aggressively. In what was called the 'Berlin Mandate', so named after the location of the first Conference of the Parties (COP) in early 1995, the parties agreed to negotiate such an agreement by the third COP scheduled to be in Kyoto in 1997. They also hardened the North–South distinction by stating explicitly that emission reduction obligations would only be imposed on Annex I countries. Alongside this North–South conflict, and the general foot-dragging by oil exporting countries like Saudi Arabia (Depledge 2008), the key dynamics of the negotiations that produced the Kyoto Protocol were on the one hand about whether or not the obligations of Annex I countries would be focused on quantitative emissions targets or on the introduction of specific 'Policies and Measures', and on the other hand about the proposals for various 'flexibility mechanisms' such as emissions trading and carbon offsetting. These two debates were principally a debate between the US (and a few allies, notably Canada, Australia and sometimes Japan) and the EU. The result was that Kyoto was organized around emissions targets, preferred by the EU, but contained the flexibility mechanisms that the US bargained strongly for. Overall, Kyoto obliged the Annex I countries collectively to reduce their emissions by 5.2% by between 2008 and 2012, but allowed them to trade these emissions allowances among themselves (emissions trading, article 17) or invest in projects in other countries to count against their emissions obligations (the Clean Development Mechanism, article 12, and Joint Implementation, article 6, see UNFCCC 1997).

It was at this point that the project of governing climate change via a multilateral treaty started to falter. A number of things occurred over the next few years that undermined the ability of the Kyoto Protocol to become the basis for sustained action on climate change. Of course, the emissions reductions contained in the Kyoto Protocol were very weak in the first place, but they got weaker as they were undermined by various events.

First, the US refused to ratify. It was well known that the US would not be in a position to do so since the Senate had voted 98-0 in the summer of 1997 that they would not ratify any treaty that did not contain obligations on major developing countries to limit their own emissions. But US opposition to Kyoto became much stauncher after the election of George W. Bush to the Presidency in 2000, and Bush formally renounced Kyoto in March 2001. Second, while Kyoto contained novel institutional features, notably the flexibility mechanisms, the details of implementing these took four years to finalize, including producing the UNFCCC's first failed COP, in The Hague in 2000. The final rules for these, combined with the US withdrawal, meant that Kyoto became much weaker than it already was. Third, many states faltered or failed outright in their implementation of their obligations. While overall Annex I countries did meet their (weak) target,

a number of countries, notably New Zealand and Japan, were fairly far away from meeting theirs, and Canada failed to implement any policy measures that would have a chance of meeting their target, and in the end withdrew from the Protocol in 2011 shortly before its provisions expired.

Finally, as negotiations resumed in 2005 at the COP in Montreal, repeated attempts to produce an agreement that might come into force in 2013, when Kyoto's main provisions to reduce emissions would expire, failed. This occurred most spectacularly in the Copenhagen COP in 2009. The parties had hoped to sign such a treaty, but negotiations collapsed and even a very weak 'Copenhagen Accord' was not adopted by the plenary meeting but only 'noted'. Successive COPs failed to get the UNFCCC process back on track, and the success of the Paris COP in producing such a treaty has come at the cost of a radically different treaty design where the obligations of states are to produce regular plans for reducing emissions (known as 'Nationally Determined Contributions' or NDCs), submit them to the UNFCCC institutions, and report on progress towards meeting them, without specific targets enshrined in the treaty itself.

But while multilateral negotiations stalled, many other actors stepped in to fill the void. States themselves sought other fora in which to pursue climate change, such as the Major Economies Forum (MEF) and Group of 20 (G20). Many of these were in partnership with private sector organizations and private sector organizations themselves developed a range of initiatives, as did NGOs. Subnational political units established their own targets and emissions trading systems to implement them, or developed means of collaborating through voluntary networks. In other words, the response to climate change shifted from being international to being global. There are many elements in this transnational governance of climate change (see Bulkeley et al. 2014 for the fullest survey); we focus on three interesting and important types of activity here to illustrate the breadth of action. They are not listed in any particular order of importance.

Investor-led governance

Institutional investors have developed a set of initiatives designed to govern the companies they invest in. The two main initiatives here are the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). These are an outgrowth in particular of activity by insurance companies during the 1990s (Paterson 2001). These companies were worried about the increase in frequency and severity of extreme weather events that threatened business models dependent on good data for such events in order to set premiums. They were encouraged in this first by Jeremy Leggett at Greenpeace and later by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), which set up an Insurance Industry Initiative in 1995 (Paterson 2001: 19). Under the UNEP, in 1998 they established a CO_2 benchmarking initiative that was the first attempt to generate a carbon accounting tool that would give information to investors about companies' exposure to the risks posed by climate change itself but also to policies designed to reduce GHG emissions. This became the basis for the CDP that was established in 2000–2001.

The CDP has since become an enormous initiative. It works by surveying the world's largest companies annually about their exposure to these sorts of climate risks and their strategies to respond to them. It collates the results and produces reports on the basis of them. The members of the CDP are the world's largest investment companies – pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds in particular. In 2015 the CDP claimed '822 institutional investors representing an excess of US$95 trillion in assets' (CDP n.d.), using the crude figure about these assets to underscore CDP's legitimacy when asking for reports from companies. The CDP has branched out from its initial focus on company reporting to other areas, notably in generating reports on supply chain carbon emissions for some companies (Walmart was the pioneer company for this), water management, and producing reports on city climate change emissions and initiatives.

Evaluations of the CDP tend to suggest that it has not had significant effects on investor activity in terms of investment switching, but that it has rather had more effect on either investor activism in questions of company strategy or on company managers as they respond to the data collected as part of reporting to the CDP (Kolk et al. 2008). However, the CDP has clearly become an important component of the corporate climate change agenda, feeding, for example, into a push for more robust means of incorporating carbon emissions into corporate financial accounting (Thistlethwaite and Paterson 2015).

Cities

Cities and city-networks have emerged, in the shadows of national and inter-state inaction, as important sources of experimentation and global leadership over the past two decades (Rosenzweig et al. 2011). Both on their own and as part of national, regional and transnational networks (such as the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, and the EU Covenant of Mayors for example) cities have come to approach climate change as a global problem that both poses a distinct threat to urban ways of life and represents an opportunity to link together local objectives (economic growth, job creation, liveability, ability to compete for tourism, talent, and investment) with global ones (reducing greenhouse gas emissions) (Betsill 2001; Bulkeley and Betsill 2003).

The manner in which cities have done so has evolved over the course of those 20-plus years. Early work by transnational city-networks focused largely on getting climate change onto the local government agenda but struggled to induce their members to live up to nominal commitments, and urban climate governance remained largely symbolic and ineffectual (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). A second 'wave' of urban governance emerged around 2005, and with it cities ranging from New York to Sao Paulo, Sydney to Shanghai, became more assertive, more ambitious, and more active in an effort to position themselves as a key part of the global response (Bulkeley 2010; Acuto 2013). They have done so by reframing urban development and growth as inherently intertwined with the issue of sustainability, by positioning climate change as an opportunity as much as a threat (Rutland

and Aylett 2008; Hodson and Marvin 2010). This is perhaps best captured in the oft-enunciated notion that 'cities act while nations talk' and is backed up by a demonstrated increase in the number, diversity and ambition of local governance actions that have been undertaken by cities (Arup 2014; Lee 2015; Gordon 2016).

There is, as a result, a great deal of optimism with respect to cities filling the governance void (Ostrom 2010; Barber 2013). Yet while cities are without question taking all sorts of 'action' – increasing energy efficiency standards, installing bicycle lanes, establishing zoning regulations, updating waste management facilities – it remains unclear whether, and to what extent, they can produce meaningful governance outcomes (Gordon 2013). This is, in part, a problem of aggregation and comparison as cities and city-networks are inconsistent with respect to the measurement and management of urban greenhouse gas emissions (Pattberg and Widerberg 2015). It is, at the same time, partly a function of the very real limitations that city governments face as they enact the role of global climate governor. Cities around the world are faced with a substantial gap between their fiscal capacity and the fiscal demands inherent in (re)building sustainable local infrastructure (water, waste, power, and transportation) (World Economic Forum 2014). In response city-networks have begun to consolidate both under the umbrella of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC NAZCA n.d.) and outside of it (Compact of Mayors n.d.). They have, in addition, started to coalesce around standardized means of measuring and reporting local GHG emissions (the Global Protocol for Local Greenhouse Gas Emissions, or GPC, being the most prominent, see Greenhouse Gas Protocol n.d.) and common third-party platforms for reporting on local actions and their effects (the CDP Cities platform, carbon*n* Climate Registry, and the Gold Standard Foundation Cities Programme). Demonstrating a commitment to accountability, and evincing a willingness to measure (and be measured), city-networks aim to augment their claim to legitimate authority and secure access to sources of finance deemed necessary if they are to live up to their promise (Hickmann 2015; Gordon 2016).

NGOs and carbon market governance

Carbon markets have spawned a huge range both of entrepreneurial activity by market actors and of innovative governance by transnational environmental NGOs. While much of the transnational activity on climate change, such as the city initiatives, emerged in part as a reaction to the failure of states to agree to effective treaties on climate change, this activity was stimulated by provisions in the Kyoto Protocol and state policies (especially in the European Union (EU)) that established the basic rules of carbon markets.

In the debates about the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the rules for what sorts of projects would be allowed and how they would be judged acceptable were particularly fierce. NGOs and their allies amongst some governments fought hard, and largely successfully, for the exclusion of forest projects from the CDM (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). Once the rules for the CDM were approved, two things happened.

One is that the companies who started to develop projects for the CDM realized also that there were opportunities to develop carbon offset projects outside that framework. For example there was demand for forestry projects from companies who sought to use these investments in high visibility projects for their 'green marketing'. While there had been carbon offset projects already developed in what became known as the 'voluntary carbon market' (i.e. markets not stimulated by government regulation directly), these took off in the early 2000s as companies involved in CDM projects realized their commercial potential.

The second, however, is that NGOs worried about the quality of these offset projects, both in the CDM and the voluntary market, and decided to intervene to try to remove their worst effects (for useful critiques of these effects, see for example Bachram 2004; Reyes & Gilbertson 2010). The WorldWide Fund for Nature (WWF) already had experience in establishing certification programs in the forestry and fishery sectors (Cashore et al. 2004; Auld 2014), and decided to establish something similar to intervene in the CDM and later in the voluntary carbon market. Their carbon offset certification system is known as the Gold Standard (see Gold Standard, n.d.). This was initially highly restrictive, in that it would only accredit projects in renewable energy and energy efficiency, excluding projects that it thought were of more doubtful quality. The intent was to give project developers a premium price by adding value to their projects for offset credit purchasers over and above the regular value of a credit under the CDM. The Gold Standard was accompanied by many other systems with their own intended niche, developed both by NGOs and by business associations such as the International Emissions Trading Association, and the certification of carbon offset projects has now become integral to how that market works (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Lovell 2010; Newell and Paterson 2010).

These three examples attest to the increasing complexity of global climate governance. The point is not that the UNFCCC doesn't matter, but rather that it now exists alongside a myriad of other initiatives attempting to shape a global response to climate change. In line with the idea of complexity, we might expect the overall response to be a result not of one or other initiative being the 'magic bullet' that solves the problem itself, but rather through the interactions between many initiatives as they create effects that are magnified or sometimes annulled by their interaction with others (van Asselt 2014; Betsill et al. 2015; Jordan et al. 2015).

The future(s) of climate politics

Given this sketch of how climate governance has evolved so far, how might we expect it to develop in the future? We set out in this section three general trajectories along which global climate governance might proceed into the future, and three associated points of political contestation that will contribute to setting the trajectory along which it will travel. The first is a trajectory of consolidation and coordination, the second a trajectory of incoherence, and the last a trajectory of

coming apart and conflict. Below we set out the basic parameters of each, and specify in broad outlines the kind of politics we might expect to see in each instance.

As outlined above, climate governance can be understood as both a problem of collective action and a problem of complexity. While the former offers a means of understanding the coordination challenge that states confront as they seek to impose immediate costs in the service of future benefits, the latter directs attention instead to the vast increase in both the number and variety of actors claiming the mantle of global climate governor, and a sharp increase in the type and diversity of initiatives undertaken in the name of global climate governance. Scholars have begun the necessary task of identifying and mapping this expanding universe (Hoffmann 2010; Bulkeley et al. 2014; Chan et al. 2015) but there remains a considerable degree of uncertainty with respect to the aggregate (real and potential) effect of all this experimentation. Can, in other words, the panoply of governance initiatives undertaken by cities (developing bicycle infrastructure, establishing energy efficiency standards, re-zoning public space, planting trees), corporations (assessing the carbon footprint of internal production, adopting certification standards, reducing energy and water consumption), investors (divesting from fossil fuel industry holdings, directing assets towards sustainability-enhancing projects), and individuals (altering daily practices of mobility and consumption) align so as to create either the political pressure and public support needed to drive national policy and legislation into conformity with international commitments *or* disrupt the socio-technical system in which we find ourselves currently 'locked in'?

In one possible future, the answer is yes. The transformative potential of governance experimentation is corralled and coordinated, harmonized with the inter-state system in such a way as to produce meaningful and timely collective effects. As the inter-state climate regime has shifted from a top-down to a bottom-up approach there has been much interest in finding ways to include, integrate and account for experimental governance interventions (Moncel and Asselt 2012; Oxford Martin Commission 2013; Widerberg and Pattberg 2015).

Such coordination will likely have to emerge both within and beyond the climate regime (Okereke et al. 2009). With respect to the former, there is, in the aftermath of COP21, a functional imperative acting on national governments and the UNFCCC. If the voluntary emissions reduction targets set out in state NDCs are to be attained the emissions reducing activities of all actors will need to be identified and taken into account. Furthermore, the persistent gap between emissions reduction commitments inherent in the COP21 agreement and those recommended by the IPCC suggest that efforts will have to be made not only to account for the effects of diverse governance interventions, but also to accelerate and scale up those interventions in a relatively rapid manner. Whether this takes place via processes of diffusion (Busch and Jorgens 2012; Paterson et al. 2014), orchestration (Hale and Roger 2014, Abbott et al. 2015), or indirect acceleration (Bernstein and Hoffmann n.d.; Green 2013) there will need to be a shift from governance experimentation towards governance coordination and consolidation.

Another possible future is one in which experimentation and innovation proceed apace – or even increase in terms of either the number of actors involved or initiatives undertaken – but remain incapable of adequately disrupting the status quo. In such a future climate governance is likely to remain, or become more, fragmented (Biermann et al. 2009; Zelli and Asselt 2013). While COP21 in Paris has set the stage for a positive transition towards effective global climate governance there are a number of issues that may serve as roadblocks or barriers. First among these are the problems inherent in the model of decentralized governance that has been adopted as the foundation of the global response. Decentralization opens the door to governance initiatives working at cross-purposes, and creates the very real possibility that experimental governance interventions by actors of all sorts (state, sub-national, corporate, civil society) create substantial amounts of light with little consequential heat.

The politics of climate governance can, at a fundamental level, be conceptualized as a struggle to redefine the basic practices, values, and institutions of global capitalism (Dauvergne 2010; Newell and Paterson 2010; Klein 2014). Yet prior efforts to do so in the name of environmental, climate, or sustainability objectives have been subsumed and subverted – 'compromised' as it were – so as to gain legitimacy and move from out of the niches in which more radical efforts are rendered (Bernstein 2001; Geels and Schott 2007). As global climate governance moves towards the middle of the twenty-first century this is likely to prove a site of much political contestation and conflict, as competing camps emerge around an emphasis on technological fixes that allow for the persistence of status quo practices of consumption (renewable energy, biodegradable packaging), mobility (electric vehicles, driverless cars) and lifestyle (low-emissions air travel) versus transformative shifts in everyday practices (100-mile diets, non-disposable consumption) and values (the sharing economy, slow lifestyles).

We may, in addition, expect a continued, albeit somewhat altered, politics operating in and around the equity implications of climate governance. If a future of coordinated climate governance is possible, it raises important questions with respect to whom, exactly, is orchestrating such coordination: international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank; institutional investors such as pension funds; standard-setting and accounting organizations like the CDP; IOs like the UNFCCC; national governments working outside the UNFCCC like the US and China? To paraphrase Robert Cox, orchestration is likely to be 'for someone' and this may represent an additional site of political struggle and contestation. There is, as well, an ongoing debate around the relationship between democracy and global climate governance (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014) and whether some degree of democratic accountability or representation is likely to (must?) be sacrificed in the name of efficacy. While the norm of common but differentiated responsibilities, a contentious foundation stone on which the entire UNFCCC edifice is built, has lost its privileged position questions remain with respect to the equity implications of a governance regime that is now largely organized around the tracking of measurable actions and impacts (Bulkeley et al. 2015; Kuzemko 2015).

A final future possibility is the complete breakdown of the experimental and inter-state systems and the regression into a state of anarchic inter-state conflict and consolidation around beggar-thy-neighbor practices redolent of the mercantilism of the eighteenth century. While the contemporary mood is one of optimism, there remain open questions with respect to how, for instance, the global climate regime can manage the interlocking pressures of (a) issue spillover (b) intra-regime conflict and (c) rapid climatic change.

As noted above, there is a considerable gap between the ambitious objective of limiting global temperature increase to between 1.5 and 2°C and the emissions reduction targets that have been set forth. While cities and corporations may be able to fill some of this gap (Erickson and Tempest 2014) the reality of rapid climatic change remains highly plausible. If the level of ambition, and the translation of rhetorical commitments into practical and effective action, are not augmented considerably or soon enough (a distinct problem inherent in a bottom-up governance approach) states are likely to face the prospect of dealing with increased instances of climatic crisis (drought, famine, flooding, extreme weather events) that may in turn fuel or aggravate underlying or latent governance problems via climate migration or competition over access to scarce resources leading to instances of conflict and violence (Homer-Dixon 1994; Dalby 2009). On the other hand, while the mood at the moment within the climate regime is largely one of conciliation and compromise, there remains a possibility that tensions arising in other issue domains (such as those taking place in the South China Sea, for instance) may spill over.

In both instances there is the prospect that states may, at some point in the future, shift their attention to pursuing a technological 'fix' to the problem of climate change, in the form of unilateral efforts at geo-engineering. Geo-engineering, for example through solar radiation management or atmospheric, terrestrial, or oceanic carbon sequestration, has been largely relegated, to date, to the margins of global climate governance. Its supporters advocate on its behalf as a stop-gap measure, a means of slowing down atmospheric build-up until effective mitigation measures are developed and implemented (Keith 2013). Yet should the global climate regime come undone, or prove inadequate to the scale of the task, a future of unilateral geo-engineering becomes likely. This raises a host of questions and concerns, both political in terms of who decides, who acts, and how the cross-border implications of geo-engineering are managed, and ethical with respect to the normative implications of intervening to alter natural systems, and imposing costs on vulnerable communities, non-human species and ecosystems (Blackstock et al. 2015; Horton and Reynolds forthcoming).

Whichever of these scenarios is realized, climate change is highly likely to have a transformative effect on global politics for the next several decades. It has a distinctive character in the way that it threatens the viability of contemporary civilization, brings many new actors into the global political process, and brings forth a novel form of governance focused on the transformation rather than regulation of the global economy. Succeed or fail, how we respond to climate change will leave no part of international politics untouched.

Guide to further reading

For an excellent overview of climate change, see Dessler and Parson's *The Science and Politics of Climate Change* (2009). For a more entertaining, but highly informative take, see Kate Evans' cartoon book *Funny Weather* (2006). Oberthür and Ott's *The Kyoto Protocol* (1999) provides the most comprehensive account of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, while Biermann et al.'s *Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012* (2010) offers an excellent introduction to the key issues that drove the emergence of the Paris Accord. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand's *Research Handbook on Climate Governance* (2015) covers a broad range of thinking about contemporary global climate governance across numerous sites of governance. Bulkeley et al.'s *Transnational Climate Change Governance* (2014) gives a comprehensive account of climate governance beyond the UNFCCC, while Hoffmann's *Climate Governance at the Crossroads* (2010) develops the notion of complexity in climate governance most fully. Introductions to other aspects discussed in this chapter include Newell and Paterson's *Climate Capitalism* (2010) on carbon markets and institutional investors, Bulkeley's 'Cities and the Governing of Climate Change' (2010) on transnational city networks, and Ciplet et al.'s *Power in a Warming World* (2015) on justice in global climate politics.

Chapter 11

Global Financial Crises

GIULIA MENNILLO AND TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR

Introduction

A reality of global politics is that some of its most important features are over-shadowed by what, on a dispassionate analysis, are really much less significant issues. Financial crises, for example, are increasingly frequent and can pose challenges to the established order of global politics. But even though financial volatility seriously affects governments and the lives of billions, it is typically relegated to the business pages by the drama of terrorism or the high politics of trade negotiations, until it bursts forth in a global financial crisis, such as the one that began in 2007, or in dramatic events like the Chinese stock market falls that began in 2015 but whose consequences are unclear. This is unfortunate because it means that what is happening in the 'engine room' of globalization is often poorly understood by those in power and by those who wish to change the policies of those in power.

Some of this can be attributed to journalistic sensationalism. But much of this neglect is a result of the mythic technical character of finance, especially as it is talked about by business people, and written about by most journalists, government officials and even some scholars. Finance and money are discussed as if they are purely technical matters, which those without the requisite training cannot hope to understand. The widespread propagation and acceptance of this false-hood makes it easy not only for policymakers to pursue their objectives without the constraint of informed democratic debate, but also for the financial industry's interest groups to shape policies in their own interest.

We start by examining the competing ways financial crises are understood and comment on the merits of these perspectives, beginning with the market advocates' account of crises, then moving on to critical views. In the second part we start with a brief historical review of the financial volatility that followed the end of the Bretton Woods system and the liberalization of financial regimes in the developed countries starting in the 1980s. This includes the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the Enron bankruptcy of 2001–2002. The chapter then considers the global financial crisis that began in 2007, suggesting that the immediate causes of the crisis are quite different from those commonly assumed. After this discussion, we consider the prospects for regulatory reform based on the example

of the credit rating agencies and banks, and then offer a series of conclusions on global financial crises and world politics in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Perspectives

It is possible to distinguish between two main ways of understanding financial crises that compete for scholarly and political pre-eminence. The first of these has dominated economic thought about finance for 30 years and has had a major influence on policymakers. This stream of thought we term the exogenous approach. Although invoking the legacy of Adam Smith, this tradition's modern founders include Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. Their views are associated with attacks on the mixed economy model of state intervention popular in much of the developed world after the Great Depression of the 1930s. These thinkers took it as axiomatic that markets, when left to their own devices, are efficient allocators of resources. For them, financial crisis is a deviation from the normal state of the market. Eugene Fama's Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) has come to represent this tradition of thought (Fama 1970). The basic idea of the EMH is that because prices for stocks, bonds, derivatives and so on are always based on all available information they therefore reflect the fundamental value of these securities. Real-world markets are therefore efficient in that securities trade at equilibrium between supply and demand. No price gouging is possible if the EMH holds true. It is a remarkable claim about information and how it is incorporated into market prices.

The case for EMH is built on three assumptions. First, investors are said to be rational and to value their potential purchases accordingly. So investors are not likely to buy blindly or without thinking about how to maximize their return. Second, if there are irrational investors their random trades will cancel each other out, leaving prices unaffected. Irrationality is the exception and is therefore of no consequence. Last, even if there is a consistently irrational approach to investing amongst a group of investors, rational arbitrageurs will meet them in the market and eliminate their influence on prices by asserting 'fundamental values'.

What are the problems with EMH? The so-called 'ergodic axiom' underpins EMH, which in turn sustains financial engineering such as collateralized debt obligations. The ergodic axiom holds that the future is just a repeat of the past. So financial economists calculate probable future risks based on historical data. Unfortunately, human societies are not quite so stable and repetitive. Our communities are more like living things than automobile engines. They grow, change, adjust and over time are transformed. They are non-ergodic. Adopting a fundamental axiom more appropriate for the physical universe rather than social life seems like a bad start.

EMH encourages neglect of the role and regulation of key institutions like banks and credit rating agencies that actually make our markets work. But in a non-ergodic world institutions are fundamental to instilling confidence in

market participants to engage in financial transactions. In the concrete case of the credit rating agencies, EMH implies that rating agencies 'do not matter' for the market's creditworthiness perceptions –notwithstanding the experience of the financial crisis, including what led up to it, and its consequences. The idea that rating agencies 'only follow the markets' suggests that the view of creditworthiness implicit in rating would not be consequential for the conduct of actors and the course of events. Because the market knows everything already, rating agencies do not matter. How does EMH contribute concretely to such reasoning? 'Knowing everything' hinges on the definition of relevant and available information. Conventionally, the knowledge that matters in financial markets is limited to economic fundamentals, which suggests that only facts which exist independently from interpretation, also referred to as 'material facts,' are priced in by investors. Therefore rating agencies, at least in the case of ratings that rely on publicly available information, would not bring any informational value to the market, and would thus not matter.

But, what if EMH confounds the notion of 'knowing everything' and 'processing information efficiently'? In other words, if the definition of the information which is available and deemed relevant by financial market participants comprises non-fundamentals and social facts, which exist because of commonly shared cognitive frameworks and ideas, the consequentiality of ratings cannot then be simply assumed away. When market participants believe that ratings matter, it seems only plausible to suppose that the market tries to anticipate a future rating agency action when pricing. Unsurprisingly, from an EMH perspective, this would still be interpreted as rating agencies merely following the market. Proponents of the EMH can therefore conclude that the agencies 'do not matter'.

Given exogenous thinkers assume markets work efficiently, this tradition focuses on 'external' causes, especially government and regulatory failure, as the cause of crisis. Friedman, for example, blamed the Great Depression of the 1930s on what he considered to be incorrect Federal Reserve policy in 1929 and 1930, rather than the effects of the stock market crash in October 1929 (Aliber and Kindleberger 2015: 97–98).

Exogenous accounts of financial crisis assume, following EMH, that market participants are constantly adjusting their behavior – for example, whether they buy or sell financial instruments like bonds and stocks – based on new information from outside the market. In this context, market prices are assumed to always reflect what other market participants are prepared to pay. If this is the case, reason exogenous thinkers, prices are never inflated or false. They must always be correct. So the idea of a 'bubble economy', in which assets like houses, stocks and oil futures deviate from true value to a higher, false value, is rejected. There can be no 'true value' other than what the market is prepared to pay.

The endogenous account, by contrast, says that financial crises begin primarily inside finance. For Marx and Polanyi, crises are caused by the internal 'laws of motion' of the capitalist mode of production. These produce constant change and upheaval, not equilibrium between demand and supply. For Keynes, the 'animal spirits', or passions of speculation, give rise to risky behavior. Typical of the

endogenous perspective is the idea that market traders do not merely integrate information coming from outside the markets in the wider, real economy, but are focused on what other traders are doing, in an effort to anticipate their buy/ sell activities, and thus make money from them (or at least avoid losing more money than the market average). Given this, gossip, norms and other features of social life are part of their understanding of how finance works. On this account, finance is subject to the pathologies of social life, like any other activity in which humans engage. This is an image of finance far from the self-regulating conception that characterizes the exogenous view.

Keynes provided what remains perhaps the best intuitive illustration of the importance of this internal, social understanding of finance and financial crises in his tabloid beauty contest metaphor, first published in 1936 (Akerlof and Shiller 2009: 133). Keynes suggested that the essence of finance is not, as most supposed, a matter of picking the best stocks, based on an economic analysis of which should rise in value in future. Anticipating what other traders in the market were likely to do was actually more relevant. Keynes compared finance to beauty contests that ran in the popular newspapers of the time. These contests were not, as might be assumed, about picking the most attractive face. Success was achieved by estimating how *others* would vote and voting with them, although as Keynes pointed out, others would be trying to do the same, hence the complexity and volatility of financial markets.

More specifically, in a useful synthesis of some of the writings that fall within the endogenous approach to global finance including the ideas of Hyman Minsky (2008 [1975]), Cooper has argued that the traditional assumptions made about markets and their tendency to equilibrium between demand and supply do not work for assets like houses, art and financial instruments like stocks, bonds and derivatives (Cooper 2008: 9–13). In the market for goods, greater demand can be met with greater supply or higher prices. But this simple economic logic does not work for assets. Instead, demand often grows in response to price increases for assets. The 'animal spirits' identified by Keynes and elaborated upon somewhat by Akerlof and Shiller, do not produce stability in the market for assets like they do in the market for goods. In the absence of equilibrium, there is no limit to the expansion of market enthusiasm for financial assets or houses, producing what we have come to call a 'bubble' economy. Unfortunately, as we know, bubbles tend to deflate in an unpredictable manner, with very negative consequences for economic activity.

A brief history of financial crises

The history of financial crises shows that they are always shocking events, as they typically occur after long periods of affluence. Pride comes before the fall. The reversal which crises represent seems incomprehensible to those at the heart of things, never mind the general public. The standard against which all financial crises are measured is, of course, the Great Depression of the 1930s. At the height

of the Depression a quarter of American workers were unemployed (Galbraith 1997 [1955]: 168). As a quick perusal of the Dow Jones Industrial Average shows, the New York Stock Exchange did not return to its summer 1929 value until the early 1950s, almost a quarter century after the crash of October 1929 (www. djindexes.com). However, financial crises did not start in the twentieth century. The Dutch 'tulip mania' of the 1630s, in which tulip bulbs greatly appreciated in value, is usually cited as the first documented boom and bust. At the time tulips were exotic imports from the eastern Mediterranean. 'Mass mania' for the bulbs led to massive price inflation, so that some tulip bulbs were worth the equivalent of $50,000 or more each. When the crash came and the bubble deflated 'not with a whimper but with a bang', many who had invested their life savings in tulips lost everything (Galbraith 1993: 4). Mass default ensured a depression in the Netherlands in the years after 1637 (Galbraith 1993: 26–33). More recently, the 1907 financial panic came about after the failure of a trust company at the center of Wall Street speculation (Bruner and Carr 2007). Calamity was avoided by cooperation between major banks, led by J.P. Morgan, perhaps the world's best known and most powerful financier at the time.

After the Great Depression and World War II, the Bretton Woods system was created to bring greater order to the global financial system. As much a political as a financial system, Bretton Woods was intended to avoid rapid and unsettling economic adjustment within countries. The hope was that this would avoid the sort of economic problems which contributed to World War II and which would, no doubt, increase support for the communist system in Russia. Although the intent behind Bretton Woods was to avoid crises and the political conflict that followed, despite US assistance, it had few resources at its disposal. Given considerable protectionism in trade after World War II, countries were frequently either in significant surplus or deficit in the national accounts that measured their trade and payments with the rest of the world. This led to crisis-driven efforts to restore balance, often aggravating relations with other states.

The Bretton Woods system, fixed exchange rates and controls over the movement of capital, were gradually abandoned in the developed world during the 15 years after 1970. What emerged was a new system in which floating exchange rates were increasingly the norm, at least in developed countries, and in which capital could flow freely around the world to find the highest returns. Although a floating exchange rate regime should rapidly and effectively adjust to reflect the changing economic conditions in a country (real interest rates, inflation, profit margins, regulations, political stability) this system proved less than perfect. The 1980s is marked by a series of currency crises, as the values of major currencies like the Japanese Yen appreciated, causing trouble for their trade partners. Perhaps the most dramatic of these crises was the ERM crisis of 1992, in which currency traders, especially George Soros, placed bets on the ability of the British government to keep pound sterling within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. At the end of the crisis the British government abandoned defending sterling, which depreciated substantially, and had to be removed from the ERM.

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 was the culmination of a boom in East Asia that led to what in hindsight turned out to be excessive short-term lending and risky pegging of national currencies to the US dollar, a problem also for Argentina in 2001. Like Holland in the 1630s, the result of the crisis was economic depression in some countries, notably Indonesia, where the price of basic foodstuffs and other costs increased dramatically. The Asian crisis, like the financial crisis that began in 2007, led to criticism of lax regulation, fraud and corruption. In Malaysia, despite a barrage of criticism, controls on the movement of capital were reintroduced until the panic pressures eased.

Global financial crisis

The subprime crisis that began in the summer of 2007 may rank as one of the most traumatic global developments since World War II. The crisis challenged the power and prosperity of the global financial markets which are located in the North Atlantic but which impact on all regions. This crisis and how it was caused seems to have caught the governing elites in rich countries completely unawares. The crisis and the deep recession it generated have caused dismay and at times panic as the depth of the problem revealed itself, especially in September 2008 with the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers. These events led to the realization amongst policymakers that there is a problem with what banks do (Rethel and Sinclair 2012).

Like most financial crises, the origins of the crisis can be found in the ending of the previous boom, with the bursting of the stock market mania for dot.com stocks in 2000. The US Federal Reserve responded to this market reversal with a low interest rate policy intended to make the cost of borrowing cheaper. The policy worked and interest rates fell. But the fall in rates had unanticipated effects. Looking for higher returns in a low yield environment, bankers sought out financial instruments that would deliver better profits. Structured finance had been around for several years but now it became the financial instrument of choice. Structured finance packages the debt most of us incur – credit card borrowings, car loans, mortgages – into securities that can be traded in financial markets. These securities gave their owners a claim on the revenues that those with car loans, credit card debt and mortgages repay. In a stroke a whole world of illiquid consumer debt was turned into financial market assets. Traders were then able to trade these new securities in the markets, just as they traded the more traditional bonds issued by corporations, municipalities and national governments.

The usual claim made about securitization is that it led to a breakdown in the relationship between the originators of mortgages and those in the financial markets creating and trading in the bonds and derivatives that pooled the stream of income from these mortgages. Because people in the financial markets were so distant from the actual credit risk of the individual mortgage payers and may have been poorly advised by credit rating agencies, they underestimated the riskiness of the assets they were buying. This meant the financial system was full of 'toxic

assets' and once this was fully appreciated by markets in the summer of 2007 as a result of increasing mortgage defaults by subprime borrowers, panic developed, followed by collapse of a number of major financial institutions, worldwide government intervention to prop up the markets, massive falls in world trade, and the subsequent recession. Many popular accounts such as Baker (2009) assert that too much debt was accumulated, and that therefore it was inevitable that the boom would collapse into bust. These depictions do not typically identify the mechanism through which this took place.

The popular view suggests that the crisis occurred because some people were not doing their jobs properly, and that if we can just make sure people do what they are supposed to do, another financial crisis like this can be avoided. Given that the subprime securities market was worth only \$0.7 trillion in mid-2007, out of total global capital markets of \$149 trillion, the supposed impact of subprime assets is out of all proportion to their actual weight in the financial system (Bank of England 2007: 20). This strongly suggests that another explanation for the global financial crisis is needed. The 'subprime crisis' is not likely to be a direct consequence of actual subprime mortgage delinquencies given how small they were relative to the system as a whole. The crisis developed not because subprime lending is important. The paralysis or 'valuation crisis' that came over global finance in 2007–2009, in which banks were unwilling to trade with each other or lend money had no specific relationship to subprime lending. Other bad news might have had the same effect on the markets, as Galbraith shows is typical at the top of a boom (Galbraith 1993: 4).

An interpretation that fits the facts better is that the confidence in financial markets had, prior to 2007, reached such a frenzy that it became an episode of 'irrational exuberance', like so many financial manias before. Like a drunk, the hangover the next day is unpleasant. The 'bad news' about subprime lending was actually quite modest in summer 2007, predicting a higher rate of mortgage foreclosures than previously anticipated, but not a crisis. But in the context of the preceding mania this was enough to cause panic. The panic, which so typically follows financial expansions, created widespread uncertainty about the quality of financial institutions and their balance sheets. It is this uncertainty or panic that effectively brought the financial markets to a halt, forcing government intervention.

The so-called 'euro crisis' is a further case that shows the destabilizing effects of a confidence loss in financial markets, which cannot be explained by the reference to economic fundamentals. Although the weight of Greek GDP with respect to the GDP of the whole Euro area did not even amount to 3% in 2009 (Source: Eurostat), the questioning of Greece's sovereign creditworthiness on the international sovereign debt markets put the very existence of the common currency at stake. The panic forced European policymakers to unmask the untenable character of the 'no-bail-out clause' in order to defend the irreversibility of the euro as a political project. Despite the efforts of the European Central Bank and countless EU summits, the abrupt confidence loss sparked fears of 'contagion' among member states. Heated discussions about a possible 'Grexit' and a permanent

scrutiny of Greek domestic politics dominated the financial newspaper headlines and other media coverage for several years. Considering the fact that the size of Greek GDP compared to the GDP of the Euro area dropped to just 1.8% in 2014, all the attention paid by financial markets to these issues is hard to grasp in 'economic-fundamental' terms, but rather demonstrates the constitutive role of confidence in finance.

Attributing blame

Since the 1930s, financial crises have almost always been accompanied by public controversy over who was at fault. Before the 1930s, governments were not generally held responsible for economic conditions, but since then the public have increasingly expected governments to manage problems in the financial system. Inevitably, efforts to defuse or redirect blame have developed. During the Asia crisis, corruption or 'crony capitalism' in Asian governments and amongst their business leaders was held responsible, even though just a few years before 'Asian values' were supposedly responsible for the unprecedented growth in the region. During the Enron scandal of 2001–2002 auditors were blamed for not revealing the financial chicanery of the corporation. The subprime crisis has been no different, with rating agencies, mortgage lenders, 'greedy' bankers and 'weak' regulators all subject to very strong attacks for not doing their jobs.

The rating agencies were subject to unprecedented criticism and investigation in the midst of the subprime meltdown. Congressional committees, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the European Parliament and Commission, and the Committee of European Securities Regulators all conducted investigations. A very senior rating official suggested to one of us that the crisis over subprime ratings is the most threatening challenge yet experienced by the agencies in their century of activity. This effort to blame the agencies is a curious reaction, given that the rating agency business is now open to greater competition since passage of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. It suggests that the movement from regulation observed during the Bretton Woods era to self-regulation adopted since the end of it – from 'police patrol' to 'fire alarm' approaches – has not eliminated the key role of the state in financial markets. Governments are still expected by their citizens to deal with market failure, and when necessary act as lenders of last resort, and they know it.

Central banks have been blamed widely too. In line with the exogenous perspective adopted by Friedman in criticizing the Fed policies before 1929, the low interest rate environment during the Alan Greenspan years as Federal Reserve Chairman have supported the construction of a state-failure argument. This is not to say that an endogenous perspective cannot include aspects of monetary policy in its analysis of the factors which contributed to the financial crisis, as mentioned above. The difference, however, lies in the fact that exogenous approaches adopt the state–market dichotomy as a working assumption, whereas endogenous approaches reject such a perspective. Put differently, even though the critique of

the monetary policy of low interest rates before the financial crisis may sound identical, the policy implications deriving from both perspectives are quite different.

From an exogenous perspective, blaming mainly the central banks, supervisors and regulatory authorities and, finally, 'the state' as the main cause of the financial crisis legitimizes further deregulation policies, financial disintermediation, securitization, and, more generally, a laissez-faire approach to finance. Consistently, these are the same recipes which were lobbied for before the financial crisis, a period also known as the 'Great Moderation', by representatives of the exogenous perspective. The paradox in retrospect is that the same representatives are not reluctant in the aftermath of the crisis to redefine state failure as the cause of the financial crisis -- notwithstanding the fact that policymakers had implemented exactly those policies they themselves advocated for during the early years of the new millennium. Therefore, the paradoxical implication of the state-failure reproach is that policymakers, at the time, should rather have not obeyed the recipes deriving from the exogenous approach if we take the state-failure reproach seriously.

This is not to say that directly after the meltdown experience of Lehman the recipes mentioned above were not put in question both across different traditions of thought and across the whole political spectrum. They were even regarded as causal for the financial crisis to happen. But with the fading away of the memory of the crisis experience, it took only a short time for the exogenous worldviews and deeply entrenched beliefs about financial markets to regain the upper hand.

Three groups seem to have got away with little criticism: politicians themselves, although responsible as law makers for the design of regulation; the academic discipline of economics, which generally opposed the notion of asset price bubbles and neglected the role of social dynamics such as market confidence in the working of financial markets; and consumers and homeowners, who created the debt in the first place and thought it normal – for no good reason – that house values should increase forever at rates well in excess of inflation. The decisive difference among these three groups, however, is that the first two did also not suffer material losses, whereas the latter group had to pay a bitter price for their mistakes by losing their homes or taking two or more jobs in order to pay back their debts.

Regulatory reform

Financial crises stimulate demand for new government intervention in markets to prevent a similar problem from occurring again. They also stimulate internal mobilization as a political strategy on the part of governments to show they are taking responsibility. The New Deal reforms of 1930s America are an example of rapid reaction to very threatening conditions. The global financial crisis has seen much regulatory action, such as the massive Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 in the US. Whether this is really substantive or not can be gauged by examining

the prospects for regulation of the major credit rating agencies, who have been blamed in part for the development of the crisis.

Rating agencies

Starting in the 1930s, the ratings produced by the rating agencies in the United States have been incorporated into the prudential regulation of pension funds so as to provide a benchmark for their investment. This required pension funds to invest their resources in those bonds rated 'investment grade' and avoid lower rated, 'speculative grade' bonds. Regulation of the agencies themselves only starts in the 1970s, with the SEC's Net Capital Rule in 1975. This gave a discount or 'haircut' to issuers whose bonds are rated by 'Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations' (NRSROs). No criteria were established for NRSROs in the 1970s, and this status was determined by the SEC in a largely informal way. NRSRO designation acted as a barrier to entry until the Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, passed in the wake of the Enron scandal, created criteria and a recognized path to NRSRO recognition.

Two major sets of concerns have dominated discussions about the rating agencies in the wake of the global financial crisis. The first are to do with the competence of the agencies and the effectiveness of their work. The second set of concerns relate to broader, structural issues. Critics have frequently attacked the timeliness of rating downgrades, suggesting that the agencies do not use appropriate methods and fail to ask the sort of forensic questions needed to properly investigate a company. Critics such as Partnoy (2006) have attacked what are perceived to be broader, structural problems in how the agencies do business. These problems, suggest the critics, create poor incentives and undermine the quality of the work the agencies undertake.

The first of these broader structural issues is the legacy of weak competition between rating agencies as a result of the introduction of the NRSRO designation. Although several new agencies were designated NRSRO after passage of the Rating Agency Reform Act, many critics would like NRSRO status abolished, removing any reference to ratings from law. The view implicit here is that weak competition has led to poor analysis, as the rating agencies have had few incentives to reinvest in their product. In this view, the revenues flowing to rating agencies are rents from a government-generated monopoly.

Concerns about how the agencies are funded became widespread with the onset of the subprime crisis. The idea was that the issuer-pays model, although established for 40 years, was a scandalous conflict of interest because it means that the agencies have incentives to make their ratings less critical than they would if they were paid by investors, the ultimate users of ratings. Like NRSRO status, many critics called for an end to the issuer-pays model of rating agency funding.

Since the onset of the crisis in summer 2007 it is apparent that both the American SEC and European Commission officials are reluctant to either regulate the analytics of the rating process itself or the business models of the major rating agencies. In amendments to NRSRO rules announced in February 2009,

SEC enhanced required data disclosures about performance statistics and methodology, and prohibited credit analysts from fee setting and negotiation, or from receiving gifts from those they rate (SEC 2009). In 2010, the Dodd–Frank Act required NRSROs to establish internal controls in order to guarantee compliance with the new rules (Brummer and Loko 2014). The Dodd–Frank Act required the establishment of the Office of Credit Ratings at the Securities and Exchange Commission, in charge of rating agency reform oversight with an expanded mandate and rule-making authority (ibid.). To date, the hesitant implementation of the Dodd–Frank requirements by the SEC and its omissions, for example, with regard to issues of internal conflict of interest and liability, have given rise to intense criticism (Gaillard and Harrington 2016). It seems that how ratings are made and who pays for them remains materially unchanged.

Much the same can be said for European efforts. For many years rating agencies were little more than 'recognized' in European states by local regulators who were free riders on American regulatory efforts. With the Enron crisis concern about rating agencies grew and industry codes of conduct were increasingly used as a useful form of self-regulation. With the onset of the global financial crisis European Commission officials have sought to regulate the agencies in Europe with proposed new laws passed by the European Parliament for referral to the Council of Ministers (Commission of the European Communities 2008; European Parliament 2009). These efforts materialized in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, on which the European legal framework for the regulation of rating agencies is based (European Parliament, Council of the European Union 2009). Since July 2011, the European Securities and Markets Authority, also known as ESMA, has been the single supervisor over credit rating agencies in the European Union (EU) (European Parliament, Council of the European Union 2011, 2013a, b). This legislation creates a registration process like the NRSRO system, and addresses issues of competition, transparency and disclosure in the rating process. But it does not change rating analytics or effectively challenge the issuer-pays model of rating funding. Therefore, despite higher regulatory costs for the taxpayer, the risk of 'rating failure' may remain as high as before.

One basic problem of the regulatory measures is their unsuitability to fix the problems that are inherent in rating. This can be illustrated by two examples: First, the persistence of the rating agency oligopoly suggests that the root of the agencies' authority is based on a lack of competition in the rating market, as mentioned above. The activation of competitive dynamics through regulatory measures is supposed to bring about a better market outcome and thus better ratings. Nowadays, the rating market consists of almost 80 players worldwide. Nevertheless, the oligopoly of the 'Big Three' continues to exist. Smaller credit rating agencies operate either on a local-national basis, or are specialized in niche markets and specific sectors. It seems that reputational entry barriers to the rating market are not only the cause for the low degree of competition, but a necessary consequence of how rating works: a rating provides a centralized assessment about creditworthiness. By definition, this function of rating can only be fulfilled

with a limited number of rating suppliers. An infinite number of ratings, as perfect competition would imply, would undermine this function of rating.

Second, the aim to increase the transparency of the rating methodology results from the popular idea that the 'objectivity' of rating is best achieved if the rating becomes the result of verifiable statistical models and algorithms. Such a probabilistic approach to predicting the future leaves out the amalgamation between aspects of willingness and ability to pay happening in determining a rating. In other words, in reality, ratings necessarily involve assessment and are not the product of mere summation. Therefore, regulatory traceability of rating decisions, as might be possible in the case of calculation, is not possible.

It is intriguing that despite the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, proposed regulation should be so insubstantial, doing little to alter the rating system that has been in place in the US since 1909 and in Europe since the mid-1980s. Part of this can be put down perhaps to a lack of confidence on the part of regulators and politicians in the efficacy of traditional state-centric solutions to market failure. It may also recognize the apparent weakness of already heavily regulated institutions such as commercial banks, and an understanding that the financial system is, despite the rating crisis, likely to continue to move in a more market- and more rating-dependent direction in future.

Banks

As mentioned above, banks were intimately involved in the financial innovation that was a feature of the euphoria that preceded the start of the global financial crisis (Rethel and Sinclair 2012). Bankers were searching for better returns on their money in the low interest rate environment that followed the dot.com bust of 2001. In cooperation with rating agencies whose ratings made these new financial instruments possible, the market in securitized debt grew rapidly in the years leading up to the crisis. With the downturn in the housing market and doubts about the robustness of the assumptions about these securitized assets, market anxiety grew rapidly in 2007, leading in early 2008 to the forced takeover of investment bank Bear Stearns by JP Morgan, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September and the subsequent $180 billion bailout of AIG later that same month. Because of the interconnection of financial contracts between counterparties the fallout from this crisis led to massive government bailouts of banks in the US and Britain worth $430bn and £456bn, respectively (Department of the Treasury 2015; National Audit Office 2011; *The Guardian* 2011). These bailouts were added to government debt. Government debt further increased due to the lost tax revenues accompanying the financial crisis-induced recession and the costs incurred for stimulus packages. According to the most recent 'Cost of the Crisis Report' released by the Better Markets non-profit organization, in the US alone the total cost of the financial crisis amounts to almost $20 trillion if lost output due to the recession is included (Better Markets 2015).

The bailouts were very controversial and led to a good deal of opprobrium for the banking industry on both sides of the Atlantic. There was intense discussion

between experts and officials about how to go about regulating banking effectively now that the public bailouts had effectively demonstrated that major banks were too big to be allowed to fail because of fear they would revive the post-Lehman crisis in financial markets. Some years on from the crash of 2008–2009 few dramatic changes have been made to the regulation of banks. The Volcker rule provision of Dodd–Frank banned proprietary trading, or trading by the bank for the bank and not for customers, by US commercial banks. A weaker rule, to ring-fence speculative activity, was instituted in Britain. Requirements for bank reserves were increased in the US and in Europe. Banks faced many investigations, fines and a bank levy or additional tax in Britain. But like the rating agencies these changes are best viewed as simply increasing the cost of doing business. While that has certainly been irksome to banks, as HSBC's threat to move out of Britain has demonstrated, banks remain very privileged institutions. It has been estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2014 that the implicit subsidy of the government support for 'too big to fail' institutions is worth $15bn–$70bn a year in the US and $20bn–$110bn in Britain (*Financial Times* 2014; IMF 2014). Governments remain reluctant to shape the banking business actively despite the demonstrated costs to the public when banking goes wrong. The real issue is whether governments will step in during the next phase of financial euphoria to prevent the mania that gives rise to panics and crashes. There have been a lot of discussions about this – what is termed macroprudential regulation – but the jury is out on whether it will become a reality (Baker 2013).

Conclusions

Two very different understandings of financial crisis compete. The first, the exogenous view, sees finance itself as a natural phenomenon, a smoothly oiled machine that every now and then gets messed up by the government, or events that nobody can anticipate, like war or famine. The other perspective, the endogenous, argues that the machine-like view of finance is mythic. Like all other human institutions, finance is a world made by people, in which collective understandings, norms and assumptions give rise periodically to manias, panics and crashes. On this account, financial crises are normal. What is not normal, concede those who support the endogenous perspective, is the expansion of financial crises into global events that threaten to destabilize world politics, as did the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Whether you adopt an exogenous or endogenous view of financial crises, the necessity for international cooperation to combat them is essential. In the first instance, this probably amounts to no more than ensuring that governments and central banks communicate about their efforts to support vulnerable financial institutions, especially when those institutions operate, as so many do, in multiple jurisdictions. While there is evidence of this in recent times, there was also much unilateral, uncoordinated action intended for national advantage, such as the Irish government's guarantee of all funds deposited in domestic banks. Building up

the institutional capacity for cooperation between finance ministries and central banks should be a priority.

Political management will remain at the heart of financial crises. Governments, whether they like it or not, know they have responsibility for financial stability and they have become adept at identifying and disciplining institutions that do not seem to serve their purpose within the financial system. As a result, 'witch hunts' will continue to be a key feature of the fallout of financial crises, as governments attempt to offload as much of the liability for crises as possible. Substantive regulatory change is likely to be muted by the lack of confidence amongst law makers in the US and Europe in the efficacy of regulation in the face of rapid financial change. The weakness of the regulatory response is already evident in the character of the initiatives developed to 'regulate' the credit rating agencies and banks (despite the cost to these institutions).

Intellectually, recent financial crises do not seem to have had much impact on the assumptions of academic disciplines like economics that provided the justification for the financial innovations at the heart of the subprime crisis. This means that even now the idea of asset price bubbles remains at odds with established thinking in this field, as promoted by financial economists. Inevitably, this means another generation of self-confident financial 'rocket-scientists' is being trained ready to pursue financial innovation once memories of the current crisis fade. While truly global financial crises are thankfully rare, we understand so little about the mechanisms that cause crises that much greater modesty about how finance works seems sensible. We argue it is best to abandon our assumption that finance is natural like the movements of the planets, and instead embrace the lesson of Keynes' beauty contest and the valuation crisis of 2007, that financial markets are social phenomena in which collective understandings, especially confidence, may be more important than ostensibly technical considerations.

Although many academic assumptions remain resilient to change, it is apparent that, at least for now, the global financial crisis that started in 2007 created a much greater sense of uncertainty in the world, and challenged the idea that globalization will deliver us all from want in a riskless way. This sense of unease has been deepened by the European sovereign debt crisis. It turns out that globalization is something that is unpredictable, that lurches in ways we cannot guess, and that even at the very heart of the global system can imperil great fortunes.

The relationship between global finance and politics has changed over the past hundred years. Before the twentieth century, governments had an interest in the smooth working of finance to fund the activities of the state, especially in relation to war. After 1929, governments, especially in the developed world, had a new role in preserving financial stability. After World War II, because of the absence of leadership between the wars, the United States assumed the central role in the design and implementation of a new global financial architecture of rules and institutions in support of an increasingly liberal order, but also one that at least in principle valued stability. After the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates came to an end in the 1970s, the US played a strong coordinating role in response to the increased financial volatility that went with renewed international

capital mobility, especially in relation to exchange rate fluctuations. Given the unprecedented circumstances of the global financial crisis that started in 2007, it is likely that a more activist stance on the part of the United States will be evident in future. Whether US leadership and inter-state cooperation will be as effective today as they were in the 1940s and the 1980s remains to be seen.

Unfortunately, the pressure to return to asset price booms (and thus, inevitably, busts) remains very strong. People seem attached to the empirically false proposition that property values only increase in real terms. But given the degree to which Western governments promoted homeownership as a route to prosperity after World War II, it is no wonder that people think this way. When we take the likelihood of future asset price bubbles into account, add in perennial developing country crises, and note the uncertain nature of market response at the top of bubbles and in busts, it seems almost inevitable that we will be dealing with financial crises on a regular basis in future, as has been the case in the past. Only through cooperation between major governments can we hope to ameliorate their worst effects and minimize their duration.

Guide to further reading

A quick, readable introduction to financial crises is John Kenneth Galbraith's *A Short History of Financial Euphoria* (1993). His equally readable history of the Great Depression is *The Great Crash 1929* (1997 [1955]). The standard history is Robert Z. Aliber and Charles P. Kindleberger's *Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises* (2015). Influential arguments about crisis in capitalism can be found in Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* (1957 [1944]), Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (2010 [1943]), Friedman and Schwartz's *A Monetary History of the United States, 1857-1960* (1963), and Minsky's *John Maynard Keynes* (2008 [1975]). An excellent review of the economic literature on the Great Depression is Bernanke, *Essays on the Great Depression* (2000). On the global financial crisis that started in 2007 the reader should examine Krugman, *The Return of Depression Economics* (2nd edition, 2008), Cooper, *The Origin of Financial Crises* (2008), Akerlof and Shiller, *Animal Spirits* (2009), and Engelen et al., *After the Great Complacence* (2011). The most readable accounts for the non-economist are Gamble's excellent *The Spectre at the Feast* (2009), Germain's thoughtful and well-informed *Global Politics & Financial Governance* (2010) and Helleiner's *The Status Quo Crisis* (2014). On banks and their troubles, see Rethel and Sinclair, *The Problem with Banks* (2012). Upton Sinclair's entertaining novel, *The Moneychangers*, based on events leading up to the 1907 panic, is well worth reading for a comparison with the past (2001 [1908]).

Chapter 12

Gender and World Politics

LAURA SJOBERG AND NATALIA FONTOURA

Introduction

In April of 2014, nearly 300 Chibok girls and young women were kidnapped by Boko Haram in the Borno State in Nigeria. Over the course of 2015, thousands of Yazidi girls and young women were kidnapped and sold into sex slavery by the Islamic State (IS). In the same year, hundreds of women migrated to and took up arms for IS, characterized in the media as 'jihadi brides' looking for 'jihottie' husbands. In 2015, domestic violence rates were on the rise, and women were disproportionately affected by a number of disease outbreaks, migration patterns, and economic setbacks. Almost everywhere in the world, women are under-represented in the halls of power, and over-represented among the poor, sick, impoverished and undereducated.

What is it about girls and women that causes them to be treated differently than men in global politics? What is it about girls and women that makes us understand the things that happen to them differently than how we understand similar things happening to men? Why do we see women soldiers, or women politicians, or women leaders as *women* first and soldiers, politicians, or leaders second? Why do we find women disadvantaged, socially, politically, or economically, as compared to men, in most places in the world?

Is the 'why' that women are fundamentally different than men? Or that women are just treated differently, and differently positioned? If women are different, is it because of their genes and bodies, or because of their social experiences? If women are positioned differently, what makes people treat them differently?

These are the sort of questions that scholars and activists interested in gender and global politics ask. Feminist scholars look at what happens to women in global politics and why. They also recognize that a feminist perspective would change theoretical approaches to global politics, which have tended to ignore women and gender. They argue that gender analysis of the global political arena is necessary to understand why and how women are seen, and treated, differently. Using gender analysis, international relations (IR) feminists have interrogated key concepts in the study of global politics, like sovereignty, the state and security, critically engaging inherited notions about what matters in global politics and how global politics works. This chapter begins with a discussion of the meaning of gender and moves to discussing the relevance of gender to the study of world politics. It

then explores the inclusion of the concept of gender generally and in the discipline of IR specifically, thereby presenting different theoretical approaches of feminist IR. After laying that groundwork, the chapter briefly discusses future possibilities for research in the field of gender and IR.

What is gender?

'Sex' and 'gender' are often used as if these two concepts were synonyms, but they are not. Generally, people use both the words 'sex' and 'gender' to refer to the difference between men and women, which they perceive as based on biological differences between those with XX chromosomes and those with XY chromosomes. The two concepts, nevertheless, do not have the same meaning. While the word 'sex' usually indicates a biological category, the concept of 'gender' relates to the social features and expectations associated with each biological sex.

Still, this dichotomy needs to be further deconstructed. Indeed, even defining an individual's biological sex can carry its own complexities: it is estimated that around 1% of the human population does not fit into either one of the two categories. 'Intersex' is a concept that is used to define individuals who have distinct physical and genetic combinations. In addition to people who are biologically intersex, people who are trans*, genderqueer, or androgynous cross categories that have been traditionally seen as immutable.

Even though people do not always fit neatly into the categories of 'male' or 'female', there are almost always social expectations of people perceived to fit into one group or another. That is exactly where the concept of 'gender' becomes fundamental to understand the dynamics between society and sex: 'gender' refers to the social expectations assigned to people based on their understood or (internally or externally) identified biological sex. In other words, men are expected to be 'masculine', while women are expected to be 'feminine'. What the concepts of masculine and feminine mean, nevertheless, changes culturally, historically and politically.

Masculine and feminine refer, then, to an expected set of characteristics associated with an individual's (presumed) biological sex. Masculinity, for instance, is often associated with features such as strength, rationality, autonomy, aggressiveness, independence, competition, materiality, bravery and objectivity. 'Being a man' is to display those social features associated with masculinity. Femininity, on the other hand, is usually associated with the opposite characteristics, such as weakness, emotion, interdependence, care, need for protection, compromise, negotiation, passiveness and subjectivity. In addition, men are frequently socially associated with the public realm and the business world, while women and femininity are often linked with the home and the private sphere.

Although the social expectations regarding what it means to be a man or a woman are present in many different social contexts (media, workplace, family etc.), there is not a single, unique idea of what masculinity or femininity should be like. Actually, in most societies there are several different competing notions of masculinities and femininities. The idea of masculinity expected by a military

officer is not the same as the one of a businessman, or a sports coach. Ideas of masculinity and femininity also change across history, place and culture. Many feminist scholars have labelled the socially and culturally dominant understandings of masculinity and femininity as 'hegemonic' ones, while other ideals of masculinities and femininities, in an specific cultural-historical context, are relegated to a subordinate position.

In this sense, the concept of gender can be considered as a *social construction*: In other words, a product, but at the same time a producer, of human social expectations. When we talk about gender-based characteristics, we are referring to what society, understood in a broad sense, *expects* from those it perceives as men and women. But gender expectations are not only read on to people. Instead, traits associated with masculinities and femininities (and their relative social value) are imputed onto governments, institutions, ideas and states. For instance, when we say that the United States, or any other country, is the 'motherland', we are assigning feminine ideal attributes to the imaginary of the nation. Assigning gender-based traits to people, states and institutions can be seen as a shortcut to organizing both their function and their relative value.

Gender and global politics

Feminist scholars within the field of IR are driven by a political and academic curiosity regarding where to locate and how to make sense of women in global politics. In *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, Cynthia Enloe explores the question of where women stand in global politics by investigating the Iran Contra affair:

> If we listened to women more carefully – to those trying to break out of the strait-jacket of conventional femininity *and* to those who find security and satisfaction in those very conventions – … we might find that the Iran/Contra affair and international politics generally looked different . . . . Making women invisible hides the workings of both femininity and masculinity in international politics. (Enloe 1989: 11)

Indeed, feminist scholars who share the same academic curiosity regarding women and global politics discovered important, yet very different, answers as to the question of what is the role (or lack thereof) of women in different areas of global affairs. Such researchers explored many different cases and contexts, through very diverse epistemological lenses, in order to understand the various ways that gender works in global politics. Joyce Kaufman and Kristen Williams (2007) found that female matrimonial practices are to be seen as an important element of nationalism in several different contexts. Brooke Ackerly (2000) studied how Indian women form informal support networks to deal with high levels of domestic violence in their communities. Catia Confortini (2012) investigated the role of women advocating for peace as part of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. On the other hand, Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg

(2007) explored the role of women as terrorists, war criminals and perpetrators of genocide. Megan MacKenzie (2012) examined how female combatants were reticent to go through DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) programs in post-conflict Sierra Leone for a number of reasons, including the stigma of being a female fighter and the mixed feelings about returning to traditional feminine roles. Katherine Moon (1997) explored the political impasse between United States troops in South Korea, and the demand for STD testing of prostitutes in camp towns near bases. Heidi Hudson (2009) investigated how women's movements manage the overlapping interests between feminist, nationalist and peace-building goals in post-conflict situations in the African continent, and how they fight, at the same time, for more inclusion in the peace process. Francine D'Amico and Peter Beckman (1995) studied how women in high political, military and economic positions are constantly fighting gender stereotypes that assume female inadequacy to those positions of power. Denise Horn (2010) found women in wars as providers of domestic necessities and especially of the motivation needed for soldiers to fight wars. On the other hand, Claudia Card (1996) explored how women were constantly victims of systematic and many times intentional wartime rape campaigns. Jean Elsthain (1987) investigated the indirect female participation in conflicts as the 'beautiful souls' for whom men should fight to protect.

These examples represent only a very small sample of the many different places and positions in which feminist scholars have found women in global politics. The women in all of those stories are positioned differently, and have different gender-specific experiences, but they share *having* gender-specific experiences. Across the world, poverty rates are significantly higher for women than for men: women in lesser-developed countries and sub-groups of minority women in developed countries are overly affected by poverty and lack of resources. Although female income, in comparison with men's, has overall increased in the last decades, women still earn less than 80 cents for each dollar earned by men. Part of the reason for this income gap is that women remain over-represented in low paying positions and are still dominant in domestic work. Women are also under-represented in positions of power in the economic and political spheres: they represent only around 17% of the world's legislators, constitute less than 10% of the world's heads of state and government, and are even more under-represented in corporate command structures.

Also, women remain the most likely to be subject to abuse at work, in the household, and in their communities. All over the globe, women continue to have less access to employment, education, healthcare and housing than men. Women have the highest rate of HIV/AIDS infection in several places across the world. Women are more likely to die of preventable diseases and of starvation. Gendered assumptions continue to pervade the security arena (Shepherd 2008), and women remain disproportionately affected by many contemporary conflicts.

In light of the social, economic and political inequality women face around the world, feminist scholars have asked themselves why, despite increasing awareness of gender discrimination, the situation does not change significantly. The possible answers to this question lead us to confront the possibility that the discrimination

that women experience around the world is not incidental, but *structural*. By 'structural', we mean that it is not just something that happens to some women some of the time, and it is not something that happens to women coincidentally. Instead, it happens to women *because they are women*, and women are targeted because of assumptions about what women are, and what is expected of them because of those assumptions about what they are.

These expectations not only expect women to be *different than* men, they expect that women and the traits associated with them are valued less than men and the traits associated with them. For example, there is a category that is casually referred to in many places around the world as 'women's work', which is work that is less well paid (if it is paid at all) and less well respected than its presumed opposite ('men's work' or even just 'work'). Similarly, women are often treated as helpless in the face of, and not involved in, war and conflict – because people associate women and femininity with peacefulness and defenselessness. This has far-ranging consequences, where often women's diverse roles in war and conflict are invisible to analysts, and women are not consulted on key questions or decisions that would be relevant to them. Along the same lines, many of the human rights and anti-abuse needs that women have are ignored by many governing bodies and rules enforcers because the abuses happen in a way that are sex-specific (can happen to women's bodies and not men's, like reproduction) and/ or happen in the private sphere (inside homes, or between spouses). Structural sex discrimination – the structural subordination of women – happens when how women are perceived, and what they are understood to be, affects the material resources, interpersonal treatment, and quality of life to which women have access.

Certainly, the situation of women in many sectors in many places across the world (especially regarding the right to vote and to work outside the household in many countries) has improved recently, but nowhere in the world do women enjoy the same rights and/or status as men. How? Why? Part of the answer is that there are still many people, institutions, and governments that do not believe women should get the same opportunities as men. Still, even in places where gender equality is openly endorsed, political institutions in all levels fail to proactively provide women with equal representation, opportunities and access to resources.

Feminists within IR have made the point that this inequality stems from the fact that states and institutions are, at their basic foundation, *gendered*. In other words, feminist scholars have argued that states, international organizations (IOs) and the international system in general prioritize and value features associated with masculinity over characteristics associated with femininity, thereby shaping the theory and practice of the relations between actors and structure in global politics.

In this sense, the argument is not only that men overwhelmingly dominate positions of power, but that men's domination is related to the prizing of traits associated with masculinity and the assumption that men have those traits. As R. W. Connell (1995) points out, the dominant presence of men in leadership positions is a product, but also a producer, of state masculinity. Men lead states because states overvalue features related with masculinity for leaders, and structure their organizational practices around masculine ideals. This produces 'the

belief, widely held in the United States and throughout the world, that military and foreign policy are the arenas of policy-making least appropriate for women' (Tickner 1992: 3). In other words, voters in many countries choose their leaders based on characteristics commonly associated with masculinity. Features normally linked to femininity are seen as less than ideal for leaders. This overvaluing of ideals associated with masculinity can be found across global politics, from people's interactions to states' relations.

For instance, scholars aiming to conduct analysis on the structural effects of the role of gender in international politics have explored how the international system and the structure of the global economy contribute to the subordination of women and other minority groups. In order to uncover such a relationship, such analysis focuses on the gendered nature of traditional concepts in IR such as security, anarchy, sovereignty and globalization. Feminist scholars have also explored the dynamics between class, race and gender within national and international boundaries. In this sense, gender is not only a descriptive concept but also an analytical tool of fundamental importance to properly understand global politics, its causes and effects, and to formulate solutions to the world's main problems.

History of the study of gender within international relations

In the 1960s scholars started to focus on gender in social science research. In the new field of women's studies, scholars focused their analysis on the reasons why women were imprisoned in a situation of social, economic and political inequality. This new academic and political interest gave birth to different academic approaches to feminism, based on distinct ontological, epistemological and political assumptions and understandings of the world. Although feminism as a social movement and the scholarship on women have developed in different ways, these two poles are not entirely separate. *Feminism* can be conceptualized as a political movement that aims to overcome discrimination and inequality against women, while feminist scholarship refers to academic production of knowledge focused on understanding and addressing gender subordination. The study of gender, in sociology, law, philosophy and history, like the study of gender within political science, has focused not only in analyzing causes and effects of gender inequality and subordination, but also on producing knowledge that could help in the formulation of political solutions. Feminist scholarship, like feminism as a social movement, is deeply embedded in a political and normative agenda based on the fight for gender equality.

Though women's studies developed in the 1960s, feminist analysis came to the field of IR only two decades later. Even then, it was not and has not been universally accepted among IR scholars that gender analysis is important. Some scholars argue that women and gender are irrelevant to global politics, since most of the key actors in inter-state relations throughout history have been men. In response to the feminist criticism that women's relative absence is *why* they

should be studied, many IR scholars assert the belief that the production of academic knowledge should be focused on how the world *is* (male dominated), rather than how it should be (more equal). In other words, the place of the scientist is only to objectively describe and make sense of the world, not to change it (Cohn and Ruddick 2002: 3; Sjoberg 2009).

In the late 1980s, feminist scholars entered the field of IR, arguing both that women matter in global politics, whether or not they are in the places IR scholars traditionally study, *and* that women's relative absence from those places is structural, not incidental, in global politics. Consequently, feminists claimed that only by introducing gender into the analysis of international affairs could the different ways that the state system and the global economy affect men's and women's lives be fully understood.

Feminist work emerged in the field of IR around the same time as IR's so-called 'third debate', which has been characterized as a debate between 'positivist' and 'post-positivist' approaches to studying global politics. The 'post-positivist' side of the debate was populated by scholars questioning the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the field: in other words, how IR researchers saw the world and measured knowledge. Post-positivist scholars argued that traditional (positivist) approaches were too focused on neutral, universal and objective knowledge, a project critical scholars approach with suspicion.

Feminist scholars share this suspicion of objective knowledge, and most feminist IR work is committed to acknowledging relationships between people's lived experiences, knowledge and power. Still, the post-positivist side of the 'third debate' should not be seen as subsuming feminist inquiry and concerns. Other 'post-positivist' theories, like critical theory, postmodern theory and even postcolonial theory, have been as slow as traditional, positivist work in including gender analysis into their scholarship. On the other hand, not all feminist perspectives are 'post-positivist', and some lines of thought certainly value a more traditional scientific approach. As a result, although the inclusion of gender happened within the framework of the theoretical possibilities opened by the third debate, feminist scholarship has been critical of both sides of this historical moment of the field.

Theoretical approaches to the study of gender in IR

There are many different theoretical perspectives on gender in global politics, much like there are many different ways people live and experience gender in global politics. Just as there is no single, unique experience of 'womanhood' or femininity in the world, there is not a single feminist theory about how to understand sex, gender, and global politics. Instead, there are many.

This book, like many IR books, breaks down IR's concerns by subject matter, and lists gender as a subject matter of concern in the study of global politics. Gender issues fit awkwardly in such a schema, though, because gender issues are not only themselves an 'issue in world politics' but also meaningful *across* issues in global politics. Whether a scholar is looking at global terrorism (Phillips,

Chapter 4) or international law (Hehir, Chapter 8), gender relations, gender-based characterizations and gendered portrayals matter in understanding the major problems of twenty-first-century global politics.

Feminist theorizing also fits uncomfortably in the inherited paradigmatic approaches to IR theorizing. When IR textbooks are not organized, as this one is, by subject matter, they are often organized by theoretical paradigm. This usually involves a fairly standard review of realism (interested in power within anarchy), liberalism (interested in cooperation under anarchy), social constructivism (interested in norms and social dynamics), critical theories (interested in emancipation), poststructuralism (interested in meanings as embedded in language), and postcolonialism (interested in the relics of colonialisms in global politics). Feminism is not just another potential paradigm. While gender analysis provides a unique outlook among these approaches, it also works across and transforms them.

IR feminists, as discussed above, share an interest in understanding and overcoming gender inequality or reaching gender emancipation. Still, what feminists from different theoretical fields mean by concepts of inequality and emancipation differ significantly, as does their understanding of the right epistemological tools and methods to be used to study gender and global politics. Feminists have generally categorized these different academic approaches as feminist liberalism, feminist constructivism, feminist critical theory, feminist poststructuralism, and feminist postcolonialism (see Tickner and Sjoberg 2006). Sjoberg (2012) has also argued that there is such a thing as feminist realism characterized by a focus on the role of gender in the relations of power politics between states. This section will briefly discuss the contributions of these different approaches.

Feminist liberalism

Feminist work defined as liberal feminism or feminist liberalism within IR focuses on the disadvantages that women face as compared to men in global politics, and believes women's inclusion in the structures of power in global politics is a key to overcoming sex-based discrimination. Liberal feminist scholars have researched key problems in global politics like sex-differential experiences of female refugees or human rights problems that uniquely or disproportionately influence women. Liberal feminists study and measure women's political representation, and how the presence or absence of female leaders impacts on inter-state relations. Scholars in this tradition have normative goals that include the destruction of legal barriers and other obstacles to women's access to opportunities.

For example, Mark Boyer and Mary Caprioli (2001) apply this approach to thinking about whether states that have more gender equality are more or less likely to be involved in international conflict. Caprioli and Boyer use large-n data to argue that states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to initiate conflicts in global politics. Liberal feminists have recently initiated a project based on a large data collection called the WomanStats database (www.womanstats.org).

The WomanStats project uses quantitative and qualitative data to discover where and how gender affects the relations and dynamics of international politics.

Feminist constructivism

Feminist work using a constructivist theoretical lens focuses on how social expectations about gender form and are formed by global politics. Constructivist oriented feminists examine how gender norms influence the global political arena, as well as how the global political arena shapes ideas about gender. For example, Elisabeth Prugl (1999) uses a feminist constructivist approach to understand the ways domestic work is treated in international law, particularly the gendered legal separations between domestic work and what others recognize as 'real' work, or paid employment. She examines the role of associations between womanhood and the private sphere in marginalizing home-based work, while associations between masculinity and the public sphere sustain the dominance of men in capitalist modes of production.

Feminist critical theory

Feminist critical theory looks at the ways that gender constitutes what the global political arena is and how it functions. As Jill Steans details:

> *Feminist critical theorists* are trying to find a way forward which retains both gender as a category of analysis and retains the historical commitment to the emancipatory project in feminism, but which takes on board the postmodern and postcolonial critique of the exclusionary practices of Western feminism. (Steans 1998: 29)

Feminist critical theorizing, then, argues that *ideas* about gender can structure people's experiences in life and in global politics. Christine Chin's (1998) *In Service and Servitude* uses this sort of approach to look at female foreign domestic workers living and working in Malaysia. Chin studies the immigration of (mostly Filipino) domestic workers into Malaysia, which reveals underpayment, exploitation and even abuse. While others focus on the political-economic incentives for this migration, Chin makes a case that the Malaysian state supported and even encouraged the 'importation' of female workers as a symbol of the rising status of middle-class families. Like other critical feminist work in IR, Chin's study looks at existing gendered power relations embedded in social and political life to account for how global politics works, and how it could be changed for the better.

Feminist poststructuralism

Feminist poststructuralism claims that gendered language, especially when certain words and features are linked to ideals of masculinity and others to ideals of femininity, serves to empower the masculine and subjugate the feminine. Feminist poststructuralists contend that words construct and limit the social realities that

we see around us. The focus of this scholarship is the connections between knowledge, power, and how everyday life is lived. If most of the writers and producers of the texts from which we learn about the international system and base our research on are men, poststructuralist feminists suggest that this matters for the content of that knowledge about global politics. If the majority of policymakers considering particular legislation, or treaties, are men, feminist poststructuralists look for masculinist constructions of the concepts in those laws or treaties.

Feminist poststructuralists have also claimed that gendered dichotomies, such as public/private, rational/emotional, strong/weak, developed/underdeveloped, civilized/barbarians and order/anarchy, so commonly used in the field of IR, are not just theoretical building blocks but actually help to create the social realities they claim to describe. Feminist poststructuralists emphasize that gender hierarchies and gendered dichotomies are real in the sense that they have concrete effects, but are not fixed: they are constantly changing and evolving depending on the social context and the historical moment. To these scholars, deconstructing and problematizing these hierarchies is a fundamental step in the construction of a less hierarchical and gender unequal international arena.

Feminist postcolonialism

Postcolonial feminist scholars focus on the power dynamics between different feminist perspectives around the world, claiming that colonialized relations of subordination and domination can also be found in the relationships between feminist analyses of global politics and in IR teaching and research. In other words, postcolonial theorists argue that the dominance of colonizers over the colonized during the era of imperial empires did not end with the independence of postcolonial states. Postcolonial feminists claim that the most powerful parts of the world continue to dominate and subjugate the rest of the globe in ways that involve issues of race, gender, class and nationality. Along these lines, postcolonial feminist scholars have argued that Western feminists sometimes replicated the domination of imperial states – using their privileged positions either to assume that all women have the same needs or to stereotype non-Western women as helpless, subordinated or naïve. In other words, postcolonial feminists challenge the way Western feminists often see women of less developed countries as poor, undereducated and victimized, portraying them as lacking political agency or knowledge about their own desires. Recent work in postcolonial feminist IR, including that of Lily Ling and Anna Agathangelou (2009), has explored the intersections between gender, race and culture in global politics by interrogating the distinction between politics and political economy.

Women, gender and #bringbackourgirls

The kidnappings in April of 2014 of between 250 and 350 Nigerian high school students by the insurgent group Boko Haram was covered by mainstream media

outlets, and then became the subject of a social media campaign (largely on Twitter, with hashtag #bringbackourgirls); then the social media campaign was itself covered in the mainstream media. In CNN's initial report, the kidnappers were described as 'dozens of gunmen' who were 'heavily armed' and kidnapped the girls 'as the students slept in their dormitories'. Most of the news coverage both in Nigeria and beyond refers to the victims of the violence as schoolgirls. The students were at the time between the ages of 16 and 18.

The story, as related in the media, contains a number of important elements for understanding the many ways gender can matter in global social and political relations. The first implication of many of the media stories is that the capture of women and girls is *not* a traditional security issue, and does not fit within the purview of power politics, international political economy (IPE) and international terrorism as traditionally understood. Instead, one needs to look outside of traditional security to see what happens to women and how the things that happen to women depend on them being understood as, and treated as, women. The second implication of many of the media stories is an emphasis on sexual abuse. While it is not clear whether or not the captives were actually sexually abused, many news stories suggested that sexual abuse was *necessarily happening*, and that the risk of sexual violence is one of the primary reasons that the kidnapping of the girls is normatively and practically problematic.

The third implication of the media stories around #bringbackourgirls is the continued use of the labels 'girls' and 'schoolgirls' to refer to the persons who had been kidnapped. When the word 'girls' is used, it brings up images of young children – perhaps younger than 10. While some of the 'girls' who were abducted were younger than 18, they were all in their late teens, and some were 18 or 19. Why call them *girls* then? The term 'girls' brings up a combination of youth, feminine innocence, and demand for protection that terms like 'people' or 'teenagers' do not conjure up. While the use of this gendered terminology *does* highlight the sexist actions of Boko Haram (which is well-known for abusing women and girls, believing it is acceptable to enslave and sell women), it also invokes stereotypes about the age and gender of the people who were kidnapped. The girls of #bringbackourgirls are defined as a group by their helplessness and need for protection, which is related to a conflated notion of femininity and infantilism.

We do not mean to minimize the brutality of kidnapping, or the many terrible things that the captors could have done to the captives. We also do not mean to imply that female captives will not be treated differently because they are female – they were likely taken captive because of their sex and treated in ways that only female captives would be treated. Still, the emphasis on gender in the media coverage provides a limited and stereotypical framing of the victims. The stories about the kidnapped girls both in mainstream and social media emphasize the gendered risks that the girls face as they remain in the custody of their captors. Sexual violence is not the only harm of feminized vulnerability that newspaper stories about the kidnapping feature. They also suggest that the girls are vulnerable to religious conversion and political radicalization. A *Global Post* report explains that:

the danger of waiting for so long to free the Chibok girls is that the group can radicalize these girls, to the point that by the time they are released, they [...] become part of the problem [...] brainwashing, indoctrination is part of the strategy of the insurgency (Conway-Smith, 2014).

This paints a picture of women and femininity as without agency, vulnerable, and susceptible to manipulation.

It is in those news stories and the proliferation of #bringbackourgirls on social media that two problematic trends can be identified. The first, discussed above, is the use of gendered language to describe the girls and the related assumptions about and characterization of feminized peril. The second is the instrumentalization of existing conflict sexual violence and/or the risk of conflict sexual violence towards particular political ends. For example, analysts have suggested that the Nigerian government exploited the kidnappings for electoral gain without putting significant effort into recovering the kidnapping victims.

This association of the ability to protect girls with national sustainability *within* Nigeria is matched by outside states volunteering to intervene when Nigeria demonstrates its *inability* to protect the girls. Samantha Nutt characterizes this as 'the risk that comes with campaigns such as #bringbackourgirls [...] that they can turn into an open invitation to endless interventionism'. Intervenors, then, gain masculine honor by protecting (or just claiming to protect) feminized victims. This serves as a justification for intervention.

At each step in the telling of the story #bringbackourgirls, sex and gender matter both to the characterization of the captives' lives and to the politics around those lives at the local, national and international level. This story is one of many in which gender dynamics are at the center, and at the surface, of global politics, yet rarely discussed in the level of detail and depth that would be required to fully understand these situations.

Looking forward for the study of gender and IR

Feminist scholars within IR have oriented their analysis by a very specific question: would the world be different if the power structures of global politics and global economics valued characteristics of femininity over characteristics associated with masculinity? We have presented, through the work of many scholars, some of the reasons why gender 'matters' in global politics (there certainly are many more!). Feminist thinkers of many different theoretical strands have been able to construct knowledge about gender and world politics in many different subjects and through many distinct theoretical lenses. The next step, then, seems to be to ask ourselves: what should we do with this knowledge produced about gender and world politics? How do we learn more about the subject? How do we end gender subordination? In some ways, feminist work in IR gives us a clear answer to these questions, by claiming, and showing us, that one of the most defining, structural and foundational properties of global politics is gender

hierarchy, or the privileging of what is considered as masculine features over feminine ones.

Feminism as an approach to global politics looks to address the subordination and mistreatment of women all around the world, as well as the blindness that ignoring that subordination produces for both theorists and practitioners in international politics. Feminist research has shown that gender-based assumptions and stereotypes have a significant impact on how people's lives are lived, around the world. Therefore, it is important to see and recognize gender in order to understand what global politics is and how it works.

We made this argument across this chapter by providing overviews both of the ways that sex and gender affect access to resources, power and influence in global politics, and to the ways that sex and gender can be theorized. IR feminists suggest that all scholars and practitioners of global politics should ask gender questions and be more aware of the gendered implications of structures and actions in global politics – from inside of executive branches to inside of homes. This approach to looking at issues in global politics – whether they are explicitly about gender or not – provides important insights into how gender works in global politics, and how global politics works more generally.

Guide to further reading

J. Ann Tickner's (2001) *Gendering World Politics* is a great introduction to the field, and Laura Shepherd's (2010/2015) *Gender Matters in Global Politics* updates much of that information and presents more in-depth examination of a number of the areas of interest for gender and IR. If your interest is in human rights, you might want to read Brooke Ackerly's (2008) *Universal Human Rights in a World of Difference*. A theoretical approach to gender and security can be found in books like Laura Sjoberg's (2013) *Gendering Global Conflict* and Annick Wibben's (2011) *Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach*. There are a wide variety of interesting empirical approaches as well, including Annica Kronsell's (2012) *Gender, Sex, and the Postnational Defense* and Maya Eichler's (2011) *Militarizing Men*. If your interest is in feminist political economy, Jacqui True and Aida Hozic's (2016) *Scandalous Economics* is both timely and impressive in scope. Jan Jindy Pettman's (1996/2005) *Worlding Women* provides a good theoretical introduction, and other books like Christine Chin's (2013) *Cosmopolitan Sex Workers* and Elisabeth Prugl's (1999) *The Global Construction of Gender* explore these dynamics in context and in depth. Louise Chappell's (2015) *The Politics of Gender Justice in the International Criminal Court* and Jacqui True's (2012) *The Political Economy of Violence against Women* combine gender-informed approaches and exploration of issues that are of significant political importance globally. Cutting-edge theoretical work like Cynthia Weber's (2016) *Queer International Relations* and Lauren Wilcox's (2014) *Bodies of Violence* is interesting to read to see the wide variety of implications that thinking about gender can have for thinking about global politics.

Chapter 13

Inequality and Underdevelopment

RAY KIELY

Global inequality and underdevelopment are particularly contentious issues in contemporary world politics. In essence, they talk to issues which ask the following questions: what is the (global) North–South divide? How has it emerged, how is it reproduced, and what can be done about it? Has the recent era of 'globalization' eroded a North–South divide and promoted some forms of convergence, or at least poverty reduction, in the global order? This chapter examines these questions, and the last one in particular.

Debate over the relationship between globalization, inequality and underdevelopment has been particularly contentious. On the one hand, there are relatively upbeat assessments concerning a shift towards convergence between rich and poor countries in the global economy. A variant on this argument suggests that while inequality in some forms may not have been reduced in recent years, what matters is the fact that global poverty *has* been reduced, and this has occurred because of the opportunities that globalization presents to developing countries. Not all states have necessarily taken advantage of these opportunities, but it is precisely in these states where rapid economic growth and poverty reduction have not occurred. Conversely the recent rise of the South (UNDP 2013) is seen by some as confirmation of economic orthodoxies (OECD 2010). Related to these upbeat assessments are various arguments concerning the dispersal of capital flows throughout the world, the growth of manufacturing in the developing world, the rise of China and India, and the increase in primary commodity prices in recent years, which in turn facilitated high growth rates in Latin America and much of Africa, including after the financial crisis of 2008.

On the other hand, more skeptical assessments question the extent to which poverty has been reduced, point to the increase in inequality within countries and (at the extremes) between them, the continued concentration of capital and high value production in the developed countries, the limits of the kinds of manufacturing that has taken place in much of the developing world, including in India and China, and the continued limits of development based on excessive reliance on primary commodity exports and thus of growth rates in the so-called periphery. These problems have all been exacerbated, so the skeptics argue, by the economic downturn since 2008, and especially with the eventual downturn in the fortunes of the Global South from 2013 onwards. The upbeat assessments thus exaggerated the positives that occurred in the boom years,

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and anyway now look woefully inadequate as the third wave of the 2008 fall-out is a new emerging markets crisis.

This chapter assesses the claims made by both the 'optimists' and 'skeptics' concerning inequality and underdevelopment. It does so by first briefly outlining the ways in which inequality and underdevelopment were theorized in the post-war era, as part of the 'great development debate'. This section will suggest that notwithstanding the over-generalizations employed by both sides, this debate retains considerable relevance in the era of globalization. The next section examines the position of the optimists, pointing to some of the evidence used to back up this case. It then moves on to examine the more skeptical side, again examining some of the evidence used to back up this case. The chapter then further illustrates this by briefly examining the case of global manufacturing. Finally, the chapter concludes by briefly reflecting on why inequality and underdevelopment are such serious issues of concern.

The great development debate: Inequality and underdevelopment 1945–1982

The post-1945 era was one in which development became a particular area of concern. While the idea certainly pre-dated 1945, it became more prominent in the context of the Cold War and the beginning of the end of formal empires. Both superpowers supported political independence for the colonies, though both, of course, were concerned that they exercise considerable influence over the political trajectory of the newly independent sovereign states.

It was in this context that the debate over the causes of global inequality and underdevelopment emerged. Though there were considerable variations and nuances in the debate, we can identify two basic positions: modernization and dependency theories. The former was the mainstream theory of development, which essentially argued that developing societies – the 'Third World' – were backward and undeveloped, and therefore in need of development. This position was expanded most famously by Walt Rostow (1960), who suggested that all nation-states pass through similar stages of development. So, poorer societies in the 1960s were at a similar stage of development to, say, Britain in the 1780s. The task of development was to hasten the transition to economic growth in poorer societies. Rostow argued that this was good for developing societies, as they would become richer, but also for the security of the West, as richer societies were less likely to be attracted by the communist alternative. Modernization theory suggested that the task of development could be facilitated by poorer countries embracing Western investment, technology and values such as entrepreneurship and meritocracy. Whether or not this was an accurate portrayal of Western societies (and the diversity among such countries), both in terms of the transition to development and the reality of modernity in the 1950s, is a moot point. Certainly civil rights movements in the 1950s would not have recognized this characterization of the United States.

The crucial argument of modernization theory, then, was that contact with the West was on the whole beneficial to the development of the Third World. On the other hand, some structuralist economists had argued that the situation of poorer countries could not be explained in isolation from the richer world, and that contact with the latter was in some respects part of the problem. Thus, one of the legacies of colonialism was that Third World countries specialized in producing primary products, and this led to an excessive dependence on the world price movements of the one or two goods that accounted for most of their foreign exchange earnings. This was in contrast to the developed countries, which were far more industrialized and diversified, and so were not excessively reliant on the price movements of a handful of products. Moreover, Raul Prebisch (1959) and Hans Singer (1950) argued that primary producers faced certain disadvantages which meant that there was a tendency for the terms of trade to decline for primary goods as against industrial goods. What this meant in barter terms is that in say, a ten-year period, primary producers would have to exchange more tonnes of cocoa in order to buy a similar number of tractors. Prebisch and Singer suggested that this tendency occurred because there was a low income elasticity of demand for primary products; in other words, as average incomes rise, so consumers spend a disproportionate amount of their income on primary products. Furthermore, while the prices of manufactured goods may fall, they are less likely to fall as quickly as those of primary goods as there were many primary goods producers but comparatively few producers of industrial goods. Clearly then, this account of inequality focused on hierarchies in the world economy, and how colonial powers had enforced specialization in lower value primary production in the colonies. Even in independent Latin America, this practice had occurred as powerful landowners accrued huge wealth from land ownership and used this to import manufactured goods rather than promote domestic manufacturing production. This account thus suggested that the Western-dominated world economy was not the solution to underdevelopment, as modernization theory contended, but in some respects at least, was part of the problem.

At the same time, this account suggested that development in the Third World could be achieved through pro-industrialization policies designed to overcome the colonial legacy. In this way, poorer countries could reduce their dependence on the import of expensive manufactures and the export of cheap primary goods. This policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) was the main development strategy employed in the Third World from the 1950s (or earlier) until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ironically, though the rationale for such a strategy was very different from that associated with modernization theory, in practice on policy the two theories effectively converged around the idea that development and modernization could occur through industrialization.

Dependency theory challenged this view, suggesting that industrialization remained dependent on the West. The mechanisms that sustained dependence included reliance on foreign capital, foreign technology and foreign markets.

Furthermore, the industrialization that was said to be occurring in the developing world was highly exploitative and reliant on cheap labor. None of this was leading to convergence with the developed world; instead it was simply promoting new forms of subordination, hierarchy and dependence in the world economy. Some theories of dependency related this to a crude zero-sum game which suggested that the rich world was rich only because it had underdeveloped the poor world, implying that protectionist ISI policies did not go far enough, and that de-linking from the Western-dominated world economy was the only effective way forward for the Third World (Frank 1969). In this account, poorer societies were not so much undeveloped as *under*developed.

This was essentially what was at stake in the debate over inequality and under-development in the period from the 1940s into the 1970s. On the one side, modernization theory: poorer countries should embrace the opportunities provided by the Western-dominated world economy, and in the process hasten the transition to development. On the other side, dependency theory: poorer countries are poor in part because they are in a structurally subordinate and dependent position in the world economy, and thus need to find ways to protect themselves from the constraints that these hierarchies generate. By the 1970s and into the 1980s, it was clear that for all their differences both sides suffered from some similar weaknesses. In particular they tended to over-generalize and homogenize a diverse set of countries. In the process they tended to make sweeping predictions concerning the inevitability of development (modernization theory) or stagnation (dependency theory). For instance, the rise of East Asian newly industrializing countries such as South Korea and Taiwan undermined crude versions of dependency theory, as these countries grew rapidly and exported to the Western economies. On the other hand, these countries did not simply embrace 'the West', and protected certain sectors from foreign competition in order to develop their own national industries. Moreover, the success of these countries may have been contingent on certain specific factors that could not easily be replicated elsewhere. It was precisely this focus on contingency and specificity that was missing in the modernization versus dependency theory debate. It was also in this context that some argued that the study of development had reached an impasse, and that from now on we could only focus on specific cases of development without employing the generalizations associated with the modernization and dependency theory (Booth 1985).

Moreover, changes in the global economy led to important changes in development strategy in the Third World. In particular, the debt crisis of 1982 saw a shift from the developmentalist strategies associated with ISI, towards neoliberal policies that encouraged trade and investment liberalization, privatization and the rollback of state intervention in the economy (or at least a shift to intervention that extended the market rather than restricted its role). This was justified on the grounds that ISI encouraged the promotion and protection of inefficient industries, rather than facilitating specialization in those sectors where countries were (relatively) most competitive; in other words, it meant the promotion of the principle of comparative advantage. While in the short term the results of neoliberal

policies were disastrous, and living standards for many fell in the lost decade of development (the 1980s), the 1990s saw a new period of optimism concerning the relationship between development and globalization.

These shifts – from grand theory to local and national development trajectories, from ISI to neoliberalism – appeared to undermine the foundations of the 'great development debate' of the 1940s to the early 1980s. However, while it is certainly true that these theories were guilty of over-generalization, I will suggest below that the optimistic and skeptical accounts concerning questions of growth, poverty and inequality replicate these older debates, albeit in the new context of (neoliberal) globalization.

Global inequality and underdevelopment: The optimistic position

This section outlines the optimistic position, which argues that underdevelopment has been reduced in recent years, and this either has reduced global inequality or has at least reduced absolute poverty. The main evidence used by the optimists is that the number or proportion of people living in absolute poverty has declined since the 1980s, and that recent years has seen the rise of the Global South.

Claims have been made that, based on the $1.25 figure, the number of people living in absolute poverty has declined over recent years, with figures ranging from 1.8 billion (1990) to 1.37 billion (2005), 1.4 billion (1980) down to 1.2 billion or 1 billion (2008) and 982 million by 2012 (World Bank 2002: 30; Chen and Ravallion 2010; Edward and Sumner 2015: 33). As a result, the proportion of the world's people living in extreme poverty fell from 43% in 1990 to 22.4% in 2008 (UNDP 2013: 12). This alleged decline is said to be the result of high rates of economic growth, which in turn is said to be caused by policies of trade and investment liberalization – in other words, by the decision of countries of the South to embrace the opportunities afforded by globalization. Poverty is thus a *residual* problem, a result of insufficient globalization, reflecting poor policy choices by some states in the South. Good policies are those that encourage competition and specialization, rather than protection, which means tariff and subsidy reduction, the removal of import controls and an openness to foreign investment. It may also mean financial liberalization, the freer movement of money into (and out of) countries, but there is some disagreement over the extent to which this should occur. The basic argument is that trade liberalization will encourage specialization in those sectors in which countries have a comparative advantage, and thus stop the production of high cost, inefficient goods. Furthermore, investment liberalization will encourage investment by transnational companies, and thus lead to a shift of investment from capital rich to capital poor areas.

This argument would appear to be reinforced by the surge in foreign capital investment, including into the so-called periphery since the early 1990s. For much of this period around two-thirds of foreign direct investment (FDI) went to developed countries and one-third to developing (and transition) economies,

but, by 2015, developing and transition economies accounted for 55% of global FDI inflows (UNCTAD 2015: 2). The so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) were central to this change, with (in 2013) China the second largest recipient (and Hong Kong China fourth), Russia third, Brazil fifth and India fourteenth (UNCTAD 2014: 4). Furthermore, the BRICS (including South Africa) have also emerged as major foreign investors themselves, and in 2013 outward FDI flows from developing countries stood at 32.2% of the total outflows (of $1.41 trillion), in contrast to 1998 when the proportion (of a much lower figure) was just 7% (UNCTAD 2014: 5). Optimists thus contend that industrialization can occur through open investment policies which allow foreign (or national) companies to take advantage of low labor costs, and this promotes properly competitive industrialization rather than the high cost, white elephant approach associated with ISI. Critics that point to the cheap labor associated with industrialization do not offer a viable alternative, and anyway this should be seen as a necessary stage that developing societies must pass through. In the long run, competitive industrialization will lead to full employment, which in turn will lead to upgrading to more a more developed kind of manufacturing, as occurred in the case of the earlier developers. Though this argument does not follow the rigid stages associated with modernization theory, the broad contention – that of embracing 'the West' and/or 'globalization' – is similar.

Moreover, the rise of China, and to some extent other BRIC countries, has impacted positively on the South as a whole as 'the world's economic centre of gravity has moved towards the east and south, from OECD members to emerging economies […] This realignment of the world economy […] represents a structural change of historical significance' (OECD 2010: 15). Thus, prices for all non-oil primary commodity prices rose sharply in the period before 2008, and while there was a significant decline in 2009, significant year-on-year price increases started again in 2010 (UNCTAD 2012: 11) leading some to identify the continuation of a commodity super-cycle, in which the South as a whole benefits from high demand from China, both in terms of volume and price (Kaplinksy and Farooki 2010).

Overall, then, the news is good – the number of people living in absolute poverty is falling (Chen and Ravallion 2010), and while progress towards the Millennium Development Goals was uneven, there was significant movement in the right direction. On the face of it, then, though there are significant differences in terms of the content of the particular theories (modernization and neoliberalism), this story appears to confirm the optimistic story supplied by modernization theory.

Global inequality and underdevelopment: The skeptical position

The skeptical position challenges this upbeat assessment on both empirical and theoretical grounds. This section concentrates on the former. The first issue is that of poverty reduction, where there are some grounds for questioning the view

that absolute poverty has fallen. Absolute poverty is defined as living on less than one dollar a day, adjusted to take account of local purchasing power. Crucial here is the way in which purchasing power parity (PPP) is measured, and this is done through a system of international price comparisons (in 1985, 1993, 2005 and 2011) which are adjusted to take account of annual changes to particular economies. With different methodologies used for different comparisons, poverty decline might simply reflect these shifts rather than any reality on the ground. In particular, the use of purchasing power parity is fraught with difficulties. This concept makes comparisons across regional variations in prices by constructing a basket of goods but these might draw on inappropriate goods for measuring the extent on poverty. This was particularly problematic in the case of the 2005 international price comparison (IPC), in which various African countries had to price a 2003 or 2004 bottle of Bordeaux, a particular front loading washing machine and a Peugeot 407 with air conditioning (Deaton and Aten 2014: 18). At this stage then, we should recognize that there are serious issues over the methodology for measuring absolute poverty.

What then of the relationship between poverty reduction and globalization? Although now quite old, the World Bank (2002) report *Globalization, Growth and Poverty* remains important because its argument is at least implicit in later cases made for why the BRICs and the South have risen in recent years (see O'Neill 2013). However, the central contentions of the Bank's work are seriously flawed (Wade 2003a; Kiely 2007a) for at least five reasons: (1) it uses trade/GDP ratios as a proxy for openness, but this measures trade outcomes and not trade policy; (2) in any case the trade/GDP ratios of many of the poorest countries are not low – the average in 1997–1998 for the poorest 39 countries was 43%, about the same as the world average (UNCTAD 2002a: part 2, ch. 3); (3) the Bank attempts to overcome this problem by measuring changes in trade/GDP ratios (from 1977 to 1997), rather than actual amounts, but this has the effect of excluding those with high but unchanging ratios from the list of high globalizers, and this would include many poor countries with little or no growth in this period; (4) following on from this point, China and India have seen shifts in these ratios, as well as trade policy such as tariff rates, but they are not more open than some of the poorest developing countries that have experienced little growth. Average tariff rates in India did decline from 80% at the start of the 1990s to 40% at the end of the decade, while China's declined from 42.4% to 31.2% in the same period, but the latter figures remain higher than the average for developing countries (Rodrik 2001); (5) if we measure trade policy indicators such as average tariff rates, then the Bank's own data suggest that if we measure openness not by trade/GDP ratios or changes in these ratios since 1975, but instead focus on trade and investment policies in 1997, allegedly high globalizers had higher average tariffs (35%) than low globalizers (20%) (Sumner 2004: 1174). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) index of trade restrictiveness measures trade policy through quantifying average tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and there is no evidence of greater trade restrictiveness on the part of the

poorest countries. Thus, even if there has been poverty reduction, it is unclear that this is because of globalization-friendly policies.

But there is a further issue, which goes to the heart of the debate over not just poverty, but the related issue of globalization and inequality. Let us return again to the question of absolute poverty. Although at the time of writing the impact of the 2011 IPC is still being debated, it appears that two of the favored poverty headline counts are $1.44 and $1.78. Based on provisional estimates, the lower figure would give us a count of 449 million people in absolute poverty, while the latter would be 745 million (Edward and Sumner 2015: 33). However, a common criticism is that either of these benchmarks are far too low and if we shift to $2 then the figure is 963 million, and $2.50 gives us a figure of 1.45 billion. Most disturbing of all, $10 a day gives us a figure of 4.7 billion (Edward and Sumner 2015: 33). Now, of course, $10 a day is a world away from the lower figures of $1.25 to $2.50 a day, where the debate usually takes place. Nor do these measures tell us about trends, and whether the numbers on $2.50 or $10 a day is declining over a period of time. But in response to this, a number of points may be made. First, even if there is a downward trend, this does not establish causality in terms of 'globalization-friendly policies', for reasons already discussed. Moreover, such downward trends existed in periods before neoliberal globalization. Second, it is the case that even $2.50 is a very low benchmark – if we consider the PPP figure for the US, this would be US $2.50, and a figure just above that does not sound like one where an American citizen would be lifted out of absolute poverty. Third, and related to this point, even a slight shift in income for people living in poverty could translate to a massive downward measurement in poverty numbers, a point reinforced by the methodological issues addressed above. Fourth, this point also applies to those living just above the $2.50 line but below the $10 line, so that even if there are 'only' 1.5 billion people living in absolute poverty, there are 3 billion more people close to, or at risk of falling back into, absolute poverty. Fifth, almost all of those living below $2.50 mean and (to a slightly lesser extent) the $10 measure live in the Global South. This is not, then, a story of global convergence.

But there is a further issue, which is particularly problematic for those who argue that poverty is a residual phenomenon which will be resolved by growth, which in turn will occur through globalization-friendly policies. This is the fact that there is a stark contrast to the period from around 1945 to 1990, when most of the poor were concentrated in the least developed countries. This is no longer the case. Based on earlier World Bank data, Kanbur and Sumner (2012: 688) estimate that between 71% and 76% of the world's poor live in middle income countries (850–950 million people), while between 24% and 29% (350 million people) live in low income countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. China and India (both middle income countries) accounted for half of the world's poor in 2007–2008, compared to around 66% in 1990. However, this is not the whole story as there is a significant concentration of the world's poor in five middle income countries, namely Pakistan, India, China, Nigeria and Indonesia (Kanbur and Sumner 2012: 688–689). More

recent data (Edward and Sumner 2015: 33) broadly confirms this thesis that growth in middle income countries has left significant numbers of people behind, and that the assumption that the poor can simply be lifted out of poverty by economic growth, common in popular books like Paul Collier's *The Bottom Billion*, must be challenged. To some extent, this reflects the fact that some low income countries have moved up to middle income countries from 1990 to 2007–2008, but equally it shows that the benefits of economic growth do not automatically trickle down to the poor.

Put bluntly, inequality matters and impacts on poverty. Whereas in the past poverty was more concentrated in low income countries where almost everyone was poor, and therefore the residual account of poverty might have been more plausible (though there may still have been relational causes operating at a global level), the geography of global poverty today suggests that a relational account which highlights inequality is more convincing. In China, inequality has risen rapidly and the Gini co-efficient – a way of assessing inequality in which 0 represents complete equality and 1 is maximal inequality – has risen from 0.28 in the early 1980s to 0.48 in 2008 (Nolan 2012: 69). Moreover, while incomes might have risen, the financial burden of healthcare or education might have risen for some even more sharply, leading to less than impressive social development indicators (Reddy 2007). From 1980 to 2010, life expectancy rose from 67.8 to 73.5, but this is actually around 50% slower than other countries with similar life expectancy levels in 1980, even though these latter countries experienced much slower growth rates (Reddy 2007: 53). More widely, there was a clear trend of increased inequality within countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Based on household income in 104 countries, inequality increased in 73 of these countries in this period and fell in only 24, with the rest remaining broadly the same (UNCTAD 2012: 57). This was also true in most of the developed world as well (UNCTAD 2012: 52).

While the picture in the 2000s saw more differentiation, with some countries in the South seeing falling inequality, this was partly the result of the rise of 'left populist' regimes in Latin America as well as some contingent benefits derived from the primary commodities boom.

The boom in foreign investment should also be treated with considerable skepticism. Although foreign investment levels had increased, this had often reflected a shift in ownership from the state to private sector, rather than genuinely new, 'greenfield' investment. Indeed, in much of the South, investment/GDP ratios have remained low since the reform process started in the early 1980s. Thus, investment/GDP ratios for sub-Saharan Africa fell from a peak of around 23% in the early 1980s to around 15% in 1985, but by 2000 were only up to around 17%. For the big Latin America five (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico), the investment/GDP ratio peaked at close to 25% in 1981, and fell to 16% by 1984. By 1989, just before the FDI boom, it stood at 19%, and by 2000 it had only increased to 20% (Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2004: 30). The case of Brazil – one of the so-called leaders of the 'rising south' phenomenon – is instructive. Essentially, for much of the globalization era,

Brazil has developed on the basis of cheap imports, short-term foreign capital flows (and high interest rates to attract it), foreign loans and mass privatizations. Even the booming 2000s did not significantly alter this situation, except that in this period the country increasingly relied on the exports of primary commodities. Thus, while in 1980 its productivity was similar to that of South Korea, by 2011 its productivity level was on average three times lower than that of South Korea (Palma 2012: 7–8). The ISI period has essentially been replaced by a period of 'production substitution', disguised by mobile capital inflows and high commodity prices (Saad-Filho 2010). Indeed, much of the manufacturing boom in the South is confined to just a few countries while others have come to rely increasingly on primary commodity exports, a phenomenon encouraged by China's rise. Even the rise of manufacturing has its limits, as we will see in the next section.

Finally, the move to a global recession in 2008 has led to a significant reduction of capital flows to developing economies, much of which was used to finance debt-led consumer booms rather than genuine industrial development. Thus, while in the period before the financial crisis and from 2009 onwards, net private inflows to emerging markets exceeded outflows (with a positive 'surplus' of $417 billion in 2010), this situation was in effect reversed as net capital outflows exceeded inflows by $98 billion in 2013 and by as much as $299 billion in 2014 (IIF 2015: 3–4). In the period from June 2014 to July 2015, total net capital outflows for the 19 largest 'emerging markets' reached $940 billion, almost double the net outflow in the first three quarters that followed the financial crisis in 2008–2009 (Kynge and Wheatley 2015). Alongside a reversal of capital inflows to the South, a run on currencies, falling current account surpluses and increasing deficits, this appears to be the start of a sharp reversal in the fortunes of the South. Indeed, this new emerging markets crisis might be seen as the third wave of the 2008 financial crisis, following the subprime crash of 2007-2008, and the Euro crisis of 2010 onwards.

Furthermore, in 2013 and 2014, most commodity prices fell from their peak in 2011. It is true that commodity prices in the period from 2012 to 2014 were on average at higher levels than they were in the period from 2003 to 2008, but for high growth rates to persist for the developing world as a whole, primary commodity prices will need to increase, not stabilize or decrease. Indeed, the IMF commodity price index, which measures the prices of all commodities, shows a sharp fall in prices from a post-crisis peak in the first quarter of 2011 of 210, down to a figure of less than 125 in January 2015 (IMF 2015). Given the production substitution that preceded the crisis, a combination of falling commodity prices and capital exports looks likely to hit the global South hard in the future.

These points reinforce earlier, dependency-oriented views, that while certain policies do affect particular development trajectories, so too do the structured inequalities of the world economy. Some places are in a structurally subordinate and dependent position in the world economy.

Explaining inequality and underdevelopment: the case of manufacturing

While there is strong evidence to back up the claims of both the optimists and the skeptics, the last section suggested that the latter is on the whole more convincing. The implication that follows, and which in some respects replicates the claims of (some versions of) dependency theory, is that there are structured inequalities that constrain late developers, and thus make it difficult to overcome inequality and underdevelopment. Unlike the claims of cruder versions of dependency theory, however, these are not insurmountable, but (unlike the claims of neoliberalism or modernization theory) they are real obstacles.

The first point to note is that while foreign investment has increased, including in manufacturing, *the type* of manufacturing that is generally occurring in the developing world is not necessarily overcoming uneven development. Since the reform period started in the 1980s, while the developed countries' share of manufacturing exports fell (from 82.3% in 1980 to 70.9% by 1997), its share of manufacturing value added actually *increased* over the same period, from 64.5% to 73.3%. Over the same period, Latin America's share of world manufacturing exports increased from 1.5% to 3.5%, but its share of manufacturing value added fell from 7.1% to 6.7% (Kozul Wright and Rayment 2004: 14). Since then the story is one of increased output and manufacturing value added for the South as a whole, but the former has grown more rapidly than the latter (Nayyar 2013: 107–108). Moreover, much of this increase in both output and value added is accounted for by East Asia.

What these figures suggest is that developed countries (and parts of East Asia) still tend to dominate in high value sectors, based on high barriers to entry, high start-up and running costs, and significant skill levels. While in the developing world there are large amounts of surplus labor, and barriers to entry, skills and wages are low. While this gives such countries considerable competitive advantage in terms of low start-up and labor costs, at the same time the fact that those barriers to entry are low means that competition is particularly intense and largely determined by cost price, which also means low wages. Thus, the clothing industry, where developing countries have achieved considerable increases in world export shares in recent years, has a very low degree of market concentration. In contrast, more capital-intensive or high-tech sectors have very high degrees of market concentration, and are mainly located in the developed world (UNCTAD 2002a: 120–123).

The optimist, neoliberal, response is that these labor-intensive sectors are only a starting point, allowing countries to upgrade as more developed countries shift to higher value production. But actually in practice upgrading has occurred by states deliberately protecting themselves from import competition from established producers, via a process of import substitution industrialization. In the context of a tendency towards free trade, upgrading is far from inevitable and indeed, faced with competition from established overseas producers, is unlikely to occur.

We thus return to the claims of the Prebisch–Singer thesis. However, rather than focusing on trade between primary goods and industrial goods, we now need to examine *different kinds of industrial goods*. A number of studies have suggested that the price of manufacturing exports from developing countries have tended to fall against more complex manufacturing and services from developed countries, including Chinese exports (Maizels et al. 1998; Zheng 2002). Intense competition within sectors where barriers to entry are low leads to competition between developing countries all trying to increase their exports in low value manufacturing. Seen in this way, China's growth is less an opportunity for other developing countries, and more one that resembles a zero-sum game. The argument that China's rise provided an opportunity for other developing countries through a primary commodities boom was always questionable because over-dependence on such commodities provides comparatively few linkages unlike in manufacturing. Furthermore, as we have seen, this boom is now over, with negative consequences for the developing world as a whole.

For development to occur, there needs to be far more diversity in production, and a shift towards scale economies, technological sophistication, skills and infrastructure – neither low value manufacturing nor primary commodity production can provide this, and neither are they likely to in the future. There are thus indeed structured inequalities in the global economy, and these are particularly acute for would-be late developers. Contrast this story with that of the United States, a power said to be in decline. Using the Forbes Global 2000 as a benchmark, which is based on the assets, market value, profit and sales of the top 2000 corporations, Starrs (2013: 820–822; 2014: 84) examines the national distribution of profit across 25 economic sectors. Even after the financial crisis, the US was leader in 18 of the 25 sectors, and while the share of the BRICs increased, this was largely accounted for by the rise of China. Moreover, China's rise is largely because of the dominance of its own companies in its own domestic market, and not because of the rise of Chinese global companies (Huawei is a notable exception). Thus, in 2011 China emerged as the world's largest PC market, but the Chinese profit share in this sector was just 2%, compared to 72% for US companies (Starrs 2014: 90).

In the most innovative sectors such as nanotechnology, the European Union (EU), Japan and the US remain the world's leaders. In 2005 they filed 84% of triadic patents, compared to just 2.6% for the BRICs (see Kiely 2015: ch. 8). By 2010, the US and Japan generated 60% of triadic patents, compared to 1.79% for China (Starrs 2014: 95). These patents are registered at national patent offices and thus can be used as a kind of rough proxy for significant patents in terms of innovation. In terms of research and development spending as a proportion of GDP, in 2013 the US figure was 2.806% compared to China's 2.019% and an OECD average of 2.398% (OECD 2014). The European Commission carried out surveys of research and development spending in 2007 and 2011, and found that while the US's share declined from 38.4% to 34.9%, Japan's share increased from 18.4% to 21.9% (Starrs 2014: 94). In fact, the only significant BRIC in 2011 was China, with a share of just 2.7% (Starrs 2014: 94–95).

This then is a story of a global diffusion of production, which has aided manufacturing in parts of the developing world, but has not ended inequality. Instead this diffusion has coincided with continued concentration of higher value activity in the developed world, with parts of East Asia the only region of the developing world to buck this trend. This is a story closer to the dependency approach outlined in the first section.

Conclusion

Between 1950 and 2010, the South's share of global GDP rose from 27% to 47.9%. But this increased share abstracts from important regional differences. Measured in PPP dollars, the global share of GDP in Africa was 3.8% in 1950 and 3.4% in 2008, while Latin America's share increased from 7.8% to 7.9% over the same period. In contrast, Asia's share increased from 15.4% to 38% (Nayyar 2013: 50). Moreover, population growth was higher in the developing world, and when per capita GDP is factored in, we see a different picture, and the rise is effectively wiped out, with the share standing at 4.7% in 1970, 4.9% in 1980 and 4.9% in 2005 (World Bank 2007). Indeed, based on market exchange rates, while the ratio of per capita GDP in Asia to that of the developed world shifted from 1:20 in 1970 to 1:11 in 2010, in Latin America it remained broadly the same (1:5) while in Africa it shifted from 1:12 to as much as 1:24 over the same period (Nayyar 2013: 59–61). Thus, once population is factored in, the inexorable rise of the South does appear to be somewhat limited. Even the most optimistic of all official reports concludes that:

> the convergence observed in the 2000s was not statistically significant. This suggests that any improvement is tentative, and the situation could quite easily be reversed if, for instance, the strong growth performance of the largest convergers (above all India and China) fails. Nonetheless, the 'change of gear' in the 2000s was important in psychological terms, helping to shake off the development pessimism of the 1990s. (OECD 2010: 37)

Thus a global shift towards convergence is ultimately reduced to one of perception. This then implies that ultimately the 'pessimistic' position is more convincing when we carefully consider the reality, which is the basic argument of this chapter. But there are two further questions that need to be addressed, at least briefly. First, why does inequality matter? And second, what are the alternatives? In terms of the importance of inequality, the argument is often made that it is an inevitable feature of all societies, and it is better to have a richer but unequal society than a more egalitarian but poorer society. Related to this point, an additional argument made is that inequality does not matter so long as people are lifted out of poverty. There are three responses to this. First, while it may be the case that inequality is an unintended outcome of the social interaction of millions of individuals, the fact that it is unintended does not mean that efforts should not be

made to alleviate it. If we are to take the claims made for democracy and equal opportunity seriously, then there is a need for collective action both nationally and within the international order, to alleviate inequality. Just because no single individual intended certain unequal outcomes, it does not follow that no one is responsible for it. Second, inequality may be social and even economically dysfunctional. This is because it can be linked to crime and anti-social behavior, and it can undermine sound economic principles. It is clear that the financial crisis of 2007–2008 onwards must in part be linked to attempts to sustain financial expansion through the granting of credit to people (and countries) that could ill afford to pay it back. When this became clear – in the subprime mortgage crash in the US, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and (it now seems) emerging markets – the economic results were (and may well be) devastating. Third, the generation of inequality is cumulative, as capital tends to concentrate in certain areas and by-pass or marginalize other parts of the globe. It is therefore wrong to suggest that poverty and inequality can be entirely separated – it is true that the wealth of a specific, rich individual is not caused by the poverty of a specific, poor person in the developing world. But both are part of a social order which encourages the concentration of capital in some areas and marginalization in others.

These points lead to the final issue, which is that of alternatives to neoliberalism. The current economic crisis may lead to a new international order, where a more 'managed' capitalism, perhaps along the lines of the Bretton Woods order, re-emerges. However, increased state intervention per se does not mean the end of neoliberalism – contrary to neoliberal ideology, neoliberal policy has always included a great deal of state intervention, not least to expand the market. Moreover, much of the response to the crisis has been to cut public spending and expand the rule of the market. What then of national alternatives, based on the revival of ISI policies? WTO rules are far less conducive to such policies than was the case in the era of ISI. Moreover, the domestic social alliances that encouraged ISI policies after 1945 have broken down. It is therefore likely that national capitals, happy with access to global circuits of capital and uninterested in developmentalist policies that would encourage productive investment, would oppose a return to ISI. Recent events in Latin America bear this out, where left populist regimes have experienced considerable opposition from wealthy elites.

But perhaps most fundamentally, like neoliberalism ISI is premised on the belief that upgrading to a 'developed capitalism' can occur so long as the correct policies are carried out. The disagreement is over what policies are deemed to be 'correct'. In a context where 'value added', upgrading and thus development is increasingly derived from increasingly monopolized information (embedded in WTO rules), it is unclear that technical policies of upgrading will lead to sustained 'modernization' and the eradication of 'underdevelopment'. While policies matter, so do power relations, both at the national and international level. Only a radical transformation of these relations is likely to seriously challenge inequality and underdevelopment.

Guide to further reading

The major statement of underdevelopment theory can be found in A. G. Frank (1969). D. Held and A. Kaya (eds.) (2007) is a useful reader on the debates over the relationship between globalization and inequality. R. Kiely (2007b) challenges the optimistic account, and relates the debates back to older theories of development. W. Rostow (1960) is the major book associated with modernization theory. Edward and Sumner (2015) provide a rigorous assessment of data on global poverty and inequality. Starrs (2013, 2014) and Kiely (2015) highlight the continued importance of different forms of inequality despite the (limited) rise of the Global South.

Migrants and Refugees in Global Politics

ANNE HAMMERSTAD

The movement of people has helped shape the trajectory of history for as long as human communities have existed. Ever since the first groups of modern humans left Africa to populate the world, population movements have brought with them prosperity and devastation, cultural enrichment and annihilation, cooperation and conflict. Mass migration has contributed to the collapse of some great powers (the migration of Visigoths, Vandals and other peoples contributing to the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century) and the rise of others (the mass emigration of some 60 million Europeans to the US in the nineteenth and early twentieth century). More recently, technological innovations have made long-distance relocation cheaper and easier, while the combination of globalization and inequality has primed the world's working-age population to consider migration as a natural path to achieve economic opportunities and betterment. Add to this the record number of refugees, asylum seekers and other forced migrants fleeing a surge in political repression and wars, and it is safe to say that the movement of people will continue to be a salient feature of global politics throughout the twenty-first century.

As the dynamics of forced migration makes clear, people do not only move out of a desire for a better life. For many the decision to migrate is taken more out of necessity than choice. In the academic literature, there tends to be a distinction between migration studies and forced migration studies – a distinction strengthened by the fact that research on the two areas is often conducted in separate institutes and centers. But such neat categorizations between forced/voluntary, legal/illegal, regular/irregular, economic/political, internal/external migrants seldom fit the experiences and motives of actual human beings on the move. At one end of the voluntary/forced spectrum we find highly educated professionals moving between countries in pursuit of career opportunities, and welcomed by their host country due to the skills and resources they bring with them. At the other end we find poor villagers gathering up their children and fleeing across a border to escape war and ethnic cleansing, who find shelter of a sort in a refugee camp supported by international aid agencies. Between these extremes (each is a minority among international migrants), are a large group of people who migrate for a varied mix of personal, political, economic and security reasons. The reception

these migrants get in their host countries is also mixed, but over the past two decades the trend has been one of increasing unease and even fear over immigration levels. This trend has been particularly noticeable in middle- and high-income countries.

Today's population movements pose economic, political and security challenges, not just to individual host states but to regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and to the international community as a whole. This chapter will discuss some of the challenges and opportunities posed by population movement in the twenty-first century. It investigates whether the present 'age of migration' (Castles et al. 2014) is indeed characterized by unprecedented migration levels – and unprecedented migration challenges. It looks at what is old and what is new about migration trends, and discusses the meteoric rise in global displacement in the past few years, from 45.2 million people in 2012 to 59.5 million in 2014 – a level not seen since the aftermath of World War II (UNHCR 2015b).

An age of migration?

International migration (the movement of people across sovereign borders to live in a different country to that of their birth) has always been a politically contentious issue, causing widespread concern among the public and politicians both in high-income countries and the developing world. For many liberal thinkers, migration is mostly a desirable phenomenon, a natural aspect of free-market dynamics, particularly if migrants are allowed to integrate quickly into their host societies' economic sphere, as workers and taxpayers. According to an *Economist* special report published during the 2008 global financial crisis, migrants are a 'new force that is reshaping our world' (Roberts 2008). The report, in line with the magazine's liberal outlook, sees this as a challenging but mostly positive force, but documents a widespread backlash against migration, both in terms of public opinion and policy decisions.

Hostility to migrants deepened in the wake of the global financial crisis, as job markets and wages shrunk in traditional high-immigration countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. But such hostility cannot be explained purely as a response to economic downturn or competition for jobs. Anti-migrant sentiments have been building up over decades, particularly in Europe, but also in other parts of the world, even in times of economic growth and job creation.

In Europe, attitudes towards migrants hardened in the early post-Cold War period. For the first time in decades, Europe had to deal with a mass refugee movement on its own soil, as a chain of wars of ethnic cleansing broke out in the Balkans. Refugees from the former Yugoslavia were joined by rapidly rising numbers of asylum seekers from all corners of the world, and there was widespread concern that the disintegrating Soviet Union would produce even larger numbers of migrants heading west into Europe. The latter did not materialize, as most of the displaced from the wars in the successor states to the Soviet Union

remained within their region of origin. Fears of out-of-control immigration persisted nonetheless.

The next milepost on the downwards path of anti-migrant sentiment came with the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Alongside concern over jobs, the welfare state, communal cohesion and social integration, rose a fear of letting in international terrorists through lax immigration systems. Luedtke (2009) shows an increasingly restrictive trend in EU policies since 9/11, where EU harmonization in the immigration sphere meant adopting the practices of the members with the harshest pre-existing rules and practices. In the US, the events of 9/11 induced a narrower focus on border control, and bolstered, however spuriously, a populist backlash aimed more against Mexican undocumented immigrants than Islamist terrorists. Attempts at reforming and liberalizing the country's immigration regime in 2006–2007 were derailed, and the only policy on which the House of Representatives and the Senate managed to agree was the Secure Fence Act, creating 700 miles of fencing and surveillance along the US–Mexican border (Rosenblum 2009: 13).

The rise of hostility and violence against migrants has been visible across the world. It could be seen in the xenophobic riots and murders of African immigrants in South Africa in 2008. It was manifested in the organized attacks on sub-Saharan African migrants during the civil war in Libya in 2011. It mixed with geopolitical callousness in 2014, when Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia refused to provide harbor for overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels carrying tens of thousands of Rohingya refugees who were fleeing ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. It was again on display in 2015, a year when more than one million refugees and migrants, almost half of them from Syria, traveled across the Mediterranean and through the Balkans to the EU, causing acrimonious arguments among EU member governments about what to do and who to blame. Local and national elections in EU countries that year saw a lurch to the anti-immigrant right, while in the United States, Republican Party candidates for the 2016 US Presidential elections competed to make the most hardline anti-immigrant statements.

Why is migration, whether of the voluntary, forced or mixed kind, such a potent and controversial topic in contemporary global politics? In order to assess the challenges and opportunities created by international migration, it is useful to ask first in what ways they differ from earlier eras of migration. Are we indeed living in 'an age of migration' (Castles et al. 2014), characterized by unprecedented levels of population movement? Looking at the statistics, the answer is both yes and no. Immigration levels are high today compared with recent history, and have accelerated in the past couple of decades. Forced migration figures, which were relatively low in the first decade of the twenty-first century, have grown even faster, particularly since 2012. In Europe in modern times, immigration is mostly a post-1945 phenomenon (*emigration*, on the other hand, is an age-old European pursuit). In the 1960s, when the British politician Enoch Powell made his infamous reference to 'rivers of blood', less than 5% of Britain's population was foreign born. By 2001, this proportion had increased to 8.3% (ONS 2005:

133), and by 2015, bolstered by the opening of the UK labor market to Eastern European EU members, to 13.2% (UNDESA 2015). Other European countries have had even larger increases. In Germany, international migrants as a proportion of total population stood at 14.9% in 2015, while in Sweden the proportion was 16.8%, and Austria 17.5%.

If one takes the long view, today's levels of migration are less remarkable, but still high. In proportion to the world's population, migration levels are somewhat higher today than they were at the height of the last great wave of migrants a century ago. Then, international migrants constituted 2.5–3% of the world's population (IOM 2008: 4). In 2015, the proportion was 3.3%. Even after more than two decades of fast and sustained immigration growth in the US, the foreign-born proportion of the population was still slightly lower in 2015 (14.5%) than at the previous immigration peak in 1910 (14.7%) (UNDESA 2015).

The origin and destination of migrants have changed dramatically, though. While the mass migration movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth century consisted mostly of Europeans emigrating to the New World (North and South America as well as Oceania), Europe is now a major recipient of immigrants, although a majority of them (53%) are Europeans moving from one part of the continent to another. A general trend, both within Europe and globally, is for migrants to move from less (but not the least) rich to the richest parts of the world, from struggling or less dynamic economies to stronger ones with more jobs on offer. In 2015, more than two-thirds of international migrants (172 million out of 243 million) had high-income countries as their destination (UNDESA 2015).

Turning to *forced* migration, there were in 2015 more than 60 million displaced persons around the globe, counting refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people and others in refugee-like situations – the majority remaining displaced inside the borders of their own countries. This is the highest recorded figure since the aftermath of World War II, although comparing today's displacement with the level of human upheaval caused by that war would not be justifiable. In May 1945, around 40 million people were displaced in Europe alone. Among them some 13 million ethnic Germans expelled from the Soviet Union, Poland and other eastern European countries, many of whom perished on their march westwards (UNHCR 2000: 13). Millions of Russian former prisoners of war as well as Poles, Ukrainians and other nationalities were fleeing the hardening totalitarianism of Stalin's Soviet Union. In Asia, millions of Chinese had been displaced by Japan during the war; while the creation of Israel in 1947 and the first Arab–Israeli war in 1947–1949 caused the exodus of some 750,000–900,000 refugees from Palestine. An estimated 14 million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were forced to flee in the violent 'population exchange' after the partition of India in 1947. In 1971, another 10 million refugees, this time mostly Hindus, fled the war leading to the independence of Bangladesh. In the two decades after the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975, some three million Vietnamese left their country, around a million of them as boat refugees. More than one million Vietnamese refugees were resettled in the United States alone.

In post-Cold War history, one million Rwandan Hutus fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaïre) in the course of 24 hours in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide – another million left for Tanzania. Between 1991 and 1995, around three million refugees from the former Yugoslavia fled the Balkan wars, the vast majority to other parts of Europe.

Having provided some historical perspective, it is clear that current levels of migration – both forced and voluntary – are at a historically high level, although particular historical refugee flows have been larger than today's. If the growth trend continues at the same rate, the world could in the years to come experience international migration of a magnitude well beyond the peaks of earlier eras of mass migration, at least since the Industrial Revolution.

Contemporary migration patterns also differ in their characteristics from previous migration periods, and offer distinct challenges and opportunities. First, in absolute figures, migration numbers are unprecedented, and if continuing at current trends, international migrants as a proportion of global population will reach levels well above anything seen in modern history. Second, the direction of migration flows has changed; and, third, migration control and management practices are taking on new dimensions, linked to the criminalization of migration and the rise of a migration security agenda.

Migration numbers

There are around 243 million international migrants in the world today (UNDESA 2015). Due to massive population growth over the past 100 years, this is a vastly higher number than at the previous migration peak in the early twentieth century. For instance, the 14.7% of the US population that was foreign born in 1910 amounted to 13.5 million people. In 2015, a proportion of 14.5% equalled a foreign-born population of over 46.6 million people (UNDESA 2015).

The cumulative effect of migration in the post-war period has led to significant demographic changes in some countries, especially in major cities. According to the US Census Bureau, in 2010–2014, 37.1% of New York's population of 8.2 million were foreign born, getting close to the 1910 peak of 40% (after which the city's foreign-born population more than halved in the period until 1970). In Inner London, more than one in three residents (39%) in 2013 was non-UK born (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2016: 2). Indeed, more than half of the UK's foreign born population live in London. Most migration, whether internal or international, is towards urban centers, and the world's fast-growing megacities are increasingly diverse and multi-ethnic, teeming with new arrivals from nearby rural areas as well as abroad.

Regarding forced migration figures, the trend has been more uneven. A peak in the early 1990s was followed by a long slump before climbing to another peak in the mid-2010s. As a proportion of overall international migration figures, forced migration across international borders remains small. While there are around 243 million international migrants worldwide, the UNHCR estimated

that, in 2014, there were *c*.19.5 million refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR 2015b: 8). Despite this, the *impact* of displacement across borders on world politics has taken on a new significance. One reason for this political significance is the dramatic, uncontrollable and sudden nature of many refugee flows. This is not a new phenomenon, but the frequency with which we have seen large-scale refugee flows leading to humanitarian emergencies in the post-Cold War period is unprecedented. Conflict in Iraq (1991 and 2003), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1992–1995), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999), Darfur/Chad (2003), Libya (2011), Syria (from 2011 onwards), Somalia (over the past two decades), and Afghanistan (over the past three decades), are just some of the post-Cold War world's sources of mass refugee movements.

A new, and contested, category of forced or partly forced migrants, 'environmentally induced migration', has in recent years been introduced as part of the climate change debate. Influential reports such as the Stern Review (Stern 2007: 6), have cited alarmist estimates of hundreds of millions of people forced on the move by 2050 due to environmental strain. The figure is taken from a widely quoted but methodologically flawed estimation by Norman Myers (see Myers and Kent 1995 and Myers 2002) and has been used to posit climate change-related migration as the next big global security challenge. More methodologically sound and empirically grounded research rejects such claims, but suggests that climate change is likely to add momentum and volume to existing migration patterns (for an overview of this research, see Foresight 2011, and FMR 2015). It is clear that migration will be an important option for individuals and societies in their responses to worsening environmental conditions such as rising sea level, melting glaciers and desertification. Most climate change models suggest that global warming causes more frequent extreme weather events, and there are signs that environmental shocks (tsunamis, typhoons, earthquakes and other natural disasters) are more frequently leading to sudden mass movements of people (IOM 2011: 52–53), although not usually across international borders.

The significance of mass refugee flows in global politics is also due to the rise of the norm of humanitarian intervention, most recently in the manifestation of a *Responsibility to Protect*. Forced migration can spur international interventionism, including military invasion (Roberts 1998). Since the end of the Cold War, refugee movements have been frequently listed in the United Nations Security Council as cause for international action. In the cases of Haiti (1993) and Northern Iraq (1991), refugee situations were determined as a 'threat to international peace and security' and used to justify coercive action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. More recently, in December 2015, the Security Council stated that the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria 'is further contributing to the movement of refugees and poses risks to regional security', but without invoking Chapter VII authority.

Thus, even though the main impact of forced migration continues to be mainly felt in certain regions in the Global South, the question of how to respond to this problem has become a dilemma of global politics, involving the armed forces of the world's major powers. This is particularly the

case when refugees start moving out of their immediate region of origin to seek asylum in higher-income countries. Haitian refugees fleeing to the US spurred the superpower to intervene in that country, while the millions of Bosnian, Croat and Serb refugees fleeing to the rest of Europe in the first half of the 1990s were a key ingredient in NATO's resolve to intervene decisively in the war in Bosnia in 1995.

The global political significance of refugees is also due to the challenges to sovereignty and border control created by the legal framework of the international refugee regime (consisting of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the UNHCR and several regional refugee conventions). This regime asserts the right of individuals to seek asylum and not to be returned to their home country if in danger of persecution (*non-refoulement*). This means that, in the developed world, each asylum application must be treated on an individual basis. Thus asylum seekers cannot be controlled in terms of the numbers and background of those arriving. As legal labor migration channels from the Global South to the Global North have narrowed, the potential loophole provided by cumbersome asylum determination procedures has been seized on as a way into Northern labor markets. This said, the vast majority of the world's asylum seekers come from war-torn or repressive countries. Although economic betterment constitutes a key reason behind asylum seekers' decision to make the journey to Europe, North America or Australia, usually traveling illegally, it does not follow that they do not also have political or humanitarian claims to remain in their country of destination.

While the dilemma of how to deal with so-called mixed flows of refugees and labor migrants is not an entirely new phenomenon, its scale and political significance have grown dramatically since the end of the Cold War. As refugees and asylum seekers can now be found across the world, they affect a larger number of states in both the North and the South, causing Loescher (1993) to declare a *global* refugee crisis. The early 1990s saw a steep rise in asylum applications in developed countries, especially Europe. From around 20,000 asylum applications in Europe in 1976 (Loescher 1993: 111), numbers peaked in the EU during the wars in the Balkans, with 667,770 applications in 1992, down to a still high 291,220 in 1998 (UNHCR 1999: Table V1). After more than a decade of relatively low asylum figures, numbers rose again from a low of 235,900 new asylum claims in 2010 (UNHCR 2011b: Table 1) to 570,800 in 2014 (UNHCR 2015b: 2), and to then explode in 2015, with 1.26 million new asylum claims (Eurostat 2016).

To sum up, the world has never before seen so many people on the move, and global migration has accelerated in pace. The trend is linked to the long period of economic growth we have seen in many parts of the developing world, especially Asia, since it is generally not the poorest people of the world who become international migrants. In order to make the way from one country to another, some resources are necessary. Thus, part of the migration boom since the end of the Cold War should be seen in conjunction with the success

of countries such as China and India in lifting millions of people out of abject poverty in the same period.

International migration is not only a result of economic growth, but of economic inequality – as well as, for a smaller group of migrants, political upheaval. Broadly speaking international migrants travel from less developed countries to high-income countries, and from repressive and unstable countries to more democratic, open ones. Immigration, then, could be seen as a reflection of economic and political success.

Direction of flows – still mostly a regional phenomenon

The rise in asylum requests in the North in the 1990s is an example of how the *direction* of migration flows is changing. In the previous age of migration, which came to a close in the 1920s, those on the move were mostly Europeans resettling in the New World. Another substantial migrant group were colonial subjects moved from one colony to another, such as the indentured laborers moved by the British from India to African colonies. Today a substantial number of the world's migrants make their journey from the Global South to the Global North. The change is particularly visible in Europe, which has gone from a continent of emigration to one of immigration. As a result, many previously homogeneous states in Europe have, at least in their major cities, attained a multicultural hue.

Most international migration, however, remains intra-regional. Even after the migration and refugee crisis in Europe took off in the summer of 2015, more than half of the continent's immigrants came from other European countries. For Asia and Africa, more than 80% of migrants move within the region. Only in the case of North America and Oceania did the majority of migrants hail from outside the region (although the statistics are a little misleading, since Mexican immigrants are counted as from a different region to the United States) (UNDESA 2015).

We can see the same trend for refugees and asylum seekers. Looking at one of the world's longest-standing refugee populations, in 2014, 95% of a population of 2.5 million Afghan refugees lived in nearby Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR 2015b: 33). At the end of 2015, the war in Syria had led to 13.5 million war-affected people in need of humanitarian assistance; over six-and-a-half million internally displaced people; over four-and-a-half million refugees in Syria's neighboring countries; and just over 800,000 Syrians seeking asylum in Europe. Syria's destructive war shows how conflict often creates concentric circles of humanitarian need and displacement, with asylum seekers who travel beyond their own region constituting a small minority of everyone affected by the conflict. Before the 2015 Syrian influx, the only mass flows of refugees and asylum seekers to European countries in the post-Cold War period have come from within the European region: from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, Russia.

Responses to migration movements: migration management and control

The responses to challenges posed by international migration have also taken some new forms. Here I will first look at domestic politics before moving on to international interaction and cooperation to attempt to regulate, manage and control migration flows.

Despite the fact that most migrants stay within their region of origin, the sheer number of people on the move, together with growth in South–North migration, have nevertheless made immigration and asylum a highly salient issue in domestic politics across the globe, from South Africa in the South to Scandinavia in the North. In Western Europe, the steep rise in asylum applications in the early 1990s contributed to strong electoral results for populist anti-immigrant and far-right parties in countries such as Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway. Consequently, talking 'tough on immigration' has also become a mainstream pursuit. During the 2015 migrant and refugee crisis in Europe, anti-immigrant parties did well in elections across the continent, entering into government in some countries. In the United Kingdom, it bolstered the campaign to leave the EU. In the United States that year, Republican presidential candidates competed with each other over who would introduce the most repressive measures to curb the number of asylum seekers and resettled refugees from Muslim countries.

The past two decades have seen, in tandem with this political rise of anti-immigrant sentiments and parties, a gradual tightening of legal migration routes across the Global North entailing harsher visa regimes and stricter border controls. This has been particularly visible in the case of asylum systems, where preventative (and punitive) measures against asylum seekers have taken a range of forms: widespread use of detention centers (even for children); withdrawal of the right to work while pending application outcomes; distribution of benefit payments in vouchers instead of money; making family reunification slow and difficult; and even confiscating valuables belonging to asylum seekers in order to pay for their upkeep.

National measures to clamp down on unauthorized migration can be seen as a series of 'beggar-thy-neighbor' strategies with global effects (Hans and Suhrke 1997: 84), where each country tries to make itself less attractive than its neighbor and thus shifts the burden of hosting refugees, asylum seekers and unwanted migrants onto other states. Asylum practices are more often about migration control, spurred by domestic economic, political and security considerations, than about asylum obligations incurred by international law.

One way of avoiding this race to the bottom while managing immigration flows is through multilateral cooperation and coordination, and particularly strengthening international migration (and forced migration) management regimes and organizations. There has been a flurry of regional and global initiatives in the past couple of decades, all with the aim of harnessing the positive aspects of international migration – for migrants themselves and for their host and home

communities – and counteracting the negative aspects, especially trafficking and people smuggling. Migration issues are now routinely placed high on the agendas of various regional and global institutions, such as the UN, the EU, the World Bank, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union. In addition, migration-specific institutions such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have been strengthened and a variety of migration-specific inter-regional processes, such as the 2015 EU-Africa Summit on Migration, have been created to foster international cooperation.

However, the outcomes of such processes have been modest. An overarching international migration regime is difficult to achieve, since states value control over their migration policies in order to be flexible to adapt these to the changing demands of economic and political circumstances (Solomon 2005). If anything, the trend towards unilateral, 'each country for themselves', versions of migration management and asylum policies has strengthened in recent years, in tandem with the rise in migration and asylum seeker numbers. As immigration, and particularly asylum, policy has become one of the most emotive and urgent of election issues in middle- and high-income countries, many governments have chosen an inward-looking 'tough on migration' stance that hampers their ability to cooperate with other states on migration issues.

The responses from European countries in 2015 to the mass movement of refugees arriving across the Mediterranean, then walking through the Balkans and into northern Europe, is a case in point. Despite several pre-existing EU-wide agreements on immigration, a joint border agency, and a Common European Asylum System, the influx of over one million refugees and migrants led to human misery and chaotic scenes along the so-called 'migrant trail' and caused a political crisis within the EU. While some countries, notably Germany and Sweden, decided to welcome refugees, most others responded to German and Swedish generosity by closing borders and tightening already strict asylum rules. EU summit after summit led to half-hearted agreements on 'burden sharing' and migration management, but with widespread dissent and little practical impact. For instance, in order to ease the burden on first countries of asylum, the European Council agreed in September 2015 to relocate 160,000 refugees from Greece and Italy to other member countries. By January 2016, only 272 refugees had been relocated.

Instead of cooperation to manage the flows, Europe saw a domino effect of events, as the unilateral decisions of one EU member state affected its neighbors, which consequently instituted their own unilateral measures. The domino effect made the migration flow harder to manage for the EU as a whole, and more arduous and dangerous for the migrants. By the first quarter of 2016, the influx was dramatically reduced through a range of harsh measures, including the closing of borders and building of fences along the eastern Balkans migrant trail from Greece into northern Europe and the detention of new arrivals to Greece in closed camps. In March, the EU negotiated a migrant-return deal with Turkey, where migrants and refugees arriving in Greece would be sent back to Turkey, in return for money and the promise of resettling some Syrian

refugees directly from Turkish camps. The deal blatantly undermines the *non-refoulement* principle of the UN Refugee Convention, and quickly led to other refugee hosting states, most notably Kenya, to threaten to close down their own refugee camps and forcibly repatriate the refugees living in them. The normative and legal principles underpinning the international refugee regime has, as a result, come under unprecedented pressure.

If a closely integrated region such as the EU struggles to cooperate on immigration policy, it is no surprise that inter-regional cooperation between poorer migrant-sending and richer migrant-receiving countries has also proven difficult to achieve. Attempts at international agreements to manage (and reduce) migration is hampered by the schism between the perceptions and needs of developed and developing states in migration management. For instance, while lower-income countries voice concern about the effect of a 'brain drain' on their economies, higher-income countries usually welcome skilled migrants but attempt to stop undocumented, irregular labor migration. Migrant-sending countries such as Nigeria, on their side, have little incentive to try to hinder some of their large pool of unemployed youth from attempting to make their way to richer countries by irregular means. Such tensions between lower- and higher-income countries can also be seen in the international refugee regime. There have been several attempts at serious reform of the refugee regime in the twenty-first century in order to achieve better burden sharing and deal more efficiently and humanely with so-called mixed flows of forced and economically motivated migration. None of these efforts have had much success. Attempts by northern states, especially in the EU, to contain refugees in regions of origin and to negotiate return agreements with so-called safe first countries of asylum, are broadly seen by refugee-hosting countries of the South as attempts at burden shifting rather than burden sharing (Hammerstad 2014: 157; Loescher et al. 2008: 62–66). The outcry over asylum seekers in the North is resented in the South, considering that 86% of refugees in 2014 were hosted in the developing world – 25% of them seeking shelter in Least Developed Countries (UNHCR 2015b: 34).

The pros and cons of international migration – why a backlash?

The EU's (lack of) cooperation to manage the 2015 refugee and migrant influx into Europe has in common with other recent national and regional efforts at controlling migration, such as the US, Indian and South African building of border fences against their poorer neighbors, a particular concern with policing and security aspects of migration management. The focus has been on 'irregular' and 'illegal' migration, 'bogus asylum seekers', 'mixed flows' (of refugees and economic migrants), people smuggling, trafficking and in general what has been termed 'the criminalisation of migration' (Haas 2005: 13).

With international terrorism added to this already heady mixture of concern and fear over migration, it can be argued that there has also been a partial

securitization of population movements. The impact of 9/11 was immediately felt by advocates of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. Only few weeks after the terror attacks on New York and Washington, the UNHCR placed states' anti-terror and security-based efforts to restrict asylum within a broader context of the increasing criminalization of asylum seekers and refugees, and called for resolute leadership 'to de-dramatise and de-politicise the essentially humanitarian challenge of protecting refugees and to promote better understanding of refugees and their right to seek asylum' (UNHCR 2001). The next section will address the concerns and fears raised by immigration by investigating its impact on economies, culture/identity and political security. Although I will mainly discuss host communities, as the phenomenon has global reach and consequences it is also necessary to look at effects on sending states, as well as on global politics.

Migration's benefits: an uneven picture

It is not straightforward to determine the economic impact of migration, or to assess whether this impact is mainly of a beneficial or harmful nature. This is partly because migration figures are not accurate, a particular problem in the case of irregular migration (defined by IOM (2008: 203) as 'migrants whose status does not conform, for one reason or another, to the norms of the country in which they reside'). In 2014, IOM estimated that around 50 million, or more than one fifth, of all international migrants were irregular (IOM 2014: 3). The difficulty is also due to the political controversies surrounding immigration, which have made cost-benefits analyses often highly politicized.

What is safe to say is that migration's benefits are uneven, whether viewed from the perspective of sending country or host country. Focusing on sending countries first, emigration can be a pressure valve for countries such as Nigeria, Morocco and the Philippines with fast-growing and youthful populations and high unemployment – as indeed it was for European countries such as Ireland and Norway in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It can also be a political pressure valve. For instance, a disproportionate number of the estimated 1.5–3 million Zimbabweans living in South Africa come from the south-western parts of Zimbabwe, the stronghold of political groups opposing president Robert Mugabe (Hammerstad 2012).

But emigration can also hamper development. Since it is often the resource-ful and educated who take the leap, emigration can rob developing countries of their most valuable workers and entrepreneurs. The debate continues on whether this 'brain drain' hinders development or whether it is underdevelopment and poor economic opportunity, corruption and inefficient bureaucracies that lead the bright and the educated to seek greener pastures elsewhere (Roberts 2008).

The question of the value of remittances is another issue that is high on the migration research agenda. First, it is not straightforward to measure the levels of remittances, since many are not transferred through official channels. This is especially the case for irregular migrants, but regular migrants may also choose

cheaper alternatives to official transfer channels. The World Bank estimated the size of remittances worldwide in 2015 at more than US$600 billion, of which around $441 billion went to developing countries. But since this estimate is based on formal transfers the World Bank agrees it is certainly too low (World Bank 2016: V). Nevertheless, even if a conservative estimate, this is a significant transfer from North to South, constituting almost three times the amount of official Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Furthermore, remittances have shown themselves to be more resilient to the global economic downturn than foreign direct investment (FDI) and ODA. From 2008 to 2009, FDI in developing countries fell dramatically from US$593 billion to US$359 billion, while remittances in the same period dipped from US$325 billion to US$307 billion – only to recover in 2010 and increase again in 2011. In many countries remittances are higher than earnings from major export commodities. In 2014, remittances constituted 10% or more of the GDP of 28 countries, with Tajikistan topping the list with 41.7% (World Bank 2016: 30).

Early research on remittances tended to dismiss their significance, suggesting that they merely increase immediate consumption among the migrant's family and relatives. Today it is clear that remittances can have a strong developmental role. It is a capital flow mostly unhampered by bureaucracy and corruption, which tends to improve nutrition, health and education among recipients. It can also take the form of highly efficient micro-level direct investment when migrants put money into small businesses back home. Due to the size of remittance flows, the question of how to maximize their impact on development is high on the research agenda of the World Bank, IOM and migration research centers across the world.

The economic impact on migrants' host countries is also uneven. In the UK, the anti-immigration think tank Migration Watch released a controversial study in 2007 suggesting that the overall economic contribution of immigrants to GDP per capita was almost negligible. It suggested that the very small benefit to the host (or 'native') population was far outweighed by the social costs of migration on 'already overburdened infrastructure, housing, health and schools' and 'an increasing impact on employment and added strains on community cohesion' (Migration Watch 2007). Others argue that the UK economy would not have boomed in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s were it not for young and dynamic immigrants working in a range of sectors from construction to banking and hospitals. The strain on infrastructure is mostly a short-term planning problem for local authorities needing to adapt schooling and housing policies to include the new arrivals, while longer-term benefits depend on how quickly new migrants are integrated into the economy and the workforce. The fact that even an anti-immigration think tank could not find data to show an outright *negative* economic cost-benefit analysis of migration is a sign that immigration into developed countries in most cases has an overall beneficial economic impact on host economies. Indeed, most governments of migrant-receiving states understand well that immigrants contribute substantially to wealth production and welfare provision, even though their public discourse of migration control and reduction could make one conclude otherwise. For instance, a survey of economic growth

from 2000 to 2007 in the US found that 17.3% of this growth was accounted for by Latin American immigrants (IOM 2011: 29). Research has also shown that migrants tend not to be 'job stealers', but complement the domestic workforce by filling skills gaps, taking jobs locals do not want, and adding vitality to the demographics of the otherwise rapidly aging populations of high-income countries (IOM 2011: 28).

This said, the benefits of immigration are unevenly spread, and some groups of society, especially low-skilled workers, may lose out to newcomers. Furthermore, public *perceptions* of the cost of immigration tend to be much more negative than data and research supports (IOM 2011: 5–19). This distinction between overall benefits to the economy and (perceived and real) costs to particular segments of the population has been stark in the case of South Africa, a country of extreme wealth differences, a poor education system and high unemployment among the country's many poor and unskilled workers. The relatively dynamic South African economy has benefited from an influx of skilled and/or cheap African labor immigrants, as the government has acknowledged. However, little has been done by the authorities to dispel the strong feeling among South Africa's unemployed urban poor that migrants are direct competitors, 'job stealers' and criminals, leading to widespread xenophobic violence and vigilantism against African immigrants (Hammerstad 2012).

From identity concerns to national security

Concerns over immigration levels often relate to identity and culture as much as to the economy. The perceived unmanageability of immigration adds to this unease, as it is difficult for states' border authorities to distinguish between 'deserving' and desired immigrants and 'bogus' and unwanted ones. Both in political and academic debates (see Wæver et al. 1993) there have been concerted and partly successful attempts at elevating both economic migration and forced migration onto states' broader security agenda. Kenya's government has repeatedly threatened to close down its refugee camps and forcibly return around half a million Somali refugees, citing 'reasons of pressing national security that speak to the safety of Kenyans in a context of terrorist and criminal activities' (Nkaisserry 2016), despite little evidence of links between the camps and terrorist plots or actors. Huysmans (2006) has shown how a language of threat and unease permeates EU discourse on immigration. Migration has usually been categorized as a 'societal security' threat, defined by Buzan (1991: 19) as 'the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom'.

Anxieties over immigration heightened after 9/11 due to fears over letting in international terrorists through a country's immigration or asylum system (Givens et al. 2009). In November 2015, at least two of the perpetrators of the attacks killing 130 restaurant guests and concertgoers in Paris had arrived in Europe using the migrant trail from Turkey via Greece and through the Balkans,

stoking widespread fear that the migrant flow was infiltrated by terrorists from the Islamic State (IS) (most of the attackers, however, had French and Belgian citizenship). As many migrant-receiving countries continue to struggle with the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, security-related anxieties have been compounded by economic concerns and protectionist instincts. Stagnating growth, and in some cases recession, has sharpened the sense of competition between locals and new arrivals.

Mixed motives are not a prerogative of immigrants

It is difficult to separate out concerns raised by the economic, cultural/identity and national security impact of migration. While it is analytically useful to attempt to separate these concerns, in reality the political discourse on immigration tends to include a mix of all types of concerns. Cultural/identity fears provide a vaguely formulated but pervasive background atmosphere to more clearly articulated and specified concerns relating to the national security of the state and the economic welfare of its citizens.

Neither in the case of immigration nor in the case of asylum was 9/11 the starting point for such securitization of population movements. An emerging trend could be seen already in the 1980s, where immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees became increasingly subsumed within a discourse of unease and fear (Huysmans 2006: 63; and on the particular securitization of forced migration, see Hammerstad 2014). This is important for understanding the way in which international migration and international terrorism were quickly grouped together in the aftermath of 9/11. This happened almost automatically and without substantial political debate as the ground had already been laid for perceiving immigrants and asylum seekers within a security perspective. Such proclivity for framing migration as a security threat can also be seen in the discussion of climate change-related migration. This is an important future research agenda, but both migration and conflict experts have cautioned about positing a clear and direct link between climate change, mass migration and conflict (Foresight 2011).

Conclusion: Immigration challenges and opportunities for twenty-first century world politics

Migration challenges are not likely to abate in the coming years. Immigration controls have gone some way to reduce some inflows into some countries, but as Harris (2002 mentioned in Haas 2005) points out, immigration correlates more strongly with economic growth than with migration control policies. Near-complete immigration control in a world with an increasingly globalized labor market (IOM 2008: 24) is not possible without creating a politically authoritarian and economically autarkic state disregarding both the rights of the individual and the logic of the market.

The welcome immigrants receive has always ebbed and flowed. Migration trends are to some extent cyclical, where immigration booms are followed by increasing concern and fear among host populations and ensuing political backlashes. The reaction following the mass influx of economic migrants to the US in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was severe, and more xenophobic and racist than anything we have seen in recent years. The backlash then started with the recession in the 1890s, and by 1930 'the doors to the new world were effectively closed' (Hatton and Williamson 2005: 160). The globalized nature of twenty-first-century politics and economics makes such draconian reactions unlikely today. A combination of demographic trends and economic realities – as well as the entrenchment of human rights – will ensure that international migration remains a central feature of world politics. Considering the inequalities of the world economy, motivated individuals will continue to find ways to relocate to improve their prospects. And most states acknowledge the importance of immigrants to their economies. In terms of demographics, the combination of youthful and fast-growing populations in many parts of the Global South, and an aging population in many parts of the North, suggests that a relatively high level of migration could remain desirable for both sending and host countries for the foreseeable future.

But migration can also constitute an economic cost, and can be a source of political instability and communal tension. The magnitude and severity of the challenges posed by today's high migration levels will depend only partly on the size, speed and direction of migration flows. At least as significant will be the local and global *responses* to dealing with refugee situations and to managing international migration. There is a risk that international frameworks for migration management and refugee protection could buckle under the pressure of states' short-term unilateral measures to curb influxes. While these framework have their flaws, undermining them is likely to aggravate the problems caused by mass population movements, while hampering migrants' ability to make a positive contribution to their destination countries.

Guide to further reading

The statistics and data used in this article are mostly taken from the World Bank, the IOM, and the UNHCR, and are freely available through their websites. Migration and forced migration studies are fast-growing academic fields. Because of the policy salience of the topic, recent research is often in the form of reports and policy papers from migration organizations such as IOM (www.iom.int) and UNHCR (www.unhcr.org), and think tanks and research centers such as the Migration Policy Institute (www.migrationpolicy.org); the Center for Immigration Studies (www.cis.org); and Oxford University's Centre on Migration Policy and Society (www.compas.ox.ac.uk) and Refugee Studies Centre (www.rsc.ox.ac.uk). Hatton and Williamson (2005) give an impressive overview of the economics and history of international migration over the past two centuries, providing

the reader with a much-needed sense of perspective on today's challenges. *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* (2014), edited by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., gives a comprehensive overview of the current state of academic research into displacement, while the fifth edition of Castles et al.'s *The Age of Migration* (2014) does a similar job for migration studies. Several post-9/11 volumes cover the topic of security and migration, including Huysmans (2006), Guild (2009); and Givens et al. (2009).

Chapter 15

Social Movements in World Politics

KELLY GERARD AND SKY CROESER

Introduction

Social movements have played a central role in global political change, both historically and in recent decades. During the 1990s and early 2000s the global justice movement advocated for an alternative vision of globalization to that being developed through international financial institutions (IFIs), In recent years, more localized movements, such as the interconnected city-based manifestations of Occupy, have been organizing in response to the recent economic crisis, and, more generally, the conflicts and contradictions of neoliberalization. Despite their central role in global politics, this is the first contribution on social movements in this series. The omission of such a chapter draws attention to a broader lack of engagement with social movements outside of the field of 'social movement studies'.

In political science, scholars have increasingly engaged with the question of what constitutes political action, considering diverse new modes of political engagement and participation outside of formal political institutions (Bang and Sorensen 1999; Li and Marsh 2008), often drawing on related debates in sociology on the political motivations of social action (cf. Maffesoli 1996; Riley et al. 2010). This interest is also reflected in the recent focus on 'everyday politics' in international political economy (IPE), where scholars have looked at local representations of global markets (cf. Hobson and Seabrooke 2007), furthered through feminist global political economy scholarship examining the mutually constitutive relationship between global markets and the relations of social reproduction (cf. Elias and Roberts 2016). Deciding what is counted as 'political' is, of course, a political act, and one that is contested by social movements. As this chapter highlights, politics are infrequently confined to political institutions, with social movements often emerging in response to the communities or issues that these marginalize or overlook. A narrow focus on institutional politics thus overlooks the struggles that occur to change political institutions.

In this chapter, we adopt a broad conceptualization of social movements, recognizing them as collective undertakings of varying duration and degree

of organization, directed towards systemic change (Flacks 2005). Social movements can be understood as fluid, heterogeneous networks: they may be anchored by key organizations, but they are also made up of participants who flow in and out of the movement, people who may take part in a single protest, and people with a wide variety of perspectives and levels of engagement (Croeser 2012). For example, while we might write about 'the feminist movement', this actually encompasses a range of different politics, from those pressing for women's involvement in front-line military service to pacifists; large national organizations with paid staff, and small informal collectives that meet infrequently; people whose lives revolve around their feminist activism and identity, and people who might attend a single event over the course of a year and hesitate to call themselves feminists.

The distinction that is frequently made between local movements and transnational (cross-border) or global movements is also more complex than it seems at first glance. While activism against neoliberalization is often described under the umbrella of the global justice movement, this movement was actually a 'movement of movements'. It brought together activists with very particular concerns, whose targets of advocacy were often national, or even local. These activists often positioned their work in relation to global struggles, and occasionally were involved in specific anti-globalization (or more accurately, alter-globalization) events, but they did so ambivalently and sporadically (Croeser 2015). In recent years, the global justice movement has fragmented and other strands of activism have emerged that contest global power structures while being rooted in local manifestations. Despite – or at times because of – the complex and chaotic nature of social movements, they have played a central role in world politics, both historically and today.

Much of the academic scholarship on social movements focuses on progressive movements: those that work towards more equal, inclusive and sustainable societies. This is, in part, because many social movement researchers see their work as connected to a sympathy for, or involvement in, particular movements. It is also linked to the methodologies that dominate social movement studies, which often require that researchers develop a strong reciprocal relationship with activists. Our own research, for example, has been affected by our particular personal histories, geographical location, and political perspectives. This chapter thus focuses predominantly on progressive movements in Australia, Southeast Asia, Europe and North America, reflecting both our personal politics and the limitations of English-language coverage and analysis of protest movements globally. Conservative and reactionary movements, which Gillan and Pickerill (2012: 136) refer to as 'ugly' in their discussion of the complex relationship between researchers and movements, meanwhile, have become increasingly visible in recent years. World politics have been affected in recent years by, for example, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism; the Tea Party and fundamentalist Christian movements in the United States; the spread of far-right movements in many parts of Europe; and the Hindu right in India. These movements pose specific threats to marginalized groups within the states where they are active through, for example, attacks on the

rights or even physical safety of women, foreigners, ethnic minorities, or others. They also contribute to shifts in national politics that can reverberate throughout the world in the form of foreign policy.

These developments also make visible the complex relationship between states and social movements. Protesters are often positioned as being in opposition to the state, with limited access to state resources and embodying resistance to state policy. However, there are often connections between different state institutions and social movements. Both progressive and conservative movements often have a complex relationship to dominant political institutions. For example, Australian Liberal Party senator Cory Bernardi, inspired by the Tea Party, established the Conservative Leadership Foundation and led the development of a network of political websites promoting small government, lower taxes, 'traditional' values, and campaigns opposing the Labor Party's climate change policy. The websites appeared to be driven by grassroots activism, however they were orchestrated by Bernardi and the conservative organizations with which he is affiliated (Gough 2011). A political party is not, in itself, a social movement, but political parties are often connected to, and overlap with, movements. Studying social movements then means examining their often complex relationships with institutional politics.

This chapter first considers the historic role of social movements in world politics and how this history has been overlooked in much international relations (IR) scholarship. The second section describes the concepts and methods that have been used in studying social movements. The third section charts more recent trends, both in the social movements we have observed and the ways social movements have been conceptualized.

Understanding social movements in world politics

Social movements have served a central role in shaping the form and function of contemporary political institutions. For example, abolitionism made slavery illegal, while both the suffragettes and the civil rights movement were central in defining the cornerstone of contemporary democracies: universal suffrage. Another was the Protestant Reformation. Martin Luther advanced this movement against the Church, critiquing its ability to define Christian practice and particularly the use of penances to achieve salvation, given that from the twelfth century the act of repentance increasingly involved monetary transactions. Through the dissemination of Luther's 1517 publication, *The Ninety Five Theses on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences*, aided by the printing press and this text being written in the vernacular, the movement gained support. With the Church and religion being central to the exercise of political power at this time, these conflicts over religious differences inspired wars dominated by rivalries between Europe's feudal powers. These conflicts culminated in the Thirty Years' War from 1618 to 1648, the outcome of these being the treaties known as the Peace of Westphalia.

While this movement critiquing the Church and the events it precipitated were no doubt significant in the formation of contemporary political institutions, notably the separation of religious and secular power, the importance awarded to the Peace of Westphalia by IR theorists is central to the discipline's marginalization of extra-institutional politics. In IR the Peace of Westphalia is typically pointed to as the end of the feudal order of Christendom, it having been replaced by the sovereign state system where states are the principal actors in the international anarchic system. However, as demonstrated by Carvalho et al. (2011), the Peace of Westphalia has been given unwarranted significance in IR scholarship, with this 'origin myth' having since been debunked through recent scrutiny of these treaties and subsequent revisionist scholarship (Osiander 1994, 2001; Teschke 2003; Hobson 2012). The sovereign state did not in fact become the more generic political unit of the global system until well into the post-colonial era.

The significance awarded to this event in IR scholarship contributes in justifying the discipline's statist ontology, and consequently marginalizing the study of extra-institutional politics – those politics that occur outside of state institutions. In IR scholarship the unitary, independent, and coherent state is typically taken as the starting point for analysis, awarding states a 'naturalness' that overlooks the context in which they emerged, the diversity of state forms and qualities, and how they are continually transformed in response to social and political conflicts. As demonstrated by Carvalho et al., this 'origin myth' of IR persists and is reproduced in IR textbooks. They argue:

> The myth of 1648 is detrimental because it provides a distorted view of how the modern sovereign state and states-system came into being – and thus of the naturalness and quality of the basic units that IR takes for granted, the result of which is to produce a rigid statist ontology that is ill-equipped to handle the challenges of global governance, suzerainty, empire and international hierarchy. (2011: 737)

Politics are infrequently confined to state institutions, and social movements often emerge in response to the communities or issues that these marginalize or overlook. West (2014) argues that a narrow focus on institutional politics overlooks the struggles that occur to change political institutions, and points to four reasons for which we should consider a more encompassing understanding of politics. First, denying the existence of legitimate forms of politics outside of political institutions is not a factual claim, but rather a normative or ideological one. Those opposed to changing existing political institutions typically devalue extra-institutional politics, because such a position privileges the interests served by existing structures and processes. West argues, second, that examining extra-institutional politics is crucial to understanding the formative history of contemporary political institutions. The institutions we recognize as characteristic of liberal democracies, and the states for which they are part, emerged through protracted struggles, frequently violent.

Understanding politics as confined to the processes of authoritative political institutions overlooks the struggles that have defined these institutions' form and their function.

Third, the scope of both the state and institutional politics is indeed contested. Feminists, for example, arguing that the 'the personal is political' have highlighted how capitalist states are built on a number of exclusions, one being gender (Fraser 2013). Finally, understanding politics as limited to the confines of political institutions diverts attention away from other sources of social power. As argued by Piven and Cloward (2005), power lies not only in rule making, but also in rule breaking. While designing and enforcing rules is a way of stabilizing power and making it more secure, power also lies in the capacity to withdraw one's consent or contribution to interdependent power relations, necessitating analysis of other sources of social power.

Extra-institutional politics, moreover, do not necessarily map onto state borders. The state centrism of much IR scholarship makes it ill-equipped for addressing cross-border political organization, including transnational social movements. Sovereignty is the cornerstone of IR theory, this being the notion that national governments are the supreme authorities within their geographical territories. This conceptualization ignores how sovereignty has been deployed in practice. As charted by Jones (2012, 2013) sovereignty plays a key role in structuring political life by simultaneously enabling and constraining different political projects. The process of establishing territorial state sovereignty – basing political authority on a bordered space – is not neutral because it legitimates political projects that are mediated through the institutions of the state and denies legitimacy to other political projects, which may be transnational.

While states are recognized as sovereign in international law, it is governments that represent them. It is governments, then, that '"wield" state sovereignty in international politics, on behalf of the populations they supposedly represent' (2012: 19). The 'slippage' between the categories of 'the people', 'the state' and 'the government' enables the basic procedures of international politics, but it also makes available to those in government a range of political strategies that can be used for highly sectional purposes to pursue objectives that benefit just a small number of their constituents (2012: 20). Governments, consequently, strategically employ sovereignty, invoking it to try to ward off influences that may be destabilizing or detrimental to their interests. For example, the governments of ASEAN have invoked the norm of non-interference as a means of defending the capitalist social order, despite their various interventions in one another's domestic affairs for the same purpose. Governments also pursue interventions, whether military, economic or ideological, as a means of both upholding international order and also managing domestic order in the intervening state by containing transnational threats (Jones 2013). For example, the various interventions by the US during the Cold War were directed towards containing the spread of communism and defending the capitalist social order. Sovereignty is thus a technology of power, and it is contested because it can be used to further particular power configurations.

Basing political authority on a bounded space, its people, and the flows in and out of that space works to rule out other possible ways to organize political communities (Jones 2012). Conflicts and the social groups organizing around these can cross state borders, and consequently extra-institutional politics can have transnational dimensions. Many social movements have organized around political projects that appeal to non-territorial communities, given the many forms of human solidarity that cross territorial borders – race, class, gender and religion – particularly for those parts of the world that were colonized. These political projects have included anarchism, feminism, international communism and other forms of class solidarity, anti-colonial internationalism, indigenous groupings, the Islamic *umma,* transnational diasporic communities and regional formations such as the EU (see Lawson and Shilliam 2009). The statist ontology of IR thus marginalizes the study of extra-institutional politics, overlooking social movements and their possible transnational dimensions.

Understanding the form and the function of states necessitates examining the ways in which they are reconfigured in relation to the conflicts arising from competitions between different social groups, including social movements. State power is reliant on the extent to which leading social forces are able to mobilize support, and hence it is always being reconstituted in relation to competitions between social groups, including social movements. Thus, rather than conceptualizing states as abstract entities with a 'natural' form and set of characteristics, it is much more useful to examine them as a set of agencies and capacities that have been shaped by various historical conflicts among social forces vying for dominance (Jessop 2007). Following Poulantzas (1978), Jessop conceptualizes states 'neither as a unitary political subject nor as a passive, instrumentalizable thing but as a *complex social relation*' (2004: 50). Extra-institutional politics have been central to the production and reproduction of state power, and social movements over history have sought to change prevailing political powers, whether these existed through monarchs, empires or states, with many such challenges not being neatly confined to geographic borders.

Understanding states, their agencies and capacities not as having a 'natural' form and quality but as being socially constituted means paying attention to the relationships between state actors and those seeking to exert change, including social movements. It means examining the ways in which political institutions allocate power in asymmetric ways, as dominant interests shape institutional form and composition and their matrices that produce and allocate power (Carroll 2010). Existing institutions are the product of distinct political amalgams making efforts to change them problematic because doing so entails challenging the existing formation of power. While IR constructivist scholarship similarly understands states as being socially constituted, this scholarship typically remains state centric, assuming states to be the primary actors in the international system (cf. Wendt 1994), or focuses on a small elite of NGOs functioning as 'norm entrepreneurs' to shape state conduct (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This is distinct from examining state forms and functions as being derived from social conflict, and constantly reconfigured in relation to competing social groups, problematizing how political rule is spatially and institutionally organized.

Competitions between social forces, including social movements, are central in shaping state agencies and capacities, and dominant social forces play a key role in structuring the form that politics can take. By making some forms of participation acceptable and others not, dominant social forces influence the activities of social movements and the terms on which participants seek political change. The types of activities through which social movements pursue political change are determined in a vacuum, but reflect the boundaries of participation that are set by prevailing interests. Jayasuriya and Rodan conceptualize modes of participation as the 'institutional structures and ideologies that shape the inclusion and exclusion of individuals and groups in the political process' (2007: 774). Modes of participation, consequently, function in organizing conflicts because they determine which conflicts are 'expressed, mediated, or marginalized' through authoritative political institutions (2007: 779). Social movements' activities will thus be determined in relation to the boundaries of political participation in a particular context. For example, street protests for marriage equality may be an effective means of pursuing political change in Australia, but less so in countries with anti-LGBT laws because of the threat of violence or vilification.

Similarly, the possibility of political change through direct engagement with prevailing interests will be shaped by the terms that powerholders set. For example, consultations held on various issues related to the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community were structured to exclude dissenting voices through strict controls over who could participate, the nature of their participation, and the issues discussed (Gerard 2015). Social movements thus found their attempts to contest policy or advance alternatives readily blocked through these channels. Activists consequently pursued their agendas outside of spaces sanctioned by powerholders, termed 'created spaces', such as conferences organized parallel to official summits, protests, and the production and dissemination of information criticizing policy. While these spaces are not directly managed by powerholders, they are not sealed off from sanctioned modes of political participation. Activists can contest policy through created spaces and in doing so provide alternative perspectives to official views; however, with no mediating structures to link these activities to their targets and activists not being granted the institutional legitimacy that comes with participation in sanctioned spaces, they may be reliant on alliances with institutional actors in promoting their agendas (Gerard 2014). Hence, even seemingly spontaneous forms of political expression must be considered in the context of power relationships with state actors (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 786).

The varying activities of social movements across different issues and geographies must thus be considered in relation to the boundaries of participation that are set by prevailing interests in specific socio-political settings. Recognizing states not as 'natural' entities with fixed form and characteristics, but as a set of agencies and capacities that is constantly being reconfigured in relation to conflicts among competing social groups, social movements and their activities are determined in relation to the boundaries set by dominant social forces, resulting in myriad different arrangements and strategies.

Methods and movements

The study of social movements, and extra-institutional politics more broadly, has occupied the separate field of 'social movement studies'. Here, social movement theory is typically presented as progressing through a series of stages. This standard presentation (cf. Staggenborg 2012) notes that social movements were first studied as psychological phenomena, with researchers focusing on the motivations of individuals for participation. Reflecting the earlier orthodoxy regarding the centrality of institutional politics in social life, scholars argued that disruptions played a central role in driving collective behavior, with these activities broadly conceived as a threat to social order.

The second stage in this progression is presented as generated by the social movements of the 1960s. Movements for civil rights, second-wave feminism, the new Left, anti-war, gay rights, and the environment were deemed to have prompted a normative shift, where researchers increasingly conceptualized social movements not as psychological phenomena but as political actions. With many movements' emphasis on identity claims and horizontal organizing, social movement researchers increasingly acknowledged how social power is reproduced through many spheres of social life. Researchers consequently rejected a sharp distinction between what is considered 'normal' and 'abnormal' conduct. In recognizing movements as a legitimate form of political action, these accounts broadened the prevailing conception of politics to include extra-institutional politics, thereby integrating the study of social movements into the study of contentious politics. This second stage of social movement theorizing looked at questions regarding organization, resources and leadership, seeking to clarify the distinct characteristics of movements and strategies. This standard presentation then denotes 'new social movement theory' as the third stage in this progression of social movement theorizing, where scholars increasingly turned to questions regarding cognition, culture and identity.

As argued by Cox and Flesher Fominaya (2013) this is the 'origin myth' of social movement studies. This prevailing account notes the shift from the 'dark days' of collective behavior approaches, followed by the recognition of rationality in social movement participation and the shift to study collective action. As they demonstrate, this prevailing account presents 'new social movement theory' as originating in Europe and informed by social theory and political philosophy, and it is positioned as an extension of the field, as demarcated by scholars working in North America. They argue that this 'origin myth' serves a few important ideological functions. First, it distinguishes the study of social movements from the study of Marxism, bringing academic respectability for scholars working in the 1960s and 1970s, and particularly in the US. Second, incorporating European social theory into social movement theory served to synthesize European and North American ideas, and, in doing so, grant European scholars legitimacy in North America, particularly in the context of the cultural prestige that US research was acquiring in the 1970s. Third, this presentation of social movement theory positions the study of social movements as thoroughly academic, and thereby distinct from the theorizing of movement activists.

Cox and Flesher Fominaya assert that this presentation of the progression of social movement studies not only misrepresents the ideas of European scholars, but more importantly it overlooks both the context in which these debates occurred historically and the role of European scholars in movements themselves. European social theorists were not seeking to define a sub-discipline, as were scholars in North America. European social theory was typically characterized by a much broader set of reflections that did not distinguish between 'politics' and 'culture', instead seeking to understand movements as embedded and defined by their specific social context. Understanding movements as one of multiple forms of political participation, Cox and Flesher Fominaya draw attention to the transatlantic politics that have shaped how scholars have studied social movements: 'The construction of a self-referential "literature" is necessarily a process of closure, exclusion and marginalisation – even at the cost of ignoring some of the most significant bodies of writing on movements' (2013: 19).

West (2014) develops a more useful approach to understanding these transatlantic struggles in researching and teaching social movements. Rather than presenting European social theory as an extension of the ideas developed in the sub-discipline of 'social movement studies' has been defined in North America, West presents two categories: normative and formal approaches, and historical and substantive approaches. This distinction doesn't privilege either of these bodies of scholarship, representing one as dominant and incorporating the other. Instead it frames these according to the types of questions that they ask and the methods they employ. Normative and formal approaches typically apply empirical concepts to understand social movements as a distinct mode of political action, thereby emphasizing the commonalities across movements. Historical and substantive approaches are concerned with the specific characteristics of particular movements, as opposed to what is common across social movements, adopting an 'embedded' analysis that examines social movements in relation to their distinct social and political contexts. This presentation, and categorization, of social movement scholarship thus acknowledges these differing approaches to researching and teaching social movements as complementing, rather than competing.

Recent trends

Throughout the last decade, we have seen a wave of activism including the Occupy movement in the United States; anti-austerity movements in Europe (such as the Indignados in Spain, the Aganaktismenoi in Greece, and student protests against cuts to education in the United Kingdom); the Arab Spring (including uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt); pro-democracy activism in authoritarian states, including the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong; and movements against racialized state violence and dispossession, including Idle No More in Canada, Black Lives Matter in the US and SOSBlakAustralia. Some of these movements show clear continuities with movements of the 1960s, and many can be seen as extensions of the transnational activism of the 1990s and early 2000s that resisted neoliberalization and

its specific local effects. At the same time, scholars have argued that recent social movements demonstrate two important emerging trends. First, scholars point to the impact of the internet. Manuel Castells, for example, poses a rather optimistic assessment: 'The movements spread by contagion in a world networking by the wireless Internet and marked by fast, viral diffusion of images and ideas. They started in the South and in the North, in Tunisia and in Iceland, and from there the spark lit fire' (2012: 2). Secondly, many of those studying social movements link the use of the internet to a renewed wave of enthusiasm for non-hierarchical politics and horizontal organizing structures among progressive social movements.

As with many developments in the history of social movements, the novelty of these trends is sometimes overstated. While the internet has certainly opened up new possibilities for political action and communication, social movement participants have been using communications technologies for centuries. British abolitionists argued in the mid-1800s that 'America was no longer a distant land: it was only two weeks away'. British and American antislavery groups developed their networks by exchanging letters and publications, and through travel by abolitionists (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 47). Similarly, suffrage activists, members of internationalist workers' movements, and campaigners for decolonization were among those who used faster and cheaper postage systems, telegrams, and more affordable travel in order to build and strengthen their networks. Milan notes that 'movement media' – the use of communications technologies to spread perspectives that resist dominant political narratives – are as old as social movements themselves, and include the labor printing presses of the nineteenth century (2013: 6). The spread of digital information technology over recent decades is thus the latest development in 'movement media', and one that has had a significant impact.

The Zapatista struggle is often pointed to as a turning point in social movements' use of the internet. This movement, which emerged in the Mexican region of Chiapas in 1994, struggles for the self-determination of indigenous peoples and peasants (Starr 2006: 103). Cleaver argues that no catalyst for the growth of non-governmental networks challenging national governments and international agreements 'has been more important than the indigenous Zapatista rebellion [...] and the widespread political mobilization to which it has contributed' (2002: 3). In the early days of the Zapatista uprising, international support depended on a network of intermediaries, many of whom journeyed to Chiapas and disseminated information to international connections online. Over time, this network of communications developed to include a series of 'intercontinental encounters', beginning in 1996, bringing together activists from around the world who were resisting neoliberalization (Cleaver 2002: 11). These meetings, and the international networks of communications that they built on and strengthened, were incredibly influential. As well as their continued influence on a wide range of social movements around the world (Milburn 2004: 473), the networks established through the 1996 'encounter' were part of the global organizing effort that led up to the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Seattle, often known as the 'battle of Seattle'.

This conference, or rather the resistance to it, was another significant turning point in the history of social movements in world politics. In the decades preceding 1999 there was a growing sense, particularly in the West, that the turbulence of the late 1960s and 1970s had passed: that there were no alternatives to neoliberalism. However, the estimated 14,000 to 30,000 protesters who severely disrupted the WTO Conference changed that by demonstrating a diverse, transnational opposition to the labor abuses, environmental degradation and economic inequality that had accompanied neoliberalization (Smith 2001: 1). Protests continue at meetings of the WTO and other institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, despite efforts to increase policing at these events and make them harder for activists to access (Fernandez 2008). Social movement participants play a significant role in highlighting and contesting the political impact of institutions and trade agreements that might otherwise be nearly invisible. In recent years, transnational activism around the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has been central to creating a spotlight on negotiations that might otherwise have remained entirely invisible to most citizens of signatory countries. The networks that mobilized for the Seattle protests, and the opposition that they voiced to an unequal and undemocratic global system, continue to have an impact today.

The protests in 1999 also had an enduring impact through the establishment of Indymedia, an independent, movement-run media hub developed to ensure that activists' perspectives could be spread. Beyond Seattle, Indymedia developed into a global, decentralized tool for organization and communication (Milberry 2006), and it continues to be used by many social movements today, although it is no longer as vital as it once was (see Croeser and Highfield 2015b). Despite Indymedia having waned, its development can be seen as part of 'a growing awareness of the relevance of technology and media issues as such to contemporary democracies' (Milan 2013: 6). A significant proportion of movements' work involves trying to shift the dominant narratives used to understand political issues (or to understand issues as political), and this can be challenging to achieve when mainstream media coverage is unsympathetic.

Many activists continue work to develop or run independent media services, but at the same time commercial social media platforms have become an important tool. Social media platforms are websites and/or mobile phone applications that allow users to connect and interact with others. Commercial platforms, as opposed to independent media, are run by companies that make a profit (or aim to) by selling users' data to marketing companies, advertising to users, and, in rarer cases, charging an access fee. Facebook and Twitter have both been important for activists in many countries, although academic scholarship has tended to focus more heavily on Twitter because it is easier to access. The particular technical characteristics of commercial social media platforms have facilitated the growth of 'big data' research methods, which use quantitative methods to explore movements' use of the internet (Croeser and Highfield 2015a). Given these complexities, we should be aware that while social movements' use of the internet opens up new possibilities for activists, it can do the same for researchers, and this

sometimes skews the focus of academic literature as old methods are sidelined and new ones adopted; big data is the latest shift, following on the heels of other methodological fashions.

Mainstream understandings of social movements' use of communications technologies over recent decades tend to veer between extremes. On the one end of the spectrum are dismissive references to 'clicktivism' and 'slacktivism'. These are often grounded in an assumption that the use of online strategies – such as mass email campaigns, petitions, Facebook groups, or the sharing of memes – displace other, more effective, action (for more discussion of these arguments, see Karpf 2010; Vie 2014). At the other end of the spectrum are those that claim a defining role for digital technologies, referring to the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa as 'Twitter revolutions'. Of course, the situation is more complex than either of these extremes suggest.

Social movements operate in a plethora of different contexts, and communications technologies themselves vary significantly. As Dencik and Leistert note, it is unhelpful to abstract social media technologies 'from the social, political, economic and cultural processes that embed their development and uses' (2015: 2). National context (including legislation around protest, censorship and surveillance), the dominant language, and the specific politics of a movement may all influence which platforms a movement uses to organize, and to communicate internally and externally. For example, in the Greek antifascist movement, efforts to build independent online platforms hosted by activists themselves are influenced by their anti-capitalist politics, and concerns about censorship from both the government and platforms like Facebook and WordPress (Croeser and Highfield 2015b). Their ability to organize effectively and to communicate with their target audiences is affected by shifts in national politics, the policies of individual platforms (for example, Facebook's policy of requiring that user accounts show their legal names), and the technical affordances of platforms (including Greek-language support for hashtags on Twitter). The many ways in which context affects social movements' use of digital technologies means a nuanced and critical approach is needed, outlining general trends while also remaining aware of their limitations.

This requires, in addition, remaining aware of the ways in which the internet facilitates not only new possibilities for social movements, but also new ways for the state to monitor and control them. Given the broad data gathering that many social media companies carry out, they also become key actors in this struggle. Leaks by Edward Snowden have made it clear that the mass surveillance carried out by sections of the US government, and contractor companies, have frequently relied on integration with social media, sometimes reluctant, and at other times complicit (Hintz 2015: 109–110). The combination of personal communications, locational data attached to mobile phone use, web search history, and data on social connections can have far-reaching implications for activists' privacy. Of course, surveillance of activists is not new. However, while current practices are continuations of the history of monitoring and management of dissent by the state, 'the sheer size, scope and ubiquity of contemporary data surveillance' is a

new development (Redden 2015: 131). This is an important shift in the landscape of contemporary activism, and one that has global impacts.

This shift is partially reflected in the ways in which social movement participants' awareness of surveillance and censorship – often in an environment of uncertainty about the extent and exact form that it might take – can in itself hamper their work. For example, Treré discusses the 'general sense of paranoia' Mexican activists felt around mobile phone and social media use, and the mass deletions of their own accounts and other material that might be considered compromising after a wave of repression by police (2015: 174–175). Activists may refrain from using particular platforms, or limit their use, in ways that undermine their ability to organize and communicate effectively, regardless of whether they are actually subject to surveillance. This is, at times, the result of the opacity of commercial social media platforms' policies: activists cannot be sure, for example, who might have access to their data, or why a particular post seems to have disappeared.

Online surveillance and censorship has such a broad impact that it has, in itself, become the focus of recent social movements. Milan argues that the emancipatory communications practices associated with a range of technologies, including the internet and community radio, show a new interest in communications projects in themselves, as opposed to as annexes of other movements. These, she writes, 'are the signals of a growing awareness of the relevance of technology and media issues as such to contemporary democracies' (2013: 6). Even before Edward Snowden's leaks made the scale of surveillance by the US government clear, activists were starting to mobilize around calls for online communications infrastructures that focused on users' needs, rather than those of governments or corporations (Postigo 2012; Croeser 2015). Digital liberties activists have raised the profile of these issues around the world, including by challenging national legislation and international agreements that would make it more difficult to communicate freely online. For example, the US Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect International Property Act received very little attention when they were framed in 2011, and were expected to pass without incident. However, throughout 2012 and 2013 campaigners worked to raise the alarm about the ways in which these might chill speech, not only in the US but also internationally, building a coalition that included many large technology companies such as Google and WordPress (Croeser 2015: 105–106). The legislation was shelved in 2013. This movement demonstrates the power of making visible the politics of a decision previously considered apolitical, as well as the growth of activism around the control of online communications. We therefore need to understand social movements not just as using, but also as shaping, communications infrastructures in ways that reverberate throughout global politics.

The mutually constitutive relationship between technology and social movements, where each exerts complex effects on the other, has generated the second major trend affecting social movements today: the growth of more horizontal forms of organizing and activism. Since the early days of the internet, commentators have been drawing links between the use of digital technologies and new,

more open and decentralized structures within social movements. A study from 2001 funded by the US Office of the Secretary of Defense argued that the internet facilitates the use of swarming tactics by social movements (in addition to military forces and terrorist organizations). Swarming works, they write,

> by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire [which can be] metaphorical in the case of NGO activists, who may, for example, be blocking city intersections or emitting volleys of emails and faxes. Swarming will work best – perhaps it will only work – if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units. Swarming occurs when the dispersed units of a network of small (and perhaps some large) forces converge on a target from multiple directions. The overall aim is *sustainable pulsing* – swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then dissever and redisperse, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001)

Arquilla and Ronfeldt list both the Seattle anti-WTO protests and the Zapatistas as following this model, and it can also be seen to characterize many of the more recent waves of mobilization.

Forms of horizontal, decentralized protest have, of course, a long history. The anarchist labor movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries worked towards non-hierarchical organizational structures, while horizontality was also central to the second-wave feminist movement in the 1970s. The latter movement led to important debates about the problems with horizontal organization, including Freeman's 'The Tyranny of Structurelessness' (1972) and Levine's (1979) reply, 'The Tyranny of Tyranny', which continue to circulate within many activist communities today. While remaining cautious not to erase this history, we can nevertheless point to ways in which the internet is facilitating non-hierarchical organizing and tactics within social movements.

Activists around the world are experimenting with different ways to connect with one another, make decisions, organize events, and communicate their messages to others. For example, the *#Occupy Wall Street NYC General Assembly* website (n.d.) offered options for participation (such as information on working groups); information on decision making (including information on proposals and how to participate in assemblies); and suggestions for how to get involved in the movement. Juris (2012) argues that the Occupy movement initially relied heavily on a 'logic of aggregation', which used social media to recruit masses of people from diverse backgrounds to join in physical events. With the forcible shut-down of Occupy encampments in the US and around the world, Juris sees an accompanying shift towards a 'logic of networking', where collaborative processes are used to build more inclusive and diverse horizontal connections. These processes may be more fragmented than the General Assemblies and camps that the Occupy movement first relied on, but they can also be more flexible and sustainable.

The interconnected processes being developed in the wake of the dispersion of Occupy encampments, and with many other movements that inspired or drew on

tactics from the Occupy movement, are also tightly intertwined with a renewed interest in anarchist praxis. Anarchism is a political philosophy that prioritizes self-governance and attempts to flatten hierarchies of all kinds. Its influence as an ideology waned in Europe and the US in the early twentieth century, although anarchist ideas experienced a resurgence in the 1960s and 1970s. While most Occupy groups did not identify overtly with anarchist ideas, anarchist forms of political practice were central to the movement, including inclusive and horizontal decision making and a rejection of involvement with formal political processes (Gibson 2013). The embodiment of this anarchist praxis can also be seen in the encampments of the Arab Spring which, like those of the Occupy movement, can be understood as a form of prefigurative politics: an attempt to create the change activists hope for in the present (van de Sande 2013). Rather than lobbying the state to reduce inequality and provide services, many Occupy groups began to directly enact their political vision, providing food, shelter and medical services (Croeser and Highfield 2014). These efforts were not, of course, without problems. Jaleel, while arguing that Occupy encampments transformed social relations in significant and useful ways, also points to divisions that undermined their radical potential (2013). Despite these challenges, Occupy's prefigurative practices, like those of other movements in recent years, show the influence of anarchist ideas and organizational forms.

This influence is not limited to the West, and is often grounded in parallel political traditions. Ramnath, for example, argues that an anarchistic struggle towards 'more dispersed and less concentrated power; less top-down hierarchy and more self-determination through bottom-up participation' can also be clearly identified in South Asian history, including in (Muslim) sufi and Hindu (bhakti) movements (2012: 7–8). Similarly, Lasky (2011) argues for paying attention to the ways in which indigenous and feminist struggles around the world connect to and embody anarchist ideas. As anti-racist and decolonizing movements continue throughout the world – from the successful resistance to the Keystone XL pipeline in Canada to the struggle against the closure of Aboriginal communities in Australia – understanding these links remain vital.

Conclusion

Social movements have long shaped global politics, and will continue to do so. They have played a central role in defining the form and function of contemporary state agencies and capacities, and continue to engage in the conflicts through which state power is constantly reconfigured. Central to understanding the role of social movements in global politics is recognition that states are one of multiple ways through which political authority has been organized, both in the current context and throughout history, and that they are socially constituted, with their agencies and capacities defined by competitions between different social groups. This conceptualization of the state facilitates an engagement with extra-institutional politics, thereby recognizing the social forces organizing

around the issues and communities that are marginalized or overlooked by state agencies and institutions, which may not be neatly confined to territorial borders.

The impact of social movements on global, or even national, politics is often complex, and not readily identified or measured. The Occupy movement was dispersed through attacks on its camps, but it has arguably put inequality on the political agenda in the United States. The digital liberties movement has brought attention to online censorship and surveillance. The movements of the Arab Spring had radical effects on their countries, and subsequently on the entire region, but those effects have been diverse and not always positive. Social movements can create a shift in the narrative around a particular idea; they can help us see an issue as political where it was previously seen as uncontentious. They are often dispersed and reconfigure to emerge again in new forms. Social movements are diverse, and unpredictable. We have pointed to a few specific examples, and some broad trends that can be seen across movements globally, but movements manifest and work differently depending on their context.

Guide to further reading

David West's (2014) *Social Movements in Global Politics* provides an excellent introductory guide to social movements, as well as a good overview of the differing theoretical approaches and their development. Stuart Price and Ruth Sanz Sabido's edited volume, *Contemporary Protest and the Legacy of Dissent* (2015) collects useful chapters exploring recent social movements from around the world, as well as exploring important emerging trends. Valentine M. Moghadam's (2012) *Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement* explores the interplay between transnational social movements, states, and globalizing processes. Kanishka Jayasuriya and Garry Rodan's (2007) edited special issue of *Democratization* highlights the complex relationship between states and social movements, explored through analysis of the boundaries of political participation. Shinichi Shigetomi's edited (2009) *Protest and Social Movements in the Developing World* provides a much-needed examination of social movement studies in developing-world contexts.

Chapter 16

Democracy's Meaning, Progress and Recession

WILLIAM CASE

Democracy, in a mainstream understanding, involves the recruitment of state position holders and the making of public policies in ways that allow participation by, and promote accountability to, ordinary citizens. During the European Enlightenment, democracy's procedures began to cohere in their modern representative and majoritarian form, made manifest in parliaments and regular elections. But greater than two centuries more were needed for democracy to spread globally, involving a series of what Samuel Huntington (1991) identified as 'waves'. A 'long' first wave, beginning during the nineteenth century and extending into the early twentieth, introduced elected parliaments across Europe and, at least nominally, in Latin America and Japan. But during the 1920s–1930s, a 'reverse wave' set in, with democracy losing ground in all these places amid the rise of totalitarian ideologies. After victory by the Allied powers in World War II, followed by the break-up of empires, a second wave took shape, renewing democracy in Europe and Japan, while conveying it also to parts of Africa and East and Southeast Asia. However, during the 1950s–1960s, momentum was again reversed, with democracy retreating before military coups and modernizing bureaucracies.

Starting in the mid-1970s, democracy surged anew, gathering in what came famously to be described by Huntington as the third wave. And as Larry Diamond (2015: 141) would marvel, 'nothing like this continuous growth in democracy had been seen before in the history of the world'. It began simultaneously in southern Europe and South America, nearly completing the democratization of politics across both continents. During the 1980s, 'people power' in Manila erupted, bringing democracy to the Philippines, then encouraging it to 'snowball' across South Korea and Taiwan. During the early 1990s, the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of communism enabled Eastern Europe to democratize. Important transitions in South Africa and Indonesia followed. Thus, in tallying up democracy's progress in 2006, probably at its zenith, two-thirds of the world's countries could reasonably be classified as democratic (see Diamond 2008: appendix). Only China, Russia, post-Soviet states in Central Asia, and Arab societies seemed to be holdouts. In this context, Francis Fukuyama (1992) was moved even to proclaim the 'end of history', arguing that with communism having vanished, democracy was

now recognized widely as the only legitimate way in which to organize political systems. However, this optimism has since been tested, if not by any full reverse wave, at least by what Diamond (2008: ch. 3) has called a 'democratic recession'.

One aim of this chapter is to survey some of the milestones and dynamics of democracy's progress and setbacks. To do this, analysis begins by briefly rehearsing two major ways of understanding democracy. Next, it outlines some of the preconditions for democracy that scholars have been enumerated, as well as the motivations possessed by different social groups for seeking democratic change. Some obstacles will also be recounted before turning to the transitional pathways along which democratic change takes place.

This chapter also evaluates the extent to which globalization may have shifted decisional power from governments to such a degree that democracy organized at the national level loses relevance. It considers debates too over whether, even as power may gravitate to multilateral institutions and transnational corporations (TNCs), there may be prospects for democratizing politics on a global plane. But in finding that the chances are scant, analysis grows sombre, confronting the notion of democratic recession.

What is democracy?

Modern democracy has principally been understood by scholars in two competing ways: a mainstream 'procedural' view and a more critical 'substantive' one. Procedural democracy emphasizes the civil liberties by which citizens confront governments and the competitive elections by which citizens fill state positions, then afterward hold governments accountable. It gives priority, then, to institutions and processes, while remaining agnostic over the policy outcomes that result. In sharp contradistinction, substantive democracy privileges social equality between classes, ethnic communities, genders, and other forms of identity and affiliation. It gains expression through idioms of 'social', 'economic', and 'industrial' democracy. In this view, policy outcomes that promote equality across multiple social cleavages take precedence over any regularized institutions and processes.

In considering which interpretation is more valid, Burton et al. (1991: 2) reminded us that social equality may be a precondition for democracy, or it may follow as a policy outcome, but equality and democracy cannot be the same thing. Indeed, they argue that the conflation of these disparate concepts causes analytic confusion. As one example, they observe that the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), in its ideological appetite for social levelling, distributed wealth relatively equitably. Yet, while the GDR's government might call its regime a democracy, its utter avoidance of any autonomous participation by citizens mocked the concept. Accordingly, in mostly reaching consensus, analysts of democracy and democratic change today hold that a procedural understanding of democracy is best. Only in the more vexed analysis of democracy's consolidation have some scholars reopened old questions about how democracy should be understood.

In conceptualizing democracy in procedural ways, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) distinguished in their classic text between civil liberties and competitive elections. Hence, they drew upon Robert Dahl's (1971) earlier notion of the liberal and inclusionary elements of what in the real world he elaborated as 'polyarchy'. Civil liberties include free speech, press and assembly, enabling citizens to communicate freely, then organize in pursuit of their interests and causes. Elections, meanwhile, must be free, fair, regularly held, and meaningful, promoting accountability. These contests are free in that the voting franchise is inclusive. They are fair in that incumbent government eschews a grossly partisan use of state agencies, facilities and funding, therein ensuring competitiveness. They are held regularly within fixed time frames, recorded in a constitution. And they are meaningful in that elected chief executives and legislators control the state apparatus, not cabals of generals, bureaucrats and sundry economic elites nestling unaccountably in 'reserved positions' (Schedler 2002: 41).

Democratic preconditions and motivations

Democracy's functioning requires that participation strikes a fine balance between vigorous competition and restraint. Accordingly, politicians, political parties, civil society organizations and social movements compete over state positions and policy outcomes, though not at all costs. Winners must display magnanimity after claiming office, while losers prepare to compete another day. This rare configuration of 'restrained partisanship' led scholars to investigate the preconditions that might underpin democracy's complex sets of institutions and procedures. These included appropriate historical legacies, past experience with democracy, social structures, developmental levels, institutional designs and cultural outlooks. According to Myron Weiner (1987), specifically British colonial experience, in exposing indigenous elites to the rule of law through new bureaucratic structures and to restrained competitions through elections, amounted to a 'tutelary model' that greatly favored democracy. But as Diamond (2008: 155) recounts, this model was often countered by a vice-regal tradition, involving 'an ugly, racist system of exploitation and domination that was intrinsic to the very nature of colonial rule'. Thus, if India and Jamaica have internalized enough British common law values and electoral traditions to remain democracies, Pakistan, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore and many African countries once part of the empire have not.

In examining the social structures deemed necessary for democracy, theorists have mainly peered through the lenses of socio-economic classes and ethnicity. In Britain and the United States, where private capital took the lead in fomenting development, capital-owning classes, in seeking to defend their property rights against state predation, sought protection through the formation of elected parliaments. This found expression in Barrington Moore's (1966) pithy dictum, 'no bourgeoisie, no democracy'. According to modernization theorists, however, urban middle classes were more crucial. Uplifted by general prosperity and made confident by their business and professional dealings, members of the middle

class sought to extend their independent decision making from their private pursuits to political life. This led them to support political parties and join civil society organizations in ways that enabled them to hold governments accountable. And yet, the historical record also shows that where the middle classes have been dependent upon the state for economic benefits and protection from the lower classes that vastly outnumber them, they can oppose democratic change. This is particularly so in countries that industrialized late. Recent examples include middle-class protesters in the Philippines and Thailand, cohering respectively in 'People Power II' and the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). In criticizing populism and poor governance, protesters in both cases succeeded in ousting elected governments, actions funded by business magnates, winked at by the military, and sanctioned by the courts. Even students can be unreliable democrats, with Huntington (1991–1992: 604) casting them as the 'universal opposition', stridently criticizing any regime in place, whatever its tenor. Accordingly, Eva Bellin (2000), in charting the varying political preferences and behaviors of these classes, has described them at most as 'contingent democrats'.

Accordingly, in the view of Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), it is the industrial working classes that are the most reliable democratizing agent. Organized into powerful trade unions and seeking representation in government in order to improve welfare for themselves, workers drive democracy by pressing for democratic concessions from the government and the capital-owning classes who often collude with one another. However, though the working classes might sometimes operate along these lines, they have in other cases been drawn into patterns of top-down populism and corporatism, as well as protectionist strategies, that can as readily support authoritarian rule. Thus, if organized labor helped to advance democratization in the nineteenth-century Europe, it has since been identified with the authoritarian rule of Juan Peron in Argentina and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former president of Iran. But in any event, industrial working classes today are often fragmented, dispersed by foreign investment and global production chains, rather than concentrated in particular polities, greatly muting their capacity for change.

Ethnicity too lacks any straightforward impact on democracy's prospects. In societies in which multiple ethnic communities reside, Huntington (1984) argued, democracy was stronger due to the dense mosaic of impenetrable ethnic redoubts and cultural baffles that resisted any systematic intrusiveness of state power. The surprising persistence of democracy in India, notwithstanding its low level of development, is often attributed in part to its extraordinary ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity (see, e.g., Kohli 2004). By contrast, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) argued that ethnic divisions and conflict lead to democracy's breakdown, citing the cases of Malaysia and Lebanon as evidence. Arend Lijphart (1969) and Benjamin Reilly (2001) have showed how communal peace can be preserved by painstaking constitutional engineering, electoral innovations and power-sharing processes. But in so reducing competitiveness in order ethnically to apportion state power and positions, questions arise over how democratic the regime then is.

A less ambiguous thesis, then, first proposed by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), focuses on developmental levels and democratic outcomes. Put simply, it contends that as societies grow richer, better educated, and more differentiated, ascriptive hierarchies and patterns of deference begin to break down, encouraging social groups, especially middle classes, to grow more participatory. Usually parsed as modernization theory, this expectation, along with its more contemporary refinements, has been enormously influential. And yet, even though most rich countries are indeed democracies, some, like Singapore, Brunei, and the Gulf states, are not. Rapid economic growth, generating a kind of performance legitimacy, and petroleum exports, producing revenues that sooner empower the state than social forces, can dampen pressures for democratic change, even in rich countries. At the same time, though, in a much-cited study, Przeworski et al. (1996) argued that democracy is more likely to persist in rich countries than poor ones. We note, then, democracy's lengthy practice in places like India, Botswana, and Papua New Guinea, as well as its seeming durability in East Timor.

Thus, the debate over economic development and democracy has grown convoluted. If development's causal impact on democratic change is often brittle, it may be that directionality cuts the other way. With democracy freeing the participatory impulse of citizens, its liberal elements may carry over into private entrepreneurship and innovation, helping fuel development. But this argument is challenged by the post-war record of rapid industrialization in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and China documented in an immense literature on developmental states, industrial policies, and more recently, state capitalism.

Given the ambiguities that haunt the search for democracy's preconditions, political science seemed to abandon it, at least for a time. To be sure, the causal connection between high levels of development and democracy are robust. And weak states, states made strong by resource revenues, hyper-nationalist sentiments, and radical Islamism all militate against democracy. But with democracy so often failing to appear in settings where it might be predicted, and in other cases taking root where it would not be, much scrutiny shifted during the third wave from historical and structural variables to the vagaries of elite-level preferences and bargaining.

How does democratic change take place?

With legacies and structures seemingly indeterminant, leading democracy theorists like Rustow (1970), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and Burton and Higley (1987) shifted attention to the contingent choices of national leaders and elites. They assessed the patterns by which elites interacted with one another (whether in restrained or warlike ways) and the appeals through with elites sought constituencies (either galvanizing or under-mobilizing in tenor). A vast new literature accumulated that came informally to be called transitology (Schmitter 1995). At its core lay O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986: 19) proposition that 'there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of

important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself'. And any democratic change that followed involved elites gaining consensus over democracy's worth, such that it became, in Linz and Stepan's (1996: 5) memorable phrase, 'the only game in town'.

Focusing intently, then, on inter-elite relations, a new vocabulary emerged that included hardliners and soft-liners in the authoritarian coalition, engaging with minimalists and maximalists in opposition parties and movements. Further, in tracing the ways by which the coalition unraveled, 'popular upsurge' set in, and as democratic change unfolded researchers identified patterns of top-down 'transformation' (as in Spain and Brazil), bottom-up replacement (Portugal, the Philippines and Indonesia) and a more evenly negotiated process that Huntington termed 'transplacement' (Korea).

In emphasizing contingency, this approach seemed to its structuralist detractors to offer no more than description. But some constraining conditions were gradually discovered. In particular, the pathways by which democratic change took place were tracked back to the distinctive forms of authoritarian rule from which they had emerged. Using a simple typology of military governments, personal dictatorships and single-party systems, comparativists identified military governments as most likely to undertake top-down transformations (Geddes 1999). With generals abhorring the politicization of their institution that so eroded its professionalism and corporate élan, they were often keen to cede state power and return to the barracks. Thus, where they could claim some industrializing success while in power, they initiated processes of pre-emptive transformation, then negotiated from a position of strength, giving rise to extensive 'pacting' or 'settlements' through which to gain amnesties while retaining control over selected state enterprises and budgets. On this count, Spain's transformation during the mid-1970s, mediated by the prime minister and encouraged by the king, was viewed as paradigmatic (Gunther 1991). But where their records were disastrous, as in Greece and Argentina, humiliated by defeat in war, militaries were pushed from power much more briskly. In these cases, contention arose over any amnesties that had been granted, leading in some cases to generals being jailed.

By contrast, under personal dictatorships, with strongmen having so personalized the state apparatus and world of business, they had no counterpart to the barracks to which they might safely retreat. In the case of the Philippines, as Mark Thompson (1995) has documented, President Ferdinand Marcos possessed no refuge outside the state, and hence refused to negotiate any withdrawal from power. Under personal dictatorships, then, it is only through bottom-up replacement, exemplified by the 'people power' uprising that took place in 1986, that democratic change can take place.

Finally, single-party and single-party dominant systems, while often resilient, lack the blunt coercive capacity of militaries. Hence, where economic crisis or societal pressures loom large, they may be willing, though grudgingly, to cede state power. They may even be positively incentivized by the fact that in contrast to personal dictatorships, they possess party organizations that may, through competitive elections, win back a stake in any democratic order. Communist

parties that operated single-party systems in Eastern Europe, as well as the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico and the Kuomintang in Taiwan, long resisted democratic change. But when matched by strong opposition parties and vast social movements, they slowly assented, recognizing that for them, while democracy was hardly their first preference, it might not be the end of the world. Indeed, though pushed from power by the transition, many of these parties came back later to win elections. These dynamics, wherein participating sides were more equally weighted than under military governments and personal dictatorships, were captured by the notion of transplacement described above.

But despite these constraining conditions and signposted pathways, the analytic focus on elite-level contingency left may scholars dissatisfied, indeed, dismissive over the modest amount of theorizing that it seemed to generate. In this situation, scrutiny returned to the institutional and structural variables that might aid or retard democracy's advance. New attention was thus given to executive and legislative institutions, with parliamentary systems of representation seen to better perpetuate democracy than presidential ones can (see, e.g., Linz 1990; Stepan and Skach 1993). Governance reforms were also heavily canvassed, in a quest for rule of law and transparency. State capacity was re-examined as scholars discovered that democracy's persistence in late-developing countries depended partly on economic performance. In addition, as the third wave began to slow, researchers took a new look at the dynamics of militaries and single-party dominant systems. In Myanmar, observers noted that military officers, in defiance of expectations about the transience of military governments, had been socialized in ways that enabled them to perpetuate their regime for more than half a century. In Singapore, where the People's Action Party (PAP) has effectively contained corruption, and in Malaysia, where the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has masterfully dispersed patronage, dominant single parties have remained in power since independence. And China, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, and other countries with single-party systems – which hold no meaningful elections at all – appear to have been strengthened by their origins in violent revolution (Levitsky and Way 2015: 55). Transitology, then, while once having been expected to flow logically and seamlessly into the study of democracy's consolidation ('consolidology'), spawned a new subset of investigation into authoritarianism's durability and even its resurgence.

As debates over democratization continued to shift away from elites, they began also to address the variegated terrain of civil society. In O'Donnell and Schmitter's early formulation of popular upsurge, a sudden spike in mass-level activism and street protest only took place in the wake of the break-up of the authoritarian coalition. Diamond (2008: 102) took this further, declaring that civil society must be 'resurrected' as a leading causal force. But this opened the door to new questions. For example, where processes of top-down transformation have unfolded, how had elites been so pressured by civil society that they ever agreed to initiate democratic change? Further, who were the minimalists with whom softliner elites might engage in a garbled process of transplacement? And where elites were swept clean away through a process of replacement, how had civil society so

overcome the collective action problems that generally bedevil it? In this context, as recognition grew that the dynamics by which transitions to democracy took place were far wider and more complex than had been believed, new attention was given to civil society. In particular, scholars focused on the ways in which its political activists coordinated direct action strategies, raised political education and levels of mobilization, and then, in turning to political society, filled the interstices between opposition parties in order effectively to cement new coalitions (Weiss 2006).

Additionally, while the study of democratic transitions had long been conducted in domestic arenas, attention spread to external factors. Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010) took the lead. In their exhaustive study of international 'linkage' and 'leverage', they argued that near proximity to, and close affinity with, the United States and Western Europe have encouraged lasting democratic change. During democracy's second wave, perhaps the most enduring transitions took place in Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan through a process of conquest and imposition by Allied countries. And during the third wave, Grenada and Panama were democratized through US military action. But more subtle forms of Western pressure seemed also to grow in importance. In the late 1970s, the United States began to scale back its support for dictators whom it had embraced while waging the Cold War. This new turn in foreign policy aims began during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, then accelerated under Ronald Reagan. Across the developing world, where governments showed greater respect for civil liberties, human rights and competitive elections, the United States began to dispense developmental aid, principally through its vehicle the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Governments that resisted were confronted by varying levels of economic sanctions, usually involving trade and investment restrictions. Further, while Germany had long supported party-building programs in developing countries, it was joined now by some other Western states in undertaking broader campaigns of explicit democracy promotion. To this end, the US Congress formed the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983 which, together with its various subsidiaries, provided financial support and training for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, newspaper publications, judiciaries and teams of election monitors. British, Dutch, Scandinavian and Taiwanese organizations have provided some of the same. Thus, as elections began to take place in ever more national settings, large numbers of monitors were recruited by these agencies of democracy promotion in order to evaluate freeness and fairness.

Further, as ever more countries democratized during the third wave, this in itself seemed to give impetus to democratic change in yet other countries. Through what were variously characterized as snowballing and demonstration effects politics were democratized with high speed across South America. One notes also the ways in which democracy activists in South Korea had learned from the strategies adopted by their counterparts in the Philippines, bringing pressures to bear that finally disposed the government to bargain. Even more explicitly than in South America, then, the South Korea and Philippine cases showed how political

learning could drive democratic change more rapidly than structural forces such as developmental levels and global economic positioning.

However, just as doubts had grown earlier over the importance of preconditions and elite-level preferences for democratization, so too have they surfaced over the potency of external factors. Wartime imposition by the United States did succeed in several important country cases after the Second World War. But its large-scale investment in Iraq and Afghanistan seems to have grievously retarded democracy's advance. In consequence, during the last years of the Bush presidency, the United States retreated from its democratizing mission to a more realist outlook towards foreign policymaking. One also detected that commitments continued to wane during Barack Obama's tenure.

The impact of subtler forms of democracy promotion has also been disappointing, with efforts to reform institutions and procedures often distorted or repulsed by governments, especially in Russia under Vladimir Putin and in Central Asia under a variety of autocrats (see Carothers 2015). Indeed, election monitoring agencies have grown so fearful of raising the ire of the governments at whose pleasure they operate that they routinely overlook many polling transgressions, announcing blandly that despite any cheating, the government would have anyway been returned to office. To be sure, so egregious was the conduct of Russia's presidential election in 2012, shifting Putin from the prime ministership into the presidency, that foreign observers finally spoke out. But the government dented their criticisms by denouncing them as 'frauds' through a series of televised exposes (Barry and Kishkovsky 2012). In addition, governments in countries like Sudan and Thailand today, in seeking the international investment that helps to generate the patronage necessary for their survival, have turned away from Western countries that threaten sanctions over undemocratic conduct, forging ties instead with an uncritical China. What is more, even the snowballing that seemed so decisive across South America and Eastern Europe has had little staying power in regions like Southeast Asia and Africa. With the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bound by an operating principle of non-interference, people power in the Philippines had less influence on colleagues in the region than it did in South Korea. Similarly, though the *reformasi* movement that brought democracy to Indonesia during the late 1990s was echoed next door in Malaysia, it failed finally to topple UMNO's single-party dominant system. In this context, Thomas Carothers (2002), a leading analyst of democracy promotion, pronounced more than a decade ago the 'end of the transition paradigm'.

Can democracy be globalized?

Debates over democracy and democratization have been vigorously conducted by scholars and political practitioners. But to some analysts, these debates seem utterly misplaced. Put bluntly, even if democracy has made gains during the third wave, it has at the country level lost relevance. In an increasingly global economy, international investment flows, production chains, trading networks

and economic shocks have concentrated decisional power in a few financial and regulatory nodes. Power has thus been shifted out of the hands of sovereign governments, rendering elections – and citizens who vote in them – nearly pointless.

Moreover, in combating the cross-national problems that more globalized activities create, many more international or regional organizations need to be formed. Observers have thus noted the need for regulatory and enforcement agencies whose authority effectively supersedes that of particular governments and national borders in order to deal with environmental ills, infectious diseases, the contagion of financial crises and the spread of international crime and terrorism (see, e.g., Drezner 2007). But as multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are joined by an array of new regulatory agencies, questions grow over how to maintain popular sovereignty in this new and complex setting.

Organizations and movements of what is sometimes called global civil society have taken up this call, sometimes through direct action, mounting mass protests at the venues where multilateral institutions have met. And in organizing their activities and sourcing funding, these elements have been greatly aided by communications technologies, in particular, the internet, mobile telephony, and social media. In an effort to foster transparency, the World Bank and WTO have responded by uploading copious amounts of information about their internal workings onto their websites. Their officials argue too that they are responsive to the national governments that have selected or vetted them – and that these governments are in turn accountable to their citizens. But plainly, this chain of democratic accountability is too extended and disarticulated to foster any meaningful sense of mass-level participation.

Mechanisms for increasing the responsiveness and accountability of multilateral institutions and regional agencies have been imaginatively proposed. David Held (1999b: 106–107), perhaps the leading scholar on this front, once envisioned the nation-state withering away, for 'states can no longer be […] the sole centers of legitimate power within their own borders'. To be sure, in this vision, states are diminished, but do not disappear. Rather, they are 'relocated' within an overarching transnational framework of democratic law in which people possess 'multiple citizenships'. Under what Held has called 'cosmopolitan democracy', citizens retain or even enhance their political participation at the local and national levels on relevant issues. But in responding to today's transnational challenges and institutions, they participate increasingly also in global politics, primarily through global civil society.

But such schemas still strike many scholars as utopian. That democracy's viability should wither at the level of nation-states offers no assurance that it will be recovered among multilateral institutions and regional agencies. Indeed, for Robert Dahl (1999: 21–23), the size and complexity of even the European Union (EU), let alone global institutions, so increases the need for delegation that mechanisms for participation, representativeness and accountability grow unacceptably stretched. He thus sketches a dilemma in which,

while 'a world government might be created in order to deal with problems of universal scope […] the opportunities available to the ordinary citizen to participate effectively […] would diminish to the vanishing point'. On this count, Dahl notes too that even in established democracies, citizens are rarely able to influence their government's conduct of foreign affairs. And so, he asks, 'What grounds have we for thinking […] that citizens in different countries engaged in international systems can ever attain the degree of influence and control over decisions that they now exercise within their own countries?' And how might even the 'general good' be determined when democracy is extended across countries and regions, vastly increasing the 'diversity of interest, goals, and values among the people in the unit'? Accordingly, though democracy has made important advances in the world for the past quarter-century, it may now have reached a plateau. It may even be falling into reverse, unable to cope at the global level, while increasingly eroded within country borders.

Does democracy make a difference?

Even where democratic change has taken place, avoiding the pitfalls of globalization and the setbacks inherent to recession, questions are regularly raised over whether it makes any difference in ordinary people's lives. On one level, democracy's worth seems clear. In respecting the civil liberties of individuals and social groups, while registering the choices of citizens through elections, democracy allows for what is commonly cast as popular sovereignty, therein raising human dignity in ways that authoritarian regimes cannot. It is striking, for example, to find that in democratic Brazil today, residents of *favelas* who were once routinely evicted under military governments to make way for development projects, are able to resist relocation today by officials seeking to build urban venues for the 2016 Olympics and Soccer World Cup. By appealing to the courts and an often sympathetic media, mounting public protests, and mobilizing through Twitter accounts, working class citizens have protected their communities in ways that their counterparts in Bejing never could as the groundwork was rapidly laid for the Olympics in 2008 (Romero 2012). More broadly, in its respect for due process and human rights, democracy spares citizens the arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killings that so frequently characterize coercive authoritarian rule.

   Democracy may in concrete ways advance 'human security' too. On this score, Amartya Sen has argued that under democracy, the planning disasters that result in widespread famine, for example, are far less likely to occur, owing to the feedback loops that readily communicate to governments information about shortages and mass-level discontent (see Diamond 2008: 28). Further, at the global level, democracy may contribute to more ordinary security. Although the relationship is hardly ironclad, the record suggests strongly that countries that are democratic, in their liberal commitments and belief systems, are less likely to wage war against one another than are authoritarian states. In this context, an academic subfield

of democratic peace theory has flourished. Accordingly, there appear to be good reasons for large majorities of citizens, when responding to surveys administered in many dozens of societies, regularly declaring their preference for democracy over authoritarian rule.

And yet, in the real world, democracy too often lags behind these ideals. As one example, during the prime ministership of Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, though the government was popularly elected, press freedoms were truncated through harassment of journalists and ever more concentrated patterns of media ownership. Human rights were also seriously violated through the killings of alleged drug traffickers and Muslim separatists, actions taken by security forces that were welcomed by large numbers of Thai citizens. Additionally, democratic change has done less to moderate corrupt practices than to decentralize them, with payments and vote-buying fanning out now from the national leader, his or her family members and cronies, top bureaucrats and generals to the political party leaders, legislators on multiple tiers and the ordinary voters that democracy has empowered. Indeed, Ross McLeod (2000), in writing about the dispersion of corrupt practices across Indonesia today, refers to Suharto's period of authoritarian rule as a 'better class of corruption'. Little is achieved either in terms of redressing income disparities, with studies long having demonstrated that social inequality remains impervious to democratic change (e.g. Jackman 1974).

Democracy theorists responded, then, with a new research agenda on consolidation, trying to weave notions of regime stability and quality into their conceptualization. In addressing stability, lengthy investigation was conducted into requisite elite-level attitudes, supportive mass-level outlooks, and appropriate institutional design, with something between 10 and 14 years of continuous functioning, as well as two government turnovers, as indicative. Meanwhile, questions about quality focused on rule of law, popular participation, representativeness, policy responsiveness and accountability (e.g. *Journal of Democracy* 2004). Researchers began to rank different democracies through 'audits', identifying executive abuses that have, in some cases, grown so great that they have been reclassified as undemocratic. However, though an evaluative framework has been taking shape, questions remain over whether particular dimensions interact in mutually reinforcing or negating ways – or indeed, whether the clear thresholds necessary for measurement can even be specified. How many no-confidence motions must be held, for example, and how many referenda must be organized before accountability can be adjudged as high quality? And what of more fundamental dilemmas wherein stability stands in contradiction to high quality, with elites finally overturning the democracy whose strengthening rule of law threatens their 'inviolable' interests? Indeed, it may be that democracy stabilizes where quality is minimized, increasing doubts over how much ordinary citizens benefit. In this situation, scholars have found little consensus over consolidation's meaning. And as disillusion has mounted, citizens may come to revise their procedural understandings of democracy along more substantive lines.

Democratic recession?

In its analysis, as well as its real-world practice, the headiest days of the third wave appear to have passed. Indeed, some of the most insightful work being conducted today involves the study of authoritarian durability and resurgence mentioned above. To be sure, where democratization has taken place, it has seldom broken down. And even where reversals have occurred, as in Turkey in 1980, Fiji towards the end of the decade, Peru in 1992, a number of African countries during the 1980s–1990s, Thailand in 1991, 2006 and 2014, Pakistan in 1999 and the Maldives in 2012, at least partial re-democratization has usually followed. Levitsky and Way (2015) claim too that as many of these countries were never really democracies to begin with, to label them now as instances of breakdown is misleading. But Diamond (2015: 146–147) counters that while there may be disagreement over whether these countries are democratic today, or ever really were,

> what is beyond argument is that there is a class of regimes that in the last decade or so have experienced significant erosion in electoral fairness, political pluralism, and civic space for opposition and dissent, typically as a result of abusive executive intent upon concentrating their personal power and entrenching ruling-party hegemony.

As evidence of democratic 'recession', he cites Russia under Putin and Venezuela under Hugo Chavez as the most obvious cases. But he also portrays countries like Ecuador, Bolivia and Honduras, while once democratic, as today 'limping along as "semidemocracies"'.

Diamond (2015: 145) provides a list of some 25 cases of democratic breakdown between 2000 and 2014. He explains that few of them, though, have involved outright military coups. Rather, breakdowns have mostly been instigated by democratically elected executives who, as their terms unfold, resort to such abuses and manipulations – sometimes to the point of jailing and killing – that institutions are 'desecrated' and opposition is 'suffocated'. Even so, abusive executives usually stop short of instituting the tightly closed dictatorships seen in the past. Instead, as they have grown 'more resourceful and sophisticated' (Diamond 2015: 152), they have learned to use some of the tools of democracy in order substantively to avoid democracy, producing a range of 'hybrid regimes'.

For example, under what Andreas Schedler (2006, 2013) conceptualizes as 'electoral authoritarianism', executives who at heart are autocratic hold regular elections. But they have truncated civil liberties beforehand, thereby hindering opposition parties from contesting effectively. In this configuration, opposition parties are permitted to organize, set up headquarters, raise funds, select their own leaders and candidates and then recruit cadres and mobilize at least modest constituencies. But they are also prevented from reaching wider audiences by the government's control over most media outlets; they are restricted in circulating their own party publications; and they are barred from organizing mass rallies, even during campaign periods. Opposition members who persist are often

targeted with crippling defamation suits, the rescinding of government contracts and bank loans, police intimidation, or worse. Further, on the electoral dimension, outcomes may be skewed through delineation exercises that involve extreme malapportionment, gerrymandering and distorted forms of multimember districting. At the same time, government candidates may make partisan use of state resources in campaigning, practices winked at by a pliant election commission. In these circumstances, opposition parties are able to articulate the grievances of their followings, though only in muted ways. And they are able to win enough legislative seats that they gain a toehold in parliament, though rarely so many that they can form a new government.

In these cases, then, executives have borrowed or retained some of the elements of democracy in order substantially to avoid it. Acknowledging the legitimacy that democracy has come to attain, they have mostly abandoned the crude military rule, personal dictatorships, and hard single-party systems that once proliferated. They have turned instead to strategies of electoral authoritarianism, gracing their tenures with some legitimating cover. As the long-time prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, used to say to his critics, 'If you don't like me, defeat me in my district' (quoted in Case 2002: 7). The offer, of course, was always disingenuous, for there was little prospect of turning Mahathir's constituents, coddled with patronage, against him. Russia under Putin, Singapore under the People's Action Party, and Cambodia under Hun Sen offer other prominent examples of this regime type, one which is probably the most subtle, yet serious challenge to democracy's deepening today.

Of course, even under conditions of electoral authoritarianism, governments have, in underestimating the intensity of societal discontents, sometimes been 'stunned' by the results of the elections they have held. Diamond (2008) records that one in seven of the governments organizing elections along these lines have eventually lost. Moreover, these defeats can in themselves amount to democratic change, thereby producing yet another pathway of transition that has been conceptualized as democratization-by-election (Lindberg 2009). The best-known cases involve the Philippines in 1986, Chile and Poland in 1989 and Nicaragua in 1990.

But even after democratization takes place, some social groups, especially those based in new urban middle classes, sometimes grow alienated with the democracies that follow. Coming to associate democratic politics with poor governance, economic stagnancy, unfunded populist distributions and diminished personal security, these groups may resort to upsurge again, though this time to oust elected governments. Through street actions that have been variously designated as 'rally democracy', 'muscular democracy' and the 'People Power II' noted above (see, e.g., *Time Asia*, January 29, 2001), citizens have forced elected executives from power in the Philippines, Thailand and at the local level in South America. Moreover, in doing this, they have sometimes won the sanction of disaffected elites in the legislature, the courts and, most crucially, the military.

Against this backdrop of mounting impatience over democracy's functioning, autocratically minded executives and some middle-class citizens have been drawn to alternatives, chief among them the 'rationalized authoritarianism' in practice

in China. With its high growth rates and rising level of development, China has set a powerful example of what can be achieved despite, or perhaps even because of, its deepening suppression of civil liberties and political freedoms. As Andrew Nathan (2015: 158) observes, 'by demonstrating that advanced modernization can be combined with authoritarian rule, the Chinese regime has given new hope to authoritarian rulers elsewhere in the world'. The government has vastly enlarged, but co-opted the country's middle class. It appears also to be coping with the grievances of ethnic minorities. It shows how to innovate, yet contain the internet and social media. It has gained new military prowess and geostrategic prominence. And through massive flows of international trade, investment and lending, it has given new shape to the global economy. So far, China's government has resisted any overt propagation of a 'China model'. But through its various news agencies, world television services, and Confucius Institutes it exerts its soft power in support of 'authoritarian values'. It cooperates closely with authoritarian regimes in North Korea, Cambodia, Thailand today, and further afield in Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It actively undermines democracy where it can, as in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.

At the same time, democracy's standing has declined in tandem with that of the United States, the foremost advocate on the international scene. It is deeply ironic that during the presidency of George W. Bush, a tenure marked by a sharp increase in democratizing commitments, the valuation of democracy around the world was eroded by the ineptitude with which these ambitions were pursued. Most signally, in response to the authoritarianism across Arab societies and the rise of religious terrorism, US policy makers came to define democratization in national security terms. But with the invasion of Iraq marking an escalation from strategies of tepid democracy promotion to democracy-by-imposition, the United States elicited quite unintended consequences. As the mayhem in Iraq worsened, the United States found its political and military prestige diminished, while the very authoritarianism and terrorism that it had hoped to roll back gained in momentum. In this context, the United States even became more authoritarian itself, weakening civil liberties at home, while engaging overseas in detention without trial, 'extraordinary rendition' and interrogation techniques amounting to torture. And its change in outlook seemed hastened too by the fact that where democratic change had taken place in the Middle East, the elections then held in settings like Lebanon and Gaza were often won by Islamist elements. Hence, the fillip given to democracy at the end of the Cold War appeared now to dissipate amid new kinds of international conflict.

However, a string of long-standing and seemingly resolute authoritarian regimes, amounting to personal dictatorships, dissolved suddenly during 2011–2012 across North Africa and the Middle East in what came collectively to be hailed as the 'Arab Spring'. True to transitology's expectations, dynamics involved bottom-up processes of replacement, with strongmen deposed in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen. Further, the long-standing military government of Myanmar, after conducting a sham election in November 2010, appeared thereafter to grow more committed to change, unleashing a surprising, if tightly calibrated, process

of transformation. Most notably, through a by-election held in April 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi, a long-time symbol of dignified resistance, was able to claim a place in the People's Assembly. What is more, the willingness of Myanmar's government to countenance such change was attributed to economic sanctions that had been imposed, seeming to suggest their workability (Popham 2012).

But however remarkable these changes, today's democratic recession seems unlikely to re-flower in any fourth wave of democracy. The Arab Spring, in all the countries that it swept save Tunisia, has bred even harsher dictatorships than those it replaced or, as in Libya and Yemen, has only brought chaos. Further, in Myanmar, it appears that hardlining generals only acquiesced to change because, in recognizing their dependence on China, they wished to escape sanctions and to diversify their sources of foreign investment. In careful preparation, then, they have built such stumbling blocks into their democratic roadmap, they are given a veto over the choice of president and the legislative initiatives of any popularly elected government.

What, then, can be said on a more positive note? We turn again to Larry Diamond who recounts that in most public opinion surveys, citizens around the world still report that they find democracy, however they might conceptualize it, to be the best form of political regime. 'Democracy may be receding somewhat in practice, but it is still globally ascendant in peoples' values and aspirations', he writes (2015: 154). And on the other side? Even where authoritarianism is buoyed by performance legitimacy, as in China or Singapore, or hyper-nationalism, as in Russia or North Korea, its prospects look no brighter over the next decade than democracy's do. In these cases, too, the institutions and procedures of which regimes are composed must change, even, perhaps, in democratic ways.

Guide to further reading

The literature on how democracy is best understood is voluminous. The classic text is Joseph Schumpeter's (2010 [1943]) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*; but see also 'What Democracy is … And is Not' by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (1991) and the introductory text by Jean Grugel (2002). The debate over democracy's preconditions, once vibrant, has long since waned. But a concise cataloguing of factors is provided in *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* edited by Diamond et al. (1990). For a more recent and highly mathematicized exploration of preconditions, see Jan Teorell (2010), *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006*. With analysis moving next to the dynamics of democratic transitions, attention shifted initially from structural forces to voluntarist calculations. Strong expressions in this genre include Dankwart Rustow (1970), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Burton et al. (1991). But probably the key overview of transitional processes is given in Samuel Huntington's (1991) *The Third Wave*. See also the fine collection of essays by Guillermo O'Donnell (1999). For an early analysis of civil society and democracy, see John Keane's

(1988) *Democracy and Civil Society*. The literature on democratic consolidation, whether understood in terms of institutions, elite and mass-level attitudes, or the emergence of civil society, has also grown vast, even as the term lost currency precisely because of its multiple meanings and unclear causal directions. But Larry Diamond (1999) offers a comprehensive overview. And his (2008) *Spirit of Democracy* addresses the new uncertainties over democracy's prospects. See also Thomas Carothers (2002), whose ground-breaking 'The End of the Transition Paradigm' addresses the limits on quality that bedevil so many new democracies. By contrast, David Held's (1995) work, in particular, *Democracy and the Global Order: From Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, assesses the possibilities for internationalizing democracy, strengthening its relevance in a more globalized polity and economy. Finally, for an excellent set of essays on democratic recession, see the issue of *Journal of Democracy* (2015) entitled 'Is Democracy in Decline?'

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