

Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research

John DeLamater
Amanda Ward *Editors*

Handbook of Social Psychology

Second Edition

 Springer

Handbook of Social Psychology

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John DeLamater • Amanda Ward
Editors

Handbook of Social Psychology

Second Edition

 Springer

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Preface (Reprinted From First Edition)

The Vision

This *Handbook* is one tangible product of a life-long *affaire*. When I was re-introduced to social psychology, as a first-semester senior psychology major, it was love at first sight. I majored in psychology because I wanted to understand human social behavior. I had taken an introductory sociology course as a freshman. The venerable Lindesmith and Strauss was our text, and I enjoyed both the text and the course. I thought at the time that it was the *psychology* of the material that attracted me. Two years later, after several psychology courses, I walked into social psychology and realized it was the *social* that attracted me. I never looked back. Later in that semester I quizzed my faculty mentors and learned that there were three places where I could get an education in *social psychology*: at Stanford with Leon Festinger, at Columbia, and at Michigan, in the joint, interdisciplinary program directed by Ted Newcomb. Fortunately, I arrived in Ann Arbor in the fall of 1963 and spent the next 4 years taking courses and seminars in social psychology, taught by faculty in both the sociology and psychology departments. I especially value the opportunity that I had to learn from and work with Dan Katz, Herb Kelman, and Ted Newcomb during those years.

These experiences shaped my intellectual commitments. I am convinced that social psychology is best approached with an interdisciplinary perspective. I bring such a perspective to my research, undergraduate training, and mentoring of graduate students. I do not believe that social psychology is the only relevant perspective, but I do believe that it is an essential to any complete understanding of human social behavior.

As I completed my graduate work, I was fortunate to obtain a position in the University of Wisconsin Sociology Department. At that time, there were two other faculty members there who had earned degrees in the joint program at Michigan, Andy Michener and Shalom Schwartz. The three of us did much of the teaching in the social psychology area, graduate and undergraduate. We shared the view that social psychology is an interdisciplinary field, that combining relevant work by persons working in psychology and in sociology leads to a more comprehensive understanding. We viewed social psychology as an empirical field; theory, both comprehensive and mid-range, is essential to the development of the field but so is empirical research testing and refining those theoretical ideas. We believed that research employing all types of methods, qualitative and quantitative, make an important contribution.

What, you ask, is the relevance of this personal history? The answer is that it is the source of the vision that guides my work. You will see this vision of the field reflected in various ways throughout this *Handbook*.

I was very pleased when the Social Psychology Section of the American Sociological Association decided to sponsor the volume, *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives*, edited by Rosenberg

and Turner. I felt that there was a need for such a volume that could be used as a textbook in graduate courses. Following its publication in 1981, I used the book regularly in my graduate course. According to Cook, Fine, and House, it became the textbook of choice for many sociologists teaching graduate courses in social psychology (1995, p. ix). The need for updating and expanding that volume to reflect new trends in our field led the Section to commission a new work, published as *Sociological Perspectives in Social Psychology* in 1995. I used this book in graduate courses for several years. By 2001, I felt that a new edition was needed. Conversations with members and officers of the Social Psychology Section indicated that the Section had no plans to commission such a book. At about this time, Howard Kaplan, general Editor of this series of Handbooks, invited me to edit a volume on social psychology.

The Goals

My goals as editor are similar to those of my distinguished predecessors, including Morris Rosenberg, Ralph Turner, Karen Cook, Gary Fine, and Jim House. I have also relied on the *Handbooks of Social Psychology*, which draw together work in our field from a more psychological perspective, in both my research and teaching. Now in the fourth edition, published in 1998, it convinced me of the value of a volume that can serve as a sourcebook for researchers and practitioners. One goal in preparing this *Handbook* is to provide such a sourcebook, or a standard professional reference for the field of social psychology (Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998, xi). A second goal is to provide an opportunity for scholars in the field to take stock of and reflect on work in their areas of expertise. Authors were invited not only to draw together past work but also to identify limitations in and to point to needed future directions. Third, I hope that this volume will serve as the textbook of choice for graduate courses for the next several years.

The Field of Social Psychology

Social psychology is a major subfield within sociology. The principal journal in the area, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, was founded in 1938 (?) and is one of only six journals published by the American Sociological Association. Sociologists share this field with psychologists. This has led to diverse views of the relationship between psychological and sociological social psychology. Twenty-five years ago, a widely held view was that these subfields were relatively distinct, that each was a distinctive face with its own core questions, theory, and methods (House, 1977). It is certainly true that there are differences in core questions; a comparison of the Table of Contents of the *Handbook of Social Psychology* (1998) and *Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology* (1995) will make clear these differences. Psychologists often emphasize processes that occur inside the individual, including perception, cognition, motivation, and emotion, and the antecedents and consequences of these processes. In analyzing interaction, their focus is often on how aspects of self, attitudes, and interpersonal perception influence behavior. Sociologists have traditionally been more concerned with social collectivities, including families, organizations, communities, and social institutions.

Social psychology is the study of the interface between these two sets of phenomena, the nature and causes of human social behavior (Michener & DeLamater, 1999). Both intra-individual and the social context influence and are influenced by individual behavior. The *core concerns* of social psychology include:

- the impact of one individual on another;
- the impact of a group on its individual members;

- the impact of individuals on the groups in which they participate; and
- the impact of one group on another.

Given this set of concerns, I share Cook, Fine, and House's (1995) view that social psychology is interdisciplinary, that it involves and requires a synthesis of the relevant work in the two disciplines on which it draws. The apparent division into two social psychologies reflects in part the bureaucratic structure of the modern American university, including the division of knowledge by departments and the practice of requiring a faculty member to have a single tenure home. I do not believe that there are insurmountable differences in theory, method, or substance between the work of psychological and sociological social psychologists. The so-called cognitive revolution brought to the fore in psychology the same processes traditionally emphasized by symbolic interaction theory, identity theory, and the dramaturgical perspective in sociology.

One facet of social psychology within sociology is a set of theoretical perspectives. Rosenberg and Turner (1981) included chapter-length treatment of four theories: symbolic interaction, social exchange, reference group, and role theory. Cook, Fine, and House (1996) did not include a section devoted to theory, using instead an organization based on substantive areas. I have included a section on theory, with chapters on symbolic interaction, social exchange, expectation states, social structure and personality, and the evolutionary perspectives. The differences in the topics of theoretical chapters between Rosenberg and Turner and this *Handbook* reflect the changes in the field in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Although it remains a useful metaphor, the role perspective *qua* theory has not flourished. Renewed interest in cognitive processes and their social context, and the development of social identity theory, has recast some of the concerns of the reference group perspective. Expectation states theory has become a major perspective, reflecting the continuing incremental and innovative theoretical development and research activities of a new generation of social psychologists. The rapid development of evolutionary perspectives and their application to such topics as interpersonal attraction, mate selection, family, and sexuality are the most visible changes to have occurred in the field.

Another facet is the methods we use to gather empirical data. Those who share(d) the two social psychologies view point(ed) to the dominance of the experiment in psychological social psychology, and of the survey in sociological social psychology. While there was a pronounced difference in this regard in the 1970s and 1980s, that difference has narrowed greatly in the past decade. Researchers, whether psychologists or sociologists, interested in areas such as prejudice and racism, mental health, and adult personality have always relied heavily on surveys. Recent developments in the analysis of data and the increasing use of longitudinal designs have enhanced our ability to test causal models with survey data; the experimental method is no longer the only way to study causality. Furthermore, the use of the experiment by sociologically oriented social psychologists is increasing, particularly in research on expectation states and exchange theory. This development is welcomed by those of us who believe that problems are best studied using multiple methods. Finally, there has been a renaissance in the use of systematic observation by sociologically oriented researchers. Thus, in 2002, social psychologists from both sides of the aisle are using surveys, experiments and observational methods, and learning from each other on how to improve these techniques.

At the same time, social psychology remains well integrated into the larger discipline of sociology. We share the use of the theories and methods described above with other sociologists. In our research and writing, we focus on topics that are of interest and in some cases central to the discipline: life-course analyses, social networks, socialization, status, stereotyping, and stigma, to name a few. Work by social psychologists is integral to most of the other major subfields in sociology: collective behavior and social movements, development, deviance, emotion, health, language, and social stratification. The relevance of social psychology to these topics is made clear in many of the chapters that follow.

In their Preface, Rosenberg and Turner characterized sociological social psychology as having reached the late adolescent stage of development; as such, it is heir to the various identity crises that

so often characterize that developmental stage. This volume, we hope, will assist it in discovering and establishing that identity (1981, xxxiv). Fourteen years later, in their Introduction, Cook, Fine, and House stated we have grown as a field and become more integrated into the discipline (1995, xii) and suggested that the field had reached early middle age. In light of the fact that only 8 years has passed since then, and of the continued growth, emergence of new areas of work, and increasing integration captured in these pages, we cannot have grown much older. I foresee a long and healthy midlife.

Madison, WI, USA
October 2, 2002

John DeLamater

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Introduction

It has been 10 years since the First Edition of the *Handbook of Social Psychology* was published. Judging from continuing sales and the many positive comments by colleagues, graduate students, and more general readership, the first edition successfully achieved the goals stated above. In the past decade, however, the sub-discipline of sociological social psychology has continued to develop and grow. In many areas, both theory and empirical research have advanced significantly. In a few areas, interest and research activity appears to have declined. Further, some new topics have been introduced. In recognition of these changes, it seems appropriate to produce a second edition of this *Handbook*.

For several reasons, I invited a second person to join the Editorial team. Foremost was my desire to bring in a young scholar with a good feel for the contemporary state of the sub-discipline. Another reason was to share the burden of logistic and editorial work involved in this undertaking. Finally, I hope that adding a young person will enhance the likelihood of a third edition. Amanda Ward is completing her Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. She specializes in social psychology and has an excellent grasp of the current state of the field. In particular, she was able to identify young researchers whom we could invite to author chapters.

We began the revision process by reviewing the Table of Contents for the First Edition as well as articles published in the *Social Psychology Quarterly* in the last decade. We identified new and recent developments in social psychology and their implications for the content and outline of the second edition. The preliminary outline and list of potential authors benefitted greatly (again) from input from graduate students and faculty participants in the Social Psychology and Microsociology seminar at UW-Madison. We also discussed the project with other colleagues here and elsewhere. Once the outline was complete, we contacted some potential contributors directly as well as putting out a call for contributors in the Fall 2011 ASA Social Psychology section Newsletter. In a number of cases we invited authors of chapters in the first edition to revise their work. In others, we invited new persons to contribute chapters.

The Table of Contents for this edition has an organization similar to the first edition. Section I includes four chapters presenting major theoretical perspectives, including the interactionist, identity, social exchange, and social structure and the person perspectives. Readers familiar with the first edition will note the absence of Evolutionary Social Psychology and Expectation States Theory in this section. After reviewing the literature and evolving chapters for this edition, we felt that Expectation States Theory fit naturally and was comprehensively discussed in the Interaction in Small Groups and Social Psychology of Race and Gender chapters. After careful consideration and much discussion we decided that literature drawing on (or debating) Evolutionary Social Psychology in sociological social psychology has waned in recent years and is sufficiently discussed in the Social Psychology and the Body and Emotions chapters.

Section II includes one chapter covering both childhood and adolescent socialization, and a second chapter focused on adult socialization through the life course. The decision to combine coverage of childhood and adolescence reflects our sense that there has been less work on these topics in the past decade. Section III, Personal Processes, includes two chapters on topics new to this edition, social psychology and the body, and individual agency and social motivation. Both were written by contributors new to the second edition and capture areas of novel and interdisciplinary work with varied theoretical and empirical development. The other four chapters treat topics included in the first edition: self; language and social interaction; ideologies, values, attitudes, and behavior; and emotions and sentiments. All but the second are written by contributors new to the second edition who brought new eyes to the literature.

Three of the chapters included in Section IV, Interpersonal Processes, consider topics also included in the first edition: interpersonal relationships, small groups, and social networks. The first two are written by contributors new to the second edition, bringing a more contemporary perspective. As we considered recent work in the social structure and personality area, it seemed to us that it has shifted its focus to stress and health, so that is the topic of the fourth chapter in this section.

Section V, the Person in Sociocultural Context, begins with another topic new to the second edition, the social psychology of race and gender specifically and intersectionality more generally. Race and gender have always been of interest to sociological social psychologists, particularly those who focus on social structure and the personality. We felt that a chapter explicitly reviewing social psychology research on race and gender as topics of interest, rather than variables, would demonstrate social psychology's relevance to the discipline. The remaining chapters reprise topics included in the first edition: intergroup relations, deviance, and cross-cultural social psychology. With respect to the latter, it seems to us that the focus has broadened in the past decade beyond comparisons of two cultures to a cross-national or international perspective. The title of the chapter reflects that shift.

In the previous edition, discussion of research methods was not a prominent feature. As the primary goal of the *Handbook* is to serve as a resource for graduate courses, we decided that methods should be discussed systematically. Since many methods are associated with research on only a few of the topics covered, we decided not to include a generic methods chapter, but instead asked authors to systematically discuss the methods used in research in the area(s) they wrote about. We hope this will provide an appropriate level of coverage of methods in the contexts where it makes sense.

We appreciate the seriousness and patience with which many of our colleagues considered our invitation to contribute. Some of them added the writing of a chapter for the *Handbook* to an already full plate of professional commitments, and we greatly appreciate it. Of the 35 contributors to this edition, 27 of them are new. All of the authors share our sense that this is an important undertaking. We invited more senior persons to collaborate with as younger scholar in preparing their chapters, and many did so. Every author/team provided us with a draft which we read very carefully and provided (sometimes extensive) feedback; in many cases, we reviewed the second draft equally carefully and requested additional changes. We thank each contributor for their careful reading of and response to our feedback.

As a single volume *Handbook*, this one has some limitations. Some tough choices were necessary with regard to topics. Not included are chapter-length treatment of some important topics, including aging, sexuality, and social psychology of organizations and work. In spite of our best efforts, we were unable to secure chapters on the evolutionary perspective and genetic research, and on collective behavior and social movements. Limitations notwithstanding, we hope the second edition will provide the next generation of scholars with the conceptual and methodological tools they need to make their contributions to this exciting sub-discipline.

Part I

Theoretical Perspectives

Chapter 1

Interactionist Perspectives in Social Psychology

George J. McCall

Introduction¹

Interaction is two or more agents (individuals or collectivities) acting upon one another in the forms of either a reciprocal or a mutual influence (McCall, 2003). Interactionism is the distinctive doctrine that society is a web of interaction, a principle first enunciated by the German sociologist Georg Simmel (1908) and subsequently elaborated in the highly influential textbook by the great American sociologists Robert E. Park (a student of Simmel) and Ernest W. Burgess (1921). This doctrine that society amounts to a web of interaction is itself compatible with a wide variety of social science perspectives, including social exchange theory, conflict theory, role theory, affect control theory, expectation-states theory, and identity theory.

But whenever interactionist perspectives are discussed, the main perspective is generally that of *symbolic interactionism*: the perspective that the agents involved in interaction are selves and that distinctively human interaction takes place through those selves' reliance on the use of symbols and their shared meanings. Indeed, the perspective of symbolic interactionism will be the main focus of this chapter, even though (perhaps because) there are many "flavors" of symbolic interactionism, each offering a somewhat different "take" on the nature of human interaction; all do address how humans handle the problem of establishing their significance for one another.

Core Themes of Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism is a fairly recent name (dating back to the 1930s) for an ancient and highly persistent social psychological view (dating back to the mid-1700s). Indeed, symbolic interactionism has been thoroughly established in sociology, to the extent that that many take that view to be virtually

This chapter reviews developments in symbolic interactionism, a relatively ancient framework (or perspective) dating back some 250 years. The initiators, early contributors, and current users share (in important degree) elements of that perspective; they also differ significantly in the ways they interpret the propositions that together constitute that framework.

¹Inevitably, this chapter draws heavily on the author's previous work (especially McCall, 2006), not departing from that work simply for the sake of being different. It does reflect, however, an updating of that previous work through substantive changes in ideas and changes in the relevant literature.

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Exhibit 1.1 Core Themes of Symbolic Interaction

Proposition A: *All humans share a common nature that is unique among all animals but obscured by human social differences.*

Proposition B: *Humans generally behave in socially proper ways.*

Proposition C: *Human conduct is self-regulated.*

(**Proposition C-1**) *A person is a social animal.*

(**Proposition C-2**) *Fundamental to Society is communication.*

(**Proposition C-3**) *Fundamental to Person is mental life.*

(**Proposition C-4**) *The key link between society and person is the “looking-glass self.”*

(**Proposition C-5**) *Self-regulation is a process.*

coterminous with sociology. The almost axiomatic themes of symbolic interactionism, in their most basic forms, are set forth in Exhibit 1.1.

Symbolic interactionism (SI) is fundamentally a perspective on human nature, a view that developed among the Scottish moral philosophers² in reaction against prevailing views of human beings that they felt were wrongly pessimistic and overly individualistic. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, had previously expressed the position that human lives are, in nature, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short. Although many of the writings of the Scottish moralists proved to be of enduring interest to sociologists, it was one groundbreaking book by Adam Smith—*The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759)—that most centrally defined their emerging view of human nature.

Original Themes

Proposition A. To identify the “human nature” that so concerned them, the Scottish moral philosophers felt it necessary to peer beyond the ubiquitous effects of environment (history, culture, circumstance) to find a nature common to all human beings. Accordingly, these Scottish moralists read extensively the emerging literature on newly documented peoples, including a variety of North American Indians, and importantly contributed to theories and works of history itself. And as early economists (Smith standing at their center), the Scottish moralists were sensitive indeed to many of the ways in which poverty, prosperity, and social position can cause one individual to seem so different from another.

At the same time that they were peering beneath the ubiquitous effects of environment in their efforts to put their finger on the common nature of human beings, these scholars had also to be concerned with humans’ similarities with and differences from other species of animals. Consequently, their views of human nature were always comparative in nature, pondering quite forthrightly all sorts of comparisons with many other creatures.

Proposition B. Over against the brutish behaviorism of Hobbes, the views of the Scottish moralists emphasized instead the notion of conduct. By that they meant behavior that is sophisticated, civilized, polished—consistent indeed with their distinguishing interest in the emergence of a civil society.

²This school of thought is usually reckoned to include, at minimum and in alphabetical order, Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Frances Hutcheson, Lord Kames, Lord Monboddo, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, and Dugald Stewart (Schneider, 1967). The social context of their work is discussed in Herman (2001).

Proposition C. But how is it, the Scottish moralists asked, that persons generally do the proper thing, at least in the eyes of their fellows? First of all, they contended, a person is fundamentally a social animal (C-1). Against prevailing social-contract theorists (who held that persons must have made a tradeoff, giving up to a government some freedoms so that they would benefit from greater social order), the Scottish moralists argued that society is primary and persons are only secondary, rather than the obverse. Second, they adopted the stance that society is peopled by selves, i.e., socially conscious actors who are aware of their position in society.

Serving to make individuals aware of their position is the process of communication, so fundamental to the very existence of society (C-2). Without some sort of communication, there would exist only a population rather than a society.

Smith dwelt upon the fact that individuals tend to make moral judgments about the actions (and underlying emotions) of other human beings. Judgments of the propriety or the merit of such actions (and their source feelings) depend on one's sympathy, or fellow feeling, with the feelings of actor or recipient. Sympathy, in this sense, is experiencing an analogous emotion at the thought of the situation the other person faces. Smith's breakthrough was his realization that this same mechanism can be used also to ensure propriety in judging one's own actions and feelings; impartiality of judgment can result only from looking at one's own actions as though they were those of someone else. Indeed, Smith contended that others serve the individual as a "social looking-glass," a mirror reflecting to the actor how others are reacting to his doings and his feelings—reflecting, that is, their moral judgments about the quality of his actions.

Of course, without some sort of mind—an internal and subjective counterpart to society's communication process (C-3)—a person could never even apprehend those moral judgments provided by society. The perceptual theory of mental life that prevailed in the 1700s emphasized the role of images—pale derivatives of the externally caused perceptions and sensations. Imagination, or the ability to entertain images, was regarded as a distinguishing human capacity, making possible a truly social intelligence.

In a thoroughly brilliant leap of theorizing, Smith claimed that the key link between society and the person is the *looking-glass self* (C-4); the individual comes by his moral compass through internalizing the social looking-glass:

We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behavior and endeavor to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our conduct.³

Smith thus postulated the existence of a divided self—one aspect inclined to execute particular actions, while a second aspect imagined how specific other humans would react to those actions:

When I endeavor to examine my own conduct, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons. ... The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavor to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself. ... The first is the judge; the second the person judged of.⁴

An action that apparently would be badly received by other people important to the individual would presumably be suppressed. Action, then, is (morally) regulated by this process of the functioning of the divided "looking-glass self" (C-5), and such self-regulated action amounts to conduct (Proposition C). Doing the proper thing, in the eyes of one's fellows (Proposition B), is quite a natural consequence of self-regulation.

³Smith, 1759, p. 260.

⁴Smith, 1790 (6th ed.), p. 131. This addition was already put forth in Smith's letter to Gilbert Elliot (Smith, 1987, p. 51).

Yet, Smith held that self-regulation through internalization of the social looking-glass is a human characteristic that is far from innate:

Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in a solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character ... than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.⁵

In that fashion, Smith advanced a position that the process of self-regulation requires both time and experience to develop (Proposition C-5).

Elaborations of Symbolic Interactionism

As an intellectual tradition of long standing, SI is quite like a pearl, accreting successive layers of development. In describing these successive layers of development accreting around the core, I will make selective use of that framework of intellectual development outlined by Colomy and Brown (1995), defining works that either elaborate, proliferate, revise, or reconstruct a tradition. As we shall discover, adaptations of SI (revisions or reconstructions) have generally been occasioned by the fundamentals (propositions C-2 or C-3), that is, by the rise of new (or at least different) theories of communication or of mental life.

European Influences

Symbolic interactionism, like much of social science, strongly reflects two other defining European intellectual traditions: neo-Kantian relativism, and evolutionism.

Neo-Kantian Relativism

Living at about the same time as Smith, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant achieved towering intellectual influence through his reconciling of the two very ancient intellectual traditions of rationalism and empiricism. Like the idealistic rationalists, Kant postulated a pregiven but chaotic world that could make human sense only through the imposition of conceptual categories. Like the empiricists, however, he conceded that such conceptual categories are significantly shaped by individual sensory experience of that world. Kant's new perspectival theory of mental life retained Smith's notion of a divided self (the knower and the known) but served to introduce a considerably more cognitive, less emotional view of mental life and action.

A century later, German Romanticism reveled in the increasingly documented cultural differences among all human groupings—races, nations, folks, tribes—to emphasize how conceptual categories themselves are shaped by such group-based differences in lived experience. By emphasizing differences in peoples' conceptual categories, these Romantic scholars effectively revised Kant's view of how conceptual categories are acquired. Such neo-Kantian relativism importantly defined much of the social sciences for decades to come.

Relativism of just this kind took on its sharpest form in the work of the German-American anthropologist Franz Boas (1911), who contended that languages are the primary basis for differences in conceptual categories. This doctrine of "linguistic relativism" (W. Foley, 1997) was subsequently perfected by Boas's student, Edward Sapir, and Sapir's close colleague, Benjamin Whorf (1956).

⁵Smith, 1759, p. 254.

Indeed, it was their doctrine (C-2) on how growing up speaking a particular language shapes a person's worldview, and therefore one's world, that effectively put the "symbolic" dimension into symbolic interaction.

Evolutionism

The concept of evolution had enjoyed a general currency in Europe for a century or more before its applicability was firmly established through the brilliant empirical and theoretical work of Charles Darwin (1859). Indeed, the Scottish moralists themselves had made several important contributions to evolutionary thought, particularly the evolution of societies.

But it was actually the various English developments of evolutionary doctrine (in biology by Darwin, Alfred Russel Wallace, and T.H. Huxley, and in sociology by Herbert Spencer) that lent new significance to the Scottish moralists' old questions of human nature, by emphasizing that humans are in fact animals. In the latter half of the 1800s, virtually every field of learning was revolutionized by evolutionism and its focus on changes in animal nature and on survival tests of fitness. For the first time mankind saw the rise of evolutionary psychology and of evolutionary sociology—fields that are even stronger today (Axelrod, 1984; R. Foley, 2001; Gaulin & McBurney, 2004; Kenrick & Luce, 2004; Key & Aiello, 1999) and that continue to challenge or refine Proposition A, thus lending a very modern cast indeed to ancient questions of human nature.

Early American Philosophy

Even though these three European traditions (Scottish moral philosophy, neo-Kantian relativism, and evolutionism) essentially established the intellectual context in which symbolic interaction further developed, it was an American movement in philosophical thought—pragmatism—that truly led to symbolic interactionism as we know it today (Lewis & Smith, 1980). Pragmatism represents a philosophical emphasis on adaptation and fitness (from evolutionism) and on experience (from Kantianism). In its basics, pragmatism is a philosophy of taking seriously the practical consequences of ideas for intelligent, purposive action.

Cambridge-Style Pragmatism

Among the group of philosophers meeting regularly at or around Harvard University, within which meeting the pragmatic movement sprang forth, surely the most seminal was Charles Sanders Peirce, who is credited with the invention of pragmatism. After all, it was Peirce's (1878) communication theory of signs—that a sign will always involve a tendency to behavior in anyone for whom it is a sign (Morris, 1970)—which lay at the heart of the pragmatists' distinctive theory of meaning (C-2), that what a thing means is what actions it involves. For example, a tomato means either nutrition or anger, depending on whether it is eaten or thrown.

Yet Peirce remained a recondite figure even among technical philosophers, and it was only through the works of his Cambridge colleague William James, that the movement of pragmatism came to achieve appreciable influence. (The latter was, after all, a well-connected humanist with a superior literary style—the brother of novelist Henry James.) James (1907) managed to broaden the appeal of the pragmatic maxim by bending its original emphasis on how ideas function in the community of scientists to his own concern for how ideas function in the lives of particular individuals.

Chicago-Style Pragmatism

The pragmatic movement soon attained an even wider audience through the very popular works of John Dewey (1908, 1925), one of the first well-known scholars in the field of education. Dewey's educational theories, emphasizing problem solving through enquiry, obviously struck a deep nerve in American thought, and not incidentally established that explicit self-regulation of actions need only be episodic rather than continual (C-5). According to Dewey, a creature usually relies on habit to control its actions, and it is only when the habitual solution is disrupted (through its failure) that explicit self-regulation (intelligence) is required. But beyond Dewey's important substantive ideas, it was his academic leadership that assembled at the University of Chicago a philosophy department centered (after his own departure) on the brilliant George Herbert Mead (Morris, 1970).

After Smith, Mead was undoubtedly the central figure in developing SI, owing mainly to the genius with which he united the pragmatists' theory of meaning (C-2) (see below) with an appropriate theory of mind (C-3) (see below). Key to that unification (Mead, 1934) was attention to a particular type of sign—the *gesture*—in which the earliest stages of an act call out in its beholders subsequent stages of that act. For instance, if we see a movie cowboy's hand stiffen near his holster, that is a sign that rather soon he is going to go for his revolver and drill the outlaw in the black hat; this first component of the act has become a gesture.

Mead's view emphasized that animals can signal their intentions only through such gestures, and so that animal interactions amount to a "conversation of gestures." Human actors, on the other hand, also employ a second category of sign—the *symbol*—that evokes within them the same response tendencies (i.e., meanings) that it evokes in beholders. This response in common serves to place actor and audience on the same footing, thus enabling a person literally to "assume the role of other toward oneself" and thereby to have the basis for that self-regulation of conduct that Smith noted (Proposition C); Mead's position was that humans act toward objects (including self) in terms of the meanings of those objects. And of course, the use of symbols (i.e., language) to communicate entails that the "other" here is not simply specific persons but is instead the "generalized other," thus transcending actor's imagination of how numerous specific persons might view one.

Like Smith, then, Mead supposed that the looking-glass self operates through individuals responding identically, to something; for Smith, that something was the situation, while for Mead it was the linguistic symbol. Yet, the difference between Smith's "seeing ourselves as others see us" and Mead's "taking the role of other toward the self" certainly does represent an important intellectual advance. After all, linguistic symbols make possible far more abstract conceptions than does any concrete situation.

Mead's symbolic theory of communication comports quite neatly with his representational theory of mental life (C-3), within which speech and language are taken to dominate human consciousness, at least in those situations where habit no longer succeeds and reflection is required of an intelligent actor. Gradually, by stages (C-5), a human being learns to internalize the "conversation of significant symbols," so that the process of self-regulation comes to take place by means of an "inner forum" of internalized debate. Such an "inner forum" based on linguistic symbols requires that the divided self (C-4) that carries on the debate consists of the "I" (the impulsive side of the actor) and the "Me" (the reactive side, embodying a variety of imported frameworks for response).

Early American Psychology

While all these developments were occurring in the mother field of philosophy, the major academic disciplines (including the social sciences) were struggling to establish themselves as independent entities in the emerging American universities.

In psychology, James Mark Baldwin (1897) was among the earliest scholars to emphasize that a person's human nature actually has to be developed, by society (C-5). In fact, Baldwin contributed a

quite specific theory setting forth and explaining the developmental stages through which such capacities are cultivated.

But among early American psychologists, it was William James who was, once more, of greatest importance. Attempting to move the older Continental psychology in a more Darwinian, evolutionary direction, James (1890) initiated what we now regard as a “functional” psychology, in which the self serves as a key factor in adapting the actor to the environment. His theory of mental life (C-3) accordingly emphasized the functions of “the stream of consciousness.” In his influential treatment of the self, James was perhaps the first to label the Kantian self-as-knower the “I” and the self-as-known the “me,” and he certainly emphasized that the social self (C-4) is not a single entity but rather is multiple:

A man’s social me is the recognition which he gets from his mates. ... Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of his in their mind. ... we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinions he cares.⁶

Early American Sociology

Although it was largely dominated by Social Darwinism, early American sociology, in its battle for standing as an independent scholarly discipline, found SI quite appealing in its insistence on the primacy of society over individuals and its generally optimistic account of human nature.

University of Michigan

From the lively academic center of Ann Arbor (Jacobs, 2006), Charles Horton Cooley (1902) enormously re-popularized among sociologists all the basic ideas of the Scottish moralists, especially that of the looking-glass self (C-4):

A social self of this sort might be called the reflected or looking-glass self:

“Each to each a looking-glass

Reflects the other that doth pass.”

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this imagination upon another’s mind. ... We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgments of the other mind.⁷

Although Cooley added to the framework the (rather Mead-like) interpretation that it is the communication process (C-2) that gives rise to mental life (C-3) and thence to self and other, his phenomenological insistence that the latter two entities are personal ideas—and thus can get together only in the mind—has considerably annoyed numerous other sociologists over the years, even though that insistence also underpinned his argument that society and self are twin-born—two sides of same coin. That is, Cooley’s phenomenology requires that self and other are only a person’s ideas and thus can encounter each other only in that person’s mind, a conception which also entails that self and that web of others that together comprise society (being personal ideas) have no priority and are essentially contemporaneous. Ignoring the advances of the pragmatists that same time, Cooley

⁶James, 1890, p. 179.

⁷Cooley, 1902, pp. 184–185.

stuck to the older theory of communication—emphasizing sympathy as the key mechanism (though his view of sympathy was much less emotional and considerably more cognitive than Smith’s)—and to the older theory of mind (C-3) that centered on the faculty of imagination. To Cooley, self was Person’s imagination of an idea of Other about Person, while Other was Person’s image of other. To take but one example, Person might imagine that Other considers him unusually intelligent (a self-idea), while Person regards Other as highly simple-minded (an idea about Other).

More innovative was Cooley’s demonstration that self-regulation (C-5) is a process that has to be developed over time through participation in society.

Man does not have [human nature] at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation.⁸

Cooley’s studies on the sociability and imagination of young children helped all to see the truth in Smith’s claim that human nature is not inborn but has to be socially developed. Taking the lead in that developmental process are not institutions but what he first styled “primary groups,” particularly the family and the peer group (Cooley, 1909).

University of Chicago

Across Lake Michigan, the newly established University of Chicago—based as it was in the Social Gospel movement of religious Darwinism—quickly assumed leadership in the newly emerging social sciences. That leadership has often been attributed in part to the university’s interdisciplinary character; graduate students in sociology took courses in anthropology with Sapir (1921), in linguistics with Leonard Bloomfield (1933), and in philosophy with Mead. Yet such courses always had considerable sociological focus; for example, Mead long taught the course Social Psychology and certainly appreciated the contributions that Cooley had made (Mead, 1930).

But the early sociology faculty itself included two giants of SI, in Robert E. Park and W.I. Thomas. These two are widely credited with turning sociology—including SI—into an empirical science (Bulmer, 1984). Thomas’s sprawling cross-national empirical study (with Florian Znaniecki) of the Polish peasant in Europe and America employed multiple methods, including analysis of a variety of personal documents (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918–1920). Park, explicitly treating the city of Chicago as a laboratory, supervised a most ambitious program of participant observation field studies that helped to define sociology. But to suppose that their contribution lay chiefly in that empirical proliferation of SI is surely misleading, as each man also contributed classical theoretical formulations.

The more philosophical Park, once having been a student of William James and Georg Simmel and a colleague of Mead, served students as something of a linking character. His essays (Park, 1927, 1931) significantly elaborated the SI view of human nature, delineating more precisely the distinction between humans and other animals (Propositions A and C-1). In doing so, Park also specified the sociological meaning of the term conduct (B) and linked it enduringly with Simmel’s notions of interaction. Finally, Park sociologically elaborated Smith’s (1776) old notions of specialization and division of labor, demonstrating that it is social roles that provide the framework for the self-conception (C-4), and so doing gave new meaning to the traditional Proposition B by asserting that humans strive to live up to their self-conceptions.

One thing that distinguishes man from the lower animals is the fact that he has a conception of himself, and once he has defined his role he strives to live up to it. ...⁹

Under these circumstances our manners, our polite speeches and gestures, our conventional and proper behavior, assume the character of a mask. ... In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the conception we

⁸Cooley, 1909, p. 30.

⁹Park, 1927, p. 738.

have formed of ourselves, the role we are striving to live up to, this mask is our “truer self”, the self we would like to be. So, at any rate, our mask becomes at last an integral part of our personality; becomes second nature.

From James, Park also derived a lifelong emphasis on grasping the subjective perspective of the actor in order to understand the meaning and motivation of actions—a view certainly consistent with SI.

Thomas, similarly, is best known today as the author of the so-called Thomas Theorem on the definition of situation (McHugh, 1968), that:

If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.¹⁰

The theory of mental life (C-3) embodied in that theorem cleverly unites Smith’s original emphasis on the social situation with the deepest insights of pragmatism in its focus on consequences. That is, the Thomas Theorem makes possible all sorts of sociological investigations, from Merton’s (1957) study of the self-fulfilling prophecy to Kuhn’s (1964b) study of reference groups.

Classical Symbolic Interactionism

University of Chicago

Of course, both Park and Thomas eventually left the university with which they had come to be so strongly identified. Following the eventual departures of these two figures, the Chicago sociology department actually consolidated its standing as the fountainhead of SI.¹¹ Herbert Blumer (as an avowed social psychologist and a follower of Mead) and Everett C. Hughes (as the fieldwork heir to Park) assumed faculty leadership in that consolidation. Indeed, it was Blumer who invented the label Symbolic Interactionism for this now-richly accreted framework. However, somewhat like Cooley, Blumer (1969) exasperated many other interactionists through his unrelenting emphasis on humans’ need to interpret signs and symbols, such that only full access to the mind of a person could underwrite understanding (see Process Tradition below). Meanwhile Hughes, like his predecessors, continued the empirical elaboration of SI and also contributed importantly regarding the occupational core of the self and how the self-concept changes as a function of career movement (1958).

Yet in many ways it was the post-war students of Blumer and Hughes who most directly elaborated SI in its heyday (Fine, 1995). Only a few can be singled out here for the contributions they made to the development of that perspective.

Anselm Strauss played a major role in that elaboration, not only through his book on the writings of Mead (Strauss, 1956) and his highly influential textbook of social psychology (Lindesmith & Strauss, 1949/1956), but also through his own theoretical monograph *Mirrors and Masks* (Strauss, 1959) uniting imagery of the mirror from Smith and of the mask from Park.

Erving Goffman’s series of publications on the self and interaction (Goffman, 1959, 1961, 1967) is largely responsible for moving dramaturgical theory (Brissett & Edgley, 1974) from its place on the periphery strongly toward the center of SI (see *Dramaturgical Tradition* below).

Gregory P. Stone (1962; Stone & Farberman, 1970) detailed an influential view of personal appearance—emphasizing the part played by nonverbal gestures in the identification of persons—while Howard S. Becker (1964; Becker & Strauss, 1956) developed views of self and career that significantly advanced those of his mentor Hughes.

¹⁰Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572.

¹¹The magnitude of that stature is difficult to exaggerate when it had already produced such major SI contributors as Willard Waller (1938), Robert E. Faris (1950), and Leonard Cottrell (1950).

Not only did Ralph H. Turner similarly advance the views of Park and Blumer on collective behavior (Turner & Killian, 1957/1962/1987), he contributed heavily to the basics of SI (see below) through his ideas about role-taking and role-making (Turner, 1962) and the role framework of the self (Turner, 1968, 1978).

Tamotsu Shibutani too contributed to the application of SI to collective behavior (Shibutani, 1966) but in his textbook of social psychology he also attempted to link SI with more psychoanalytic ideas (Shibutani, 1961)—ideas which were very popular among sociologists of that era.

Neo-Chicago

Following the eventual forced breakup of the traditional Chicago department starting around 1952, Blumer and Goffman eventually assembled something of a replica on the Berkeley campus of the University of California, where they turned out a number of remarkable students, including John Lofland and Stanford Lyman. Subsequently, Norman K. Denzin also joined the faculty, where he became thoroughly Blumerian even though working briefly also with Strauss, who was by then himself in the Bay Area. (Denzin later played a major part in proliferating the *Postmodern Tradition*, see below.)

Beyond Chicago

Of course, if SI had remained a Chicago (or even a neo-Chicago) school of thought, it would never have achieved its wide popularity among sociologists. In its classical period almost every department of sociology, particularly in the Midwest, not only taught SI but also importantly elaborated that perspective. Again, only a few such departments and individuals can be mentioned here, but the interlocking nature of most such departments must be emphasized.

The University of Minnesota, for instance, featured the contributions of Arnold M. Rose (1962) and generations of his students—most notably Sheldon Stryker (1962, 1980). In turn, Stryker joined others at Indiana University to inspire numerous additional cohorts of SI students (and, along with others, elaborated the *Structural Tradition*—see below).

And finally, of course, the University of Iowa department is said (Meltzer & Petras, 1970) to have developed its own distinctive version of SI under the influence of Manford H. Kuhn (1964a; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Those views of a role-based self assessable by means of structured instruments were carried forward by his many students, including Carl Couch (1958) and the duo of George J. McCall and J.L. Simmons (1966/1978). But again, Couch and his own students at Michigan State (e.g., McPhail & Tucker, 1972) and later at Iowa developed yet another major variant of SI (Katovich, Miller, & Stewart, 2003).

Common Developments

Wherever their academic home, classical symbolic interaction scholars contributed to the development of several of SI's basic themes, as sociology became more advanced in both theory construction and empirical testing of theories.

For example, the proposition that humans generally behave in socially proper ways was put to a severe test through countless studies of social deviants (Cressey, 1953; Lemert, 1951; Lindesmith, 1947; Rubington & Weinberg, 1968). Labeling theory (Becker, 1963; Schur, 1971), by extending

the Thomas theorem to the situation where persons are labeled by others as deviant, achieved great currency among sociologists. Although labeling theory and the idea of social deviance were more than sustained through these numerous studies, their apparent contradiction of Smith's Proposition B was resolved by the almost universal discovery that even deviants mainly conform—not to mainstream social and cultural expectations, but instead to the expectations held by deviant subcultures and deviant peer groups. Central to interpreting these repeated findings was the again-popular scholarly notion of the *reference group*, holding that humans tend to judge themselves by the standards of those groups that they hold most important to them (Kuhn, 1964b; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Shibutani, 1955).

A second common development of SI reflected a far more advanced and sophisticated understanding of language and communication during the classical period. Sociolinguistics (Fishman, 1970) emerged in several disciplines to study the uses of language in society. Especially important for SI was the recognition that the practical uses of language (Austin, 1965; Hymes, 1962) establish contexts that provide levels of meaning which can never be captured by mere semantics. Pragmatics, as a branch of linguistics, examines such contextual or speaker meanings as opposed to semantic meanings (Kasher, 1997; Van Dijk, 1997). In response to this new branch of sociolinguistics, there arose within SI an "ethnomethodological approach" interested to discover those methods that members of a speech community use to produce and recognize social actions in social situations (Garfinkel, 1967). [This "ethnomethodology" was to later evolve into "conversational analysis" (see Chapter 11, Language and Social Interaction).]

At the same time, *psycholinguistics* (Saporta, 1961) emerged within several fields studying the connections of language with individuals. Particularly vital to SI were studies of lost linguistic capacities (Brain, 1961), of shifts in how a child employs language (Piaget, 1959; Vygotsky, 1962), and of how language serves to regulate the individual's actions (Luria, 1961). The communication phenomenon of role-taking, so central to the tenets of SI, was subjected to careful measurement of the ability to take the role of another and to empirical testing of Meadian hypotheses about it (Cottrell & Dymond, 1949; Dymond, 1949; Miyamoto & Dornbusch, 1956; Stryker, 1962). Given the SI emphasis on the reciprocity of self and other, of role-making and role-taking (Turner, 1962), numerous related studies were undertaken to examine how self-conceptions are influenced by the reactions of others (Backman & Secord, 1962; Quarantelli & Cooper, 1966; Videbeck, 1960). In both areas of hypothesis testing, the core SI notions received considerable empirical support.

A third common development during the classical period reflected the growth of a more proactive view of individuals—a view entirely consistent with pragmatism's focus on the individual's strivings. As an example of this more proactive view, no longer was SI's focus on how appearances are judged but rather on how the individual can influence how he/she appears to others (Goffman, 1959; Stone, 1962). While that emphasis was particularly strong within the developing dramaturgical approach (Goffman, 1959; Lyman & Scott, 1975), a definitely proactive view became quite widespread among SI scholars, leading to far greater attention to processes of negotiation more generally (Strauss, 1978). Roles were no longer taken as given but rather as being negotiated with others in a process of role-making (Turner, 1962). Social situations came to be viewed as being socially defined through a process of collective negotiation involving not only presentation of self and role-making but other processes as well (G. McCall & Simmons, 1966/1978). The "definition of the situation" was seen as entailing a negotiated working agreement on the selves of everyone present (Weinstein & Deutschberger, 1964), so that even the social self came to be seen as not merely a personal thing but a "social object" negotiated with others in the course of their social act (G. McCall & Simmons, 1966/1978). A significant result of this view was the implication that the bipartite self is actually tripartite in its structure: the I, the Me, and the self as negotiated social object (Goffman, 1959; G. McCall & Simmons, 1966/1978).

Common Themes

As a result of such common developments, the following summary statement of the fundamental neo-Meadian, pragmatic principles of symbolic interaction attained considerable acceptance among classical SI scholars:

1. *Man is a planning animal.* Man is a thinker, a planner, a schemer. He continually constructs plans of action (what Mead called “impulses”) out of bits and pieces of plans left lying around by his culture, fitting them together in endless permutations of the larger patterns and motifs that the culture presents as models. This ubiquitous planning is carried on at all levels of awareness, not always verbally but always conceptually.
2. *Things take on meanings in relation to plans.* The meaning of a “thing” (as a bundle of stimuli, in Mead’s sense) can be taken as its implications for these plans of action we are always constructing. Its meaning can be thought of as the answer to the question, “Where does it fit in the unfolding scheme of events?”... [Of course, a “thing” might be a person, a place, an action, or any other sort of object.]
3. *We act toward things in terms of their meaning for our plan of action.* Or, better stated, the execution of our plan of action is contingent upon the meaning for that plan of every “thing” we encounter. If we bend down to pick up a stick and that stick turns out to be a dead snake—or vice versa—the chances are that that plan of action will be suspended and superseded by some other plan.
4. *Therefore, we must identify every “thing” we encounter and discover its meaning.* We have always to be identifying (categorizing, naming) the “things” we encounter and interpreting (construing, reconstructing) them to determine their meanings for our plans of action. ... Until we have made out the identity and meaning of a thing vis-à-vis our plans, we have no bearings; we cannot proceed.
5. *For social plans of action, these meanings must be consensual.* If a plan of action involves more than one person and we encounter a “thing” whose meaning for this plan of action is unclear—not consensual among those involved—the meaning must be hammered out by collective effort in the rhetoric of interaction.

As the consummation of a social act, the resulting attributed meaning is a “social object.” It is this process of arriving at a meaning for a problematic “thing,” of structuring an unstructured situation, that lies at the core of that fascinating subject we call “collective behavior.” This meaning will seldom be clear and identical in the minds of all concerned, yet it will still be consensual, in the pragmatic sense that the understanding will at least be sufficiently common to permit the apparent mutual adjustment of lines of action, whether in cooperation or conflict.

6. *The basic “thing” to be identified in any situation is the person himself.* For each actor there is one key “thing” whose identity and meaning must be consensually established before all else—namely, himself. “Who am I in this situation? What implications do I have for the plans of action, both active and latent, of myself and of the others?” The answers to these questions, if consensually arrived at as already described, constitute what we have called the character of that person. Self qua character, then, is not alone a personal thing but also a social object.¹²

Some Key Concepts of Symbolic Interactionism¹³

Reflecting those successive accretions, common developments, and classical themes, virtually all symbolic interactionists can agree on what are the core concepts of SI. Most of these ideas have been introduced heretofore, but often in rather striking isolation from one another. In this section I briefly consider them as an interlinking system of concepts—a perspective.

¹²G. McCall & Simmons, 1966, pp. 60–61.

¹³This section draws heavily upon Stryker and Vryan (2003) as published in the first edition of this handbook.

The central concept of SI is, of course, meaning, which in turn presupposes the occurrence of an act (present in latent form in the animal and released—not “stimulated”—by configurations of stimuli that the animal seeks out in order to fulfill these impulses or incipient acts). Because acts take place over time, they make possible the occurrence of gestures—parts of an act that foretell parts still to come. Gestures may take the forms of vocal sounds, facial expressions, bodily movements, clothing, and the like, because all these allow persons to anticipate each other’s future actions. The meaning of a gesture, after all, is the response of an audience to it. Those gestures that mean the same thing to those producing and those perceiving them are termed symbols. Vocal gestures, more than most other sorts, are especially likely to elicit the “same” response and thus to serve as symbols in this sense. Symbols (specifically, the language that they may form) allow the actor to carry on a solitary and internal conversation, so vital to controlled behavior (i.e., conduct).

Symbols also permit things and ideas to enter people’s experience as objects (being the object or the point of an act) whose meanings, developing from social interaction, become their social reality. And because symbolic gestures anticipate the future course of acts, symbols can also be said to underwrite plans of action.

Among the key objects (integrating plans of action) are definitions of the situation. In order to interact with other persons in an organized manner, meanings must emerge in (or be assigned to) the situations in which the actors find themselves. Without such meanings, behavior even in familiar situations is apt to prove disorderly. Tentative readings (or definitions of the situation) might hold steady throughout an episode of interaction, but naturally they could also be revised during the course of an unfolding interaction as early definitions of that situation may prove inadequate to the task of permitting the interaction to proceed satisfactorily.

As the common themes of SI make clear, the crux of situations (requiring this sort of definition) is who (or what) persons in the situation are—oneself even more than others who might be present. (Of course, defining the situation of action itself may often impose restrictions on the types of people who can enter a situation, so that the situation itself may sometimes take precedence in this process of definition.) Persons in the situation are most often defined by means of specifying their social categories, i.e., those that stand for the kinds of person it is possible to be in that society. Specifying the social categories of persons (both self and others) makes it possible to bring to bear expectations associated with those social categories—i.e., roles. Of course, the value of such role expectations can be altered (whether favorably or unfavorably) in the many situations that permit (or even require) specifying self or others in more than a single category, thus opening up the possibility that conflicting expectations emerge.

Whether based on one or several categories, role-expectations play an important part in role-taking, the more general process through which people anticipate how others will respond—in effect, by putting themselves in the place of an other, to perceive the world as that person does. Of course, the accuracy of that role-taking is affected by one’s prior experiences with those and similar others, by one’s knowledge of the social categories in which those other persons are located, and by cues emerging through interaction with those specific others. Role-taking (or “taking the role of another toward the self”) allows one to anticipate and to monitor the consequences for interaction of one’s own actions; that process also allows one to redirect those actions if necessary or useful in the course of interaction. The process of interaction sometimes also reflects role-making (Turner, 1962), modifying or creating roles by devising performances responsive to roles imputed to others. Role-making occurs when roles lack concreteness or consistency but actors must nevertheless organize their behavior on the assumption that they are unequivocal. For instance, the role of “computer hacker” lacks even clearcut approbation or condemnation, yet many of us will have to deal quite concretely with such hackers. Especially in such complex societies as our own, meanings are not apt to be shared in detail by parties to interaction; in fact, often enough the meanings entertained by some actors outright contradict the meanings considered by at least some others. Whenever interpretations are not shared in detail, inaccuracy in role-taking and difficulty in role-making are likely to occur, thus complicating social interaction.

Last (but far from least) of these fundamental concepts of SI is the self. The individual achieves selfhood at that point at which he or she first takes the role of an other toward oneself—when one responds reflexively to oneself, by classifying and defining who one is. In this way, self implies a plan of action in a defined situation. The meaning of this self, like any other meaning, develops in and through social interaction as plans of action are responded to. But of course, not all social behaviors are to be taken as self-directed; many of them are based on habit (e.g., Camic, 1986) or on ritual (e.g., Goffman, 1967). Self enters the picture only when behavior becomes problematic for one reason or another. Nor is self-awareness always present in social interaction: the effects of self-processes below the level of awareness may well have considerable impact on social behavior.

Some Traditions Within Symbolic Interactionism¹⁴

Despite such a general agreement on the basic principles and concepts of symbolic interactionism, SI reflects nearly as many different “flavors” as does a certain popular ice-cream chain. Four of these “flavors,” or traditions, are discussed in this section.

Process Tradition of Symbolic Interactionism

Some symbolic interactionists set themselves apart by emphasizing the inherent fluidity of the interactive process, contending that the meanings and definitions fundamental to that process are always reformulated in the very course of interaction itself.

Beyond any doubt, the most influential advocate of such a process tradition within SI was Herbert Blumer (1969), long associated with the University of Chicago and the founder of the neo-Chicago department at the University of California-Berkeley. That influence stems partly from the fact that he seemed to inherit the University of Chicago’s tradition of sociology and social psychology from Mead and partly from his performance as perhaps the most public advocate for SI through a time (roughly, the 1930s through the 1960s) when SI was overtaken by a quite ascendant structural-functionalism that came to dominate sociology, both intellectually and institutionally. Blumer enunciated a version of SI that contained vital humanistic elements and thus attracted sociologists who rejected a structural-functionalism they regarded as treating human beings like mere puppets of social structure and as being “scientific.”

Blumer held that the SI that he articulated was entirely consistent with Mead’s thought (Blumer, 1980) and that, further, it implied a rigid set of methodological requirements. Regarding his impact on how SI has developed as a social psychological framework—my concern in this chapter—it is this set of methodological implications he drew from Mead that stand out as most important. First of all, Blumer claimed that pursuing a goal of general, predictive theory within sociological research would necessarily prove futile given the centrality of meanings, definitions, and interpretations for subjects’ actions. He viewed people as actively and continuously engaged in the construction of their own behaviors in the very course of ongoing interaction and, most importantly, he regarded this sort of “perpetual construction” as characterizing social life in its entirety. Those meaningful elements so basic to social interaction undergo continuous reformulation in the course of the interaction itself and are thus emergent and subject to moment-to-moment change. Consequently, he held, these subjective

¹⁴This section (save for the subsection on the dramaturgical tradition) draws heavily upon Stryker and Vryan (2003) as published in the first edition of this handbook.

elements lack the generality and the objectivity required of theoretical concepts from which predictive theories are developed. From this line of argument Blumer concluded that, although it is quite possible (and indeed desirable) for sociologists to achieve after-the-fact understandings of social behavior but that sociologists cannot develop general theoretical explanations that predict social behavior (either individual or collective).

A second line of argument concerns the nature of scientific concepts themselves. Blumer distinguishes the “definitive concepts” of conventional science from the merely “sensitizing concepts” of the social sciences: “Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look” (Blumer, 1969, p. 148).

Like any framework, the process version of SI does in fact have methodological consequences. First of all, the process tradition implies that sociologists waste their time in undertaking any research which starts from a theory that is (1) pre-existing (since such a theory must employ concepts that came before the new research) and (2) gives rise to hypotheses that predict concrete outcomes of social behavior. Second, the process tradition implies that any research method that fails to focus directly on actors’ meanings as these emerge in social interaction that is both ongoing and naturally occurring (e.g., any experimental or survey method) necessarily lacks validity. Third, the process tradition effectively denies any value for sociology of mathematical or statistical manipulation of quantitative data, since such data are necessarily devoid of the meanings that are themselves the essential character of sociological phenomena. Fourth, the process tradition minimizes the impact of social organization and social structure on social action, by viewing organization and structure as merely frames within which action takes place rather than as themselves shaping action. In fact, Blumer contended that any attempt even to link social behavior to elements of structure—to role requirements, expectations, or situational demands—is not consistent with the recognition that humans are subjective beings who constantly engage in the activities of defining and interpreting.

Work in the process tradition (1) tends to follow Blumer’s methodological dicta and (2) displays a preference for small-scale studies that rely on ethnographic, observational, and intensive interviewing methods coupled with qualitative methods of analysis. This sort of research often is used either to illustrate a concept previously developed in the work of others, or to present and illustrate a “new” concept considered useful in understanding that situation being examined. Often, the situation examined is relatively unusual or exotic in its nature, and is deliberately approached without any prior conceptualization, rationalized by reference to a “grounded theory” approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Work of this kind typically takes little or no interest in whether what is learned might generalize to other situations or other interactions. Most often, that is, work done within this process tradition appears to take as its task a thorough description of the situation being studied and an understanding of the processes that take place in that situation. A contemporary argument for the unique value of work in this process tradition can be found in Harris (2001), who contends that what lends distinctiveness to the mission of SI research is to give voice to the subjects of research while focusing on the details of their definitions and interpretations in developing accounts of their social behavior.

Structural Tradition of Symbolic Interactionism

In general opposition to such a process tradition within SI stands the structural tradition, first and most clearly associated with Manford Kuhn (1964a), a social psychologist at the University of Iowa (Meltzer & Petras, 1970). In close accord with those sociologists who contend that social structure is created, maintained, and altered through symbolic interaction, Kuhn argued that such a structure, once created, does in fact constrain and limit further interaction. Embracing the Meadian ideas that (1) self is an object and (2) objects are attitudes or plans of action, Kuhn viewed the self as being a plan of

action and, therefore, the most significant object to be defined in a situation: to know an actor's self is to have the best available index of that actor's future behavior (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Kuhn's methodological posture was steadfastly devoted to what Blumer called "conventional science" and thus envisioned developing generalizing propositions from which specific explanatory and predictive hypotheses can be deduced and empirically tested.

Although Kuhn himself died relatively early, his beginnings of a structural tradition within SI were continued by many others, including Strauss (1959), George J. McCall (G. McCall & Simmons, 1966), Peter J. Burke (1991), and, especially, Stryker (1980). This tradition is most explicit about the need to incorporate every level and kind of social structure into social psychological analyses; in fact, this tradition developed, in part, in response to critiques of the process tradition (Gouldner, 1970; Huber, 1973) that asserted an outright ideological bias resulting from a neglect of social structure. The structural tradition has been further motivated by (1) the sense that social psychological processes cannot be understood without locating those processes in their structural contexts and (2) the belief that if sociologists do not deal with this task no one else will.

Structural SI incorporates in modified form ideas of the process tradition about the openness and fluidity of social interaction, self-direction, and human agency stemming from the symbolic capacity of humans. Modifications of those ideas emphasize the *constraints* on openness and fluidity, self-direction, and agency that are inherent aspects of membership in society. Toward such an end, this tradition draws on structural role theory (e.g., Stryker, 2001), which concurs with the generic propositions of SI that person and society are twin-born, yet accords causal priority to society, on the grounds that every actual person is at birth enmeshed in and cannot survive outside of pre-existent organized social relationships. Thus, for all practical purposes, "in the beginning there is society" (Stryker, 1997). That aphorism essentially opens the way to other basic arguments of the structural tradition. First, human experience is socially organized, not random; that is, those experiences are shaped by the social locations of actions and by the relationships, groups, networks, communities, institutions, and strata of which individuals are a part. Second, social structures define boundaries, rendering it more likely that those located within them will or will not have relations with particular kinds of others and will interact with those others over particular kinds of issues with particular kinds of resources (G. McCall & Simmons, 1966/1978). Third, social structures also affect the probabilities that persons will or will not develop particular kinds of selves, learn particular kinds of motivations, and have available particular symbolic resources for defining the situations that they enter.

Process interactionists hold that social life is constructed and is therefore open to reconstruction and radical change. Structural interactionists agree, but note that the constructions of life are not necessarily ephemeral; those constructions are usually social (seldom up to an individual) and in any case they are constrained by objective features of the world—by prior constructions, norm-based pressures from partners in interaction, and habit. (Often, in fact, interaction simply reproduces extant structures.) Thus, even though human beings are (interpretive) actors, their action does not necessarily result in changing the situations or larger structural settings in which they live their lives.

Structural interactionists expect social behavior to reflect some sort of blend of construction and reproduction, change and stability, creativity and conformity, and it becomes a major task to specify conditions making for change or stability (e.g., Serpe & Stryker, 1987).

Both the symbolic and the subjective are thus central to social life and warrant attention to the impact of definitions, including self-definitions. SI emphasizes that the reciprocal relation of society and social action is mediated, in particular, by the self. Precisely because it is rooted in the reactions of others, a self can permit some measure of independence from others' expectations. At the same time, persons' structural locations variably constrain the symbolic and the subjective aspects of reality. Additionally, the structural tradition points out that external realities impinge on social behavior independently of definitions, including definitions of self (e.g., social class exerts its effects whether or not actors conceptualize themselves, others, or situations in class terms). The argument advanced by the structural tradition is that social psychology must view the symbolic and the social structural

as operating simultaneously in social behavior; the theoretical task once again becomes specifying the conditions affecting the “mix” of the two.

To summarize, the structural tradition within SI views society as a complex and differentiated—but organized—mosaic of relationships, groups, networks, organizations, communities, and institutions intersected by encompassing structures of age, gender, ethnicity, class, religion, and the like. For the most part, people live their lives in relatively small and quite specialized networks of social relationships, doing so through roles attached to positions in these networks. These social networks may be independent of one another or they may overlap, and they may entertain compatible or conflicting expectations. Because self reflects society, selves incorporate these characteristics of society. Selves are complex, differentiated but organized structures whose essential subparts are identities—internalized expectations attached to the numerous roles that are played in such networks of social relationships. Each of these constituent identities, being tied to a particular network of social relationships, may likewise reflect compatible or conflicting expectations. Both social interaction and networks of relationships may present possibilities for reinforcement or conflict; the degree to which each occurs reflects the characteristics of ties between persons and social structures.

Dramaturgical Tradition of Symbolic Interactionism

Perhaps intermediate between the process and the structural traditions within SI is the dramaturgical tradition, most widely associated with certain works of Erving Goffman, a Chicago Ph.D., long an influential social psychologist within the Berkeley department, and later a communications scholar at the University of Pennsylvania. [Other scholars widely acknowledged to have contributed importantly to the development of the dramaturgical tradition include Kenneth Burke (1945), the early C. Wright Mills (1940), Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman (1966), Dennis Brissett and Charles Edgley (1974/1990), Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin B. Scott (1975), and Robert Perinbanayagam (1985).]

Central to the dramaturgical tradition is the metaphor of “life as theater”—this tradition speaks often of staging a show, of performances, of scenes that come off, and so forth. Goffman (1959) himself took performance to be central, defining that concept as the staging of a character before an interpretive audience. Implicitly, such a staging of character is consistent with Kenneth Burke’s analysis of actors’ explanations of their behavior, in which he held that every account (or motive) for behavior includes the same five terms (or principles): Act (what is being done, in deed or thought); Scene (the background situation in which the act occurs); Agent (the perpetrator of the act); Agency (the means by which the act occurs); and Purpose (why the act is done). Particularly important to Goffman and to other adherents of the dramaturgical tradition is, of course, Burke’s element of Scene, as it is this element that underlies all dramaturgical analysis. Indeed, according to Goffman (1959, p. 252), “A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation—this self—is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it.”

In his analysis of performance, Goffman gave a central role to an actor’s expression (and to the ideally corresponding impression made upon an audience). Whenever a person comes into the presence of other people, they usually try to learn about him or her or try to use information about that person that they already have. Information about that person helps to define the situation, thus enabling the others to know in advance what that individual will expect of them and what they may expect of that person. According to Goffman, then, whenever in the presence of others an individual inevitably projects (or expresses) a definition of the situation. And does so by means of two quite different kinds of expression: the expressions that the person gives, and the expression given off. The first includes verbal symbols that the person uses openly and solely to convey the information that the individual and all of the others are known to attach to these symbols: communication, in the traditional sense. Expressions given off, on the other hand, involve a wider range of actions, which those same others can treat as

being symptomatic of the actor, on the supposition that the action was performed for reasons other than the information conveyed. Expressions given off are thus more theatrical—often non-verbal and always presumed unintentional—and lend themselves to others checking on the validity of the actor's expressions.

These impressions gained by others (especially first impressions) are vital determinants of the others' own definitions of the situation, and therefore the actor has a vested interest in controlling those impressions received (i.e., in impression management). Particularly valuable in this regard are fronts, expressive equipment analyzable into geographical settings (which supply the scenery and stage props) and personal fronts (items, such as race or age, that we naturally expect to accompany the person wherever he or she may go). Regions often result from a division of a setting into a front region (where the performance is presented) and a back region (where the performance is prepared).

Being a sociologist, Goffman accorded great significance to social establishments (such as homes and workplaces) and to their relevant performance teams (troupes or casts of players who together stage routines to control audiences' impressions—that is to say, team members cooperate to present to an audience a given definition of the situation). Indeed, Goffman explicitly stated that “the team and the team-performance may well be the best units to take as the fundamental point of reference” (1959, p. 80) and that the dyadic case may best be viewed as two-team interaction in which each team contains only one member.

Goffman did this in order to better analyze incidents (disruptions of performances), that he classified as manifesting either discrepant roles (e.g., informer, shill, spotter, shopper, go-between, non-person, service specialist, confidant, colleague, renegade) or communication out of character (treatment of the absent, staging talk, team collusion, temporary realignments). Preventing incidents of these kinds falls into the categories of defensive measures used by performers to save their own show (dramaturgical loyalty, discipline, and circumspection) or protective measures used by audiences and outsiders to help performers save their show (i.e., exercising tact).

At one point, Goffman strongly defended the dramaturgical tradition, taking the position that dramaturgy could even stand alongside the technical, political, structural, and cultural perspectives as valid ways to study social establishments. In the end, however, he did back away from dramaturgy, stating that, while in his work to develop a conceptual framework some language of the stage was inevitably used, the time had now come to admit that dramaturgy was merely a scaffold in his real purpose (understanding the structure of social encounters) that inevitably must be taken down.

Nevertheless, this dramaturgical work of Goffman has long been attacked (e.g., Messinger & Towne, 1962) “as being essentially a sociology of fraud and deceit. ... dramaturgical man is alleged to be a selfish, scheming, deceitful conniver and con artist who fashions an illusionary existence for himself by manipulating the thoughts and actions of others through skillful performances.” (Edgley, 2003, p. 147) A spirited defense of Goffman's version of the dramaturgical tradition is provided by Brisset and Edgley (1990)—and, in somewhat abbreviated form, by Edgley (2003)—in which specific types of attack are countered: (1) dramaturgy is a nonsystematic form of inquiry lacking formal theory (but see Goffman, 1959, p. 239); (2) dramaturgy fails to produce (culturally) universal statements about human behavior (but see Goffman, pp. 244–248); (3) dramaturgy manifests methodological inadequacies; and (4) the role of social structure is said to be trivialized in dramaturgy (but see Goffman, pp. 238–242).

Postmodern Tradition of Symbolic Interactionism

Drawing support from certain methodological tenets of the process tradition—particularly Blumer's contention that no generalizing sociological theory is possible—the postmodern tradition within SI has been most often associated with Norman K. Denzin, also initially a social psychologist within

the Berkeley department and later at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. [Other symbolic interactionists commonly identified with postmodernism include Laurel Richardson (1997), Carolyn Ellis (Ellis & Bochner, 2000), Barry Glassner (1990), and Michal M. McCall (M. McCall & Wittner, 1990).]

A number of symbolic interactionists (certainly many of those mentioned above) have been seriously influenced in recent years by developments initiated outside of SI. Such developments include post-structuralism and postmodernism (e.g., Denzin, 1983a, b), cultural studies (e.g., Becker & M. McCall, 1990; Denzin, 1992) and feminism (e.g., Richardson, 1991). These developments have led some to identify what Denzin (1996) has termed “crises of representation and legitimation” within social psychology and to remedial experimentation with unconventional ways of presenting ideas (Ellis & Bochner, 2000; M. McCall & Wittner, 1990; Richardson, 1997). Whether such works represent expansions of the SI frame, are related to but separate from that frame (Musolf, 1993), or are irrelevant to that frame, are questions for current debate. For reasons noted above, I have chosen not to enter that debate here. Nevertheless, insofar as they imply the need for greater reflexivity on the part of SI researchers of whatever flavor—and, in particular, increased sensitivity to the possible confounding of their perspectives and those of their research subjects—attention to these works is more than warranted.

Recent Developments in Symbolic Interactionism¹⁵

Developments

Sociology had become such a popular field of study during the 1960s that sheer numbers allowed serious expansion of SI into nearly every sociological specialty: e.g., deviance (Becker, 1963; J. Lofland, 1969; Rubington & Weinberg, 1968), urban sociology (Karp, Stone, & Yoels, 1977; L. Lofland, 1973), organizations and occupations (Glaser, 1968; Hall, 1975), even the sociology of knowledge (Berger & Luckman, 1966). The spread became geographical as well as substantive, with SI making a belated return to its original home in Great Britain (Harré & Secord, 1972; Rock, 1979; Yardley & Honess, 1987). Both types of spread gave rise to more specialized publication outlets, including the journal *Symbolic Interaction* and the annual *Studies in Symbolic Interaction*, each of which continues today.

A serious challenge to SI during these years was a series of empirical studies that called into question how closely and in what respects the looking-glass self does reflect appraisals by others (Tice & Wallace, 2003). Beyond the fact that these studies examined only quantitative ratings and rankings as appraisals (unimaginable to Smith, Cooley, or Mead), the findings that perceptions of external appraisals often are less than accurate, skewed to give greater weight to the opinions of significant others, and biased by semi-independent self-images, could scarcely prove surprising to modern SI scholars such as Felson (1993). After all, the proactive character of classical SI had already predicted exactly that pattern (G. McCall & Simmons, 1966/1978).

Despite such challenges, traditional SI persists into yet another century, the twenty-first, as marked by the appearance of the thousand-page *Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism* (Reynolds & Herman-Kinney, 2003).

¹⁵This section also draws heavily upon McCall (2006).

Current Themes of Symbolic Interaction

Reflecting all of these developments, the core themes of SI (as depicted in Exhibit 1.1) have accreted many additional layers of significance over the years since the time of Smith. Though heavily elaborated, those themes are, I submit, consistent with all the leading textbooks of SI, not only those of yesteryear—from Lindesmith and Strauss (1949/1956) to Secord and Backman (1974)—but also those of today, such as Hewitt (1999) and Charon (2009). More important, those themes continue to accrete further layers of significance as empirical and theoretical advances are made in many fields—not only sociology and psychology, but also anthropology, linguistics, and philosophy. A brief review of the current standing and significance of each theme is thus useful in this account of SI.

With regard to Proposition A, exactly what distinguishes humans from other creatures is still hotly debated today (Griffin, 1981; Lieberman, 1991), though nearly all commentators agree that language (Deacon, 1997) and self-awareness (Ferrari & Sternberg, 1998) are surely key aspects of human uniqueness. Still obscuring the matter of species differences is the enormous variability among humans—not only individual genetic differences manifested physiologically but also numerous social and cultural differences (Aiken, 1999), including the shaping influence of languages (Bloom, 1981; Deutscher, 2010). This variability within the human species has long been a constant theme of both anthropology and medicine, and from its beginnings psychology has regarded the study of “individual differences” as a major subfield.

Proposition B, that humans generally behave in socially proper ways, has today gone well past the original opposition of the Scottish moralists to Hobbes’ view of savage individualism bridled only by the force of the state. Although the latter view is still echoed in various conflict theories (Collins, 1975), many social scientists today take for granted the Scottish moralists’ claim that the primacy of society is not merely temporal but that selves are built in such a way as to facilitate individuals fitting into, and getting ahead in, society. Self and a benign sort of social control fit one another very nicely; even the radical sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1960) sought to demonstrate that a norm of social reciprocity is fundamental to all societies. Only with Rousseau did “self versus society” emerge as the Romantic myth of individualism; if one’s position in society is no longer seen as voluntary, then social control must be seen as coercive rather than cooperative.

Concerning Proposition C, “conduct” may remain something of a theory-laden term, but the phenomena of self-regulation have become the focus of considerable empirical and theoretical research (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). Still prominent within the large body of work on self-regulation are the SI maxims that we act toward objects (including the self) in terms of their meanings (Mead, 1934) and that we strive to live up to our social roles (Park, 1927).

The more specific propositions that underlie and flesh out that more general one have similarly accreted their own layers of meaning. The first of these (C-1, that a person is a social animal) has been abundantly demonstrated in social psychological studies of isolation (Davis, 1947; Shattuck, 1980) and socialization (Clausen, 1968), to the point that at least one major textbook of social psychology was actually entitled *The Social Animal* (Aronson, 1984). In fact, classical SI extended the study of socialization from its focus on children to a consideration of adult socialization (Becker, 1968), using the notion of careers (Becker, 1964; Becker & Strauss, 1956; Strauss, 1959) to argue the necessity of studying socialization across the entire life-cycle (Brim & Wheeler, 1966). The primacy of society that was so vital to Smith’s views has now mainly taken the form of the primacy of a speech community (Bloomfield, 1933; Sapir, 1921), and the importance that Smith attributed to the idea that human society is peopled by selves is seconded today by evolutionary theorists (Sterelny, 2003). In fact, the latter provide an additional sense of the primacy of society, as they demonstrate the importance of *group* selection—that a truly social group can serve as the object of evolutionary selection pressures (Mayr, 1997)—in hominid evolution:

Group selection became very important, and underwrote the evolution of a cooperation explosion, the effects of which include language, the division of labor, and resource sharing.¹⁶

Theories of communication (C-2) are no longer confined to theories of animal communication (Rogers & Kaplan, 2000) and of the true nature of language (Keller, 1998) but have had to be broadened to include the communication of humans with intelligent machines (Preece & Keller, 1990).

Accordingly, theories of mental life (C-3) themselves have also had to cover not only human beings but all sorts of intelligent machines (Clancey, Smoliar, & Stefik, 1994), as the phenomena of mental life have been attributed by some scholars to lower animals (Griffin, 1981) and to at least some of the machines of artificial intelligence (Minsky, 1986). Accordingly, one now speaks of, and often diagrams, the “cognitive architecture” hypothesized of “intelligent systems.” The systems model enjoying greatest popularity among SI scholars today (P. Burke, 1991; McPhail, 2000) is perception control theory (Powers, 1973).

Serving to link these two types of theories ever more closely is the current importance attributed to the communication process of role-taking, or “mindreading” as it is currently termed in other fields (lacking mind, other complex entities are considered subject to mere “behavior-reading”). Interestingly, the very same mechanism proposed by Smith in 1759 (i.e., sympathy) is currently the leading candidate to explain the phenomena of mindreading (Nichols & Stich, 2003). In any case, underlying the capacity for role-taking is an ability to employ concepts in the process of categorical perception (Murphy, 2002; Zerubavel, 1991):

Behavior is said to make sense when a series of actions is interpretable as indicating that the actor has in mind some role which guides his behavior. ... The isolated action becomes a datum for role analysis only when it is interpreted as the manifestation of a configuration. ... For example, the lie which is an expression of the role of friend is an altogether different thing from the same lie taken as a manifestation of the role of confidence man.¹⁷

The looking-glass self is still regarded as the key link between the realms of society and individuals (C-4), but contemporary accounts of the structure of intelligent self-awareness emphasize how many voices have to be included as participants in the inner forum—or, in more contemporary terms, how many components must be included in the architecture of intelligent systems (Dennett, 1991; Minsky, 1986).

That self-regulation is a process extended over time (C-5) now implies not only the social development of the child and the cognitive dynamics of an inner forum—both far better documented and understood in cognitive science these days than in the past—but also that the idea that regulating the self is an emotional as well as cognitive affair.

To be sure, Smith himself had initially focused on the role of emotions in self-regulation, but SI scholars today have returned to that theme (Franks & McCarthy, 1989; Scheff, 2003), often including an echo of the pragmatists’ claim that much human action is “mindless” (Langer, 1992) until a breakdown of routine calls into play emotions and then cognitive intelligence. That emotions often serve as a signal of a blocked routine—even of a threatened identity—is now widely accepted among many SI scholars (Smith-Lovin, 1990).

Future Directions

I have contended that change and development in the framework has generally taken the form of reinterpreting (rather than displacing) the core themes of symbolic interactionism—reinterpretations that have accreted over the long lifespan of that framework. Indeed, I have sought to identify and briefly to discuss some of them specifically, and I expect that—in the future—change and development within SI will continue to take this form.

¹⁶Sterelny, 2003, p. 172.

¹⁷Turner, 1962, p. 24.

New methods of empirical research are one major source of reinterpretations. For instance, the relatively recent emergence of various methods of *brain imaging* (Baars & Gage, 2010, Chapter 4) has excited numerous scholars who seek to shore up psychology by demonstrating a biological basis for many of its behavior-inferred constructs. These brain-imaging techniques—ranging from EEGs (electroencephalograms) through PET scans (positron emission tomography) to fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging)—more or less directly map brain functions onto various systems of the living brain. Brain-imaging studies have thus essentially converted many aspects of psychology into a cognitive neuroscience (Baars & Gage, 2010). Particularly relevant for SI are future brain-imaging studies of social cognition—the ability to understand each other. Most relevant, perhaps, are future studies of the system of “mirror neurons” (Iacoboni, 2005) that are believed to fire not only when another person performs a specific action but also when we ourselves perform the same action. These mirror neurons might prove to be involved in various manifestations of empathy; what, then, is the precise connection between the looking-glass self and mirror neurons?

New concepts are another source of reinterpretations of the core themes of SI. To mention again one example, I expect that the concept of group selection—the notion that a truly social group can be the object of evolutionary selection (Mayr, 1997)—will be vigorously pursued not only by students of evolutionary anthropology but also by students of evolutionary sociology and evolutionary psychology. The obvious pertinence of this concept to Proposition B (that human beings tend to behave in socially proper ways) renders studies of group selection especially relevant to SI.

New theoretical works, of course, are a third and most direct source of reinterpretations of the propositions that together define SI. One leading example is the work of Terrence Deacon (1997) which draws upon his own fields of anthropology and neural imaging (together with linguistics and philosophy) to provide reinterpretations of several core themes of SI, most especially of Proposition A (how we differ from other animals) and Proposition C-2 (reinterpreting Peirce about the character of symbols and clarifying the nature of sophisticated animal communication). I expect that such a seminal and highly relevant book will inspire a variety of future work.

Naturally, the contributions of symbolic interactionists themselves may be virtually unlimited and might address any or all of the eight propositions that constitute the framework of SI. Yet, as students of society, they might be expected to focus in future on the nature of social control (especially its cooperative modes) and self-regulation (especially the role played by emotions), particularly the linkages between these two.

As Stryker and Vryan (2003) concluded from their examination of this topic in the previous edition of this handbook,

Not too long ago, symbolic interactionism was written off as no longer being an influential perspective in sociological work (Mullins, 1973). Current work stemming from that framework testifies vigorously to the inaccuracy of that judgment. Deriving from a powerful philosophical and sociological tradition, the future of symbolic interactionism in guiding the theorizing and research of sociologists doing social psychology is indeed bright.¹⁸

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¹⁸Stryker & Vryan, 2003, p. 25.

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Chapter 2

Identity Theory

Jan E. Stets and Richard T. Serpe

Introduction

Over the past four decades the concept of identity has been one of the major topics areas of both theoretical and empirical development within sociological social psychology (Burke & Stets, 2009; McCall & Simmons, 1978; Owens, Robinson, & Smith-Lovin, 2010; Serpe & Stryker, 2011; Stets, 2006; Stryker, [1980] 2002; Stryker & Burke, 2000). This sustained interest in the concept of identity is based on the primary importance of understanding individuals as situated in social interaction and embedded within society. Generally, we consider an identity to be a shared set of meanings that define individuals in particular *roles* in society (for example, parent, worker, spouse, or teacher role identity), as members of specific *groups* in society (for example, a church, book club, or softball group identity), and as *persons* having specific characteristics that make them unique from others (for example, an athletic or artistic person identity). Thus, people have many identities (James, 1890), and they are of different kinds (Burke & Stets, 2009).

One of the primary goals of identity theory is to specify how the meanings attached to various identities are negotiated and managed in interaction. Specifically, identity theorists focus on how identities relate to one another (given their likelihood of being brought into situations and how central or important they are to individuals), as well as how identities relate to role performance (or behavior), affect (feelings), physical and mental health (such as stress, anxiety, and depression), the self-concept (such as self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-authenticity), and social structure.

In this chapter, we begin with a brief review of identity theory's roots in symbolic interactionism, more generally, and structural symbolic interactionism, more specifically. Following this, we discuss central ideas in identity theory including the definition of an identity, identity verification, identity salience, identity centrality/prominence, resources, and the bases of identities: role, group, and person identities. We then review the two primary ways in which identities have been empirically investigated: through survey research and laboratory research. This is followed by a review of how the central ideas in identity theory have been measured.

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Three topics that have captured the attention of researchers for some time include multiple identities, identities and emotions, and identity change. We review these topics, directing attention to advances both conceptually and empirically. Researchers also have been applying identity theory to a variety of sociological areas of investigation. We review the application of identity theory to three major areas in sociology: crime and law, education, and race/ethnicity. Finally, we discuss future substantive and theoretical advances for identity theory. Substantively, we direct attention to situational factors, identity formation and change, negative/stigmatized identities, and identities within social movements. Theoretically, we point to how identity theory can establish a link to other theories such as affect control theory, expectation states theory, exchange theory, and social identity theory.

In identity theory, there are three major research programs: the interactional (McCall & Simmons, 1978), structural (Serpe & Stryker, 2011), and perceptual control programs (Burke & Stets, 2009). Most theoretical and empirical activity has occurred within the perceptual control and structural programs of research. Consequently, we draw upon these research programs more heavily in this review. Importantly, we view these two research programs as complementary and not competing, thus providing an integrated view of current and future research in identity theory.

We emphasize that this chapter reviews *identity theory* and not the use of the term *identity* in the literature. The concept of identity has been used to examine such issues as identity construction (Sandstrom, 1990), identity performance (Riessman, 2003), and identity work among those with stigmatized identities such as the homeless (Snow & Anderson, 1987) or parolees (Opsal, 2011). This research is typically qualitative and often based on in-depth interviews and ethnographies. Frequently, identity is left undefined (e.g., see O'Brien, 2011) and identity theory rarely frames the research (see Granberg, 2011 for an exception). In this chapter, we discuss identity as a theory and systematic program of research that has been developing for over 40 years. The research program within identity theory is historically rooted in the structural version of symbolic interactionism, it is largely quantitative, and it uses the definitions and processes outlined in the theory to empirically test hypotheses. While a review of this literature necessarily narrows the scope of the chapter, it simultaneously provides clarity as to our focus.

Symbolic Interactionism

In general, symbolic interactionism's theoretical formulation can be organized into two distinct schools of thought: the Chicago and Iowa Schools. From the 1930s to the 1970s, Herbert Blumer was the most influential voice shaping the meaning of symbolic interactionism within the Chicago School. The major counter-voice to Blumer in this period was Manford H. Kuhn, identified with the Iowa School. Blumer's work provides much of the content of current *traditional* symbolic interactionism. Kuhn's work represents a major early effort to define a *structural* symbolic interactionism, which has been most influential for identity theory (Stryker, [1980] 2002).

Important issues separate the symbolic interactionisms of Blumer and Kuhn, but the two share a view of society as a product of social action and interaction. Social life is a dynamic flow of events involving many people. Since both society and persons are derived from social processes, both take on meanings in and through interaction. The symbolic capacity of humans means they have minds; they think. When individuals think about themselves, self-conceptions are constructed that refer to who and what they are, and these self-conceptions are shaped by the social process. Contained in this imagery is the idea that humans, both individually and collectively, are active and creative.

Asserting that his symbolic interactionism represented Mead's ideas, Blumer (1969) argued that the development of general theory is not a useful endeavor. People continuously construct their behavior anew in the course of social action. Consequently, the meanings and definitions that underlie social interaction also undergo continuous reformulation, and those applicable at one point in time will not be

applicable at subsequent points in time. Blumer concluded that, at best, sociologists can construct post-hoc understandings of social behavior but cannot effectively develop theory-based explanations to predict an ever changing landscape of behavior. He also rejected quantitative sociological analysis, arguing that numerical representations of social action do not capture the meanings developed in the course of social interaction. Rather, he suggested that using interpretative methods that represent actors in their own voice (for example, listening to conversations, focus groups, interviewing, life histories, letters, diaries, and public records) provide a rich understanding of the construction of meanings associated with social interaction. For Blumer, interpretive methods are useful in assessing how micro interactions develop.

Labeling his framework “self-theory” to differentiate it from Blumer’s vision of symbolic interactionism, Kuhn (1964; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) aspired to precise theory-based generalizations and their rigorous empirical test. Accepting the position that social structure is created, maintained, and altered through symbolic interaction, he asserted that once created, structure constrains further interaction. He brought role and reference group ideas into his framework (Merton, 1957; Merton & Rossi, 1950). He assumed that social structure is composed of networks of positions that organize relations among persons. He further posited that role expectations, shared by others, are linked to those positions. Recognizing that the relations of expectations to behavior are loose, he saw greater determinacy in specifying the link between self and behavior. Taking Mead’s views of self as an object, Kuhn presented the self as the most significant object within the meanings of social action.

Kuhn maintained the concept of a core self as a set of stable self-meanings, which provide stability to personality, predictability to behavior, and continuity of interaction. As a way of measuring the stable self, he developed the Twenty Statements Test (TST), which measured people’s responses (allowing up to 20 answers) to the question, “Who am I?” This questionnaire was important because it was a way in which symbolic interactionists could begin to examine internal processes in a quantifiable manner across people. However, he indicated that a person’s actions do not simply follow the dictates of the core self. Persons use the role-taking/role-making process and self-control to allow for creativity in behavior. Thus, individuality is a product of a variety of component parts including social networks, social status, role expectations, choice behavior, and personal attributes and traits. This process of contextualizing how one defines an identity demonstrates the link between social structure and the self.

The primary distinction between Blumer’s traditional symbolic interaction and Kuhn’s structural symbolic interaction is the extent to which interaction is negotiated anew versus structured. Compared to the former orientation, the latter leans more heavily on the impact of structure on interaction, leaving open the possibility of negotiated, subtle meanings that over time may result in change in the social structure (Serpe & Stryker, 2011). Implied in the structural version is the idea that human behavior is to some extent indeterminate since neither the course nor outcomes of interaction are completely predictable from conditions preceding that interaction (Stryker & Vryan, 2003).

Structural Symbolic Interactionism

While symbolic interactionism’s imagery asserts that individuals and society are mutually constitutive, the structural symbolic interactionist perspective gives causal priority to society on the grounds that individuals are enmeshed in society from birth and cannot survive outside of pre-existing organized social relationships. Society can be characterized as social structures comprised of patterned behavior and interactions. Recently, there has been a refinement in the conception of social structure by differentiating large, intermediate, and proximate social structures (Stryker, Serpe, & Hunt, 2005). Large social structures are those features of the stratification system such as race/ethnicity, class, gender, and socioeconomic status. A basic premise of sociology is that in most societies, these

structures serve as social boundaries having important consequences for individual life chances including the probability of entering particular networks of social relationships (cf. Blau, 1977). Large social structures can provide persons with a group identity through which they can identify with others based on sharing both the social location and the meanings associated with a given stratification characteristic.

Intermediate social structures are more localized networks, for example, neighborhoods, associations, and organizations. These structures create important social boundaries that increase or decrease the probability of particular kinds of social relationships forming. Proximate structures are those closest to interpersonal interactions such as families, athletic teams, and departments within larger corporate or educational structures, or social clubs within schools (Serpe & Stryker, 2011; Stryker et al., 2005). Proximate social structures provide persons with social relationships directly attributable to a specific role identity, and enactment of the role identity supports their participation within these structures. In addition, proximate social structures provide access to others who have counter-identities necessary for role enactment (Merolla, Serpe, Stryker, & Schultz, 2012).

Taken together, the above provides an image of society as a differentiated but organized mosaic of role relationships, groups, networks, organizations, communities, and institutions cross-cut by structures of age, gender, ethnicity, class, and religion. Subparts can be independent or interdependent, isolated or closely related to one another, cooperative or conflicting. Further, social structures affect the likelihood that the individuals located within them will evolve particular kinds of selves. These individuals will have particular kinds of motivations and symbolic resources that will facilitate interacting with particular kinds of others with specific backgrounds and resources of their own. Thus, while individuals develop their own self-definitions, these self-definitions are influenced by the realities of the social structures within which they are embedded.

Social structures also influence social interaction by both constraining and facilitating entrance into and departure from networks of social relationships within which people generally live their lives. Actors adjust to how “closed or open” the social environment is to interactions that express different selves and behaviors (Serpe, 1987). Much interaction simply reproduces existing structures, that is, people choose to interact in a manner that is prescribed by both the situation and structure (Burawoy, 1979; Serpe & Stryker, 1993). This is not to say that human action does not produce some creativity and that social change is not possible, only that there is pressure to conform and not disrupt the social order. A major theoretical task for structural symbolic interactionists becomes specifying the features of interactions that lead to varying degrees of change and stability in social structures (Serpe & Stryker, 1987).

If social structures influence the self and social interaction, it is also true that the self emerges in social interaction and within the context of a complex and organized society. Since the relationship between the individual and society is reflexive, then as society is differentiated and organized, so too must be the self. This brings up the image of individuals having many “selves” as they have others with whom they interact and come to know them in a certain way (James, 1890).

Key Concepts in Identity Theory

An Identity

An *identity* is a set of meanings attached to roles individuals occupy in the social structure (Stryker, [1980] 2002) (role identities), groups they identify with and belong to (group identities), and unique ways in which they see themselves (person identities) (Burke & Stets, 2009). *Meanings* are individuals’ responses when they reflect upon themselves in a role, social, or person identity (Burke & Stets, 2009). For example, a woman may have the meaning of being principled when she thinks about how moral she is, efficient when she thinks of herself as a worker, and reliable when she thinks of herself

as a member of the local PTA. Principled, efficient, and reliable are the meanings that help define her in her moral person identity, worker role identity, and PTA group identity. More generally, identities help organize an individual's "place" in an interaction, guide behavior, facilitate the development of stable social relationships, and make interaction possible (McCall & Simmons, 1978). This is all within the context of social structure.

Verification

An important concept in identity theory is identity verification. *Identity verification* is individuals perceiving that others see them in a situation in the same way they see themselves. In order to understand how identity verification occurs, we briefly review the perceptual control dynamics that occur for any one identity (Burke & Stets, 2009).

When an identity is activated in a situation, a feedback loop is established according to the perceptual control model. This loop has five major components. First is the *identity standard* or self-meanings that individuals associate with their identities. Second is the *perceptual input* of meanings about the self in a situation including how individuals see themselves, and the feedback that they received from others (known as reflected appraisals). Third is a process that compares the perceptual input meanings with the identity standard meanings. This is known as the *comparator*. The fourth component is *emotion*, which signals the degree of correspondence between input meanings and identity standard meanings. A correspondence in meanings results in positive emotion while a non-correspondence in meanings results in negative emotions. Finally there is *output* to the environment in the form of behavior that carries meaning. On the one hand, the identity standard guides individuals in the direction of output/behavior that carries meanings consistent with the identity standard meanings. On the other hand, output/behavior also is a function of the comparison between the perceptual input meanings and the identity standard meanings. When there is a non-correspondence between input and identity standard meanings, output will be modified in the situation in an attempt to change input meanings to match the identity standard meanings.

In general, the perceptual control identity process is unconscious and relatively automatic. It becomes conscious if and when a non-correspondence between perceptual (self-in-situation) meanings and identity standard meanings becomes large. The goal is correspondence between the two. When perceptions are congruent with the standard, *identity verification exists*, and positive emotion is experienced. Identity non-verification leads to negative emotion. Negative emotion will create a greater pressure or drive to reduce the non-correspondence between input and identity standard meanings. Behaviorally, this translates into individuals working harder to resolve the non-correspondence or discrepancy, doing whatever it takes to facilitate congruity, assuming that there are no significant situational constraints.

Importantly, negative emotion results irrespective of whether the direction of the discrepancy is positive (persons exceed their standard) or negative (persons fall short of their standard). In the case of non-verification in a negative direction, individuals may need to strengthen their behavior to convince others that they are who they claim to be. For non-verification in a positive direction, persons may need to temper what they are doing, thereby pushing the identity system less forcefully.

It is easiest to understand the verification process for *one* identity that a person invokes in a situation. However, individuals have multiple identities. The idea of multiple identities follows from James' (1890) notion that a person has multiple selves, each self corresponding to the different people who come to know the person in a particular way. Now we talk about multiple identities rather than multiple selves, but the idea is the same. Over the course of our life, we take on different identities, and in any situation, we have many identities that could be activated. Research suggests that multiple identities are activated in situations when the identities share meanings (Deaux, 1992; Stets, 1995).

For example, a feminine gender identity and the mother identity simultaneously may emerge in a situation because they both share the meanings of care and nurturance. Thus, enacting the mother identity facilitates expression of a feminine gender identity. More generally, multiple identities are conceptualized within the self as organized into hierarchies of salience (Stryker, [1980] 2002), centrality or prominence (McCall & Simmons, 1978), and levels of control (Burke & Stets, 2009). Below, we briefly review the salience and centrality/prominence hierarchies which have received the most attention. Later we will discuss the control hierarchy.

Salience

Given the image of people having multiple identities, at issue is which identities will be enacted in a situation. An assumption in identity theory is that individuals work to develop a self-structure that reflects the organization of the various identities they hold. One theoretical formulation of the organization of identities is the concept of *identity salience* (Stryker, 1968, [1980] 2002). Identity salience is defined as the probability that one will invoke a specific identity across situations. More salient identities are those that have a greater likelihood of being brought into situations either through verbal or behavioral action. Explicit in this formulation is the individuals “choice” to enact an identity across situations. As such, identity salience is viewed as a behavioral indicator and represents an agentic aspect of identity in social action (Serpe, 1987; Serpe & Stryker, 1987, 1993; Stryker, 1968; Stryker & Serpe, 1983).

The relative level of identity salience across a set of identities makes up the *identity salience hierarchy* (Serpe, 1987; Stryker, [1980] 2002). Implicit in this hierarchical formulation is that for identities that have higher salience, individuals may actively seek out opportunities to perform that identity. For example, if a man is giving a presentation at a professional organization, and the presentation does not focus on issues related to the family, the person may work into his presentation the fact that he has become a grandparent for the first time. Invoking the grandparent identity within the context of the professional identity demonstrates that his grandparent identity is salient in his hierarchy of identities.

Identity salience is based on how committed one is to the identity. Commitment brings in social structure because it refers to the degree to which people are tied to particular social networks. Access to particular social networks reflects one’s placement in the social structure. For example, an individual who has limited educational opportunities beyond high school is not likely to develop strong social relationships with professionally trained individuals. Additionally, the person is less likely to be engaged in other community level activities that are most often open to those who have advanced degrees or an educational pedigree. When a person’s ties to a set of particular others depends upon playing out a particular identity, then that identity will be salient to the individual. Thus, the greater the commitment to an identity, the greater the identity salience (Serpe, 1987; Stryker, [1980] 2002; Stryker & Serpe, 1994).

Commitment

Commitment has been conceptualized in two ways: from a structural perspective and a perceptual control perspective. From the structural perspective, commitment has two dimensions: an interactional and an affective dimension that reflects the extensiveness and intensity of network ties, respectively (Serpe, 1987; Stryker & Serpe, 1994). Interactional commitment, characterized as a quantitative indicator, is made up of the number of the people an individual interacts with as a

result of holding a given identity and the number of interactions with those people. Commitment to an identity will increase as the size of the social network increases and the number of social interactions with members of the social network increase (Adler & Adler, 1989).

Affective commitment, reflective of a qualitative indicator of people's experiences in interaction with others, is made up of the assessments of how others see them with respect to their behavior within the identity, and the amount of affective discomfort they would experience if they were no longer engaged in interaction with others associated with an identity. Those who perceive that others have a positive evaluation of them, and who experience affective distress if they no longer interacted with others associated with an identity have higher affective commitment to that identity.

From the perceptual control perspective, commitment is the degree to which individuals work hard to verify who they are (Burke & Reitzes, 1991). The harder they work to verify an identity, the more committed are they to that identity. This view of commitment complements the above view because it highlights how identity commitment occurs not only externally, given ties to others in the social structure, but also internally, given the pressure to match self-in-situation meanings with one's identity standard meanings. In this latter view, most of this pressure comes from reflected appraisals, that is, those to whom one is tied by having the identity, thereby implicating the earlier external view of commitment.

Centrality/Prominence

Rosenberg (1979) presents a theoretical scheme that uses *centrality* as the axis for organizing aspects of the self-concept. He indicates that centrality is based on how important self-concept components such as dispositions or identities are to individuals. An identity that is highly important to one's self-concept has greater centrality.

McCall and Simmons (1978) use the concept of a prominence hierarchy to represent the organization of identities. An identity ranking based on *prominence* represents the importance of the identity to the individual. It characterizes their desires and values, and how they want others to see them. The more prominent an identity, the more it will be invoked in a situation. Several factors influence where an identity appears in the prominence hierarchy. Individuals are more likely to have identities high in their prominence hierarchy when they receive support from others for the identity, when they are committed to the identity, and when they receive rewards (both extrinsic and intrinsic) for the identity.

The distinction between salience and centrality/prominence is not just conceptual. How each is measured implies a different set of indicators. Salience is based on probable behavior, while centrality/prominence is based on the internalized importance of an identity. Stryker and Serpe (1994) focused on the relationship between salience and centrality/prominence and asked if these concepts are equivalent, overlapping, or complementary. They found that some identities can be salient and central (for example, the athletic/recreational and extracurricular role identities) while other identities can be salient but not central (for example, the academic and personal involvement role identities), thus showing their independence. They conclude that since these two concepts are theoretically different, when possible both should be included in identity theory research.

Resources

Resources are anything that sustains or enhances a system of interaction and the people connected to it, including verifying people's identities (Freese & Burke, 1994). What is important is not what is counted as a resource but rather what persons do in the situation that is resourceful in verifying their identities.

In this way, resources are viewed not in static terms as ‘in place’ ready to be consumed, but in dynamic terms as ‘in motion’ in a situation (Freese & Burke, 1994). Identity theorists have operationalized three types of resources: structural, interpersonal, and personal (Stets & Cast, 2007). The more one uses these resources, the more identity verification is facilitated.

Structural resources are those processes that afford individuals greater influence in the social structure, and by extension, interactions. An example would be one’s occupational status. *Interpersonal resources* are those processes that arise out of relationships and that help verify individuals. An example would be taking the role of the other. *Personal resources* are beliefs about the self along such dimensions as worthiness and competence that facilitate identity verification (Stets & Cast, 2007).

Bases of Identities

The importance of organizing identities into three bases, that is, role, group, and person identities helps us understand how individuals are tied to various aspects of the social structure (roles and groups) while at the same time they seek to establish their distinctiveness as human beings (persons) (Burke & Stets, 2009). Role identity was the earliest conceptualization of an identity (Burke, 1980; McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stryker, [1980] 2002), and it was a clear extension of symbolic interactionism (Thoits & Virshup, 1997).

To understand role identities, we need to first understand roles and social positions. *Roles* are the shared expectations attached to social positions in society such as teacher, student, and parent. For example, the expectations/roles associated with the position of student may include attending classes, completing assignments, passing courses, and earning a degree. A *role identity* is a set of internalized meanings associated with a role. For example, the student role identity may involve the meaning of being “academically responsible,” the performance of which should match this meaning by attending class, taking lecture notes, doing homework assignments, and passing tests (Burke & Reitzes, 1980).

Group identities are those meanings that emerge in interaction with a specific set of others like our family, work group, and clubs. It implies involvement with these others, sharing and attempting to fulfill the expected ways of behaving that each group member has of the other, and participating in the group’s activities. Examples include being a member of a professional organization, civic group, or recreational team. Group identities are different from *social identities*, that is, the meanings associated with an individual’s identification with a social category (Hogg, 2006; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Social categories are created by society for stratification purposes and often are ascribed such as one’s race/ethnicity or gender. Such categorization facilitates understanding the status of groups of people in the social structure, the resources they have access to, and how they should be treated. In turn, this helps make interaction predictable and smooth. When individuals’ social identities are in play, they attend to the perceptions of the collectivity’s attitudes and values. The actions of individuals are based not on their self-definitions, but on the definitions outlined by category membership. We think that the social category meanings that social identity theorists highlight is important, but we see this identity as based on a “grouping” rather than a group identity because it does not involve interaction for a common purpose (Burke, 2012).

Person identities are based on a set of meanings that distinguish the person as a unique individual, not as a person who holds a specific role or is a member of a group (Burke & Stets, 2009). Person identities are culturally recognized characteristics that are internalized and define the person in distinct ways. For example, persons can see themselves as moral and internalize the cultural meanings associated with this identity (Stets & Carter, 2011, 2012). One’s internalized identity standards or goals guide behavior.

It is important to point out that role, group, and person identities often overlap and cannot be easily separated in situations. Within groups people play out various roles, and individuals enact these

various roles in different ways given the unique person identity standards they bring to their roles. Which identity that is the focus will necessarily omit issues related to other identities. For example, let us consider a person who is a student (in a role) attending a particular school (group membership). When the school identity is triggered at a school pep rally, we may observe how individuals perform the school chant. However, we may neglect to examine that at the pep rally some students may take the lead in the chants more than others because they are in the role of class president, football captain, or captain of the varsity cheerleading squad. We also may not observe that some students may be very rowdy at the pep rally perhaps because they have a person identity of being aggressive. Thus, taking the lead in the school chants and doing so more aggressively than others simultaneously verifies the group (school) identity, the role (leader) identity, and the person (aggressive) identity. Thus, we need to be sensitive to the simultaneous activation of the different bases of identities in interaction.

Methods

Survey Research

Most researchers in identity theory have used surveys to collect data on different aspects of the identity process. Only in rare instances have they leveraged existing cross-sectional surveys such as the GSS to study identities (Stets & Tsushima, 2001). Many existing surveys simply do not ask the relevant questions needed to understand and explain the different dynamics underlying identities. Consequently, identity researchers have relied on their own data gathering efforts to conduct cross-sectional surveys on different groups in society to study an array of identity issues (e.g. Owens & Serpe, 2003; Stets & Harrod, 2004).

One of the most common issues that has been examined in cross-sectional surveys is how one's identity guides behavior in situations. For example, researchers have studied how commitment to and salience of a religious identity influenced time spent in religious activities (Stryker & Serpe, 1982), how a salient blood-donor identity was related to donating blood (Callero, 1985), and how a salient and prominent mother identity influenced their behavior such as making sacrifices (Nuttbrock & Freudiger, 1991). Cross-sectional surveys have used college students to examine the identity-behavior relationship such as the relationship between the student identity and school performance (Burke & Reitzes, 1981), gender identity and physical and sexual abuse in dating relationships (Burke, Stets, & Pirog-Good, 1988), and the environmental identity (being concerned about the environment) and taking action to protect the environment (Stets & Biga, 2003).

Though longitudinal data can be costly and time-consuming to obtain, we can learn a great deal about the dynamics of identities when the identity process is captured in real-time and in the natural setting. Indeed, a host of identity findings have emerged from a major longitudinal study that followed newly married couples during the first two years of marriage in two communities in Washington State (Tallman, Burke, & Gecas, 1998). Important findings stemming from this data reveal that while verification of the spousal identity had positive consequences such as increased love, trust, commitment, and self-esteem (Burke & Stets, 1999; Cast & Burke, 2002), identity non-verification had negative consequences such as distress (Burke & Harrod, 2005). Longitudinal research on identities also has been carried out on college students. From this research, we have learned how a new situation such as entering college influenced the degree to which prior identities were maintained (Serpe & Stryker, 1987). More recently, a longitudinal panel has tracked students involved in science-training programs to assess commitment and salience of the science identity (Merolla, Serpe, Stryker, & Schultz, 2012).

We simply do not have enough longitudinal data available to study identities. Sometimes, because situations that researchers want to study are sensitive, infrequent in their occurrence, or data collection is too costly, the methodological tool of vignettes is employed to obtain the data. Individuals typically

are exposed to a hypothetical situation and asked to imagine how they would think, act, and feel as an actor or observer in the situation. For instance, one study that examined the relationship between a salient mother identity and the emotion of jealousy gave parents two brief stories, and they were to indicate how the mothers in the stories felt when the fathers in the stories actively participated in childcare (an activity that is typically the domain of mothers) (Ellestad & Stets, 1998).

In some studies, individuals read about situations that they might have experienced, and they are asked to report their thoughts, actions, and feelings the last time the situation occurred. If they did not experience the situation, they are to imagine what they would think, do, and feel. This has been used in recent research that has examined the moral identity and its relationship to moral behavior and moral emotions (Stets & Carter, 2006, 2011, 2012; Stets, Carter, Harrod, Cerven, & Abrutyn, 2008). Using vignettes is not without potential problems, for example, individuals may lack the experience that would provide an informed answer, or what they tell you they would do in the situation may differ from what actually occurs. One needs to be judicious as to how often and for what purpose this methodological tool is used.

Laboratory Research

Laboratory work enables researchers to study the identity process in a specific context created in the laboratory under controlled conditions. The goal in laboratory research is to test theoretical relationships rather than reproduce the natural environment. This is not to say that laboratory research cannot approximate events in the natural setting. For example, researchers have simulated the leadership identity using task discussion groups in the laboratory (Riley & Burke, 1995). Other researchers have simulated the worker identity by creating a work situation in the laboratory, and they have examined individuals' emotional responses to receiving feedback from a manager that was what the worker expected (identity verification) or did not expect (identity non-verification) (Stets, 2003, 2005; Stets & Asencio, 2008; Stets & Osborn, 2008).

An advantage of laboratory research is that it is able to create situations that are analogous to those found in the natural setting but that may be difficult to study because the researcher has limited access to the investigative site or the investigation is of a sensitive nature. For example, to study the relationship between the moral identity and moral behavior, a researcher needs data on individuals engaging in dishonest activity. It is hard to gain access to these behaviors in the natural environment. To study this activity, a laboratory study was devised in which individuals were placed in a moral dilemma of a testing situation, and they had the opportunity to cheat (an act of commission) or not report that they were over-scored (an act of omission) on a test (Stets, 2011; Stets & Carter, 2011). Measures of their moral identity and negative emotions were obtained. The results revealed that those with a higher moral identity were less likely to cheat. Further, individuals were more likely to report feeling bad when perceptions of who they were in the situation fell short of or exceeded their moral identity standard based on how they thought that others viewed them. Survey and laboratory research both have their limitations. Because survey research often gathers retrospective information on individuals, we miss observing the individuals in real-time. Laboratory research permits the collection of data in real-time, thereby supplementing survey research.¹ When the two are used in combination (Stets & Carter, 2011), we obtain a better understanding of past and current situations that potentially influence individuals thoughts, actions, and feelings.

¹The purpose of laboratory research is to discover law-like patterns. The intent is to test theoretical relationships under carefully controlled conditions rather than generalize to the natural setting.

Measurement

We summarize below how the major concepts in identity theory have been measured. In instances where the measure has changed over time, we discuss the most recent measure under the assumption that as measures evolve, they better approximate the identity concepts.²

An Identity

As mentioned earlier, an identity is the *meanings* people provide when they think about themselves. Individuals *control* their identity meanings at a particular level (Burke & Stets, 2009). Therefore, the goal in measuring identity meanings is to identify the current level at which individuals' meanings are set. To do this, one must first obtain the meanings that are held in the population from which the sample is drawn. This may involve asking respondents about the important and relevant meanings for themselves. This is in contrast to a researcher assuming the content of the identity meanings or deriving the meanings from some other population (Burke & Tully, 1977). The identity meanings are then measured using a semantic differential in which the meanings are placed on a scale of polar opposites, following the Osgood idea that meaning is contrastive (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). For example, gender identity may involve meanings of being very independent/not at all independent, very aggressive/not at all aggressive or very active/very passive. Individuals respond to these meanings as they think about themselves in an identity. This helps formulate their current level at which their identity is set.

Meaning is understood not in an absolute sense but in a relative sense. What it means to claim a particular identity is always understood in relation to its opposite, for example, the feminine gender identity is in contrast to the masculine gender identity, the husband identity is distinct from the wife identity, and the moral identity is different from the immoral identity. The bipolar nature of the semantic differential reflects this. To find the relevant meanings for an identity in relation to its opposite, the statistical procedure of *discriminant function analysis* is used to find the bipolar meanings which best distinguish the identity from its opposite. Researchers have used the semantic differential to measure a host of identities such as one's gender identity (Stets & Burke, 1996), the student identity (Burke & Reitzes, 1981), the spousal identity (Burke & Stets, 1999), the environmental identity (Stets & Biga, 2003), and the moral identity (Stets & Carter, 2011).

Verification

Identity *verification* occurs when people's identity meanings match the perceived meanings about themselves in a situation. This is measured by taking one's identity meanings and subtracting it from the reflected appraisals, that is, how people think others perceive them in the situation.³ If one is interested in the reaction to verification (or the lack thereof), the subtracted value is squared. Squaring the

²For more detailed information on identity measures, see Burke and Stets (2009).

³Some researchers have used the actual appraisals of others as a proxy of reflected appraisals (Burke & Harrod, 2005; Burke & Stets, 1999). The idea is that others will communicate their views, individuals will perceive these views, and then they will infer that this is what the other thinks of them. However, others may selectively communicate some views (such as positive views) and not others (such as negative views) (Felson, 1980). Even if others communicate their views accurately, this information may be ignored, distorted, or rejected (Stets & Harrod, 2004).

value reflects the identity theory assumption that the negative reaction in response to identity non-verification is curvilinear (Burke & Harrod, 2005). People will feel bad irrespective of whether others view them more negatively or more positively than their own identity meanings. If one is interested in how identity meanings are tied to behavior meanings, the value is not squared in order to establish that the meanings of the identity and the behavior are in the same direction. Further, the value is not squared if one is interested in identity change so that one can identify the direction in which the identity change occurred.

Salience

Identity *salience* is the readiness or probability to act out an identity within and across situations. This is measured by asking respondents to imagine meeting different people for the first time (for example, a co-worker, member of the opposite sex, and a friend) and indicate the certainty by which they would tell each person about a particular identity (“almost certainly would not to almost certainly would”) (Owens & Serpe, 2003). If certainty is high, then the salience of the identity is high.

Commitment

Identity commitment has been conceptualized as people’s position in a network of social relations, and it has been measured along two dimensions: the *interactional* (the number of others that persons interact with based on an identity and the amount of time spent in the identity) and *affective* (the depth of the ties to others based on an identity) (Owens & Serpe, 2003; Serpe, 1987; Stryker et al., 2005). Operationally, each dimension contains three questions. For interactional commitment, individuals are asked how often they do things with others related to an identity, how much time, and how much money they spend in identity-related activities. For affective commitment, persons are asked how much they would miss others related to an identity if they could not spend time with them, how close, and how important these others are to them.

Centrality/Prominence

Identity prominence (McCall & Simmons, 1978) or centrality (Stryker & Serpe, 1994) is how important an identity is to an individual. There are two measures that have been used. First, other identities that individuals may claim are paired with the identity of interest to see which identity is more important in the way they think of themselves, thereby producing an overall ranking of identities from high to low (Stryker & Serpe, 1994). Alternatively, a one-item question has been used in which people indicate how important the identity is to them (Stets & Biga, 2003).

Resources

Resources are of three kinds: structural, interpersonal, and person. Measures of structural resources are a person’s education, income, occupational status, and race (Burke, 2008; Stets & Cast, 2007; Stets & Harrod, 2004). When individuals use these resources, they demonstrate that they have the knowledge and skills to accomplish their goals including obtaining identity verification. Interpersonal resources include, but are not limited to taking the role of the other, being trusted, and being liked

(Stets & Cast, 2007). These interpersonal processes bind actors together and help facilitate the establishment of a mutually verifying context. Measures of personal resources include self-worth and self-efficacy (Stets & Cast, 2007). When worthy and efficacious feelings about the self are in motion, individuals are likely to be more persistent in achieving identity verification because they will continue their efforts toward this goal even when they periodically fail.

We now turn to several substantive issues that have facilitated advancing identity theory as a theory. These areas are still rich and fertile for more development, so there is still more work to do.

Multiple Identities

Conceptually, there are two perspectives that help us understand how multiple identities are interrelated. An *internal perspective* focuses on how multiple identities are interrelated within the self. This involves investigating the hierarchy of identities within the perceptual control system of the self (Burke & Stets, 2009). It would also include examining identities in terms of their rank ordering given all of the identities that individuals may claim (Stryker, [1980] 2002). An *external perspective* addresses how multiple identities are related to the positions individuals hold in the social structure and the groups to which they belong (Thoits, 1983).

Internal Perspective

Control Hierarchy

Since individuals claim person, role, and group identities, at issue is how these different bases of identities are interrelated. Borrowing from Powers (1973), it has been argued that identities can be understood as forming a hierarchical system composed of an interlocking set of individual control systems at multiple levels (Stets & Harrod, 2004; Tsushima & Burke, 1999). At the highest level in the hierarchical system, the *principle level*, are person, role, and group identities, which provide the standards or goals for the *program level*, the level just below it. At the program level, individuals perceive the degree to which the goals set by the identities have been accomplished. If the identity goals have been accomplished, the identity meanings are maintained; otherwise they are modified. Look at another way, the identities at the principle level provide the meanings and standards that guide the selection and implementation of behavior at the program level, and the behavior will sustain or alter those identity meanings.

Theoretically, the principle level is also hierarchically arranged with person identities carrying the most abstract meanings; thus operating at the highest level like a “master” identity influencing the selection of role and group identities just below it, at a less abstract level (Burke, 2004; Stets & Carter, 2006). For example, the moral person identity may involve meanings of being caring, helpful, and compassionate. In turn, individuals may choose roles consistent with these meanings such as the parent, priest, or nurse role, and they may become involved in groups that encompass these roles such as being a member of a family, parish, or hospital.

Salience Hierarchy

Given the internal ranking of identities within the self, if an identity ranks higher in relative salience, then it will be activated across situations more often than lower salient identities.

As already mentioned, salience is influenced by a commitment to an identity in terms of the number and deepness of the ties to others on the basis of an identity, and the greater motivational force to respond to non-verifying meanings in a situation.

When an identity is salient and activated in a situation, it becomes a filter or lens that directs attention to controlling meanings in the situation that are consistent with one's identity meanings. To be clear, it is not simply the person but also situational cues that may introduce meanings that encourage the activation of one identity over another. Individuals will interpret these situational cues by relying on shared symbols and cultural meanings and identify the particular identity that is called forth (Stets & Carter, 2012). However, the identity may not get invoked if other situational factors impede the expression of the identity such as others in the situation that may encourage the adoption of an alternative identity. For example, when a person must decide whether a friend should drive home drunk from a party, rather than invoking the moral identity and driving the friend home, partygoers may encourage the person to continue having a good time and ignore the drunk friend who is about to leave, thus encouraging a self-interested identity over the moral identity (Stets & Carter, 2011). Alternatively, moral exemplars may be present in the situation who reinforces the meanings of the moral identity, reminding the person to respond in a moral manner.

The above illustrates how various situational factors facilitate or impede the expression of a salient identity depending upon whether the elicited meanings complement or contradict the salient identity meanings. More generally, situational meanings may simply constrain the expression of a salient identity as when one moves to a new environment (such as going off to college) and is unable to reconstruct social relationships based on the identity (Serpe & Stryker, 1987). Alternatively, the situation may impede the exercise of "choice" in the identity an individual enacts, thereby imposing the enactment of a particular identity (Serpe, 1987; Serpe & Stryker, 1993; Stryker, [1980] 2002).

Identity salience and the perceptual control system of identities both have the image of a hierarchy. How might the two be related? It may be that the more central or prominent particular person identities are to an individual in the control hierarchy, the more these identity meanings will infiltrate particular roles and groups that share these identity meanings, and the more salient will be these person, role, and group identities relative to other person, role, and group identities the person claims and that exist in the salience hierarchy. However, situations carry their own meanings about the particular identities that should be enacted. To the extent that situational meanings are consistent with individuals' salient person, role, and group identity meanings, and this occurs often, the salience of these identities should strengthen, and strengthen as well more prominent identities in the control hierarchy. To the extent that situational meanings are inconsistent with salient person, role, and group identity meanings, and to the extent that this persists over time, the salient identities should weaken, as well as weaken more prominent identities in the control hierarchy.

External Perspective

Roles

Since individuals can be tied to the social structure in multiple ways, having multiple identities can create competing demands and potentially lead to conflict and distress. Thoits (1983, 1986) has argued that rather than multiple identities creating problems and stress, they provide meaning and direction in people's lives, thus reducing anxiety and depression and counter-normative behaviors. Thoits also maintained that multiple identities fostered positive beliefs in self-efficacy and well-being such as high self-esteem. High self-efficacy and esteem and positive mental health such as few psychological problems can be more generally viewed as personal resources that facilitate involvement in multiple identities (Thoits, 2003) and that can potentially buffer the stress associated with maintaining them as

evident in stress research. Thoits argued that if multiple role identities generated conflict, the source of this conflict is in claiming obligatory role identities rather than voluntary role identities.

Obligatory role identities are identities that individuals are expected to assume over the life course such as student, worker, spouse, and parent. Individuals may not think these identities represent their “real self,” but they are normative in society. Thoits maintains that when obligatory identities compete for attention in a situation, individuals are more likely to experience conflict and distress because they cannot easily exit any one of the identities to resolve the conflict. Alternatively, voluntary role identities are those identities which offer more agency and choice, and which are easier to exit should they begin to compete with other identities and generate distress. Examples of voluntary identities include the friend, triathlete, gourmet cook, or choir member identity. People claim voluntary identities because they derive personal benefit from them, and they can abandon these identities when the costs begin to outweigh the benefits. Not surprisingly then, Thoits (2003) found that those with more voluntary identities reported higher self-esteem, mastery, and lower distress than those with more obligatory identities. Voluntary identities offered more control over one’s life than obligatory identities, and this greater control fostered these salutary outcomes.

An alternative to Thoits’ argument is that positive outcomes emerge from claiming multiple identities not because of their voluntary nature, but to the extent that they are verified in a situation (Burke & Stets, 2009). When an identity is not verified, individuals experience distress. Conversely, when an identity is verified, individuals feel good. The more identities that are verified, the better one should feel. Thus, accumulated multiple identities of all kinds have benefits, but only if the accumulated identities are verified.

Groups

Multiple identities may emerge in groups, particularly when membership in one group intersects with membership in another group. Specifically, a person may claim one identity in a group, but then something in the situation activates an identity that a person has in another group. For example, during the evening dinner hour, the mother identity may be enacted as a woman talks to her children, but as the conversation turns to a medical problem, she may invoke her physician identity. A person may also have different ties with different others in the same group. When a supervisor is discussing administrative responsibilities with a friend who is also a co-worker, role conflict may emerge when the worker identity and friend identity compete for attention.

People will spend more or less time in an identity depending upon the level of commitment and salience.⁴ Indeed, Stryker (2000) argues that differential involvement of individuals in social movements is a function of how committed and salient competing identities are to the activist identity. For example, individuals may have a spouse or worker identity to which they are more committed and which is more salient to them that precludes them from full participation in a social movement.

Identities and Emotion

Early on, Stryker (1968) posited three main components to self: I am (cognitive), I want (conative), and I feel (affective). Identity researchers tended to focus on the “I am” and neglected an analysis of the “I feel.” This is not to say that identity researchers were not interested in understanding what elicited positive and negative feelings when individuals entered an interaction, and how negative

⁴ However short or long the duration in an identity, the goal is to verify the identity.

emotions were resolved. For example, McCall and Simmons (1978) maintained that negative emotions emerged when a prominent identity was not supported by others in an interaction. Indeed, research revealed that the lack of confirmation of a prominent identity was tied to negative emotions (Ellestad & Stets, 1998). McCall and Simmons also argued that individuals engage in a variety of strategies to mute negative feelings such as rejecting others who are non-supportive or withdrawing from the interaction. Again, empirical evidence has shown that coping strategies emerge when individuals experience negative feelings (Stets & Tsushima, 2001).

Similar to McCall and Simmons, Stryker (2004) linked emotions to the support (or lack thereof) of an identity, but it was a salient identity rather than a prominent identity. Additionally, Stryker went further than McCall and Simmons in theoretically integrating emotions into identity theory by offering a series of propositions. For Stryker, identities emerge out of various roles that individuals occupy in social networks. Emotions influence the formation of networks because individuals who share common affective meanings are more likely to enter into and maintain social relationships with each other. When positive affect is linked to an identity, the feeling stems from meeting role expectations, and it encourages individuals to seek more relationships on the basis of that identity. Thus, interactive commitment to the identity is increased as is the social network and the salience of the identity. Negative affect stemming from an identity discourages increased relationships on the basis of that identity. Thus, interactive commitment is reduced as is the network and salience of the identity.

Stryker also argued that more salient identities will generate more intense positive affect if behavior is consistent with the identity, and it will generate more intense negative affect if the behavior is inconsistent with the identity. Intense affect has implications for identity commitment and salience. Strong positive emotions tied to identity enactment will increase ties to others based on that identity (commitment) and, in turn, increase the salience of that identity. Alternatively, strong negative emotions will reduce identity commitment and its salience.

Another way to look at the idea that emotions are confirming or disconfirming a prominent or salient identity is to view emotions as signaling the degree of correspondence between perceptual meanings of the self in the situation and identity standard meanings (Burke & Stets, 2009). Correspondence or identity verification produces positive emotions and non-correspondence or identity non-verification produces negative emotions. Identity non-verification involves self-perceptions in the situation falling short of one's identity standard as well as exceeding one's identity standard. Negative emotions motivate individuals to change the non-verifying state to a verifying state. Similar to McCall and Simmons' idea of coping strategies, individuals will engage in a variety of behavioral and cognitive strategies such as doing something different in the situation or reinterpreting the perceptual meanings of the self in the situation in order to create a verifying state.

A variety of studies have examined the emotional outcomes of identity non-verification (Stets, 2003, 2004, 2005; Stets & Asencio, 2008; Stets & Osborn, 2008). In these studies, a work situation was simulated in the laboratory that invoked the worker identity. Workers/participants received feedback from a manager/confederate in the forms of points earned for their work. Workers were previously informed as to how points were allocated to work output. Workers were placed in one of three conditions. Either they received feedback (points) from the manager that was: (1) what they expected for their work (identity verification), (2) more positive (received more points) than what they expected (identity non-verification in a positive direction), or (3) more negative (received less points) than what they expected (non-verification in a negative direction).

The results revealed that identity non-verification did not always lead to negative emotions as hypothesized in identity theory. While negative emotion occurred for identity non-verification in a negative direction, positive emotion emerged for identity non-verification in a positive direction. These unexpected findings indicated that more empirical tests are needed. The findings may be unique given the laboratory setting in which participants may not have invested in the identity they were enacting and sought only to enhance themselves rather than verify themselves. Alternatively, in the

laboratory study, participants were not able to refute the feedback that they received from the manager on their work. If they were given the opportunity to refute the feedback, they may have been less likely to align their emotional reaction in the direction of the feedback.

Identity researchers have begun to refine their research on emotions by moving beyond a focus of positive and negative emotions to an analysis of specific emotions. Stets and Burke (2005b) generated a series of testable hypotheses regarding how specific emotions might emerge from the identity process. In doing this, they examined several relevant dimensions that could be explored such as the source of one's identity standard meanings (self or other), the source of one's identity discrepancy (self or other), and the relative power and status of the self and other in the interaction. For example, if the source of people's identity meanings is primarily themselves (they've built up a set of expectations they hold for themselves), and if they feel responsible for not being able to verify their identities (an internal attribution), they may feel *sad*. Alternatively, if others are primarily the source of people's identity meanings, and if individuals see another as responsible for not being able to verify their identities (an external attribution), *anger* may be felt. Adding the dimension of power, if the other who is responsible for not verifying one's identity is of higher power than the person, the person may feel *fear*; if the other is of lower power than the person, the person may feel *rage*. In general, if individuals make distinctions in terms of how they are feeling in situations, then identity theorists need to explain the conditions under which these distinctions emerge. The above research begins to address these conditions.

An analysis of specific emotions in identity theory has extended to an investigation of moral emotions. For example, Stets and her associates (Stets & Carter, 2012; Stets et al., 2008) studied the moral emotions of shame and guilt, and their relationship to one's moral identity and moral behavior. Consistent with identity theory, they found that reports of shame and guilt were more likely to occur when individuals experienced non-verification of the moral identity. Specifically, when individuals with a high moral identity perceived that others in the situation did not see them as acting as moral persons, this lack of verification as to who they were influenced feelings of guilt and shame.

Identity Change

Identity change occurs when the meanings of an identity shift over time. In identity theory, it is assumed that identity change is ongoing but very gradual (Burke & Stets, 2009). Individuals may not find their identity as different from yesterday, last week, or last month. It is only when considering a longer period of time ranging from months to years that they may see a difference. While the identity verification process involves matching meanings of the self in the situation with identity meanings, thus supporting identity meanings and resisting identity change, resisting identity change does not mean that identity change does not occur at all. Burke (2006) discusses three ways in which identities may change. They include: (1) changes in the situation which prompt changes in the identity meanings, (2) multiple identities that conflict in a situation causing both identities to change, and (3) identity meanings and behavior meanings that conflict causing a modification in both meanings.

Changes in a situation can cause a discrepancy between identity meanings and perceived meanings of the self in the situation. If situational changes persist and people's meanings of themselves in situations are unable to adjust to match their identity meanings, their identity meanings may slowly change. Empirically, we see this in a study which tracked the changes in the gender identity meanings of newly married couples over the course of a year upon the birth of the first child (Burke & Cast, 1997). The birth of a child is a change in the situation that is generally irreversible. Becoming parents tends to move individuals to more traditional "gendered" meanings of parenting, and this was clearly the case in this study. The researchers found that in order to successfully accommodate

the situational change of a newborn, the gender identity of husbands became somewhat more masculine and the gender identity of the wives became somewhat more feminine.

Changes in a situation can cause a more dramatic shift in one's identity as when individuals enter environments that provide few possibilities for choosing which identities to enact. In other words, the social structure is "closed" rather than "open," thereby constraining individuals' identities and actions (Serpe, 1987; Serpe & Stryker, 1987, 1993). Examples of "closed" environments include prisons, the military, cults, and mental hospitals. Aside from how "open" or "closed" is the environment, there are environmental changes that occur as part of life course transitions that may influence identity change such as going off to college, getting married, becoming a parent, grandparent, and retired person. However, unexpected changes also alter one's identities such as divorce, unemployment, the loss of a home, or the loss of a loved one.

A second source of identity change is the simultaneous activation of two or more identities in a situation. For example, a woman's gender identity may contain meanings of being nurturing and somewhat passive, but in her lawyer identity at the firm, her worker identity contains meanings of being aggressive and proactive. Unless she is able to compartmentalize being a woman from being a litigator, the two identities will likely conflict and cause distress. Behaving in ways consistent with one identity will diverge from the meanings of the other identity. According to identity theory, this conflict is resolved and distress is reduced by the meanings in each identity slowly moving toward each other over time and reaching some middle ground (Burke & Stets, 2009). In the above example, the woman may modify her gender meanings to involve being more assertive over time, while at the same time she may alter her worker identity to include a more temperate orientation. To be clear, once identity meanings are modified, they are changed in whatever situations the identity is expressed.

Indeed, research reveals that a compromise in identity meanings does occur over time between conflicting identities. For example, in a study of newly married couples in which one's gender identity and spousal identity were measured along the traditional masculine to traditional feminine dimension, those who had a more feminine gender identity compared to their spousal identity in one year increased their femininity of their spousal identity in the next year (Burke, 2006). Similarly, those who had a spousal identity that was more feminine than their gender identity in one year increased their femininity of the gender identity in the following year. Thus, the meanings of each identity were being modified over time to bring them into alignment.

When one considers the issue of which identity is likely to show more change, identity theory suggests that less committed and less salient identities will be more likely to change than more committed and more salient identities. If more individuals expect a person to enact behavior consistent with a set of identity meanings, then it would be costly to change the meanings of this identity than an identity based on fewer ties to others. Additionally, since salient identities are more likely to be invoked in a situation, there will be more occasions to enact behaviors based on more salient identities than less salient identities. Thus, it would be easier to change less salient identities because the likelihood of enactment is not as high.

The third source of identity change is when identity meanings are inconsistent with behavior meanings in a situation. In general, individuals will try to behave in ways such that the meanings are consistent with their identity meanings. When the meanings are not consistent, individuals will try to enact alternative behavior that better reflects their identity meanings. This assumes that the situation is not constraining the individuals to act in a particular way, and that another competing and more salient identity has not been invoked which may direct a different behavior. At the same time that alternative behaviors are enacted to see if they better match identity meanings, identity meanings will slowly change to be more like the behavior meanings in the situation. Thus, changes occur for both the identity and the behavior over time, serving to reduce the inconsistency between the two.

Empirical work evidences the above dynamic. Returning to the study discussed above of newly married couples gender identity and spousal identity (Burke, 2006), the findings also revealed that

when those with a feminine spousal identity engaged in more masculine household activities in one year, they reduced their level of masculine tasks the following year. And, when those with a masculine spousal identity engaged in more feminine household tasks in one year, they increased the level of masculine tasks in the following year. Thus, they were modifying their behavior over time to better match their identity meanings. However, at the same time, their spousal identity meanings were changing to adapt to the meanings of their behavior in the situation. Those who were acting too masculine for their spousal identity slowly changed their spousal identity to become more masculine over time, and those who were acting too feminine for their spousal identity slowly changed their spousal identity to become more feminine.

Bridging to Other Sociological Areas

By using identity theory to theoretically inform other sociological areas of investigation, we are gaining further insight into sociological issues and problems. Below, we briefly discuss how identity theory has informed some sociological areas such as the sociology of crime and law, sociology of education, and sociology of race/ethnicity. Given space limitations, this is just a sampling of the inroads that identity theory has made into various sociological fields.

Sociology of Crime and Law

Violence Research

Researchers have argued that identity theory can provide an important theoretical development in domestic violence research because all behavior, including aggressive behavior, is rooted in issues of self and identity (Stets & Osborn, 2007). An important goal in interaction is to confirm people's identities. By first understanding people's identities, we can then identify how aggressive behavior facilitates or impedes verification of those identities.

The relationship between identity verification and aggression was investigated among newly married couples (Stets & Burke, 2005a). The researchers found that when people's spousal identity was not verified by the other in the marriage, it reduced their perceived level of control over their environment. In order to compensate for this reduced control, these individuals asserted control over their spouses, and heightened control over their spouses was associated with acts of aggression toward them. Using aggression to regain control disrupted later identity verification because aggression in one year significantly reduced verification of the spousal identity in the following year. Further, aggression led to a spiral of more aggression in subsequent years. Thus, identity disruptions at the individual level threatened established relationships at the interactive level and jeopardized the institution of marriage at the social structural level.

Identity theory has been applied to an understanding of the criminal identity using incarcerated offenders at a southern California correctional facility (Asencio & Burke, 2011). An unexpected finding from this research was that the incarcerated initially internalized the non-verifying feedback from others that they were criminals rather than challenging this feedback by engaging in alternative behavior to counteract it. This occurred controlling for the amount of time incarcerated. The incarcerated may have felt that they did not have the power or resources to resist the non-verifying feedback. Indeed, other research reveals that having power or resources in the situation was important in resisting non-verifying feedback (Cast, Stets, & Burke, 1999).

Law

Identity theory has been used in the related area of law. Specifically, it has been invoked to explain the lapses in judgment of lawyers who defend corporate and government scandals without recognizing their biases in defending such scandals (Robertson, 2009). Robertson argued that attorneys may have multiple identities that contribute to their poor judgments. For example, when attorneys assume the identity of lawyer, it involves aggressively defending their clients who may be a corporation or government agency. However, attorneys may also have the identity of employee in the corporation or agency they are defending. This latter identity might be more salient than the identity of lawyer, thereby influencing biased judgments and behavior to protect the organization or agency, which financially supports them. In the lawyer identity, behavior is organized around providing sound legal advice to the client, while in the employee identity behavior is focused more on advocating for the organization's goals under the guise of legal advice. Robertson argued that when attorneys allow the employee identity to guide their behavior, they have a stake in a favorable outcome for the corporation, because in winning the case, it facilitates verification of their employee identity. In this way, attorneys acting in the employee identity are subject to the same distortions and biases as the corporation, thus the lawyers place themselves in the worse position to offer independent counsel. Partisan bias clouds their judgment.

Robertson (2009) discussed how attorneys can enhance independent judgment and avoid the pitfalls of partisan bias. She argued that they should avoid dual role identities in organizations. For example, they should avoid taking on the role identities of employee and legal expert in a company or government agency. The risk is that the identity of lawyer will be subordinated to the employee identity such that the attorney's judgment will be filtered through these other identities. A further problem can contribute to partisan bias when an attorney has other identities that may threaten impartiality. For example, a company may want their employees to adopt the cost-saving strategy of environmentally friendly behaviors in the workplace, and the attorney who is giving legal counsel to the company is an environmental activist. A successful outcome for the company would verify the attorney's activist identity, once again blurring the line between advocacy and independent counsel. Robertson indicated that attorneys can take steps to raise the salience of the lawyer identity over other identities by spending more time in the lawyer identity and establishing ties to others who share that identity.

Sociology of Education

In science, mathematics, and engineering (SME) disciplines, women are underrepresented. In a series of papers using a sample of high school students who attended summer programs designed to foster SME interests, Lee (1998, 2002, 2005) used identity theory to explain women's underrepresentation in SME disciplines, and how it might be overcome. Lee (1998) found that females' perceptions of themselves (as more feminine) was more discrepant with how they perceived other science students (as more masculine) compared to males' views of themselves (as more masculine). Females saw themselves more like other females than other science students. Females also saw themselves as different from occupants in SME disciplines. These findings contributed to females reduced interest in science and provide insight into why women are not inclined to an SME identity.

What fostered an SME identity for women is attendance at SME summer programs (Lee, 2002). Specifically, experiencing emotionally satisfying relationships with others also involved in science activities (affective commitment) encouraged salience of the science identity and engaging in SME activities. This forging of good relationships with other SME students helped women to maintain science activities after they had left the summer program, thereby showing a more prominent science identity over time (Lee, 2005). Indeed, recent research revealed how participation in science training

programs was associated with an increased commitment to the science identity, which, in turn, increased the salience of the science identity, and one's intention to pursue a scientific career (Merolla, Serpe, Stryker, & Schultz, 2012).

Sociology of Race/Ethnicity

An important development in identity theory is how identity processes operate across different races/ethnicities as social categories. Owens and Serpe (2003) studied the role of self-esteem, commitment, and salience of the family identity for Blacks, Latinos, and Whites. An important finding stemming from this work was that sources of identity salience differ for Latinos as opposed to Whites and African Americans. Commitment (both interactive and affective) influenced the salience of the family identity for Latinos, but self-esteem influenced the salience of the family identity for Whites and African Americans. The former finding revealed how significant the family was for Latinos compared to Blacks and Whites. However, this familial emphasis may have unintended effects on the formation of other relationships. For example, other research revealed that compared to Whites and Blacks, Latinos were less likely to have their friend identity verified (Stets & Harrod, 2004). Stets and Harrod suggested that because of Latinos devotion to the family, they may be more likely to rely on and confide in kin members than friends. If friendships are not encouraged and developed, it may become difficult to acquire the resources such as care, trust, and loyalty that are necessary to facilitate verification of the friend identity.

In other analysis of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos, Stryker and his collaborators (Stryker et al., 2005) examined how large-scale, intermediate, and proximate levels of social structure impacted commitment to family, work, and voluntary associations. They found that across all ethnic groups, the degree to which individuals interacted with the same set of others in multiple networks (e.g., the individuals one related to at work were the same individuals one related to in voluntary associations) had positive effects on interactive and affective commitment to work and voluntary association relationships. This supports the identity theory assumption that losing a position and an identity in one network threatens relationships in another network to the degree that the networks have common members.⁵

Future Directions

Though identity theory has developed over the years, there are areas that can serve as fertile ground for further development. We discuss some of these areas below, including an examination of situational factors, identity formation and change, negative identities, and social movement activity. Working to develop these areas will extend the theory beyond its current boundaries as well as identify the scope conditions of the theory. Further, identity theory can advance by establishing links to other theories. Studying these linkages may put us in a better position to understand and explain behavior because it allows us to study multiple processes simultaneously. We discuss the potential of this with four theories: affect control theory, expectation states theory, exchange theory, and social identity theory.

⁵The above discussion is not intended to be exhaustive as to how identity theory has helped inform various sociological areas of study. For example, we have not discussed how using identity theory in environmental sociology has helped us better understand environmental behavior (Stets & Biga, 2003). When one's environmental identity was examined, including its prominence, commitment, and salience, researchers found that these identity factors significantly influence pro-environmental behavior.

Substantive Areas of Investigation

Situational Factors

In identity theory, given the internal structure of the self, research has revealed that more salient identities provide a stronger guide for behavior in situations than less salient identities. However, more research is needed on situational factors that independently cue particular identities in a situation that may not be salient to individuals. Thus, at issue is the extent to which salient identities act as a filter in situations, directing behavior that is consistent with the identity meanings, compared to situational meanings that may direct behavior. Looked at another way, what characteristics of situations permit more or less *choice* as to the identities that are invoked in situations (Serpe, 1987)? For example, a large number of others in a situation who are tied to each other based on a particular identity may encourage that identity to be invoked in the situation compared to another identity. Alternatively, the presence of a strong, salient identity exemplar in a situation may encourage the salient identity to be invoked. The power of others in a situation also may encourage the invocation of a particular identity with more powerful individuals directing one's identity compared to the less powerful. Still another factor may be the norms in the situation that constrain individuals to enact certain identities that are consistent with the norms. For example, the more individuals see a situation as directing them to behave morally, the more they may invoke the moral identity (Stets & Carter, 2012). In general, we need to more closely examine the context within which identities are embedded to investigate how they may independently influence the enactment of some identities over others.

Identity Formation and Change

As individuals age, they will likely take on identities that are considered normative given life course transitions. These are obligatory identities (Thoits, 2003). However, not all individuals assume these identities at the expected time, some claim them more easily than others, and some do not take them on at all. Additionally, individuals may take on a host of voluntary identities throughout the life cycle. In identity theory, we need to better understand how identities form, why they form when they do, and whether this formation varies by age, class, or race/ethnicity. For example, it is possible that those with more resources (for example, more education, wealth, and power) will be more likely to take on more identities compared to those with fewer resources.

Additionally, it may be important to study the relationship between the formation of obligatory identities and voluntary identities. For example, do individuals take on more voluntary identities as they leave obligatory identities, for example, divorcing or becoming unemployed? Are some individuals more likely to form voluntary identities that satisfy meanings not found in obligatory identities? Are the factors that influence the formation of voluntary identities significantly different from those factors that influence the formation of obligatory identities?

Though we are making progress on understanding identity change, there is still more research that is needed. We need to better understand the conditions that change one's commitment to an identity, the salience of the identity, and the prominence of the identity. One avenue of study is the role of reflected appraisals versus self-appraisals in producing identity change. For example, self-appraisals may be instrumental in identity change as individuals come to define themselves differently over time given changes in their location in the social structure.

Negative/Stigmatized Identities

Most research in identity theory has examined positive, normative identities (for example, student, friend, worker, spouse, and parent) rather than negative, stigmatized identities. An assumption in

identity theory is that individuals seek to confirm the meanings in their identities, irrespective of whether those meanings are positive or negative (Burke & Stets, 2009). Given all of the identities that persons may claim, it is possible for individuals to have some identities that are predominately positive in meaning, others that are predominately negative, and still others that have a mixture of positive and negative meanings. It is important to examine whether some identities are more easily verified (such as identities with positive meanings) than others (such as identities with a mixture of positive and negative meanings).

When a person assumes a negative identity such as criminal, alcoholic, or homeless, identity verification is feedback along the same dimension of meaning as the negative identity. While there are other identities than a stigmatized identity that an individual may hold, it may be difficult to verify these other identities because the stigmatized identity may become a “master status,” and all identity meanings that a person holds may be interpreted in light of the stigmatized meanings. Quantitative research is needed to examine this.

Another aspect of negative identities in everyday life that has not been addressed by the current research is the presence of the meanings associated with occupying counter normative role identities such as “childlessness” or “non-religious.” The individual who has chosen to remain childless throughout their adult life or the person who has chosen not be part of an organized religion (whether agnostic or atheist) has those identities activated when interacting with a person who holds the opposite and socially valued role identity of parent or religious person. While these identities may not be viewed as stigmatizing, they are in fact aspects of people’s lives that may bring negative social and self-evaluations into play. Because they locate the individual in a social space of “not” holding a role identity that others value, the impact may be instrumental in the areas of self-concept (esteem, mastery, authenticity), emotions, and mental health.

Social Movement Activity

More research is needed on the relevance of identity concepts to social movement activity. Currently, social movement research focuses on the collective identity, that is, a sense of “we-ness” that emerges in a group on the basis of group members experiencing a common set of interests. Identity processes at the individual level that we have discussed in this chapter tend to get omitted from the analysis. Over a dozen years ago, an effort was made to bridge identity theory research with social movement’s research (Stryker, Owens, & White, 2000). In this work, we obtained a sense of just how rich the connection is between identity concepts and social movement processes.

For example, Stryker (2000) maintained that one of the reasons why individuals differ in their level of participation in social movements is that individuals have multiple identities. To the extent that commitment to networks or groups related to an identity overlap with the networks or groups involved in a social movement, then a person may be more likely to participate in the movement. Gecas (2000) pointed out that research on the collective identity does not go far enough in incorporating culture; it needs to consider one’s values in social movement participation. He argued that if we recognize that people have value identities, that is, “desired personal qualities or desired social conditions” (Gecas, p. 96), if the values held within identities overlap with the values of a social movement, then we can expect greater movement participation. Kiecolt (2000) focused on how social movement participation changes one’s identities. For example, movement participation can change the salience hierarchy of identities, shifting an identity up or down in the hierarchy.

The above ideas are ripe for empirical testing. Social movement activity is about the collective as well as the individual. Thus, it is important to examine how identity theory concepts and processes enhance our understanding of movement participation at the individual level, and how individual and collective identities collide, complement, or otherwise are independent of one another during movement activity.

Bridging to Other Theories

Affect Control Theory

The similarities and differences between affect control theory and identity theory have been discussed elsewhere (Owens et al., 2010; Smith-Lovin & Robinson, 2006). The primary distinction between the two theories involves what is being maintained in the situation. In identity theory, individuals act in a situation with an eye toward maintaining the meanings held in their identity. Since the identity meanings are the internal representation of people's external positions in the social structure in the form of roles and group memberships, maintaining identities correspondingly facilitates maintaining the social structure within which identities are embedded. In affect control theory, individuals act to maintain all the fundamental or cultural meanings of a situation including one's own identities meanings, the identity meanings of others in the situation, the behavioral meanings in the situation, and the setting meanings. These meanings are the fundamental, cultural meanings of a society, thus to the degree that the meanings in the situation are sustained, culture is being maintained.

From an identity theory perspective, we might bridge these two theories by suggesting that in the course of verifying meanings in a situation, both the social structure *and* culture are maintained. For example, in focusing on the verification of people's identity meanings, it is important to point out that these meanings come from culture (Burke & Stets, 2009). Early on, individuals learn the meanings that define roles and group memberships from parents, educators, peers, and the media. These meanings are tried on, and they are modified and refined through role-taking and observations of others' behavior (Williams, 2002). Thus, in verifying an identity in a situation, individuals are simultaneously verifying the cultural meanings tied to that identity. If people draw on cultural meanings to guide their behavior, then to what extent are individuals acting to maintain the cultural meanings of a situation at the same time they are maintaining their own identity meanings? For example, do persons work to maintain the identities of others in a situation, or do they only do so when it sustains their own identity meanings (Smith-Lovin & Robinson, 2006)?

From an affect control theory perspective, researchers have typically not focused on salient identities that are activated across situations nor have they conceptualized the self in stable terms, as having a clear structure that is organized (Owens et al., 2010). This focus may help establish a bridge. Recent work in affect control theory is beginning to study how the self shows some stability in terms of maintaining a particular self-image across situational encounters (MacKinnon & Heise, 2010). Thus, affect control theorists are developing some of the taken-for-granted assumptions about the self in identity theory.

Expectation States Theory

Expectation states theory and identity theory can be connected by incorporating the status process into the identity process. An important assumption in expectation states theory is that when individuals enter an interaction, they develop corresponding performance expectations of one another (an evaluation of how much each will contribute to the goals of the interaction) by locating one another's status relative to themselves. Those evaluated as higher in status will be evaluated as more competent, be expected to contribute more to the interaction, receive more deference from others, and be held in high esteem compared to those lower in status. Essentially, higher status individuals have greater influence in an interaction than lower status individuals. Identity theorists have studied the role of status in the identity verification process, and they have found that those with higher status were more successful in having their identities verified than those with lower status (Burke, 2008; Cast et al., 1999; Stets & Harrod, 2004). Thus the greater influence of higher status individuals occurs not only for external (task) assessments but also internal (self) assessments. High power should have the same effect as high status.

Expectation theorists could bring the identity process into the status process. In identity theory, people bring their group, role, and person identities into situations. At issue is how identities are sustained when performance expectations might be challenged or even reversed in a situation. As others have argued, if negative performance expectations assigned to females by males in a mixed gender group can be reversed with these new positive performances expectations for women carrying over to subsequent group interactions (Lucas, 2003) would this reversal in performance expectations for women occur for individuals who claim a masculine gender identity that contains stereotypical views about women (Serpe & Stryker, 2011; Stryker, 2008)? And, would this reversal carry over to subsequent interactions for those who claim a masculine gender identity? If the success in modifying performance expectations is variable, this variation may be due to the nature of meanings in individuals' identities.

Exchange Theory

There are similarities between identity theory and exchange theory such as how repeated interactions are associated with increased commitment and positive emotions (Burke & Stets, 2009). In exchange theory, repeated interactions are repeated exchanges, while in identity theory, it is repeated identity verification. However, there are differences. For example, exchange theory focuses on value preferences guiding exchanges while identity theory focuses on meanings that serve to sustain the self and the interaction. More importantly, there are opportunities for bridging the two theories.

Lawler (2003) identifies one avenue for linking the theories. He argued that the stronger persons are affectively attached to a social unit (for example, a relationship, organization, community), the more this will increase their commitment to their role identities. Further, when role identities are strong, this will increase people's emotional attachment to the social unit. Thus, the relationship between role identities and emotional attachment within a group is reciprocal. Others have argued that exchange theorists might want to examine the role of multiple identities during exchange interactions rather than a single identity, as well as assess the relative salience of identities prior or during an exchange to examine their influence on the course and outcome of an exchange (Serpe & Stryker, 2011; Stryker, 2008).

Social Identity Theory

Finally, the similarities and differences between identity theory and social identity theory have been discussed elsewhere (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; Stets & Burke, 2000). We discuss three areas in which there may be a bridge. These include how identities are conceptualized, the significance of the identity verification process in group behavior, and the different bases of identities: person, role, and group identities.

In social identity theory, identities are understood in terms of membership in one category or another. Self-categorization involves people identifying the prototypical attributes of a category and seeing themselves as having these attributes. In turn, they will feel and act according to the norms of the group. Social identity theorists could incorporate the more nuanced understanding of identities in identity theory by describing the self in terms of meanings rather than self-categorizations. The self could be conceptualized along an array of meanings, and in terms of having higher or lower levels of these meanings, rather than in dichotomous terms.

Second, in social identity theory, prototypical members usually identify more strongly with a category, and therefore act in ways that benefits the group (Hogg, 2006). However, social identity theorists could use the identity verification process as an alternative mechanism that motivates behavior. Members of a category could be acting so that there is consistency between perceived

self-meanings as to who they are given the category and their identity standard meanings. In a related way, less prototypical members may be more likely to be perceived as a threat because they are not acting in ways consistent with the norms of the category. Their identity standard meanings are not entirely consistent with the standards of the group. In identity verification terms, their identity as a member of a category is not being verified. One of the ways to resolve this non-verification would be to change their behavior to match the group standard meanings. Over time, this would change the meaning of their identity standard.

Finally, identity theory historically has focused on role identities while social identity theory traditionally has emphasized categorical identities. We prefer the concept of group identities over categorical identities to emphasize the important sociological process of interaction and shared purpose among individuals. Within groups people play out various roles, and individuals enact these various roles in different ways, given the unique person identities they bring to their roles. Thus, in situations, group, role, and person identities may not be easily separated, and we may need to examine their simultaneous occurrence. This poses a challenge as to how we might examine their independent effects, but perhaps these effects cannot be understood as independent.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the development of identity theory, now four decades old, beginning with its theoretical foundations in symbolic interactionism. Structural symbolic interactionism, from which identity theory directly emerges, reminds us that identities are always embedded in social structures whether large, intermediate, or proximate. These structures both constrain and facilitate entrance into and departure from networks of social relationships from which identities emerge. The central concept of identity theory formulations is “self,” understood as comprised of many meanings and thus identities that are hierarchically arranged thereby creating a self-structure. A number of distinct research programs have developed out of identity theory that represents differential levels of analytical focus. Importantly, we maintain that these research programs are not competing explanations, but rather complementary, resulting in a more complete understanding of how a theory rooted in symbolic interaction can provide a set of explanations for the statement “society shapes self shapes social interaction.”

Following the suggestions of Stryker and Burke (2000), we have presented theory and research associated with the challenges facing the future development of identity theory. We outline some of these challenges. First, we need to continue the development of theoretical and empirical specifications of the bases of identity. The question of how different aspects of identity come into play in different social structural situations and with different constellations of identities in which individuals are embedded is the challenge of studying multiple identities. A richer understanding of the role of emotions as they relate to identity processes is needed such as the specific feelings that individuals may experience within and across situations as they play out different identities. Third, because identities are not static but change in terms of their meaning, we need a deeper understanding as to how identities take shape and evolve over time. Fourth, identities are always enacted within a context and more research is needed as to how contextual factors facilitate or impede the expression of identities. Finally, rather than fragmenting the field into yet more theories, we think that it is important to bridge identity theory to other theories. Doing so will make the relationship of identity theory to other theoretical research programs clear and assist social psychologists in forming a better understanding of social action.

The next decade of social psychological work on identity should see theoretical development and research that draws on the logical connections between related research paradigms within identity theory and beyond, to other theories. The result will be a comprehensive research agenda aimed at investigating the interrelated and reflexive nature of social, role, and person identities to social structure and culture.

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Chapter 3

Social Exchange Theory

Karen S. Cook, Coye Cheshire, Eric R.W. Rice, and Sandra Nakagawa

Introduction

We engage in many exchanges on a daily basis with a wide range of actors most often embedded in the groups, networks, organizations and institutions we inhabit. Thus it is not surprising that exchange theory has remained one of the major theoretical perspectives on social interaction and social structure since the early writings of George Homans (1961), Peter Blau (1964) and Richard Emerson (1962, 1972a, 1972b). In this chapter we review the foundational work of these three key contributors and the subsequent research their work has inspired. The roots of this theoretical orientation can be found in earlier philosophical and psychological work deriving from utilitarianism on the one hand and behaviorism on the other, the vestiges of which remain evident in the versions of exchange theory current today. We focus on the nature of the contributions of exchange theory to the analysis of social psychological and sociological phenomena of importance in understanding micro-level processes of exchange and the social structures they constitute.

First, we provide an overview of the major theories of social exchange. Then we draw out some of the relevant distinctions between the different theoretical formulations. After this exercise we discuss the main topics of research that have been studied by many of the key contributors to the exchange tradition within the field of sociology. One major hallmark of recent research on social exchange in the field of sociology is its attention to the links between social exchange theory and theories of social status, influence, social networks, fairness, coalition formation, solidarity, trust, affect, emotion and collective action. We address these topics in our review of recent important contributions to exchange theory. We conclude with a brief statement concerning methodological issues in the study of social exchange and directions for future research. In particular we focus on the linkages between exchange theory in sociology and work in related fields of inquiry such as economic sociology, social networks and online exchange. There are many important topics of research yet to be studied fully within the exchange tradition, which provide an exciting research agenda for the future.

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Social Behavior as Exchange

For Homans (1961), one of the first sociological theorists to focus on interpersonal exchanges, the dominant emphasis was the individual behavior of actors in interaction with one another. His primary aim was to explain fundamental processes of social behavior (influence, conformity, status, leadership, and justice) from the ground up. Homans believed that there was nothing that emerges in social groups that cannot be explained by propositions about individuals as individuals, together with the given condition that they happen to be interacting. In his effort to embrace this form of reductionism his formulation is very clearly different from the subsequent work of Peter Blau (1964) who built into his theory of social exchange and social structure an analysis of the “emergent” properties of social systems, which could not be reduced to individual action alone.

Homans (1961, p. 13) defined *social exchange* as the exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two parties. Cost was viewed primarily in terms of alternative activities or opportunities foregone by the actors involved. Reinforcement principles derived from the kind of behaviorism popular in the early 1960s (e.g. the work of B. F. Skinner) were used by Homans to explain the persistence of exchange relations. Behavior is a function of payoffs, whether the payoffs are provided by the nonhuman environment or by other humans. Emerson (1972a) subsequently developed a more formal psychological basis for exchange based on these general reinforcement principles. Linda Molm’s (1979, 1980, 1985) later work also built on this foundation of behaviorism.

Homans explained social behavior and the forms of social organization produced by social interaction by showing how A’s behavior reinforced B’s behavior (in a two party relation between actors A and B), and how B’s behavior in contingent fashion reinforced A’s behavior in return. This was the explicit basis for continued social interaction explained at the “sub-institutional” level. The existing historical and structural conditions were taken as given. Value in this formulation is determined by the actor’s history of reinforcement and thus was also taken as a given at the initiation of an exchange relation. Homans’ primary focus was the social behavior that emerged as a result of the social process of mutual reinforcement over time. Relations could also terminate on the basis of the failure of reinforcement or as a result of too much asymmetry in the relevant rewards and costs.

Dyadic exchange, the main emphasis of his work, formed the basis for much of his theoretical consideration of other important sociological concepts such as distributive justice, balance, status, leadership, authority, and solidarity. Homans’ work was criticized for two main reasons: it was too reductionist (i.e., it took the principles of psychology as the basis for sociological phenomena) and in analyzing the sub-institutional level of social behavior it underplayed the significance of the institutional forces as well as the social processes and structures that emerge out of social interaction, a major focus of the work of Blau and Emerson. In this respect, it is somewhat ironic that one of Homans’ lasting contributions to social psychology has been his early treatment of distributive justice in social exchange relations. The irony derives from the fact that Homans was explicitly much less interested in norms since he was preoccupied with the “subinstitutional” level of analysis in his study of elementary social behavior. His effort to focus on elementary behavior is derived from his opposition to the systems oriented and normative views of Parsons that held sway during the time that he wrote his treatise on social behavior. In his autobiography, Homans (1984) refers to Parsons’ main work on the social system as the “yellow peril.” We discuss Homans’ conception of distributive justice in greater detail in the section on commitment and fairness in exchange relations.

Homans’ key propositions framed the study of social behavior in terms of rewards and punishments. Behavior that is rewarded in general continues (up to the limit of diminishing marginal utility). His first proposition, the success proposition, states that behavior that generates positive consequences is likely to be repeated. The second proposition, the stimulus proposition, states that behavior that has been rewarded on such occasions in the past will be performed in similar situations. The value proposition, the third proposition, specifies that the more valuable the result of an action to an actor, the more likely that action is to be performed.

The fourth proposition, the deprivation-satiation proposition, qualifies the stimulus proposition introducing the general ideal of diminishing marginal utility: the more often a person has recently received a particular reward for an action, the less valuable is an additional unit of that reward. Finally, the fifth proposition specifies when individuals will react emotionally to different reward situations. People will become angry when they do not receive what they anticipate. Homans (1974) later argues that they can become angry when they do not receive a fair rate of return, introducing the normative concept of distributive justice into his analysis of dyadic exchange.

Blau, writing at about the same time, framed his micro-exchange theory in terms of rewards and costs as well, but took a decidedly more economic and utilitarian view of behavior rather than building on the reinforcement principles derived from experimental behavioral analysis. A key distinction between these two broad perspectives, as Heath (1976) points out, is whether the actor is forward-looking or backward-looking in his determination of what to do next. Utilitarianism generally looks forward. Actors are viewed as acting in terms of anticipated rewards that benefit them and they tend to choose the alternative course of action that maximizes benefit (and minimizes costs, but see Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). Reinforcement theories look backwards with actors valuing what has been rewarding to them in the past. The micro-level exchange theory in Blau's work is embryonic and underdeveloped though it is one of the first attempts to apply utilitarianism derived from economics to social behavior.

Blau viewed social exchange as a process of central significance in social life and as underlying the relations between groups as well as between individuals. He focused primarily on the reciprocal exchange of extrinsic benefits and the forms of association and emergent social structures that this kind of social interaction created. According to Blau (1964, p. 91): "Social exchange ... refers to voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from others." In contrasting social and economic exchange he emphasizes the fact that it is more likely in social exchange for the nature of the obligations involved to remain unspecified, at least initially. Social exchange, he argues, "involves the principle that one person does another a favor, and while there is a general expectation of some future return, its exact nature is definitely not stipulated in advance" (Blau, 1986, p. 93).

The first third of Blau's book on exchange and power specifies the nature of the social processes that result in associations between individuals (e.g., attraction). Two conditions are defined as important in the assessment of whether or not the behavior involved leads to exchange. The behavior "must be oriented toward ends that can only be achieved through interaction with other persons, and it must seek to adapt means to further achievement of these ends" (Blau, 1986, p. 5). Social exchange processes give rise to differentiation in social status and power based on the dependence of some actors on others for the provision of valued goods and services. This conception of power was based on the approach taken by Emerson (1962) in his treatment of power-dependence relations.

Much of the remaining focus of Blau's classic book is on the structure of social exchange and emergent social processes at the group and organizational level. His explicit attempt to build a theory of social structure on the basis of a micro-level theory of exchange was also influential in Emerson's work, though they used different theoretical strategies.

Emerson's important contributions to exchange theory are an interesting mix of the work of Homans and Blau. The behavioral underpinnings of his micro-level theory are based on reinforcement principles of the type that animated Homans' work in the 1960s. In Part I of his theory, Emerson takes the experimental analysis of behavior of Skinner and others as the basis for his formal theory of exchange behavior (see Emerson, 1972a). In Part II, he builds on the analysis of dyadic exchange to develop a framework for the analysis of exchange network structures (see Emerson, 1972b). This work is reviewed in our discussion of exchange and power, since power was the dominant emphasis of the early work on exchange structures. It was the main focus of the work of Blau and Emerson and until the 1990s it was the central topic of much of the empirical work on social exchange networks.

The Structure of Social Exchange

One of the distinguishing features of Blau's (1964) influential book on social exchange is the primary emphasis on the structure of associations larger than the dyad. Blau's explicit aim was to develop a theoretical formulation that could provide the basis for a theory of macro-social structures as well. His attempt to build links between a micro-sociological theory of behavior and a macro-sociological theory of social structure was in many respects prophetic of the theoretical efforts in the 1980s and 1990s that emerged to examine more closely the "micro-macro link" (Alexander, Munch, Smelser, & Giesen, 1990; Huber, 1991), a project that remains unfinished.

In addition to the effort to build a macro-sociological theory of structure on the basis of a micro-sociological theory of behavior, Blau identified generic social processes and mechanisms he viewed as operative at various levels of social organization. These included collective action, legitimacy, opposition, conflict, and cooperation. This work set the stage for a number of subsequent developments in exchange theory on collective action, coalition formation, justice and status, among others (see below), but Blau was not given full credit for this broader influence, until several decades later.

Montgomery (1996), for example, reformulated Blau's (1964) model of social exchange to reflect the dynamic nature of interaction and the potential for opportunistic behavior. He demonstrated how social exchange could be formalized as a repeated game, and how game-theoretic models might be used to predict the stability of certain exchange network structures. Whereas Blau's (1964) theory could not explain the strong, reciprocal relationships in the work group advice network (Blau, 1955), Montgomery's model (1996) provided a plausible explanation. Montgomery's model, however, only addressed the stability of the exchange network noted by Blau (1955) and did not address the emergence and possible transformation of this structure in real time. The primary emphasis in the work of Blau on exchange structures such as advice networks was on its causal link to the distribution of power and network influence.

Exchange Relations, Networks and Power

Starting with the early theoretical work of Blau (1964, 1986) and Emerson (1962, 1972a, 1972b) research focused on the connection between social structure and the use of power. Despite his important contributions to social exchange theory, Homans did not focus much attention on power (Cook & Gerbasi, 2006). Blau (1964) believed that inequality and power distributions were emergent properties of ongoing relations of social exchange. Inequalities, he argued, could result from exchange because some actors control more highly valued resources than do others. As a result, they incur social debts that are most easily discharged through the subordination of their social debtors. Blau (1964) argued that such relations of subjugation and domination took on a self-perpetuating character and formed the micro-foundations of power inequality.

For Emerson, the relationship between power and social structure was the central theoretical problem in social exchange theory. From his earliest work in social exchange, Emerson (1962) defined *power* in relational terms as a function of the dependence of one actor on another. In a particular dyad of exchange partners (A and B), the power of actor A over another actor B is a function of the dependence of B on A for valued resources and behaviors. Dependence and power are, thus, a function of the value one actor places on resources controlled by another and the relative availability of alternative sources of supply for those resources. This relational conception of power has two central features that helped generate the large body of social exchange research that exists today. First, power is treated explicitly as relational, not simply the property of a given actor. Second, power is potential power and is derived from the resource connections (often now referred to as a form of "social capital") among actors that may or may not be used.

It was Emerson's move to conceptualize power as a function of social relations that opened the door for the subsequent development of micro-theories connecting social networks to power. Like Blau (1964, 1986), Emerson viewed the fundamental task of social exchange theory to be the building of a framework in which the primary dependent variables were social structure and structural changes. He went on to expand his treatment of power and dependence as a function of social relations to an extensive theory of social exchange relations and networks (Emerson, 1972a, 1972b). He argued that *potential power* was the direct effect of structural arrangements among actors who controlled valued resources (1972b). In his work with Cook (Cook & Emerson, 1978), Emerson brought social exchange theory into its contemporary empirical and theoretical domain. They argued and experimentally demonstrated that power was a function of relative dependence. Moreover, dependence was a feature of networks of interconnected exchange partners whose relative social power was the result of the shape of the social network and the positions they occupied (Cook & Emerson). While Cook and Emerson (1978) concerned themselves with other exchange outcomes, particularly commitment formation, it was the connection between the use of power and the structure of social networks that became the central focus of a new generation of social exchange theorists.

The most consistent finding among scholars working on social exchange is that relative position in a network of exchange relations produces differences in the relative use of power, manifest in the unequal distribution of rewards across positions in a social network (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Markovsky, Willer, & Patton, 1988; Skvoretz & Willer, 1993). While several competing micro-theories connecting network structure and power-use now exist, all these competing perspectives converge on one point: "Power differentials between actors are related to differences in actor's positions in the network of exchange relations" (Skvoretz & Willer, p. 803). The theories, however, view different causal mechanisms as being at work in converting differentials in network position into differentials of power. The Graph-theoretic Power Index approach uses elementary theory and focuses on the role of exclusion in networks (Markovsky, Skvoretz, Willer, Lovaglia, & Erger, 1993; Markovsky et al., 1988; Skvoretz & Willer). Core theory borrows concepts and solutions from game theory and focuses on viable coalitions among partners (Bienenstock & Bonacich, 1992, 1993, 1997). Equi-dependence theory is based on power-dependence reasoning and centers on equilibrium points in which dependence between parties to the exchange reaches a balance (Cook & Yamagishi, 1992). Finally, expected value theory is based on a probabilistic logic and looks at the expected value of exchanges weighted by their likelihood of occurrence (Friedkin, 1992, 1993).

Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992, 1993, 1997) make arguments about how structural arrangements affect the frequency of exchange. They introduce the concept of the core, as developed by game theorists, into the context of social exchange. They argue that intuitively the core as a solution implies that "no group of players will accept an outcome if, by forming a coalition, they can do better" (Bienenstock & Bonacich, 1992). Not only do different network structures produce different power distributions, but also different coalitions emerge as "solutions" to exchange. What this argument implies is that the structural arrangement of actors in relative position to one another can be an impetus for some subsets of actors to exchange more frequently than others. This increased frequency of exchange may in turn reinforce the coalitions that form. Bienenstock and Bonacich (1993) are aware of this implication and test it explicitly, finding that the core typically made effective predictions about the frequency of exchanges as well as relative power differences. Often these coalitions form in response to the existence of power differences among the actors in the network as Emerson (1972b) noted. Coalitions can serve to mitigate such power differences such as when employees combine efforts in order to respond collectively to an employer's requests for increased time commitments.

Cook and Yamagishi (1992) also proposed that structural arrangements would affect patterns of exchange among actors in a social network. They argued that exchanges proceed toward an equilibrium point where partners depend equally on each other for valued resources. This equi-dependence principle has implications for partner selection. They argue that three different types of relations can emerge from a network of potential exchange relations (which they refer to as an opportunity

structure). Exchange relations are those relations in which exchanges routinely occur. Non-relations are potential partnerships within the network which are never used, and which if removed from the network do not affect the predicted distribution of power. Finally, latent relations are potential relations, which also remain unused but which if removed affect the subsequent predicted distribution of power across positions in the network.

Friedkin (1992, 1993) likewise argues that some relations are the focus of more frequent interaction than are others, depending on the structure of alternative relations present in the exchange network. He views networks as a space for potential relations and calculates the probabilities that particular exchanges will occur. Payoffs are a function of the expected value of a particular exchange weighted by the probability of the occurrence of that exchange. For Friedkin, the fact that some relations are used more than others is central to his explanation of how power becomes differentially distributed across positions in a social network. Central to his theory of actor behavior in exchange networks are predictions about how often some exchange relations occur and, moreover, how some relations are more likely to occur within a given structure than are others.

As was the case for Expected Value Theory the Graph-Theoretic Power Index (GPI) is explicitly concerned with predicting resource acquisition by actors in positions in networks of exchange. In so doing, GPI relies explicitly on the probability of particular partnerships being formed (see Markovsky et al., 1993, pp. 200–204 for a detailed explanation). Beyond using the probability of an exchange occurrence in the GPI, Markovsky and his collaborators focus on the idea that some types of structures tend to have more of an impetus toward exclusion than do others. Some network structures can be characterized as weak-power networks and others as strong-power networks. The essential difference between these two types of networks is that strong-power networks include positions that can exclude particular partners without affecting their own relative power or benefit levels. On the other hand, a weak power network is typically more densely connected, which acts to prevent the emergence of large inequalities in exchange outcomes.

An example of a strong power network can be seen in a workplace where a manager can compel increased compliance from workers because they are highly dependent on the manager for valued outcomes that only she can offer. In a weak power network there are typically more alternatives from which each actor can obtain resources of value. For example, in a group of friends if one of the friends becomes rude or unfriendly each person typically has alternative social partners he or she can turn to for support, thus there is less opportunity for exploitation to occur. One implication of this distinction is that strong-power networks will tend to have lower levels of commitment between the parties to the exchange than will weak-power networks, because strong-power structures allow the arbitrary exclusion of some partners (Markovsky et al., 1993), facilitating power use.

Molm (1990, 1997a; Molm, Peterson, & Takahashi, 1999) formulated a different conceptualization of the connection between social structure and the use of power. Molm started with Emerson's two central propositions: power is relational and power is a function of dependence. But Molm's program of research took a distinctly different direction from the other positional theories of social exchange. First, Molm focused on exchanges that are not negotiated, but are reciprocal acts of contingent giving (Molm, 1990, 1994, 1997a, 1997b). In *reciprocal exchange*, actors do not bargain over the division of a finite pool of resources (or a fixed range of positive returns), rather exchange is a process of "gift-giving" or the simple act of the provision of a valued resource or service and exchange relationships develop over time through repeated acts of reciprocal giving. The failure of reciprocity results in infrequent exchange. Second, power is not solely tied to the legitimate use of reward power. Power may take the form of coercion or punishment (Molm, 1990, 1994, 1997a, 1997b). Whereas the other theories view the use of power as wielding structural influence through the threat and/or practice of exclusion from exchange (especially when there is a power-imbalance in the network), Molm considers how actors may impose punitive sanctions or negative outcomes on one another. The threat or practice of exclusion is most effective in networks in which there is a large power difference between the actors as noted above. And, actors who are most dependent (least powerful) are most likely to be excluded from exchange in certain networks (e.g., networks in which there is a monopoly structure).

Molm's extensive research on non-negotiated or reciprocal exchange has produced important contributions to the understanding of the connections between social structure and the use of power (for a thorough review of this body of research see Molm, 1997a, 1997b). First, Molm's work demonstrates that not all types of power use are primarily structurally motivated (Molm, 1990, 1994). While exclusion can produce the unconscious use of reward power in negotiated exchange contexts (Molm, 1990), punishment power is used more sparingly. Second, power-use can have strategic motivations. Punishment power may not be used frequently but when it is, it is usually employed purposively to influence the future actions of one's exchange partners (Molm, 1990, 1994). Third, her work provides an analysis of the alternative sources of power. Power-use in the form of punishment is distinct from power use in the form of the differential distribution of rewards. Finally, her line of research shows how coercive power is connected to and limited by the structures of dependence. Dependence on rewards is the primary force in exchange relations, motivating both the use of punishment and reward power (Molm, 1990).

Exchange, Power and Status

In recent work, Thye and others have made explicit linkages between theories of exchange and status. Although Homans and Blau included consideration of status processes centrally in their original formulations of exchange, the empirical research on exchange since the 1980s shifted attention to power processes primarily independent of status dynamics. After two decades of concentrated work on the role of network structure as a determinate of power in exchange networks it thus appears that status processes have been given short shrift. In addition, some of the most developed theoretical formulations on status dynamics in social relations during this same time period have given much less attention to power than originally implicated in earlier work. For example, the earliest formulations of expectations states theory in sociology (e.g., Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972) presented status as a clear determinant of the observable power and prestige order within a group. Status in this sense is viewed as a cause of differences in power and influence in society. In contrast, the exchange formulation of power dynamics focused more attention on the structural and locational causes of power differences. The location of an actor in a network was viewed as the key determinant of an actor's power and influence (in the form of control over needed resources such as knowledge, information or goods and services at her disposal), and less attention was paid to the links between structurally determined power and pre-existing status distinctions.

The interesting feature of the work by Thye (2000) and Lovaglia (1994, 1995), among others, is that they attempted to produce a conception of *composite power* – power that is determined by both location in a structure of exchange relations and power that is derived from the status of the actors in a hierarchy of status relations. Specifically, power in this framework is conceived as a structural potential that enables some actors to earn favorable resource distributions at the expense of others. The status of the actors in the exchange is viewed as having influence on the perceived value of the resources to be exchanged. Resources (e.g., goods and services) associated with high status actors are perceived to be of higher status value than those of low status actors and this valuation is symmetric. That is, both low and high status actors have the same view (i.e., view high status actors' resources as more valuable). Thye's (2000) findings indicate that there is a preference for interaction with high status actors in exchange networks of equal power. Even in unequal power networks status confers an advantage on high status actors. High status actors were more actively sought after as exchange partners and received more favorable exchange rates in both equal and unequal (weak) power networks. Thye, Willer, and Markovsky (2006) demonstrated that high status actors not only earned more than low status actors in the same position, but high status actors also exerted more influence over others and were perceived as higher in competence.

This research began the interesting task of determining the separate effects of status and power differentials. What are the mitigating effects of positional power or status when the two are not

consonant? How does low status affect the relative power of an actor with high positional power or vice versa? The findings Thye (2000) reports suggest that there is a combinatorial effect of status and positional power in exchange networks in which weak power differences exist. The relatively high status actors in lower power positions exercised more power and were preferred as exchange partners more often than in networks in which there was no status distinction among the actors in the network, only positional differences. The effort to link attributional and positional determinants of power is an important direction for continued research in exchange network theory. It might draw on significant developments in network methods (Faust & Wasserman, 1992) that allow the analysis of positional and attributional factors as predictors of network level events and processes. Thye (p. 426) concluded that, “further research is needed to determine exactly how levels of power and status differentially affect the tendency to seek partners for exchange.” Only relatively recently have others begun to explore this topic (e.g., Harkness, 2011).

Exchange, Fairness, and Commitment

Normative constraints on the exercise of power in exchange relations often include assessments of fairness, feelings of obligation and interpersonal commitments. Following a discussion of fairness and its role in social exchange, we discuss research on the emergence of interpersonal commitments in exchange relations and networks.

Fairness

Both Homans (1961) and Blau (1964) included a conception of fair exchange in their theoretical formulations. For Homans distributive justice exists when rewards align with investments, except where participation in the exchange involves costs beyond those investments. Taking costs into account, Homans suggests that distributive justice obtains when the profits (rewards minus costs) of two actors engaged in an exchange relation are equal. Blau addressed fairness norms as determinants of the “proper” exchange rates. Norms of fair exchange develop over time, Blau argues, to regulate social exchange and to eliminate continuous negotiation and conflict over fair returns. The conception of fairness and distributive justice in dyadic exchange was expanded in Homans’ work to include indirect exchange involving three or more parties. The notion of indirect exchange and the evaluations of exchange relations by third parties were important in the development of Blau’s more macro level theory of exchange and legitimacy.

Cook and Emerson (1978) demonstrated in their work on exchange networks that equity concerns could limit the potentially exploitative use of power by power-advantaged actors (i.e., those with a positional advantage in a network of exchange relations). Once actors in the networks they studied were informed of consequential inequalities in the distribution of profit in the network subsequent exchange reflected a reduction in the demands made by the powerful actors in their exchanges and an increase in the demands of the less powerful actors. The power differences alone did not operate to justify the inequalities that emerged. Cook and Hegtvædt (1986) show that power disadvantaged actors view inequality in the distribution of profits resulting from exchange as more unfair than do those who have advantageous power positions in the network and who benefit from these positions in terms of higher rates of return.

Molm (1988) also studied the role of fairness concerns in the exercise of power in relatively small exchange networks, typically four-person networks. In her research, the type of power the actor has (reward power or coercive power) influences the perceived fairness of their partners’ power-use strategies. Molm, Quist, and Wiseley (1994), for example, find that those who are the recipients of coercion

feel that the use of power by their exchange partner is fairer when the power user was power advantaged than when she was power-disadvantaged. Thus, fairness judgments are affected not only by the power of the power-wielder, but also by the level of power of the recipient of the power use.

Molm (1988) reports that fairness judgments also vary by the type of power being used, reward power versus coercive power. Coercive power is used much less frequently in power-imbalanced relations and is likely to evoke strong fairness judgments when exercised. In fact the norm against the use of coercive power appears to be quite strong in exchange settings. Molm argues that this is because of the fear that the use of coercive power to bring a partner's exchange behavior into line with expectations may have negative consequences, perhaps even leading to termination of the relationship. This finding explains why coercive power is used much less frequently. When it is used, however, Molm's work suggests that it can be a fairly effective mechanism for aligning the interests of the parties to the exchange relation. In this research tradition fairness judgments were based on individuals' own conceptions of justice and they extended beyond the evaluation of the exchange outcomes to include the strategies actors used to exercise the power they had in the relationship.

The early exchange formulation of distributive justice produced by Homans was subsequently criticized by a number of authors (e.g., Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, & Cohen, 1972; Jasso, 1980) for focusing only on local comparisons (to one's exchange partner or those similarly situated in an exchange network) rather than referential comparisons (to groups or classes of actors). This criticism led to the development of several alternative justice formulations, the most significant of which was developed by G. Jasso (1980, 1986, 1998).

For Jasso, justice is an evaluation of what one receives in exchange or in an allocation more generally in comparison with a standard or expectation regarding one's "just share." The formulation is represented as: $JE = \ln(\text{actual share/just share})$. The logarithm is taken of the ratio of the actual share to the just share to represent the empirical fact that individuals react more strongly to under-reward (i.e., receiving less than one expects based on the just share) than to over-reward (i.e., receiving more than one anticipated based on the just share). What is expected can be based on either a local comparison, an aggregate set of comparisons, comparison with a group, or with an abstract standard or principle (e.g., equal shares for all). Jasso argues that things like crime rates and collective action in the form of strikes or revolutions are often consequences of perceived injustices among individuals and members of various social groups. Her theory allows for the prediction of differential rates of response to types of injustice based on the aggregate levels of perceived injustice in the relevant social group or society and extends well beyond relations of exchange.

Various empirical tests (see Jasso, 2001) of some of these predictions provide some support for Jasso's theory of distributive justice. In a later section we address the role of emotions in exchange relations. The introduction of fairness conceptions into exchange theory by the early theorists placed emphasis on the emotional side of exchange. That actors could view their exchange as unfair or unjust and react negatively with anger was one of the reasons Homans included fairness as a relevant concept in his formulation of dyadic exchange. Actors who receive what they anticipate, he argues, feel their exchange was just. Actors react with either the positive emotion of guilt (when receiving more than they expect), or the negative emotion, anger (when receiving less than they expect). Jasso makes a similar argument concerning the emotions that attend receiving or not receiving the "just share" from an exchange or a simple allocation process.

Commitment

Like many other research topics within exchange theory, the earliest work on commitment formation between exchange partners was largely focused on examining how levels of commitment were affected by structural arrangements between the actors involved (Cook & Emerson, 1978;

Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, & Yamagishi, 1983; Markovsky et al., 1988). In exchange theory, *commitment* refers to the extent to which an actor engages in repeated exchanges with the same partner over time. Examples include relations between friends, collaborators, marital partners, and colleagues, among others. Connections to other social psychological concepts such as social uncertainty (Cook & Emerson, 1984; Kollock, 1994; Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998) or affect (Lawler & Yoon, 1998; Lawler, Yoon & Thye 2000; Molm et al., 2000) were later developments and refinements. Even in some of the earliest experimental work on social exchange (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Stolte & Emerson, 1977), researchers were interested in actor's commitments to particular relations within an opportunity structure of alternative relations. Cook and Emerson, for example, originally described commitment within the context of social exchange as "an interpersonal attachment leading persons to exchange repeatedly with the same partners." For them, commitment was defined in pure behavioral terms, as the frequency to exchange with a given partner relative to all available exchange opportunities. They found that power-use and commitment were inversely related.

Commitments, moreover, have been shown to be a function of the distribution of power throughout an exchange network (Lawler & Yoon, 1998; Markovsky et al., 1988). Markovsky and his collaborators argue that some network structures (which they refer to as strong-power networks) allow exclusion in any given round without reducing the rates of exchange for the non-excluded members. Commitments in such network structures are rare. Take, for example, three actors connected in a line, A to B to C. Actor B is pulled equally toward and away from each A and C. Alternatively some network structures promote commitments. The classic, "kite-shaped" network of four persons (one actor with three alternatives, two with two alternatives-one other and the central actor-and a third actor connected only to the central actor) promotes commitment between the central actor and the actor with only one alternative, and a second committed relation between the remaining two actors (Skvoretz & Willer, 1993). The potential for commitment thus varies with network structure.

While commitment has been shown to be a function of power-use (Cook & Emerson, 1978) as well as the distribution of power in a network (Markovsky et al., 1988), much of the research within social exchange theory has linked commitment to social uncertainty. The conceptualization of uncertainty, however, has undergone some modification over time. Initially, Cook and Emerson (1984, p. 13) argued "uncertainty refers to the subjective probability of concluding a satisfactory transaction with any partner". They found that greater uncertainty led to higher levels of commitment with particular exchange partners within an opportunity structure. Actors formed these commitments, they argued, because it increased the frequency of completed exchanges, thereby increasing an actor's overall level of benefit. While this conceptualization of uncertainty was also used by Markovsky and his collaborators (Markovsky et al., 1988, 1993) in their work on exclusion, other social exchange theorists opted for a different operationalization of social uncertainty.

Uncertainty in subsequent research has been conceived as the probability of suffering from acts of opportunism imposed by one's exchange partners (Kollock, 1994; Rice, 2002; Yamagishi et al., 1998). For example, when selling a used product in an online marketplace a buyer may be worried about the quality of the item while a seller may face uncertainty about receiving payment. In this line of research, uncertainty has also been shown to promote commitment formation (Kollock, 1994; Rice, 2002; Yamagishi et al., 1998). Commitments in these studies are examined in environments that allow actors to cheat one another in their exchanges, thus commitments to specific relations become a viable solution to the problem of uncertainty. If an actor or subset of actors within a given opportunity structure prove themselves to be trustworthy, continued exchanges with that exchange partner provides a safe haven from other potentially opportunistic partners. Such commitments, however, have the drawback of incurring sizable opportunity costs in the form of exchange opportunities foregone in favor of the relative safety provide by ongoing commitments.

In Kollock's (1994) initial study connecting opportunistic uncertainty and interpersonal commitment, actors exchanged in two different environments. In one environment (low uncertainty) the true

value of the goods being exchanged was known, while in the other (high uncertainty) environment the true value of goods was withheld until the end of the negotiations. He found that actors had a greater tendency to form commitments in the higher uncertainty environment. Moreover, actors were willing to forgo more profitable exchanges with untested partners in favor of continuing to transact with known partners who had demonstrated their trustworthiness in previous transactions (i.e., they did not misrepresent the value of their goods).

Yamagishi et al. (1998) further explored the connections between uncertainty and commitment, deviating from Kollock's experimental design but coming to similar conclusions. In their experiment, actors were faced with the decision of remaining with a given partner or entering a pool of unknown potential partners. They employed several modifications of this basic design, but in each instance the expected value of exchange outside the existing relation was higher than the returns from the current relation. They found that actors were willing to incur sizeable opportunity costs to reduce the risks associated with opportunism. Moreover, they found that uncertainty in either the form of an uncertain probability of loss or of an unknown amount of loss promoted commitments between exchange partners.

Rice (2002) attempted to bridge this early work on uncertainty as the probability of finding an exchange partner with the work on uncertainty as environments that allow opportunism. In both the Kollock (1994) and Yamagishi et al. (1998) studies, exchange occurs among actors in environments, which allow for potential opportunism, but where actors are guaranteed of finding an exchange partner on every round. In Rice's design, actors exchanged in two different environments: one that allowed actors to renege on their negotiated exchange rates (high uncertainty) and one where negotiations were binding (low uncertainty). Exchange, however, also occurred in two different network structures: a complete network where all actors could always find a partner, and a T-shaped network, where two actors were excluded from exchange every round. He found that uncertainty promoted commitment in the complete network, but not in the T-shaped (strong-power) network. Commitments, he argued, are viable solutions to uncertainty in networks that do not force exclusion. In networks that do force exclusion, the structural pull away from commitment is sufficiently intense as to undermine the propensity to form commitments. Whereas the earlier work of Kollock and Yamagishi and his collaborators suggested that actors would incur sizeable opportunity costs to avoid potentially opportunistic partners, Rice's work suggested that such tendencies could be muted by particularly deterministic network structures.

Rice (2002), moreover, expanded the work on social uncertainty in exchange by exploring how commitment relates to other exchange outcomes, such as the distribution of resources across relations and within networks as a whole. He argued that commitments reduced the use of power in imbalanced networks, resulting in a more egalitarian distribution of resources across different positions in a network. In networks where power between actors is unequal, power-advantaged actors have relatively better opportunities for exchange than their power-disadvantaged partners. These superior alternatives are the basis of the power-advantaged actor's power. If, as uncertainty increases, power-advantaged actors form commitments with power-disadvantaged actors, they erode the very base of their power. Forming commitments entails ignoring potential opportunities. Alternative relations are the basis of structural power and as these relations atrophy, the use of power and the unequal distribution of resources will be reduced.

Results on exchange under social uncertainty indicate a strong tendency for actors to incur large opportunity costs by forming commitments to achieve the relative safety or certainty of ongoing exchange with proven trustworthy partners (Kollock, 1994; Rice, 2002; Yamagishi et al., 1998). In addition to these opportunity costs Rice argued that commitments may also have unintended negative consequences at the macro level of exchange. Actors tend to invest less heavily in their exchange relations under higher levels of uncertainty. Moreover, acts of defection in exchange while producing individual gain, result in a collective loss, an outcome common in prisoner's dilemma games. Both processes reduce the overall collective gains to exchange in the network as a whole. So while there is a socially positive aspect to uncertainty, in so far as commitments increase feelings of solidarity

(e.g., Lawler & Yoon, 1998) and resources are exchanged more equally across relations (Rice), there is the attendant drawback of reduced aggregate levels of exchange productivity and efficiency.

Emotion and Exchange

Work on the role of emotion in social exchange over the past two decades represents a distinct move away from the traditional focus on the structural determinants of exchange outcomes, although it returns to some of the topics included in the work of the early exchange theorists, including the emotions associated with fairness in exchange relations. Much of the actual empirical work on exchange investigates specifically how the social structure affects the outcomes of exchange such as power-use and commitment. The bulk of this research has shown that actors who are simply pursuing their own interests can unknowingly generate inequities in the distribution of resources and pattern exchange relations such that certain relations within an opportunity structure are favored over others. This results from the power differences among actors derived from their positions in a network of exchange and is a pure structural effect. Subsequent research began to explore the emotional consequences of such patterns of exchange and the role that emotions play in the actual structuring of the network of exchange relations.

Edward Lawler and his collaborators (Lawler, 2001; Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1996; Lawler et al. 2000), for example, examined various aspects of emotion and exchange in their work on affect and relational cohesion. More recently Lawler and his colleagues have developed applications of the Affect Theory of Social Exchange to what they call “micro social orders” (Lawler et al., 2008). Molm and her collaborators (Molm et al., 1999, 2000) also began to explore the role of emotions in exchange but they focused more on affect as an outcome of exchange rather than as a mediating factor. A related line of research by Molm and her colleagues (Molm, Collett, & Schaefer, 2007) aims to systematically examine how the structure of reciprocity affects the development of trust and solidarity in social exchange.

While these two bodies of research each represent a move away from the predominantly structural concerns reflected in earlier empirical work on exchange (e.g., Bienenstock & Bonacich, 1997; Cook et al., 1983; Markovsky et al., 1988), the move to include affect more centrally in social exchange theory has deep connections to the classical exchange formulations. Blau (1964), for instance, was particularly concerned with the emergent properties of exchange relations. He argued that ongoing relationships of social exchange develop intrinsic value to the exchange partners over time, a central tenet of Relational Cohesion Theory (Lawler & Yoon, 1996, 1998; Lawler et al., 2000). Moreover, Emerson (1972b) theorized explicitly about cohesion, liking and commitment as emergent outcomes of successful exchange relations, all outcomes examined by Molm and her colleagues (Molm et al., 1999, 2000). We discuss each line of research in turn, focusing on the key theoretical contributions to exchange theory. Then we briefly describe a recent attempt by Kuwabara (2011) to reconcile findings from both lines of research.

Relational Cohesion, Solidarity, and Micro Social Order

Relational Cohesion Theory is based on the premise that emotion is a proximal mechanism in the exchange process, mediating the effects of structural arrangements on behavioral outcomes. The basic model which Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996, 1998) originally proposed argued for a simple causal chain. First, structural power positively affects the frequency of exchanges between actors, which in turn results in the development of positive everyday emotions (e.g., liking, satisfaction). These emotions then lead to relational cohesion, which positively affects behavioral outcomes such as

commitment to the relation. It is important to note their focus on the relation as the unit of theoretical and empirical analysis. Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996, 1998) repeatedly stress that central to this process is the idea that actors come to see an ongoing exchange relationship itself as an object toward which they develop emotional responses. Because of this focus, task interdependence is a key factor in the development of social cohesion. They are careful to point out that each effect in the chain is dependent on the previous step. It is only relational cohesion that is expected to have a direct effect on commitment behaviors. All other variables work through relational cohesion.

Their early work generated a great deal of empirical support for many aspects of the theory (Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1996, 1998). Exchange partners expressed positive emotions about their relationships and these positive emotions increased commitment to these relations. Two unanticipated results, however, have led to subsequent modifications of their theory. First, they found that perceptions of uncertainty and the frequency of exchange have enduring independent effects on relational cohesion and commitment (Lawler & Yoon, 1996) as Cook and Emerson and Yamagishi et al. argued. Second, when social network structures were added to their empirical tests, the effects of relational cohesion became more complex. In egalitarian relationships (i.e., equal power), they found that affect acted in accordance with their theory. However, in power imbalanced dyads, relational cohesion had a positive effect on commitment for powerful actors but a negative effect on commitment for less powerful members of the dyad (Lawler & Yoon, 1998). This latter finding revealed that individual actors within a given relationship seem to have different orientations to the relationship, violating the relational focus of the theory (but see Leik & Leik, 1972).

These empirical outcomes led to subsequent modifications in the basic model proposed in the original theoretical formulation (Lawler et al., 2000). Lawler and his colleagues acknowledged that two parallel processes affect the development of relational cohesion, one emotional and the other more cognitive. Actors are motivated to form commitments to reduce uncertainty (Cook & Emerson, 1984; Kollock, 1994). They argue that this cognitive process is one of boundary defining, in which individuals who are interested in reducing the possibilities of a loss by increasing the predictability of exchange outcomes come to see relations as distinct social entities. The emotional aspect of exchange is a social bonding process in which the relation becomes an object of intrinsic or expressive value. As was the case with their earlier formulation, this more refined model also finds empirical support, with one important caveat. The independent effect of “predictability,” the proximate cognitive causal mechanism, has no direct effect on cohesion, but perplexingly from the theory’s standpoint has a strong independent effect on commitment.

In a related line of work Lawler, Thye, and Yoon (2008) focus on the development of micro social order. Lawler and colleagues describe micro social order as being characterized by the following: repeated interactions, emotional responses, perceptions of a group, and affective sentiments concerning the exchange relationship. Importantly, micro social orders are conceptualized as being emergent social units that do not yet take the form of a fully developed social group. And, as with Relational Cohesion Theory, the development of micro social order depends on actors attributing feelings to a social unit rather than to another specific partner or to the self.

In theorizing about the emergence of micro social order, the authors argue that forms of exchange that are characterized by more task jointness and a greater sense of shared responsibility for outcomes will lead to the creation of stronger micro social orders. Findings support this claim and Lawler et al. (2008) experimentally demonstrate that productive exchange (in which jointness of the task and shared responsibility are highest) leads to the development of the strongest micro social order, while generalized exchange leads to the weakest (and negotiated and reciprocal forms of exchange fall in between). A micro social order evolves when actors involved in repeated interactions begin feeling emotions and affective sentiments in addition to experiencing emergent perceptions of a “group”. However, at this stage the idea of the group has not fully developed. They argue that an emergent micro social order is a somewhat tenuous state, which is still characterized more by individualistic than collective, group-oriented motivations.

A Theory of Reciprocity in Exchange Relations

Molm and her collaborators (Molm et al., 1999, 2000), while having an equally strong interest in the connections between affect and commitment in social exchange, have a markedly different conception of the social psychological processes at play. For them, affect is not a proximal mechanism promoting commitment to particular relationship. In their theory, emotion is an outcome of the exchange process generated largely by commitments to exchange relations. The structural arrangements, not emotional mechanisms are responsible for differences in commitment behaviors that exist across different exchange structures. They argue that level of affect is determined by the form of exchange (i.e., reciprocal or negotiated) and by the degree of behavioral commitment induced by the nature of the available alternatives to exchange in a social network (Molm et al., 2000).

Central to Molm and her colleagues' theory is the delineation of two distinct components of commitment, one behavioral and the other affective. The behavioral aspect of commitment focuses on the patterns of exchange found in networks of social exchange, in which actors choose to interact repeatedly with one another rather than with their available alternatives. The affective component, however, is concerned with the emotional bonds that develop from repeated experiences with successful exchanges between the same partners. This dimension of commitment shares many similarities with Lawler et al.'s (2000) "social bonding" aspect of relational cohesion, but there is a critical distinction that must be made between the conceptions of bonding included in each of these theories. In Relational Cohesion Theory, "social bonding" centers around an exchange relation as a social object, whereas Molm and her colleagues discuss emotion directed toward a particular partner, not the relation or group.

Molm et al. (1999) argue that the social psychological mechanisms responsible for each of the two kinds of commitment are different. Behavioral commitment is determined by the structure of the exchange relations. Large power imbalances lead to low levels of interpersonal commitment while power-balanced (or equal) relations promote commitment behaviors (Molm et al., 2000; see also Cook & Emerson, 1978). Affective commitment, however, is a function of two influences: the type of exchange and the level of behavioral commitment. In reciprocal exchanges, as opposed to negotiated exchanges, there are great uncertainties surrounding the outcomes of exchange; partners are not obligated to return gifts or engage in acts of reciprocity. This lack of certainty leads actors to develop feelings of trust (based on credible signals of trustworthiness) and other positive affective orientations toward their partners as successful exchange relations emerge over time. Moreover, as the level of behavioral commitment increases, so too does an actor's level of positive affect toward her partner.

There are two important distinctions to be made between these theories of emotion in social exchange. First, Molm and her colleagues see affect as directed toward specific exchange partners whereas Lawler and his collaborators stress the centrality of the exchange relation as the object of affect. While each theorist is careful to distinguish their primary unit of analysis, it is not entirely clear that such distinctions are crucial. Lawler and Yoon (1998) have found that looking at actor-specific, relational affect is empirically and theoretically fruitful, despite their careful use of relations and not individuals as the main unit of analysis in their theory. Moreover, in practice actors may have great difficulty separating affect directed toward a relation from affect directed toward a partner. The second difference may be more critical. Molm et al. (2000) see affect as an outcome, whereas Lawler et al. (2000) view affect as a proximal mechanism. When emotion is taken to be an outcome, structural issues still dominate theorizing, as Molm and her colleagues are careful to point out. When emotion becomes a causal mechanism, however, structural arrangements can then become outcomes. If emotion dictates patterns of behavior to the extent that alternative relations atrophy and cease to become viable exchange alternatives, the shape of the social networks of actors engaged in exchange can be altered. While Lawler and his collaborators continue to find enduring independent effects for factors outside of relational cohesion, their theoretical orientation may provide crucial insights into the dynamic linkages between structure and action.

Molm et al. (2007; Molm, 2010) have recently examined how the structure of exchange affects the development of solidarity. Proposing a general theory concerning the structure of reciprocity and solidarity in exchange, Molm and her collaborators focus on whether exchange is direct or indirect and whether it occurs bilaterally or unilaterally. While their study is methodologically similar to Lawler et al.'s (2008) work on the development of micro social order, their results differ. Molm finds that generalized exchange produces the highest level of social solidarity (with reciprocal exchange producing a lower relative level of solidarity and negotiated exchange leading to the lowest level). They identify three key factors that explain this finding: the risk of non-reciprocity, the salience of conflict, and the expressive value of reciprocity. The authors propose that the risk of non-reciprocity is greater in generalized exchange since benefits flow unilaterally (while in bilateral forms of exchange, typical of negotiated exchange, the risk of non-reciprocity is virtually eliminated). Moreover, the expressive value (or the symbolic meaning independent of instrumental benefit) is greater in generalized exchange since reciprocity is highly uncertain and indirect (e.g. A gives to B, B gives to C, C gives to A). Finally, Molm argues that salience of conflict is lowest in generalized exchange since giving is very indirect and it is much harder to compare outcomes in a network of generalized exchange than in negotiated or reciprocal forms of exchange.

Recent work by Kuwabara (2011) proposes that the nature of the exchange context is a crucial factor in distinguishing between Lawler and Molm's findings. By examining competitively and cooperatively framed exchange settings, Kuwabara demonstrates how differences in Lawler's theory of relational cohesion and Molm's work on affective outcomes in exchange can be reconciled. He argues that bilateral or transactional forms of exchange, like negotiation between two parties, will produce solidarity when experienced by the actors primarily as a cooperative venture. However, when bilateral exchange is perceived as competitive, actors' feelings of solidarity will be inhibited in part because the salience of conflicting interests will be higher, as Molm suggests. By experimentally manipulating cooperative and competitive contexts in bilateral and unilateral exchanges, Kuwabara demonstrates distributive negotiation (in which conflict of interest is high) and one-way trust games (also highly competitive) lead to lower levels of cohesion, while integrative negotiation (in which there is room for compromise) and two-way trust games (highly cooperative) create higher levels of cohesion. Kuwabara's work suggests that the development of relational cohesion through task jointness (Lawler's theory) and the emergence of trust through risk-taking (Molm's theory) are distinct processes that together increase our understanding of the role of affect in exchange relations. Affect and emotion may also play a role in collective action and the resolution of social dilemmas.

Collective Action and Social Exchange

Research on social exchange has many theoretical ties to the enormous body of research on social dilemmas (for a thorough review of this research see, e.g., Yamagishi, 1995). The theoretical problems, however, faced by theorists of power and dependence generate a unique perspective on the problems of collective action in exchange (e.g., Cook & Gillmore, 1984; Lawler et al., 2000; Leik, 1992). As with most collective action problems, actors in social exchange contexts face the competing pressures of satisfying their own interests and participating in the provision of collective goods. Moreover, while exchanges are often the outcome of explicit negotiations, many exchanges occur within contexts in which there is no explicit bargaining and no guarantee that partners will fulfill their obligations (Kollock, 1994; Molm, 1997a, 1997b; Yamagishi et al., 1998). Such uncertainties characterize a large number of exchanges outside of the laboratory (Heckathorn, 1985). Heckathorn has argued that exchanges in the "real world" are thus the product of two factors: the explicit negotiation over social goods and the individual decision to abide by the terms of trade. He claims that social exchange thus entails not only the bargaining over social goods, but also the playing out of a prisoner's dilemma concerning the fulfillment of social obligations.

The dynamics of power and dependence within networks of exchange partners create additional problems of collective action that cannot be characterized as a prisoner's dilemma. Power inequality creates strains in exchange relations and provides an impetus for structural changes, creating problems of collective action unique to exchange contexts (Cook & Gillmore, 1984; Emerson, 1972b; Lawler & Yoon, 1998). Before turning to empirical work on such collective action problems within exchange networks it is necessary to briefly review Emerson's (1972b) ideas concerning power-balancing mechanisms, for this theory constitutes the intellectual basis for this work. Emerson argued that reciprocity was a core feature of exchange relations over the long term and that ongoing exchange relations could be characterized as relations in which a balance of power existed. Power imbalances, he argued, were a somewhat temporary state of social relations, which generated strains in exchange relations to be resolved. He claimed that four distinct "balancing" operations existed which would stabilize unequal power relationships. Within the context of a given dyadic exchange relation, if the dependence of an actor A for good y (controlled by actor B) is greater than B's dependence on A for good x (controlled by actor A), there are four possible outcomes: First, there can be a decrease in the value of good y for actor A, called *withdrawal*. Second, there can be an increase in the value of x for actor B, called *status-giving*. Third, there can be an increase in the availability of resource y to A often as a result of an increase in the number of alternatives open to A, called *network extension*. Fourth, there can be a reduction in the number of alternatives for resources of value open to B, called *coalition formation*. Note that the first two mechanisms concern changes in value whereas the second two focus on structural change. With the exception of Emerson (1987) exchange theorists have focused their energies on exploring the latter two outcomes.

The work on coalition formation (e.g., Cook & Gillmore, 1984) has empirically demonstrated that power imbalances do promote the formation of coalitions. In a network in which there are power imbalances, some actors can be characterized as power-advantaged while others are power-disadvantaged. In simple hierarchical network structures in which one power-advantaged actor exchanges with a number of power-disadvantaged actors, a coalition of all power-disadvantaged actors against the power-advantaged actor will balance power in the network (Cook & Gillmore). Those coalitions that do not include all disadvantaged actors will not attain power-balance because the power-advantaged actor still possesses alternatives to the coalition. Moreover, coalitions that include all power-disadvantaged actors tend to be stable over time, as Emerson (1972b) would argue they should. Coalitions, however, that do not include all disadvantaged actors tend to deteriorate over time. More recently Borch and Willer (2006) analyze power and the formation of coalitions in exchange networks from a game theoretic perspective. They similarly find that coalitions among the less powerful are a counter-vailing force, when they occur.

The tensions generated by power inequality can also result in network extension. Power-disadvantaged actors rather than banding together to form coalitions to balance power, may alternatively seek out new relations, thus also reducing their dependence on a given actor for valued resources. This solution to power balance has been less thoroughly explored by exchange researchers, but nevertheless warrants a brief discussion.

Leik (1992) proposed a theory of network extension and contraction based on the theoretical principles of the GPI model developed in Network Exchange Theory (e.g., Markovsky et al., 1988, 1993; Willer & Anderson, 1981). He argues that so long as actors are assumed to be trying to maximize their power vis-a-vis their partners, power-advantaged actors will attempt to reduce linkages between partners in an effort to consolidate their power while power-disadvantaged actors will attempt to create new linkages to increase their power. He goes on to explain that such a theory requires that actors have a great deal of information and strategic savvy: "Without sufficient information and the savvy to utilize it, neither the weak nor the strong will be able to perceive the advantage of linkage changes" (Leik, p. 316). Empirical work by Lawler and Yoon (1998), however, suggests that emotional responses to inequality may be sufficient to motivate network extension.

While Lawler and Yoon are explicitly concerned with developing a theory of relational cohesion based on affect directed toward exchange relations (see the discussion of this work above), their

empirical work sheds light on issues of network extension. Toward the end of their experiment, actors are freed from the constraints of their initial network of exchange relations and allowed to interact with every other participant. Actors in relations that can be characterized as power balanced continued to seek out one another in exchange. Power-advantaged actors likewise continued to solicit exchanges from their disadvantaged partners, whereas the disadvantaged attempted to form new relations with other participants who had not been previously exploitative (Lawler & Yoon, 1998). Thus, the negative affect directed toward a power-advantaged actor by a power-disadvantaged partner in concert with the low levels of reward accrued by power-disadvantaged actors seems sufficient to motivate network extension.

Beyond the issues of power-balancing operations and the prisoner's dilemma features of exchange relations, a third type of collective action problem has arisen in recent research on generalized exchange. Generalized exchange exists when individuals exchange valued resources indirectly and without explicit agreement (Molm & Cook, 1995). In generalized exchange, the rewards that an individual receives from others do not depend on the resources provided by that individual (Ekeh, 1974; Emerson, 1976; Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). Because giving and receiving valued goods and services is indirect, generalized exchange relations inherently involve a minimum of three actors. Moreover, there is no one-to-one correspondence between what two actors directly give to and receive from one another.

There have been several empirical studies that attempt to explain how such complex exchange systems may emerge (Bearman, 1997; Cheshire, 2005; Mark, 2003; Takahashi, 2000; Takahashi & Yamagishi, 1996, 1999; Ziegler, 1990). Generalized exchange is challenging to explain since individuals have an incentive not to give their valued resources to others. However, if everyone in the network refuses to give they clearly do worse since no one gains. Thus, the typical structure of a generalized exchange system entails the classic incentives of a social dilemma (see Yamagishi, 1995). Coordination problems are also likely, especially as the size of the network increases. Actors exchange indirectly with more than two participants, so individuals must rely on the goodwill of a third party over which they have no direct control. Without assurances of reciprocity or mutually contingent exchanges, actors can "free-ride" on the contributions of others by collecting rewards while refusing to reward others (see Yamagishi).

In his review and synthesis of various forms of direct and indirect social exchange, Peter Ekeh (1974) describes several different types of generalized exchange. One of the major types in his classification is group-focused generalized exchange. This type of generalized exchange involves individuals who independently choose whether to contribute to a collective good or not. Yamagishi and Cook (1993) refer to this type of system as "group-generalized" exchange because individuals pool their resources centrally as a group, and receive indirect benefits from the collective good rather than directly from other individuals (in contrast to the decentralized nature of network-generalized exchange). Examples include communities that pool resources to create valued shared outcomes such as a school or a town bridge (Yamagishi & Cook, 1993), some forms of digital file sharing in peer-to-peer Internet systems (Cheshire, 2005), combining resources for business ventures (Ruef, 2003), and online information sharing and redistribution (Cheshire & Antin, 2009).

Online environments provide a ripe opportunity for the sociological study of large-scale group-generalized exchange. For example, digital information goods (Kollock, 1999a) are often pooled as a collective good from which individuals receive benefits. Drawing on Kollock's (1999a) initial insights, Shah and Levine (2003) and Cheshire (2005) argue that many digital goods have near-pure jointness of supply (i.e., they are non-rival goods) because many enjoy such goods and those who contribute need not lose value. Since digital goods can typically be perfectly replicated, the contributor keeps a copy when she makes a contribution (Cheshire, 2005; Cheshire & Cook, 2004; Kollock, 1999a, b).

The second key type of generalized exchange is chain-generalized, in which each individual gives goods or services directly to other individuals in chains or cyclic patterns of exchange. Yamagishi and Cook (1993) refer to this form of exchange as network-generalized since individuals receive goods or services from others in the same network. The non-economic exchange of necklaces and bracelets

among the Trobriand Islanders in Papua New Guinea (Malinowski, 1922) is a classic example of this type of generalized exchange. Bearman's (1997) observation of aboriginal tribes that exchange women between families also constitutes a form of network-generalized exchange. Other common examples include stranded motorists in small communities where individuals help one another when necessary, but rarely (if ever) in a direct, reciprocal fashion (Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). Early anthropological and sociological research in this tradition predicts that indirect, generalized exchange will lead to high social solidarity in a given society, compared to more direct forms of negotiation and bargaining. Recent experimental research by Molm and her colleagues supports this classic prediction as noted above (Molm et al., 2007).

The production of collective action is a difficult problem in both network-generalized and group-generalized exchange because the interests of individuals and those of the larger collective often conflict. One way to alleviate this problem is to share information about prior interactions with new partners, thereby creating mutual benefits within the collective. Takahashi (2000) uses simulations to show that when self-interested actors can pass along information about the behaviors of others, network-generalized exchange does emerge. This occurs when individuals employ a fairness-based selective-giving strategy (see also Mark, 2002). Takahashi assumes individuals in generalized exchange want to give more often to those with higher ratios of giving or receiving. Although this explanation works in situations in which reputations exist, it potentially fails when individuals are anonymous or when identities can be easily changed, as is often the case in online interactions (Yamagishi et al., 2009). Takahashi's solution, like many solutions to the problem of the evolution of cooperation in systems of repeated prisoners' dilemmas, relies on the existence of network structures that provide some sort of localized information and accountability (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Macy & Skvoretz, 1998). Norms regarding contributions can emerge and persist in these network structures through systems of reputation, monitoring and sanctioning. However, the existence of reputation and sanctioning structures creates a "second-order" social dilemma since at least some minimal group of individuals must first create and subsequently maintain these systems.

One promising avenue of research on large systems of network-generalized exchange examines unilateral online sharing of goods, services, and information. For example, on websites such as NetCycler.com and Freecycle.org, individuals give unneeded goods to others who indicate that they have a need for those same goods. In systems such as Freecycle.org, direct negotiation or payment is explicitly discouraged to sustain the culture of a unilateral gift economy. Many of these systems have become popular, prompting researchers to examine how online generalized exchange systems can foster group identity, solidarity and community among participants over time (Suhonen et al., 2010; Willer, Flynn, & Zak, 2010). Without the relative security of direct negotiation and sanctions for failed agreements, these online systems foster perceptions of uncertainty that can be difficult for potential exchange participants to overcome (Suhonen et al., 2010). Furthermore, many of these systems involve hybrid online-offline social exchanges where the matching of givers and receivers takes place online, but the actual exchanges occur offline. The relative risks and sources of uncertainty may be minimal when the exchanges take place in small, local communities (Suhonen et al., 2010), but the risks may be much higher when individuals must meet in-person to complete an exchange. In some cases the risks are especially conspicuous, as with Couchsurfing.com where individuals use an online system to link travelers to hosts who provide space in their own homes for visitors (Lauterbach, Truong, Shah, & Adamic, 2009).

Methodology and Social Exchange

Ethnography, participant-observation, and inductive reasoning formed the base from which different approaches and research methods to analyze social exchange would later emerge. The first empirical descriptions and examples of social exchange processes came from the work of anthropologists such

as Malinowski (1922) and Mauss (1923). In his ethnographic examination of the Kula ring among the Trobriand islanders of Papua New Guinea, Malinowski provided the first in-depth documentation of stable generalized exchange within a society. Mauss (1923) later combined Malinowski's observations with several other ethnographic examples into his book, *The Gift*, which was among the first critical analyses of the role of gifts and reciprocity in social life.

The next major theoretical development in the examination of social exchange came from the convergence of the psychological approaches of Homans (1958, 1961) and Thibaut and Kelley (1959). Although Homans' perspective was based primarily on the psychology of instrumental behavior and Thibaut and Kelley focused on the examination of dyads and small groups of dyads, both research traditions built on the same anthropological field research and case studies to develop potentially testable theories of social exchange. Blau's (1964) version of social exchange, though not based on the exact same assumptions as either Homans or Thibaut and Kelley, also built on the earlier ethnographic and field research. Despite a strong foundation of propositions, theoretical arguments and clear predictions, Homans, Thibaut and Kelly, and Blau never conducted controlled studies of their respective approaches to social exchange theory. Instead, much of the empirical evidence for social exchange theory in the 1950s and 1960s was limited to case studies.

The more formalized version of social exchange theory developed by Emerson (1972a, 1972b) combined with the unique adoption of networked computers helped to bring controlled experimental testing to the study of social exchange in dyads and networks (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Cook et al., 1983; Cook & Yamagishi, 1992; Yamagishi, Gillmore, & Cook, 1988). The first experimental studies by Emerson, Cook and their colleagues were quickly followed by an upsurge in laboratory experiments by other researchers on different aspects of social exchange, including further examinations of power dynamics (Molm, 1985, 1990; Willer, Markovsky, & Patton, 1989), coercion (Lawler, Ford, & Blegen, 1988; Willer & Anderson, 1981), commitment (Lawler & Yoon, 1993), and emotion (Lawler & Yoon, 1998). As a supplement to experimental studies as well as a tool to elaborate certain aspects of theory, computer simulation and game-theoretical modeling also became useful tools for investigating network dynamics, power and social exchange (Bienenstock & Bonacich, 1992, 1993, 1997; Whitmeyer, 1997a, 1997b). For example, game-theoretic modeling allows researchers to use different parameters to calculate specific predictions about power distributions among actors in a given network structure. In more recent years, experimental investigations of social exchange processes have expanded to include studies of trust (Cook et al., 2005; Molm, 2003) and transitions between modes of social exchange (Cheshire, Gerbasi, & Cook, 2010; Molm, Whitham, & Melamed, 2012).

The development of controlled laboratory experiments remains the dominant methodological approach for testing predictions from social exchange theory and examining related issues of power, status, equity, and trust, among others. The specific characteristics of the experimental studies mentioned above vary by researcher, independent variables, and focal outcomes. Yet, the central features of these experiments are fundamentally the same. First, most experiments in this tradition are conducted using networked computers and all interactions take place only through the computer interface to assure that behavior is affected solely by experimental manipulations and not by individual characteristics. The setting must meet the general scope conditions of the theory, while making it possible to control key aspects of exchanges (structures and processes) to measure exchange outcomes (Molm, 2007).

Second, subjects are randomly assigned to positions in a particular exchange structure, such as dyads or larger network forms. Third, valued resources are distributed to each participant (e.g., virtual coins, units with different names and associated values such as "X's" and "Y's"), and these valued resources are worth money that is provided at the end of the given study. Although social exchange in natural environments occurs with a variety of different resources including status, approval or expert guidance, money allows researchers to quantify and control the value across different actors and over time (Molm, 2007). Finally, participants exchange their valued resources

for others' valued resources either in one-time interactions, repeated interactions with the same individuals, or in some other combination of experimenter-controlled pairings or interaction choices for the participants. Exchanges take place either in networks (e.g., Cook & Emerson, 1978) or in dyads (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). The rules about the form of the exchange, who can exchange with whom, for how long, whether individuals can choose their partners or not, the presence of intake or exit surveys, and other aspects of the exchange interaction define the different conditions in a given study.

In some cases, simulated or programmed actors are used as exchange partners with other real actors (though the human actors typically are not made aware of this fact until the end of the experiment). Simulated actors are most often used when the particular research questions in a study require controlled or manipulated behavior, in much the same way that human confederates are used in other types of psychological and social psychological studies. Since most social exchange experiments are already computer-based, simulated actors provide reliable, controlled behavior that can scale from dyads to very large networks. In general, when social exchange research focuses on behavioral and/or affective responses of individuals instead of relational or interaction patterns, computer-simulated actors are an attractive option for controlling the behavior of certain actors in dyads or networks (Molm, 2007).

Experimental studies in the social exchange tradition are exceptionally good at controlling very specific elements of exchange by restricting most (and usually all) interaction to lean computer-based communication rather than rich, face-to-face based communication. Social exchange researchers have directly compared face-to-face social exchange with computer-mediated settings, showing that verbal and non-verbal cues in face-to-face interaction sometimes affect key outcomes such as perceptions of justice and the use of power (Skvoretz & Willer, 1991). To avoid experimental confounds due to subtle communication, the computer-mediated method continues to offer a controlled way to empirically examine social exchange processes. While this approach is critical for establishing high internal validity and clear experimental manipulations, one critique of the experimental research on social exchange theory is that it is hard to generalize to other contexts (low external validity), and the nature of the experimental interactions are less like the real-world situations from which the origins of the theory emerged (ecological validity).

Researchers are beginning to expand their empirical tests of social exchange processes to include many real-world interactions, including organizational studies, online field experiments, and other mixed-methods studies of individuals who are engaged in different types of social exchange. Several empirical studies of social exchange examine organizational relationships, including research on balance among employer and employee exchanges (De Jong, Schalk, & De Cuyper, 2009) and *guanxi* processes (personal networks of influence, favors, and mutual understanding) in Chinese organizational partnerships (Chen, Friedman, Yu, Fang, & Lu, 2009). In the case of online social exchange research, investigators are making use of advances in data collection techniques while capitalizing on the rise of Internet-based social interactions. For example, it was once considered impractical to study large-scale social exchange and romantic matching before the match occurred in the way that Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and Blau (1964) discussed in their respective approaches to social exchange theory. However, the popularity of online dating systems now allows researchers to conduct analyses of the logs of messaging data to examine aspects of social exchange and partner matching among millions of potential pairings over time (Taylor et al., 2011). Furthermore, the rise of online generalized exchange systems such as NetCycler.com and Freecycle.org allow social exchange researchers to employ mixed methodologies including interviews, participant-observation, survey research, log analysis of behavioral data over time (Suhonen et al., 2010), and online field experiments (Willer et al., 2012). In sum, earlier concerns about the ecological validity of social exchange research methodology have largely given way to a realization that, "the real world has become the laboratory" (Cheshire & Cook, 2004, p. 18).

Future Directions: Linkages to Economic Sociology and the Study of Networks

While exchange theorists for the past few decades have been primarily experimentalists, there is certainly room for exchange theory to make more meaningful ties to other sub-fields on the broader canvas of sociological research. The best candidate for such a venture seems to be in the sub-field of economic sociology. Exchange theory and economic sociology focus on a similar set of core theoretical issues. Both fields balk at the notion that individual motives (or the mere aggregation of individual motives) can properly explain transactions between social actors. Moreover, both sub-fields theorize extensively about the role of networks of ongoing relations in exchange. We argue in this section that a marriage of these two fields would greatly benefit each. First, we discuss the reasons for the development of each field in isolation from the other. We then focus on the theoretical overlap in the work of “embeddedness” and Relational Cohesion Theory and argue that each field can benefit from exposure to the other. Finally, we provide two illustrations of this argument by looking through the lens of exchange theory at several notable studies within economic sociology of the credit card market in Russia and of emerging business relations that extend beyond family and friendship ties in this transitional economy.

The separation of these two sub-fields is likely due to the conflation of several issues. First, early theorists of social exchange were careful to make the distinction between economic and social exchange. This focus, however, has slowly receded as work in exchange theory has become increasingly abstracted and the exchange of resources under study are now typically concrete and quantifiable objects. Second, exchange theory is frequently aligned with rational choice theory (Bienenstock & Bonacich, 1992; Blau, 1964; Heckathorn, 1984) and economic sociologists often use rational choice theory as a theoretical foil against which to argue their more “social” theories. But even when exchange theory is founded in operant psychology (e.g., Emerson, 1972a; Molm, 1994), connections between the two sub-fields are rare. This separation can most readily be attributed to methodological divides. Exchange theorists tend to generate *a priori* predictions that they test in laboratory experiments, whereas economic sociologists favor *ex post* explanations and empirical field research. Such differences in style have caused these two fields to develop in relative isolation, until more recently.

Research on “embeddedness” shares a great deal of intellectual common ground with contemporary work in social exchange. Exchanges are rarely purely economic; rather they often are “embedded” in networks of ongoing social relations. This last claim is a central claim of economic sociology and the focus of much of the theoretical and empirical research. Uzzi (1996), for example, has argued that “embeddedness” has profound behavioral consequences affecting the shape of exchange relations and the success of economic ventures. “A key behavioral consequence of embeddedness is that it becomes separate from the narrow economic goals that originally constituted the exchange and generates outcomes that are independent of the narrow economic interest of the relationship” (Uzzi, p. 681). The work by Lawler and Yoon (1996, 1998) and Lawler et al. (2000) mirrors this set of theoretical concerns. They argue that as exchange relations emerge actors develop feelings of relational cohesion directed toward the ongoing exchange relation. These feelings of cohesion result in a wide variety of behaviors that extend beyond the “economic” interests of the relationship, such as gift-giving, forming new joint ventures across old ties, and remaining in a relationship despite the presence of new, potentially more profitable partnerships. They expand on this set of arguments in their latest work linking relational cohesion and commitment to micro-social order (Lawler et al., 2008).

There is great mutual benefit to be derived from increased attention to research done in each field. Exchange theorists can benefit from the rich tapestry of “real” world (i.e., non laboratory) exchange contexts studied by economic sociologists. While great theoretical advances have been made in exchange theory within the context of experimental work, any sociological theory worth its salt must also speak to empirical phenomenon outside of the laboratory. Moreover, new insights and new

theoretical directions are likely to be uncovered by a renewed focus on the kinds of exchanges that can be studied outside of the experimental setting. Economic sociology would likewise benefit from the work of exchange theorists, particularly in so far as exchange theory provides easily derivable and testable predictions for actor behavior in exchange networks. Moreover, exchange theorists have conducted research on the effects of a number of interesting variables that are often overlooked by economic sociologists, such as the use and distribution of power and cohesion within relationships.

To illustrate the potential value of such a marriage, we discuss how two studies within economic sociology relate to work in exchange theory and explore the possibilities for new research generated by such an examination. Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001) compared the credit card markets of post-Soviet Russia and the United States. They were concerned with how credit lenders in each country manage the uncertainties of lending credit. In the United States, they argue, credit lending is a highly rationalized process that converts the uncertainty of defaulting debtors to manageable risk. Lenders take advantage of highly routinized systems of scoring potential debtors, through the use of credit histories and other easily accessed personal information. This system allows creditors in the United States to be open to any individuals who meet these impersonal criteria.

In Russia, creditors must reduce uncertainties through personal ties and commitments. Defaulting is an enormous problem in Russia, aggravated by the fact that credit information such as that used by American lenders has, until relatively recently, been unavailable. To overcome these uncertainties, Russian banks seeking to establish credit card markets must use and stretch existing personal ties. Loan officers make idiosyncratic decisions about potential debtors, based largely on connections to the banks, or known customers of the bank. In this way defaulting debtors cannot easily disappear, as they can be tracked through these ties.

Viewed through the lens of theorizing on the connections between uncertainty and commitments, these different strategies seem quite reasonable. As discussed earlier, exchange theorists have repeatedly shown that as uncertainty increases, commitments to specific relations likewise increases (Cook & Emerson, 1984; Kollock, 1994; Yamagishi et al., 1998). In the case of credit card markets, it is clear that the United States presents an environment of relatively low uncertainty, compared to the high-levels of uncertainty present in Russia. Exchange theory implies therefore that commitments will be greater in Russia, which is exactly the case. Lending is facilitated by existing commitments to the banks or the bank's known customers. While such theoretical confluence is interesting, it is in generating new insights that one can see the value of examining this situation through the lens of exchange theory. Rice (2002) in his work on exchange under uncertainty argued that network structure intervenes in the process of commitment formation. This insight suggests that sociologists ought to ask how different shaped networks of potential debtors and lenders in Russia affect the use of commitments to procure credit? Rice also argued that uncertainty, while promoting commitment simultaneously reduces the overall level of exchange in networks; this is yet another outcome observed in the Russian credit card market, but one largely ignored by Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001). It is this aspect of the problem that is addressed to some extent in another study by Radaev (2002) on the emergence of reputation systems in Russia. Finally, Yamagishi and his collaborators (Yamagishi et al.) argued that uncertainty can stem from either the probability of loss or the size of loss. Another question that should be raised in this context is how the size of loss, not just the potential for loss relates to the behaviors observed in the Russian versus the American credit card markets.

This examination, however, is not a one sided affair, benefiting only economic sociology. Exchange theorists also can learn from this example. Exchange theory tends to focus on commitments as an outcome, not as a social mechanism. In the case of the Russian credit card market, existing commitments provide a mechanism through which network structures are expanded and changed. This raises the issue of how commitments may in turn create opportunities for network expansion and/or reduction. Similarly, in the context of credit card markets, there are two distinct roles, creditors and debtors. Exchange theory, with the exception of Kollock's (1994) work, does not focus on the explicit context of buying and selling. Exchanges are studied among actors who divide, give or trade resources

with other actors who are engaged in an identical task. Much of the world of economic transactions, however, does not occur in such contexts, rather buying and selling are the primary modes of exchange. Exchange theorists if they are to speak to economic sociologists and inform economic research must develop a more explicit and rigorous theory of exchange across roles of this type.

In another study of emerging markets for non-state businesses in Russia, Radaev (2002) investigated the mechanisms and institutional arrangements that help actors cope with the uncertainty and opportunism common in such an uncertain environment. Two features of the situation are significant. Under uncertainty individuals turn to interpersonal ties involving trust and greater certainty to produce some security in the context of high levels of opportunism. This is the behavior that is documented also by Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001) discussed previously.

In documenting the uncertainty of business relations in Russia, respondents to the surveys Radaev (2002) conducted indicated how important honesty and trustworthiness were in business partners. This result is driven by the fact that there are frequent infringements of business contracts creating both risk and high levels of uncertainty. Half of the respondents admitted that contract infringements were quite frequent in Russian business in general and a third of the respondents had had a high level of personal experience with such infringements. This degree of opportunism creates barriers to the formation of reciprocal trust relations. Widespread distrust exists of newcomers to the market but reliable partners are viewed as more trustworthy.

In this climate commitment is clearly the most predictable response to uncertainty as in the case of Kollock's (1994) rubber markets and the credit card market discussed by Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001). Another reason for the uncertainty is that the existing institutions lack credibility and legitimacy. The courts do not effectively manage dispute resolution and existing institutions do not secure business contracts. To cope with this fact the business community creates closed business networks with reputation systems that define insiders and outsiders. This system is based on information obtained from third parties, but more importantly on common face-to-face meetings between potential partners.

In a 1993 survey conducted by Radaev the emerging networks of entrepreneurs in Russia post-transition primarily included personal acquaintance (42 %), friends and their relatives (23 %) and relatives (17 %). This fact reflects the reality discussed in the work of Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001) on the credit card market in Russia. Only a small percentage (11 %) of the business contacts in 1993 were new or relatively new acquaintances. Subsequently, however, they moved away from affect-based commitment and trust to reputation-based trust since networks formed purely on the basis of acquaintance, kin ties or friendship often fall apart due to inefficiency. The relatively closed business networks that have emerged to replace the older "familial" and friendship ties provide better information about the trustworthiness of the partners and their competence. Within exchange theory the formation of commitment and trust networks (see also Cook & Hardin, 2001) in the face of uncertainty provide theoretical support for the evidence provided by Radaev (2003) and others on the emergence of business networks in Russia. This development is also consistent with Rice's (2002) argument that commitments can have negative aggregate level consequences in terms of productivity and efficiency in exchange systems.

This extended example identifies only some of the ways in which exchange theory can inform economic sociology and vice versa. Topics that have returned to center stage on the agenda for research in the exchange theory tradition such as trust, emotion, affect, fairness, strategic action, commitment and reputational networks all have potential applications in the analysis of the emergence of exchange networks in countries with transitional economies as well as in other types of economies as evidenced by the work of many economic sociologists (e.g., Uzzi, Granovetter, etc.). Moving from closed groups to more open networks of trade mirror some of the processes identified by Emerson (1972b) as important for study from an exchange perspective contrasting group-level exchange systems (productive exchange in corporate groups) with network-level exchange. In addition, the return to the study of the significant differences between social processes (e.g., power, justice, and commitment)

involved in different types of exchange, negotiated, reciprocal, and generalized exchange (Molm, 1988, 1990, 1994, 2010) has the potential to provide new insights into a variety of emergent forms of exchange under different circumstances. For example, under conditions of uncertainty, negotiated, binding exchange is likely to emerge before reciprocal (most often, non-binding) exchange because reciprocal exchange involves a greater degree of uncertainty. Reciprocal exchange, as Molm and her coauthors (Molm, 2010; Molm et al., 1999, 2000) have documented, generally requires more trust since the terms of exchange are not simultaneously negotiated and opportunism is possible. This research has the potential to produce a theoretical basis for the empirical work on the development of various global economic sectors as well as for the study of the Internet and its consequences not only for the world of trade, but also for social and political change more broadly as interactions bridge across previously existing exchange boundaries.

Exchange theory provides a general analytic approach to a wide array of social processes that are central to sociological inquiry at various levels. In particular, it emphasizes the role of exchange processes at the micro-level and how such processes often form the bedrock of social structure and social change. It provides a conception of the social interactions that result in the exchange of resources and services of value, which occur on a daily basis in all societies. Understanding these interactions, how they emerge, change, and alter the groups and networks in which they are embedded is one of the major contributions of this theoretical perspective, not only to social psychology, but also to sociology more broadly. Future theoretical work should lead to new connections between this perspective and other social psychological perspectives covered in this volume. We have provided not only an introduction to the current status of this work, but also a window into the ways in which it continues to produce important insights into the world around us as the social, political, and economic landscape continues to change, often more rapidly than our theories do.

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Chapter 4

Social Structure and Personality

Jason Schnittker

Introduction

Social Structure and Personality (SSP) has a long history, but sociology has a short memory for its dictums. The influence of SSP has waned, as was pointed out in the 1980s (House, 1981; Kohn, 1989), the 1990s (House & Mortimer, 1990), and the early twenty-first century (McLeod & Lively, 2004). This assessment will be echoed here as well, but I hope to convey a more optimistic impression by showing the framework's ongoing evolution and relevance. SSP has matured in ways that sociologists might not appreciate. Furthermore, the interests of sociology and SSP are realigning, especially as sociology entertains the role of culture in behavior, emphasizes cultural complexity, and struggles to understand variation in how individuals respond to similar structural constraints. Perhaps sensing these connections, a number of sociologists who might not consider themselves social psychologists have made social psychology a central part of their research agendas (DiMaggio, 1997; Harding, 2011; Lamont & Small, 2008; Small, Harding, & Lamont, 2010; Vaisey, 2010). As a particular type of social psychology, SSP has much to offer.

But before I discuss the future, I will review the past. Much of my discussion will follow the traditions of previous chapters and begin with a historical overview of key SSP concepts. I will revisit classic studies in the SSP tradition, including ongoing criticisms of this work. I will then review the most direct descendants of this research, focusing in particular on cross-cultural psychology and research on the psychological dimensions of social class. Despite their different topics, these two areas are thematically very similar, revealing an emerging coherence that may have eluded early SSP. They also illustrate the value of an ongoing dialog between SSP, psychology, and sociology. In making the case for further dialogue, I will focus on two key facets of SSP that have not been the focus of previous versions of this chapter in the handbook: its concern with culture and its concern with developing a psychologically realistic view of the actor. In many ways, ongoing critiques of SSP have emphasized its psychological focus, including the larger question of whether psychological factors matter at all. For this reason, criticisms of SSP generally grow stronger the further the framework advances from macro to micro. These criticisms need to be addressed directly, especially given my focus. I will argue that reinvigorating SSP involves focusing, in particular, on *psychological social psychology*, which has done a great deal in recent years to enrich our understanding of the psychological sources of behavior, the dimensions of culture, and the complexity of proximate influences. The value of SSP ultimately rests on its

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psychological dimensions--its forcing sociology to wrestle with the mind--and current psychological social psychology offers concepts that cohere very well with the mainstream of the discipline.

The Three Faces of Social Psychology Revisited

The three faces of social psychology were outlined by House (1977) more than three decades ago, but the distinctions he outlined then are still applicable today. Most of my discussion will naturally focus on *psychological sociology*, which is tantamount to social structure and personality. This face tends to use survey methods and observational data, in large part because of its focus on macrosocial phenomena. Naturally much of this work is produced by sociologists, trained in sociology programs with specialty strengths in social psychology. But it is not exclusively the bailiwick of sociologists and may be even less so very soon. Psychologists have recently called for a greater appreciation of sociology (Oishi, Kesebir, & Snyder, 2009), even as psychology has become less prominent within sociology (House, 2008). I will also refer to *psychological social psychology*, in reference to the work of social psychologists trained in psychology departments and employing primarily lab-based experiments. Psychological social psychology focuses on individual psychological processes and personality, but this focus does not mean psychological social psychology is unconcerned with macrosocial influences or with the organization of social groups. Indeed, a notable feature of contemporary psychological social psychology is its full-scale engagement with cross-national and cross-cultural differences, its serious consideration of macrosocial influences in human development, and its use of anthropological and sociological conceptions of culture. In 1977, House encouraged greater engagement with psychological social psychology. This engagement remains incomplete, but in many ways, it is easier today than it was then because the conceptual bridges are clearer and the relevancies more straightforward. I will refer somewhat less directly to the third face of social psychology, *symbolic interactionism*. This is mostly because of my interest in macro-to-micro linkages, as well as my emphasis on quantitative survey research and lab-based experiments. Symbolic interactionism tends to focus on micro-social interactions, using participant observer and interview methods. Although symbolic interactionism will not play a large role in this chapter, readers will recognize the theme of the mutual constitution of the person and situation, a hallmark of the tradition (Stryker, 1980). I will also focus on how individuals subjectively define their situation, an important feature that distinguishes symbolic interactionism from mainstream sociology (see Fine (1991) on SSP's focus on "obdurate realities").

The Basic Elements of Social Structure and Personality

SSP is concerned with charting the relationships between macro-social phenomenon and individual personality, beliefs, and behavior, tracing along the way the precise mechanisms of influence and their particular psychological effects (House, 1981, p. 527). In this way, SSP has been used to explore cross-national differences in modernity, trends in beliefs and attitudes, and the relationship between occupational conditions and cognition. It has also been used to explore more specific topics, including how social position affects health and well-being or why upstream causes may be more influential than downstream risk factors (Schnittker, 2008; Schnittker & McLeod, 2005). Although most research in the SSP tradition has focused on macro-to-micro relationships, SSP is also concerned with micro-to-macro relationships, as represented by the influential role of SSP in the social movements literature (Snow & Oliver, 1995).

It is important to be clear about what the SSP framework is and distinguish it, when necessary, from SSP-*inspired* research. Some researchers working in the tradition explicitly identify with SSP,

but many more do not. For example, researchers can explore the effects of macro-level gender norms on the household division of labor (Fuwa, 2004) or divorce culture on gender equality (Yodanis, 2005) without casting their studies explicitly as contributions to SSP. Some literatures have moved in a macro-to-micro direction and invoke SSP in doing so, but rarely come around to casting their results as a contribution to SSP itself (e.g., Kalleberg, 1989). SSP is also concerned with developing a complete catalog of environmental influences and psychological outcomes. This remains an explicit interest of some of the most ambitious projects emerging from the SSP tradition, but the larger goals of the framework are often lost in investigations that explore the effects of particular features of social structure on particular psychological outcomes (House, 1981). This tendency has become even more pronounced over time. Partly for this reason, contemporary SSP research is identifiable more often by its chosen outcomes (e.g., health) than by an explicit invocation of the SSP framework (e.g., Schnittker & McLeod, 2005).

SSP is a conceptual framework rather than a theory in the sense that it provides researchers with general guidance for understanding linkages between society and the individual, but not specific hypotheses for particular substantive areas (McLeod & Lively, 2004). Although some might question the value of a framework when sociology has developed many useful theories, SSP remains vital for directing empirical research in fruitful directions and for illuminating blindspots. In this sense, SSP serves a valuable prescriptive function, if not always a hypothesis-focused one. Yet, even so, research inspired by SSP has served as a springboard for the development of theories regarding, for example, educational attainment (Kerchkhoff, 1995) and has helped connect research on specific topics to larger themes in sociology, as in the case of beliefs about inequality (Hunt, 1996). Indeed, there is a natural alignment between SSP and the orientation of mainstream sociology, prompting some to label SSP a “quintessentially” sociological approach (Kohn, 1989). Sociology is distinguished from other behavioral sciences in its focus on social structure and, so, a natural topic of concern is the relationship between social structure and personal attributes. It is no surprise that when reviewing SSP, authors often begin by discussing Marx, Weber, and Durkheim and conclude with reviews of topics as close to the discipline as stratification, household organization, and health (House, 1981; Inkeles, 1969; McLeod & Lively, 2004). Where SSP perhaps differs from mainstream sociology is its commitment to understanding the *psychology* of individuals in service of understanding behavior. By disciplinary preference—if not consensus—sociology emphasizes the relevance of social structure to the point that structure is occasionally cast as superseding personality or personality is interpreted merely as a byproduct of structural arrangements. In contrast, SSP empowers psychological factors, rendering the relationship between social structure and personality more reciprocal and the relevance of psychological influences more central. This difference is more than mere shading. As sociology struggles to develop a robust understanding of action, the role of psychological factors in behavior is even more relevant than ever.

SSP consists of three core elements: *social structure*, *personality*, and *culture*. These abstract elements are defined eclectically in order to invite broad application, but over time their usage has been specified, elaborated, and, in the case of culture, greatly revised. It is important to appreciate both their original definitions and their conceptual evolution, as it reveals the evolution of SSP more generally. In his early specification, House (1981) defines *social structure* as a “*persisting and bounded pattern of social relationships (or pattern of behavioral interaction) among units (that is, persons or positions) in a social system*” (emphasis in the original, p. 542). This definition stretches beyond popular definitions of social structure, which often refer generically to patterns in behavior (see Sewell, 1992, p. 1). Consistent with this usage, House emphasizes patterns and persistence, but he also highlights the social and organizational nature of social structure, referring explicitly to social relationships embedded in a social system. For some, the language of a social system might conjure the ideas of Talcott Parsons and, thereby, align SSP with structural-functionalism, but the use of social system within SSP is intended only to describe the universe of relevant influences rather than dictate a priori the patterns among those influences.

Personality refers to psychological attributes, such as values, attitudes, affect, character, or beliefs. House (1981) goes further in arguing that personality denotes traits more than states, defining personality as “a generic label for stable and persisting psychological attributes” (p. 527). This definition is not inconsistent with the definition of personality found in personality psychology textbooks (see Mischel, 1998, pp. 4–5), but, in practice, personality psychology tends to focus on a more limited set of dimensions (e.g., the Big Five: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) and has devoted considerable effort to identifying a small set of universal dimensions (McCrae, 2000). Within SSP, personality denotes a more multidimensional set of individual characteristics, including self-esteem, perceived control, and social attitudes. Indeed, partly in reaction to the growth of SSP-inspired research exploring outcomes as diverse as education and health, some have begun referring to the framework as social structure and the *individual* rather than social structure and personality (House & Mortimer, 1990). This is not an inconsequential elision insofar as it downplays the psychological focus of the framework, but for present purposes the two names are referring to essentially the same body of research. In addition, there has been an evolution toward considering personality in a more flexible fashion, especially with respect to its durability. This effort has been explicit in psychological social psychology. Markus (2004), for instance, argues that viewing personality as an entity has led researchers to exaggerate the situational invariance of behavior and to promote the view that members of groups share essences (p. 82). Contemporary views, by contrast, see personality as the product of a group’s engagement with their current circumstances, and see the relationship between personality and behavior in a more complex and bidirectional fashion. Consistent with this view, personality is no longer seen as exclusively the product of socialization (Ardelt, 2000), providing a sharp contrast with early social psychology, which placed socialization and personality very near each other in conceptual space (Turner, 1988).

Despite not being part of its moniker, *culture* is no less important to SSP than social structure or personality. Here, too, SSP has adopted an eclectic definition. According to House (1981), culture denotes “a set of cognitive and evaluative beliefs—beliefs about what is or what ought to be—that are shared by the members of a social system and transmitted to new members” (p. 542). House’s definition is noteworthy for emphasizing culture’s shared dimensions and interpersonal transmission, as well as its focus on evaluative beliefs. Current definitions, by contrast, emphasize the complexity of culture within groups and the multiple ways in which culture can be transmitted (DiMaggio, 1997, 2002). Current definitions also move well beyond evaluative beliefs, emphasizing psychological processes and cognitive styles, rather than values or beliefs about desirable ends. Furthermore, there has been an alignment between personality and culture in the sense that researchers have focused on the psychological manifestations of culture—psyche and culture are mutually constituted, as psychologists regularly argue (Markus, 2004).

Yet even defined in this more expansive and blended way, culture retains much of the rhetorical force it had when House developed his definition. For instance, the distinction between culture and structure remains crucial and many controversies still stem from how researchers think about the relationship between the two. Inkeles and Levinson (1969) align social structure and culture when they define a social system as a set of actors that possess both a culture and social structure (see also House, 1981, p. 542). Consistent with this definition, culture can be seen as a product of social structure and a means of identifying common experiences. Others, especially within anthropology, see culture itself as a kind of structure (Levi-Strauss, 1963). Within contemporary sociology, however, culture is still often deployed in sharp contradistinction to structure, signifying that the two have different determinants and consequences. This distinction, in turn, entails different types of arguments. Whereas a structural argument emphasizes how behavior is the result of a set of situational factors, often brought about through macro-structural influences, a cultural argument emphasizes how behavior is the result of beliefs, shared by group members, and brought about usually through socialization within the family or community (see, for example, Bendix, 1952).

Although the culture versus structure axis remains an important organizing idea, the distinction between the two has become less sharp. This has been a productive development rather than an artifact

of conceptual deterioration. In poverty research, for instance, research has begun to reengage the well-known culture of poverty debate, albeit under more psychologically sophisticated terms. In its original formulation, the culture of poverty thesis attributed the intergenerational perpetuation of poverty to maladaptive psychological patterns that were transmitted between generations, resulting in a more-or-less homogeneous culture of poverty that persisted regardless of apparent opportunities for socioeconomic attainment (Lewis, 1998). Rather than talk about *a* culture of poverty, uniformly maladaptive behaviors, or generational socialization, current research talks about cultural complexity and priming effects, all rooted in current experiences rather than past adaptations. In cross-cultural research, meanwhile, there has been a renewed interest in the role of culture in behavior and cognition, independent of or in interaction with its structural origins. The future of SSP depends on further mapping points of intersection and divergence between culture and structure, and interesting research is occurring around their boundaries. This literature will be reviewed shortly.

There are other controversies surrounding SSP. Some of the most important stem from what critics see as SSP's crude psychological reductionism, as well as its implicit homogenization of nations and groups. Some of these controversies stem from the definitions SSP employs, starting with culture. SSP emphasizes the shared nature of culture, whether within a nation, a racial/ethnic group, or a social class. SSP also emphasizes the enduring nature of culture, elevating the apparent relevance of culture for explaining persistent patterns. Put together, these ideas are only a small step from casting culture in a monolithic fashion and, indeed, early research made this a goal: it sought to identify a basic or modal personality structure to all societies (Kardiner, 1945). This orientation is hardly unique to SSP, but it is increasingly out of step with contemporary views. Contemporary perspectives emphasize culture's heterogeneity, conflicts, dynamism, and loosely-bounded nature (DiMaggio, 1997; Swidler, 1986).

In thinking about the controversies surrounding culture, it is important to emphasize the difference between SSP itself, which articulates guiding principles, and research coming out of the SSP tradition, not all of which abides by these principles. On its own, SSP does not dictate the boundaries of culture and, indeed, by encouraging scholars to specify the proximate mechanisms that affect personality and culture, SSP provides a conceptual safeguard against imposing artificial similarities among groups comprised of heterogeneous members. Recent research emerging from the SSP tradition has been even clearer about the sharp distinction between cultural differences and individual differences, noting that one has no logically necessary relationship to the other, especially if the two have different determinants (Na et al., 2010; Pettigrew, 1997). In addition, by emphasizing a variety of proximate influences, recent research has allowed for cultural complexity. It is clear that within any given environment there are many cultural narratives available to individuals, a fact that partly explains why any single dimension of culture is only weakly related to behavior. In this way, current psychological conceptions of culture approximate Swidler's (1986) idea of a "toolkit" insofar as they cast culture in a fundamentally plural form, as a set of skills (p. 275). None of these debates, however, make culture irrelevant to the study of behavior.

Similar controversies pertain to personality. As it is usually defined, personality entails enduring features of psychology and implies an organization of psychological attributes. From this definition, some argue that SSP places undue blame on individuals for the persistence of poverty or for the inability of nations to move out of developmental traps. A culture of poverty implies an organized syndrome of attributes, as does the idea of individual modernity. Furthermore, the idea of coherent attributes implies fixed entities, which leave little room for inconsistencies. Perhaps for good reason, then, SSP has been associated with research that blames the victim (Ryan, 1976). Yet enduring does not mean obdurate and organized does not mean overdetermined. A common misconception of SSP is that it does not allow for change. But just as social structure can change, so, too, can personality, and seemingly minor changes in personality can, in fact, lead to a cascade of behavioral changes, even when the rest of the environment is left the same (Wilson, 2006). Furthermore, simply because a feature of personality is enduring does not mean that it leads to the same behavior under all circumstances. An important feature of contemporary SSP-inspired research has been the illumination of the many contingencies

between personality and behavior (Mischel, 2004). Simple trait measures of personality are only weakly related to behavior (Mischel, 1968), but their importance grows when they are combined with an understanding of the situations individuals encounter and when behaviors are aggregated over many situations (Mischel, 2004). Consistency emerges at the intersection of person and environment, not with the person individually. Similarly, SSP emphasizes the importance of developing a realistic psychological profile of the individual, something not all research has done. For example, some of the controversy surrounding modernization theory pertains to its use of a one-dimensional measure of modernity. If this is a failure, it is a failure of measurement, rather than of SSP per se. Across the assorted literatures comprising SSP, these criticisms and subsequent developments are thematically related. To better appreciate the enduring legacy of SSP and its value for future research, it is necessary to review its three key principles.

The Three Principles of SSP

SSP offers three guiding principles for those interested in charting the connections between social structure and personality (House, 1981). The *components principle* encourages researchers to be explicit about the elements behind the effects of social structure. This involves specifying the many dimensions of social structure in a detailed fashion. Unfortunately the causal elements of even well-established structural influences are often left unspecified even when researchers are trying to be more specific, as when research interested in the effects of social stratification demonstrates the importance of education over income but does not specify what it is about education that matters. Identifying components is crucial to elaborating a more complex model. By focusing on the many elements of the environment, the components principle also encourages scholars to appreciate potentially countervailing influences. It is often the case that when a more complete ledger of influences is articulated, complicated effects emerge, as when research finds conflicting effects of education on economic and behavioral outcomes when employing designs that better account for endowments (Schnittker & Behrman, 2012).

The *proximity principle* stipulates that the effects of social structure, no matter how rooted in macro-level factors, must ultimately operate through influences available to the individual's experience. This principle encourages researchers to provide an explicit cross-walk between levels of analysis, which is important for macro-to-micro approaches, but it is important to keep in mind that the demand for proximal influences does not dictate a specific space or geography. The idea of proximal influences is meant to capture a variety of experiences at different levels, from interaction within dyads, to small groups, to families, to organizations, to communities, to nations. For this reason, SSP does not in principle elevate influences that are closest to the individual, even if early research focused on, for example, the role of factory labor in promoting individual modernity among workers, rather than, say, the economy and the availability of industrial jobs (Inkeles, 1975). According to Inkeles, the activities of factory work teach a general sense of efficacy, decrease fear of innovation, and impress upon the worker the value of education, all of which lend themselves to adapting to modern life, even if they are not explicit pedagogical activities. Organizations per se, thus, provide a link between the modern economy and the modern mindset by way of experience. In addition, the proximity principle encourages researchers to consider interactions between proximate influences, as when the effects of the closeness of supervision are shown to depend heavily on the quality of the relationship between a worker and his/her supervisor (House, 1987).

Finally the *psychological principle* encourages researchers to develop a psychologically realistic model of the actor. If scholars understand the relevant components of social structure and can trace their influence to the experience of individuals through proximal influences, they must also understand how these experiences are processed, remembered, and made meaningful at a psychological level. This is no

small task. Early SSP researchers thought it essential for sociology to develop a general theory of personality (Inkeles, 1959). But as with the components principle, subsequent efforts have been more specific and perhaps more dissipated, focusing on a single outcome, such as well-being, anger, or perceived control, to the neglect of understanding how these outcomes are or are not related. An encouraging development has been a turn toward exploring a multitude of psychological outcomes under the same design, as well as a clear move away from discerning modal personalities (McCrae, 2000). Similarly, there has been much greater appreciation of construal processes (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). The same environment and stimuli can be interpreted in very different ways, depending, for example, on culture, rendering construal an important process to be explained.

Classic Examples of Social Structure and Personality

These principles are demanding, especially as a package. Even the most ambitious studies often leave at least one the principles unaddressed. Yet the best examples attempt to shed light on all three simultaneously and benefit from trying. Some classic examples include Alex Inkeles's work on modernization and Melvin Kohn's work on occupational conditions. Both research programs have been and continue to be criticized, especially regarding their psychological dimensions. I will discuss these programs and their critics in detail because they are emblematic of the fate of SSP more generally. Throughout its history, SSP has served an important rebalancing function, moving debates focused on socialization, for instance, toward a greater appreciation of the contemporaneous environment or moving debates focused on culture toward a greater appreciation of structure. This rebalancing is apparent in the work of Inkeles and Kohn, as well as their contemporary offshoots, which have addressed many of the earlier criticisms without supplanting the original models altogether.

Modernization and the Individual

A general interest in macro-to-micro linkages is more than a century old, but SSP came into its own with Alex Inkeles's research on modernity and personality. For most sociologists, his work likely remains the quintessential example of SSP. Inkeles's research centered on the *convergence thesis*, which hypothesized that industrialization lead to forms of social organization, such as urbanization, formal education, and bureaucratization, that produced common values, attitudes, and ways of thinking, the whole of which Inkeles labeled *individual modernity* (Inkeles, 1960). In this way, individuals in modern societies slowly converged toward a common psychological syndrome because of the overwhelming influence of economic development. The transformation of individuals was premised on the demands of the system: economic systems required certain characteristics among individuals, who developed new mindsets in adjustment to these new systems.

Although Inkeles spent considerable time specifying the concepts behind his theory, he devoted even more time to testing it. Evidence for his thesis was based on an ambitious cross-national survey fielded in six developing nations. In this survey, individual modernity was measured as a unitary composite of multiple dimensions, including openness to new experiences and people; the expression and cultivation of independence from traditional authority; a belief in the efficacy of science, medicine, and man; an interest in planning and efficiency in the pursuit of goals; and an active interest in civic affairs (Inkeles, 1969). The determinants of individual modernity were equally multidimensional, including mass media exposure, urban residence, and the widespread availability of consumer goods, but as an empirical matter Inkeles focused on factory labor and formal education. Echoing the culture/structure distinction that would play a role in much of the SSP research to follow, Inkeles considered cultural traditions an

alternative explanation for common values, focusing in particular on the influence of religious institutions. His regression models, however, provided more support for a structural explanation and, indeed, among the changes Inkeles documented among modernizing societies was a move toward secularization. Although Inkeles engaged in a good deal of data reduction—combining multiple indicators into a single index or focusing on particular features of structure rather than the entire set—these efforts were not wholly at the expense of accuracy. In his model, Inkeles was able to explain between 32 and 62 % of the variance in individual modernity, an often unappreciated fact (Inkeles & Smith, 1974).

Yet, despite its promise, a number of features of Inkeles's project remain controversial. Indeed, critics of Inkeles have focused on virtually every link and level in his macro-to-micro chain, striking at the heart of his ambitions. A major critique, for instance, is that Inkeles neglects larger macro-economic and political forces that frustrate economic development, including the exploitation of periphery nations by core nations. Critics argue that these relationships are the ultimate sources of underdevelopment, overshadowing the influence of factors further down the pathway (Chase-Dunn, 1989; Gendzier, 1979). A more general expression of this concern is that SSP fails to consider the relational nature of inequality, whether at the macro level (between nations) or micro-level (between individuals), especially when SSP focuses on the individual as the unit of analysis (Hollander & Howard, 2000). Other critics have focused on the mezzo-level of Inkeles's work, targeting how Inkeles fails to specify how certain institutions actually produce modernity, especially factory labor (Gendzier; Yogev, 1976). Identifying some particularly important influences is not the same thing as arguing why or how they matter. Related to this, some have argued that Inkeles neglects variation in favor of central tendencies, especially when he emphasizes the functional nature of macro-to-micro linkages. Inkeles assumes, for instance, that individuals occupying similar structural positions have common experiences, but there is variation in actual experiences within any given structural location, as well as variation in how individuals react to those experiences. Other critics have focused on the micro-level, especially Inkeles's relatively simple view of the psychology of modernity. Critics argue that his single modern-versus-traditional continuum obscures the multidimensionality of modernity (Portes, 1973) or, relatedly, that Inkeles fails to explain the persistence of certain cultural traditions, which are left entirely unmeasured (DiMaggio, 1994). Apart from this, a single dimension implies a progression from one pole to the other. Pulling together these assorted critiques, some have argued that Inkeles blames the victim insofar as he argues that the development of a modern economy is thwarted because individuals fail to develop a modern mindset (Bradshaw & Wallace, 1996). Certainly Inkeles (1975) himself did not shy away from this controversy when he claimed, for example, that “national building and institution building are only empty exercises unless the attitudes and capacities of the people keep pace with other forms of development” (pp. 323–324).

These criticisms are compelling. Moreover, the natural association between Inkeles and SSP has perhaps led mainstream sociologists to think of them as one and the same. Yet these criticisms should not be applied to SSP more generally and SSP did not stop evolving when Inkeles's program came to an end. Indeed, in some ways, these criticisms reflect the very things that a robust SSP can prevent. In attempting to draw linkages between social structure and personality, for example, Inkeles focused on proximate components of the broader social system and provided considerable empirical evidence for the relevance of factory labor. Yet a robust SSP also requires explaining how these proximate environments prevail in the first place. In addition, a robust SSP necessitates considering all relevant components of the environment, not simply those that can be cast as plausible mechanisms for the specific outcome of interest. By the same token, the psychological principle insists on psychological realism, discouraging a one-dimensional approach to individual modernity.

In evaluating the Inkeles program as an example of SSP, it is important to consider it in its historical context. Inkeles's approach is fundamentally structural. Prior to Inkeles, much of the research on cross-national differences was dominated by psychoanalytic theory. At the time, many sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists believed societies could be characterized according to a basic personality structure, which, in turn, could be linked to childhood socialization carried through to

adulthood (e.g., Kardiner, 1945; Levine, 1973; Whiting & Child, 1953). In this context, Inkeles work was pathbreaking in several respects. It was pathbreaking in its emphasis on rigorous empirical analysis based on extensive survey research. It was also pathbreaking in its specification of a much more encompassing set of proximate influences, well beyond the family. Inkeles was quite explicit in arguing that adult experiences were more relevant than childhood experiences and, in this way, he emphasized the mutability of personality rather than its rigidity (see Inkeles, 1975, p. 331). Put differently, his approach allowed for agency in a way previous accounts may have more flatly denied. If Inkeles's work appears dated now, we should remember that it provided a quantum leap over other work at the time. The history of his work also reveals the rebalancing function of SSP.

It is also important to appreciate the research Inkeles inspired and how that subsequent research evolved. The most direct descendant of Alex Inkeles is Ronald Inglehart, but there are crucial differences between the two, which are emblematic of where SSP could go in the future. Like Inkeles, Inglehart has explored modernization and, in particular, the competing hypotheses of whether values have converged or whether traditional values persist. Inglehart has shared some of the criticisms leveled against Inkeles. For instance, Inglehart has been criticized for his view of values, as well as his somewhat thin exploration of the proximate influences that link modernization to personality (Haller, 2002, esp. pp. 142–143). However, in a revealing departure from the main thrust of Inkeles's work, Inglehart and colleagues (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) find evidence for both convergence and persistence, arguing that change is path dependent and that post-industrialization is different in kind from industrialization. Despite the “massive” effects of modernization (p. 19), the cultural heritage of a society has a lingering influence, rendering the psychological profile of modernity much more complex than was apparent in the work of Inkeles (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The nuance in this conclusion partly reflects improvements in data and, therefore, reflects a steadfast commitment to empiricism. Inglehart uses more recent data drawn from a larger and more varied set of countries, allowing him to detect more individual variation than was possible in Inkeles's design. Inglehart also uses a more sensitive and multidimensional measure of modernity. In particular, he distinguishes two dimensions of individual modernity, one related to survival versus self-expression values and the other related to traditional versus secular-rational values. Inglehart shows that secularization is not an essential feature of modernization because trends in the two dimensions are not identical: depending on their religious traditions, countries can move toward self-expression values but not toward secular-rational values. Indeed, even when affiliations with religious institutions decline, concerns about spiritual matters often increase. In this way, the changes brought about by post-industrialization are not a linear extension of those brought about by industrialization, and, in a sharp rebuttal to the convergence thesis, Inglehart and Baker conclude, “we doubt that the forces of modernization will produce a homogenized world culture in the foreseeable future” (p. 49).

In light of his study, Inglehart proposes several modifications to modernization theory, all of which move the theory in a more complex and contingent direction. These modifications are emblematic of trends in SSP more generally and speak to the value of reconsidering its principles, as I will elaborate shortly. For one, Inglehart tempers the strong evolutionary tone of modernization theory by arguing that the process of modernization is probabilistic and reversible, as was the case in the former Soviet Union when the economy collapsed (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Inglehart further argues that societies are not becoming more like the United States and that, indeed, the United States may be atypical (see Portes, 1973 for an early critique). Finally, Inglehart encourages further examination of the persistence of culture and its consequences. According to Inglehart, culture is not entirely a product of macroeconomic structure and culture can exert an influence of its own. In support of this claim, Inglehart shows that the effects of self-expression values on democracy are greater than the effects of democracy on self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). In this way, the effects of social structure are not as overwhelming as they may have appeared in the work Inkeles. These effects are further deflated at the mezzo-level, given the complexity of the relationship between occupational conditions and psychological functioning.

Occupational Conditions and Psychological Functioning

Although it emerged from the same tradition as Inkeles, the work of Melvin Kohn is strongest where Inkeles is weakest. In a research program spanning several decades, Kohn has sought to identify the components that link social class to personality, focusing on occupational self-direction and its many different psychological effects. Kohn perhaps begins at a less macro-level than Inkeles, but he provides a richer mezzo- and micro-level account, thereby addressing the components principle and, in a more limited way, the psychological principle. In his empirical work, Kohn demonstrates a robust connection between opportunities to exercise self-direction at work and improved psychological functioning, including greater intellectual flexibility, more openness to change, better mental health, and more self-confidence. Kohn argues these broad effects reflect a process of generalized learning. In complex work environments, individuals must make decisions based on a large number of considerations with little direct supervision. When such decisions are rewarded, as they are in occupational settings, individuals are motivated to apply these decision-making styles to other situations, including those well outside the work domain (Schooler, 1984).

Kohn's basic model is powerful. It has been expanded in several fruitful directions. Some have explored the effects of environmental complexity more generally, arguing the same concepts that Kohn applies to occupation experiences can be applied to other proximate environments (Schooler, 1984). The idea of environmental complexity, for example, has been applied to understanding trends in intelligence, arguing that growing environmental complexity has propelled general increases in IQ (Flynn, 2007). Kohn himself has applied the model to the intergenerational transmission of class, noting that high-status parents are more likely than low-status parents to encourage their children to value self-direction over conformity, which in turn has implications for socioeconomic attainment (Kohn, 1969; Pearlin & Kohn, 1966). In perhaps the most ambitious extension of his model, Kohn argues for macro–micro feedback loops between occupational self-direction and individualism within a society, noting the individualism found in the United States may be further buttressed by our occupational structure and vice versa (see also Schooler, Mulatu, & Oates, 2004). The psychological consequences of self-direction advance socioeconomic attainment for individuals, but they may also do so for societies as a whole.

The contribution, scope, and legacy of Kohn's program are undeniable. Yet, as with Inglehart, some elements in his macro-to-micro chain are controversial. Kohn focuses a great deal on the components principle and empirically identifies and sorts the most important features of class. Yet some have questioned Kohn's focus on occupational self-direction, much like some have questioned Inkeles's focus on factory work. In this vein, subsequent work has added a number of other relevant influences to the mix, often in a critical and corrective tone. Wright and Wright (1976), for instance, emphasize the importance of education over occupation and note that trends in the value of self-direction cannot be attributed to gains in socioeconomic attainment alone. Others note that the influence of occupation on values has declined over time (Alwin, 1984) or, more generally, that the effects of occupation on values are significant but not overwhelming (House, 1981; Spenner, 1988). In general, critics have argued that if people learn their values from their experiences in the stratification system, they learn from a variety of sources given the many elements in that system.

In much the same way that critics of Inkeles have encouraged a more contingent approach to modernization, critics of Kohn have also emphasized the importance of interactions between individuals and occupations. In various ways, these criticisms, too, are directed at the psychological principle. For example, Kohn's model emphasizes the direct relevance of occupational conditions for psychological functioning and, thus, assumes the "curriculum" of work is learned by all workers. Fit models, by contrast, emphasize the intersection of occupational conditions and the psychology of workers and, thus, emphasize moderator relationships. Consistent with this idea, highly educated people are more likely to work in self-directed jobs, but they may also have a stronger preference for such work (Halaby, 2003) and so gain more from occupational self-direction than those who prefer less

discretion (Locke & Latham, 1990). Also consistent with this idea, expectations moderate the relationship between occupational conditions and satisfaction, meaning self-direction does not promote satisfaction for every worker in equal measure (Locke & Latham, 1990). By the same token, other research has focused on contingencies in the link between the psychological consequences of self-direction and behavior. Luster, Rhoades, and Haas (1989), for example, explore the link between parental values and parenting practices. They find that middle class parents value self-direction and working-class parents value conformity, as expected, but also that parents within class groups hold heterogeneous beliefs about how best to instill such values. In a related extension of Kohn's model, Weininger and Lareau (2009) explore the practices that link values to parenting behavior, revealing paradoxes below the surface of professed and seemingly coherent self-direction values. By definition, self-direction is the ability to initiate and direct personal activities in an independent manner, but Weininger and Lareau show that middle-class parents often use authoritarian methods to encourage independence. Rather than allow their children to direct themselves, middle-class parents put their children in settings with relatively high levels of adult authority, allowing for little discretion. By contrast, working-class parents ostensibly value conformity to external authority, but they often place their children in settings with little to no adult oversight, allowing their children, in effect, to exercise initiative and make their own decisions. Weininger and Lareau spend little time discussing the long-term implications of this apparent disjuncture between values and practices, but they do suggest the possibility of a "fusion" of value commitments (p. 694). This interpretation is consistent with the idea of cultural complexity, which focuses on the relevance of competing cultural models for deflating the apparent relevance of culture for adult behavior (discussed below). In a similar way, other studies point to the potentially countervailing effects of social class. Although Kohn and others view higher social class as generally emancipatory, the evidence for this claim is surprisingly unclear. Seccombe (1986) finds a weak relationship between occupational conditions and gender role values, suggesting that occupational self-direction does not, of necessity, promote a more egalitarian mindset (see, however, Klute, Crouter, Sayer, & McHale, 2002). Similarly, Schnittker and Behrman (2012) find that schooling promotes self-direction and high socioeconomic attainment, but also that independence is occasionally achieved at the expense of cohesive social relationships.

Although Kohn's work clearly shows that class has psychological effects, his model leaves the curriculum of class is surprisingly unclear. Subsequent work has focused on elaborating the pathways, but has revealed more paradoxes than patterns. These revelations are part of a more general concern: if critics of Inkeles and Kohn have focused on a single idea, it is that both share a relatively simple view of personality and culture. Contemporary research in the SSP tradition has greatly expanded on the psychological principle, while simultaneously highlighting the complexity of the environment, consistent with the proximity principle. The footprint of SSP is perhaps strongest in research on the psychological dimensions of culture, much of it emerging from psychological social psychology. This research demonstrates that psychological factors are indispensable for understanding behavior, but illustrates the multidimensionality of personality and culture.

Contemporary Research in the SSP Tradition

In this section, I will review two related areas of research, the first on cross-national differences in culture and the second on social class differences in culture. These two areas have obvious topical overlap with classic SSP research, following the work of Inkeles in the case of the former and Kohn in the case of the latter. However, they are more sensitive to the criticisms of classic SSP and, when discussing culture, provide concepts entirely consistent with contemporary cultural sociology. For instance, cross-cultural psychology sees an alignment between culture and psyche (Heine, 2010), but this alignment is far removed from Parsons's efforts to reduce culture to values or even Inkeles's efforts to reduce culture to the demands of the economy. Similarly, whereas older views regarded

culture as an internally coherent web of meanings, contemporary cross-cultural psychology employs a multidimensional approach, allowing for complexity and inconsistency. Current research is also more flexible with respect to the categories of cross-cultural comparison. To be sure, cross-cultural psychology maintains an interest in distinguishing between groups and geographic boundaries—the nomothetic imperative has not disappeared entirely—but it is much more cognizant of the complexities involved in these exercises and avoids characterizing a culture in a monolithic fashion. Finally, current research is more eclectic with respect to culture's structural antecedents. Current research sees individuals as harboring multiple cultures simultaneously, which can be activated based on seemingly slight environmental cues, rather than individuals as encapsulating a single culture, which emerges by force of the demands of the economy. In this way, current conceptions see culture as a reflection of the social demands of individuals situated in multiple kinds of environments. There remain some commonalities with classic SSP. Current research sees culture as important to behavior, much like Inkeles and Kohn saw individual modernity and self-direction as important to motivation, but current research also sees a more complex mix of psychological attributes in play. I will review the basic parameters of these cultural differences before discussing their sources.

Culture and Psyche: Cross-National Differences in Personality

Much of cross-cultural psychology has focused on comparing “Eastern” or East Asian cultures (using samples drawn primarily from Japan, China, or Korea) with “Western” or European American cultures (using samples drawn primarily from the United States or Canada) (for reviews, see Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Heine, 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 2003). There are obviously other regional differences that could be explored, as well as variation within these nations, but no other comparisons have been studied in as much detail. Research has documented the importance of culture for both social orientation and cognitive style.

Perhaps the most important axis of social orientation is *individualism* versus *collectivism*, also referred to as *independence* versus *interdependence* (Kitayama, 1992; Triandis, 1989). Individualism and collectivism have multiple dimensions. In individualistic cultures, such as the United States and Canada, there is a greater emphasis on individual uniqueness and encouraging behaviors that distinguish the self from others. In these cultures, the locus of agency is believed to reside in the individual, who is seen as autonomous, achievement-oriented, and defined by a set of distinguishing internal attributes (Brewer & Chen, 2007). Given these beliefs, people in individualistic cultures tend to self-enhance, or emphasize the positive dimensions of the self, and self-esteem is a key feature of motivation. In collectivist cultures, such as Japan and China, there is a greater emphasis on maintaining well-functioning social relationships and, therefore, more interest in fostering affinity rather than difference. The locus of agency is seen as residing in the group rather than the person and achievement is cast in terms of conformity rather than individual attainment. Accordingly, self-enhancement is less common and self-esteem is a less relevant source of motivation.

Individualism and collectivism have corollaries in cognitive style (Na et al., 2010; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). In individualistic cultures, individuals tend to reason analytically, meaning they categorize objects according to their underlying attributes, assign agency to an actor rather than a context, and use fixed rules to predict behavior, rather than contingencies. Given this style of reasoning, individual abilities are seen as entities, resulting from innate factors that are less amenable to improvement (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). In collectivist cultures, by contrast, individuals tend to reason holistically, meaning they recognize actors and objects independently, assign influence to the context, and categorize objects according to their relationships more than their qualities (Heine, 2010). For this reason, individual abilities are seen as incremental, capable of being improved with effort or diminished with neglect. Although early work put these cultural

differences in the context of the self-concept (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), it is important to remember these orientations reflect responses to *social* dilemmas and, therefore, sit at the intersection of the individual and society. For this reason, the idea of culture as psyche should not be confused with an asocial theory of personality. As Heine asserts, “the conflict between the pursuit of individual and social goals may prove to be the most fundamental aspect in which cultures differ in their psychology” (p. 1429).

These dimensions of culture are also relevant to behavior and, accordingly, speak to the structure-culture divide in sociology. But as with much of contemporary psychological social psychology, the role of psychological processes is regarded as inseparable from the role of the environment and, for this reason, the idea of contingency is pervasive in the literature. One intuitive implication of the independent/interdependent distinction is that interdependent people should demonstrate less consistency between situations. In interdependent cultures, behavior is determined more by the situation than by personal disposition, and the former is generally seen as more fluid than the latter. There is considerable evidence for this idea. For instance, Suh (2002) finds that, compared with North Americans, Koreans view themselves as more flexible across situations and have self-concepts that are more sensitive to the perspectives of others. For this reason, North Americans are more likely to receive positive social evaluations when they act consistently from occasion to occasion. Similarly, Oishi and colleagues (2004) find less emotional variability across situations among European Americans than among Japanese people. East Asians are also more likely than Americans to describe themselves in reference to social roles (Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995) and change their self-descriptions depending on whom they are talking to (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001). In general, those with interdependent selves tend to be consistent only to the degree a social role is consistently activated across situations, suggesting strong person-environment contingencies that diminish the apparent relevance of dispositional measures of personality (Mischel, 2004).

A related implication of the independent/interdependent distinction is that interdependent people should show more conformity, an obvious reflection of structure. Research using the Solomon Asch (1956) conformity paradigm confirms this pattern, but there are important exceptions that speak to how conformity is conceived and interpreted. Among interdependent people, for example, the degree of conformity depends heavily on the relationship. Among strangers, for example, independent and interdependent people do not differ in their total amount of conformity, but among peers, interdependent people show more conformity, perhaps reflecting a stronger distinction between in and out groups in interdependent cultures (Bond & Smith, 1996). For similar reasons, the meaning and significance of choice differs between cultures. Whereas European Americans prefer tasks they have chosen for themselves, East Asians prefer tasks chosen by others (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). These differences have implications for behavior and motivation, especially with respect to perseverance and what we might interpret as “intrinsic” motivation. Whereas Asian American children display more intrinsic motivation for a task chosen by others, European American children display more intrinsic motivation for tasks they selected themselves. In addition, relative to Westerners, East Asians tend to focus more on negative information about the self (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999), especially for traits they want to improve (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). For this reason, East Asians tend to persist more after failure, while Westerners tend to persist more after success (Oishi & Diener, 2003). In addition, because they endorse a more incremental view of abilities, interdependent people tend to respond to failure with renewed effort, whereas independent people tend to search for an alternative task for which they believe they might be better suited (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Heyman & Dweck, 1998). These orientations have macro-level implications, including with respect to how individuals conceive the public good. In Western societies, activating the concept of “choice” decreases empathy for disadvantaged people, whereas in Eastern societies it does not, suggesting, among other things, a relationship between culture and support for social provisions (Savani, Stephens, & Markus, 2011).

For the same reason culture is relevant to understanding conformity, culture is also relevant to understanding how agency is construed. Sociologists tend to regard and measure perceived control

exclusively in terms of beliefs about the self (e.g., Mirowsky, Ross, & Van Willigen, 1996), but cross-cultural research reveals additional dimensions that are not routinely included in survey instruments. Much like individuals hold beliefs about whether the self is malleable or fixed, individuals hold beliefs about whether society is malleable or fixed. One sort of belief need not follow the other: people from Western cultures tend to see the world as more malleable than the self, whereas people from East Asian cultures tend to see the world as less malleable than the self (Su et al., 1999). This distinction is related to behavior. In Western cultures, individuals work to change their environments in ways that accommodate the self (primary control), whereas in East Asian cultures individuals work to change the self in order to adjust to the environment (secondary control) (Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002). These orientations, in turn, frame understandings of agency. Americans are better able to recall events where they influenced a situation rather than adjusted to it, whereas Japanese persons are better able to recall situations where they adjusted (Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002). Although the meaning of agency may differ between cultures, both independent and interdependent people report experiencing agency in their behavior. Japanese persons, for example, report feeling more power in adjusting, much like Americans report feeling more agency in personal influence.

The interpretation of these differences is important, especially given the history of research on cross-cultural differences and the tendency of some researchers in the SSP tradition to infer ought from is. They also speak to how sociology might understand constraint. Although it is possible to interpret interdependence as a lack of internal motivation or to interpret conformity as acquiescence, the meaning of agency is suffused with culture: East Asians see themselves as agents in a group rather than as having no agency at all (Miller, 2003). Similarly, although there is no doubt that consistency is valued in Western society, consistency can be evaluated from multiple standpoints: from one standpoint, cross-situational variability among interdependent people can be interpreted as having no core set of beliefs, but from another standpoint variability between situations is actually consistency within situations insofar as individuals respond to the same situation in similar ways (English & Chen, 2007). These results also speak to how individuals respond to the demands of the situation. Both Inkeles and Kohn rest their models on how individuals respond to the demands of the modern economy and its occupational structure. Cross-cultural psychology renders all the social demands of a society relevant, not only its economic requirements.

A psychological understanding of culture sensitizes our interpretations in another way as well. Much of sociology is premised on a crisp tension between structure and agency: studies envision a self-enhancing actor who may be thwarted by social structure, but who nonetheless strives in advance his/her self-interests. Accordingly, choice is usually cast in distinction to structure and in alignment with agency. By the same token, preferences are elevated in most formulations of motivation and distinguished from obligations. To the degree that behavior is an apparent reflection of preferences, an individual is seen as demonstrating control, and to the degree that there are departures from preferences, structural barriers are assumed. This view is appealing, but it may be uniquely Western. It may also be uniquely middle-class.

Social Class Differences in Personality

Recent research reveals differences between working and middle classes that parallel, to a striking degree, those found between Eastern and Western cultures. Some of this work focused on the meaning and significance of *individualism*, unpacking a concept that some regard as having a uniform meaning. Individualism is a hallmark of American culture, but Kusserow (1999) finds it assumes very different shadings across social classes. In working-class communities, she finds evidence for *hard individualism*, characterized by an emphasis on autonomy, self-reliance, and vigilance against the threat posed by others. Kusserow further distinguishes among different types of hard individualism.

In especially poor neighborhoods, individualism assumes a defensive character, requiring individuals to be cautious and stand their ground, whereas in higher low-income neighborhoods, individualism is more offensive, encouraging tenacity and self-determination. Although her analysis focuses on individualism, Kusserow shows the importance of cooperation in working-class communities. For instance, hard individualism is associated with self-determination, but it is not associated with emphasizing the uniqueness of the individual and, indeed, in resource-poor environments cautious cooperation is often seen as the preferred route to attainment. Lamont (2000) echoes this point when she describes the feeling of interdependence found among the working class in France and the United States, suggesting some cross-cultural consistency.

In middle-class communities, by contrast, Kusserow finds evidence of *soft individualism*, which is very different from its hard counterpart. In middle-class communities, children are encouraged to develop their individuality, to cultivate emotions, and to develop knowledge and wisdom. Rather than maintaining a defensive stance toward others, middle-class children are encouraged to open themselves to experience and cultivate their own unique viewpoints. Because uniqueness is regarded as more authentic than similarity, middle-class children regard their self-interest as the primary source of motivation and foster independent pursuits to a greater degree (for a parallel, see Lareau, 2002 on concerted cultivation).

Stemming partly from these different conceptions of individualism, the nature of choice also varies between classes. In this regard, the parallels with cross-cultural psychology are especially striking. Stephens, Markus, and Townsend (2007) find that working-class college students tend to make choices similar to those of other students and are more satisfied when they do so. Middle-class students, by contrast, seek differentiation and are more satisfied when their choices are unique. For working-class students, then, what might be seen as conformity is interpreted as a more authentic expression of a mature self, whereas for middle-class students, conformity is interpreted as compromise, an understanding that parallels differences between independent and interdependent cultures. Similarly, Snibbe and Markus (2005) find class differences in how individuals respond to the opportunity to exercise choice. Whereas middle-class persons prefer objects they have chosen for themselves to those assigned to them, working-class persons are not affected by whether they had a choice or not. Reflecting this difference, the relationship between preferences and choice is stronger among well-educated persons, and not only because they generally have more options. For example, college-educated people change their preferences to match their choices more than do high school-educated people, suggesting dissonance between preferences and actions is more motivating among the highly educated. Indeed, when asked to describe what “choice” is, working-class persons are less likely to associate choice with freedom and more likely to associate it with negative feelings (Stephens, Fryberg, & Markus, 2010).

These differences have a variety of implications, including for how individuals define agency and think about control. They are also relevant to well-being. In an ambitious mixed-method study, Markus and colleagues explore class differences in open-ended descriptions of the good life (Markus, Ryff, Curhan, & Palmersheim, 2004). Although both middle- and lower-class persons value relationships with others, middle-class persons describe influencing their friends and mutual self-improvement, whereas lower-class persons describe adjusting to events, controlling emotions, and avoiding bad circumstances. Importantly, however, both groups portray themselves as agents, regardless of the different activities they invoke when describing the good life. As Markus and colleagues note, the descriptions of lower-class persons were as long as those of the middle-class and reflect a similar sense of motivation. In these ways, class-related culture guides the interpretation of agency and choice in sophisticated ways.

Studies of this sort provide a valuable extension to sociological research, especially insofar as they speak to the culture/structure nexus. Before going too far, however, it is crucial to understand the structural origins of these psychological differences, consistent with the proximity principle. Without an appreciation of the structural origins of culture, sociologists risk recapitulating old debates and, in particular, presenting cultural arguments that obviate the importance of the environment (Lamont &

Small, 2008). Given the complexity of the task, the lack of attention to structural determinants is not entirely the fault of researchers. Culture is, after all, ubiquitous: it is embodied in institutions, in media, in relationships, and in daily practices, making it difficult to discern the active ingredients of the cultural environment. Furthermore, all environments contain multiple cultures simultaneously, meaning researchers must assess not only a dominant culture for a class or nation, but also competing cultures and narratives. Different cultures can emerge from seemingly identical environments (Cohen, 2001). Even with these complexities, however, research has made considerable progress. If critics are concerned about the deterministic flavor of classic SSP research, they will find much to like in current scholarship.

The Structural Origins of Culture: Culture, Complexity, and the Proximity Principle

Some efforts to explain cultural differences between nations or classes explore the full sweep of geography, ecology, history, and economics, consistent with the ambitions of early SSP. These efforts are also strongly empirical, carrying forward one of the best traditions of SSP. Focusing on macro-level variation in individualism between U.S. states, for example, Kitayama, Conway, Pietromonaco, Park, and Plaut (2010) develop a production-adoption model of cultural change and provide a preliminary test. According to their model, the high levels of independence found in the U.S. originated in particular experiences on the Western frontier that slowly spread to other regions through emulation. Initially, the frontier environment itself was crucial. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the unsettled Western states required independence and autonomy, which, in turn, encouraged self-promotion and competition among pioneers. A culture of independence spread to other regions, however, as individuals attempted to imitate the behavior of settlers emerging from the frontier with considerable wealth and status. Although this model is difficult to test in all its historical detail, Kitayama and colleagues develop a testable hypothesis by drawing a distinction between different types of cultures and how they are transmitted. These distinctions are premised on a psychological conception of culture and, therefore, highlight the importance of psychological theory for developing testable hypotheses. Whereas explicit cultural values are expressed through values and behaviors, implicit cultural values are expressed through tacit practices and habits. According to their model, the two types of culture are produced through different mechanisms and, therefore, will map onto to different regions. Explicit cultural values are produced through direct experiences and, therefore, are more common in frontier states, whereas implicit values are adopted through imitation and, therefore, are more common in Eastern states. Models of this sort are increasingly common. Other scholars have used production-adoption conceptions to explain the rise of interdependence in Eastern cultures, focusing, for instance, on patterns of trade (Nisbett, 2004). Similarly, others have explored the culture of honor in the Southern U.S. as it relates to the security of resources (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996).

Parallel to these macro-historical efforts have been efforts to understand influences closer to the individual in time and space, consistent with the proximity principle. The overall picture emerging from these studies is one of great multiplicity. Cultural tendencies may occasionally begin with socialization, but socialization is not the only influence or even the most important. For instance, some research shows that middle-class parents encourage more individualism in their children through narrative practices, which eventually lead to particular cognitive styles (Harwood, Miller, & Irizarry, 1998; Kusserow, 1999; Wiley, Rose, Burger, & Miller, 1998). The long-term effects of parent-child interactions are, however, small, unless the practices parents encourage are reinforced by other institutions and experiences (Rowe, 1994). There is some evidence, for instance, that schooling increases the value placed on independence, at least in the U.S. (Franks, Herzog, Holmberg, & Markus, 1999; Mirowsky & Ross, 1998). Education also increases analytic thought, although the effects of schooling

may be very different in Eastern cultures (Na et al., 2010). Social networks are also relevant, especially for understanding social class. Social networks in working-class communities tend to be more densely structured, meaning working-class individuals spend more time interacting with family, whereas in middle-class communities social networks tend to be looser and more freely-chosen, allowing for a more complex mix of exposures to independence and interdependence (Lamont, 2000). Other influences are more ambient but no less important. Commercial advertising, for example, tends to reinforce dominant cultures (Han & Shavitt, 1994). Kim and Markus (1999) show how advertisements in Korea and the United States promote collectivism and individualism respectively. In a different way, other research demonstrates the importance of culture by cuing cultural tendencies in an experimental setting and observing their consequences (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Seemingly slight cultural cues can change individual mindsets in striking ways, suggesting that cultures differ because of the chronic environmental salience of a cultural tendency, like individualism or collectivism, rather than because of fixed individual differences.

The variety of influences offered to explain cultural differences in contemporary research is considerably different from the efforts of early SSP researchers to identify the single most important feature of an environment and use that feature to explain a trend. One implication of the turn toward multiplicity and dynamism has been greater appreciation of *cultural complexity*, reflecting the idea that individuals are exposed to many cultural influences simultaneously and, therefore, can learn and use multiple cultures strategically. Early theorists regarded culture as a “seamless web” (Swidler, 1986) learned by “oversocialized” individuals (Wrong, 1961) who would then enact their culture in a consistent fashion. Yet precisely because there are a variety of places where individuals learn culture, they are often exposed to different cultures. For this reason, it is more important to ask why one culture is more accessible than another at any given time, rather than ask the degree to which an individual embodies a single culture. It is also important to ask the degree to which individuals are able to deploy culture strategically and the degree to which they are influenced by culture unintentionally.

The idea of cultural multiplicity can be leveraged in assorted ways. For instance, individuals situated within multiple cultures provide interesting case-studies for understanding the dynamics of culture. Seemingly slight situational cues can override dominant cultural tendencies. On average, for example, Japanese and American subjects differ in their tendency to self-enhance. This tendency might be difficult to change. If cues supporting this tendency are sufficiently ubiquitous in an environment, self-enhancement can eventually become “automatized or habitualized to form a functionally autonomous psychological tendency” (Kitayama et al., 1997, p. 1260). Yet experimental evidence suggests that when placed in American situations, characterized by cues to self-enhance and focus on the self, Japanese subjects are more self-enhancing and, when placed in Japanese situations, characterized by cues to self-criticize and focus on the group, American subjects are more self-critical (Kitayama et al., 1997). These situational cues illustrate the power of the environment, but they also explain individual variation in responses to the environment insofar as they suggest that variable-based conceptions of social position (e.g., race/ethnicity, social class) will provide only a weak approximation of actual moment-to-moment experience.

The situation of immigrants provides similar leverage. On the one hand, studies of those moving between cultures point to the malleability of personality and the possibility that one culture might eventually supplant the other. The self-critical tendencies of East Asians, for instance, may be replaced by self-enhancing ones when East Asians move to a European American context, even after a short period of time (Fiske et al., 1998). By the same token, European Americans may become more interdependent when exposed to relatively simple primes regarding affiliation (Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009). On the other hand, some research shows that immigrants maintain both cultures simultaneously and switch between the two depending on the situation. In one study, a simple prime of Chinese or American cultural icons (e.g., the American flag versus a Chinese dragon) administered to Chinese-American biculturals (Hong Kong Chinese college students) was sufficient to switch subjects' attributions between external and internal causes and induce more or less

cooperation (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000; Wong & Hong, 2005). Studies of this sort do not suggest a blended culture in the sense that both cultures are operating at once in a unique fashion. Rather they show that a single culture can remain a coherent set of practices and beliefs, but that individuals learn multiple such cultures and are capable of using each of them at different times (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000). In this light, the important question is not merely whether an individual possesses a culture or whether that culture is coherent in some fashion, but whether a given culture is cognitively accessible and why.

Although not as explicitly cognitive as these studies, a parallel can be found in poverty research in sociology. Recent research has focused on the presence of cultural complexity in low- and middle-income neighborhoods and its behavioral consequences (Harding, 2011). Expressed in SSP terms, the value of this research lies in its embrace of the psychological principle. This research demonstrates that in low-income neighborhoods mainstream values coexist with oppositional values, meaning low-income neighborhoods do not have a distinct and consistent subculture born of cultural isolation, but rather harbor multiple and conflicting cultures born of cultural immersion (Harding, 2007). Indeed, those in low-income neighborhoods often display more cultural complexity given the greater occupational diversity of disadvantaged neighborhoods, their relatively low levels of social control, and widespread exposure to popular media (Harding, 2007). Complexity, in turn, has important implications for behavior. In neighborhoods with more heterogeneous cultures, individuals are less likely to act in accord with dominant cultural scripts, but this reflects being exposed to alternative goals and having less information about how to pursue any one of them rather than being exposed to a single oppositional culture that dominates all other aspirations (Harding, 2011). Of course, there are numerous factors that might lead to a gap between ambitions and attainments, including blocked opportunity, but the idea of cultural complexity implicates psychological factors and, in so doing, “incorporates greater individual agency than a subcultural model, in which action is determined by group membership” (Harding, 2011 p. 15).

The idea of cultural complexity is part of a larger trend. A number of sociologists have returned to discussing the role of culture in poverty, albeit in new ways that are psychologically more sophisticated and permit more explanatory power. Young (2010), for instance, discusses how poor African American men frame their circumstances and, in so doing, illustrates a disjuncture between values and expectations. Young finds that although these men aspire to a college education and value schooling, they lack the cultural tools to make those goals a reality. Anderson (2011), meanwhile, shows how African Americans are able to switch fluidly between cultural modes depending on how cosmopolitan an environment is, thereby upending conventional notions of subculture. Similarly, Edin and Kefalas (2005) show how poor single mothers value a traditional family and interpret their situation in ways that preserve those values, even when attaining a traditional family is not a possibility. Studies of this sort share a concern with articulating a more complete understanding of the worldviews of the underclass. In this sense, they embrace the psychological principle and show the many dimensions of their subjects’ worldviews. But apart from illustrating the complexity of culture, this research has generally not explored under what circumstances one culture dominates another (Lamont & Small, 2008), a departure from the progression of psychological social psychology and an unfortunate omission. For sociology, then, there are several remaining challenges to understanding the role of culture in behavior.

Challenges of a Cultural Explanation for Behavior

The first stems from the distinction between individuals and groups. Much of sociology is interested in explaining group differences using individual-level data. Yet differences observed at the group level are not reducible to individual differences and, for this reason, concepts that are coherent at the level

of nations can become less relevant for understanding differences between individuals. Using standard measures of social orientation, for instance, it is possible to characterize some nations as more individualistic than others, but within nations the correlations among these items are often negligible (Na et al., 2010). This result is not anomalous: it will emerge whenever groups and individuals are influenced by different factors. This result is also consistent with the claim that culture per se should be distinguished from the psychological attributes of individuals within that culture. Individuals are flexible to the demands of the situation and need not act in a culturally-consistent fashion if the situation does not demand it (Zou et al., 2009). This presents a challenge for those interested in traversing levels. SSP focuses on macro-to-micro linkages and, thus, is often concerned with between-nation differences premised on macro-economic forces, but moving between levels requires a better understanding of the demands made on the individual and, for this purpose, concepts useful at one level need not be useful at another. A fully integrated model will be more than the sum of its parts.

A second related challenge is how to balance structure, culture, and personality as explanations for disadvantage. Cultural arguments have historically been met with resistance, but there are a number of examples of researchers taking both culture and structure seriously and using them in constructive ways. Some research begins with the relatively simple question of mediation. In this vein, some argue that personality contributes to earnings and, further, that it contributes to the intergenerational transmission of economic status. Groves (2005), for instance, finds that perceived control reflects a high socioeconomic background and contributes partially (just over 10 %) to the intergenerational transmission of earnings (see also Bowles, Gintis, & Osborne, 2001a, 2001b). Less concerned with additive mediation, other studies argue that cultural factors play a role in how structural interventions are utilized. In a study of neighborhood development, for instance, Small (2004) finds that some community residents are reluctant to participate in community development efforts because of how they perceive the neighborhood. In a similar vein, Wilson (2010) argues that culture shapes how African Americans respond to structural disadvantages and, for this reason, he recommends “composite” policies that redress structural disadvantages and culture simultaneously. Mediation and moderation remain useful concepts, but research should be mindful of how one concept need not supersede the other.

A third challenge is in interpreting the influence of culture correctly. An appropriately balanced perspective discourages scholars from making normative claims about the influence of culture. If culture has complex effects, cultural influences are unlikely to be effective under all circumstances for all individuals and seemingly counterproductive behaviors can be interpreted in light of their coherent cultural significance. In this way, cultural research serves an important sensitizing function. An illustration of the complex relationship between structure and culture is provided in *Lone Pursuit* (Smith, 2007), wherein Smith documents how individualism—ordinarily a valued cultural style in the United States—discourages African Americans from seeking assistance from friends, despite the importance of social networks for finding employment. A similar example can be found in research on cross-cultural differences in emotional support. Although social support is demonstrably important for well-being, Asian Americans seek less social support than European Americans because of their fear of disrupting group harmony (Kim, Sherman, & Taylor, 2008). Appreciating cultural complexity deepens our interpretations in other ways as well. The early work of SSP researchers reinforced the idea that structural disadvantages produce docile and conformist workers, one of the many “hidden injuries” of class (Sennett & Cobb, 1973). Yet embracing the interests of others need not imply conformity, just as free choice need not reveal agency. If working-class people “conform” in order to maintain relationships, one interpretation is that conformity is an intentional survival strategy and not a habitual reaction. Research is increasingly sensitive to issues of interpretation, albeit not always in ways that encourage further empirical research. When Lamont describes the “dignity” of the working class, for example, she is partly calling for a more nuanced appreciation of an interdependent world-view. Similarly, Lareau (2002) argues that concerted cultivation, although valuable for attainment within dominant institutions, is not intrinsically desirable and can produce negative psychological

outcomes for the individual (p. 774). On the flip side, Ehrenreich (1989) argues that if middle-class people appear to conform less than working-class people, it may be as much out of status anxiety as a tactic for socioeconomic advancement. Casting these insights in psychological terms will make them available for further empirical exploration.

The fourth and perhaps biggest challenge is providing convincing evidence that culture and personality truly matter for behavior, especially in an observational setting. One legacy of early SSP research is the still common idea that culture is difficult to change and, therefore, unimportant as a policy lever. This idea has been expressed in many ways, to the point that it is perhaps interpreted as fact rather than intuition. Lamont and Small (2008) assert, “of course, culture cannot be easily manipulated or changed through policies” (p. 93). Other research implies much the same when it discusses the crystallization of psychological dispositions into cultural practices over consecutive generations (Wilson, 2010, esp. p. 211). Still other research suggests that culture becomes hardwired at the level of neural pathways, effectively creating habits out of practices (Kitayama & Uskul, 2011). If culture appears less powerful than structure, it is at least partly due to the difficulty of envisioning any factor that might alter it. Complicating matters further are the many contingencies between culture and behavior, noted especially by critics of Inkeles and Kohn. With so many complicating and limiting factors, why should we expect culture to change, and even if it does, why should we expect it to matter?

Yet research has shown that seemingly small interventions aimed exclusively at psychological factors can result in lasting changes in behavior. In this vein, Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, and Master (2006) demonstrate that a brief social psychological intervention designed to improve minority students’ sense of personal adequacy can lead to a large decline in the racial gap in academic achievement. In a randomized field experiment, students were asked to indicate their most important values and write for approximately 15 min about why those values were significant to them. A control group was asked to indicate their least important values and write about why those values might be important to someone else, thereby engaging in a parallel but less self-relevant task. Apart from the writing exercise, no changes were made in the quality of the instruction or in other features of the classroom. Despite this focus, the effects of the writing exercise were not small: among the intervention group, the racial gap in achievement declined by 40 %. Furthermore, the effects were pervasive and long-lasting: they were apparent even in already high-achieving students and applied both to end-of-the-semester grades and a follow-up conducted 2 years later (Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, Apfel, & Brzustoski, 2009). This study is not the only one of its kind. Indeed, a number of previous studies have found effects of a similar magnitude across diverse outcomes based on other psychological interventions, targeting, for example, how individuals explain their poor performance or whether individuals feel socially connected with others (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Steele, 2010; Wilson, 2006; Wilson & Linville, 1985). For example, a values affirmation intervention directed at the gender gap in college science moved the modal grade among women from the C to B range (Miyake et al., 2010).

In light of these studies, social psychologists conclude that it can be as important to change how individuals construe their environment as it is to change the environment itself (Wilson, 2006). This interpretation departs considerably from much of sociology, where the person recedes in significance relative to the situation. In sociology, for example, it is common to emphasize the mutually reinforcing nature of inequality, as when studies exploring racial inequality highlight reciprocal pathways between segregation, identity, and behavior (Bobo & Suh, 2000; Massey, 2007). Yet the results of these experiments are not as fanciful as they might seem insofar as the many connections sociologists elaborate in services of a fundamentally structural model can imply instability as much as persistence. As Cohen and colleagues (2006) note, psychological changes can lead to a cascade of other changes if the environment and psychology are closely intertwined. The normal school environment, for instance, can spark a negative recursive cycle wherein poor performance and psychological threats feed off one another and lead to worsening performance over time (p. 1309). But, assuming all the other ingredients necessary for achievement are in place, a simple psychological boost may be the last piece necessary to set a more positive process in motion. Similar results have been found in

observational research, when, for example, Correll (2001, 2004) demonstrates the importance of negatively biased self-assessments, net of abilities, in explaining gender differences in career choice. They are also implicit in research documenting how individuals use, manipulate, and transform culture in ways that change social roles (Callero, 1994). Armed with the right psychological attributes and tools, individuals can sometimes overcome structure.

Although studies demonstrating the power of psychological factors may be contrary to received wisdom, they in fact reflect an old idea from an earlier and more interdisciplinary era. In an article published in the *American Journal of Sociology* in the early twentieth century, the psychologist Kurt Lewin (1939) argued that behavior is the result of many factors operating within a field, not all of which are operating in the same direction. In such a tension system, as he phrased it, seemingly small interventions can tip behavior in dramatically different directions. The challenge for social scientists was to “represent the structure of the total situation and the distribution of forces in it” (p. 868). To this end, Lewin encouraged a rebalancing of sorts, urging social scientists, who at the time were disproportionately focused on psychological influences, to pay more attention to social and environment influences. Times have changed, but the trend is cyclical. In no small part because of the efforts of sociology, the total field may be better characterized today than it was then, but further understanding the social system requires a renewed appreciation of psychological and cultural influences.

Methodological Requirements of SSP

The methodological challenges of reengaging with the principles of SSP are many, but not insurmountable. Contemporary social psychology has revealed the subtlety of the environment, the swift dynamics of psychological change, and the importance of multiple simultaneous psychological processes, all of which demand a great deal of data collection enterprises. In effect, SSP routinely demands more than we have already. Nevertheless, it also establishes some priorities. First, SSP encourages the inclusion of psychological instruments in social surveys, including but not limited to measures of personality. This, in itself, is a growing challenge given the difficulties of funding ongoing social surveys that are sufficiently tailored to satisfy the interests of their multiple stakeholders. Social psychological influences are rarely a focus of contemporary large-scale efforts, as they might have been in earlier data collection efforts steeped in the SSP tradition, such as Americans’ Changing Lives (House, 2010). Yet if the explanation of behavior is the goal, it will be difficult to achieve without making some explicit allowance for psychological influences and, moreover, making such influences available for empirical exploration.

Second, social structure and personality encourages researchers to be mindful of the scope and level of their studies. The eclipse of psychological influences is at least partly a result of how disciplines have evolved. The influence of SSP was strongest when it was able to demonstrate the relevance of insights derived from experiments using nationally-representative surveys, thereby providing an empirically compelling link between micro and macro processes (House, 2008). The risk of the current environment is that methodological practices and habits have artificially segregated these processes and created a divide. When, for example, the exploration of psychological influences is largely the province of experiments, while the exploration of macro-level influences is largely the province of surveys, the apparent relevance of psychological influences can artificially recede to the background insofar as their scope appears narrow (e.g., effects on students in a particular classroom). Preventing this means framing experiments in an appropriate macro-historical-cultural context, while encouraging macro-level research to explicitly state its implied psychological model for human behavior.

The empirical challenges of social structure and personality have grown even sharper as social science has turned to an emphasis on identifying causal effects. There is no doubt social scientists often make real or implied causal statements in absence of compelling evidence for them. With growing

concern over the rigor of social scientific research designs, micro economics has emerged as a vanguard discipline, in part because of its long-standing interest with identifying effects and its mature tradition of utilizing natural experiments. The statistical tools of micro economics are, thus, well-suited to the needs of contemporary policy and, in this context, the focus of SSP might appear limiting. SSP is perhaps seen as overly-concerned with psychological processes, often apart from any of their behavioral consequences; the surveys regularly used by SSP researchers are often ill-suited to addressing causal effects, even when they are longitudinal; and, whether warranted or not, personality itself is often seen as only weakly compatible with the levers policy-makers have at their disposal. Yet the pursuit of causal effects can be limiting in its own right. Designs that are especially good at identifying effects are often ill-suited to identifying mechanisms. We might find, for example, that education has a causal effect on wages, but answering that question in a satisfactory fashion almost never says anything about what schooling actually does to increase wages. Similarly, the strength of economics draws, in part, from the pedestal upon which it rests. Much of micro-economic theory is premised on rational choice. In recent years, a great deal of attention has been focused on how economists can address departures from rationality, based on work that translated social psychological insights into formal economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Social psychology has much more to offer, especially with respect to the values and motives behind human behavior, and identifying the limits of rational choice is only one way in which to demonstrate the importance of human cognition. For SSP, the challenge is to cast its insights in ways that will compel other disciplines to appreciate its relevance.

Conclusion

The status of SSP as a framework for guiding research remains marginal, but the conditions for a robust recovery are perhaps in place. Sociologists are increasingly interested in the relationship between culture and behavior, as well as how individuals understand and frame their environments. A new generation of scholars is conceiving of culture in new ways and discussing its explanatory power in a more complex fashion (Small, Harding, & Lamont, 2010). At the same time, sociology has shown a growing appreciation for the complexity of both the environment and culture. In contrast to efforts to study specific aspects of society in relation to specific aspects of personality, a critique raised by House (1981), recent efforts have been much larger in scope, assessing how individuals are exposed to multiple cultures simultaneously and how different features of personality relate to each other. These efforts perhaps fall short of the full theory of personality, as demanded by Inkeles, but they point to the growing depth and sophistication of the debate.

There is a historical irony to the trajectory of SSP. Following a period of crude research on cross-cultural differences and the development of the culture of poverty thesis, SSP emerged to provide a stronger empirical foundation for cross-national research and a more complete understanding of the structural influences that shape psychology. Over time, however, sociology moved in a more structural direction and the apparent need for SSP declined as the relevance of psychology was seemingly obviated. Things are different now. Sociologists are reengaging questions of culture and personality and turning to social psychology to understand how environments affect individuals. SSP remains on the periphery on the discipline, but sociologists would benefit from moving it closer to the core. The interests of SSP have perhaps been central to the discipline all along.

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Part II

Development and Socialization

Chapter 5

Socialization in Childhood and Adolescence

Lara Perez-Felkner

Introduction

Societies are shared communities with complex codes and organizational structures. *Socialization* is the process by which individuals adapt to and internalize the norms, values, customs, and behaviors of a shared social group (see Lutfey & Mortimer, 2006; Parsons, 1951). The degree to which children learn how to participate and be accepted by society has important consequences for their development and future lives.

Importantly, the social codes that children and adolescents learn are specific not only to nation-states and regions of the globe, but also to historical periods and social groups within larger societies. The sociohistorical context is a critical dimension of the socialization of children and adolescents, both with respect to their status within society (as compared to adults) as well as their social roles. For instance, gender and race have become less restrictive social categories in the past 50 years. However, these social categories are still associated with different social norms and expectations, particularly around schooling and careers. It is also vital to consider that individuals in the same ‘society’ do not necessarily share a sense of belonging to the dominant culture within that group. While studies of socialization theory tend to emphasize the influence of ‘broader society,’ individuals often experience simultaneous socialization pressures from both the dominant culture as well as marginalized subcultures. Notably, research has documented the socializing influence of adolescent peer cultures – and of their parent cultures – in reproducing social class and other social divisions (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1976; Willis, 1977).

This chapter examines the mechanisms and consequences of socialization in childhood and adolescence. The first section reviews socialization theory over the life course. The second section reviews methods of research inquiry relevant to studies of socialization. Third, the contexts of socialization are explained, moving from the most proximal to the child to the farthest removed. Next, socialization is examined in relation to its influence on socialization on later experiences, including identity development, behavior, and education. Finally, directions for new research are discussed.

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Socialization Theory

Theorizing Childhood and Adolescence

Theories of socialization have alternately framed children as being passive recipients of socializing messages or active agents engaged in the process of adapting to society (Corsaro, 2011). Passive socialization theories depict a malleable child who can be molded to fit society. In Bronfenbrenner's ecological model (1977), individuals develop through the process of accommodation to their environmental contexts, specifically concentric rings of influence, from family to neighborhoods and schools, to cultural forces. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) similarly presents individual socialization as a process by which individuals are influenced by the class-specific cultural milieu in which they are being reared: the tastes and ways of speaking and acting that represent their *habitus*. In Bourdieu's model, these class-specific preferences and behaviors signify social class to others and in turn serve as a mechanism for reinforcing rigidly stratified social status categories in certain societies, a phenomenon known as *social reproduction* (Bourdieu, 2000; see also Chin & Phillips, 2004). In that vein, Michel Foucault (1979) typically depicted socialization as a disciplining process originating from a seemingly invisible power structure transmitting norm-enforcing pressures which appear to permeate society and restrict individuals' agency. Even Foucault acknowledges that individuals are not mere objects shaped by society however, but rather can enact their own subjectivities (Foucault, Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, 1988).


How Socialization Occurs

Theoretical and empirical work has shown that socialization happens during interactions between young people and their environments (e.g., Handel, Cahill, & Elkin, 2007; LeVine, 2003; Strayer & Santos, 1996). Bronfenbrenner's *ecological systems theory* of human development (1979) frames the child inside a series of concentric circles that represent different contexts of socialization. Figure 5.1 summarizes his model. Society influences the child through the most immediate contexts in which the child is present (*microsystem*) – the family, siblings, peer groups, and classrooms; the contexts in which the microsystems meet (*mesosystem*) – e.g., parent-teacher relationships, parents' work environments, and extended family networks; the community context (*exosystem*) – e.g., schools, neighborhoods, local media, local government; and the broader sociocultural context (*macrosystem*).

How children interpret these developmental contexts has been the focus of studies of children's social learning. Learning theories have been developed to explain how children develop knowledge about the world, including the social world (e.g., Bandura, 1977). Extensive theoretical and empirical work has established that children learn through play, not only cognitive skills, but social skills as well. More specifically, play is a space for children to try on social roles and develop social meanings whether through free play, games, or interactions with others (see Denzin, 2009, pp. 142–169; Lancy, Bock, & Gaskins, 2011).

While there may be certain universal processes in human development, such as play, cultures influence how children and adolescents learn about their world and make their place in it (Rogoff, 2003). Play appears to operate similarly among children from both dominant and non-dominant cultures and around the globe; however, studies of children's play have uncovered nuanced differences in how children's play is structured (Long, 2007). For example, the use of emotion appears more restrained in the pretend play of children in Yucatec Maya families than in that of middle-class U.S. families (Gaskins & Miller, 2009). Children's social learning through play can occur in relations with other children or adults (e.g., parents). In traditional societies however, children seem to more commonly participate in play with peers than with parental caregivers (Lancy, 2007). Notably, because middle class children in industrialized societies less commonly participate in practical activities (including

Fig. 5.1 Bronfenbrenner's model of human development (1979) (Note: Created by Perez-Felkner for this volume)



work) than do children in other societies and less advantaged socioeconomic groups, learning through play takes on a more central role in the socialization process.

Symbolic interaction theory emphasizes the importance of how individuals interpret their social worlds over the direct message inputs they receive from (adult) society (G. H. Mead, 1934; Weber, 1968). For George Herbert Mead and other scholars in this tradition, individuals engage in everyday processes of meaning-making, developing their interpretations of symbols through communication with other social actors (Blumer, 1986). Stated more plainly, individuals try on social roles that are familiar to them, comparing themselves to a 'generalized other' that serves as a symbol of society and its norms and expectations (G. H. Mead). Children regularly engage in socialization activities as well, as they play. In so doing, children learn to interpret these social systems and accordingly develop their sense of self through the process of interpreting social roles.

Socialization Over the Life Course

Some scholars distinguish socialization by when it occurs during the life course (e.g., Handel et al., 2007). *Primary socialization* occurs in childhood (generally, the span between birth and puberty). Socialization does not cease at a fixed age however, but rather continues over one's lifetime. This later socialization has been referred to as *secondary socialization* because it may be less influential than that which occurs during childhood.

Stage Theories

Early theories of human development framed childhood and adolescence as distinct stages of life, with distinct challenges and goals to complete on the linear path from infancy to old age. Particularly well known examples are Sigmund Freud's psychosexual stage theory, Erik Erikson's psychosocial stages of development, and Jean Piaget's stages of cognitive development. These stage theories tend to be closely associated with biological time and depict normative patterns of development.

Freud (2009 [1915]) *psychosexual stage development theory* emerged from his clinical case studies. He presents a series of developmental stages in which children encounter challenges – or fixations – that have to be overcome in order to progress to the next stage and a healthy adulthood more generally. Freud's stages begin with the oral stage in infancy and continue through the anal (1–3 years), phallic (3–6 years), latency (6 to puberty), and genital stages (puberty onward). Unresolved fixations in these stages were presumed to contribute to personality psychoses, such as dependency on others for those not resolving the oral stage and cleanliness and control for those not resolving anal stage. Freud's theory has received both methodological and feminist critiques over the years (most notably, focused on Freud's depiction of the phallic stage), but it remains alive in our scientific and cultural consciousness. Subsequent stage theories build upon Freud's model.

Erikson (1950) posits eight psychosocial stages of development, or ages of man, borrowing some of Freud's language but focusing more closely on how individuals relate to themselves versus others in their world. These stages are presented in terms of conflicts and questions. *The psychosocial stages of development* begin with (1) basic trust vs. basic mistrust (infancy) and move through (2) autonomy vs. shame and doubt (early childhood), (3) initiative vs. guilt, (4) industry vs. inferiority (school age), (5) identity vs. role confusion (puberty and adolescence), (6) intimacy vs. isolation (young adulthood), (7) generativity vs. stagnation (mature adulthood), and (8) ego integrity vs. despair (later life). This conceptualization closely examines adult development as well as development in childhood. Erikson considers generativity, if achieved, a particularly important turning point in which individuals focus attention on others by training – and socializing – the next generation, and caring for others more generally. The emphasis – as in Freud's model – is on how development comprises a series of challenges and tasks that need to be resolved in order to transition into a healthy adulthood.

Three other stage theories of human development bear mention here, focusing on cognitive and moral development. Piaget (2000) conducted experiments with children and adolescents to investigate their cognitive development. He presents the following *stages of cognitive development*: (1) sensorimotor, in which infants and toddlers explore the world, primarily from an egocentric perspective; (2) the preoperational stage, in which young children further develop motor skills and begin to weaken their egocentric focus; (3) concrete operational stage, in which children develop logic but cannot yet reason abstractly; and (4) formal operational stage, in which older children and adolescents can think abstractly and from a non-egocentric perspective. Kohlberg (1969) expanded on Piaget's notions of egocentric and non-egocentric reasoning in his theory of moral development, emphasizing the development of moral reasoning. Based on his studies of how boys respond to morally ambiguous problems,¹ his six stages of moral development explain how children initially rely on caregiver's moral authority, gradually learn and internalize their societies' norms and values, and may eventually develop their own independent moral compass. Kohlberg concludes that about ¼ of the population does not reach this highest (sixth) level of moral reasoning, and women in particular tended not to be in that most morally sophisticated grouping. In response, Gilligan (1977) critiqued Kohlberg and his predecessors' theories, claiming that they fail to correctly interpret gendered differences in females' response to moral dilemmas. She charged that Freud and Kohlberg miss the mark in concluding that women have a weaker sense of morality; rather, the previous theorists did not capture the importance of care in their instruments, a central dimension of women's moral reasoning. This controversy illustrates the importance of carefully examining gender and other group-level variation in social development and in the outcomes of socialization.

¹For instance, in one scenario known as the Heinz scenario, respondents are presented with the case of a financially-strapped husband who can save his terminally ill wife by stealing an expensive drug. They are asked to offer their responses to whether he should pursue the criminal option and how police and justices should respond to his potential crime, and to explain their reasoning.

Overall, these stage theories contribute to our understanding of how children interact with the social world in their development, over the early and later life course. These conceptualizations also have recognized shortcomings however. While highly cited and frequently taught in university classrooms, they have each received notable methodological critiques, primarily centered on research design issues (e.g., Freud's convenience - based clinical samples and Kohlberg's cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data). Moreover, in presenting development as a linear and sequential process attached to specific ages, these theories simplify the variation that occurs across even healthy and normal young people with respect to their completion of these stages. Furthermore, individuals' social development may correspond to biological life changes such as physical maturation, but comparative research reveals how social development is also specific to cultural and socio-historical contexts.

Socio-Historical Time

Social expectations for children and adolescents are not universal and are subject to change. The social and cultural contexts in which individuals are reared can have important consequences for shaping a generation of youth (Mannheim, 1952). Social change can alter age norms, relations between age groups, and the boundaries of life stages such as childhood, adolescence, and old age (Neugarten, 1974). Life course sociologists such as Elder and Neugarten have argued for the importance of examining cohorts as units of analysis, as they experience a specific configuration of socio-historical conditions that influence the timing of their life transitions (e.g., wars, recessions, social revolutions) and take into account shifts in the ideal normative life timelines (e.g., Elder, 1975; Neugarten & Danan, 1996; Neugarten & Hagestad, 1976). Human development is neither one-dimensional nor one-directional, nor does it have fixed ends (Settersten, 2003). While socialization theory and research crosses age categories, it can be helpful to consider socialization processes in children and adolescence separately to unpack distinctions.

Children

How societies view children has varied over time, both within and across cultures. It has been argued that in the West, perspectives on childhood can be divided into three major historical periods: the premodern period, which focused on preparation for adulthood (through the mid-1700s); the modern period in which childhood and adolescence gained societal attention (through the 1940s), and post-modern period in which children and youth were identified as consumers with their own cultures and desires independent of adults (Mintz, 2004).

Ariès (1965) famously argued that in Europe, outside of the aristocracy, childhood did not emerge as a social category whose members were to be coddled, morally trained, or defended until after the Middle Ages. Recent historical studies of childhood, however, have challenged the notion that children were not held in high regard (Hanawalt, 1995; Pollock, 1983). While historians may dispute whether childhood was a socially valued category prior to modern times, it does seem clear that children were considered economically valuable commodities. Industrialization and urbanization fostered social changes that shifted how adults viewed children, who were not yet mandated to attend extensive years of schooling, but rather tended to be conscripted into economic labor in homes, farms, shops, and factories (Kett, 1977; Modell & Goodman, 1990). Since then, children have increasingly occupied the more protected role of the object of adults' sentimental attention and economic consumption in democratic societies (Zelizer, 1994).

Post-modern concerns over children's well-being and protection have fostered greater attention to children's rights around the globe (e.g., Rosen, 2007). Recent research has particularly focused on the impacts of public health crises, poverty, and violent conflict on the lives of children. For example, the

HIV/AIDS crisis in southern African nations such as Botswana has fostered conflicting spheres of socialization for orphans being reared in part in western non-governmental organizations with different norms for children's behavior than those typical in Botswana families (Dahl, 2009).

Recently, a 'new' sociology of childhood has emerged. This scholarship aims to elevate the status of research on childhood. 'New' childhood scholars argue that children are agentic beings and should be framed as such in research (King, 2007; Pufall & Unsworth, 2004). More specifically, this literature breaks from a focus on how children are socialized into future adults, focusing on childhood as a topic worthy of serious study, not merely as a stage on the path to adulthood (see James, Jenks, & Prout, 2005; Matthews, 2007). This shift in how children are theorized in research characterizes childhood as a socially constructed category that is understood differently over time (Handel et al., 2007, pp. 17–18).

Adolescence

Perspectives on the stage known as adolescence have similarly varied historically and socially. While cultures near-universally recognize and mark the shift from child to adult, this transition into a liminal space outside of these more defined categories may be confined to rites of passage (see Turner, 1969; van Gennep, 1961) or alternatively occur over protracted periods lasting years, known as the stage of 'adolescence' (see E. E. Erikson, 1950; G. S. Hall, 1904). Adolescence was first identified by G. Stanley Hall, who characterized young people in this stage as experiencing emotional, behavioral, and physiological upheaval as they experience the biological transition from childhood to adulthood (i.e., puberty).

This experience of storm and stress was argued to be less prevalent in traditional societies like that of Samoa, in which adolescents were less socially and sexually regulated than their contemporary peers in the U.S. and northern Europe (M. Mead, 1928). The level of stress experienced during adolescent years seems to be influenced by the social and historical contexts of human development. Adolescence as a phenomenon emerged after industrialization and an elongated span of compulsory schooling began to cluster young people together in urban areas. With growing independence from their families, young people were left increasingly free to engage in political revolutions, crime and deviance, and loosen their sexual mores (Kett, 1977). However, globalization has influenced social changes in the life course across nations, such that adolescence as a stage of life is increasingly being experienced by young people outside of the West (Larson & Wilson, 2004; Shanahan, 2000).

The transition to adulthood tends to be marked by a time (e.g., a few weeks or a few years) spent primarily with same-gender age-mates, under the guardianship of select same-gender adults who mentor youth about the coming adult stage of life (van Gennep, 1961). A physical ritual such as circumcision or face markings might mark the end of childhood, with adults bearing physical markers of their adult status. Rites of passage also accompany the path to adulthood in Western societies (e.g., school graduations and religious rites such as the bar/bat Mitzvah and Confirmation), but these ceremonies do not signify a final transition to adulthood. Rather, in Western societies, each of these rites serves as one of a number of milestones along the way that young people may experience, such as: a first paycheck; certification to drive a car; a coming-out (debutante, Quinceañera, or Sweet 16) party; first intercourse; leaving the family to enlist in the military or enroll in college; and marriage. The duration of adolescence varies across cultures as well as with socio-historical change.

Social change and the transition to adulthood

Developmental tasks that seem normative in our society at the present can shift in response to large-scale social changes. Keniston and Cottle (1972) argued that extended education, labor changes, and the emergence of a generation gap in social values fostered a new stage of life in between adolescence

and adulthood, which they called ‘youth.’ This stage is exemplified by waiting to get married, remaining in school, and not settling into a permanent job. They characterized this as a ‘stretched’ or ‘protracted adolescence’ (p. 634), during which youth may experience estrangement or alienation from the larger society. About 30 years later, a similar pattern of behavior was identified and labeled ‘emerging adulthood,’ whereby education and labor norms again are associated with delayed marriage, childbearing, and commitment to a career (Arnett, 2000). It remains unclear whether these patterns are normative or cyclical, and to what degree this behavior is being spread across the middle and upper-middle classes of the world’s youth (e.g., Larson & Wilson, 2004; Liechty, 2003).

It is certain however that ‘normal’ adolescence and transition to adulthood vary across social time, across subgroups, and across cultures (Schoon, McCulloch, Joshi, Wiggins, & Bynner, 2001; Shanahan, 2000). Social and economic conditions can change normative patterns in young people’s transitions from childhood to adulthood. Societal challenges such as poverty and violence can constrain youths’ ability to develop independence and meet traditional age markers, disrupting the possibility of occupying traditional adult roles (Cole, 2011). Meanwhile, the introduction of global capitalism can similarly alter traditional norms for youth and foster rejection of traditional lifestyles in favor of desires for Western-influenced status items: from styles of dress to educational and career attainment (Liechty, 2003).

Economic and societal changes can disrupt normative pathways to adulthood (e.g., Cole, 2005). For example, departure from the family home – and other such markers of adulthood – can be shaped not only by age norms but also by economic shifts (Billari & Liefbroer, 2007; Settersten, 1998). Indeed, norms and pressures on the timing of departure from the family home have been found to be culturally- and historically-specific (Holdsworth, 2000). For this and other reasons, it is especially important to use careful and rigorous methods to understand the development of young people, and how various forces in their lives socially influence their development.

Methods of Inquiry for Studying Young People

This section summarizes the most common methods for studying children and adolescence and explores the ethical and logistical challenges of conducting careful and meaningful studies of young people. In line with the new sociology of childhood, scholars are increasingly designing their research to glean children’s perspectives and voices (e.g., Hagerman, 2010; Winkler, 2010). Most of these studies are primarily ethnographic and/or interview-based in nature (e.g., Corsaro, 2003). Nevertheless, this concern with more accurately representing children in research can extend across methodological designs (see C. D. Clark, 2010), and will likely have consequences on the use and design of even those traditionally more restrictive methodological approaches, including survey questionnaires.

Experiments

The classic scientific technique, experiments compare two or more groups of children with matched characteristics that differ on the experimental treatment condition (e.g., salience of gender in a test-taking setting). Experiments usually occur in laboratory settings, but circumstances sometimes allow for natural experiments. For example, two neighboring school districts with similar demographic characteristics have different levels of exposure to an educational policy (e.g., a mandate that students complete 4 years of high school mathematics). Comparing students from these districts (or comparing students in the same schools before and after the policy goes into effect) would constitute a natural experiment.

Notably, innovations in statistical analysis have opened the door to ‘quasi-experimental’ designs which manipulate secondary data to approximate experimental scenarios, and suggest causal pathways (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001). Experimental methods in laboratory settings have facilitated seminal research on children’s social development (e.g., K. B. Clark & Clark, 1939). Experimental methods in natural settings may be impractical or logistically challenging for researchers to conduct, sometimes because of limited resources and other times because of ethical considerations (e.g., offering beneficial programs to one group but not another). For these and other reasons, many researchers use alternative methods for their research.

Survey Methods

Survey methods continue to be a primary method of data collection and analysis for the study of socialization among children and adolescents, even for the study of young children. These quantitative methods may focus on select populations, such as the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) (Portes & Rumbaut, 2012). Alternatively, they may aim to represent a snapshot of a nation’s youth. These studies may follow cohorts of young people over time. Studies focused on early childhood may start from birth or earlier, as with the National Children’s Study (NCS, following children from birth through age 21) and the Early Childhood Longitudinal Program (ECLS, following children from birth through kindergarten and kindergarten through fifth grade). Other studies might focus on adolescence (e.g., Childhood and Beyond (CAB)) or transitions from adolescence to adulthood (e.g., the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS)).

Most studies of young children tend to rely on responses from caregivers rather than from the child directly. There are multiple reasons for this. In addition to concerns about ethics in research on young children, survey methods need to be carefully tailored to children’s comprehension level. One recent research methodology paper uses Piaget’s stages as a guide, explaining that young (preoperational) children’s ongoing cognitive and language development necessitate simple and careful wording that corresponds to words and expressions children use, limits problems of literal interpretation of questions, limits suggestibility, and holds their attention (Borgers, de Leeuw, & Hox, 2000). These ideas are echoed in a recent paper on child computer interaction (CCI) describing successful survey techniques that are ‘fun, fast, and fair’, based on analyses of studies using ‘The Fun Toolkit’ aimed at children age four and older which assesses children’s opinions using a smiley face scale and a picture-oriented rating of the level of fun of an activity and whether they would like to do the activity again (Read, 2008). The simplicity of the fun toolkit questions suggests the limited nature of the responses one can glean from surveys in which young children are the responses. There is also the issue of potential bias inherent in using smiley faces and ‘fun’ ratings to evaluate children’s emotional states (see also Read, 2008, p. 127). Nevertheless, there is certainly value in being able to quantitatively evaluate children’s responses, perhaps in conjunction with responses from caregivers and teachers, and potential for the growth of child-friendly survey methods.

There are certain advantages to the use of survey methodology in research on childhood and adolescence. Surveys are a tool aimed at efficiently collecting comparable data of a sample representative of a subset of the population, or even the population itself, as is found in census data. Because the data from many of these major studies are widely available and the items are considered reliable, extensive research on childhood and adolescence has utilized this information. Such research has furthered our understandings of patterns of socialization and their outcomes, such as how socially-influenced subjective experiences can influence female and male adolescents’ educational and career attainment (Perez-Felkner, McDonald, Schneider, & Grogan, 2012).

This method also presents limitations. Sample selection, item design, and nonresponse biases are common challenges that need to be considered carefully by researchers engaged in primary or secondary survey data analysis (see Fowler, 2009). Additionally, because closed-coded questionnaire items are

intended to be generalizable, the range of responses and interpretations that can be gleaned from these items is severely restricted. Furthermore, respondents from different cultures, social class backgrounds, and ethnicities can often have different understandings of the question resulting in significantly different tendencies in their responses. This may speak more to biases inherent in how the question is interpreted than in true differences across social groups (see Wang, Willett, & Eccles, 2011).

On a final note, surveys observe individual respondents at one moment in time, but the feelings and friend groups of children and adolescents vary even over short windows of observation, depending on their context. The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is one means of addressing this limitation. This method probes students for responses in real-time eight times per day over a 1–2 week period in different settings, often using a mobile electronic device (see Csíkszentmihályi & Larson, 1987), and has been used effectively in studies of adolescent development (e.g., Schneider, 1997). Additionally, the internet has expanded opportunities to conduct surveys capturing young people's experiences.

Ethnographic and Observation Research

Scholars interested in capturing the cultures and voices of adolescents often use observation research, including participant observation or ethnography. Pure observation studies may use video or audio recordings to observe and then code the behaviors of children, for example, in interaction with their caregivers and with other children. For example, scholars looking to improve the quality of data on children's aggressive behavior during school recess installed wireless microphones and video cameras to observe aggressive and non-aggressive children on the school playground (Pepler & Craig, 1995). Observation studies can occur in laboratories or natural settings, with groups or mother-child dyads (e.g., Morris et al., 2011; Strayer & Santos, 1996). Observation studies can also follow children over time, for example over a school year (Meyer, Cash, & Mashburn, 2011; Plank, 2000). Some observation researchers employ quantitative methods to assess their observation data (see P. R. Martin & Bateson, 1993). Bakeman and colleagues have used systematic sequential analysis to compare children's behavior over time and use behaviors at Time 1 to predict later behaviors (Bakeman & Quera, 2011).

While pure observation has its strengths, direct engagement with children and adolescents can help researchers access how children and youth construct meanings from their social worlds and yield deeper understandings of socialization processes. Clifford Geertz (1973) famously explains that simple behaviors (e.g., winks) can have complex meanings that can only be understood if the researcher also understands the culture in which that behavior occurs. Ethnographers position themselves in a research site as active participants in that setting (e.g., volunteer teachers in schools or temporary additions to a family) to gain firsthand knowledge of a specific culture as a first-hand participant (e.g., Briggs, 1970). They take copious field notes to document interactions they observe in the setting, and then code those interactions to analyze themes in the data (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). Corsaro has produced numerous ethnographic accounts of children's peer culture in pre-school classrooms in the U.S. and other countries (e.g., Italy). In these studies, he positions himself as a "friend" and is brought into children's play activities within that role (e.g., Corsaro, 2003, 2011). These methods can be used to interpret children's socialization behavior across cultures (Gaskins, Miller, & Corsaro, 1992).

Interviewing

Interview methods may be used independently or in conjunction with other methods (e.g., ethnographic studies). Interviews are intended to capture how respondents understand the world, and vary on their levels of structure and formality (see Weiss, 1994). *Informal* interviews may occur within the context of an ongoing ethnographic study. For example, Corsaro (2003) asked children questions

within the context of participant observations about how they were learning about their social roles in the context of activities with peers. Alternately, interviews may be *formal* – permission requested in advance, questions and responses audio and/or video-recorded, and responses transcribed for later analysis. Formal interviews may be more appropriate for older children and adolescents, because of the concerns raised in the above section on survey methods. It may be appropriate to the research question to interview multiple respondents at once, using a *focus group*. For example, in a study of child and youth socialization in post-conflict Mozambique, focus groups were used in the context of an ethnographic study to elicit candid responses about young people's feelings about reconciliation with those with whom they had been at war (Errante, 1999).

Interview research shares potential limitations with surveys, in that question and sample design are important factors in the quality of the data. Conversely, interview research shares some limitations with ethnographic work. The respondent is presented in relation to the interviewer, therefore the biases held by and elicited by the interviewer are important considerations in the research design (Cody, Davis, & Wilson, 2010).

Mixed Methods Research

Increasingly, scholars are using multiple methods to understand the development of children and adolescents. For example, systematic social observation from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods employed video observations of communities and longitudinal surveys of children and their families, using this data to inform our understanding of how neighborhoods influence children (Sampson, Morenoff, & Felton, 1999). A recent study triangulated multi-wave survey, interview, and participant observation data examining social dimensions of high-aspiring ethnic minority adolescents' pathways to college (Perez-Felkner, 2009). More commonly, researchers combine informal or formal interview methods with observation research, such as the Corsaro and Errante studies noted above. One notable study used interviews of schoolchildren and their parents in concert with classroom observations to learn about how families shape children's schooling experiences (Lareau, 2003). Another combined ethnographic accounts of classroom behavior with interviews to explain the emergence of student resistance in classrooms (McFarland, 2004).

Contexts of Socialization

Families

Early socialization is thought to occur primarily within the family (Grusec, 2011). Psychologists have tended to emphasize socialization within the parent-child relationship, with particular attention on mother-child dyads (e.g., Gardner, Ward, Burton, & Wilson, 2003; Spinrad et al., 2007). Extensive research, in fields ranging from psychology to anthropology, has documented how families prepare children for the social world around them. Research on emotion socialization serves as an example. Briggs' ethnographic study (1970) detailed how Inuit families train their children to learn to regulate their emotional behavior to more socially-acceptable forms – specifically in this case, prohibiting displays of anger. Recent research similarly finds that families serve as an important context for emotion socialization, across cultures (Friedlmeier, Corapci, & Cole, 2011) and within cultures, such as the United States (e.g., Hunter et al., 2011).

Importantly, families also influence their children's orientations toward education. German adolescents with parents who engaged them in discussions about school tended to have higher educational expectations and performance (Juang & Silbereisen, 2002). Parents' high expectations for their children

seem to promote high academic performance among immigrant Asian and Latino adolescents in the U.S. (Pong, Hao, & Gardner, 2005). Although the effects of parent involvement on U.S. adolescents' academic performance appear to wane over the course of high school (Muller, 1998), it does seem clear that family background – and parents' expectations in particular – promote adolescents' own educational and career expectations and later attainment (Hauser, Tsai, & Sewell, 1983).

The influence of significant others' expectations seems to vary among youth by their racial-ethnic group membership. High expectations may be more powerful when communicated by specific family members. Notably, the expectations held by Asian and Latino mothers and African American fathers seem to have weaker effects than those held by either the other parent or – for Latino and African American adolescents – those in their extended family network (Simon & Starks, 2002).² While Latino parents highly value education, research suggests that their expectations may be shaped by their child's academic performance in school (Goldenberg, Gallimore, Reese, & Garnier, 2001). This and other research demonstrate that children can influence their parents' socializing beliefs and practices (see e.g., Offer & Schneider, 2007). Families are not isolates however. Early socialization in the family functions in conjunction with other developmental contexts, such as schools and religious organizations (Bronfenbrenner, 1986; Eccles et al., 1993).

Friendships, Peer Groups, Subcultures, and Social Networks

Research on adolescence and youth has historically had a strong focus on adolescent subcultures, in particular after the youth movements of the 1960s (Clarke, Hall, Jefferson, & Roberts, 1975; Fine & Kleinman, 1979; Yinger, 1960). Examinations of the influence of friendships and peer groups on children and adolescents have a long tradition as well, and research continues to document their impact on socialization (e.g., Antonio, 2004; Crosnoe, 2000; Giordano, Cernkovich, & Holland, 2003). The nature of this influence may vary depending on the quality of the friendship and the characteristics of these friends (Hartup, 1996). During adolescence, young people often begin to affiliate with a larger peer group or 'crowd' that is associated with particular identity types, which seem to wane in importance as young people move through adolescence and develop a stronger sense of identity independent of the crowd (Brown, Eicher, & Petrie, 1986). Young people who are actively engaged in school and school activities may have more positive adjustment than those who focus their energies on acceptance by the group (Barber, Eccles, & Stone, 2001; Feldman & Matjasko, 2005).

Increasingly, researchers have highlighted the role of social networks as socializing contexts for children and adolescents (see Schneider, Ford, & Perez-Felkner, 2010). Advances in data quality, analytic tools, and theory have facilitated growth in the use of these methods to examine the structure of social ties and how these ties emerge (see Carrington, Scott, & Wasserman, 2005; see Chapter 10). This research can explain how adolescents' networks influence academic, health, and relational behavior, using the comprehensive network data available in studies such as the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health Study (AddHealth) (e.g., Frank et al., 2008; Kreager, 2004). Notably, social norms among adolescents' peer network members – their same-gender peers in particular – appears to shape high school students' decisions about course taking (and presumably) later career pathways (Frank et al.).

Parents' social networks matter as well. For instance, family caregivers meet formal caregivers in childcare centers and schools and, perhaps more interestingly, may develop social relationships among one another that can be instrumental in sharing resources and knowledge about the care of their

² Variation by social class, race-ethnicity, and gender with respect to education and careers will be discussed more extensively later in this chapter.

children. A case study of parents who use New York City area daycare centers reveals that differences in the level of opportunities for parent interaction fosters unequal access among parents to these resource gains (Small, 2009). Similarly, school parents who engage in social networks organized around surveillance of the quality of teachers' instruction appear to gain both knowledge about their child's experience in the classroom and influence over the teacher that they may be able to leverage to improve their child's position in the class (McGhee Hassrick & Schneider, 2009).

Schools, Schooling, and Work

Schools are a primary site for socialization for children and adolescents in particular, for whom relationships with individuals outside of the home gain increasing importance (Eccles & Roeser, 2011; Schneider et al., 2010). Although schooling structures can be sites in which adolescents are socialized to reproduce existing social class hierarchies (Bourdieu, 2000; Willis, 1977), they are also mechanisms for upward mobility. In particular, school social contexts have been found to be critically important sites for socialization towards schooling and career, with consequences for students' educational outcomes (Hallinan, 2006; Stanton-Salazar & Spina, 2000).

The relationships children form through school have been theorized to be instrumental in their access to resources and supports that, transmitted through these relationships, can foster the realization of academic and career goals. The quality of these relationships has proven to be an important factor in youths' academic achievement (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Crosnoe, Johnson, & Elder, 2004). Within schools, students and school staff exchange *social capital* – primarily, norms, expectations, and sanctions – to improve students' educational outcomes (Coleman, 1988). Access to these resources is complicated by racial, ethnic, and class differences which may exclude underrepresented families from building these ties with teachers and highly educated families (Carter, 2003; Lareau & Horvat, 1999; Ream, 2005).

High school students' pathways to college and careers may be particularly influenced by their teachers, peers, and other school actors (e.g., coaches, extracurricular advisors, principals, counselors). When youth perceive others' expectations of their underachievement based on their race, they may adjust their self-concepts and lower their ambitions (Eccles, Wong, & Peck, 2006; O'Connor, 1999). (See discussion of Steele's work, below.) Alternatively, should minority students perceive that these individuals care about their futures, this belief may sustain their motivation during academically and personally challenging periods in their pursuit of higher education (Perez-Felkner, 2012).

Communities and Neighborhoods

Many youth and their families are actively engaged in community- and religious-based organizations and activities which can serve as major sites for socialization (Arum, 2000). Involvement in these activities appears to promote adolescents' political, religious, and occupational identity achievement (Hardy, Pratt, Pancer, Olsen, & Lawford, 2011). Notably, Flanagan and colleagues (1998) find that participation in community service activities also appears to promote social responsibility and civic engagement. Many middle and upper class youth are exposed to these service opportunities through their religious organizations and youth groups (see Youniss, McLellan, & Yates, 1999). Civic engagement in turn is associated with positive youth development, but opportunities appear to be less available to young people from low-income and minority backgrounds who experience cumulative disadvantages at home, at school, and in their communities (Flanagan & Levine, 2010).

Although methods and theory for assessing the causal mechanisms by which neighborhoods influence children's outcomes remain underdeveloped, there is consensus that neighborhoods do matter and indeed shape children's outcomes (Ellen & Turner, 1997; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000). Neighborhoods with low levels of trust might reproduce this mistrust in children and foster behavior problems, as was found in a study of 241 African American first grade students (Caughy, Nettles, O'Campo & Lohrfink, 2006). It has been argued that social trust is lower in African American neighborhoods that are associated with high levels of crime and disorder (Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Taub, Taylor, & Dunham, 1984). Small (2002, 2007) argues that poverty is the primary driver of inequalities in disadvantaged neighborhoods, which have more limited organizations in which residents (including youth) could participate and build community (see Flanagan & Levine, 2010).³

The relative dearth of productive community spaces for youth in disadvantaged neighborhoods may contribute to greater levels of delinquency and problem behavior in those neighborhoods. Using nationally representative longitudinal data and interviews of adolescent boys in Boston, Harding (2007) argues that older neighborhood peers are a primary source of socialization for adolescent boys in disadvantaged neighborhoods, and these older boys may expose them to local and at times violent cultural models for behavior. Anderson (1990) describes how the concentration of poverty, urban blight, and lack of labor market opportunities in inner cities can be partially attributed to the disappearance of older male role models who had been primary enforcers of moral socialization around family and career (see also Wilson, 1996). Sampson and colleagues find that families in predominantly black and disadvantaged neighborhoods in Chicago have weaker intergenerational ties with neighbors, appearing to result in fewer opportunities for children to engage in positive social capital exchanges with adults in their community as compared with children in predominantly white Chicago neighborhoods (Sampson et al., 1999). Inequalities in children's socialization experiences are socially reproduced through cumulative advantages and disadvantages that are made manifest in studies of their neighborhood and community contexts.

Social and Cultural Forces

Cultural Variation

Cultural forces shape young people's future selves as well. For over a century, researchers have understood that childhood and adolescence appear quite different depending on the cultural context in which youth reside. Margaret Mead compared cross-cultural differences in the experience of storm and stress among Western adolescents and adolescents in Samoa (M. Mead, 1928). This early work problematized scholars' dependence on Western models of the life course. Globalization notwithstanding, childhood and adolescence continue to look and be experienced differently around the globe, depending on individuals' social(izing) contexts (Bühler-Niederberger, 2010; Larson & Wilson, 2004), as discussed more extensively in Chapter 10.

³U.S. neighborhoods remain heavily racially and socioeconomically segregated (Perez-Felkner, Felkner, Taub, & Papachristos, 2008). As students' entry into public schools continues to be based primarily on neighborhood residence, these segregation patterns are perpetuated in school (Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield, 2003). For these reasons as well as *homophily* – the phenomenon of individuals preferring to form relationships with individuals they perceive as similar (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) – it is difficult to disentangle the distinct impacts of race and class, and both continue to be consequential in shaping the neighborhood, school, and peer contexts of young people's lives.

Mass and Social Media

The media has had a considerable socializing role on children and adolescents' development. Popular music, television, and movies socialize individuals into consumers of certain kinds of identities, lifestyles, and aspirations (McRobbie, 1999). Mainstream media can facilitate the spread of normative values, desires, and beliefs that may inhibit young people's healthy development. For example, images of African Americans and Latinos continue to be racially charged and stereotypical in nature with respect to both race and gender (see e.g., Rodriguez, 2004), and have negative consequences on the racial and gender socialization of adolescents from minority communities (Littlefield, 2008). Mainstream media – including video games – may promote the sexual objectification of women (Dill & Thill, 2007) and in turn females may internalize these gender stereotypes which negatively affect their female self-concept (Behm-Morawitz & Mastro, 2009). A recent report from the American Psychological Association (2007) defines *sexualization* as being distinct from healthy sexuality, and develops when one or more of the following conditions is present: (a) they come to believe that their value is determined by their sexual appeal or sexual behavior; (b) they associate physical attractiveness with sexual attractiveness; (c) they are viewed as a sexual object by others, and/or (d) they inappropriately or prematurely have sexuality imposed on them by others. Indeed, research evidence suggests that media can influence the *sexualization* of youth to more stereotypical and casual attitudes toward teen and general sexual behavior (L'Engle, Brown, & Kenneavy, 2006; Ward, 2003).

The Influence of Socialization on Later Life Experiences

Adolescent Identity

While childhood is largely known as a period of developing physical, emotional, and behavioral competencies, the central task of adolescence has been characterized as having a more conscious focus. Erikson (1958, p. 14) suggests that adolescents are tasked to develop “some central perspective and direction, some working unity, out of the effective remnants of his childhood and the hopes of his anticipated adulthood.” Erikson refers to this process as an *identity crisis*, from which an individual “must detect some meaningful resemblance between what he has come to see in himself and what his sharpened awareness tells him others judge and expect him to be” (1958, p. 14). By this logic, an individual's attainment of a whole and unified identity is the path towards a healthy and well-adapted adulthood (E. E. Erikson, 1950). Erikson acknowledges however that young people do not forge their path in isolation. Rather, this process occurs in the context of not only their family but also their conception of the values and ideal ‘prototypes’ of the larger society, to which they aspire to reconcile themselves (E. E. Erikson, 1994, p. 128).

Marcia (1966) developed a related model, formulating four paths of ego-identity status with respect to career and ideology affiliations. *Foreclosure* refers to a commitment (e.g., to a career path) that occurs without exploration. Adolescents in this status tend to be responding directly to socialization pressures without having developed a sense of whether this identity is appropriate for them. Foreclosed adolescents may be susceptible to dissatisfaction later in life because of not developing their own identity. Other adolescents may be in a state of *identity diffusion*, neither exploring nor committing to an identity. Some may go on to explore and perhaps later develop more committed identities, while some remain in this diffuse status. Adolescents in *moratorium* are those engaged in identity search – and potentially in identity crisis, a state that can generate anxiety. *Identity achievement* is marked by resolution of identity moratorium, perhaps influenced – but not directed – by the expectations of society.

The models of identity development described above were developed in the U.S. with frameworks based on advantaged white males (see Erikson, 1950; Marcia, 1966). Notwithstanding, empirical studies using on these theoretical models of identity development have been conducted around the globe with culturally diverse populations. These analyses have found overall support for these models (e.g., Busch & Hofer, 2011).

Identity Development Among Marginalized Youth

While adolescents are tasked to develop a sense of self within the context of society as a whole, they may be simultaneously integrating particular dimensions of their identity with their internalized sense of society's expectations for them. Adolescents who identify with a marginalized group – like racial-ethnic and sexual minority youth, for example – may be particularly likely to experience this phenomenon. With respect to racial-ethnic minorities, W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) maintained that African Americans experience a *double consciousness* in which they view themselves simultaneously through their own eyes and those of white society. Phinney and colleagues extended Erikson's identity development framework to include ethnic identity development, under which an ethnic identity crisis might emerge, should ethnic minority youth develop strong and stable affiliations with their ethnic group but not with the dominant culture, or vice versa (Phinney, 1992; Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997).

Ethnic and racial identity. In the U.S. and other countries, racial and ethnic minority group members tend to experience distinct patterns particular to their social position. These socializing patterns are derived from cultural beliefs and individuals both inside and outside their group. Ethnic and racial socialization has been associated with young people's well-being as well as educational and career pathways (O'Connor, 1999; Ogbu & Fordham, 1986; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). As understood by sociologists since the early twentieth century (e.g., Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918), it is particularly important to consider the related but distinct socializing effects of cultures of origin on children and youth, especially in light of increased waves of migration and immigration from non-European countries, and from new regions of the U.S. and its territories (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; R. C. Smith, 2002; Zhou, 1997).

Children from ethnic and racial minority groups learn about race – and their status – from an early age and throughout adolescence (see Winkler, 2010). African American girls continue to prefer white girl dolls over dolls that look like them, as was found in the seminal Clark & Clark studies in the 1930s and 1940s (Kurtz-Costes, DeFreitas, Halle, & Kinlaw, 2011, see [Clark and Clark reference given at the end of notes/questions to author]). In studies of four distinct minority groups (African American, Hispanic, American Indian, and Arab-Palestinian Israelis), those minority adolescents who are engaged in school are most likely to be those who position their racial-ethnic identity as being a *dual identity* – both a member of their racial-ethnic group and broader society – as opposed to either (a) focusing on their in-group or (b) not having a racial-ethnic frame (or *self-schema*) for their behavior (Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, Fryberg, Brosh, & Hart-Johnson, 2003).

Gender identity. Although gender identity emerges early, it is shaped by sociocultural influences across a variety of spheres – from the home, to social structures such as schools, to broader society – as well as by individuals' interpretations of gender (see Bussey, 2011 for a review of the literature). Gender socialization can influence children's preferences, for example children's responses to gendered colors of toys and clothing. The toys that parents select for their children are becoming increasingly gendered. Even Lego – initially targeted to both girls and boys – released a girls' line of building blocks with pastel colors focused on the building of friendship communities (Orenstein, 2011). In a study of children aged 7 months to 5 years of age, clear gender differences emerged by age two such that girls increasingly chose pink items (as compared with seven items of other colors) and boys increasingly avoided pink items (LoBue & DeLoache, 2011).

From infancy, children's play, dress, friendships, and other relationships are influenced by others based on their being viewed as female or male (e.g., Astin, 1975; Eder & Hallinan, 1978; Maccoby, 1990; Thorne, 2011). Psychologists have argued that preschool age children develop a sense of gender constancy, that gender is a stable trait, and that children pay closer attention to gender-specific information related to the gender with which they identify (Kohlberg, 1966; Ruble et al., 2007). They in turn affiliate themselves with the norms, behaviors, and attributes of that gender. When made salient in preschool classrooms, children appear more likely to favor same-sex peers and employ gender stereotypes (Hilliard & Liben, 2010).

Such gender socialization practices continue to play a consequential role in shaping children's social and learning groups, from preschool onward. Teachers and parents are influential in shaping the centrality of gender in children's schooling. Gender socialization towards mathematics is one example of this process. Teachers with anxiety about mathematics may foster the reproduction of math anxiety among their female students (Beilock, Gunderson, Ramirez, & Levine, 2010). By elementary school, boys and girls seem to have internalized gender stereotypes about mathematics (Cvencek, Meltzoff, & Greenwald, 2011). By high school, females show notably less interest in mathematics and science than their male peers (Catsambis, 1994; Lee, 1998) and subsequently take fewer mathematics courses in high school (e.g., Riegle-Crumb, Farkas, & Muller, 2006). It may be that the messages girls and boys receive about the gender-appropriateness of certain career fields influence their interest and enjoyment on tasks corresponding to gender-normative fields, as opposed to those that are associated with another gender (Eccles, 1987, 2005).

Studies of gender-related teasing illustrate commonalities in the socialization of gender and of sexual identity. Children are teased for behaviors that are seen as not masculine or feminine (e.g., style of dress, manner of speech, participation in the arts). Such socialization pressures shape gender performance among all youth, heterosexual and sexual minority children and adolescents alike (Pascoe, 2007). The rampant nature of sexually-charged teasing – often times rising to the level of harassment – has been documented, as well as its often negative impact on young boys and girls (C. Hill & Kearl, 2011). These and other studies explain that calling a student “gay” may not necessarily be directed at their sexuality (while nonetheless being intended as an insult), but the recipient may still interpret the harassment in relationship to their gender and sexual identity. In early adolescence, teasing is used to demarcate gender boundaries between girls and boys while also increasingly framing cross-gender interaction as heterosexual and romantic in nature (Thorne & Luria, 1986).

Sexual identity. Adolescents may encounter distinct and sometimes conflicting socialization messages from both mainstream society and their non-dominant identity group(s) about how to think, feel, and behave (see Hyde & DeLamater, 2008). Overall, the process by which adolescents explore sexuality, develop their sexual identity and learn about sexual behavior seems to follow a pattern encouraging heterosexuality and heteronormativity (Tolman & McClelland, 2011). LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) youth may however experience disconnects between societal norms and identity-based norms with respect to their developing sense of self and position within society (see Hammack & Cohler, 2009).

For children and adolescents who do not identify with gender-normative roles, strong socialization pressures can negatively influence their developing sense of self. Notably, a recent study finds that mothers of young children tend to present only heterosexual options in their discussions with them about romantic relationships, either because they assume that their child is heterosexual or perhaps because they hope to inhibit the development of a non-heterosexual identity (K. A. Martin, 2009). Socialization pressures may prompt youth to develop strategies of coping with these challenges to their identity and personhood (e.g., Pascoe, 2007). The bullying of LGBT children and youth persists as a major societal problem (D. H. Hill, 2008; Katz-Wise & Hyde, 2012). Sexual minority youth seem to be at greater risk for marginalization and disengagement from school, which can have adverse consequences over the life course (Pearson, Muller, & Wilkinson, 2007). Media and internet outlets are a particularly important option for young people, perhaps especially for those with limited access to face-to-face communities. Young people may engage in LGBT and feminist

subcultures to help empower them in their sexual identity development. For example, female ‘zines have been used by adolescent females to resist and counter messages from the dominant culture about females’ roles in society (Schilt, 2003).

Recent research points to the weakening supremacy of homophobic attitudes and culture, including – importantly – adolescent males (M. McCormack, 2010). A study of a British secondary school finds that boys’ social status is marked more by charisma and other predictors of popularity than by the masculinity of their behavior (M McCormack, 2011). The marginalization of gay athletes appears to be waning in some schools as well, as noted by a recent study comparing openly gay high school athletes in the early 2000s with those from the later part of the decade (E. Anderson, 2011). Importantly, in a study of adolescent sexual minority teenagers, Savin-Williams (2011) finds that the young people interviewed tended to ‘come out’ about their identity earlier than was the case in past years when the social climate was less accepting, and they were remarkably happier and better adjusted than expected as well. These studies point to the influence of sociocultural contexts in shaping adolescents’ perceptions of possible identities. Same-sex unions have been increasing in number (see Rosenfeld & Kim, 2005), but the increase has been particularly notable among young women, a phenomenon that may also be explained by factors regarding social acceptability (Butler, 2005).

Behavioral Outcomes

Romantic Relationships and Onset of Sexual Behavior

As young people’s social worlds become more focused on life outside of the home, they tend to focus on developing relationships, including romantic partnerships (see e.g., Erikson, 1950; Leaper, 2011), as is discussed more extensively in Chap. 15. Although interracial and same-gender relationships are increasingly accepted in most industrial societies (Rosenfeld & Kim, 2005), traditional norms may continue to exert influence.

Research has also examined how socialization can promote early and risky sexual behavior. In an analysis of seventh through twelfth grader adolescents from U.S. secondary schools in the AddHealth study, researchers have found that peer group membership has been associated with both (Bearman, Moody, & Stovel, 2004). South and Haynie have studied the effects of residential mobility on adolescents’ school-based friendship networks (e.g., South & Haynie, 2004). They find that adolescents who move are more likely to experience premarital intercourse earlier than those who have not recently moved, perhaps because they also have a greater tendency to form friendships with adolescents who are both engaged in delinquent behavior and less engaged in school (South, Haynie, & Bose, 2005).

Delinquent Behavior

Studies have found that peers can influence adolescents’ tendency towards risky behavior more generally (e.g., South et al., 2005). Specifically, studies have found that affiliation with peers engaged in delinquent behavior (e.g., theft, vandalism) is associated with adolescents’ own engagement in such behavior, although there seems to be an interactional mechanism behind this association rather than mere socialization alone (Thornberry, Lizotte, Krohn, Farnworth, & Jang, 1994). Indeed, it may be that adolescents’ delinquent behaviors leads them to similar peers (Matsueda & Anderson, 1998). The evidence is mixed. In a cross-lagged panel study of 497 Dutch adolescents, their closest friends, and their parents, the peer socialization model was better supported by the data (Keijsers et al., 2012).

Perhaps because engagement in school would affiliate adolescents with similarly engaged peers, school engagement has also been found to influence young people's likelihood of engaging in delinquent behavior. Using a diverse sample of 1,977 early adolescents, researchers found that those who experienced increasing behavioral and emotional disengagement in school appeared to be more susceptible to delinquent behavior and substance abuse (Li & Lerner, 2011). A study of 4,890 African American and Latino fifth through eighth graders in Chicago found consistent results (Hirschfield & Gasper, 2011). Delinquency can not only negatively impact young people's educational and criminal trajectories; it seems to decrease their ability to effectively complete transitions to adulthood as well (Massoglia & Uggen, 2010).

Education and Career Outcomes

Parents, family members, teachers, and communities may influence children's interests and aspirations towards higher education and careers, and achievement therein (Jodl, Michael, Malanchuk, Eccles, & Sameroff, 2001; E. Smith, Atkins, & Connell, 2003; Sonnert, 2009). In the Wisconsin status attainment model developed by Sewell and colleagues, significant others are found to shape students' educational aspirations and career attainment (Sewell, Haller, & Portes, 1969; Sewell & Hauser, 1975). Perceptions of their relationships with teachers and peers seem to positively influence students' educational trajectories during and after high school; in particular, their perceptions of their teachers' and classmates' regard for their potential to succeed academically (Perez-Felkner, 2012). Such supportive relationships with teachers and classmates may help underrepresented students foster resilience in the face of academic, social, and socioeconomic obstacles to their entry to 4-year colleges and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. This can be particularly important because of the challenges that disproportionately affect underrepresented minorities in their pursuit of higher education (DeLuca & Rosenbaum, 2001; Goldrick-Rab, 2006; Hanson, 1994; Spenner, Buchmann, & Landerman, 2005).

Class and Racial-Ethnic Differences

In this vein, the processes by which socialization influences educational and career outcomes may differ by family background, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Families' social class and racial-ethnic background can shape their children's educational contexts both in terms of the schools they attend and the resources they receive in school and at home. The influence of social class on young people's matriculation into 4-year colleges is notable but may have been declining, net of other factors, based on a study of the two most recent nationally representative longitudinal cohorts of U.S. secondary school students, who were high school sophomores in 1990 and 2002 (Perez-Felkner, Hedberg, & Schneider, 2011). Both class and race-ethnicity remain important factors in children's socialization into educational and career trajectories however, a pattern that could be intensified by the rising wealth gap among Americans. This gap is disproportionately high between white families and black (20 times less wealthy) and Latino families (18 times less wealthy) (Kochhar, Fry, Taylor, Velasco, & Motel, 2011).

Race-ethnicity can shape how families socialize their children, in particular around cultural socialization (e.g., ethnic pride), preparation for bias in society, promotion of mistrust, and egalitarianism (e.g., relationship with mainstream culture) (Hughes et al., 2006). Notably, variation in African American families' approaches to racial socialization has been found to affect children's skill and

behavioral development, in particular around language skills and trust in others (Caughy et al., 2006). In a recent study using a cultural-ecological frame to examine the relationship between parents' socialization practices and children's competence (as measured by academic achievement), preparation for bias interestingly increased fifth grade African American boys' grade point averages while decreasing those of girls (Friend, Hunter, & Fletcher, 2011).

With respect to class, middle class white families are more likely than working class families to enlist their children in concerted cultivation training for adulthood – school-and out-of-school activities that are associated with school achievement and preparation for participation in middle-class society and professional careers (Lareau, 2003). Middle class parents appear to more commonly apply pressure on teachers to maintain or benefit their children's educational resources than do working class parents (McGhee Hassrick & Schneider, 2009). Similarly, elementary school children from working class families seem to employ less effective strategies for obtaining help from their teachers than their middle-class peers (Calarco, 2011). The findings described above were from small original studies of students in urban schools. In an analysis of the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 cohort, parent involvement in schools does not uniformly affect their elementary age children's academic and behavioral outcomes, but does appear to more positively benefit socioeconomically disadvantaged students who are traditionally underrepresented in higher education and professional careers (Domina, 2005).

Developing and Aligning Ambitions

Ogbu and colleagues argued that youth from involuntary minority groups (as opposed to those from groups who voluntarily emigrated) may develop oppositional identities as a result of their observation of a closed opportunity structure (e.g., Ogbu & Simons, 1988). Based on this premise, some involuntary minority youth might resist participating in what they see as a system fixed against them and tease their more academically-oriented school peers that they are 'acting white' (Ogbu & Fordham, 1986). Empirical evidence has disputed the claim that racial-ethnic achievement gaps can be explained by young people's concerns about 'acting white' (see Ainsworth-Darnell & Downey, 1998; Tyson, Darity, & Castellino, 2005). Nevertheless, various studies have found that young people's perceptions of their abilities as a function of being a member of their racial-ethnic group can affect their academic performance and educational choices.

Based on numerous social psychological laboratory experiments, Steele and colleagues' *stereotype threat* theory argues that when negative stereotypes about a racial-ethnic group's ability are made salient, members of that group underperform on tests of ability as compared to testing situations in which these stereotypes are not a part of the test-taking context (Steele, 2003; Steele et al., 2002). School-based research finds that minority adolescents construct narratives about the opportunities available to them as members of their group, and the nature of these narratives is associated with their educational aspirations (O'Connor, 1999). Young people's experiences with racism and racial-ethnic socialization in their support networks may influence their perceptions of their cultural group and the roles available to members of this group (Stevenson & Arrington, 2009), which may shape their academic ambitions (Oyserman et al., 2003; Rivas-Drake & Mooney, 2009).

Generally, the aspirations of educationally underrepresented adolescents are rising, such that about as many black and Latino high school sophomores expect to graduate from college as their white and Asian peers (see Ingels et al., 2005). Nevertheless, Schneider and colleagues maintain that social inequality remains in adolescents' access to the knowledge and resources needed to align their high aspirations to the actions and behaviors essential to realizing these goals (Crosnoe & Schneider, 2010; Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). Indeed, misaligned ambitions may foster frustration and disappointment among young people who are unable to realize their aspirations (Sabates, Harris, & Staff, 2011).

Gendered Differences

Children and adolescents undergo a sex role socialization process that influences their educational and career outcomes (Eccles & Hoffman, 1984; Lee, 1998; Lips, 2004; Riegle-Crumb et al., 2006; Stake & Nickens, 2005). For many, their primary identity is defined by their gender. Gender socialization in families, schools, and peer groups can shape female and male adolescents' subjective orientations to all fields, especially engineering and computer science careers. Extensive research suggests that children are socialized early to consider science and mathematics to be male pursuits (e.g., Farland-Smith, 2009; Jacobs, Davis-Kean, Bleeker, Eccles, & Malanchuk, 2005). Traditionally male-dominated career fields tend to pay higher wages than those that are traditionally female-dominated, which effectively maintains gendered inequalities in individuals' pathways to financially stable adulthoods (England, 2005).

These differences are puzzling considering overall gender differences in academic performance. Girls tend to work harder and perform better in school than boys (Mickelson, 1989), and are perceived by their teachers as being more engaged (Jones & Myhill, 2004). Furthermore, males are being outperformed by their female peers in secondary school as well as in postsecondary matriculation and completion (Buchmann & DiPrete, 2006). Nevertheless, socialization seems to continue to steer young women away from scientific, mathematical, and engineering majors (Cheryan, 2012; Seymour, 1999). Eccles (1987, 1994, 2009) developed an expectancy-value model to explain this process, in which gender influences young people's expectations about their potential success in a given career field and these expectations shape their interest to fields that either do or do not conform to their gendered expectations.

Importantly, many females with high mathematics ability in high school – who might be best suited for these fields – tend not to persist in optional advanced mathematics sequences in upper secondary school and college, and instead pursue alternate fields such as the social and behavioral sciences (Perez-Felkner et al., 2012). In the nationally representative study of U.S. adolescents transitioning from high school to college cited above, those females who pursued these traditionally-male scientific fields appear to have similar subjective orientations to the subject matter as their male peers. Notably, Bandura and colleagues draw upon his theory of self-efficacy to argue that children's perceptions of their efficacy in select areas are more influential in predicting their career aspirations and pathways than their academic performance in those areas (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 2001).

New Research Directions

Currently, researchers are pursuing more precise methodologies and frameworks to improve our understandings of how socialization processes influence children and adolescents. With respect to methods, technological innovations are facilitating causal inferences about social processes. For example, quantitative researchers are increasingly testing counterfactual hypotheses and using experimental and quasi-experimental methods such as fixed effects and propensity score models to assess not only effect sizes but also causality (e.g., Harding, 2003; Schneider, Carnoy, Kilpatrick, Schmidt, & Shavelson, 2007). Moving causal inferences out of psychology laboratories into observational, large-scale research holds the promise for major findings over the coming years. Qualitative researchers are engaged in cutting-edge research as well, including child-centered approaches that methodically aim to incorporate young people's perspectives in increasingly authentic ways (see C. D. Clark, 2010). Additionally, some researchers are constructing collaborative ethnographies to explain complex phenomena – like racial interactions and perceptions across a major city's ethnic groups – with

complementary data from distinct but complementary qualitative research projects (e.g., DeGenova & Ramos-Zayas, 2003).

These methodological innovations are associated with complementary initiatives to bridge theoretical and disciplinary divides, in particular with respect to investigations of social change. For example, both adolescents and children increasingly access interactive media and engage in previously inaccessible social and socializing contexts through the internet. The rise in online media use raises the question of how it may be shaping young people's development. It is important to examine the influence that this media – which often targets youth as consumers – has on both their developing sense of self and their behavior. Internet use on cell phones and smartphones appears to be increasing participation in digital media. Latinos' participation continues to lag behind that of whites however, such that only 88 % of Latino teenagers aged 12–17 use the internet as compared to 97 % of white, non-Hispanic teens, and only 63 % of Latino teenagers own a cell phone as compared to white teens (Lenhart, 2012). The digital divide is particularly pronounced among nonnative Latinos (Livingston, 2010).

Current published research on young people's use of social media is extremely limited, but interest in this area from both researchers and users (e.g., Boyd, 2007) suggests that this is an area with the potential for considerable gains in knowledge.⁴ Results of a recent Pew Research Center study indicate that 20 % of children age 12–17 who use social media think that people their age are mostly “unkind” to one another on social network sites, and 41 % report witnessing online cruelty and meanness “sometimes” (21 %) or “frequently” (12 %) (Lenhart, 2012). These spaces are not necessarily used merely for acquaintance formation and recreational interactions between already familiar peers. As noted earlier, electronic media also present opportunities for youth to engage in social resistance, against established gender norms and regulatory institutions including states (e.g., Schilt, 2003), as seen with protest activity during the Arab Spring of 2011. Innovations in and increased access to social network research software (e.g., UCINET) seem particularly well-suited to investigate the role of social media in the socialization of children and youth.

Another area in which there has been and continues to be dramatic changes in young people's lives is education. The past few decades have seen increasing participation of minorities in both secondary and postsecondary education (see [National Science Foundation, 2011](#)), although many minorities continue to be left out of the gains that their more advantaged same-ethnic peers have been experiencing (Reynolds & Johnson, 2011). There has been a rapid expansion of school choice options, from elementary through postsecondary school, aimed at closing opportunity gaps. The research is mixed however, as this climate of innovation has fostered immense changes in school contexts with wide variation in quality (see Zimmer et al., 2009); thus far, minority students attending schools of choice (e.g., charters, magnets) do not fare much better than those attending traditional public schools with respect to entry to 4-year colleges and universities (Perez-Felkner et al., 2011). Recent research examines the intersection between race-ethnicity and gender with respect to college access, matriculation, and careers – research that is both feasible and intriguing because of these changing rates of participation (Wood, Kurtz-Costes, & Copping, 2011). In addition, policies designed to increase preparedness for postsecondary school science and mathematics foster rich potential for future research on socialization in and toward school (see e.g., Allensworth, Nomi, Montgomery, & Lee, 2009; President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), 2010).

⁴There do appear to be gendered differences in how young people use social media, whereby females tend to pursue friendships and males focus on potential romantic relationships (Thelwall, 2008). Recent research also suggests that social networking sites can exert influence over young people's developmental trajectories, such as their alcohol-related behavior (Szwedo, Mikami, & Allen, 2012).

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Chapter 6

Socialization for Primary, Intimate, and Work Relationships in the Adult Life Course

Sharon E. Preves and Jeylan T. Mortimer

Introduction

Socialization is a process through which societies, and groups within them, reproduce themselves, creating new members who are able to participate in the established routines and relationships of social life as well as to effectively adapt to new circumstances. Lutfey and Mortimer (2003, p. 183) define socialization as “the process by which individuals acquire social competence by learning the norms, values, beliefs, attitudes, language characteristics, and roles appropriate to their social groups.” The outcomes of socialization encompass a wide range of phenomena – including many specific psychological orientations and behaviors of great interest to social psychologists, such as role and character (e.g., brave, empathic, moral) identities, self-esteem, self-efficacy and other dimensions of self; achievement-related aspirations and plans; social trust and interpersonal skills, and diverse forms of social behavior. Socialization may be highly formal and institutionalized, as in high schools, colleges, vocational training programs, and religious organizations, or quite informal, as when teenage peers or adult co-workers socialize one another. Socialization tends to be most fully developed, especially institutionally but also informally, when future roles are widely anticipated, institutionalized, and positively evaluated. For example, children are universally socialized for their future roles as workers and citizens, but obtain little preparation for physical disability, bankruptcy, cohabitation, relationship dissolution, marital failure, or premature widowhood. Socialization is responsive to life events, e.g., an accident or serious illness which requires individuals to learn the sick role and renegotiate their responsibilities vis a vis prior role partners and organizational memberships (see Charmaz, 1991); salient social experiences, e.g., a year of study abroad which broadens perspectives, promotes new forms of behavior, and leads individuals to see their lives in new, and sometimes critical, ways; and diverse social influences, including the mass media, popular music and other elements of popular culture, and on-line social media. Socialization occurs through processes of social learning in immediate socialization contexts and generalizing what is learned to other settings, as well as through identification with socializers and modeling their behaviors.

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In this chapter we consider four primary topics with regard to socialization, exploring the impact of diversity across these realms: (1) conceptual and methodological approaches in the field; (2) socialization for adult primary relationships and intimacy; (3) socialization for work; and (4) socialization for balancing work and family. We address key themes regarding the socialization for adult primary relationships and intimacy that include the development of gender and sexual identities, gender socialization, adolescence as a key period for socialization to relationships, the development of intimate relationships among youth and young adults, socialization in more stable relationship contexts (including marriage), socialization to parenthood, and socialization in contexts of relationship dissolution. With regard to the socialization for work, we explore the historical context of work, socialization to work in families, delayed vocational development and the erosion of socialization for work, socialization for work in post-secondary educational settings, and socialization for work in the early occupational career. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of socialization for balancing work and family roles. In each of these domains we consider – gender, sexuality, work, and family – socialization has become increasingly prolonged, individualized, and diverse as a result of broader social change.

From a social psychological perspective, socialization may be considered from the vantage point of the group, or alternatively, from the perspective of the socializees who may have greater or lesser incentive to be socialized and to join the group as full participants. The diversity and complexity of socialization settings and processes parallels the differentiation of the society at large. That is, socialization will be more unified and predictable in culturally homogeneous societies with little stratification; socialization processes will be more variable in culturally diverse societies characterized by substantial inequality. In this review we illustrate divergence in socialization processes by social class, race, and gender in contemporary societies.

The process of socialization may be relatively straightforward and predictable or fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. In some circumstances, the agents of socialization – e.g., parents and teachers – may be unified in purpose; in other situations socialization agents may have quite divergent perspectives and goals (e.g., parents and peers). This latter situation often gives rise to conflict and confusion on the part of the socializee. Socialization tends to go more smoothly when there is consensus, when social environments are stable, and when there are opportunities for socializees to observe and even practice their future roles. For example, there are ample opportunities for anticipatory socialization with respect to heteronormative family roles, as children can observe their parents as they relate to one another as husbands and wives. There may be less opportunity for such socialization when individuals are trying to learn how to behave in other circumstances, as when they are embracing non-traditional gender roles, cohabitation, or minority sexual orientations. Similarly, anticipatory socialization to work is less likely to occur when occupational roles and technologies are rapidly changing or hidden from view.

Conceptual and Methodological Approaches

The process of socialization is critically important, as the very continuation of whole societies and the groups within them depend on it. It is therefore the focus of considerable study in social psychology and other social science fields. Some investigators approach this process from the perspective of the teachers, that is, parents (Kohn, 1983) or educators, focusing on their goals, values, and objectives; while others study socialization from the vantage point of the socializees, focusing on both positive and negative outcomes (e.g., Aries & Seider, 2005; Hermanowicz, 1998, 2009). Still others examine socialization as a process of interaction, attempting to parse out the mechanisms through which socialization realizes its consequences (Lareau, 2002). Some scholars have focused on differences in socialization contexts, considering how structural variation across settings influences both

processes and outcomes (see Mortimer & Kruger, 2000, for a cross-national comparison; and Person, Rosenbaum, & Diel-Amen, 2005, for comparison across post-secondary educational organizations).

Methodological approaches are diverse, including surveys (Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Mortimer, 2003), interviews (Hermanowicz, 1998, 2009), ethnographic studies (Lareau, 2002), narrative biography (Chamberlayne, Bornat, & Wengraf, 2000; Gagné, Tewksbury, & McGaughey, 1997), and autoethnography (Ettorre, 2005; Tillman-Healy, 1996; Vidal-Ortiz, 2004). Each of these approaches has particular strengths and weaknesses. Surveys, especially if they follow the same respondents over time, longitudinally, are useful for understanding shifts in attitudes and behaviors that may be linked to particular socialization experiences. For example, Mortimer (2003) examined change in work values, self-concepts, and behaviors associated with exposure to different types of work conditions in adolescence (e.g., presence of learning and advancement opportunities, and stressful work). Positive outcomes were associated with experiences that affirmed the youth's value as a worker, such as being paid well, having advancement opportunities, and being provided with work that enhanced learning. While such information is useful in identifying the kinds of work that may have positive consequences for future adaptation, it does not illuminate socializees' unique perceptions and interpretations of the socialization process itself.

Interviews are useful in that they allow the investigator to probe the subject's own perceptions and understanding of the changes they experienced in the socialization process. For example, in his study of physicists, Hermanowicz (1998, 2009) elicited rich narratives describing their experiences during graduate school and as they moved through their professional careers. These accounts highlighted the disconnect between the research focus in their graduate work and the emphasis on teaching in undergraduate programs, which caused considerable discontent. Whereas such interview-based studies are especially valuable in learning what is most salient to the socializees, they may miss changes that are not noticed but that have considerable importance. For example, the workers in Kohn and Schooler's studies (Kohn, 1969; Kohn & Schooler, 1983) may not have been aware that the self-directed character of their occupational experiences influenced their child-rearing values.

Narrative biographies and autoethnographies are valuable in their coverage of long periods, enhancing the likelihood that subjects will encounter and recognize socializing contexts that influenced them in ways that constituted "turning points" in their development (Cohler & Hostetler, 2003). Ethnographic and observational techniques are especially useful in illuminating the perspectives of the participants and the processes through which socialization occurs (Corsaro & Fingerson, 2003; Kinney, 1993; Lareau, 2002). These, like other qualitative approaches, are beneficial to the extent that they illuminate contexts and outcomes of which subjects are aware; they may not elucidate socialization processes about which subjects have little interest or understanding.

Although socialization can be studied in many different institutional contexts and social settings, in this review we focus on the domains of gender, sexuality, family, and work. As Freud (1957) recognized long ago, work, love, and the healthy expression of libidinal impulses are of central importance in human lives, critical for successful social adaptation and mental health. Marx (1964) considered working to be a natural expression of human goals, interests, and capacities, and a source of profound well-being; work is often the context for what Csikszentmihalyi (1990) calls "flow", or optimal experience. Work, family and intimate relationships are of central importance in individual lives; all are significantly structured by gender. Work and family are long-standing areas of socialization research; recently, scholarly interest has turned to the study of socialization in intimate relationships.

Socialization is becoming increasingly challenging for both socializers and socializees, given dramatic changes in the past few decades in the institutions of family and work as well as broad normative shifts in attitudes toward various modes of gender and sexual identification and expression. New institutional demands and opportunities, rapidly changing contextual circumstances, and shifting normative orientations make old ways of thinking and behavior obsolete; new orientations and behaviors must arise for successful adaptation of both individuals and groups. Increasingly, in this era of rapid change, scholars emphasize the importance of instilling qualities that promote lifelong learning,

flexibility, and tolerance of ambiguity (Field, 2006; Heinz, 2002; Morgan-Klein & Osborne, 2007). At the same time, rising expectations about the quality of life in family, work, and intimate relationships make effective socialization all the more important.

Whereas socialization theory and research has traditionally focused on childhood, emphasizing family, school, and peer influences, this chapter examines socialization in adulthood. As elaborated elsewhere (Brim & Wheeler, 1966; Lutfey & Mortimer, 2003; Mortimer & Simmons, 1978), adult socialization differs from that which occurs in childhood in important ways. Socialization in childhood tends to be more general, focused on broad principles and ideas (e.g., obeying parents and teachers, being responsible); socialization in adulthood tends to be more specific, geared to particular roles and circumstances (e.g., how to become an electrical engineer). Whereas children typically have little choice regarding socializing agents or institutions (e.g., they do not choose their parents or teachers), adults generally have considerable discretion over such matters (e.g., regarding college or training program selection), and have more latitude to exit socialization contexts that they find uncongenial or deem irrelevant to their goals.

Efforts to socialize children focus on what might be considered “new material” – for example, when children initially enter preschool or kindergarten, socializers attempt to instill appropriate psychological orientations (e.g., goals, expectations, and preferences). In contrast, adults have a backlog of experience to draw upon, some of which is relevant, and some irrelevant or even dysfunctional in new situations. Considered in a life course framework, socialization is expected to vary depending on prior experiences as well as concurrent responsibilities, activities and objectives of the socializees, all of which tend to be more varied among adults than is typical in childhood. Lutfey and Mortimer (2003) explore differences in socialization experiences and outcomes depending on the prior trajectories, goals, and strategies of the socializees, and their contemporaneous circumstances and roles in multiple life arenas. College, for example, is not the same experience for the student who just graduated from high school and has no dependents, and the older student, with a family and heavy financial responsibilities, who is returning to school after a decade in the labor force. The latter may be less receptive to the directives of the instructor or teaching assistant, who is her junior of many years, and more sensitive to the discrepancies between personal goals and socialization experiences.

While the present chapter focuses on adulthood, since adult socialization is contingent on prior experiences, especially during the transition to adulthood, we give some attention to earlier socialization as well.

Socialization for Adult Primary Relationships and Intimacy

With attention to diversity across race, class, gender, and sexual orientation, we address the key roles played by families, schools, media and technology in socialization for adult primary relationships and intimacy. From early childhood and puberty through adult intimate relationships, we explore socialization and note key theories, policies and social trends with regard to sexual identity, heterosexual and same sex marriage and cohabitation, as well as relationship dissolution through divorce, death of a partner or spouse, or “breaking up.”

Defining Key Terms

As Renfrow and Howard note in Chap. 17 of this volume, defining key terms related to gender and sexuality is essential to promoting clarity when discussing these issues. In this effort, we cross-reference Renfrow and Howard’s definitions of the terms sex, gender, gender identity, gender role, and sexuality.

According to Renfrow and Howard, “*Sex* typically refers to biological characteristics that distinguish females and males: chromosomes, reproductive characteristics, [and] physiological features” (Chap. 17, p. 475). They define *gender* as “the social and cultural behaviors and characteristics associated with, but not determined by, biological sex” (Chap. 17, p. 475). Within the broader concept of gender, “*gender identity* refers to one’s internal sense of gender, e.g., to one’s self as female, male, or some combination, or neither” (Chap. 17, p. 475). Similarly, *gender roles* “...are a subset of gender stereotypes [and] include behavioral expectations for females and males” (Chap. 17, p. 476). Finally, the concept of *sexuality* “refers to sexual behavior, eroticism, sexual orientation, and one’s overall inclination to engage in sexual activity” (Chap. 17, p. 476).

Developing Gender and Sexual Identities

One of the most fundamental aspects of socialization throughout the life course is gender. For both socializers and socializees, the emphasis on physiological sex, gender, and sexual identity begins before a child is even born and continues to be a focus after death. From the pressure to “find out the sex of the baby” during pregnancy and decorate the nursery in a gender appropriate fashion, to holding gender-specific memorial and burial rites, gender plays a key role in a person’s life.

Gender and Sexual Norms

Gender classification begins at the moment of birth (and sometimes well before). Attaching a sex label of “female” or “male” to newborns is one of the most basic elements of early socialization. Once a child’s sex is ascertained, typically by its genital appearance at birth, gender-appropriate socialization may begin.¹ Soon thereafter parents give their children gender-specific names, swaddle them in pink or blue blankets and clothing, and send out “It’s a Girl!” or “It’s a Boy!” birth announcements to family and friends in celebration. With ultrasound technology, many expectant parents are choosing to identify their child’s sex even before it is born; this practice reflects the reality that much of social life is organized by gender. Many parents even find it difficult to plan for a child’s life without first knowing its sex.

Adults often interact with children in ways that reinforce the importance of gender and the expected distinctions between gender roles. Some parents are so concerned that people might mistake their baby for the wrong sex, that they tape pink bows to infants’ bald heads, have their ears pierced, or dress them in gender-specific clothing only, such as dresses or overalls. This includes family members surrounding children with “girl” and “boy” toys and teachers using gender as a way to separate their students into competitive teams or lunchroom lines.

Most children first learn about gender roles from their parents and other family members (Cunningham, 2001; Freeman, 2007; Halim & Ruble, 2010). Other important agents of gender socialization are teachers, peers, media and even toys (Blakemore & Centers, 2005; Francis, 2010; Freeman). Kohlberg demonstrated 46 years ago that children are able to identify themselves as female or male by the age of three. By the age of five, Kohlberg argues, children adhere closely to traditional gender-typed behavior that is taught and reinforced by the society in which they live (Kohlberg, 1966). Likewise, children learn at an early age to interact with one another in ways that reinforce the importance of gender by playing gender-segregated games on the playground, including jump rope and

¹It is important to note that approximately 1 in 2,000 children are born intersexed (or hermaphroditic) with external genital features that are not characteristically female or male. This frequency is the same as Down Syndrome and Cystic Fibrosis (Preves, 2003).

baseball. Toys such as Easy Bake Ovens and G.I. Joe prepare children to inhabit vastly different worlds in child and adulthood, replete with emotions, occupations, personal tastes, and even physical stature that all become laden with gendered meaning.

After early childhood, the significance of gender increases when young adults begin dating and romantic endeavors. The ability to identify one's sexual orientation as lesbian or gay, bisexual, or straight is related to one's identity as female or male and the social distinctions between those categories. From early high school romances, to lifelong partnerships and parenting relationships, gender plays a central role. Gender continues to shape social life, from education and career choices to the division of parenting and housekeeping duties at home (Crockett & Beal, 2012; Moen, 2001; West & Zimmerman, 1987).

As noted above, a fundamental theme regarding gender throughout the life course is the expectation that one's sex and gender are binary and static. Kessler and McKenna's (1978) work captures the ways we conflate biological sex (i.e., genitalia, chromosomes, hormones, gonads, and secondary sex characteristics) with gender identity and role (the social identity and presentation of oneself as feminine or masculine). According to a predominant cultural mandate, physiological sex correlates "naturally" with gender identity and presentation. That is, persons who have bodies classified as female are expected to be feminine and identify first as girls and later as women; those with bodies classified as male are expected to be masculine and identify first as boys and later as men. Furthermore, the expectation for heterosexual identity and behavior is so strong that it is nearly compulsory.

Kessler and McKenna draw on Garfinkel's (1967) classic study of gender to summarize commonly held social expectations: (1) genitals are the essential sign of sex and gender; (2) there are only two sexes/genders; (3) the female/male dichotomy is natural; (4) everyone must be classified as a member of one sex/gender or the other; and (5) one's sex/gender is invariant across the life course (1978, pp. 113–114).

Gender Socialization

Key agents of socialization for gender identities and sexual identities are the same as those for other aspects of social development. The family is of primary influence, particularly for children and adolescents as they form notions of what it means to be gendered and sexual beings. Role modeling and reinforcement of appropriate displays of gender range from choice of clothing and leisure activities, to playmates, life partners, and careers. Families play a key role throughout the life course regarding socialization for intimate partnerships, family dynamics, parenting, and career choice.

Principal agents of socialization for the development of gender and sexual identities expand from the familial base as children age, and include school and associated peer groups, religious or spiritual communities, and increasingly, entertainment media. With the diversification and skyrocketing availability of the Internet, connections via cell phones, Skype, and mobile computers, social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr) and video or photo sharing sites such as YouTube and Flickr are also playing a central role in the development of gendered and sexual identities (Brickell, 2012; Ross, 2005; Subrahmanyam, Smahel, & Greenfield, 2006).

Despite increasingly diverse opportunities for women and men on the basketball court and in the boardroom, toy manufacturers still insist on targeting female children with creative activities to make themselves "princess beautiful" or to turn their make believe homes into scenes of domestic tranquility, and ply male children with games that engage their inner engineer, superhero, or warrior. One need only head to the local big-box store to appreciate just how dominant and divergent these themes are.

Similar trends are found in children's clothing. Gender stereotypical themes are noted in the images that adorn children's clothing, such as nature scenes on girls' garments and action themes, such as sports emblems, trucks, or trains on boys' (Halim, Ruble, & Amodio, 2011; Ruble, Martin, &

Berenbaum, 2006). In addition to toy and clothing manufacturers reinforcing gender stereotypes, children's literature is replete with messages about normative genders, sexualities, and family structures (Renzetti, Curran, & Maier, 2012). Gender stereotypes in children's toys, clothing, and literature roundly reinforce the notion that girls are passive and boys are active, or, as Sadker and Sadker put it, "pretty is [and] handsome does" (1995, p. 55).

Research in elementary schools has documented the palpable presence and salience of the gender binary for children as well as teachers. In her landmark study of gender in elementary schools, Thorne illustrates the ways students and teachers utilize gender to create social order, including rules for occupying precious playground real estate, and rituals that accentuate gender differences, such as the "pollution" rituals in the lunchroom of being infected with or cleansed of girl or boy "germs," popularly referred to as "cooties" (Thorne, 1993).

Theories of Gender Identity Development

Three prominent theoretical perspectives attempt to explain the acquisition of gender identity in childhood: psychoanalytic theories, social learning theories, and cognitive development theories (Zosuls et al., 2009). All recognize that children become aware of their own and others' gender at a very young age – by 2–3 years of age, according to some (e.g., Golombok & Fivush, 1994; Kohlberg, 1966) – or as late as 4–5 years of age, according to others (e.g., Freud, 1925). Moreover, children as young as 18 months of age express stereotypically gendered preference in toys (Golombok & Fivush). These displays of gender stereotypical behavior typically intensify during preschool age (Freeman, 2007).

Psychoanalytic Theories

Psychoanalytic theories are based on Freud's identification theory and emphasize the connection between the awareness of one's physical sex (i.e., genitalia) with the development of gender identity. Freud argued that as children become aware of their genitalia during the phallic stage of development, at approximately 4 years of age, they assume their place in the world as gendered beings. As Kessler and McKenna write, "The recognition that one has or does not have a particular set of genitals is, for Freud, tantamount to recognizing that one is a particular gender...In this system gender identity is genital identity" (1978, p. 85). Beyond the significance Freud placed on genitalia for the development of gender identity was his emphasis on gender roles in children, studying how and why they behaved and identified as feminine or masculine beings. His identification theory posits that, based on their own genitalia (in essence, the presence or absence of a penis), children become more or less identified with their mother or father. Boys, suffering from castration anxiety, learn to more closely identify with their fathers; whereas girls, suffering from penis envy, identify more closely with their mothers (Freud, 1933). Clearly one limitation of Freud's identification theory is its reliance on heterosexual two-parent family structures; in single parent or same sex parent households, the absence of both female and male role models (and types of genitalia) render the theory problematic. In addition, its phallic focus recalls an era far more androcentric than is true of the early twenty-first century.

Social Learning Theories

Social learning theories emphasize the modeling and reinforcement of gender "appropriate" behaviors in early childhood by key agents of socialization, such as parents, teachers, childcare providers, and peers (Freeman, 2007). Children are positively rewarded (reinforced) for imitating

or modeling normatively gendered behavior and characteristics. They learn to repeat this behavior to seek out additional rewards and avoid the negative sanctions associated with non-normative gender displays. Research indicates that children are unequally sanctioned for engaging in cross-gender behavior. That is, girls typically receive fewer and less stringent consequences for engaging in stereotypically masculine (or “tomboy”) behaviors than do boys for engaging in stereotypically feminine behaviors. While there is some degree of allowance for girls to “act like boys”, boys who “act like girls” are subject to taunts that question their very viability as males, including labeling them as “sissies”, “queers”, or “fags” (Pascoe, 2007). In short, one of the most common and effective ways to insult a male child or adult is to question his manhood by accusing him of acting or being feminine.

This disparity in negative sanctions for cross-gendered behavior is sensible if one considers the differential associations of power afforded to adult women and men. That is, adult women are rewarded with financial and social power for presenting themselves in a somewhat masculine manner. For example, women who ascend to power in business, education, or politics display characteristics stereotypically associated with men, such as confidence, independence, intellectual prowess, and leadership (Barreto, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2009; Eagly & Carli, 2007; Kellerman & Rhode, 2007). Moreover, women are allowed to “appear as men” with regard to fashion. Most girls and women can wear pants with ease, but boys and men would be ridiculed for wearing skirts in the U.S. In short, masculinity is socially rewarded and associated with success and power, whereas femininity is disparaged.

While getting ahead in leadership often requires masculine displays, women in leadership roles who are perceived to appear “too masculine” in their communication and dress are frequently sanctioned for behaving too much like men (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2011). Asserting and self-advocating women are often disliked by colleagues or employees, yet women who are less assertive are likely to be perceived as less competent. Thus women in leadership positions may experience a “leadership backlash” for being perceived as too feminine and a “social backlash” for being perceived as too masculine (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013).

Cognitive Development Theories

While social learning theories are quite compelling, they have been criticized for viewing socialization as a one-way process, with children depicted as passive recipients of culture (Corsaro & Eder, 1990). In cognitive development theories, socializees are viewed as having greater agency with regard to which messages they choose to attend to and which ones they ignore. Based on the earlier work of psychologists Piaget and Kohlberg, cognitive development theories focus on the importance of organizing social stimuli into manageable schema by which people cognitively lump together and split apart ideas that are similar to, or different from, one another (Zerubavel, 1996). For example, cognitive research on children’s gendered language acquisition shows that by age two most children organize information about people into a gender binary, displayed by their ready use of male and female nouns and pronouns (Zosuls et al., 2009).

In her theory of gender lenses, Bem (1993) argues that every culture has hidden assumptions that act as cultural lenses through which members of society view and shape the world. Bem identifies three social norms (or lenses), which are primary guides for social interactions in the United States and much of the Western world: gender polarization, androcentrism, and biological essentialism (Bem, 1993). Echoing our prior comments, Bem asserts that there is a strongly held belief that (1) there are only two sexes/genders (“gender polarization”); (2) society is male-dominated (“androcentrism”); and (3) nature trumps nurture with regard to gender and sexual identity (“biological essentialism”).

Critiques of cognitive development theories focus on the narrowness of the research inspired by this approach. While most research on gender socialization has focused on White and middle class children

and families, some scholars have noted racial and social class differences in gender norms and roles (Ruble et al., 2006). In her research on Black families, Hill (2005; Hill, 1999; Hill & Sprague, 1999) argues that concerns about race and class outweigh those of gender. This is particularly true for African Americans who live in or near poverty where primary concerns are about food, shelter, and safety, more so than gender.

In further research about the intersection of gender, race, and social class, Hill (1999) concluded that White parents emphasize that their sons learn the traits of respect and obedience more than do Black parents. Gendered socialization was especially central in working- and lower-middle-class White families, whereas Black families of similar socioeconomic status placed far less emphasis on differential gender role socialization. Racial disparities seemed to shift with social class. For instance, upper-middle-class Black parents stressed the importance of gender role socialization more than did upper-middle-class White parents. About the intersection of race, class, and gender, Hill and Sprague (1999) write, “Parents operate within their own specific economic and social constraints...In struggling with these constraints and expectations, they draw on the values they learned from their own families and communities, which are marked by race and class. In parenting, and probably in the rest of life, race, class, and gender dynamics interact” (497).

Adolescence

Adolescence and puberty are times of great turmoil for most children, even those who appear to conform to normative expectations with regard to their sex, gender, and sexual orientation. Negotiating the minefields of puberty and early intimacy is complicated tremendously for children and young adults who are out of sync with standard expectations with regard to gender and sexuality.

Puberty

There is a robust literature on the social psychological impacts of puberty. Disparate socialization for the development of gender roles is intensified at the time of puberty. Girls and boys experience overwhelming pressure to be heterosexual with respect to sexual intimacy. In general, girls’ psychosocial adjustment at puberty is poorer than boys’ (Vogt Yuan, 2007). Negative cultural messages abound about girls’ post-pubescent bodies, particularly regarding hygiene, odor, and menstruation. Manufacturers of “sanitary supplies”, such as tampons and menstrual pads, offer a plethora of perfumed products to hide the natural odors associated with menstruation. Additional products, such as FDS’s “Feminine Deodorant Spray” and freshening wipes, suggest that women need to use their products to “stay fresh all day, every day with FDS sprays and washes,” indicating that the natural occurring secretions produced by women’s bodies need to be covered up and cleaned up for women to be considered attractive and/or feminine (<http://www.fds.info/products/index.aspx>). Thus, it is not surprising that girls often learn to feel ashamed of their maturing bodies during and after puberty and they are pressured to develop a highly alert sense of body consciousness (Lindberg, Grabe, & Hyde, 2007). The theory of *objectified body consciousness* asserts that during puberty, adolescents experience sexual objectification and as a result come to see their own bodies as objects to be scrutinized and evaluated (McKinley & Hyde, 1996). Lindberg et al. (2007) argue that girls experience higher levels of objectified body consciousness than boys and, as a result, develop greater feelings of shame associated with their maturing bodies. Their research documents high levels of objectified body consciousness among girls as young as age 11. With the increasing sexualization of males and male bodies in popular culture, it is possible that boys’ sense of objectified body consciousness during and after puberty may intensify as well, although data do not yet support this change.

Additional differences in response to pubescent transitions were noted by Vogt Yuan's (2007) analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (a nationally representative sample of 9,011 girls and 8,781 boys in grades 7–12). In her exploration of whether or not and in what ways depressive symptoms differ by gender pre-, peri-, and post-puberty, Vogt Yuan found that boys experience more depressive symptoms before puberty, while girls undergo greater symptoms of depression following puberty. She concludes that these gendered differences may be attributed to negative body image in post-pubescent girls. Her findings indicate that during puberty, boys' insecurities relate to concerns about being physically smaller and less developed than their post-pubescent male peers. In contrast, consistent with Simmons and Blyth's (1987) work, girls' elevated insecurities post-puberty revolve around being more physically developed and overweight than their pre-pubescent female peers. Girls' psychological sensitivity to their physical changes lends credence to Lindberg et al.'s (2007) theory of heightened objectified body consciousness among female adolescents. Consistently, Vogt Yuan (2007) found no differences in depressive symptoms in comparing pre- and post-pubescent boys, whereas there was a significant increase in depressive symptoms among post-pubescent as compared to pre-pubescent girls. Vogt Yuan notes that socialization regarding ideal body types is far more limiting for girls than for boys, in that (particularly for White girls) the ideal adult woman is thin. For boys, there is a greater acceptable variety of ideal adult male body types, although a central aspect of being normatively masculine is physical strength.

Further research, based on data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health as well as the Adolescent Health and Academic Achievement Study, found that the age of pubescent onset, as marked by first menses, has significant implications particularly for girls' sense of self and relationships with others (Cavanagh, Riegle-Crumb, & Crosnoe, 2007). Cavanagh et al. note that girls who reach menarche earlier than the majority of their peers have higher risks of long-term negative body-image, a greater likelihood to choose high-risk and older peer relationships, and are more likely to engage in early risk-taking behaviors, such as drinking, smoking, and sexual activity. Their data also show that girls who commence menstruation earlier than the majority of their peers are both more likely to fail a course in ninth grade and more likely to drop out of high school before completion than girls who begin menstruating at an average age (Cavanagh et al., 2007, pp. 192–193). These patterns of difficult transitions for those who menstruate early remain statistically significant when other variables that could yield spurious associations are controlled.

Sexuality Education

Even though the National Education Association endorsed sexual education in the schools in 1912, the source and substance of that curriculum remains hotly contested 100 years later (D'Emilio & Freedman, 1997, p. 207; Luker, 2006). Formal and informal lessons about sexuality help to inform the sexual socialization of the self. Most school-based sexuality curricula strongly reinforce messages about gender normativity, heterosexuality, and the perplexing social contradiction that premarital and/or non monogamous sexual activity causes diseases and is sinful, but sexual intimacy is a sacred gift to share with one's spouse in heterosexual marriage (Fields, 2012). In short, the confusing message youth often receive about sexuality is that "sex is dirty, sex is bad, and we should save it for the one we love." The discouragement of premarital sex, saving sexual expression for marital unions, itself perpetuates heterocentric socialization and the misconception that all school children will someday engage in the legal institution of marriage.

For American school children, sexuality education is typically divided into two primary stages: early puberty (in approximately 5th grade) and mid-to-late adolescence (around 10th grade). In elementary school, children are frequently divided by gender and receive separate girls' and boys' curricula that concentrate on gender-specific pubescent rites of passage. At this stage, girls' sexuality

education focuses on menarche (first menses), menstruation, and the role of ovulation in pregnancy, whereas the boys' curriculum emphasizes sexual pleasure in the form of nocturnal emissions ("wet dreams") and the role of sperm in pregnancy. In high school, the topic of sexuality is frequently covered in health class and is a co-ed experience. Depending on the funding sources a state receives, the curriculum is more or less comprehensive. It may rely on teaching abstinence until heterosexual marriage as the sole method of preventing pregnancy and the spread of sexually transmitted infections (STI), such as HIV and chlamydia, or take a more comprehensive approach, including information about contraception and the use of condoms in minimizing one's risk of contracting STIs. Condom-use education in the schools increased dramatically in the era of HIV and AIDS (Eisenberg, Bernet, Bearinger, & Resnick, 2008; Kirby & Laris, 2009).

The rates of teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections in the United States reflect the fact that our youth are woefully unprepared with regard to pregnancy prevention and engaging in safer sex practices. Rates of transmitting STIs are higher in the United States than in any other industrialized country; U.S. teen pregnancy rates are approximately four times those of Sweden and France and nearly 50 % higher than Great Britain and Canada (Hust, Brown & Ladin L'Engle, 2008, p. 4). Furthermore, with an emphasis on maintaining virginity until marriage, some teenagers are engaging in oral and anal sex (Lindberg, Jones, & Santelli, 2008; Markham, Peskin, Hernandez, Johnson, & Addy, 2011). Those who take "virginity pledges" to wait until marriage are less likely to use contraception and to protect themselves from STIs when they are sexually active (Bruckner & Bearman, 2005; Rosenbaum, 2009).

Schools are only one source of sexual socialization; families, peers, media, and religion also play major roles in socializing our youth about sexual norms. In non-school settings, girls and boys receive very different information about sexuality, with girls learning information from their mothers and peers at younger ages and more frequently than their male counterparts (Allen, Kaestle, & Goldberg, 2011; Epstein & Ward, 2008). Furthermore, we live in a culture that is awash in contradictory messages about sexuality. In popular culture, sexuality is pervasive, flagrant, and often bordering on the pornographic, yet with regard to sexual messages from familial, religious, political, and educational bodies, sexuality should not be discussed openly or shared readily (Kammeyer, 2008; Levin & Kilbourne, 2009). In essence, our culture is simultaneously oversexed and undersexed. The ease of access to sexual content has flourished with the ready availability of cable and reality television programming, amateur video hardware and software, such as computer Web cameras, Skype, YouTube and cell phones, and the popularity of adolescent and adult "sexting" (cell phone or other electronic communication involving sexually explicit content).

In their quantitative analysis of sexualized messages in popular television programs, movies, magazines, and music consumed by 3,261 Black and White 12–14 year-olds, Hust et al. (2008, pp. 3–4) found that less than .05 % of the content contained depictions or messages about healthy sexuality. Their further qualitative analysis of these rare media portrayals of youth engaging in sexually healthy behaviors, such as negotiating sexual encounters or contracepting, revealed stereotypes about gender and sex, such as boys/men want sex and girls/women are responsible for preventing pregnancy. Additional representations of sexuality in these four types of media revealed themes of shame and embarrassment in relation to contraception and puberty. In short, popular media compound the lack of open communication and healthy role models with regard to sexual socialization.

Deviation from Gender and Sexual Norms

Deviation from gender and sexual norms brings about consequences that range from bullying and teasing to violent hate crimes that include homicide (Drake, 2004; Grant et al., 2011; Namaste, 2000). Those deemed to be both gender and sexually nonconforming, for example, people who are transgendered, are often subject to the harshest of social consequences. According to the National Transgender

Discrimination Survey of 6,450 transgender adults, 41 % of respondents reported attempting suicide (as compared to 1.6 % of the general U.S. population) (Grant et al.). Gender nonconforming adults also reported harassment in K-12 educational settings, not only by their peers, but by their teachers as well (Grant et al.). Those who were harassed by both teachers and peers fare far worse on a variety of health measures as adults than do those who were victimized by peers but not teachers. Poor health outcomes include addictive use of tobacco, drugs, or alcohol and higher rates of HIV infection (Grant et al.). A staggering 78 % of respondents who expressed their gender nonconformity during grades K-12 reported being harassed or bullied in school; 61 % reported being victims of physical assault at the hands of their peers, and 64 % reported sexual assault by peers (Grant et al.).

Developing a Gay or Lesbian Identity

The process of developing a gay or lesbian identity in a heteronormative society is challenging, particularly since key agents of socialization, such as family, school, religion and mass media, often fail to model, respect, or even recognize a diversity of sexual orientations. The importance of being able to identify positive role models and rewards for one's sexual orientation echoes the need for affirmation in identity formation found in both the social learning theory and cognitive models of identity development. Rosario, Schrimshaw, Hunter, and Braun (2006) speak to the magnitude of identity development challenges for lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth given a dearth of positive role models: "Unlike members of other minority groups (e.g., ethnic and racial minorities) most [lesbian, gay, and bisexual] individuals are not raised in a community of similar others from whom they learn about their identity and who reinforce and support that identity" (p. 46).

Given the difficulties of being perceived (or perceiving oneself) as sexually "deviant," a large body of research has addressed the ways people cope with being socially outcast due to their sexual orientation. A recurring theme across scholars' work in this area is that being able to identify with others who have been similarly outcast increases one's sense of efficacy in creating a viable and meaningful identity. While longitudinal and life course research in this area is particularly valuable, much of it is retrospective and cross-sectional in nature. Earlier models of coming out and community empowerment identify a multi-stage process of embracing one's socially stigmatized aspect of self. These stages include: (1) recognition of one's non-conformity; (2) acknowledgment of one's difference to self and others; (3) seeking and socializing with similar others; (4) pride in the marginal identity; and (5) integration of one's identity within a prevailing socio-cultural context (Cass, 1984; Minton & McDonald, 1984; Preves, 2003). More recent research calls into question a stage model of coming out and the notion of "coming out" as a linear process altogether, particularly for young gay men (Mosher, 2001; Orne, 2011; Savin-Williams, 2001). In his research on identity negotiation among young gay men, Orne concludes that "strategic outness" is a more apt term than "coming out," which implies "a continual, contextual, social identity management" (2011, p. 685). His conceptualization draws on Mosher's concept of being both "in and out" of the closet at the same time.

A recent rash of suicides among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender North American youth has led to increased concern about the bullying to which queer youth are subject as well as calls for more education about and support for queer youth (Haskell & Burtch, 2010). At the forefront of this effort is a viral Internet video campaign and book comprised of "It Gets Better" inspirational autobiographical testimonials from adults who survived adolescent bullying, alienation, and the coming out process (thetrevorproject.org; Haskell & Burtch, 2010; Savage & Miller, 2011). According to the co-founder of the "It Gets Better" video campaign, Internet technology enables connection with others who have been similarly marginalized: "I could speak directly to [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)] kids. I could look into a camera, share my story, and let LGBT kids know that it got better for me and it would get better for them too. I could give 'em hope" (Savage & Miller, p. 4).

The coming out and identity formation processes for queer youth are complicated by race and class. For example, commitments to community, family, and tradition have been found to be higher among Blacks and Hispanics, making the development of nontraditional gender and sexual identities even more challenging than it may be for Whites, who more readily find positive queer role models and acceptance of LGBT identities (Hetrick & Martin, 1987; Icard, 1986). Barnshaw and Letukas (2010) conducted research on heterosexually-identified men who have sex with men “on the down low,” utilizing data from the Urban Men’s Health Study (n=2,881). Among Black and Latino men, the lack of support for queer identity in their communities encourages sexual risk taking that increases exposure to sexually transmitted diseases and infections, including HIV and AIDS, and discourages the development of long-term intimate, open relationships. They note that the strong religious ties predominant within Black and Latino culture emphasize the already pervasive homophobia that is present in society at large. Thus, for queer Blacks and Latinos, the stigma associated with deviant sexual/gender is amplified.

Development of Intimate Relationships

The Influence of Relationships in Early Childhood

The influence of relationships in early childhood on overall quality of life and the ability to develop and sustain intimate relationships later in life cannot be overstated. A child’s early connections with parents, siblings and additional significant others initiates them into relational practices that will continue throughout their lives. Socialization research has chiefly focused on the importance of the relational qualities of warmth, security, and mutual reciprocity in early childhood (Laible & Thompson, 2007).

Warmth is a key component of early relationship socialization in that its presence gives children the sense that they are respected and loved. These qualities promote a child’s ability to trust in their caregivers – a feature central to future relationship success (Laible & Thompson, 2007). The presence of consistent, reliable caregivers promotes a child’s sense of security in relationship development. Attachment theorists posit that the creation of secure and trusting relationships in early childhood is essential for success in future relationship development and allows for the experience of intimacy and close relationships in adulthood (Laible & Thompson; Thompson, 2007). Finally, children’s experience of mutual reciprocity in close relationships enables them to develop a sense of shared obligation and sensitivity in relation to others throughout their life course (Laible & Thompson, 2007).

Relationships in Adolescence and Emerging Adulthood

As children age, the influence of peers becomes increasingly significant in their socialization. Adolescents, like people in other age groups, tend to choose friends that are similar to themselves in multiple ways (such as race, social class, gender, social proximity, and school achievement, among other factors). In addition, adolescents demonstrate greater intimacy in their friendships with others than do younger children. Between the ages of 18–25, as adolescents become young adults and enter the relatively newly defined period of “emerging adulthood,” the emotional depth and complexity of their friendships are enhanced (Arnett, 2007). Arnett speaks to a number of societal changes that led to the extension of adolescence into a prolonged period of “emerging adulthood”:

Economic changes from a manufacturing to an information-based world economy increased the need and desirability of obtaining additional education and training beyond secondary school...[T]he invention of the birth control pill...made it relatively easy for young people to become sexually active in their late teens

without a high risk of pregnancy. Corresponding social changes, specifically, increased acceptance of premarital sexuality and cohabitation, further weakened the traditional belief that marriage must be entered before sexual activity begins... Thus the period of life lasting from the late teens through (at least) the mid-20s changed in less than a half century from being a period of entering and settling into adult roles of marriage, parenthood and long-term work to being a period when young people typically focus on their self-development as they gradually lay the foundation for their adult lives (p. 208).

Social interactions with peers is influential for continued socialization, as well as the internalization and generalization of prosocial or deviant behaviors and values (Bukowski, Brendgen, & Vitaro, 2007; Wentzel & Looney, 2007). Close relationships with peers provide children, adolescents, and emerging adults with ongoing proximal feedback regarding appropriate social behavior and offer the opportunity to extend the intimate relationship dynamics first experienced within one's family. Through friendship, further socialization occurs about the role and reliability of intimacy, warmth, security, and reciprocity within relationships. Throughout the life course, our intimate relationships are deeply affected by the sexual scripts learned through dating and other intimate encounters that socialize individuals' attitudes and behaviors (Carpenter & DeLamater, 2012; Gagnon & Simon, 1973).

The Influence of Media

In addition to peers, North American youth have extensive exposure to various forms of media that increasingly affect socialization (Brown & Strasburger, 2007; Grabe, Ward, & Hyde, 2008; Lenhart, Madden, Macgill, & Smith, 2007). Television, video games, and the Internet have direct implications for the formation of gender roles and sexual identities. In their study, *Generation M: Media in the Lives of 8-18 Year-Olds*, Roberts, Foehr, and Rideout (2005) discuss their survey research with 2,032 students in grades 3–12 and supplemental analysis of media diaries written by a subset of nearly 700 of these students. A majority of youth reported that the television is on “most of the time” in their homes (51 %), with 63 % reporting that the television is on during mealtimes. Furthermore, Roberts et al. (2005) found that video game consoles are present in 83 % of 8–18 year olds' homes. As is the case with television, boys spend more time than girls playing video games (Roberts et al.). Finally, their research documents the nearly ubiquitous presence of computers in American homes (86 %) with the majority of families having Internet access (74 %). While they found no gender difference in the amount of time youth spend on the computer, age does play an important role. For example, Internet use increases from an average of 8 min per day for preschoolers to 82 min per day for 15–18-year-olds (Roberts et al.).

Dating and Sexuality

With the prevalence of sexual imagery in television programming, popular music videos and lyrics, movies and on the Internet, it is perhaps not surprising that most American youth become sexually active as teenagers. Notable differences in sexual socialization across gender, race, and ethnicity likely account for disparate sexual outcomes noted in the literature. For example, more than 90 % of men and 85 % of women engage in sexual intercourse premaritally (Renzetti et al., 2012) and 57 % of Americans agree that sex between an unmarried woman and man is morally acceptable (Gallup Poll, 2009). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report that among U.S. high school students, 47 % report being sexually active (2006). African American high schoolers are more likely to report having sex than their Hispanic and White peers; 67 % of Black high school students report having sex as compared to 52 % of Hispanics students and 44 % of White students (CDC, 2008).

Despite the high rate of sexual intercourse among U.S. teens, there remains social pressure to retain one's virginity as a “gift” for their future (heterosexual) marital partner, particularly among

Christians (Carpenter, 2005; Luker, 2006). Perhaps due to this pressure, teens report being more likely to engage in oral sex than in penile-vaginal intercourse and view oral sex as having fewer emotional and social consequences than intercourse (Carpenter, 2005; Halpern-Felsher, Cornell, Kropp, & Tschann, 2005). Once having engaged in intercourse, adolescent boys and young men report experiencing more pleasure and less guilt than do adolescent girls and young women. Gender differences in motivation for first intercourse are also notable. For example, 48 % of young women indicate their primary motives for first intercourse include affection for their partner and approval. Fifty-one percent of young men, in contrast, indicate their primary motives for first intercourse include curiosity, feeling ready, and status seeking (Hyde & Jaffee, 2000; Little & Rankin, 2001). Abma, Martinez, Mosher, and Dawson (2004) note the social pressures experienced by adolescent girls to be sexual, in that fewer than 50 % of adolescent girls said they truly wanted to engage in sexual intercourse the first time they did so.

Morgan and Zurbriggen (2007) offer further insight into likely gender differences in socialization to first sexual intercourse via their qualitative interviews with 79 young adults. Young women in their study reported receiving pressure from their boyfriends to be sexual, whereas young men reported receiving messages about sexual boundary setting from their girlfriends. The young women frequently responded to sexual pressure by engaging in unwanted sexual activity, whereas the young men responded to their girlfriends' boundary setting with a combination of acceptance and frustration (Morgan & Zurbriggen). The concept of "consensual unwanted sex" due to various social pressures (Muehlenhard & Peterson, 2005) in adolescents' (and even adults') sexual experiences warrants further investigation.

Among older adolescents and young adults the likelihood of engaging in sexual activity outside of a committed relationship increases significantly. According to Manning, Giordano, and Longmore's (2006) analysis of data from the Toledo Adolescent Relationships Study, more than 50 % of teens have casual sexual relationships with friends or former girlfriends or boyfriends. The phenomenon of teens and young adults engaging in sexual activity outside of a dating context, also known as "one-night stands" or "hooking up," has gained the interest of many scholars (Armstrong, England, & Fogarty, 2012; Regnerus & Uecker, 2011). Manning et al. (2006) report that among the 1,316 – 7th, 9th, and 11th, graders in their study, 48 % of teens said they had sex with a friend, 14 % with a former girlfriend or boyfriend, 23 % with an acquaintance, and 6 % with someone they didn't know within the past year (p. 470). One implication of these data is that socialization to sexual relationships has changed significantly in recent years.

Gender differences in the outcome of engaging in casual sex are illustrated by Eshbaugh and Gute's (2008) study of 152 sexually active female college students. Similar to adolescents, college women report that engaging in oral sex carries fewer consequences than sexual intercourse does. Not surprisingly, women in the study reported that the regret they experienced after having casual sexual intercourse increased as the level of contact with their sexual partner decreased. That is, respondents reported more regret following casual sexual intercourse if they knew their partner less than 24 h before engaging in sex with them and if they engaged in intercourse with them only the one time, illustrating that especially for women there is an emphasis on sexual socialization that links sexual activity to partner intimacy. Participation in casual sex may have significant implications; that is, adult sexual feelings, actions, and identity may stem from these earlier sexual experiences.

Interesting racial differences in casual sexual encounters are also noted in the literature, highlighting a diversity of socialization experiences with regard to race and sexuality. For example, in her interviews and secondary data analysis of Stanford University's College Social Life Survey, McClintock (2010) studied racial differences in "hooking up" among 732 students. Her findings indicate that young adults are more likely to engage in interracial "hook ups" than in interracial dating relationships. Moreover, she found that Black women and Asian-American men are considerably less likely to engage in casual sexual activity with partners outside of their race than are Asian-American women and Black men. Her research supports others' findings with regard to socialization for

friendship, dating, or marriage in that there is an emphasis on choosing intimate partners that are racially and ethnically homogenous to oneself.

Further highlighting racial and ethnic diversity with regard to socialization for intimate relationships, research about the sexual and dating behavior of Asian-American adolescents shows that among 14–18 year-olds, those who are more closely aligned with traditional Asian values (as measured by the Asian Values Scale) postpone sexual activity and date without parents' knowledge. Indeed, regardless of their scores on the Asian Values Scale, nearly 75 % of Lau, Markham, Lin, Flores, and Chacko's (2009) 31 interviewees had dated without their parents' knowledge. Many of the interviewees reported being engaged in monogamous, steady relationships. A consistent theme throughout the interviews was that parents stressed academic success as a prerequisite for permission to date, which could explain, in part, the reason for adolescents' secrecy. In their qualitative and quantitative research on 76 Midwestern seventh graders and their mothers, Mounts and Kim (2009) found additional racial differences in parental values. African American mothers stressed the importance of religiosity of their child's potential dating partners more than did Caucasian or Latino mothers. Caucasian mothers also expressed more intentional involvement in their children's prospective dating lives than did the other mothers. Raffaelli and Ontai (2001) explored similar themes in their qualitative research with 22 Latina women between the ages of 20–45 who had lived in the United States for at least 8 years, but were raised in Spanish-speaking families. Their interviewees reported parents' overt socialization against premarital or extra-marital sexual activity and strict boundaries around dating and sexuality to protect their daughters' and families' "honor".

Regardless of notable differences in sexual socialization across gender, race, and social class, the common emphasis on compulsory heterosexuality cannot be overstated. The pressure to be heterosexual, and appropriately gendered, is felt across all realms of socialization. As a result, youth who identify as LGBT lack appropriate role models, education, and outlets for the development of intimate relationships throughout the life course.

Socialization in More Stable Relationship Contexts

Given the diversity of contemporary family structures, children grow up in a variety of family forms, including heterosexual married or cohabitating parents, single-parents, step-parents, and same sex parents, and in interracial marriages. Cohabitation is far more visible and socially acceptable and may now be considered a normative stage for young adults in their preparation for marriage, particularly for middle class heterosexual couples (Sassler, 2010; Sassler & Miller, 2011). Finally, the growing prevalence of childlessness (in various family forms) presents another alternative as young people contemplate their futures.

Despite the diversification of coupling and family structures, American youth are still largely socialized to anticipate that they will someday be married with children. The overbearing presence of lavish heterosexual weddings in television, film, advertising, children's literature, and fairy tales stress highly gendered and heteronormative visions about someday growing up to be married – even to one's prince or princess (Ingraham, 2008).

Even though the image of the two-parent middle class White heterosexual household replete with housewife, "breadwinner", two children and dog still persists, the reality of American family structures is far from this nostalgic ideal (Coontz, 2000). Indeed, demographic trends among American families at the beginning of the twenty-first century indicate that childbearing among single and cohabiting, non-married, parents is on the rise. In fact, recent research indicates that more than 39 % of children born in the U.S. today are born to unmarried women (Cherlin, 2010, p. 406) and an increasing number of women have children who are fathered by more than one man – a situation referred to as "multiple partner fertility" (Cherlin, p. 407). Below we explore contemporary trends in coupling and family structures, and the implications they have for socialization.

Heterosexual Marriage and Cohabitation

Historically, youth viewed getting married as a rite of passage to attaining adulthood. As youth delay marriage and increasingly opt out of marriage for cohabitation with or without children, the models for how to attain adulthood have shifted considerably. Consider, for example, how many 25–34 year-olds are living with their parents today. According to the 2011 Current Population Survey, 19 % percent of young men and 10 % of young women in this age group are living with their parents (U. S. Bureau of Census, 2011).

As youth have extended the transition to adulthood, they have also been getting married later or, in growing numbers, not at all. The average age at first marriage has been climbing steadily for decades. According to the Pew Research Center (Cohn, Passel, Wang, & Livingston, 2011), the median age at which Americans marry is currently at an all-time high: 28.7 for men and 26.5 for women. Moreover, only 51 % of U.S. adults are married today, as compared to 72 % of the adult population in 1960. Eleven percent of contemporary heterosexual U.S. couples cohabitate without being married (Cohn et al., 2011).

Same Sex Marriage and Cohabitation

The institution of marriage has been in flux in recent years, in part because of the frequency of divorce, the increasing visibility of extramarital affairs, and the polarizing counter-movements for marriage equity and marriage defense. With between 40 and 50 % of all marriages ending in divorce (Cherlin, 2010) and the tendency, particularly for men, to remarry, children are socialized in a society in which divorce, “blended” families, and shared custody are all normalized. Youth see the trends in relationship instability not only in their own immediate or extended families, but in their friendship groups, religious institutions, the media, and popular culture. The institution of marriage itself has become highly politicized in the last 15 years, as the move towards marriage equity for same sex couples spurred the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and an overwhelming number of state-based constitutional marriage amendments. The Defense of Marriage Act and constitutional marriage amendments share the same goals: defining marriage as a legal union between one woman and one man and allowing states the right to refuse to recognize the validity of same sex marriages performed in other states.²

The right to same sex marriage and the opposition to it has been a mainstay of political and social discourse in the first decade of the twenty-first century. From San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom (temporarily and singlehandedly) legalizing gay marriage in June of 2008 to the abrupt passage of Proposition 8, which made same sex marriage illegal throughout the state of California a matter of months later, the issue of gay marriage is at the heart of social and political contemporary discourse. The United States Supreme Court is hearing cases on the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act and Proposition 8 at the time of this writing. Beginning with Massachusetts in 2004, same sex marriage is now legal in twelve states and the District of Columbia (Gay Marriage ProCon.org, 2013). In May 2012, Barack Obama became the first sitting U.S. president to endorse same-sex marriage

²The federal Defense of Marriage Act became legislation in 1996, preventing same sex couples who legally marry in a state that allows it from enjoying federal marriage benefits, such as filing joint federal taxes, receiving a spouse’s Social Security, Medicare, or disability benefits, and receiving spousal military and veteran’s benefits for medical care, education, or special loans (Ingraham, 2008). Constitutional marriage amendments go a step further by actually altering a government’s constitution to prohibit same sex marriage. In addition to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, six states have their own Defense of Marriage Acts to prohibit same sex couples access to state issued marriage rights (Human Rights Campaign, 2013), such as the joint filing of state taxes, the ability to make medical decisions on behalf of one’s partner in an emergency, access to visiting one’s partner in the hospital, joint custody, immunity from testifying against one’s spouse, and automatic inheritance (Ingraham). Furthermore, thirty states have altered their state constitutions to prohibit same sex marriage at the constitutional level since 1998 (Human Rights Campaign, 2013).

(Calmes & Baker, 2012).³ The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that there are 594,291 same sex cohabitating couples in the nation; a third of female same-sex cohabitating couples are parenting children while nearly a quarter of the male same-sex cohabitating partners are (Cherlin, 2010, p. 409). In short, regardless of their own sexual orientation or family's stance on the issue, youth are being socialized in an era where LGBT individuals and families are increasingly visible (Biblarz & Savci, 2010). As a result, queer youth may be socialized to think more normatively and positively about their sexual identities and future family structures, including envisioning the possibility of being legally married and having children.

Socialization to Parenthood

Becoming a parent is a normative stage in the life course and the pressures to become a parent are pervasive. The social expectation not only to parent, but to have one's own biological offspring, has led to the development of new reproductive technologies that include expensive, invasive, and often painful fertility treatments.

Socialization to parenthood extends well beyond the modeling of parenting by one's immediate or extended family into the realms of education, religion, media, and peers. Children and young adults have ample opportunities to engage in anticipatory socialization for parenthood by "practicing" being a parent before (or instead of) actually having children. Common outlets for anticipatory socialization to parenthood include being an actively engaged aunt or uncle (Milardo, 2008), a "parentified" older sibling who shares the responsibility of parenting (Hooper & Doehler, 2011), and raising a pet alone or with an intimate partner (Walsh, 2009).

A person's experiences of socialization to parenthood are likely to create an overall positive or negative attitude toward childrearing and children in general and to impact the timing of becoming a parent. For example, in her analysis of eight longitudinal waves of the Intergenerational Panel Study of Parents and Children, Barber (2001) finds a strong correlation between the attitudes one holds towards children and parenthood and the timing of childbearing itself. More specifically, married women (but not men) who have a positive attitude about spending time with children have children earlier in their marriages than do women who have negative attitudes about children. The more women or men view children and parenting as stressful, the more likely they are to delay parenting (or forgo it altogether). Becoming a parent early in marriage is also more common for women and men who want large families. Chosen childlessness is more frequent for women and men who believe that their careers will be a primary source of personal gratification. For young adults, a positive outlook about one's future career prospects is correlated with a decreased likelihood of becoming a parent before or outside of marriage (Barber).

Adult socialization to the parental role differs in the contexts of two-parent married families, two-parent unmarried families, single parent mother and single parent father families, lesbian and gay parenting, and adoptive parenting (Smock & Greenland, 2010). Anticipatory socialization to parenthood is impacted by the journey one experiences on the way to parenthood (e.g., getting pregnant inadvertently or easily, international adoption, or in vitro fertilization). While establishing a division of labor in parenting and domestic tasks is challenging for any couple, when both parents are the same gender additional complications may exist. Anticipatory socialization toward lesbian and gay

³As of this writing, same-sex marriage is legal in twelve states and the District of Columbia: Massachusetts (2004), Connecticut (2008), Iowa (2009), Vermont (2009), New Hampshire (2010), the District of Columbia (2010), New York, (2011) Washington (2012), Maine (2012), Maryland (2012), Rhode Island (2013), Delaware (2013), and Minnesota (2013), (Gay Marriage ProCon.org, 2013).

parenting or single parenting is problematized by the fact that parenting roles are so frequently predicated on heterosexual and gender normative roles. Thus, single and same sex parents may be more conscious in constructing parenting roles than heterosexual co-parents are.

Socialization in Contexts of Relationship Dissolution

Involvement in monogamous intimate relationships and ultimately, marriage, is considered normative. All types of intimate relationships inevitably end, whether through widowhood, divorce, or non-marital break-up. Therefore socialization to relationship dissolution is a key component of learning to negotiate intimate relationships. According to Larson, Wilson, Brown, Furstenberg, and Verma (2002, p. 51),

to become competent adults, adolescents...will need to master the skills to form, manage, and end relationships. They need...skills for...managing conflicts, and repairing breaches; and they need to have the ability, when necessary, to sever relationships in an ethical manner and to manage emotional upheavals when relationships end.

Social networks that support the couple during and after their separation play an important role in socialization for relationship dissolution. Confidantes, during and after the breakup, may encourage new orientations (including views of the former partner), and the formation of new relationships. Learning to let partners uncouple, rather than altercasting them as still together, is a rather nuanced aspect of socialization and social interaction.

Divorce

Because separation and divorce are so common in the United States, children and young adults are socialized to various models of such relationship dissolution, whether in their immediate family or elsewhere. There is an established literature on the impact of divorce on children (Amato, 2010). Swartz' (2009) research finds that not only does divorce have deleterious effects on children, such as weakened relationship ties with noncustodial parents, but also on parents' relationships with their children when they become adults. This is particularly true for fathers who are noncustodial parents. This results in a weakening of intergenerational ties, support, and responsibility between divorced parents and their adult children. A similar lack of connection is found between children whose parents are divorced and their paternal grandparents. Divorced parents also tend to live further away from their adult children, have less frequent contact with them, and report overall lower quality in their relationships with their adult children than married parents do. The younger the child is at the time of divorce, the more pronounced these patterns of relationship distance and strain. These trends suggest that the relational distance and tension that often accompany divorce may have negative impacts on the socialization of children for adult primary and intimate relationships.

Death of a Spouse

One of the most emotionally traumatic experiences during the life course is the death of one's spouse. Youth and adult children are socialized to spousal death and bereavement through the loss of their own parents or grandparents, similar losses experienced by extended family members and friends, and spousal death portrayed in media. Preparation for widowhood is often delayed, as discussion of death in general and spousal or parental loss in particular is uncomfortable and somewhat socially taboo. Thus, anticipatory socialization to widowhood is likely lacking except in rare circumstances.

Nonmarital Relationship Dissolution

In contemporary North American society, youth are encouraged to engage in anticipatory socialization for marriage by dating monogamously. Socialization to romantic partnership involves the nearly inevitable occurrence of “uncoupling,” as well as the disparate experiences of the one who initiates the break up versus the one who is cast off (Vaughan, 1986). For couples who cohabit but choose not to marry, or for those who are not legally able to marry, relationship dissolution receives less social recognition than the dissolution of a marriage partnership, regardless of the length of relationship. That is, rites of passage for relationship dissolution, such as the legalities of filing for separation, divorce and custody, are not accessible to intimate partners dissolving a non-marital relationship. Lacking socialization for rituals that honor relationship dissolution may hinder one’s ability to successfully initiate, honor, or grieve the end of a significant intimate partnership.

The Role of Technology in Relationship Dissolution

Whatever the era, technology plays a central role in our relationships and in how we navigate the social world. Youth are socialized to conduct intimate and non-intimate relationships via the technology with which they are raised. With the advent of the Internet and subsequent technological developments, youth are learning to experience relationships in a more “wired” and public arena than ever before. From posting status updates on Facebook, sending text messages to one’s sweetheart while on a date with them, or accessing one’s photos via cell phone, wireless technology mediates North American relationships, to some degree, regardless of gender, race, and social class.

A sizeable literature exists on how electronic communications, such as e-mail, have altered interpersonal relations, including some research on how social networking affects youth identity development and interaction (Helenga, 2011). Socialization to using electronic technologies in intimate relationships includes, for better or worse, experimentation with “sexting” (sending sexually provocative text or Twitter messages, photographs, or images), and breaking up through texts, e-mail, and status updates (Weisskirch & Delevi, 2012). Highly public incidents of sexting scandals have also been part of very recent youth relationship and technology socialization. The impact that electronic relationship engagement and dissolution have had on the attitudes and behaviors of youth are important areas of inquiry.

Socialization for Work

Historical Context

Like the family, the institution of work has undergone massive changes, especially since the 1970s, as a result of globalization and rapid technological change. Globalization expands consumer and employment markets and enhances competition, as companies throughout the world seek greater efficiency and productivity, while minimizing labor costs by automating work processes and hiring cheap labor. The elimination of jobs at home as they are “outsourced” overseas becomes commonplace. Fullerton and Wallace (2007) label the resulting situation the “flexible turn in U.S. labor relations,” involving organizational restructuring, downsizing, declining unionization, growing use of contingent labor, and a general erosion of the “social contract” between employees and employers. Nonstandard employment relations, with little or no job security, affect both workers in “bad jobs” (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000), as well as highly skilled employees like managers and professionals

(Skags & Leicht, 2005). Stable work careers become ever more rare; instead of following preordained, institutionalized paths, career construction becomes an active and deliberate, albeit problematic, challenge (Heinz, 2003). The uncertainty and difficulties in securing and maintaining stable employment are of course heightened during periods of economic decline, as in the recent “Great Recession”, which began in late 2007. As jobs that can be routinized are automated or outsourced out of existence, the “good jobs” that remain require higher levels of both general skills and specialized training. While it was once possible to obtain a “living wage” with a high school education, through skilled manual labor, the collapse of manufacturing in the United States has made this virtually impossible.

As the recent “Occupy Wall Street” movement has brought to the nation’s attention, inequality in the United States has increased markedly in the past few decades (Mouw & Kalleberg, 2011). As middle level occupations have declined in numbers, the labor force has become increasingly bifurcated into two divergent streams: the more highly paid professionals, managers, and highly skilled technicians, on the one hand, and more poorly paid sales and service workers, on the other. As a result, the transition from school to work has become prolonged, as youth seek higher education and post-graduate degrees; this transition has also become more individualized, unpredictable, and problematic (Schoon & Silbereisen, 2009).

Socialization to Work in the Family of Origin

Recent trends in the labor force have strong implications for both the nature and outcomes of socialization to work. On the one hand, processes of anticipatory socialization are disrupted, as it becomes more difficult for adolescents, as well as their parents, teachers, and guidance counselors, to anticipate the kinds of jobs that will be available when they are ready to enter the labor force, the particular aptitudes and skills that these jobs will require, and the credentials that they will need to obtain them.

Initially, youth form their ideas, aspirations, and preferences related to work by observing the people around them – their parents,’ relatives,’ and neighbors’ jobs, and their reactions to them. In fact, the family is recognized as a critical source of early socialization for work and vocational development, as parents communicate their own orientations toward work and their aspirations for their children to the next generation (Schulenberg, Vondracek, & Crouter, 1984; Vondracek, Lerner, & Schulenberg, 1986). A large body of research has documented that children’s intrinsic (referencing the work itself, e.g., interesting work) and extrinsic (referencing what one obtains from the job, e.g., income) work values and occupational choices are influenced by their parents’ occupations (Porfeli & Vondracek, 2007; Ryu & Mortimer, 1986). Numerous studies have shown that children from higher socioeconomic origins are more intrinsically oriented in their evaluations of various occupational rewards, while children of lower status origins are more extrinsically oriented (Johnson & Mortimer, 2011).

Melvin Kohn and his colleagues (Kohn, 1969, 1977, 1981; Kohn & Schooler 1983) identified three linkages between parental work and child socialization outcomes: first, parental occupational experiences influence parental values; second, parental values affect parental socializing behaviors; and third, parental values and behaviors are reflected in the values and behaviors of children. For Kohn and Schooler, parents’ occupational self-direction, closely linked to socio-economic status, was the key work condition of interest. Parents whose work was complex, non-routine, and not closely supervised were found to value self-directed character traits in their children, such as responsibility and the capacity to make independent decisions. Parents whose work involved more simple skills, such as doing the same tasks repeatedly, and who were under close supervision, were more likely to value obedience in their children. Kohn and Schooler believed that socialization occurring in the family would provide an advantage for middle class children, as it would better equip them for professional and managerial jobs that could help them maintain their social class location.

In contrast, working class children would be prepared for working class jobs that placed a premium on following directions initiated by their supervisors.

Self-direction is not the only aspect of parents' occupations with the potential to impinge on the developing work and achievement-related orientations of children. Parents' fortunes rise and fall, especially in turbulent economic times. The parent is the child's closest connection to the world of work, serving as a role model of one who is successful or unsuccessful in this sphere. In times of economic turmoil, uncertainty in income flows and resulting financial stressors may assume increasing importance, as children observe their parents struggling to make ends meet, reaching into their savings and investments to preserve a threatened standard of living. Glen Elder, in his classic study of *Children of the Great Depression* (1974), found that adolescent children from economically deprived backgrounds helped their families through their paid work and contributions to household labor. Their ability to help their families cope at a time of crisis contributed to their occupational development by crystallizing their vocational interests and promoting confidence. Younger children, who could not understand the reasons for their parents' plight, and who could do little to help, did not fare as well as adolescents, who could be more active in attempting to alleviate the economic burden (Elder & Rockwell, 1979).

More recent research in the context of the current "Great Recession" extends these patterns to the present. Mortimer, Zhang, and Hussemann (2012) find that children's achievement orientations, including their confidence in being able to be economically successful and their educational and occupational aspirations, are eroded when their parents experience economic hardship, but only when their parents have relatively little education. Parents who have had at least some post-secondary education may be so attuned to the importance of educational attainment that their encouragement of high aspirations, confidence, and activities that promote human capital acquisition is impervious to economic decline. Highly educated parents may be so committed to such a regime of "concerted cultivation" (Lareau, 2002), in the interest of their children's future success, that they can effectively buffer the effects of economic decline. As Wilson (1996) emphasizes, socialization to work may be deficient in families without stable providers and in communities lacking a critical mass of employed adults.

While families provide youth with general orientations toward work and achievement, in a rapidly changing world parents' specific vocational guidance may be increasingly obsolete. Instead of guiding their children toward particular occupations, parents encourage high educational aspirations. With the relative earnings of college degree recipients rapidly rising, in comparison to those with high school degrees, a bachelors' degree has become a near-universal aspiration among high school seniors (Bachman, Johnston & O'Malley, 2009; Reynolds, Stewart, Sischo, & McDonald, 2006). Youth and their parents both understand that high wages enable a middle class lifestyle and such a lifestyle is more attainable for those who become college graduates (Lemieux, 2006). Under these pressures, adolescents strive to get into the "best" college that they can, often giving little attention to the kinds of programs or majors that would be best suited to their interests and abilities (Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). Parents, in fact, sometimes dissuade their teenagers from participating in vocational education programs, for fear that exposure to such an applied curriculum might steer them away from going to college.

Socialization in the Teen Workplace

Prior to the mid-1990s, most adolescents obtained at least some generic knowledge about the routines and requirements of work through their own labor in after school or summer jobs. The Youth Development Study, which followed a community sample of approximately 1,000 adolescents through their high school years and beyond, and surveyed their parents about their own early work experiences, found that both adolescents in the high school graduating class of 1991 and their parents gave high marks to teenage work experience as an important source of preparation for future adult work

roles (Mortimer, 2003). The adolescent participants and their parents expressed strong affirmation of the value of such experiences, in teaching them about the importance of punctuality, responsibility, following the instructions of supervisors, and fulfilling the demands of their work roles. Interpersonal skill development, especially confidence and ease in speaking with adults, was a highly salient outcome of early work experiences.

The Youth Development Study has shown that occupational values may develop as a result of accentuation and reinforcement processes in adolescence, as youth respond to the quality of their teenage work experiences (Mortimer, Pimentel, Ryu, Nash, & Lee, 1996). (The same processes are also manifest in adulthood, see Mortimer & Lorence, 1979). That is, positive experiences, such as having learning opportunities at work, fostered the development of intrinsic and extrinsic work values. Moreover, those who invested a lot of time in the labor force during high school experienced a more rapid transition to career-like work (Mortimer, Vuolo, Staff, Wakefield, & Xie, 2008). Those who worked fairly continuously, but limited the intensity of their employment, were more likely to attend 4-year colleges and to achieve bachelors' degrees (Staff & Mortimer, 2007).

Unfortunately, adolescent work as a major source of anticipatory socialization has eroded for contemporary cohorts of young people. Teenage employment has been declining since the early 1980s, repeatedly falling, and not recovering, during economic recessions. In the Youth Development Study (Mortimer, 2003), 93 % of students reported that they had held employment at least some time during the 10th, 11th, and 12th grades while school was in session. Staff (2012) reports, based on data collected from large representative samples of 8th and 10th graders by the Monitoring the Future study, that 45 % reported at least some employment during the past school year in 1994; by 2010, less than 25 % did so. The teen employment to population ratio among 16 and 17 year-olds has now fallen to just 15 %, the lowest level since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began collecting data (Smith, 2011).

Delayed Vocational Development and the Erosion of Socialization for Work

In order for anticipatory socialization to be effective, youth must have some sense of the kind of occupation they expect to enter, its task requirements, challenges, and rewards. But anticipatory socialization during high school is focused not on work, but rather on future educational careers. Thus, while classic vocational theorists saw adolescence as a time of vocational exploration and work identity development (Erikson, 1959; Ginzberg, Ginsburg, Axelrad, & Herma, 1951; Super, Starishevsky, Matlin, & Jordaan, 1963), relatively few contemporary teenagers give much attention to their future careers (Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). As a result, vocational psychologists have significantly modified their theories of vocational development, extending their paradigms for vocational socialization and work identity formation throughout the occupational career (Savickas, 1997; Super, 1990).

From the perspective of high school students, work roles are a long way off. Given their low level of salience, teenagers are likely to devote little effort to thinking about, or planning for, adult careers (Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). Cross-national research suggests that the more the transition from school to work is institutionalized, the more effective anticipatory socialization will be. The United States is distinctive among modern postindustrial societies in the weakness of its institutional bridges from school to work (Kerckhoff, 2002, 2003). Unlike Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, with their apprenticeship systems, and Japan, with its strong linkages between high schools and employers, youth in the U.S. must navigate the school-to-work transition largely on their own. Mortimer and Krueger (2000) show how German youth in their mid-teens actively seek information about work as they try to match their skills and abilities with available job opportunities in the apprenticeship system. Japanese youth, particularly before widespread educational reforms that weakened school-to-work bridges, were highly motivated to exert the effort required to obtain good grades, even if they were not

planning to attend college, in hopes of obtaining favorable job placements (Kariya and Rosenbaum, 2003).

Those who begin thinking seriously about future work, stabilizing their choices and aspirations within a few years after leaving secondary school, have better occupational outcomes and are more committed to work as young adults than those whose occupational goals continue to fluctuate (Zimmer-Gembeck & Mortimer, 2007). Some teenagers are so uncertain about their future work roles that they cannot (or choose not to) articulate an occupational choice in a survey. These individuals have lower levels of adult socioeconomic attainment than those who were able to answer occupational choice questions (Staff, Harris, Sabates, & Briddell, 2010), perhaps due to the absence of anticipatory socialization and planning. But what happens after teenagers leave high school and come closer to the time that they must assume economic responsibility for themselves and enter the labor force as full-time workers?

Socialization for Work in Post-secondary Educational Settings

While some enter vocational schools, community colleges, for-profit institutions, and other post-secondary programs, other youth matriculate at 4-year colleges. A large literature describes processes of socialization in these diverse settings, as well as in post-graduate professional schools and on the job. Case studies of socialization have examined the process of becoming a nurse (Simpson, 1967), physician (Becker, Hughes, & Strauss, 1961; Merton, Reader, & Kendall, 1957), psychiatrist (Light, 1980), police officer (Hopper, 1977; Van Maanen, 1973), member of the clergy (Schoenherr & Greeley, 1974) sociologist (Wright, 1967), and physicist (Hermanowicz, 1998, 2009).

Lutfey and Mortimer (2003) describe the difficulties in many post-secondary educational settings, as students are prepared not so much for work as it is actually practiced, given the increasingly rapid obsolescence of their instructors' training. In professional schools, such as in schools of education, teaching may emphasize theory, or ideal work conditions, but not prepare students for the realities and practical problems of the workplaces that they will enter (e.g., the classroom). On-the-job socialization has the advantage of occurring in the same contexts in which future work will be practiced. Even here, however, socializees, as interns or assistants, may be assigned only the most routine work that others do not want to do, precluding true learning experiences that will be relevant to their future occupations.

As college costs have increased, grants and loans from various sources have failed to keep up, leading to a growing economic divide between youth in different types of post-secondary institutions. Private universities are increasingly the province of the affluent, while less advantaged youth gravitate to 2-year college programs in hopes of obtaining Associates' degrees or transferring to 4-year programs after completing their general education credits at a reduced cost. Given the American ideology of equal opportunity and encouragement of "college for all" (Rosenbaum, 2001), accompanied by the increasing economic returns associated with Bachelors' degrees, college enrollments have steadily expanded. At the same time, however, graduation rates have not kept up. In fact, approximately only 57 % of college students entering programs leading to 4-year degrees actually obtain them in 6 years (Knapp, Kelly-Reid, Ginder, & National Center for Education Statistics, 2010).

Low graduation rates have generated a growing literature about the difficulties in socialization experienced by first generation and low income college students, including a perceived lack of acceptance by their peers, a sense of lacking the cultural capital their middle class peers possess in the college realm, and ongoing financial difficulties throughout their schooling (Aries & Seider, 2005). "Making the grade," that is, obtaining high enough grades to stay in, and graduate from, college, becomes highly difficult under these circumstances (Becker et al. 1995). While much attention has been directed to the problems of high school dropouts, given their dismal prospects in the contemporary labor market, high rates of college dropout – including the failure to obtain Associates' as well as

Bachelors-level degrees – may be considered evidence of persistent failure of post-secondary educational organizations.

Some of the difficulty in socialization may result from the disconnect between many post-secondary educational institutions and employing organizations, or the absence of institutional bridges from school to work. While 4-year college graduates have access to career placement services, the vast majority of youth entering the labor force attended schools that made little effort to place their graduates. As research has shown, systematic connections between vocational schools and employers in the local community heighten anticipatory socialization processes, enhancing student motivation, confidence, and commitment to their chosen careers, and increasing the likelihood of timely progress and graduation (Person et al., 2005).

The desire for better job placements and opportunities leads ever more youth, as well as adults, to seek re-certification, advanced degrees or other post-secondary education long after the traditional age of leaving school. As a result, students are becoming older; about 38 % of students currently enrolled in degree-granting institutions in the U.S. are age 25 or older (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). This increasing diversity in age is accompanied by greater differences among students in prior background and experience, making it more challenging for educators to find “common ground” and to develop programs that will be relevant to all students’ objectives. Students’ increasing dissatisfaction with socialization in higher education is likely to result.

Socialization for Work in the Early Occupational Career

Individuals are socialized to work as they acquire jobs that are age appropriate, consistent with age norms and responsibilities. For example, teenagers who have jobs that have adult-like work requirements, such as long hours and stressful work conditions, are more likely than others to engage in problem behavior. Those whose jobs are compatible with school and involve learning opportunities, in contrast, are less likely to engage in such behavior (Staff & Uggen, 2003). As youth move from “survival” to “career” jobs, they develop a stronger stake in the workplace, with much to lose if their employment is disrupted, and are thus less likely to commit deviant acts (Huiras, Uggen, & McMorris, 2000).

Young people are exposed to deviance in the workplace, not always as perpetrators, but also as victims and bystanders. Uggen and Blackstone (2004) argue that sexual harassment is an expression of power, and it is targeted toward women to maintain traditional gender hierarchies. As in school settings, individuals who deviate from heteronormative gender roles, including both men whose masculinity may be questioned and women who assume atypical gender roles in the workplace, like managers and supervisors, are especially targeted. Early experiences of sexual harassment have long-term negative implications for mental health (Houle, Staff, Mortimer, Uggen, & Blackstone, 2011).

Stable employment has become increasingly elusive for young people since the 1970s (Corcoran & Matsudaira, 2009; Danziger & Ratner, 2010). Given persistently high rates of youth unemployment, exacerbated during periods of economic recession (Norris, 2010), many young people, and especially those without post-secondary degrees, have difficulty finding work after leaving school. Unemployment threatens the acquisition of role markers of adulthood (e.g., to marriage, parenthood, community participation, etc.) as well as the development of adult identity. As a result, unemployment has wide-ranging effects, ultimately eroding a sense of personal efficacy (Mortimer, Kim, & Swartz, 2010) that affects adaptation well beyond the occupational sphere.

Resocialization occurs as individuals encounter the challenges of finding desirable jobs. In fact, both intrinsic and extrinsic values steadily erode as youth move through their early occupational careers and discover the limiting realities of the labor market (Johnson, 2001). Older youth downgrade the importance of achieving both interesting and meaningful work, as well as work that

has high payoffs in income and advancement opportunities. These adjustments in basic occupational value orientations could be a means of lessening cognitive dissonance between occupational values and aspirations, on the one hand, and actual occupational experiences and rewards, on the other.

As Lutfey and Mortimer (2003) point out, initial experiences on the job have critical importance with respect to the formation of orientations toward work, including commitment to the job and the employer, as well as aspirations for the future. Consistent with theory and empirical findings regarding attitude formation (Alwin & McCammon, 2003), individuals are especially responsive to their experiences shortly after entering new roles. Thus, it becomes particularly important for effective socialization, and for the development of positive orientations to work, to provide experiences that are challenging, yet appropriate to the workers' skills and abilities. Mentors may be especially important in helping novice workers learn "the ropes" of a new occupation (Borman, 1991), and the ways work is actually performed in a particular setting. Additional mentoring is key in informing new hires about available resources and informal communication networks, and in instructing them how to "cut corners" without receiving sanctions.

Positive initial experiences are likely to set in motion patterns of growing success, as workers gain confidence, embrace opportunities for further training and advancement, and move forward in their careers. For example, early experiences of self-direction lead workers to select, or mold their jobs, in ways that provide further opportunities for discretion and cognitive growth; these experiences, in turn, reinforce self-directed orientations and behaviors. In contrast, downward spirals may result from initially negative experiences that depress work motivation and self-confidence in the job setting. Such patterns of accentuation have been observed repeatedly in studies of careers (Lutfey & Mortimer, 2003; for a review of earlier research, see Mortimer & Lorence, 1995).

Even after the typically erratic and unstable early work trajectory as youth make the transition from school to work, the rapidly changing occupational landscape, nonstandard employment contracts, and volatile labor markets lead many adult workers to experience frequent layoffs and periods of unemployment between jobs. Failing to obtain stable work, increasing numbers of youth and older workers have become free-lancers, independent consultants, and owners of small businesses, many without adequate preparation for such entrepreneurial occupations (Kalleberg, 2011, Ch. 5 summarizes trends in several indicators of precarious employment since the 1970s; see also Hout, Levanon, & Cumberworth, 2011). As a result of these various trends, increasing numbers of workers feel insecure. When the unemployment rate (a significant predictor of insecurity) is controlled, the odds of perceiving oneself at risk of a costly job loss among respondents to the General Social Survey grew at an annual rate of 2 % between 1977 and 2006 (Kalleberg, p. 100). Instead of viewing their occupational experience as a life-long, or at least as a semi-permanent career, many workers come to see their jobs as temporary, much like musicians view their "gigs." As Lutfey and Mortimer (2003) point out, short time expectations lessen motivation to be socialized (or to socialize oneself) to effectively perform social roles.

Socialization for Balancing Work and Family

Individuals develop expectations about work-family balance by observing their own families, models in the media, and by socializing one another. The messages given by these various agents of socialization with regard to the work-family balance have changed considerably over the last 40 years. During this time period employment data reveal that for heterosexual married couples the number of families in which both parents work has increased dramatically. In 1967, notably the first year that data were available about working couples, 44 % of married couples were dually employed. In contrast, 57 % of married couples were dually employed in 2008 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010). Over the course of just one generation, from 1975 to 2000, the percentage of working mothers with children under the age of 18 rose from 47.4 to 72.9 % (2010b).

Considering the implications such drastic social change has for socialization, children of dual career couples may aspire to achieve a similar balancing act between family and work if they see their parents successfully negotiating these potentially conflicting roles. However, if parents exhibit a great deal of stress as a result of trying to balance the demands of family with the demands of two careers, youth could be reluctant to pursue a similar lifestyle and lower their work and family aspirations as a result. For children experiencing the latter scenario, anticipatory socialization for work and family could be disrupted. For children raised by a single working parent, the stressful work-family role conflict of their parent is likely to be highly salient.

There are implications for anticipatory occupational and family socialization with regard to gender as well. Children learn the balance of power associated with work for pay versus unpaid domestic tasks by observing and engaging with their families, media, and other sources. Despite dramatic increases in mothers' participation in the labor force over the last several decades, husbands' domestic duties have increased only slightly (Bianchi & Dye, 2001; Coltrane & Adams, 2001; Slaughter, 2012). The inequitable division of labor has implications for childhood socialization that may differ by gender. Girls and boys may both learn to view the "second shift" as part of women's work, seeing the necessity for women to maintain primary responsibility on the home front despite investment in a demanding career. In contrast, boys learn to consider their ability to provide financially as their main contribution to the family, even as they are involved in secondary responsibility for parenting and household chores.

Children witness their parents engaging not only in different amounts of domestic labor, but in different types of domestic tasks as well. According to Coltrane and Adams (2001), women's "chores are more time-consuming, less optional, and less able to be put off than other [traditionally male] household tasks, such as lawn care or house repairs" (p. 147). Cultural representations of housework tend to paint an inequitable portrait of the gendered division of labor. From comic strips to situation comedies, men are frequently portrayed as inept with regard to cleaning, doing the laundry, and cooking (unless doing so outdoors on a grill). While studies show that most men are reluctant to take on primary responsibility for the domestic work in their families, they have increased their participation in indoor cooking, cleaning up after meals, and grocery shopping (Coltrane & Adams). Coltrane & Adams theorize that as the gender gap in wages and employment levels shrink, so will the inequity in the domestic division of labor.

The number of couples for whom wives now earn more income than their husbands has grown. In 1987, 18 % of wives earned more than their husbands as compared to 27 % in 2008 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010.) The Great Recession hit men working in white collar professions particularly hard, resulting in an increased number of families for whom the wife was the only income earner and husbands were without work for the first time in the family's history (U.S. Department of Labor). An important area of inquiry is how these trends might differentially affect adolescent boys and girls with regard to their socialization and subsequent adaptation to their future work and family roles. It is possible that women's increased participation in the labor force affects girls and boys differently.

Discussion and Conclusion

The wide-ranging literatures reviewed in this chapter highlight the key importance and problematic character of socialization in contemporary society. Much of social life is organized by gender, with explicit expectations regarding normative patterns of sexual intimacy and identity; work is also a central focus of identity and provides the wherewithal for economic sustenance and social participation in its many forms. As a result, socialization processes in these key domains of life occur in several institutional venues – e.g., in families, peer groups, education, and work settings. Those who adhere to normative expectations, that is, internalize dominant cultural prescriptions for identity and behavior, receive multiple rewards; those who do not are subject to a variety of negative sanctions.

In each of the broad domains under consideration – family, gender, sexuality, and work – socialization has become increasingly prolonged, individualized, and often problematic as a consequence of broad societal trends. Education has lengthened in response to shifts in the occupational sector as well as heightened aspirations. Accordingly, the movement into adulthood takes place at older ages. As a result, anticipatory socialization, or preparation for adult gender and sexual enactments and identities, as well as adult occupational roles, occurs over a longer period of time. At the same time, the proportion of the population undergoing “normative” timing and sequences, for example, traditional family formation in the mid-to-late 20’s followed by parenthood some time later, or school completion followed by stable work, has declined. According to Wu and Li (2005, p. 143), divergence from the “traditional pathway” of family formation, consisting of a first marriage followed by childbearing, increased from one in six white women in the 1910s and 1920s birth cohorts to more than one in three white women born around 1950. Scholars speak of the “individualization” of the transition to adulthood (Fussell & Furstenberg, 2005).

Both family life and the expression of love and intimacy have become more diversified, with rising proportions of the population not marrying, not having children, and rejecting the “gender binary” by assuming open LGBT identities. Work has become more unpredictable and precarious, with increasing proportions of young people and adults unable to establish themselves in adult work roles. Instead, their careers may be punctuated by spells of unemployment. Long-term occupational careers have become increasingly elusive, as workers displaced from their jobs by technological change, outsourcing, organizational mergers and downsizing, or turbulent economies are forced to reenter educational institutions for further training or credentials long after the “traditional” age of schooling.

Across these domains, then, socialization processes have become disrupted and, at times, obsolescent. Socialization tends to be oriented to the most normative, highly valued outcomes – that is, preparation for the assumption of identity and behavior consistent with the “sexual binary” and preparation for middle class professional and managerial lifestyles through college and, ideally, post-graduate training. Interestingly, both sexuality education and vocational education at the high school level is controversial. Both tend to be inspired by the prevention of negative outcomes – that is, sexually transmitted diseases and teen pregnancy or unemployment among low-achieving youth – rather than preparation for healthy sexual expression in multiple forms, and diversified vocational exploration that is applicable to broad sectors of youth.

As we have seen, the expectation that individuals will assume heterosexual enactments of gender and intimacy in traditional families pervades socialization in childhood and adolescence. In contrast to this “one size fits all” homogeneity, increasing numbers of youth are embracing homosexual, bisexual, transgender, single parent, non-marital cohabitation, and other alternative identities and lifestyles. With rare exception, little in the way of effective socialization experiences are provided for them in families, schools, or other venues; internet media campaigns (e.g., the “It Gets Better” initiative) attempt to fill the gap. Moreover, even socialization for normative, heterosexual expression is fraught with contradictions and difficulties, for example, the disconnect between the “sex is bad” admonitions in adolescence coupled with the theme that “sex is a gift to be given to one’s soul mate.”

In the work domain, socialization has also become more problematic as technological advances, shifting product markets and consumer preferences, and changes in the occupational structure make it more difficult for parents, teachers, and other socializing agents to anticipate the kinds of work opportunities their charges will have in the future. Moreover, job opportunities for teenagers have declined significantly in recent decades. The increasing emphasis on “college for all” in secondary schools, and the lack of interest in vocational exploration make many youth “ambitious but directionless” (Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). Even subsequent career-related education in vocational and professional schools risks obsolescence as rapid technological changes, shifts in the ever expanding knowledge base, and fiscal austerity make it difficult, if not impossible, for educators to keep up.

As a result of these trends, socialization in each of these domains has become a more active and agentic process, requiring deliberate constructive effort. The continuing differentiation of the occupational structure provides youth with more choices; the increasing acceptance of non-normative gender and sexual identities likewise increase the lifestyle alternatives available to youth. Lacking relevant prior socialization experiences and guidance from their parents and teachers, many youth craft new gender and sexual identities largely on their own, with input from like-minded peers or the media. Preparation for work roles likewise becomes more problematic and individualized for individuals who have had few avenues for vocational socialization, exploration and work in their youth, and who confront a rapidly changing occupational structure. These problems are magnified for the large number of high school and college dropouts who have been unable to obtain the educational credentials that employers seek.

Continuing qualitative research is needed to understand socializees' perceptions and experiences across socialization settings. However, much qualitative work is cross-sectional and retrospective; we need more prospective longitudinal studies that rely on interviews and biographical narrative techniques to avoid deficient recall and enable the identification of effective socialization experiences and practices that engender long-term positive adaptations. Assessment of socializees' own understandings about what is transpiring in key socialization settings (e.g., families, schools, peer groups, work settings, and networking sites) will avoid undue attention to socializers' definitions of the situation and an overly functionalist bias that is oriented to the achievement of traditional objectives. Qualitative research approaches are necessary to discover the processes of construction of new identities and behavioral enactments in the domains of intimacy, gender, family, and work. Focus on the socializee will also engender an appreciation of diversity in reaction to socialization attempts and experiences, linked to socializees' goals, statuses in other institutional settings, and prior trajectories (as advocated by Lutfey & Mortimer, 2003).

Nationally representative quantitative studies are also necessary to monitor continuing shifts in both socialization experiences and outcomes, particularly to obtain sufficient numbers of cases of sexual minorities, and to increase the capacity to analyze the conditioning effects and intersections of gender, race, and class. As we have seen, a persistent theme in the gender and sexuality literature is the divergent normative and behavioral expression between groups defined by race and social class. More attention should be directed to religion as well, given the increasing diversity of our society. Contemporary religious institutions, which, along with sex educators in schools, emphasize chastity before marriage, may be seen as increasingly out of touch with young adults who are sexually active, often in cohabiting relationships. Socialization relevant to future gender identities and sexualities is likely to be fraught with unique difficulties for teenagers of Muslim background and those who immigrate from patriarchal societies. Moreover, while not emphasized in this review, racial minorities, particularly poorly-educated African American youth, have distinct socialization experiences relevant to their future adaptation to work, given their high rates of incarceration and other contacts with the criminal justice system.

Future research, employing multiple, complementary methodologies, should address socialization for non-traditional outcomes: alternative gender and sexual identities and role enactments. How can LGBT youth be socialized to optimize their healthy and satisfying expressions of gender and sexuality? What are the effects of differential levels of exposure to new media initiatives and connections with others on social networking sites? We also need to understand how youth may be effectively socialized for the changing, and increasingly episodic, character of occupational trajectories. For example, youth need to be socialized so that they will expect, and be prepared to continually learn as the tasks and interpersonal requirements for available jobs change. They need to learn how to utilize the gaps between paid jobs in constructive ways (e.g., returning to school, self-instruction, volunteer work, internships), and to be ready to strike out on their own, as in entrepreneurial ventures, free-lance and consulting roles. The difficulties in socialization identified in this review – the disruptions,

failures, and lacunae in socialization processes – both complicate the assumption of gender, sexual, and work identities in youth and problematize transitions and adaptations throughout the life course. This state of affairs argues for increasing scholarly attention to socialization processes, and particularly, research that is both more methodologically sound and diverse.

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Part III

Personal Processes

Chapter 7

Social Psychology and the Body

Eve Shapiro

Introduction

Social psychology is intimately about the bodies of individuals. Erving Goffman, in his research on presentation of self and on stigma, drew substantial attention to the role the body plays in self and identity formation, shaping how individuals are seen and how they, as individuals, see themselves¹ (1959, 1963). Similarly, Nisbett and Wilson's famous study on the "halo effect" (1977) demonstrated how general evaluations of individuals (e.g. likability or appearance) shape more specific assumptions (e.g. intelligence, capability) such that visible bodily characteristics (beauty, body size, ability) can take on substantial influence within interpersonal evaluation and interaction. Many of Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodological breaching experiments (1967) revealed the taken-for-granted embodiment and body norms of our culture (e.g. standing too close to another individual, avoiding eye contact). In fact, it was the visceral, corporeal reactions of subjects that Garfinkel used to demonstrate the power and fragility of social order.

Indeed, the most famous social psychology experiments – Darley and Latané's study of the bystander effect (1968), Milgram's study on why we obey authority figures (1963), Zimbardo's prison experiment on the power of social roles (1972), Garfinkel's breaching experiments (1967) – were all centrally about embodied behaviors and experiences. They raised questions such as: why do individuals ignore people in need?; how do individuals respond physiologically to cognitive dissonance and the stress of doing physical harm to another individual?; how do social roles shape the embodied experience of individuals?; what are the social scripts about embodiment that underlie everyday social order?; how do individuals experience stigma and sanction?; and how do bodily characteristics shape individual's internal and external social worlds? And yet, social psychology as a field has not historically integrated the body or embodiment into its theories or research agenda. In fact, the body has been ignored, by and large, in favor of an interpretive, mind-focused social psychology. This effort to privilege the mind over the body is not new, of course.

The distinction between body and mind – what has come to be known as *Cartesian dualism* – is one that has shaped Western thinking, including the development of social science, over the last four centuries. The development of sociology is built on the assumption that the internal self is distinct

¹Within sociological social psychology "self" is used to identify individuals' thoughts about the nature of who they are – the answer to the question 'who am I.' In contrast, identity is used, by and large, to refer to the characteristics and roles ascribed to individuals by others (Lindesmith, Strauss, & Denzin, 1999).

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from and shaped by the external material world. Moreover, modern intellectual traditions have taken the mind/body division for granted even when empirical and theoretical insights complicate the dualism. Social psychology is at its core about how the external world shapes our internal world of self and how this internal world can, in turn, shape society. In this tradition social psychology (and sociology more broadly) has both assumed distinction between mind and body and simultaneously taken for granted a mutual interdependence between the body and both internal and external social worlds (Piliavin & Lepore, 1995). It is indisputable that both internal and external worlds are experienced through our physical bodies (Leder, 1990).

Social psychology takes as its focus the interactive and interpretive processes of meaning making and action on the individual level. By attending to how individual beliefs, emotions and behaviors are shaped by real or perceived interaction with other individuals, sociology has been able to elaborate how individuals are shaped by social groups (from other individuals to society as a whole) and how they, in turn, shape others (Fine, 1995). Accordingly, the body is the mediator between the thinking, meaning-making mind and the sensory experience of interaction. We use our eyes to see what others look and act like if we are sighted, our ears to hear voices and take in language if we are hearing, our skin to feel the presence of and interact with other human bodies, and on and on. Our bodies bring sensory input to the brain and our minds make sense of it. Bodies are also shaped by the mind. We compose our dress, adorn our bodies, cut our hair and manipulate the appearance of our bodies to align with our internal sense of self.

That self, though, is not innate; as social psychology has argued so well, the self is always a social product, shaped by the internalization of social expectations, norms, and values. We make sense of bodily sensations according to meaning-making frames we have learned through socialization (Gordon, 1990), come to see ourselves as we imagine others see us (Cooley, 2010 [1902]), and present our embodied self to others in intentional ways to elicit particular reactions (Goffman, 1959). Each of these processes, and many, many others, are embodied, which is to say that they happen in and through the body. The body is both subject and object, acting with direction from the mind and serving as the material manifestation of a culturally informed, self-reflexive, social personhood.

While the body is established in sociology as a site of socialization (Gergen, 1997; Goffman, 1963; Turner, 1984); social categorization (Banks, 2000; Lorber & Moore, 2011; Weitz, 2002) and as the mediator between individual and society (Charmaz, 1995; Kleck & Strenta, 1980), the material body has been absent from most micro sociological theorizing. For example, while the body is acknowledged in research on social inequality (e.g. in expectation states theory as the source of stereotypes and unequal expectations), it has rarely been integrated in a robust empirical or theoretical manner (Shilling, 2003). That is to say attributes of the body have been studied (e.g. race, age, gender) wherein the body is accounted for as the site of difference, stigma, and presentation of self, but the body has rarely been attended to as an embodied player in psychosocial process or as a central component to be accounted for in sociological theorizing (Synnott, 1993). As Radley argued in one of the earliest books on social psychology and the body, “a social psychology of disembodied beings is, at best, like a puzzle with missing pieces; at worst, it is a repetition of misconceived explanations of action and experience” (Radley, 1991, p. 1).

Part of the problem has been vigorous resistance to bringing sociology into conversation with biology out of fear that acknowledging “nature” will invalidate arguments about “nurture” (Morgan & Scott, 1993). In large part this resistance is spurred on by the popularity of evolutionary arguments within popular culture (e.g. *Men are From Mars, Women are From Venus*, [Gray, 1992]), and the effort by many sociologists to debunk these pseudo-scientific justifications for social inequalities. In particular, the majority of evolutionary psychology studies focus on innate differences between men and women, scholarship mainstream sociology has challenged on both micro and macro levels (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Freese, Li & Wade, 2003). Alongside a resistance to acknowledging biology, sociology has framed many core issues that are centrally experienced in and through the body (e.g. as a site of socialization, mediator between individuals, marker of social status) as issues of the mind and in so

doing has been reticent to extend a sociological focus to the somatic body (the physical body as organism) (Synnott, 1993). However, the refusal to acknowledge the possibility of biological influence has resulted in the inability of sociology to participate in key social and cultural debates about genetics, biology, technology and the body (Freese, Li, & Wade; Massey, 2002; Piliavin & Lepore, 1995). Moreover, sociology has assumed that biology can only be given meaning in one way – as an ahistorical, asocial determinant of individual, social and interpersonal behavior.

Despite these concerns modern society's focus on the body and on body/self projects (e.g. exercise and dieting) has reignited interest in the body within sociology, and rightly so (Giddens, 1991; Turner, 2000). In the past 20 years the body has increasingly been taken into account in psychology, cultural studies, and in broad areas of sociological study including globalization, social movements, feminist, gender and sexuality studies (Waskul & Vannini, 2006). Increasing numbers of sociologists have argued for the reexamination of the body and biology as a meaningful part of self and social construction (Casper & Currah, 2011; Holstein & Gubrium, 2000; Lorber & Moore, 2011).

To take the body seriously in social psychology means both to recognize and theorize the body as social and to recognize and theorize the social self as shaped by the body and biology. Shilling, in his effort to establish an analytical framework for a sociology of the body makes the argument that,

Sociology needs to account for the impact of society and culture on embodied actions, while also acknowledging that the embodied constitution of human action (an embodiment forged over the *longue durée* of human evolution that cannot simply be derived from current social orders) is itself consequential for these wider relationships, norms, and values (Shilling, 2008, p.2).

For Turner this means a sociology of the body inevitably intertwines analysis on the individual, social, and societal levels (1987). Similarly, Synnott has argued that to think about the body sociologically is to examine it in three ways: (1) the body as a symbol of the self and society; (2) the body as both subject and object (something we have and are); and (3) the body as both individual and social (1993, p. 4). What both of these approaches highlight is the interactional, constructed, and deeply social nature of the body as well as the body's central role in both macro and micro social processes.

Key Concepts

A sociological approach to the body relies on several key concepts including the social body, embodiment, schematic representations and corporealization. To speak of the body sociologically is to speak about the body as more than a physiological manifestation of genetic programming. Instead the body is both informed by and responsive to the external social world within which it lives. Piliavin and Lepore describe this impact of biology on the social individual as both “from the inside out,” affecting our choices, interactions, and perception of others, and “from the outside in,” whereby others treat us differently based upon our appearance and perceived social status (Piliavin & Lepore, 1995, p. 10). The influence of the body on social interaction can take the form of genetic predispositions for particular behaviors either individually or as a species. For example hyperactivity, for which there appears to be a genetic component, can affect how we interact with other individuals, whether our behaviors are in line with or deviate from our peers, and how we are evaluated by others. The influence of the body on social interaction also manifests as the impact of our body when interacting with others, for example as a source of stigma or esteem. Our appearance generates stereotyping, expectations, and behaviors in those with whom we interact, and these responses produce differences in interaction, social response, etc. Whether our body is a site of master status, for example due to sex or race, or a source of visible sameness or difference, the way that individuals experience the world is through their bodies and, in the process, bodies are transformed physiologically and conceptually. For example, social expectations within the United States about athleticism among males leads many men to work out and participate regularly in individual and team sports. These activities (lifting weights,

running, etc.) build muscle and produce men's bodies that are strong, lean, and muscular, that is, substantially different than they would otherwise be. The masculine body is not simply an outward expression of male XY chromosomes; it is equally as much a reflection of the social norms and values around male masculinity within the United States that prompted transformative physical activity.

The physical body is not only a reflection of social norms and values, though. In interaction with the social world humans make sense of bodily experiences socially. As early pragmatists argued, reality is not *a priori*, independent of experience; instead it is our interpretation of a situation that gives it meaning and prompts human action. The process of analyzing and assigning meaning to our body and its sensory experiences is a learned one that is shaped by social beliefs, expectations, and one's definition of the situation (Thomas, 2002 [1923]). In a telling experiment, Anderson and Pennebaker (1980) found that when they told participants in an experimental study that the manipulation (rubbing an emery board across the participant's skin) might cause pain, the individuals were far more likely to describe pain as a side effect of the experiment than those who were not primed with an interpretive schema. Moreover, when participants were told that the same manipulation might cause pleasurable sensations, they were more likely to ascribe pleasure to the experience than those in the control group. Not only were there differences in participants' experiences, the findings were highly significant, suggesting that individuals' expectations for sensation (what Anderson and Pennebaker call "*schematic representations*") affected how they experienced and made sense of sensory input. Anderson and Pennebaker's findings sit comfortably within a long history of social psychological research that documents how a wide range of external factors (culture, expectations, interpersonal dynamics, and social context) shape the internal experience of the body (Blitz & Dinnerstein, 1971; Buss & Portnoy, 1967).

The body has been studied as a vehicle for self-expression (Gimlin, 2007; Pitts, 2003; Sanders, 1989), a commodity (Davis, 1995), as performative and discursive (Butler, 1993), phenomenological (Shilling, 2003), disciplined (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Foucault, 1979; Laqueur, 1990), self-reflexive (Pagis, 2009), scripted (Jackson, 2006), a bearer of social meaning (Bordo, 1999; Moore, 1997; Scott & Morgan, 1993), stigmatized (Goffman, 1963; Lebesco, 2004), shaped by technology (Wesely, 2003), and socially constructed (Crossley, 2001; Turner, 1984). The body has been conceptualized as both the self and society incarnate, personal and public, visceral and conceptual, "an individual creation, physically and phenomenologically, and a cultural product" (Synnott, 1993, p. 4). In all of these formulations the body is neither wholly determinist nor simply symbolic; instead it is a dynamic participant in individual and social action.

These efforts to create a typology of the body are rooted in a desire to refine, analytically, the varied positions of the body in society. While they do not conceptualize the body in the same way, they do all share several core elements. Sociologists have rejected the pre-social body that Descartes theorized (Descartes, 1984[1641]) and instead assert that the body is always already social (Hancock et al., 2000). The *body* is the canvas upon which social categories such as race, gender, and ability are inscribed and the site through which they are experienced; a participant in social (inter)action and shaped by society and culture; an active participant in the internal environment of social action and the vehicle through which external social action takes place. Indeed, all of the social dynamics sociology studies and theorizes are embodied – experienced by and through the body. This is what is meant by *embodiment*.

To speak about embodiment is to speak about the lived body; it is a state of being, in which the body is the site of meaning, experience, and expression of individuals in the world (Williams, 2004, p. 73). Embodiment constitutes a range of bodily dynamics. If embodiment is the social process of embodying, it also encompasses the "effect or consequences of ongoing practices of what we might call '*corporealization*'" (Turner, 2000, p. 494). It is the accomplishment of bodily techniques, the "ensemble of corporeal practices which produce and give 'a body' its place in everyday life" (Turner, p. 484), and the production of a sensory presence in the world. Embodiment is also a social process situated within a historical and cultural context.

To think of the body and embodiment in this way locates it at the center of social psychology's domain. As Rossi claimed in her groundbreaking work on gender, "organisms are not passive objects

acted upon by internal genetic forces, as some sociobiologists claim, nor are they passive objects acted upon by external environmental forces, as some social scientists claim. Genes, organisms, and environment interpenetrate and mutually determine each other” (Rossi, 1984, p. 11). The body is the site where the internal and external social worlds meet (Shilling, 2008), a social project in and of itself. Moreover, social psychological processes are themselves corporeal projects, not only taking place within the body but shaped by the body as an active participant in self-reflexivity (Pagis, 2009), subjective evaluation (Fine, 2010; Sinclair, Hardin, & Lowery, 2006), self-construction (Shapiro, 2010), emotion (Freund, 1990), and interpersonal interaction (Goffman, 1959), among many other processes. In order to outline the contours of a social psychology of the body, I begin by examining the body and embodiment in classical theory and then trace its development through pragmatism, early social psychology and phenomenology, and end by examining its maturation in twenty-first-century social psychological research and theorizing.

Early Theoretical Approaches

Classical Sociology

The same tendencies that marginalized social psychology within sociology at its founding inhibited a focus on the body and embodiment. While the body was acknowledged as site of socialization (Simmel, 1971 [1910]) the processes were left undefined (social influence goes in, magic happens, person comes out) as macro level, structural features of society took precedence. The body was also marginalized as part of efforts to carve out a space for sociology, distinct from already established fields of medicine, biology, philosophy, and psychology. However, the body and embodiment are not wholly absent from classical sociological theory (Shilling, 2007). Comte engaged with emotion as a core aspect of humanity’s morality (2009 [1853]), and Durkheim connected social systems to emotional and embodied actions such as suicide (1984 [1893]); Marx theorized the body as shaped by the economic structure (1975 [1844]). Simmel saw people as embodied subjects engaged in social interaction and the body as the source of and motivator for interaction, and even Weber who prioritized rational action over “animalistic” habitual action, engaged emotion and the social body into his theories of capitalism and power (Shilling, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, Weber’s concept of interpretive understanding (*verstehen*) took seriously the embodied meaning making individuals engage in, setting the stage for social psychology and phenomenology (Synnott, 1993). While classical sociology did not explicitly take up “the body”, neither did it ignore the material corporeality of human experience. Instead it recognized the influence of the social world on the embodied individual and the embodied individual as an agentic influence on the social world.

Pragmatism and Early Social Psychology

If classical social theory framed the body within sociology, another theoretical tradition, pragmatism, turned attention to micro-sociological processes and engaged the body in conceptual ways. As a theoretical tradition pragmatism argues that social action engaged by people is embedded within a social context that both shapes and is shaped by individuals. Founding theorists like William James, and those that came after him like John Dewey and George Herbert Mead from the Chicago school argued that in order to understand the features of society and the social individual, the experience of the individual had to be brought into conversation with the external social world (James, 2010[1890]). Further,

pragmatism suggested mind/body integration such that human beings move from body-based experience (e.g. neural mapping and perception) to abstract meaning making without disruption.

As a corollary to pragmatism, phenomenology was a key site of theorizing about the body. As the study of how humans perceive the world, phenomenology emerged as part of an effort to construct an interpretive sociology rooted in analysis of subjective meaning making (Orleans, 2001). Challenging Cartesian dualism Merleau-Ponty argued that experiences of the body and mind are two sides of the same coin, not only mutually constitutive but, in fact, part of the same processes. Like Merleau-Ponty, for Mauss, each culture generated different body practices (what he calls techniques), not through conscious body work but through the process of being and interacting. These techniques “are forms of embodied, pre-reflective understanding, knowledge or reason. And they are social. They emerge and spread within a collective context, as the result of interaction, such that they can be identified with specific social groups or networks” (Crossley, 2005, p. 7). For Mauss and Merleau-Ponty both, the body-subject draws on social norms and scripts to drive action and simultaneously these schema are developed by body-subjects (Crossley, 1995).

This early focus on the body in pragmatism and phenomenology was not sustained. As symbolic interactionism came to dominate social psychology and Parsonian sociology turned attention to the structural rather than the individual, embodiment was increasingly left out of theoretical and empirical work. By and large through the middle and late twentieth century the body and embodiment was ceded to biology or evolutionary psychology. Simultaneously theories of technology increasingly argued that the body was becoming irrelevant in an age of technology. However, pragmatism’s attention to the “corporeal dimensions of social action” and phenomenology’s focus on embodied, lived experience, set the stage for a revival of the body within sociology that did come (Leder, 1990; Shilling, 2008, p. 3).

Evolutionary Theories, Sociobiology, and Social Psychology

Alongside the employment of Darwinian evolutionary paradigms within most fields of inquiry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sociology developed two strands of theorizing that made sense of human behavior and societal structure through the lens of evolution. Evolutionary sociology applied theories of evolution to social change and societal development (Parsons, 1966). In contrast sociobiology/evolutionary psychology, developed in the mid-1970s, examined human behavioral and interactional traits in an effort to identify their evolutionary function and/or genetic foundation. The work that was done in evolutionary social psychology drew on rational choice and natural selection theories to explain species-wide tendencies in human behavior, mate selection, emotion, and physiology (Piliavin & Lepore, 1995). At the level of genes the field focused on “inclusive fitness” (the tendency to help kin in order to encourage transmission of one’s genes) and altruism, assuming that human behavior could be explained as driven by rational choices to promote “optimal reproductive investment” (Nielsen, 1994).

Within psychology this approach generated twin and sibling studies in an effort to identify the heritability of social and psychological traits. Sociologists focused more on the evolutionary components of interpersonal and social interaction. For example, in their overview of biological theories and sociology Freese, Li, and Wade (2003) relate the famous research by Martin Daly and Margo Wilson that was able to identify step-parents as a significant risk factor for child abuse, using an evolutionary approach. In their book, *The truth about Cinderella: A Darwinian view of parental love*, Daly and Wilson argued that violent restraint on the part of parents is a characteristic that is evolutionarily favorable and therefore became pervasive through natural selection. In contrast, other adults in caretaking roles (e.g. stepparents) lack a similar evolutionary incentive and therefore pose increased risk for children (Daly & Wilson, 1999). While research such as this has been critiqued as

a misreading of social phenomena based upon preconceived and gendered beliefs, it has held ground as one of the best examples of evolutionary psychology (Buller, 2005).

By and large sociobiology developed outside of mainstream sociology, marginalized by the reigning structural focus of sociology as well as by the slippery slope between evolutionary social theories and social engineering projects like eugenics and race science. Research in this field became quite insular, centering itself on innate differences between men and women in terms of reproduction (Trivers, 1972), emotionality (Dabbs & Morris, 1990), and parenting (Fullard & Reiling, 1976) as well as on the heritability of personality traits among individuals (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Within the field of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, far less attention was paid to the role of biology from “the outside in” despite the sociological implications of this line of inquiry.

Revival of Sociological Theories and Empirical Inquiry

As the body was increasingly taken up in the cultural imagination as in well as scholarship across multiple disciplines in the late twentieth century, “the assumption of classical positivist sociology, that bodies belong primarily to biology, has collapsed and the meaning of the body has become a problem for linguistic, cultural, and social analysis” (Hancock et al., 2000, pp. 1–2). The body has come into focus as post-structural and cultural studies theories worked to transcend Cartesian dualism (Howson & Inglis, 2001). Within sociology, renewed interest in the body has emerged in the last 20 years for a number of reasons including the development of feminist scholarship on gender, rise of new public health crises such as AIDS (Scott & Morgan, 1993), rapid growth of biotechnology (Turner, 2008), and new patterns of postmodern consumption (Featherstone, 1982; Giddens, 1991). The “corporealization” of sociology included attending to the individual, social, and societal body both empirically and theoretically (Turner, 1984); mining classical sociological theory for insight on the body (Shilling, 2003); and drawing on phenomenology to bring new theoretical insight to the social body (Nettleton & Watson, 1998). These paths of inquiry were employed to examine a range of modern social phenomenon.

In large part it was the growth of feminist sociology that first drew a sociological focus back to the body. Feminist, sexuality and Queer studies were the first fields of inquiry to bring embodiment and the body into the social theories of socialization, stratification, and social control (Bartky, 1990; Bordo, 1993; Butler, 1993). Gender – the social status of man and woman – is an inherently embodied state, and one often assumed to be biological. But, as sociology of gender scholars began to demonstrate empirically and theoretically in the 1990s, what makes a man and woman is deeply social. Scholars such as Bordo drew attention to how the internalization of gender norms and ideologies shaped the embodied lives of women and girls (Bordo; Martin, 1992). Others examined the social construction of both gendered and sexed bodies (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Lorber, 1994), the history of sexism and misogyny in Western thought (Keller & Longino, 1996), and embodied gender differences across multiple social contexts and eras (Bem, 1995).

Of particular significance to social psychology, a number of feminist scholars began to examine the interactional production of gender and gender inequality using ethnomethodology (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; West & Zimmerman, 1987), phenomenology (Grosz, 1994; Hughes & Witz, 1997), psychoanalysis (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982), and symbolic interactionism (Denzin, 1993). This body of research began by challenging the long history of locating differences in men’s and women’s interactions, social roles, and inequality within biology. Instead of locating gender difference in genetic codes, brain structure or hormones, these scholars demonstrated, empirically, that sociocultural contexts shape men and women’s psychosocial processes in gendered ways, producing differences in emotion, ability, self-conception, ideas and action. Moreover, scholars such as Kimmel began to demonstrate the means by which gender is produced and reproduced through interaction in key social institutions such as family, education, and media (2000).

Alongside the rise of feminist sociology, public health debates and ensuing efforts to exert social control over citizen bodies reignited interest in the body in sociology. Pandemics such as AIDS and the social interventions promoted to address these crises raised critical questions about the increased disciplinary attention to bodies, by a range of institutional forces including the state and biomedicine (Foucault, 1979). Similarly, the rise of biotechnology (e.g. cloning, embryonic sex selection, genetic modification) generated vigorous social debate about the nature of humanity and the mutability of personhood, and prompted new theorizing about embodiment and subjectivity (Haraway, 1991).

Finally, post-structuralism, critical studies, and post modernism began to reintegrate the body into sociological theory as reflective of the internal self (Foucault, 1973), as shaped by discourse and narrative (Gergen, 1997), as social symbols for constructed categories of difference such as race and gender (Lorber, 1994), and as a site of impression management, socialization, and social control (Hebdige, 1979; Turner, 2000). Much of this work built on Foucault's theory of systems of knowledge and their impact on society and individuals (e.g. how the rise of science changed people) (Foucault, 1965, 1979). In addition to the creation of new products and new regimes of power, Foucault asserted that new systems of knowledge led to the development of technologies of sign systems and technologies of self (Foucault, 1988). These products of new systems of knowledge both shape individuals and society and are shaped by them in the process of upholding and challenging social paradigms and structures. Most relevant to social psychology was Foucault's conceptualization of technologies of the self to make sense of the "practices that allow individuals, usually with the help of others, to function in a society by using their bodies and minds to regulate and facilitate their own conduct" (Rooney, 1997, p. 403). Alongside the revival of post-structuralism, new readings of phenomenology in critical studies and sociology drew attention to the body-subject. For example, a number of scholars endeavored to bypass the mind/body divide, arguing instead for an embodied self that is, at once, subject and object (Freund & McGuire, 1991).²

These historical and theoretical forces converged in the 1990s to renew interest in the body, and social psychology was quickly brought to bear on questions of embodiment. Contrary to earlier conception of the body as the untainted reflection of biology, social and biological scientists in the last 20 years have explored how individual psychosocial processes and societal beliefs shape physiology and biology.

Theorizing the Body in Contemporary Social Psychology

Theoretical elaboration from the 1990s forward has begun to tease out the complex interplay between the body/embodiment and social psychological processes (Freese, Li, & Wade, 2003). This work has built upon earlier theorists and extended the major social psychological perspectives through the inclusion of embodiment as a vector of human experience. Different theoretical perspectives have highlighted a range of aspects of the body and embodiment. For example, evolutionary social psychology has drawn attention to the complex interplay between biology and socialization on both micro (e.g. personality) and mezzo levels (e.g. stereotyping). In contrast symbolic interactionism has focused on whether and how individuals' self and identity processes are shaped by and experienced

²There are, of course, substantial critiques of this phenomenological position. Most significantly, many sociologists have highlighted the difference between philosophical and sociological inquiry, asserting that we can't reduce study of the social world to epistemology (Howson & Inglis, 2001). Because of its focus on the knowing body phenomenology can lead to conceptualizing the body as pre-social, something at odds with sociological paradigms. Some scholars have argued that the exclusive focus on representation within post-structuralism and the individual in phenomenology has diverted focus away from the body in action and interaction within a structured social world (Turner, 2000).

through embodiment, and expectation states theories engage the body as a marker of status and object of stereotype. Each of these theoretical traditions have engaged the body in recent years.

Evolutionary Social Psychology

This approach posits “gene-culture coevolution” in which “what we inherit are biases to respond to certain situations in certain ways, and these tendencies interact in complex ways with the physical and cultural environments in which we find ourselves at any given time” (Piliavin & Lepore, 1995, p. 11–12). Building on earlier research rooted in sociobiology, evolutionary social psychology has remained focused on heritability, gender, and appearance (Kenrick, Ackerman, & Ledlow, 2003). The dominant focus is gender, reproduction, and childrearing in large part because gender is both a master status and central organizing principle in society; gender differences are greatest in U.S. society in areas related to reproduction. A range of studies have examined whether the reproductive attitudes and behaviors of men and women are guided by different motivations (Trivers, 1972), hormones (Udry, 2000), and/or somatic responses to infants (Dunn & Kendrick, 1982). While large amounts of work have been done in this area, there is no clear consensus about whether the correlations identified reflect true biological difference or sexist assumptions manifested in both the theoretical and epistemological foundation of research and in the interpretation of results (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Many feminist scholars, for example, highlight the ease with which people accept scientific findings that support gender stereotypes (e.g. links between testosterone and aggression) and dismiss findings that challenge gender difference and inequality (Fine, 2010).

In addition to research on gender and reproduction, research “from the inside out” has focused on the heritability of personal characteristics. Some scholarship has examined the seeming ubiquity of ethnocentrism (van der Dennen, 1987), suggesting that human beings have an inborn prejudice for in-group members (though, of course, who is considered part of the in-group is culturally defined). There are also clear hereditary elements to personality and demeanor. A range of studies on twins and adopted children suggest that a range of personality traits such as sociability and emotionality are in part inherited (Plomin, 1990). Similarly, both the tendency for learning language and non-verbal communication of emotional states appear to be innate. Not only is there incredible commonality across cultures (Ekman, 1972), but the facial expressions for key emotions appear in infancy. For example, both deaf and blind infants express joy (laughter) and sadness (crying) in the same way and at the same developmental stages as sighted and hearing infants. In the same vein cross-cultural studies have documented similar patterns in play, non-verbal communication, and somatic response to emotion among individuals in vastly different cultures (Appleton, 1980). This has led many sociologists to conclude that, “there is at the very least a preprogrammed readiness to employ patterns of gestures – a set of epigenetic rules – as there has been shown to be prewiring for language and facial expression” (Piliavin & Lepore, 1995, p. 14).

There is also a body of scholarship on appearance and stigma. Evolutionary social psychology has argued that preference for (and altruism toward) in-groups (e.g. kin) is driven by “inclusive fitness” or the evolutionary drive to pass on one’s own genes (including those shared by kin) (Kenrick et al., 2003). This preference, seen across many animals, has been used within the field to make sense of stereotyping, and stigma (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). As I explore below (see the section on expectation states theory), physical appearance is a significant component of self-construction and social interaction. Early research in this field also endeavored to link physical characteristics to personality traits, though modern theories discredit these claims. However, social psychologists have identified the tendency of individuals to evaluate normatively attractive individuals more positively. Attractive individuals are more positively evaluated by strangers and acquaintances, across many measures (emotional disposition, ethics, sociability) and experience more positive sanctions and

higher social status (Berscheid & Walster, 1974; Patzer, 1985). While evolutionary social psychologists agree that norms for attractiveness are culturally specific, they have sought to identify commonalities across cultures that might indicate core evolutionary tendencies or adaptations. Work in this area has focused on signs of immaturity (Berry & Brownlow, 1989; Eysenck, 1990), height preference (Egolf & Corder, 1991), and facial symmetry (Rhodes, 2006), among others.

While research in evolutionary social psychology and sociobiology has been marginalized within sociological social psychology, there is continued scholarship in this field and a vibrant, if controversial, tradition within psychology. What scholarship in this field points to are several core principles relevant to social psychology. First, research in this area solidifies claims that biology is a significant component of individual and social worlds. Biology shapes all aspects of the self and interaction (e.g. the physical self, personality, social status, and stereotypes) (Piliavin & Lepore, 1995, p. 27–28). In turn, social interactions and structures affect how individuals make sense of biology, their own and others. Second, there are some seemingly ubiquitous characteristics of human societies, suggesting some biologically-based tendencies among humans regardless of culture. Scholars point to language (Pinker, 1997), kinship structures (Daly, Salmon & Wilson, 1997), in-group preference (Brown, 1991), and gender difference (Geary, 1998) as examples of cultural universals. This is the most controversial tenet of evolutionary social psychology. Many sociologists take issue with sociobiology's claims, asserting that while there are cultural universals, evolutionary psychology overemphasizes their number and character, informed by social beliefs about gender, for example. Finally, there appears to be a human tendency to evaluate in-groups and out-groups unequally, with preference given to even arbitrarily defined in-groups (Tajfel, 1982). This tendency may explain why humans tend to evaluate others on the basis of appearance, leaving open the question of how and to what effect.

Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism is arguably the theoretical perspective that has most embraced the body within sociology. Early twentieth century social psychology suggested that we make sense of who we are through interactions with other people (Mead, 1934), and this has been the dominant approach for the last 75 years. By viewing individuals as agentic, meaning-making beings situated within physical and social contexts, symbolic-interactionism's precursor, pragmatism, recognized the role of the natural and social worlds as well as of the body and embodied action. Like James and Dewey, George Herbert Mead incorporated the body into his conceptualizations of the social self. In Mead's assertion that individuals work together to achieve a shared definition of a situation he took for granted that an individual's bodily being would be significant. For Mead, embodied characteristics such as gender, race, age, and appearance form the basis for the social identities others ascribe to individuals. While Mead like other pragmatists is careful to distinguish action from bodily impulse, his self is actively experienced through the body. *Gestures* – embodied interactions between people – “were the mechanisms through which mind, self, and society emerged from social interaction” (Stryker & Vryan, 2003, p. 11). For early symbolic interactionists in the Chicago school, “a comprehensive understanding of social action required an appreciation of the integration of physiological organisms and conscious selves – selves founded on a bodily and sensory basis, albeit developed through a social process” (Shilling, 2008, p. 29). For example, Cooley's concept of the “looking glass self” asserts that the self arises out of an embodied three-stage process – imagined impression, imagined judgment, and self-feeling – such that we imagine ourselves as others see us and evaluate our own embodied response to this judgment (2010 [1902]). The self, its presentation, and its actions, then, are shaped and influenced by society. While Cooley has often been accused of ignoring the corporeal in favor of mentalism (Stryker & Vryan, 2003), Cooley's thinking self assumes embodiment. The body is more than an entity to be

evaluated per social norms. It is an experiential, active participant in the construction of the self; an individual pictures the embodied self reflexively and evaluates the bodily sensations this imagining produces. Simultaneously, bodily presentation and behavior is shaped by the imaginary other, a sort of self-censorship based upon one's interpretation and internalization of social expectations. As symbolic interactionism developed, the body became the presumed seat of meaning making as well as a social object shaped by individual and social meaning making.

Symbolic interactionism has engaged the body as more than a corporeal fact in recent years; the body is the seat of meaning making, both a social object and an experiential component of self and identity work (Waskul & Vannini, 2006). As theories of the self-in-society, symbolic interactionists have engaged the body in a range of ways. Structural symbolic interactionism has drawn attention to the body as a site for identity validation. Rooted in structural social psychology and the research of Stryker, identity theory posits identity as multiple, constituted through interaction, and relatively stable in adulthood. Individuals' multiple identities are called upon when salient, and individuals strive for consistency in identity (and are held accountable by others, accordingly) (Stryker, 1980; Vryan, Adler & Adler, 2003). The process of constituting and supporting one's identities happens in and through the body. Not only are identities built on embodied experiences, but individuals use identity cues including bodily appearance to confirm their own self-conceptions (Stryker, 1987; Swann, 1987). Individuals modify their body structure through dieting, plastic surgery, weightlifting, etc. to support their sense of self (Goffman, 1959; Schlenker, 1980; Swann). As Burke and Stets articulate, individuals engage their body and bodily presentation to support their identity-constructions for themselves and others, in order to display "signs and symbols of who we are" (Burke & Stets, 2009, p. 74). Embodied identities also affect behavior and interaction; individuals work to live up to their self-identity and this includes monitoring and manipulating the body (Burke & Reitzes, 1991; Swann & Read, 1981). For example, individuals may engage in embodied activities such as dieting, exercise, or tattooing as part of identity-verification and substantiation processes as women, athletes or rockers (Bordo, 1993; George, 2005; Sanders, 1989).

Situational symbolic interactionists have honed in on the body as an active participant in the ongoing process of identity and self formation. Starting with an argument that identity is actively constructed in each new interaction, situationalists argue that, "the self emerges and takes form in the corporal body of individuals and is a 'psychic process wherein signs and other forms of imagery answer to biologically rooted impulses'" (Schwalbe, 1993, p. 334 quoted in Callero, 2003, p. 120). Waskul and Vannini (2006) review symbolic interactionist work on the body and outline five approaches to the study of embodied self-construction, identity negotiation, and emotion. These five approaches include: the looking-glass body; the dramaturgical body; the phenomenological body; the socio-semiotic body; and the narrative body.

One of the central tenets of symbolic interactionism is the centrality of reflexivity for identity and self conceptualization. Scholars who draw on the first approach, based in Cooley's "looking-glass self", regard the body as the seat of reflexivity, wherein meaning making about bodies is based on the imagined reflection of others' meaning-making. Embodiment becomes both the active mediator between self and other and the outcome of meaning making within social groups (Crossley, 2006). Similarly, dramaturgical interactionism, Waskul and Vannini's second approach, conceptualizes the body as performance. Here, embodiment is the product of interaction with others, constructed through individual and collective social and cultural rituals. In Goffman's classic work *Stigma* (1963), the body is given meaning through interaction with others (e.g. stigmatization). As Waskul and Vannini articulate, "It is in the doings of people – not their flesh – that the body is embodied; an *active* process by which the body is literally real(ized) and made meaningful" (2006, p. 7, emphasis in original). These have been particularly useful social psychological approaches to the body, especially in their overlap with post-structural performative theories.

To study the body phenomenologically, the third approach, is "to redirect sociological attention from the body as reified object (of processes, forces, theory) towards the ways in which the body is

lived” (Howson & Inglis, 2001, p. 302). Iwakuma (2002) explains Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of embodiment as the extension of the body through sensory experience such that body image is incorporated into consciousness. From this perspective, perception is neither wholly sensory nor wholly mental and both physiological and psychological aspects of experience are mutually constitutive (e.g. body image). Similarly, the mind and body are both subject and object; irreducible to and inseparable from one another. Take, for example, psychosomatic illness, wherein the mind creates bodily distress (Iwakuma, 2001, p. 77). The bodily illness and the mental state provoking it are both cause and effect.

Elaborating the linkages between post-structuralism and symbolic interactionism, socio-semiotic theories approach the body as an effect of culture. While biology sets the stage, so to speak, the body is given meaning through the culturally specific meanings and values ascribed in discourse. The body is the mechanism through which we engage with others, and therefore is the source of signification in interaction with other bodies and selves (Strauss, 1993). Finally, Waskul and Vannini’s last approach, similar to semiotics but rooted more directly in sociological theory, is narrative practice (Charmaz, 1994; Holstein & Gubrium, 2000; Reagan, 1996). By approaching the self as a narrative accomplishment, bodies are viewed as core components of the stories we tell to ourselves and others. Individuals make sense of their bodies through narrative constructs, and use their bodies to make sense of identities through stories about bodies and embodiment. Narrative tools such as “storytelling, cultural narratives, political ideologies, roles, identities, and features of the corporal body” are employed by individuals to develop and sustain identities and self-concept (Callero, 2003, p. 123). Moreover, as the mediator between the symbolic self and the corporeal experience, struggles of identity and self play out on and in the body. For example, in Galvin’s research on the identity-based outcomes of disability, she finds that individual’s identity transformations were intimately tied up with changes in their bodies and body image. Bodily change challenged core self-narratives, ultimately leading to new identities (2005).

Another perspective draws on the earlier sociological tradition of phenomenology (Pagis, 2009). More than any other theorist Merleau-Ponty (1962) conceptualized the body as an active constituent in interaction and meaning making. Counter to Mead, Merleau-Ponty argued that the body is the source of direct experience and self-recognition. For Merleau-Ponty, the body was both the lived body through which individuals (as subjects) experienced the world, and an empirical object with ascribed characteristics such as bodily shape, size, and appearance. The body, then, is at the center of all experience and meaning is made both cognitively and corporeally (Crossley, 1995). By focusing on the details of embodied experience a phenomenological perspective focuses on the experiential body while simultaneously asserting that meaning-making shapes embodiment (Brandt, 2006).

What all of these interactionist perspectives share is a conceptualization of the body as both subject and object – a mediating participant in social interaction and a corporeal entity shaped by individuals as part of identity and self-development, interaction, and socialization. Individuals negotiate the meaning of bodies and simultaneously the experiential body is part of meaning-making processes. Because of its central place within social psychology, symbolic interactionism is the primary theoretical perspective within research on the body.

Expectation States Theory, Stigma and Embodied Difference

In addition to evolutionary social psychology and symbolic interactionism, a third major social psychology framework has been used to examine the body. Expectation states theory focuses on stigma and status gain/loss within task oriented groups, based upon preconceptions about different social roles or social statuses. (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Cohen, 1982; Driskell & Mullen, 1990). In related research theories of stereotype threat have focused on how stereotypes are created and applied by individuals, and what the consequences of stereotyping is for individuals (Steele & Aronson, 1995).

A substantial area of scholarship within expectation states and stereotype threat theories has focused on the creation of stereotypes (Link, 1982), their preconscious and automatic application (Fiske, 1998), and the consequences of stereotypes and stigma (Link & Phelan, 2001). This work has highlighted the significance of bodily characteristics as a focal point for stereotypes. For example, ability, gender and race – arguably the most significant sources of stigma and stereotype in our society – are read on and through the body. Diffuse status characteristics such as gender, race, or sexuality are assumed to be clearly visible based upon body shape, size, and coloration as well as through embodied gestures, dress, and comportment. When a status characteristic is attached to an individual they are assumed to embody the attitudinal, behavioral, and conditional features of the generalized status group and these unequal expectations produce unequal evaluations of individuals' ability, competency, and skills (Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000; Wagner & Berger, 1997). For example, in Ridgeway's foundational research she demonstrated how gender inequality persists in large part through the attribution of gendered characteristics to men and women, and the evaluation of individuals according to these criteria (2001).

Social psychology has found that these status expectations shape us beyond conscious adherence or not. Our mind makes connections between feelings, behaviors, concepts, and social statuses, and these connections shape our meaning making and action (Nosek & Hansen, 2008). Research has shown that "priming" individuals' different status expectations affects performance in equally as varied ways. For example, Shih and colleagues found that Asian women performed better on a math exam when their Asian identity was made salient versus when their identity as woman was primed, highlighting how diffuse generalized expectations affect individual performance and self-evaluation (1999). This research provides substantial evidence that these unequal responses – aka stereotypical thinking – are not innate but rather developed through socialization.

Status expectations and stereotypes not only affect how individuals are evaluated by others, but also affect individuals own identities and behaviors. For example, Cast, Stets, and Burke examined the relationship between status and self-conception within married couples and found that higher-status spouses (within a marriage) influenced how lower-status spouses thought about themselves (1999). What expectation states theory suggests, and research in the field bears out, is that status expectations and stereotypes affect how individuals are evaluated by others and how they evaluate themselves. Given the social nature of the self, these evaluations are meaningful for individuals in terms of self and identity development. This theoretical approach is able to help social psychology link macro-level processes of stratification, status attribution and stereotype to micro-level identity formation and self-concept processes. Accordingly it is able to capture how body-based status evaluations affect individual and collective social psychological processes.

Notable Research

Drawing on these theoretical frameworks, social psychological research on the body has concentrated on three main topical areas: (1) culture, socialization and the body; (2) sexuality and gender; and (3) the body in health, ability and aging.

Culture, Socialization, and the Body

One of the key insights of social psychology has been the significance of collaborative meaning making by individuals, in interaction. Individuals do not make meaning solely as they wish, of course; sociological social psychology links meaning-making to cultural norms and institutions through

processes of socialization and social learning. When considering the body and social psychology, this approach has produced a range of perspectives about how cultural norms and practices shape embodiment as well as how bodies are given cultural meaning in the process of interaction.

The social nature of meaning making has led many social psychologists to interrogate how individual characteristics shape interaction, group dynamics, and the meaning individuals make about themselves and others. Physical appearance – the product of both genetic traits and cultural forces – is evaluated by others and shapes both how individuals are treated, and ultimately how they think of their selves (Berry, 2008). Different social psychological perspectives explain these processes in a range of ways. From a symbolic interactionist perspective, bodily characteristics shape the shared, situational evaluations of self and other that take place in interaction (Waskul & Vannini, 2006). Expectation states theories engage bodily characteristics as markers of status or stigma and examine how they shape self-perception and social interaction (Webster & Driskell, 1983). Attribution theories draw attention to how interaction is shaped by individual's efforts to divine personality and social identities from the behavioral and bodily characteristics of others with whom they interact (DeJong, 1980). In contrast, social learning theories focus on how embodied individuals are shaped by positive and negative sanctions based, in part, on physical attributes. Across all of these theories, the body plays a central role in both self-construction and social interaction.

Goffman accounted for the role of bodily appearance in social interaction by linking it to social identities (1963). Building on Goffman's work, social psychologists have studied the "implicit personality theories" (Asch, 1946) associated with attractiveness (Webster & Driskell, 1983), body size (Brazier & Lebesco, 2001), and ability (Gething, 1992). By looking at what assumptions individuals make about others based upon physical characteristics, this field of study is able to link cultural stereotypes to interpersonal interaction and group dynamics. For example, a number of studies have found that normatively attractive individuals are evaluated as more competent and likeable and this translates to higher pay, milder punishment, and higher social status (Jackson, Hunter, & Hodge, 1995). Accordingly, overweight individuals are systematically undervalued and disliked, leading to lower social status, pay, etc. (Patzer, 1985). Research on physical ability has found similar patterns vis-à-vis disability, as I explore below in the section on health, ability and aging.

Self Evaluation

The evaluation of individuals on the basis of corporeal characteristics impacts more than social status in the eyes of others. Appearance also affects internal self-evaluation. Research has demonstrated the impact of implicit personality theories on individual's self-conceptions of themselves. For example, normatively attractive individuals rate themselves as more confident, likeable and successful than less attractive ones. In his work on the "appearance phenomenon", Patzer argues that appearance stereotypes become self-fulfilling prophecies and as such shape individuals in cognitive and corporeal ways (1985). Similarly, a number of studies have demonstrated higher performance on standardized tests, better health and improved career trajectories for normatively attractive and abled individuals (Etcoff, 1999; Patzer, 1985).

Of course, as the salience of corporeal characteristics vary across contexts, so to do the individual and interactional impacts of different bodily characteristics (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978). Researchers have found, for example, that when stigmatizing characteristics are made salient they have a more significant impact on self-concept (recall the earlier example about test performance for Asian women). Moreover, self-esteem appears to be protected from some forms of appearance stigma by individual's ability to reason away discrediting stereotypes (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1998).

Cultural Schema and Scripting

Alongside accounting for how bodies shape interaction, a range of scholarship has focused on how the body and embodiment are shaped by cultural practices and schema (Gimlin, 2002; Shapiro, 2010). For example, in their study of surfing, Ford and Brown draw on Bourdieu (1990) to analyze the embodiment of surfing as a cultural practice. By looking at how bodies are shaped by and understood through cultural practices and norms Ford and Brown highlight how bodies are produced and productive on psychosocial and interactional levels. They argue that,

the social logic of surfing revolves around surfing practices that, over time, inscribe or condition the body (*habitus*) in ways that then have a social (relating to social institutions), cultural (relating to ways of living), economic (relating to material wealth) and symbolic (relating to an association to something else that is invisible) exchange value in a cultural economy of groups of people that share a common interest in these practices (the field) (2006, p. 122).

That is, bodies are shaped in complex and intersecting ways by cultural scripts and social institutions, and as such bodies and bodily experiences are deeply situated. This argument about surfing can easily be extended to other embodied practices. What people do, how they do it, and what meaning is given to bodily action all shape embodiment.

Another framework for inquiry about the body and culture is scripting theory. Scripting theories assert that social interaction is guided by learned “cultural scenarios” for social identities, practices, and interactions (DeLamater & Hasday, 2007). Individuals learn through socialization the cultural expectations and guidelines for social phenomena, refine these in interaction, and integrate them with internal psychological self-conceptions and desires. These scripts are not consciously performed; instead, cultural narratives form the basis for interactional patterns and individuals make sense of these scripts intrapsychically (DeLamater & Hasday). With respect to the body, scripting theories draw attention to how individuals learn and internalize the cultural norms for bodies and embodied experience: what should my body look like for this social role?; What is the meaning for these bodily sensations?; etc. For example, Simon and Gagnon’s sexual scripting theory laid out how individuals define and experience sexual bodies and selves (1986). They argued that embodied sexuality is developed through the internalization of cultural scenarios for sex from a range of social institutions (e.g. education, media, family) and the application of these scripts in interpersonal interaction and through intrapsychic processes. With a particular focus on sexuality (Laumann, Gagnon, Michael, & Michaels, 2000) and gender (Gamson & Grindstaff, 2010) this field of study has focused on the body as a product of cultural scripts for embodiment, suggesting that bodies are given meaning through social scripts and internalized through social interaction.

Body Work

In addition to scholarship on how bodies are shaped by culture and through socialization, sociology of the body as a field has drawn attention to the way bodies are actively worked on by individuals. Moving beyond a conceptualization of bodies as the product of either biology or social practice, it has examined how individuals make sense of bodily experiences socially and reconstruct their bodies accordingly. That is, social psychology of the body has examined how the corporeal and experiential body is in dynamic relationship to the mind. The process of analyzing and assigning meaning to our body and its sensory experiences is a learned one shaped by social beliefs, expectations, norms and values, and mediated by internal psychological processes (Crawley, Foley, & Shehan, 2008; Radley, 1991; Watson, 2000). Challenging theorizing that sees the body as only a social product, Lyon and Barbalet argue that, “the human capacity for social agency, to collectively and individually contribute

to the making of the social world, comes precisely from the person's lived experience of embodiment" (1994, p. 54).

A number of scholars have focused their attention on the efforts individuals undertake to shape the form and function of their bodies – what many call “*body work*” – and the psychosocial components of these efforts (Cregan, 2006; Crossley, 2001; Grimshaw, 1999). In fact, the emergent field of sociology of the body has been dominated by studies of body modification and manipulation through plastic surgery (Pitts-Taylor, 2009), biomedical intervention (Balsamo, 1996), tattooing (Sanders, 1989), exercise (George, 2005), dieting (Kwan & Trautner, 2009) and gender affirming surgery (Meyerowitz, 2002).

Only some of this work has engaged psychosocial dynamics, however. In her study of women's body work through plastic surgery, exercise, and beauty regimens, Gimlin ties body work and work on the self together, suggesting that body work is often engaged as part of negotiating personal and social identities. Moreover, individuals are neither simply internalizing cultural scripts nor making self and body as they wish; instead, individuals engage body and identity work in agentic, complicated and varied ways. As Gimlin concludes, “the meanings of the body are neither free-floating in culture nor created solely by individuals, but are embedded in those institutions where culture and individual efforts meet” (2002, p. 9). Similarly, Pitts-Taylor has examined the social meaning of plastic surgery, and its impact on surgery patient's and critic's self-concepts and identities (Pitts, 2006; Pitts-Taylor, 2009). Pitts-Taylor asserts that body work is best understood as a complex, dynamic endeavor that is produced by and produces embodied subjectivities.

Other scholars have focused on how self and identity can shift alongside embodiment changes, for example through dramatic weight loss or aging. Building on scholarship about discursive strategies around obesity and weight-loss (Throsby, 2007), Drew draws on Holstein and Gubrium's theory of “interpretive practice” to elaborate how individuals learn, negotiate, and internalize new discourses of health and body as they navigate bariatric weight-loss surgery. What she finds is that embodied change affects self-conception through the intersecting processes of learning, modifying, and contesting medical, social, and support discourses (Drew, 2008a, p. 217). More specifically, Drew found that individuals learn and respond to ideal patient archetypes for weight loss surgery, and that, “regardless of each respondent's personal response to the ideal archetype, all respondents' personal narratives and health care experiences [were] influenced by their interactions with medical discourses” (Drew, 2008b, p. 87).

Emotion and Emotional Labor

Another body of work has built on social psychological study of emotion and emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983) to explore the social psychological aspects of body labor (Lupton, 1998; Shilling, 1997). Lyon and Barbalet argue that embodied emotion is the link between the individual and society because of its relational character (1994). Kang's study of nail salons highlights the production of emotional and affective states as part of body-focused jobs (2010). In the nail salons Kang studied, worker's bodies were used to generate and communicate particular emotional states for clients and, as Kang argues, produce status and power on and through the body. By requiring the production of different embodied affective states depending on the social class and race of clientele – for example deference in white high-class salons and respect in African-American working class salons – the emotive bodies of Asian-American women workers were actively (re)shaped in the process of labor. Similarly, Price-Glynn's research on women who work at a strip club elaborates on how body and emotion work such as plastic surgery, body modification, and constructed emotionality constitutes a central component of stripper's lives. As Price-Glynn explains, “Being a stripper is a socially created activity, a performance that women have to learn, even as it is presented as something entirely

rooted in women's physical attributes" (2010, p. 113). Part of inhabiting this social role, then, is the manipulation of bodily and emotional states, and these manipulations extend beyond the work life of individuals. What research and theorizing on body work and working bodies has revealed is how bodies are manipulated for identity construction and negotiation, and production of emotional and/or psychosocial affect. This scholarship highlights the complex interplay between psychological processes and body labor, offering empirical challenges to the mind/body split.

Sexuality and Gender

Feminist scholars were some of the first to incorporate the body into sociological inquiry and study of gender and sexuality remains one of the most vibrant areas of theorizing and empirical study of the body and embodiment within the discipline. Early feminist scholarship endeavored to deny the body in an effort to skirt debates about physical weakness, hormones, pregnancy and somatic difference. By the 1990s, however, feminist sociology began to engage the body as part of standpoint epistemologies that take seriously the complexity of situated lived experience (Howson, 2005). In an effort to counter claims that gender inequality was rooted in biological difference, feminist scholars theorized the female body as a gendered social construction that not only generated difference, but also inequality (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Grosz, 1994; Lorber & Moore, 2011). Since then, scholars have examined how gender affects all parts of psychosocial life including women's health and the medicalization of women's bodies (Morgan, 1998), appearance and embodiment (Weitz, 2002), play and gendered social learning (Messner, 2000; Orenstein, 1995; Thorne, 1993), status expectation and employment inequality (Reskin & Roos, 1991), love and desire (Kimmel, 2005; Tolman, 1994), and family (Brines, 1994; Coltrane, 2004; Hochschild, 1989). In all of these arenas, gender is read through bodily characteristics, functioning simultaneously a social institution and an embodied psychosocial experience.

Gender as Socially Constructed

The most significant shift gender scholars made in incorporating the body was to develop empirical and theoretical knowledge that refuted the taken-for-granted assumption that sex and gender were biological truths. The reigning gender paradigm in North America asserts that all bodies clearly fit into one of two sex categories (male/female), defined by chromosomes and genitals (somatic fact), and that this sex assignment is inexorably linked to one embodied gender (man/woman). This paradigm so strongly structures our social scripts and meaning making that purportedly objective science arbitrarily describes male biological attributes and processes as aggressive, violent, and strong and female biological functions as passive, soft, and receptive (Allen, 2007). Feminist scholarship on the body has challenged this binary sex/gender system by demonstrating how bodies and biological processes have been given sexed and gendered meaning through gender and sexual scripts, and how these have been used to delineate the boundaries between male and female and between men and women (Foucault, 1973; Oudshoorn, 1994).

Gender scripts – stories for who we can be – are the resources that individuals use to construct socially legible lives (Kimmel, 2000; Mead, 1949; Simon & Gagnon, 1986). Scripts offer a range of possibilities for gendered selves from which individuals construct authentic embodied lives. Gender is also an experience of the mind – a sense of who we are, and what we are 'like' and 'not like.' But contrary to our societal assumptions, neither our gendered bodies nor our gendered identities are solely biological or social manifestations (Lorber, 1994).

Numerous studies have traced how gender (man or woman) is assigned at birth (male or female, usually based upon visible body characteristics), and how these norms and expectations shape all interaction from birth forward (Renzetti & Curran, 1995; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999). Bodies are characterized as male and female through medical institutions and reflect dominant gender expectations and embodiment ideologies (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). By focusing on how cultural schema for men and women (and masculinity and femininity) are internalized through socialization, feminist scholarship has been able to link the institution of gender as a system of stratification to the embodied realities of men and women's psychosocial lives. For example, expectation states theory has focused in large part on how gender roles lead individuals to make sense of their own and others bodies and abilities in gendered ways (Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000; Wagner & Berger, 1997). For example, Ridgeway's research found that in experimental groups both men and women granted more authority to and evaluated more positively actions by those with higher status, including when that status was gender (Ridgeway, 2001). Similarly, when identical products were reported to be made by men and women alternately, those made by men were evaluated more positively (Swim & Sanna, 1996).

Social beliefs about bodies (e.g. male versus female brains) shape individual's perceptions of their own embodied skills, both consciously and unconsciously (Nosek & Hansen, 2008). For example, a series of experiments by social psychologists Brian Nosek and Jeffrey Hansen tested whether it was easier for individuals to pair gendered names with stereotypical or non-stereotypical ideas or behaviors (for example Alice to career versus Alice to wedding). They found there is a persistent difference in the time it takes for individuals to pair stereotypical associations and non-stereotypical ones, suggesting that there is an automatic and unintended association between gender and normative practices.³ That is, we learn gender norms and stereotypes on both the conscious and unconscious levels and both of these shape how we interact with others, construct our selves, and respond to social stimuli. Interestingly, as Nosek and Hansen have found, when individuals are exposed to counter-stereotypical information, their responses are more similar indicating less gendered beliefs. This body of research as a whole suggests that when gender is salient (part of the interaction, categorizing someone as male or female, etc.) gender stereotypes are primed and influential despite intentionality. Moreover, these unconscious associations appear to also shape self-concept such that individuals see themselves as stronger or weaker at particular tasks (e.g. math) in gendered ways after gender is primed (Fine, 2010). Taken together this research elaborates how social norms about embodiment (e.g. about race, gender, ability, age) shape psychosocial processes, highlighting the interplay between "bodies, minds, and society" (Lorber, 2011, p. 409). While these dynamics have often been interpreted as solely experiences of the mind, a more robust accounting recognizes how these associations occur based on the embodied experience of individuals and about individuals' bodily reality.

Gender is accomplished in the process of everyday life, shaping identity, interaction, and social status (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; West & Zimmerman, 1987). It is impossible to separate the body out from the interactional and intrapsychic elements of gender since gender is written on and read through embodiment. Even though gender rules and norms are things that are created by society, and therefore not facts of nature, their consequences are tangible and meaningful, and are experienced mentally, emotionally, and physically by individuals (Crawley, Foley, & Shehan, 2007). Because we believe that gender is natural, and because we believe that there are natural differences between men and women, societal forces create, uphold, and reproduce gender. To put it another way, the "*cultural messages* that form our expectations and 'rules' about gender determine the gendered experiences of our bodies – our *embodied knowledge*, and these

³You can try the Implicit Association Test for yourself here: <https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/>

messages and our resulting gendered practices help to shape our physical bodies as well” (Crawley, Foley, & Shehan, 2007, p. 1, emphasis theirs).⁴

Gendered Sexuality

Built on this theoretical foundation scholarship on social psychology and gender has focused on the impact of gender norms and scripts on the embodied identities, self-esteem, and self-conceptions of women (Crossley, 2001), and the way these discourses shape women’s interactions with men partners (Dworkin & O’Sullivan, 2007), doctors (West, 1993), and family (McMahon, 1995). For example, Dworkin and O’Sullivan found that gender scripts for heterosexuality shape whether and how women initiate sexual activity with men partners. Dominant social scripts for sex normalize men asking for sex, but make it problematic for women to do so; these scripts shape how men and women interact and make sense of their own sexual selves. Moreover, as men and women engage in sexual activity they learn these rules and experience reward or sanction for rejecting or abiding by them.

There is substantial overlap between gender and sexuality in psychosocial processes and interaction, as Dworkin and O’Sullivan’s work demonstrates. In part this is an outcome of their conflation in contemporary society. By and large we assume sexual desire, sex acts, and sexual identities to ‘naturally’ differ for men and women, as a society, and this ties the two together experientially and epistemologically. Social psychology has focused a lot of attention on sexuality, but only some of this has engaged the body as a significant, material participant in sexual activity, identification, and experience. The tendency, instead, has been to conceptualize sexuality as a mental social construct, a product of interaction, or as a ‘natural’ feature of human life (Longmore, 1998).

Some evolutionary social psychologists have sought the etiology of sexual identity in genetic or biological difference (Bailey & Pillard, 1991). By and large, however, social psychology has pointed to social, historical and biographical variables (Plummer, 1981; Troiden, 1988). This research has focused on the social construction of identity categories (Foucault, 1978) as well as on identity development processes (Troiden). Esterberg (1997) examined how sexual identity is an ongoing process of (re)production within communities. Whether women identified as bisexual or lesbian in her study had far less to do with sexual practice than with the norms and conventions within their local lesbian community. Esterberg concludes that, “while we make and remake our identities, we do so within the boundaries of convention” (p. 261). Looking beyond etiology, a number of social psychologists have examined how bodies and embodied acts come to be sexual.

⁴However, sex and gender are more than social constructions. They are also real and meaningful somatic experiences in the lives of individuals. It is this very complexity, however, that has posed the greatest challenge to feminist scholarship on gender and the body, particularly within social psychology. Efforts to reject essentialist theories that tied gendered patterns of behavior, personality, and interaction to genetic difference (and therefore gender inequality as natural), led many scholars to a social constructionist theory of gender that assumed sex to be biological but gender to be social. In this scenario, while bodies may be fixed, the identities, behaviors, psychological characteristics, and sense of self individuals develop as men or women are the product of socialization, interaction, impression management, and other psychosocial processes (Lorber, 1994). However, because feminist theory did not call into question the idea that males are men and females are women, it has inadvertently naturalized cisgender sex/gender alignment (male-men, female-women) and pathologized transgender alignments. Indeed, to assume that cisgender pairings are the “natural” progression of correct socialization, and transgender pairings are disordered is to engage in cisgenderism or a system of privilege that rewards people who feel their bodies and gender identities align “naturally,” and punishes those who modify their bodies in order to bring them in line with a personal sense of gender identity (Schilt & Westbrook, 2009; Shapiro, 2010). In light of this critique, scholars have begun to reconceptualize sex and gender as both learned and known, social and biological.

Scripting theory argues that social schema shape how individuals experience their embodied sexuality, interact with others sexually, and make sense of sexual experiences (Simon & Gagnon, 1986). Diamond's empirical research suggests that sexual identity development is ongoing, fluid, and non-linear (2009). Drawing on a longitudinal study of 89 adolescent women, Diamond (2009) found that sexual desire and identity was far more variable than deterministic models suggest; "sexual feelings and behaviors are structured by complex interactions among individual and contextual factors, including genes, hormones, maturational state, personality traits, situational factors, interpersonal influences, and cultural norms" (p. 239). Other social psychologists have used narrative theories to examine how individuals develop and deploy gender and sexual identities (Harvey, Orbach, Chwalisz, & Garwood, 1991; Mason-Schrock, 1996). Alongside a focus on identity, social psychologists have examined the impact of stigma and homophobia on sexualized interaction, sexual behaviors and embodied identities (Herek, 2009; Plummer, 1975; Wesely, 2003).

By and large the body of social psychological scholarship on gender and sexuality has elaborated how embodied personal and social identities – gender and sexuality – are deeply social and developed in interaction. Moreover, sociological social psychologists have drawn attention to how body parts, embodied sensation, and somatic experience gain meaning and significance through meaning-making processes, narrative, and interaction (Hakim, 2011). A related field of study on health and ability has focused on these same social psychological aspects of embodied lives.

Health, Ability and Aging

Health and bodily ability has been one of the major areas of research on the body within sociology (Turner, 1987). While other areas of sociological inquiry into the body and health are interested in the causes and consequences of illness, poor health and disability, social psychology has focused on how individuals manage the emotional and physiological aspects of illness (Bury, 1991; Kelly, 1992), reshape self-perception and identity after bodily change (Drew, 2008a, b; Imrie, 2000; Joannis, 2005), and make sense of illness, disability, and aging within particular cultural contexts (Devlieger & Albrecht, 2000; Loe, 2011; Zola, 1972). More recently, scholarship has challenged and extended this work and examined somatic knowledge and embodied reflexivity (Clough & Halley, 2007; Pagis, 2009).

The predominant approach to understanding the embodied self and illness, in the middle of the twentieth century, was rooted in structural functionalism (e.g. Parsons' "sick role" in which institutional structure determined individual status and subjectivity). Challenges to this perspective drew on early symbolic interactionism. Through studies of the "lived experience" of illness sociologists like Strauss and Glaser (1975) and Davis (1963) shifted analytical focus from the social structure to the experiential meaning-making processes of patients. For example, Strauss and Glaser (1975) examined the psychological and interactional processes individuals managed as part of chronic illness. These early ethnographic studies of illness and its effects by Becker (1953), Davis (1963), Goffman (1963), and Strauss and Glaser (1975) set the stage for much of the later work on illness as negotiated both institutionally and individually.

Stigma, Identity Work, and Social Interaction

Many scholars have drawn on Goffman's concept of stigma to examine how social responses to "abominations of the body" (1963) affect interpersonal interaction, social integration, and social status (Joannis & Synnott, 1999). For example, social psychological scholarship on chronic and highly

stigmatized diseases such as HIV/AIDS have found that persons without the diseases stereotype persons with them and sufferers develop complex coping strategies to manage stigma. These strategies affect interpersonal interaction, integration, and social status. For example, in their interviews with HIV-positive individuals Siegel, Lune and Meyer found that individuals draw on a range of reactive and proactive stigma management techniques to assert a positive sense of self, maintain self-esteem and dearly-held identities, and/or develop new illness-focused identities (1998). In similar work Marilyn Phillips found that differently abled individuals experience substantial stigma based upon labeling processes rooted in cultural stereotypes about “disability” and that this stigma affected self-concept, social interaction, and social status (Phillips, 1990).

The largest body of work has examined how identity and self-formation processes are shaped by illness (Charmaz, 1983, 2000; Galvin, 2003). This work has primarily drawn on symbolic interactionist theories to analyze whether and how individuals’ self-conceptions shift as their embodied states change (e.g. health status, developing chronic illness, disability, aging). For example, Corbin and Strauss (1987) argue that chronically ill individual’s self-reflexive identities are reshaped through three intersecting processes: illness work, everyday work, and biographical work, in which individuals must make sense of and manage their condition, their daily life, and their personal and public narrative about their illness. Earlier research in medical sociology, for example by Anselm Strauss, set the stage for contemporary ethnomethodological and symbolic interactionist studies of how psychosocial processes such as identity formation, self-esteem and self-efficacy are remade when individuals experience chronic illness (Strauss & Glaser, 1975), disability (Blaxter, 1976), aging (Boehmer, 2007; Gubrium & Sankar, 1994), and death (Glaser & Strauss, 1968).

Charmaz (1983, 1995) has focused on the “loss of self” that she argues individuals experience when coming to terms with a disability. In her interviews with chronically ill individuals Charmaz explored the mechanisms by which, “experiences of being discredited, embarrassed or ignored or otherwise devalued also contribute to ... their subsequent reappraisals of self” (Charmaz, 1983, p. 177). What she found was that the experience of chronic illness led individuals to experience a “loss of self” such that their prior self-concepts were replaced with less empowered, more discredited ones. Similarly, in their research on age-based identities Schafer and Shippee (2010) examined the relationship between individuals’ age-related self-identities and sense of self-efficacy, and cognitive ability. Using longitudinal data from a nationally representative survey they found that age-identity had a significant effect on subjective evaluation of cognitive ability, self-efficacy, and self-esteem. This relationship persisted even when controlling for health status, biological age, and other demographic factors, suggesting that individuals’ embodied self-perceptions have consequences for a range of social psychological processes.

Scholars interested in narrative and discursive psychosocial processes have examined the impact of support groups on the embodied identities of individuals (Gergen, 1991; Gottschalk, 1993; Hill, 2005). For example, Holstein and Gubrium describe how individuals construct their identity as ‘recovering alcoholic’ within Alcoholics Anonymous groups by incorporating elements of the A-A script into their story. Members build their narratives within the accepted formats for personal storytelling (discursive practices), namely through introductions and shorter ‘shares,’ sometimes after a longer account by one member (Denzin, 1987; Holstein & Gubrium, 2000, pp. 177–186). While everyone has their own personal history, people use discourses-in-practice (social scripts) in order to produce authentic, legible stories. This process of narrative identity formation argues that embodied identity is produced in groups through “the constellation of procedures, conditions, and resources through which reality ... is apprehended, understood, organized, and represented in the course of everyday life” (Holstein & Gubrium, p. 94). Similar research on support groups for those with chronic illness or disability has found that individuals learn how to make sense of embodied difference, integrate it into their sense of self, and/or develop counter-hegemonic empowered or alternative identities within groups, in the process of and as part of group therapy or support (Francis, 1997; Holstein & Gubrium 2000).

Interaction and Social Support

A second area of scholarship on the social psychology of health has centered around interpersonal interaction and social support. This literature has examined how illness and disability shape group membership and social relationships within both established sites of interaction and in new venues such as disability-focused communities. Research has found that social stereotypes levied based upon visible bodily difference have a substantial impact on both the behavior and evaluation of others and on the self-conception and interactional style of stereotyped individuals (Klein & Snyder, 2003). For example, Bury has explored how interpersonal interactions are made more challenging when an individual's social identity includes disability or illness (1988, 1991). In related work, Comer and Piliavin found that disabled individuals shortened interaction and maintained more interactional distance when interacting with able-bodied people, compared to other disabled individuals, due to interactional discomfort on the part of able-bodied individuals (1972). This research highlights the impression management burden carried by individuals who embody stigmatized differences. The impact of corporeal difference (e.g. ability, age, race) depends in large part on the context of interactions and social groups; different organizational contexts generate different expectations for the ability and "fit" of disabled workers and that these varied expectations produce different psychological and interactional consequences for disabled individuals (Spataro, 2005).

A number of scholars have also examined how support groups help mitigate stigma and illness-induced isolation (Herzlich & Pierret, 1987), provide individuals new interpretive frames (Mason-Schrock, 1996), and advocate for social and cultural change (Gillett, 2003; Taylor, 1996). Research has shown, for example, that social and emotional support is one of the primary determinants of physiological and mental health (House, 2001). Critiques of social psychological research on disability have highlighted, however, how both conceptions of disability and responses to it are always already social. Much early research on disability, for example, reified disability, and assumed victimhood, social isolation, and reduced self-concept (Fine & Asch, 1988). Scholars have found that responses to and self-conception of disability shift over time (Schulz & Decker, 1985), are shaped by other social statuses such as race and gender (Fine & Asch, 1981), and constitute only one of multiple individual and social identities.

Cultural Differences in Health and Illness

Finally, a body of research has emerged that examines the micro-level processes that underlie inequalities in health and wellness between different social groups (e.g. race, class, gender). A number of social psychologists have examined how cultural differences in health and illness shape individual's conceptualizations and experiences of their own bodies and selves. While substantial work has examined these issues from structural and individualist perspectives (Andersen, 1968; Hebl & Heatherton, 1997; Najman, 1993), these issues have also been approached from a social psychological perspective, accounting for health disparities on interactional, community, and phenomenological levels (Moore, 1969). Some research has highlighted differences in accessing care between men and women, highlighting how the norms of hegemonic masculinity often inhibit health-related care among men. For example, in a randomly assigned study Bertakis and colleagues found that women were more likely to access primary care services than men, even when controlling for health status and demographic differences such as income, age, and education (Bertakis, Azari, Helms, Callahan, & Robbins, 2000). Other research has theorized that social roles for men promote individual behaviors and subjectivities that are higher risk (e.g. for hypertension) (Spielberger et al., 1991). For example, a longitudinal study of more than 1,500 men by Courtenay found that hegemonic beliefs about masculinity were a significant predictor of health risk taking behavior (e.g. cigarette smoking),

suggesting that social norms and ideologies about masculinity shape the bodies and physiology of men in significant ways (Courtenay, 2003). Similarly, substantial research has shown that ethnicity and race affect experiences of pain (Zborowski, 1952), likelihood of seeking medical care (Bottorff et al., 1998) and other health-related behaviors. Even structural inequalities such as racism impact the somatic wellbeing of individuals. For example, a study of blood pressure and racial discrimination conducted by Krieger and Sidney found that perceptions of race-based discrimination were significantly correlated with increased blood pressure and poorer health (1996).

The ever-growing body of scholarship on the social psychology of illness, ability, and age has expanded sociological understanding of how embodied states shape and are shaped by social psychological processes. By recognizing how identity and self-construction efforts change in response to corporeal changes, as well as how these changes are produced through interaction with real and imagined others, a social psychology of health and illness extends empirical and theoretical knowledge about the relationship between body, mind, and society. Similarly, research on how social stereotypes manifest in interaction and affect psychosocial wellbeing helps sociologists link structural systems of stratification to the internal and external lives of individuals.

Methodological Trends

Research on social psychology and the body has primarily relied on three methodological approaches. For scholarship closely aligned with cognitive psychology, as well as research focused on somatic responses to psychological stimuli, experimental research has been the central method. Much of this work uses bio-monitoring to measure somatic experience, elicit narrative, and generate other quantitative and qualitative measures (Lyons & Cromby, 2010). By and large, however, qualitative study of the body has dominated empirical work, (Richardson & Shaw, 1998). While psychological social psychology has relied heavily on interviews (Sandelowski, 2002), sociological study has tended toward ethnographies, particularly in studies of body work (Gimlin, 2007; Kang, 2010), physicality, sport and dance (Shilling, 2008), and subculture (Sanders, 1989). Finally, many interdisciplinary studies that bridge sociology and cultural studies draw on comparative historical and meta-analytical methods. Some of this work examines changes in bodies and embodied selves over time and across place (Bordo, 1993; Foucault, 1973). Other studies focus on how gendered and racialized social norms and beliefs shape the interpretation and treatment of bodies and embodied lives (Banks, 2000; Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Jackson, 2006).

Sandelowski rightly critiques qualitative studies of the body, particularly on health and illness, for prioritizing discursive and interview data over observational, or archival/artifact data such that qualitative analysis and conclusions come to be disembodied. Indeed, Sandelowski argues that the tendency to rely on the “interview” both reinforces a mind/body split and privileges the cognitive as somehow more authentic and real. Instead, she argues, scholars need to draw on observational techniques and analysis of physical objects (e.g. sonograms and biometric data) in order to truly embody social science (and I would argue social psychological) research (2002). Similarly, in the introduction to her edited volume on visual methods for studying social psychological processes, Reavey argues that to ignore the visual is to lose the experiential and embodied character of the lives of individuals (2011).

In response to these and other similar critiques, a number of innovative methodological techniques are being developed by scholars in the field, in an effort to capture the complex cognitive and corporeal processes that are of interest (Freund, 1998; Freund & McGuire, 1991; Williams & Bendelow, 1998). In part, these new methods are an effort to address the heretofore inadequate marriage of cognitive and corporeal data (Benton, 1991; Newton, 2007). For Newton, a truly “material-corporeal sociology” would recognize, “the social salience of the extra-discursive body, and how any account of the

social world remains seriously deficient if it ignores the fact that human beings have biological bodies, and that our bodies are centrally implicated in human communication, development, maturation, and reproduction” (p. 122).

This is not, of course, a simple endeavor. As Newton cautions, “any non-reductionistic and contextualised corporeal sociology must still contend with the fact that it is very difficult to interrogate the body” (Newton, 2007, p. 137). A number of scholars have, however, tried to bridge this divide. For example, Crossley has pioneered study of “reflexive body techniques” in which he examines both the qualitative, experiential and narrative components of body work and the quantitative study of biometrics and special distribution of body practices in order to explore embodied reflexivity within the body work practices of individuals. For example, Crossley has focused on working out as a ‘reflexive body technique’ and combined social network analysis with reflexive ethnographic interviews to capture the social experience of gym-based classes (2004). Crossley aims to move past the self/body dualism often created in the process of studying how one is transformed (and therefore separate from) the other. Reflexive body techniques (RBTs) draw on Marcel Mauss’ conceptualization of body techniques (1979) and allow us to recognize and theorize the construction of the “I” and the “me” through reflexive processes instead of assuming that the body creates self change or vice versa (2005).

Other scholars, like Sparkes and Smith have endeavored to develop more corporeal, more embodied discursive and narrative methodologies to capture the fullness of embodied lives (2012). This work conceptualizes qualitative interview and narrative analyses as embodied engagements that can and must account for the bodies and embodied experiences of both researcher and participant. Some research has turned to photography to capture and draw attention to meaning making around bodies and embodiment, for example around embodiment and illness (Baker & Wang, 2006). By having participants take pictures of their lives and embodied experiences researchers are able to generate more nuanced ethnographic data and capture more robustly the embodied experiences of subjects. In one photovoice study of African American breast cancer survivors, for example, Lopez and colleagues were able to capture multiple dimensions of quality-of-life among survivors based upon analysis of captured photographs (López, Eng, & Robinson, 2005). Yet others have turned to post-structuralism and Foucault to situate embodied lives within larger biopolitics. Moore and Casper, for example, blend ethnographic methods with analysis of biostatistics and close readings of social texts to examine which bodies are present and which rendered invisible within contemporary society (Moore & Casper, 2009). What all of these new methodological efforts share is a grappling with the complexities of capturing both the corporeal and cognitive aspects of psychosocial processes. The innovative and transdisciplinary work will continue as social psychology continues to engage the body in a robust manner.

The State of the Field and Future Directions

The sociology of the body has matured into a robust field of study spanning the sociological spectrum and elaborating how the body and embodiment intersects socioeconomic, technological, religious, family and life-course, medical, global and political institutions in society. Social psychological inquiry has been a growing part of this field. Sociologists have examined the body from a symbolic interactionist lens, theorizing stigma, phenomenology, narrative and ethnomethodology through the empirical study of sport, work, ability, gender and gender non-conformity, sexed bodies, aging, and race. Theories of embodied socialization have focused on cultural schemas for bodies and their internalization and the construction of bodies through social learning, producing knowledge about rites of passage, body modification, dieting and body work. Feminist inquiry into the gendered body has helped to link sexism and gender roles to cosmetic surgery, body work and fat pride, and these, in turn, to stigma, self-fulfilling prophecy, narrative and expectation states theory.

Phenomenological approaches have found new life in the study of embodied practices, reflexivity, self and subjectivity as manifested in yoga, dance, spirituality and everyday life.

Alongside the explosion of research on the body within sociology generally, social psychological research that positions the body and embodiment at the center has continued to push the boundaries of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Mirroring trends in sociology broadly (Clough & Halley, 2007), work on the social psychology of the body is focusing on emotion (Lupton, 1998; Shilling, 2008). Similarly, following trends within other fields, social psychological engagement with the body is increasingly integrating nanotechnology and neuroscience (Franks, 2010; Martin, 2010; Pitts-Taylor, 2007). Fat studies have also grown exponentially in the last few years, challenging taken-for-granted assumptions about health, epidemiology, and body politics within sociology and society (Cooper, 2010; Gilman, 2008). Study of body conformity and resistance more broadly has also engaged issues of self, identity, social interaction, and groups (Bobel & Kwan, 2011; Lorber & Moore, 2011). Scholars are also continuing to integrate social psychology and post-structuralism with a focus on health, aging, and gender through the lens of biopower and biopolitics (Lemke, 2011; Moore & Casper, 2009) as well as phenomenology (Hockey & Allen-Collinson, 2009; Papadopoulos, 2011; Scambler, 2009). All to say, the social psychology of the body and embodiment is a thriving field of study.

The most promising avenues of inquiry bring together social psychological attention to meaning-making, experience, interaction and reflexivity, and knowledge about the corporeal body from a range of disciplines. While scholars in other fields like sexology and psychology have been integrating psychosocial and biometric measures for decades (e.g. John Gottman's research on couple's relationships), it is a new avenue of research within sociology. For example, by combining discursive analysis and biometric measurement Antonia Lyons and John Cromby are able to capture the complex and dynamic relationship between physiology (measured here through blood pressure) and social interaction (measured through discursive analysis of a conversation between research subjects). That is, by engaging both physiological and discursive analysis they are able to examine a relationship between individual social psychological processes (gaining voice, identity construction, status negotiation) and bodily responses (increased blood pressure) that would have been invisible without attention to both biometrics and discourse. What their data suggests is that social interaction is neither driven by physiological changes, nor the driver of them. Instead, "as embodied beings ... physiologies are thoroughly enrolled within social lives" (Lyons & Cromby, 2010, p. 8). Instead of older approaches that, "assume that one can read the social (e.g. psychological stress) from the biological (physiological 'indicators') ... which detracts from the complexity of the social and the biological," this approach recognizes and elaborates their complex interplay (Newton, 2003, p. 35 as quoted in Lyons & Cromby, p. 8). Engaging embodied social psychological processes in this way will be able to extend sociological knowledge about emotion and body work (Hochschild, 1979; Kang, 2010), the physiology and phenomenology of stigma and impression management, and the social psychological changes that go along with body work and bodily transformation.

Future research in this field will tackle the two central challenges of marrying social psychology and the body: (1) the body as subject/body as object tension; and (2) accounting for the corporeal body in a sociological way. First, current social psychological approaches tend to view the body as *either* conceptual or corporeal. In some work the body is engaged as a product of discursive power, phenomenological meaning-making, or social interaction. In other work the body is an empirical reality that drives behavior through biological imperative, is the object of body work, and is evaluated based upon social characteristics (as thin, fat, tall, short, and so on). By dividing empirical study of the body in this way social psychology is unable to truly capture the complex interplay between cognitive and corporeal aspects of human experience. Continued research on the body as an active participant in social psychological processes, as simultaneously a product of meaning-making in interaction and somatic presence that shapes social status and interaction will help the field move beyond the conceptual/corporeal divide.

Second, sociological social psychology must develop more nuanced accounting of the empirical body instead of either dismissing or assuming the body as conceptualized within physiology, biology, and biopsychology. While physiology and biopsychology take for granted the genetic and biological underpinnings of individual and social action and privilege biological explanations, a sociological social psychology can move beyond a nature/nurture split and recognize the complex interplay between social, biological, and cognitive processes vis-à-vis the body.

In this chapter I have argued that social psychology has engaged questions of body and self from its earliest theories, though they have often been construed as processes of the mind, taking for granted the centrality of the body (Archer, 2003). More recently empirical and theoretical studies have re-focused on “the body’s own experience of its embodiment’ in various social contexts” (Shilling, 2008, p. 2). There is much to gain from bringing the body back to the center of social psychology. Attention to the body within sociology can offer alternatives to the tendency in psychology and biology to reduce social outcomes to biological determinants. Including the body when exploring the relationship between the internal and external environments that guide human behavior helps scholars better explain patterns and trends within human action and works against tendencies to conflate biology with behavior (Shilling). Social psychology also challenges determinist theories of self and society within evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and pop-cultural pseudo-science, and elaborates how human behavior is guided by meaning making about the embodied self and social world.

Attention to the body in social psychology can and does elaborate the microsociological mechanisms by which societal and cultural structures shape individual embodied lives. More specifically, bringing issues of the body and social psychological theories into conversation with one another allows sociologists to highlight how individuals are agentic meaning-making creatures situated within a social structure, neither controlled by their environment or biology, nor free-floating and ahistorical. This project is at the center of a sociological social psychology.

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Chapter 8

Self and Self-Concept

Timothy J. Owens and Sarah Samblanet

Self and Self-Concept: Philosophical Foundations

Self and self-concept may be two of the most popular concepts in social psychology. Nearly every area of social psychology, and the social sciences in general, touches on some aspect of a person's self or self-concept. As we will see momentarily, the most cursory glance at a library's card catalog or a bookstore's holdings show that self and self-concept enjoy enormous popularity among academic researchers and the general public. And this is nothing new. "Few ideas are both as weighty and as slippery," according to Seigel's (2005) incisive history of the self in human thought, "as the notion of the self" (p. 3). James (1890) would certainly concur. As commonly interpreted, the self is the particular being any person is.

[W]hatever it is about each of us that distinguishes you from me from others, draws the parts of our existence together, persists through change, or opens the way to becoming who we might or should be (Seigel, 2005, p. 3).

Historically, the self was of foremost concern to theologians, philosophers (going back to antiquity), and men and women of letters. Seigel (2005) traces the conceptions of the self in Western culture from ancients (e.g., Plato and Aristotle) to medievals (e.g., Augustine and Thomas Aquinas) to modern rationalists (e.g., Descartes) and empiricists (e.g., Locke, Hume, Adam Smith) to contemporaries (e.g., Kant, Hegel, Marx, James, Foucault, and Derrida). Questions of the self that have occupied humans for millennia include: Who am *I*? Why am *I* here? What does *my* life mean? Where did *I* come from? Why have good (or bad) things happened to *me*? Am *I* a good person? Am *I* capable of change? Am *I* loved? Can *I* love? Do *I* love? And what makes me, *me*, and you, *you*? All of these questions imply a self.

Seigel (2005) notes that the basis of selfhood has primarily been conceived along three dimensions (p. 5ff). They are, first, the *bodily or material* self that is shaped, with varying degrees of consciousness, by our bodily needs and urges. Second, the *relational* self arises from social and cultural interactions that give rise to collective identities and shared orientations and values. Third, the *reflective* self, a bedrock of symbolic interactionism, hinges on the self as an active agent with the capacity to put "ourselves at a distance from our own being so as to examine, judge, and sometimes regulate or revise" our selves and the world around us (p. 6).

The prominence of self and self-concept research in sociology and psychology can be traced first to James' (1890) original and incisive treatment followed by some early and important efforts by

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sociologists (Cooley, 1902; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918) and philosophers (i.e., Mead, 1934). And while this is not the proper venue to explore the self's many constituencies, meanings, and nuances, the interested reader would benefit from overviews by Diggory (1966), Gergen (1971), Burns (1979), Rosenberg (1979), or Wylie (1979). Suffice it to say here that research on the self has long fascinated social scientists, at least since Cooley outlined the "looking-glass self" and James and Mead distinguished the "I" from the "me"—or, the self as subject and object, or knower and known. Still, thorough and empirically oriented work on self and self-concept did not flourish until sociology's post-World War II renaissance as a methodologically rigorous science (Martindale, 1981) and psychology's cognitive revolution in the 1950s (Gardner, 1985).

Theory and research on self and self-concept, though nearly 60 years-old by the 1950s, was still in its infancy, if bulk of publications is any indication. As the figures below show, the number of journal articles, authored books, and dissertations with self or self-concept in their titles or abstracts grew exponentially from the 1950s to the present. According to PsycINFO (American Psychological Association, 2012), 327 refereed journal articles with "self" in both the title and the abstract were published in the 1950s; 1,061 in the 1960s; 3,928 in the 1970s; 7,871 in the 1980s; 12,482 in the 1990s; and a whopping 31,835 from 2000 to the present. The number of dissertations and books on self or self-concept also exploded during this time period. Since dissertations are indispensable vehicles for future research, the data indicate that theory and research on self and self-concept will continue their vigorous representation in the literature. A ProQuest (Cambridge Information Group, 2012) search of social science-only dissertations showed that 8,598 dissertations on some aspect of the self were approved between 1950 and 1979; 7,452 in the 1980s; 9,220 in the 1990s; and 11,781 since 2000. At the same time, 921 books on the self were produced from 1950 to 1989; 2,394 in the 1990s; and 3,577 since 2000. These figures show the enduring vitality and increasing popularity of the concept of the self in scholarly work.

Self and Self-Concept: Some Distinctions and Definitions

Self and self-concept are complementary terms with much in common, but they are nevertheless distinct. Their commonalities sometimes come at the cost of imprecision and confusion. Self actually subsumes self-concept, just as self also subsumes identity (see Owens, Robinson, & Smith-Lovin, 2010, for a longer treatment of the linkages among self and identity). It is a matter of the hierarchical ordering of the concepts, with fine, though valid, distinctions. Nevertheless, we must attempt to differentiate and then define self and self-concept, even though James (1890) warned us over a century ago that selfhood is "the most puzzling puzzle with which [social] psychology has to deal" (p. 330).

Sniderman (1975) has observed that a person's definition of the self is often a function of one's temperament and professional inclination. "In general," he writes, "the more abstract the meanings assigned to the idea of the self, the more agreement there appears to be, and the more specific the operational definitions, the more disagreement there appears to be" (Sniderman, p. 25). Following this, we define the *self* as: an organized and interactive system of thoughts, feelings, identities, and motives that (1) is born of self-reflexivity and language, (2) people attribute to themselves, and (3) characterizes specific human beings. In contemporary psychology, self is generally conceptualized as a set of cognitive representations reflecting a person's personality traits, organized by linkages, across representations created by personal experience or biography. It is sometimes extended to include things beside trait attributes, such as social roles and even identities (see Thoits, 1995). Here, the self is a cognitive structure incorporating elements such as "intelligent," "persevering," and "honest," or perhaps, "rich," "Catholic," and "Australian."

Drawing on the early work of Cooley (1902), James (1890), and Mead (1934), the key to the self is human *reflexivity*, or the ability to view oneself as an object capable of being not just apprehended, but

also labeled, categorized, evaluated, and manipulated. Moreover, reflexivity hinges on language—any language—emanating from a broader culture’s written or non-written language (e.g., Russian and Hmong, respectively) or a subculture’s argot (e.g., Ebonics) or specialized language (e.g., sign language). In short, the reflexive self allows people to view themselves from an external point of view, just as other people might view them through varying degrees of detachment (Mead, 1934). Additionally, since the self can reflect back on itself, it is an integral part of many features we associate with being human—namely, the abilities to plan, worry about personal problems, ruminate about past actions, lament present circumstances, or be envious of others.

Identity is subsumed within the broader concept of self and is a newer entrant to social psychology. Regardless, it has been in various uses in the English language since at least the fourteenth century. Unlike the self, the etymology and definition of identity is quintessentially relational.¹ The *Oxford English Dictionary* (1999) suggests that the modern term “identity” came from the Latin *idem* (same) and *identidem* (over and over again, repeatedly). These roots have subsequently combined to mean being “side-by-side with those of ‘likeness’ and ‘oneness.’” In contemporary social psychology, the concept of identity retains these earlier notions while, also explicitly employing relatedness. Thus, the central quality that distinguishes self from identity is that the self is a process and organization born of self-reflection, whereas *identity* can be seen as a tool (or in some cases perhaps a stratagem) by which individuals or groups categorize themselves and present themselves to the world. *Identity* can be thus broadly defined as: categories people use to specify who they are and to locate themselves relative to other people (DeLamater & Myers, 2011). In this sense, identity implies both a distinctiveness (I am not like them or a “not-me”) and a sameness as others (I am like them or a “me-too”) (McCall, 2003; see also Burke & Tully, 1977, and James, 1890).²

Having previously defined self in abstract terms, we now move to another fundamental aspect of the self: self-concept, or how people envisage and perceive their selves. Self-concept is inextricably tied to the self’s “I-me” dualism. *Self-concept* may be defined as the “totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as a particular object” (Rosenberg, 1979, p. 7). The “I-me” dualism has other implications as well. The self-concept includes cognition and emotion since it is both an object of perception and reflection and an emotional response to that perception and reflection (see MacKinnon & Heise, 2010). As a product of its own objectification, it requires individuals (i.e., subjects, “knowers,” or “I’s”) to stand outside themselves and react to themselves as detached entities of observation (i.e., objects, “the known,” or “me’s”).

Referring back to James’ (1890) observation of the “puzzling puzzle,” it is worth noting that at least part of the puzzlement regarding self, self-concept, and identity is now caused by sometimes careless, imprecise, and indiscriminate employment of these ubiquitous terms (see Owens & Stryker, 2001; Stryker, Owens, & White, 2000 for details). The ambiguity stems partly from failure to adequately specify the concepts’ complex similar and different meanings. At one extreme, self-concept and identity are simply used as synonyms for how we define and present ourselves. The problem is compounded when self-concept and identity become intertwined with the innumerable disciplinary and cross-cultural meanings of self (see Spiro, 1993 for an extensive discussion). Add to this Leary’s (2004) consternation at the conflation of self, personality, and person. At the other extreme, self-concept and identity, especially, are sometimes used to represent alternative uses of words from

¹Although its typical definition is not explicitly relational, the self is nevertheless relational as well since it arises from and is developed and sustained by human interaction (Mead, 1934).

²A useful alternative definition of identity is provided by Hewitt (1979, p. 91): “the person’s biographical sense of relationship to the others with whom he has been and is customarily associated.” Biography in this sense has four interrelated meanings (Hewitt, pp. 84–85). First, people have memories of past roles, successes and failures, and hopes and disappointments that are situated in time and place. Second, these memories are used by individuals to locate themselves with reference to others. Third, by evoking such memories, people define themselves as persons. Last, peoples’ biographies are constructed both by their own hand as well as by the people and situations that surround them.

well-established social science concepts such as culture, ethnicity, or group—and vice versa (e.g., Zukin & Maguire, 2004). This is especially true when personal, social, and collective identities are not clearly linked to and differentiated from culture, ethnicity, or group (see Owens et al., 2010). To a certain extent, Buchmann (1989) represents a fall into this trap in her otherwise impressive study of the micro and macro influences in the transition to adulthood of American high schoolers in 1960 and 1980. She simply conflates self, various aspects of identity, and culture.³ The apparent cause may be in not fully delineating the differences among self, self-concept, and identity with respect to levels of analysis, whether an individual, a social category or collectivity, or a whole society. A related tendency in some research is to use conceptions of self, self-concept, and identity appropriate to analyses on one level as though they were equally appropriate to analyses at other levels. This state of affairs, as Stryker (2000) points out, reflects the imprecise relationship of personal identities and identities defined in categorical or collective terms, as well as between the self and identities of whatever variety. Other problems exist, too, such as: using the same term to mean different things, and failing to be aware of ambiguous overlaps among a variety of conceptualizations of self, self-concept, and identity. Owens et al. (2010) and Thoits and Virshup (1997) have attempted to make some order of the confusion. In the present chapter, however, we focus primarily on self and self-concept, and leave other chapters in this volume, especially Stets and Serpe, to deal with identity.

Self and Self-Concept: Theory and Research

Accepting that the self may be both subject and object serves as the rationale for conducting studies of the self-concept (Rosenberg, 1979), which we now take up. According to Rosenberg (pp. 62–77), four broad principles form the basis of support for “most of the theoretical reasoning employed in the literature to understand the bearing of interpersonal and social structural processes on the self-concept” (p. 62). However, he also warns, as have others, that the proper application of these general principles is necessary to advance our efforts to explain diverse phenomena with respect to self-concept (particularly, though not limited to, self-esteem). The four principles of self-concept development are reflected appraisals, social comparisons, self-attributions, and psychological centrality. The principle of *reflected appraisals* is central to the symbolic interactionist’s insistence that the self is a social product derived from the attitudes that others have toward one’s self, and that one eventually comes to see him- or herself as others do, à la Meadian self theory and Cooley’s looking-glass self (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). Through *social comparisons*, people judge and evaluate themselves in comparison to particular individuals, groups, or social categories. Two self-reference bases establish social comparisons: criteria and normative. Criteria bases come into play when, for example, people compare themselves to others in terms of superiority or inferiority, or better or worse, on some criteria of interest. Normative comparison bases fall along dimensions of deviance or conformity, or believing one is generally in harmony and agreement with others or in disharmony and opposition to them. *Self-attribution* holds that individuals draw conclusions about themselves by observing their own actions and their outcomes (e.g., dull, well-liked, unattractive, funny). Finally, the principle of *psychological centrality* holds that the self is an interrelated system of hierarchically organized components, with some attributes and identities more important to the self than others. Psychological centrality, or importance, helps protect people’s self-concepts by pushing potentially damaging self-attributes and

³To be fair, Buchmann’s (1989) book is not centered exclusively on the self. Her effort is to “understand how individuals perceive, evaluate, and carry out their lives, and to grasp the ways in which they cope with the opportunities and constraints imposed by the structural and cultural setting of the larger society” (pp. 3–4). She notes that this endeavor “requires the inclusion of a concept of the individual as an *actor*” (p. 4, emphasis in the original). It is the treatment of the latter, and perhaps some overreaching, which caused the conceptual confusion noted here.

identities to the periphery of the self system, while holding self-enhancing attributes closer to the center. The principle of psychological centrality is perhaps the most abstract of the four principles; however, it might also be the most consequential for the nature and character of one's self and self-concept. Psychological centrality points directly to the structure of the self. Empirical research on the role of this principle in particular has not received the attention it deserves, notwithstanding earlier work stemming from Kuhn and McPartland's (1954) Twenty Statements Test and Marsh and associates' more recent work on the multidimensional self (e.g., Marsh, Byrne, & Shavelson, 1992; Marsh, Craven, & Debus, 1998).

According to self-concept theory, as a person observes, evaluates, and ultimately draws conclusions about one's self, two key motives work in the service of protecting and maintaining the present self-concept: self-esteem and self-consistency (Rosenberg, 1979). The *self-esteem motive* provokes individuals to think well of themselves (e.g., Allport, 1961; Kaplan, 1975), and to prefer positive self-esteem over other temporal pleasures such as sex and candy (Bushman, Moeller, & Crocker, 2011). Indeed, many self-theorists regard this motive as universally dominant in the human motivational system (James, 1890; Kaplan, 1975; Rosenberg, 1979). As Rosenberg puts it:

The self-esteem motive rests on its own foundation; high self-esteem is innately satisfying and pleasurable, low self-esteem the opposite. A major determinant of human thought and behavior and a prime motive in human striving, then, is the drive to protect and enhance one's self-esteem (p. 57).

On the other hand, the *self-consistency motive* (Lecky, 1945) asserts that people struggle to validate their self-concepts, even when they are negative. He writes:

The individual sees the world from his own viewpoint, with himself as the center. Any value entering the [value] system which is inconsistent with the individual's valuation of himself cannot be assimilated; it meets with resistance and is, unless a general reorganization occurs, to be rejected. This resistance is a natural phenomenon; it is essential for the maintenance of individuality (p. 153).

Swann (1983, 1996) and Swann, Chang-Schneider, and Larsen McClarty (2007) have incorporated the spirit of self-consistency into self-verification theory. According to Swann, self-verification is organized around three basic assumptions with respect to self-conceptions (Swann calls them self-views). First, at the most basic level, self-concepts help guide people's behaviors. Second, à la Mead, they enable people to anticipate others' reactions to their own behaviors. Third, they help organize people's notions of reality. Not surprisingly, the upshot is that once people become confident of their self-conceptions, they work to confirm them—whether positive or negative, well-founded or not. In the process, people strive to refute information that disconfirms their self-conceptions. In a somewhat counterintuitive twist, self-verification theory also predicts that people with negative self-conceptions often prefer negative evaluations from others, especially if their negative self-conceptions are held firmly or in the extreme. An exception is if the person with a negative self-concept is in or wants a longer-term relationship with a negative evaluator. In this case, the other's negative evaluations are not generally favored (Swann, 2012; Swann, Milton, & Polzer, 2000).

Self-Concept as Social Product and Social Force

Although the idea that self and society are twin-born (i.e., co-created) traces to Cooley (1909) and Mead (1934) and has thus been an axiom of symbolic interactionism for decades, Rosenberg (1981) helped codify the notion more recently. As he rightfully saw it, at first blush the self-concept seems for many to be a quintessentially psychological phenomenon. However, accepting that self and society are twin-born and that the self-concept is both a social product and a social force, one can readily see its importance and relevance for sociology: It is not present at birth, it arises out of interaction, and myriad social factors contribute to its formation.

The self-concept not only incorporates the individual's location in the social structure but is also affected by it. In this more sociological sense, self-concept (like self generally) is a social creation molded by a person's interactions with others, his or her past and ongoing affiliations and experiences within and across social contexts and institutional affiliations, and his or her location within culture and social structure. In short, the self—and thus the self-concept—is a social product.

On the other hand, once a person has a self-concept, it has important consequences for action on both the individual (e.g., Baumeister, 2010; Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996) and group level (e.g., Swann et al., 2000). In these cases, the self-concept exerts a twofold influence. First, it influences the individual's cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. Second, it can influence the groups to which a person belongs as well as the society as a whole through the manifestation of social problems linked to the self-concept. In short, the self—and by extension the self-concept—is a social force.

Contemporary research attends to the potential ways in which the self, and especially specific aspects of the self, such as self-concept or self-esteem, function as social forces, social products, or both social forces and products (Owens & McDavitt, 2006). Social psychologists often pay particular attention to the ways in which individuals' locations within social structures relate to self-processes, essentially underscoring the ways in which the self is implicated in social inequalities across statuses such as race, class, gender, and mental and physical health, among others. In this section, we discuss some of the major contemporary empirical pursuits and findings related to these themes, organized according to whether aspects of the self are empirically examined as forces, products, or forces-and-products.

The Self as a Social Force

Self-processes can act as forces that shape a variety of outcomes. A prime empirical example of the self as a social force is Lee's (1998, 2002) research on the gender gap in interests in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines, which tend to be dominated by men.⁴ Lee sees the gendered gap in interests as an issue of identity acquisition: discrepancies between women's self-concept and ideas about the kind of people who tend to pursue STEM disciplines leads to lowered interest in such fields. Indeed, Lee finds that the young women in his sample tend to see themselves as more similar to other young women than to young men, and see their gendered self-concepts as being different from their perceptions about science students in general. Such discrepancies reduce women's interest in STEM fields, and also explain some gender differences in science and vocational interests. Such research provides evidence that "students' internalized meanings about self and others in science help to explain gendered patterns in scientific and technological interests" (Lee, 1998, p. 214). Cech, Rubineau, Silbey, and Seron (2011) reach a similar conclusion. They argue that attrition in engineering studies among women, compared to men, is due to women's lower professional role confidence, net the women's post-graduate family plans.⁵ In a way, Lee and Cech et al., are unwittingly arguing that women are less comfortable with their STEM selves than are men. Simmons' (2001) notion of comfort with the self is addressed under its own heading later in the chapter.

There are many additional, recent studies that address the self as a social force. For example, some research addresses how the self-concept influences substance use, such as studies by Nyamathi, Longshore, Keenan, Lesser, and Leake (2001) and Peltzer, Malaka, and Phaswana (2001). Other research addresses the role of self-concept for task performance (Parker, 2001), workplace

⁴Two other good sources are Andriot (2011) and Tonso (2007).

⁵*Professional role confidence* is defined as: "Wielding practical competencies of day-to-day professional work, and identifying with the professional role and believing that one will enjoy this role, with all the complexity, uncertainty, and responsibility that accompany its fulfillment" (Cech et al., 2011, p. 646).

inauthenticity (Sloan, 2007), and ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice (Tarrant, North, & Hargreaves, 2001). Some final examples explore the influences of self-esteem for outcomes such as onset of sexual activity (Longmore, Manning, Giordano, & Rudolph, 2004), stress symptoms (Schraml, Perski, Grossi, & Simonsson-Sarnecki, 2011), and relationship satisfaction (Scianguila & Morry, 2009). These are just a few notable examples of recent research that addresses how the self operates as a social force.

The Self as a Social Product

Another prominent focus of research, especially among sociologists, concerns how the self is shaped by social structures and ongoing interactions with others—or, how the self is a social product. For example, Oates (2004) tests Rosenberg's proposition that *contextual consonance*—the “degree to which an individual is surrounded by others with similar attributes”—fosters positive attitudes toward the self (p. 16). The author finds that African American students who attend college institutions with higher black enrollment benefit from enhanced post-graduation self-esteem. Similarly, Yabiku, Axinn, and Thornton (1999) find that high family integration (the degree to which social life is organized around family rather than outside activities, such as work) during a child's youth increases their self-esteem into early adulthood. They reason that “because a child's primary social role is that of a family member—especially during the early years of life—family integration is likely crucial to the child's development of self” (p. 1498). Other forms of social integration enhance the self, also: students who participate in school sports benefit from increased self-esteem—an association that is largely mediated via a pathway through attachment to school (“school spirit”) and a sense of physical well-being (Tracy & Erkut, 2002).

Other research attends to the ways in which disadvantaged social-structural locations exert deleterious effects on the self. African American women who grow up in households that received welfare, for example, are more likely to suffer lowered self-esteem and psychological distress later in their lives (Ensminger, 1995). Structurally disadvantaged groups often experience what Sellers and Neighbors (2008) call goal-striving stress, or the discrepancy between “socially derived aspirations and achievements” (p. 92). Among their African American sample, goal-striving stress is strongly related to reduced self-esteem.

Sometimes a bit of hardship can benefit the self, however, as long as those who endure it perceive future potential payoff. Dwyer, McCloud, and Hodson (2011) explore this possibility in their research on financial debt, self-esteem, and mastery. They reason that the modern, unprecedented availability of credit has led to a significant increase in indebtedness, which is likely to have significant effects on one's self-concept over one's lifetime. They find that debt, including college loans and credit card debt, actually increases self-esteem and mastery among some young adults, most likely because the debt represents a financial investment in one's future. The relationship among debt, self-esteem, and mastery is especially strong among lower-class and middle-class youth, while this relationship disappears for upper-class youth. The authors suggest that the “impact of debt thus appears to vary by the amount of other resources available, which affects the relative value of debt as a means to achieve investment or consumption goals” (p. 735).

Other notable examples of the self as a social product include Ge, Elder, Regnerus, and Cox' (2001) and Mustillo, Hendrix, and Schafer's (2012) studies of the deleterious effects of being overweight on adolescent self-image; research on the relationship among sociocultural norms for physical appearance, objectification, and personal evaluations of one's body and self-worth (Choma et al., 2010; Mellor, Fuller-Tyszkiewicz, McCabe, & Ricciardelli, 2010; Oney, Cole, & Sellers, 2011); Fife and Wright's (2000) work regarding the mediating role of perceptions of stigma in the relationship between illness and self-esteem; Haj-Yahia's (2001) examination of the corrosive effect of wife abuse on a victim's sense of self; Schnittker's (2002) research on the influence of acculturation and

neighborhood ethnic composition on the self-esteem of Chinese immigrants; Thoits and Hewitt's (2001) investigation of the salutary effect that volunteer work can have on the self; Carlton-Ford, Ender, and Tabatabai's (2008) study on threatened identities and self-esteem; and Bjarnason's (2009) work on anomie and self-esteem cross-nationally.

The Self as a Social Force and Product

Many studies incorporate the self as both a social force and a social product. Two recent studies highlight this dual role of the self by exploring associations between social status and the self. Cast, Stets, and Burke (1999), for example, draw on symbolic interactionism and expectations states theory (EST) to demonstrate how relative status (defined by education and occupation) among spouses influences views about one's self and one's spouse concerning intelligence and attractiveness. Consistent with predictions based on EST, they find that spouses with higher statuses are more likely to influence both their lower-status partner's self-views and their lower-status partner's views of themselves (the higher-status spouses); conversely, the views of lower-status spouses—concerning both self-views and perceptions about one's partner—are heavily shaped by the views of higher-status spouses. Spouses with equal statuses are more likely to have equal and reciprocal views of each other's selves.

Green (2008) also examines the relationship between status and self, this time among a North American gay enclave. He finds that a sexual status hierarchy exists within the enclave that privileges young, Caucasian, middle-class men and disadvantages older men, racial-ethnic minorities, and men who occupy lower social classes. Drawing on the stress process model, Green demonstrates that many men with low sexual status face stressors such as avoidance, stigmatization, and rejection. These stressors, in turn, tax many of their personal resources, including self-esteem and sense of control, which reduces some men's ability to consistently negotiate sexual advances and condom use, and thus consequently exposes them to greater health risks. Each of these empirical examples demonstrates both the relationship between social structural inequalities, associated statuses, and the self, as well as the ways in which self-processes can act as both social forces and products.

Reflected appraisals are another key component of the self. Jaret, Reitzes, and Shapkina (2005) ask, "What happens when a person perceives that others view him or her primarily in terms of his or her roles and statuses?" and they speculate about how such perceptions might relate to one's self-esteem. The authors find that when individuals perceive that *others* view them primarily in terms of categories or social positions (e.g., race, sex, age), rather than as unique individuals, self-esteem declines. Additionally, this association is generally weaker in private spaces, such as the home, and stronger in more public settings, such as workplaces.

Other researchers focus on how the self can be the site of discrepancies that produce negative outcomes. Ferguson, Hafen, and Laursen (2010) draw on the ideas of two theorists to inform their research: (1) William James' discussion of the "ratio of actualities (success in important domains) to potentialities (pretensions or aspirations in those domains)," (p. 1485) and (2) Higgins' self-discrepancy theory which purports that the self is comprised of an "actual" self (the self individuals believe themselves to be presently), an "ideal" self (the self for which individuals hope), and the "ought" self (the obligatory self). Discrepancies between these "self-states" can induce negative outcomes. Such discrepancies may be particularly deleterious for adolescents for whom identity formation is a key part of their development. Indeed, Ferguson et al. (2010) find that discrepancies between adolescents' perceived actual and ideal selves reduce self-esteem and increase depressive symptoms. Interestingly, discrepancies between actual and ideal selves are deleterious regardless of the *direction* of the discrepancy (i.e., actual self overshadowing ideal self, or vice versa). Mustillo and colleagues' (2012) study of weight and self-esteem among 2,206 black and white adolescent girls also fits well into the discrepancy literature. Using latent growth models of body image discrepancy and self-esteem, they find that discrepancies in perceived and measured body mass are higher and self-esteem is lower in

formerly obese girls (i.e., girls who lost significant body mass between age 10 and 20) compared to girls who were always in the normal weight range and chronically obese girls. Interestingly, the stigma of being formerly obese lingered in the self-esteem of white girls but not black girls.

As the aforementioned study by Ferguson et al. (2010) demonstrates, the self is frequently implicated in mental health. Hill, Kaplan, French, and Johnson (2010) find that self-esteem partially mediates the relationship between experiences of sexual coercion and mental health, and that self-esteem also moderates the association between experiences of physical assault and mental health. Similarly, Yang (2006) finds that functional disability acts as a chronic stressor that may disrupt self-esteem and a sense of control and increase depressive symptoms over the life course. Longmore and Demaris (1997) also find that self-esteem plays an important role in depression. When individuals perceive inequity (i.e., a stressor) in their intimate relationships, they also often experience depression, regardless of whether they personally overbenefit or underbenefit in the relationship (although underbenefiting bears a stronger link to depression). Self-esteem, however, moderates this relationship for those who underbenefit. The authors reason that underbenefiting conveys to a person that he/she is not worthy—because, after all, one's partner does not even bother to make equitable exchanges with her/him. Self-esteem can thus act as a protector for those who underbenefit because it reaffirms personal worth. Additionally, Choi, Kim, Hwang, and Heppner (2010) find that self-esteem mediates the influence of both instrumentality and gender role conflict on depression among Korean high school boys. Finally, Umaña-Taylor and Updegraff (2007) find that various aspects of the self, including self-esteem, ethnic identity, and cultural orientation, are implicated in the association between perceived discrimination and depressive symptoms among Latino adolescents.

Self-processes also affect general well-being. Pugliesi (1995) extends the differential exposure and differential vulnerability theoretical explanation for gender differences in well-being, which suggests that different social roles across gender are associated with different resources and stressors that impact well-being. Pugliesi suggests that this relationship may be mediated by other resources, such as self-esteem. Indeed, the author finds that characteristics of work, including control and complexity, positively enhance self-esteem, and self-esteem reduces distress. In fact, work conditions do not directly affect levels of distress, but operate only via self-esteem.

A major line of mental health research explores how self-processes are related to internalizing and externalizing behaviors. Scholarship by Rosenfield, Vertefuille, and McAlpine (2000) as well as Rosenfield, Lennon, and White (2005), Owens, Shippee, and Hensel (2008), Owens and Shippee (2009), and Shippee and Owens (2011) attempts to explain the consistent empirical finding that women and men differ in their expressions of mental health: males tend to “externalize” and females tend to “internalize.” The authors reason that these mental health differences are related to existing gender stratification in the dominant culture, which represents the generalized other (*à la* Mead) and becomes incorporated into the self. Essentially, societal gender stratification becomes codified in “opposite extremes of basic assumptions about the self” and in the way boundaries between the self and others are constructed: men tend to privilege the self as part of the public sphere and women tend to privilege connectedness with others in the private sphere (Rosenfield et al., 2000, p. 210). Thus, differential gender socialization shapes differences in what Rosenfield et al. (2005) call “self-salience.” In turn, differences in self-salience produce differences in mental health: “Schemas that elevate others at the expense of the self raise the risk of internalizing symptoms. Those that promote the self at the expense of others pre-dispose individuals to externalizing problems” (Rosenfield et al., 2005, p. 324). Indeed, both Rosenfield and colleagues and Owens and colleagues find empirical support for these associations.

Self-processes are also relevant to associations that involve violence. Fox and Farrow (2009), for example, discuss the relationship between being overweight and being bullied. Their empirical results indicate that having a higher weight status increases experiences of being bullied, but this association is mediated by global self-worth and self-esteem related to physical appearance and body dissatisfaction. Similarly, Pflieger and Vazsonyi (2006) find that self-esteem mediates the association

between parenting processes and youths' experiences of dating violence, but that the specifics vary by socioeconomic status.

Numerous other studies address how the self may serve as both a social force and a social product. Much research, for example, explores how the self operates as a force and product in relationship to mental health. Wright, Gronfein, and Owens (2000) investigate the reciprocal effects of social rejection and the self-concept among the severely mentally ill. Marcussen (2006) addresses the intervening role of self-esteem in the association between discrepancies among aspirations, obligations, and perceptions about role-identities and psychological distress. Markowitz's (1998, 2001) work explores the interrelationships among mental health, stigma, self-concept, and life satisfaction. Jackson and colleagues (2010) study associations among race, psychological distress, self-esteem, and mastery. And McLeod and Owens (2004) investigate cumulative disadvantage and the "double jeopardy hypothesis" as important determinants of self-concept and mental health during the transition to adolescence. Other research concerns how the self relates to perceived injustice (Clay-Warner, 2001), racial-ethnic identity (Jaret & Reitzes, 1999), and media and race (Milkie, 1999). Finally, additional research addresses the processes of self-change among men and women (Kiecolt & Mabry, 2000), the causes and consequences of low self-esteem (Rosenberg & Owens, 2001), associations among domain self-esteem and global self-esteem (Hu, Yang, Wang, & Liu, 2008), and the self-enhancement thesis (Jang & Thornberry, 1998). Stets and Carter (2012) and Cast and Burke (2002) add to this literature by incorporating identity discrepancies and verifications into theories of morality and self-esteem, respectively.

Self-Presentation Theory: Explicitly Linking Self-Concept as a Social Product and a Social Force

We turn now to self-presentation theory because of its enduring importance in how we construct our selves and then present them to the world. The theoretical basis for contemporary theory and research on self-presentation is derived from Goffman's (1959) landmark dramaturgical analysis of social relations and interactions in daily life, and to a lesser degree from Jones's (1964, pp. 40ff) work on self-presentation as an aspect of ingratiation.⁶ Snow and Anderson's (1987) notion of identity work, and the many studies it has inspired, sits as a more contemporary manifestation of Goffman's and many other early symbolic interactionists' pioneering work (see Rose, 1962; Stone & Farberman, 1986).

Goffman's basic premise is that some of the most illuminating insights about social behavior can be revealed by careful and detailed analysis of people's everyday—and especially public—behaviors.⁷ As he saw it, people are "actors" (his stage allegory is intentional) who assume roles that they perform for "audiences" in social situations. In so doing, both the actor and the audience co-create a "definition of the situation." This definition, fashioned through the process of interaction and negotiation, guides the actor's performance and the meanings the audience attributes to it. Actors' role performances are guided by the impressions they wish to impart to one another or to the audience and are codified in what Goffman termed their "impression management tactics" (Goffman, 1959). In short, through impression management, an individual actor seeks to make some desired

⁶Although Goffman (1959) was clearly on the scene first, Jones' (1964) study of self-presentation (i.e., impression management) helped launch self-presentation research among psychological social psychologists. I believe Leary (1996, p. 8) erroneously suggested that Jones was unaware of Goffman's work when he started his research on self-presentation and published his findings in 1964. Jones in fact cites Goffman.

⁷This stood in especially stark contrast to the insistence of many psychologists that such insights could only come from detailed knowledge of people's inner motives and personalities.

impression on others. Consequently, it is in the actor's interest to attempt to control others and their responses to his or her behavior. This control is sought by trying to influence the definition of the situation under which all the actors (and the audience) putatively operate. People not only formulate impressions, consciously or otherwise, but project those impressions with the goal of having others "voluntarily" come to the conclusions they desire.

Taking a cue from Goffman, Schlenker (1980) defines *impression management* as "*the conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions*" (p. 6, emphasis in original). However, when the projected image refers to the self, it is called *self-presentation*, in accordance with Jones' (1964) terminology, which was itself adopted directly from Goffman's (1959) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Jones & Pittman, 1982, p. 231). Jones defined self-presentation within the context of an ingratiation tactic. On one hand, he believed *self-presentations* are "communications which are explicitly self-descriptive ('I am the kind of person who...')" and on the other hand as "more indirect communicative shadings which convey the same kind of information about how a person wishes to be viewed by others" (Jones, 1964, p. 40). In another vein, but still quite in alignment with Goffman, Snow and Anderson (1987) explicitly link *identity work* with the self-concept, or "the range of activities individuals engage in to create, present, and sustain personal identities that are congruent with and supportive of the self-concept" (p. 1348). In order to accomplish this, Snow and Anderson outline four aspects of identity work: arranging physical settings and props; manipulating one's personal appearance; differential association with other individuals and groups; and *identity talk*, or the verbal construction and assertion of a personal identity. The latter is perhaps their most unique contribution. In their ethnographic study of homeless people they write:

Since the homeless seldom have the financial or social resources to pursue the other varieties of identity work, talk is perhaps the primary avenue through which they can attempt to construct, assert, and maintain desired personal identities, especially when these personal identities are at variance with the general social identity of a street person. Because the structure of their daily routines ensures that they spend a great deal of time waiting here and there, many homeless also have ample opportunity to converse with one another about a range of topics (Snow & Anderson, 1987, p. 1348).

It is the self-presentation aspect of impression management that seems to have captured the attention of many psychological social psychologists, particularly in the association between self-presentations, the self-concept, and behavior. Reminiscent of reflected appraisals (discussed earlier), Schlenker (1980) refined the definition of *self-presentation* to the attempt to influence how real or imagined others "perceive our personality traits, abilities, intentions, behaviors, attitudes, values, physical characteristics, social characteristics, family, friends, job, and possessions" (p. 6, emphasis added). In doing so, self-presentations reflect back upon the actor and influence how the actor sees and defines him- or herself. More recently, Leary (1996) has extended the notion of self-presentation by asserting that an overall self-presentational motive lies beneath practically every aspect of interpersonal life (p. xiii). This overall motive has been further refined into two subcomponents: *impression motivation* (how much a person is concerned with controlling how they are perceived in a situation) and *impression construction* (the actual image a person wants to convey) (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). In addition, the content of individuals' self-presentations is shaped by five factors: "their self-concepts, constraints imposed by salient social roles, their desired and undesired identity images, the values of the people to whom they are impression-managing, and the current and potential nature of their public images" (Nezlek & Leary, 2002, p. 212).

Self-presentation and identity work are special classes of impression management. However, the precise demarcation between the two concepts (like many of the other "puzzling puzzles" regarding the self) is murky. Part of the problem stems from a habit of many writers to use the terms interchangeably with its cognate—impression management. The other part of the problem is the tendency to draw distinctions that sometimes seem based as much as anything on disciplinary boundaries and methodological preferences. For example, Leary (1996) says that while Goffman was "an astute observer of human behavior with the ability to see processes of social life in new ways and to describe

them in an engaging fashion” (p. 8), his “work was more akin to social anthropology than sociology” (p. 7) much less psychology. Moreover, Goffman reported essentially “anthropological field observations in narrative essays...and tried to *persuade* his readers of his insights through observations and anecdotes” (p. 9, emphasis in the original). Jones, on the other hand, “tried to confirm or disconfirm particular theoretical ideas through controlled experimentation” (Leary, 1996, p. 8).

Discipline and methodological issues aside, what distinguishes Goffmanesque research on impression management and Jonesian research on self-presentation is where and how “the situation” and “the self” are emphasized. Goffman emphasized how actors project a definition of the situation and how each actor subjectively perceives and responds to the emergent definition and the situation. On the other hand, Jones and his associates and heirs examine “attempts on the part of the actor to shape others’ impressions of his personality” (Jones & Pittman, 1982, p. 231). The latter, while certainly of interest to Goffman, was secondary to his main analytic goal.

Contemporary self-presentation researchers are interested in the problematic aspects of self-presentation for the group as well as the individual. For example, being too concerned with the impression one is making in a given situation may affect psychological outcomes such as increasing the actor’s level of anxiety or influencing behavioral outcomes such as successful task performance (Leary, 1996). Self-presentation research has also extended beyond the laboratory (Nezlek & Leary, 2002) by examining how personality variables influence the impressions people want to construct in everyday life. Among Nezlek and Leary’s more interesting findings was the relation of positive and negative self-evaluations and the self-presentation motive. In their sample of college students, women with more negative self-evaluations were more self-presentationally motivated than women with more positive self-evaluations; the reverse was observed among men. In another study, Culos-Reed, Brawley, Martin, and Leary (2002) used survey methods to assess the self-presentational versus health-related motives of patients receiving cosmetic surgery for either vein problems (varicose or spider) or severe acne. Special attention was placed on post-surgery exercise frequency. They found, among other things, that patients who underwent the surgery primarily for self-presentational reasons (to look better) and who had a greater sense of public self-consciousness actually exercised less frequently after surgery than those who were more motivated to have surgery for health reasons. The key to this seeming paradox seems to be twofold. First, the self-presentational motivated/self-conscious patients may have exercised just enough to maintain or enhance their desired appearance. Health was not their primary exercise motive. Second, by limiting more vigorous gym exercising, they also avoided “conveying negative images of themselves while exercising,” such as appearing unfit or too sweaty (Culos-Reed et al., 2002, p. 566).

Finally, two recent ethnographies from sociologists provide suitable (but not the only) examples of research informed by the identity work agenda outlined by Snow and Anderson (1987). Lois’ (2003) participant observation study of a group of mountain rescue volunteers, and especially the role that “edgework” plays in their bids for hero status, speaks directly to the issue of identity work and the active social construction of the self. By *edgework* she means taking extraordinary physical, emotional, and psychological risks to save strangers stranded or injured in extreme and shifting wilderness environments (or to retrieve their bodies) because of airplane crashes, hikes gone wrong, mountaineering accidents, and so forth. Successfully completing a dangerous mission—while comporting oneself according to established groups norms—can result not only in being accepted as a member of the group, but also in acquiring the status of someone who is brave and has a strong character—in short, of being a hero to oneself, one’s fellow rescuers, to the saved, and to the community of non-rescuers where one lives. Stacey’s (2011) observations and in-depth interviewing of home care aids in California and Ohio shows not only the intense emotional work required to care for shut-ins, the frail elderly, and all manner of people with critical illnesses and injuries, but also the important identity work needed to project an image of someone who cares while also negotiating an identity of professional competence and self-protective detachment. Among the many challenges the aides face are appropriate displays of companionship, empathy, commitment, and fictive kinship via talk, touch, presence, and listening.

Some New and Under-Researched Concepts Important to the Self

Mattering

We turn now to somewhat under-researched, yet deserving, ideas in the self and self-concept literature, particularly mattering and comfort with the self. Although Rosenberg and McCullough's (1981) multifaceted concept of mattering has garnered more attention since the first edition of this chapter, especially across disciplines, more theoretical and especially empirical work is warranted. Coupling Durkheim's ([1897]1997) tripartite notion of social connectedness, mutual obligation, and an individual's sense of purposefulness with a recasting of Sullivan's (1953) concept of significant others into what one might call a *significant me* (i.e., an ego-extension), Rosenberg and McCullough define *mattering* as "the feeling that others depend upon us, are interested in us, are concerned with our fate, or experience us as an ego-extension" (Rosenberg & McCullough, p. 165). Additionally, Elliott, an important mattering theorist, described it more recently as "the perception that, to some degree and in any of a variety of ways, we are a significant part of the world around us" (Elliott, Kao, & Grant, 2004, p. 339). Mattering is an essential human motivation and an integral part of the self.

Whether one is a part of the world or living on the margins (Schlossberg, 1989), the notion of mattering has long occupied a place in human thought. Aristotle noted over two millennia ago that "no one would choose a friendless existence on condition of having all the other things in the world." Perhaps for many people what is even worse is to live unnoticed or pushed aside, whether a by-product of our location in social structure (Beckett & Herbert, 2010; Osgood, Foster, Flanagan, & Ruth, 2005) or the self-imposed exile of some low self-esteem people (Murray, 2006; Rosenberg & Owens, 2001). As Mother Teresa observed in her worldwide work with the forgotten poor and dying: "One of the greatest of diseases is to be nobody to no one" (Egan, 1986, p. 241).⁸

According to Rosenberg and McCullough (1981), mattering is founded on three components that may be usefully folded under the umbrella of being another's ego-extension: attention, importance, and dependence. *Attention* refers to the joy we feel at being the object of another's attention, especially a significant other's, and the gloom we feel when there is no one out there for whom we matter. *Importance* refers not only to being the object of another person's attention, but also of concern to them; they care about us. *Dependence* refers to the belief that others rely on us to fill some great or small need in their lives (e.g., school teachers who believe their pupils need and rely on them, a sick friend who needs our aid). Mattering, however, transcends the cognitive and emotional lives of individuals; it is also implicated in the very fabric of social life and social structure: "Mattering represents a compelling social obligation and a powerful source of social integration: we are bonded to society not only by virtue of our dependence on others but on their dependence on us" (Rosenberg and McCullough, 1981, p. 165).

⁸There is much in the literature, however, to suggest that some people would rather be loathed or laughed at, at least in the short term, than forgotten. This latter observation is illustrated in tell-all accounts of guests on some talk television shows and the hostile or belittling reaction of the audience, who are often primed beforehand to jeer and heckle the non-normative guests (e.g., Davis & Schmidt, 1977; Gamson, 1998; Grindstaff, 2002). That is, to matter, even if negatively or harshly, to others is an important human need and of central importance to one's self-concept (e.g., Bourgois, 2003; Crocker, 1999; Swann, 1983). As Vonk (2001) has shown in relationship to aversive self-presentations, especially among shameless self-promoters, they

attempt to control the conversation, direct attention to themselves and avoid the other's area of expertise, spend more time talking than listening, express disagreement with the other person, and stress their own accomplishments (p. 101).

The upshot, he explains, might be some modicum of respect and attention; but the price is often being disliked.

The first edition of this chapter noted that mattering deserved more scholarly attention (Owens, 2003). Things have improved—somewhat—in 10 years. According to a Web of Science literature search (Thomson Reuters, 2012), at least 65 journal articles have been devoted, in whole or part, to mattering. Indeed, 36 have appeared since 2008 alone. And if doctoral dissertation research is any predictor of an idea's vitality and growth potential, then mattering is doing quite well indeed. A ProQuest dissertation abstracts (Cambridge Information Group, 2012) search restricted to dissertations centrally focused on mattering (many more use it in a subsidiary role) shows at least 24 new ones have been produced in the past 10 years, with 19 appearing since 2008 alone. Moreover, the dissertations are appearing in a wide range of fields outside sociology, including several in education, counseling, family studies, and school administration.

Taylor and Turner's (2001) well-cited cross-sectional study of over 1,300 Canadians finds that mattering is inversely related to depression for men and women alike. However, when personal resources, social support, and demographic factors are controlled, mattering remains protective only for women. That is, the more women feel they matter to others (e.g., are important to others, would be missed if they went away, have others who depend on them) the lower their reported depressive symptoms. Longitudinal data support this general conclusion and also show that changes in mattering over time predict changes in depression, but again only for women. Turner, Taylor, and Gundy (2004) extend their earlier research to a multi-ethnic sample of 1,803 South Florida young adults: African Americans, Cuban Americans, "other" Hispanics, and non-Hispanic whites. They hypothesize that a sense of mattering to others may relieve some of the detrimental consequences associated with exposure to social stress. Further, they question whether the extent of mattering varies by ethnic status and whether it may contribute to ethnic differences in depressive symptomatology. Their results related to mattering, however, are mixed. While the stress buffering effect of mattering is more evident for white non-Hispanics than for African Americans (p. 46), they find no significant interethnic differences in mattering per se (p. 43).

Other work situates mattering as a mediator between volunteering and psychological well-being (Piliavin & Siegl, 2007) and perfectionism and depression (Flett, Galfi-Pechenkov, Molnar, Hewitt, & Goldstein, 2012). Looking at the role of volunteering and well-being over time, Piliavin and Siegl show that volunteering increases psychological well-being because it leads people to "feel that they have an important role in society and that their existence is important"—in short, they matter (p. 460). On the other hand, Flett et al. (2012) reason that perfectionism may be associated with mattering because the former represents a "fragility of the self" that leads to narcissistic self-promotion and/or attempts to avoid displaying mistakes publicly (p. 831). These behaviors may represent attempts to "get attention and garner an enhanced sense of mattering among perfectionists who feel interpersonally insignificant" (p. 831). The authors find that mattering partially mediates the association between perfectionism and depression, but a direct effect of perfectionism on depression remains.

In a similar empirical vein, Elliott, Colangelo, and Gelles (2005) address the relationship between mattering and suicide ideation among adolescents by postulating that self-esteem and depression may act as potential mediators. The authors find that as mattering increases, the odds of suicide ideation decrease—but this association is fully mediated by self-esteem and depression. The relationship among these variables is processual: "As mattering decreases, self-esteem decreases; the decline of self-esteem increases the likelihood of depression; and it is the depressed and those with low-self-esteem who seriously consider suicide" (p. 233). Based on their analyses, the authors suggest that mattering is a "powerful motivator that resides deep within the self-concept" and "exerts [a] profound influence on other dimensions of the self, and ultimately behavior" (p. 235).

In an examination of gender differences among adolescents, Rayle (2005) finds that mattering positively influences holistic wellness. The latter is conceptualized as wellness in six major life tasks: spirituality, self-direction, work/schoolwork, leisure, friendship, and love. She that young women's wellness is influenced by both general mattering and interpersonal mattering, while only general mattering is germane to young men's wellness.

Studies by Pearlin and LeBlanc (2001) and Galon and Graor (2012) highlight the relevance of mattering to people in care-giving contexts. Pearlin and LeBlanc focus on the dependence aspect of

matter and the psychological impact of a sudden *loss* of profound mattering among Alzheimer's caregivers. The authors examine 555 familial caregivers of people with Alzheimer's disease who received residential care at Time 1 (of five interview-points). Loss of mattering was measured with a four-item Likert scale that included such questions as how much the caregiver missed having someone to whom they were so important and to whom their care was appreciated (even if the object of care could not show it). Acknowledging that a sense of mattering should contribute to general well-being, Pearlin and LeBlanc find that its absence has modestly negative consequences for the self as manifested by lowered self-esteem, a diminished sense of personal mastery, and increased depression. Interestingly, among the spouses of Alzheimer's patients who died during the study period, the correlation between the loss of mattering and dating or remarriage a year is $-.41$ ($p < .001$). They also find that gender is predictive of a loss of mattering (in the direction of women), when a variety of sociodemographic, role-related characteristics of the caregiver, and social supports for the caregiver role are controlled.

Galon and Graor (2012) examine the factors that increase engagement with primary care providers among people with severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI). People with SPMIs represent a vulnerable healthcare population that is frequently under-treated and suffers from comorbid medical conditions and preventable deaths. Galon and Graor propose that greater access to and engagement with primary care providers would likely reduce many of these negative outcomes. Their analysis of interviews with 32 adults with SPMI reveal that mattering is one of several factors associated with positive, ongoing primary care treatment. As the authors summarize, patients feel that they matter when they describe "feeling that the provider was caring, showed genuine concern for them, accepted them without judging them, treated them with respect, heard them, reassured them, and treated them with empathy" (p. 277). Mattering to significant others, such as family and friends, also increases patients' engagement with primary care providers. As one participant relayed, "My grandmother pushed me to do it. She cares about what happens to me" (p. 277).

Researchers are also beginning to address other issues related to the study of mattering, such as its construct validity (Marshall, 2001) and whether it varies over time (Marshall, Liu, Wu, Berzonsky, & Adams, 2010). Marshall provides a refined conceptual definition of perceived mattering as "*the psychological tendency to evaluate the self as significant to specific other people*," noting that such significance can be either positive or negative (p. 474, emphasis in original). Additionally, Marshall proposes that mattering may serve two functions: (1) to create a sense of belongingness, or relatedness, and (2) to create a sense of meaning for one's existence. Marshall develops items for the Mattering to Others Questionnaire (MTOQ), which is a "summative measure of global perceived mattering to specific others," including mother, father, and friends (p. 477), which she tests on two samples: undergraduate and high school students. Her results indicate that each of these proposed functions of mattering—relatedness and meaning for life—is positively related to mattering. However, mattering and relatedness may not be substantially different constructs. Self-esteem and mattering, however, are related yet distinct constructs. In a subsequent study, Marshall et al. (2010) explore the growth trajectory of mattering and find that levels of perceived mattering are quite stable over time. Mattering to friends and father remained the most stable (flat trajectory), while mattering to mother decreased slightly over time. The authors note that this stability seems quite significant given that the participants in their undergraduate sample experienced many life changes, such as living on campus for the first time, living on their own for the first time, and beginning university education.

Comfort with the Self

The idea of comfort with the self comes from Simmons' (2001) posthumously published work of the same title. Although Simmons was unable to completely elaborate the many dimensions and implications of this important concept before her untimely death, she was able to link being comfortable or uncomfortable with who we are with the cueing function of emotion. In our opinion, her notion of

comfort with the self is a highly deserving, yet under-researched, idea in social psychology and its many cognate disciplines, especially research related to the life course. In many unacknowledged ways, her thinking on the self anticipated later research in the sociology of emotions and the ecology of the self, particularly the too elusive connection of micro- and macrosociology, or the relation of self and society.

Simmons (2001) argued that people who are comfortable with who they are, and have a place in the world that allows them to be who they are, receive reflected appraisals indicating that no major alteration in their self is necessary. Like the notion that high self-esteem people are not necessarily arrogant or prideful (Owens, 2006), people who generally feel comfortable with who they are (i.e., their self) simply possess a self-concept that they believe is okay or at least the equal of others'. However, people who feel uncomfortable with themselves are being cued that a change in self or their situation may be necessary, lest they continue their undesirable emotional state (Simmons, 2001, p. 198).

Simmons (2001) identified three aspects of comfort with the self: (1) the absence of negative emotions regarding oneself,⁹ (2) feeling familiar with oneself and at ease and at home when thinking about oneself, and (3) having low to moderate emotional arousal with respect to the self. Concerning the latter, one is comfortable when experiencing neither high positive emotions nor elevated negative emotions regarding the self. However, she does not advocate an ever-contented self. Comfort is also time-bound and punctuated by periods of high arousal and discomfort. These stave off boredom and complacency while also motivating people to make necessary life changes and transitions (e.g., the transition to adulthood and, for some, parenthood). Finally, comfort is a binary condition: one either is in a state of comfort in a situation or not. She did not see comfort as a matter of degree.

Call and Mortimer (2001) were the first to examine Simmons' notion of comfort by extending it to four key arenas in the world of adolescents: family, school, peer group, and work. In contrast to Simmons' work on comfort with the self, Call and Mortimer emphasize arenas or contexts of comfort. These are viewed as places people can relax and rejuvenate themselves while also steadying themselves for the stresses engendered in other life contexts. Within the context of the family, for example, Call and Mortimer imply that supportive, comforting, and engaging parent-child relationships can be considered as an arena of comfort for young people. Such relationships provide children with a sense of familiarity, comfort, and respite in times of stress.

Others have picked up on Simmons' (2001) idea, and especially Call and Mortimer's (2001) extensions into the ecological notions of arenas of comfort. In a broad survey of research on personal and contextual indicators of adolescent and young adult well-being, Eccles, Brown, and Templeton (2008) note the psychological importance of having a place to belong, where warmth, closeness, and a feeling of safety and connectedness to others are fostered and supported—in short, where one is comfortable. Evans, Marsh, and Weigel (2009) empirically demonstrate the importance of arenas of comfort through an individual's "sense of coherence" in dealing with life's unavoidable stresses (p. 30). Very briefly, the concept of a sense of coherence stems from McCubbin's notion of a "dynamic feeling of confidence that the world is comprehensible, manageable and meaningful" (McCubbin, Thompson, Thompson, & Fromer, 1998, p. xiii). Evans et al. report a positive correlation between the accumulation of protective ecological domains in a young person's life (operationalized by various home, school, peer, and community comfort areas) and a sense of coherence. Conversely, the more ecological domains with risk or discomfort in adolescents' lives, the lower their sense of coherence. Both findings held for males and females.

⁹Note that this aspect of comfort with the self is very much in line with Rosenberg's (1965, 1979) conceptualization of self-esteem. A detailed examination of his original Guttman scale of self-esteem revealed that he saw self-esteem not so much as the presence of positive thoughts and feelings regarding oneself. Instead, self-esteem is the absence, in varying degrees, of self-condemning thoughts and feelings. Consequently, high self-esteem people are not necessarily full of self-congratulations but instead reject, again in varying degrees, self-condemnation (see Owens & King, 2001, for a more complete discussion).

Although comfort with the self and arenas of comfort have not garnered as much attention as mattering, part of the problem is that comfort with the self touches many other aspects of self and self-concept research such as self-verification, emotions, self-consistency, social integration, self-consistency, and belongingness, to name only a few. However, Simmons' (2001) original formulation is ripe for testing and extension. At the very least, comfort with the self and mattering seem to be conceptual allies.

Methods in Researching Self and Self-Concept

The focus of this chapter has been on the century-plus theory and research on self and self-concept. Given this vast literature, we have purposefully focused on sociological social psychology research oriented on the topics. Our colleagues in psychological social psychology, it must be emphasized, have followed a somewhat parallel path. Differences nonetheless remain (e.g., Stryker, 1989, 2008). Psychological social psychologists of the self tend to focus on how individuals process social stimuli and how the stimuli, along with various individual state and trait characteristics, impact behavior, cognition, and affect. Their central, though not exclusive, method is laboratory experiments. Sociological social psychologists of the self, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the reciprocal relation of self and society as expressed in formal and informal social interactional situations, the impact that socialization and status characteristics play in the development of the self and self-concept, and how they all coalesce and are manifested in social, behavioral, and psychological outcomes. Sociologists tend to employ survey and field research via naturalistic and participatory observation methodologies. Experiments, while fewer in sociological self and self-concept research, are nonetheless important components of the research enterprise. In the following pages, we address selected research—mostly from what has appeared earlier in the chapter—under the general headings of survey, field, and laboratory research. We do not specifically address measurements issues, but refer the reader instead to Robinson, Shaver, and Wrightsman's (1991) indispensable compendium of social psychological measures (see also Wylie, 1979).

Survey Research

As noted throughout this chapter, most sociological research on the self and self-concept uses survey data. The data collection methods vary from regional (e.g., Rosenfield et al., 2005) and national telephone interviews (e.g., Sellers & Neighbors, 2008), to group administered questionnaires (e.g., Owens et al., 2008), web-based surveys (e.g., Andriot, 2011), in-person or in-home interviews (e.g., Cast et al., 1999; Hill et al., 2010), and so forth. Below, we discuss both longitudinal and cross-sectional surveys.

Longitudinal Surveys

There are a large number of national, regional, and community-based longitudinal datasets that include high-quality measures of interest to researchers of self and self-concept. The primary merit of longitudinal data is the ability to track individual change and development over a few months or even a lifetime. Longitudinal data are of particular interest to sociologists who study the life course because they also allow the researcher to study life events such as work and family status, the impact of

institutions on the individual (e.g., military service), and life course transitions such as movement from adolescence to adulthood.

Briefly, two kinds of longitudinal surveys tend to appear in the social psychology literature: cohort and panel studies. *Cohort studies* sample a defined group of individuals connected through a common event (often birth year) and then follow them at various intervals through time. Some relevant research we have addressed in this chapter include the Youth Development Study (e.g., Call & Mortimer, 2001; Owens et al., 2008), the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (e.g., Piliavin & Siegl, 2007), and the Socialization into Marital Roles Study (e.g., Cast & Burke, 2002). The Youth Development Study (YDS) is a community-based cohort study of several hundred St. Paul, MN, public school students who were ninth-graders in 1988. Among the dataset's merits is a parallel study of the students' parents, and now, more than 20 years since the first data collection, the original students' own children. The Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) began with a random sample of one-third of the boys and girls who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957. Follow-up telephone and mail surveys were conducted in 1964, 1975, 1992, and 2004. Later waves also included data from siblings. Finally, the Socialization into Marital Roles Study (Tallman, Burke, & Gecas, 1998) collected face-to-face interviews, videotaped conversations, and diary entries from a sample of marriage registration records from two midsize communities in Washington State. Like the other two studies, it has a wealth of social psychological variables.

The Rutgers Health and Human Development Project (e.g., Rosenfield et al., 2005) and the Add Health Study (e.g., Ge et al., 2001) represent two ranges of panel studies. *Panel studies* begin with a sample of a broad cross-section of people who are surveyed at regular intervals over a period of time. The Rutgers Health and Human Development Project (Pandina, Labouvie, & White, 1984) recruited a random sample of New Jersey 12, 15, and 18 year-olds and followed them for several years and through a variety of developmental periods. A main object of the study was to track the social and psychological consequences of substance use. Finally, the massive Add Health Study (Bearman, Jones, & Udry, 1997) began with a nationally representative sample of American youths in grades 7–12. Designed to be the largest longitudinal study of health-related behaviors to date, the study implemented school-based surveys that have been followed up with a series of in-home interviews conducted in 1994–1995, 1996, 2001–2002, and 2007–2008. Data were also obtained from parents, siblings, fellow students, school administrators, and romantic partners. Unique among social psychologically rich studies, Add Health also contains contextual data about the subjects' neighborhoods and communities.

Cross-Sectional Surveys

Even the most cursory look at the data holdings at the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) shows an enormous number of *cross-sectional studies*, or data representative of a population or relevant subset at a particular point in time. Our chapter includes publications stemming from various cross-sectional datasets. Cross-sectional studies, while cheaper to conduct than longitudinal studies, do not have the ability to look at individual change over time, thus precluding emerging causal analysis techniques such as latent growth curve modeling with longitudinal data (e.g., McLeod & Owens, 2004; Mustillo et al., 2012; Owens et al., 2008). However, cross-sectional data can provide important descriptive information, especially estimates of the prevalence of acute or chronic social and psychological conditions. The 2000 Youth at Risk Survey used by Elliott and his colleagues (Elliott, Cunningham, Colangelo, & Gelles, 2011; Elliott et al., 2005) represents a unique, high quality cross-sectional dataset. Using telephone interviews of 2,004 youths (11–18 years of age) living at home, Elliott and his colleagues have been able to make substantial contributions to the literature on matting, including the roles of violent behavior and attitudes toward violence, self-esteem, and family structure, to mention only a few.

Field Research

Ethnography and participant observation research on the self and self-concept has not kept pace with survey methods. Part of the reason is the enormous amount of time such studies require, which limits their supply. Rather than emphasizing self and self-concept per se, field research often emphasizes group culture, interactional routines, emergent group norms and situational meanings, identity displays, and reports of the lived experience of the subjects (e.g., Adler & Adler, 2001). We discussed a few studies that seemed especially pertinent to the self-concept literature, such as Green's (2008) fieldwork in a North American gay enclave; Lois' (2003) participant observation with mountain rescuers; Stacey's (2011) ethnography of the personal and social travails of low paid, underpowered home care aides; and Snow and Anderson's (1987) ethnography of the identity challenges faced by the homeless. We could have discussed additional field studies in greater detail, such as Rosier's (2000) ethnography of inner-city mothers and their children, but space and topical constraints make additional elaboration untenable.

Laboratory Research

As Gergen (2008) has noted, laboratory experimentation in the post-World War II period became associated in some, but certainly not all, experimental social psychologists' minds "as the most rigorous means of testing hypotheses..., tracing cause/effect relations..., [and] the chief means of solidifying scientific status" (p. 332). This ambition, however, has been relatively neglected in experimental research on self and self-concept among sociological social psychologists. There are exceptions, of course, extending as far back as Miyamoto and Dornbush (1956), and going through Robinson and Smith-Lovin (1992) and Kalkhoff, Younts, and Troyer (2011), to name a few. The vast amount of sociological experimental work has focused on group dynamics and small group behavior (e.g., Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972). The same is not true among psychological social psychologists. In our chapter, we touched on some notable psychological experimental research on self and self-concept (e.g., Baumeister, Crocker, Swann, and their many collaborators). Swann's self-verification theory and experiments, it should be emphasized, have garnered considerable attention among sociological social psychologists. Again, however, our primary focus has been on sociological contributions to the self and self-concept literature.

Conclusion

Within this chapter, a number of general points emerge. First, the concept of the self is historically rooted in early Western philosophies, but its theoretical and empirical growth is relatively recent, starting in the late 1800s, increasing in the last 60 years and flourishing in the last few decades. We now have access to thousands of books, articles, and dissertations on the self, and the numbers of each of these sources are increasing sharply. Second, it is as important as ever to attend carefully to the conceptual and theoretical distinctions among terms related to the study of the self and self-concept. The "puzzling puzzle" that James (1890) noted with respect to the self persists today. Some parts of this puzzle stem from the self's sheer complexity, but other parts are due to awkward disciplinary boundaries, reinvention and redundancy, and alternative terminology for equivalent concepts and theories. Other problems stem from imprecise employment of the concepts and confusion over their similarities, differences, and proper applications. We need thoughtful and attentive scholarship on the

self in order to enhance the rigor of our research, the accuracy of our findings, and the foundations of our theories. Third, a significant amount of research attends to the versatile ways in which the self can operate in society: as a social *force*, a social *product*, and as a joint *force-and-product*. A substantial amount of this research implicates the self in social inequality across race, gender, class, mental and physical health, and other arenas of stratification. Some research is also beginning to explore the self across the life course, although we need more empirical focus on this. Fourth, theory and research on the self continue to develop, as evidenced by newer concepts such as mattering and comfort with the self. Fifth, research on the self is dominated by survey data, but may also include fieldwork and laboratory studies. And finally, each of these general points converges on a common theme: The growing pervasiveness of the self in modern scholarship underscores its importance for understanding the twin-born relationship between society and individuals, and places the self at the forefront of new and expanding paths of inquiry.

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Chapter 9

Language Use and Social Interaction

Douglas W. Maynard and Jason Turowetz

At least since Aristotle, language has been seen as distinctively human in its complexity. Ethologists have increased our appreciation of how other mammals—dolphins, chimpanzees, gorillas, and so on—employ sounds to signal one another in sophisticated ways, but humans, in conducting their everyday affairs, rely on spoken and gestural forms of intercourse to an unparalleled degree (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). Despite the centrality of language use in human society, social psychology textbooks often ignore the topic (Clark, 1985), and when they do pay attention it is to regard language as a mode of communication or a vehicle whereby humans transmit information, including ideas, thoughts, and feelings, from one to another.

A variety of philosophers and social scientists regard the view of language as primarily communicative in function as the *conduit metaphor* (Reddy, 1979). This metaphor is rooted in the commonsensical notion that, through speech, one person conveys information by inserting it into words and sending them along a communicative channel. People receive the words at the other end and extract the encoded thoughts and feelings from them. The conduit metaphor reinforces the idea that problems of meaning in human society are essentially referential—concerned with how concepts correspond to or represent reality—and that language operates to make propositions about the world (Pitkin, 1972).

Instead of using the conduit metaphor and referential approach to meaning, scholars recently have approached language as a medium of organized social activity, in which words are “performatives” (Austin, 1962) or “deeds” (Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 546). It is partly through language that humans “do” the social world, even as the world is confronted as the unquestioned background or condition for activity. Nonetheless, the conduit metaphor and “picture book” view of language, rather than the more dynamic or activist approach, still heavily influence social psychological theory and research. This chapter begins with a review of general statements in social psychology about language, and then examines language as action and the philosophical and social scientific background to this perspective. We review the so-called mapping problem—or the question of how utterances become linked to social actions. Sociolinguistics and discourse analysis provide rule-based answers to this question, arguing that actions are linked together through a combination of linguistic (grammatical) and social rules (such as those associated with politeness). After reviewing these approaches, we turn to perspectives in which rules play a less prominent role—Goffman’s frame analysis and discursive psychology. Finally, we discuss ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, in which rules are altogether abandoned as explanatory resources and investigators connect language to action through other means, such as the sequential organization of talk. We briefly discuss methodological approaches for each of these perspectives.

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Language in Social Psychology

There are two main disciplinary “branches” to the field of social psychology—the psychological and the sociological (House, 1977). Along the psychological branch, it has been traditional to employ the conduit model of language. For example, a frequent topic along this branch is that of persuasion, and the well-known Yale communication model (Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1953) poses a basic question about it: “Who says what to whom by what means?” The conduit model of language, which has been modified by more recent, cognitively-oriented approaches such as the elaboration likelihood and heuristic and systematic models (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), includes four factors that are important to achieving persuasion—a communicator or source, a message, an audience, and a channel through which the message is conveyed. When, for example, audience members perceive a source as credible and trustworthy, they are more likely to be persuaded by what the source says. Over the years, such diverse public figures as (in the U.S.) Eleanor Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, and Barack Obama have been seen as examples of persuasive source figures. Other “source” features—including likability, attractiveness, and expertise—also affect how audiences evaluate messages. Besides features of a source, researchers have studied characteristics of messages (capacity to arouse emotion or fear, quantity and timing of messages, discrepancy between message and target’s own position, etc.), targets (mood, motivation, etc.) and situations for their influence on persuasiveness.

In the sociological branch of social psychology, symbolic interactionists have been most concerned with language (Emirbayer & Maynard, 2011). This is no doubt due to the influence of Mead (1934), who originated the suggestion that humans employ significant symbols that, when emitted by one party, elicit the same response in that party as in the party to whom the symbol is directed. This suggestion assumes importance in a larger context than social psychology, however. Sociologists regard communication as achieving a solution to “the problem of meaning,” which Weber (1947) long ago identified as being at the core of social action. The defining criterion of such action is that it is a product of the interactive interpretations of society’s members. When Mead proposed the existence of significant symbols and the capacity for “taking the role of the other,” it seemed to represent a clear statement of how humans could form common understandings, produce mutual and complementary stances within what he called the “social act,” and also thereby provide for larger patterns of social life.

From ideas like Mead’s, and a more general concern with the problem of meaning, it is easy to see how social psychologists moved to the conduit metaphor when discussing human language, seeing it as a repository of significant symbols in which people package their ideas and feelings. Significant symbols include not only words but gestures as well, although there are two views of gestural communication. In one view, gestures are substituted for words. Thus, a hand wave stands for “hello,” a green light suggests “go,” a beckoning arm signifies “come on,” and so on (Hertzler, 1965, pp. 29–30). In the other view, gestures occupy a different “channel of communication” than words—a nonverbal one. In either view, because of the presumption that gestures encode referential meaning, the conduit metaphor is preserved. Although it is recognized that gestures and words are arbitrary and conventional and that they take on different senses according to the context in which they appear, individuals’ ability to encode their own experiences with words and gestures inexorably leads actors to share the same mental attitudes or states and to agree upon reference (Hewitt & Shulman, 2011). Shared agreement, in turn, makes collaborative activity possible.¹

¹A formerly influential variant of the communicational view of language is the famous Sapir-Whorf, or linguistic relativity, hypothesis. Benjamin Whorf, a student of the anthropologist Edward Sapir, studied the languages of American Indians and other groups, and argued that these languages conditioned the members’ life experiences. The Whorfian hypothesis suggests an iconic relation between language and thought—i.e., that language determines thought. Early on, Lennenberg (1953) and Brown (1958) pointed out the logical flaws in this proposition. For a more recent critique, see Pinker (1994: Chapter 3).

Overall, then, language has been important to social psychology because it represents a vital medium whereby actors can communicate with one another and thereby set up joint projects according to preexisting social arrangements. In this view, the manipulation of significant symbols—i.e., thought—is a precursor to action. Behavior and action are the products or outcomes of pre-existing, common understandings achieved through language. A different view of language sees it as co-constitutive of social activity. That is, language and action are facets of a single process that participants collaboratively organize through their practices of speech and gesture.

Language Use and Action

The conduit metaphor implies that language is largely a vehicle for making propositions about the world. From this perspective, which is explicit or implicit in traditional social psychological research on language, problems of meaning involve how well linguistic concepts refer to, correspond with, or represent reality, including internal thoughts and feelings. For example, in the symbolic interactionist tradition, although it is recognized that words as symbols have an arbitrary relationship to what they represent, nevertheless speakers learn to associate a given word with the “same things or events, as do other speakers of the language” (Hewitt & Shulman, 2011, p. 34). To be used accurately, announcing a “fire” on one’s premises requires that this word designate, refer, or point to some actual conflagration and that others understand this and respond appropriately. A different idea, stemming from developments in what is called ordinary language philosophy, is that language is a site of social activity. A variety of scholars, including Austin, Ryle, Searle, and Wittgenstein, have recast problems of meaning and reference in traditional philosophy and, by extension, issues concerning how, and under what conditions, interactants communicate effectively with one another. Their approach avoids theorizing about the abstracting and generalizing process through which words refer or point to objects. Instead, it situates words in concrete, orderly contexts to appreciate how they achieve actions. Saying “there’s a fire in here” can perform a variety of social actions: announcing, teasing, scaring, joking, testing, or others, depending on the organization of conduct in which the saying occurs.

Speech Act Theory

The title of John Austin’s famous book, *How to Do Things with Words*, conveys the essence of speech act theory. Austin (1962, p. 12) questions “an old assumption in philosophy” that to say something is to state something in a propositional sense. Sentences that convey referential information, in Austin’s words, form “locutionary” acts, but many utterances do not describe, state, or report anything. That is, they do not state anything and cannot be evaluated for their truth, but rather are “illocutionary” performances. Examples, paraphrased from Austin (p. 5), are:

“I do” (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife) (as uttered during a marriage ceremony)

“I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” (as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem)

“I give and bequeath my watch to my brother” (as occurring in a will)

“I bet you it will rain tomorrow”

Such utterances do not report or describe what a person is doing; as formulated, they achieve a designated activity, such as promising, naming, giving, or betting.

Reflecting on the characteristics of these performances or illocutionary acts, Austin came to view locutionary acts in a new way. He proposed that the “occasion of an utterance matters seriously” and that to understand how the utterance functions, the “context” in which it is spoken must be investigated

together with the utterance itself (J.L. Austin, 1962, p. 98). That is, when we examine the occasion of locutionary or statement-like acts, we see that speakers are using them to ask or answer a question, give assurance or a warning, announce a verdict or intent, and so on. Accordingly, so-called statements or locutionary utterances also occur as some specific action; they too are performative rather than referential. In the end, Austin (1961, pp. 249–50) abandons the dichotomy between locutionary and illocutionary acts “in favor of more general families of related and overlapping speech acts.”

One of Austin’s successors, Searle (1969, pp. 16–17), more forcefully states that the “unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word, or sentence ... but rather the production of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of a speech act,” and that a theory of language therefore needs a theory of action. For Searle, this theory is one in which a set of underlying, constitutive rules specifies how speech acts can be accomplished.

Both Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) attempt to come to grips with the well-known problem in the philosophy of language that a sentence with a given reference and predication can have an assortment of meanings. In terms of speech act theory, the “same” utterance can perform a variety of different speech acts. Searle’s (pp. 70–71) classic example is a wife reporting to her husband at a party, “It’s really quite late”:

That utterance may be at one level a statement of fact; to her interlocutor, who has just remarked on how early it was, it may be (and be intended as) an objection; to her husband it may be (and be intended as) a suggestion or even a request (“Let’s go home”) as well as a warning (“You’ll feel rotten in the morning if we don’t”).

Among speech act theorists, linking a given or “same” utterance to specific actions may involve what Austin (1962) called “felicity conditions,” or the set of circumstances that allow for the successful completion of a performative. Thus, for an act of promising to be effective, the promisor must intend to promise, have been heard by someone, and be understood as promising. Searle (1969, 1975), taking issue with Austin as well as others (H.P. Grice, 1957; Strawson, 1964) who base theories of meaning on speakers’ intentions, provides a sophisticated system of rules whereby the “direct” or “indirect” action a given sentence is intended to initiate can be consummated. For example, rules or conventions, according to Searle (1969) specify how an uttered promise is produced, what the preparatory conditions are (e.g., that the promise stipulates an act for someone that would not occur in the normal course of events), that the speaker intends to do the act as an obligation, and that the hearer recognizes the utterance as it was meant. These rules can be related to what Grice (1975) has called “conversational implicature,” a set of maxims that underlie and provide for the cooperative use of language.

Language Use as a Form of Life

Another important figure, and perhaps the most influential, in the ordinary language tradition is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in his own early work was deeply committed to logical positivism and the idea that the function of language is to represent objects in the world. Subscribing to the referential approach to meaning, Wittgenstein thought that the fundamental question about language was the truth or falsity of its propositions. The philosopher’s main task was to translate complex sentences into their elementary units in order to assess its truth or falsity (Pitkin, 1972). Later, Wittgenstein disavowed this and any other rule-based approach to language, instead urging the examination of language practice—how individuals employ words and sentences in concrete situations.

In *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein, 1958) and other posthumous publications, he argued that language, rather than being a vehicle for naming things, conveying information, or enacting intentions according to rules, is an activity or form of life in its own right. For example, to analyze a single word in the language, and propose that there is a single definable class of phenomena to which it refers, is to neglect that words can be a wide variety of things depending on the various roles they

occupy in a multiplicity of language games (Wittgenstein, 1958, para. 24). Consider the word “hello,” which we might define as a greeting. However, its status as a greeting depends on where, in a developing conversation, the item occurs (Schegloff, 1986). When a party uses the word after picking up a ringing telephone, the activity it performs is *answering* a summons rather than greeting the caller. Subsequently, there may be an exchange or sequence of salutations, and in that context “hello” does perform greeting. To discover the meaning of a word, then, it is not possible to rely on ostensive or referential or any other fixed definitions; one must examine the contexts of use. When contexts of use are similar, then words may be said to share what Wittgenstein (para. 67) called “family resemblances.” It is in the actual practice of placing words in particular contexts that such resemblances can be traced, and the lexical and other components of language appreciated as a form of life.

This emphasis on actual practice differs significantly from speech act theory, especially that of Searle. In Wittgenstein’s view, just as the word “hello” might appear in a variety of language games, so might the word “promise.” Rather than deriving meaning ostensively or from underlying constitutive rules, however, the word is always related to the force of the utterance in which it appears. Consider an example from an actual conversation at a family dinner table. Virginia, a teenager, has been asking her mother for a raise in her allowance, while her mother has been resisting the request. At one point, Virginia says, “I promise I never have enough money.”² Here, she is not making a promise in the conventional sense—assuring that she will do something in the future. Rather, in a context where she has made a request for an increased allowance and met with resistance, Virginia is complaining about her financial situation and justifying the request. Furthermore, by her use of “promise,” she intensifies her complaining/justifying actions. From a Wittgensteinian-informed perspective, an investigator would not try to derive meaning from definitions, from the rules of illocutionary force, or by inferring speaker intentions. Instead, the interest is in overt expressions, interactional contexts, and acts through which a word such as “promise” comes to life. Linguistic and interactional competence, in this view, consists in systematically relating given lexical items to other pieces of vocal (and bodily) conduct that signal how such items are produced and to be understood.

The “Mapping” Problem

According to speech act theory, the language that humans use can constitute an infinite variety of social actions (John R Searle, 1969). Austin (1962) suggests that there are on the order of a thousand or so actions, while Wittgenstein (1958, para. 23) proposes that there are “innumerable” activities in which language plays a part, including but by no means limited to “ordering, describing, reporting, speculating, presenting results, telling a story, being ironic, requesting, asking, criticizing, apologizing, censuring, approving, welcoming, objecting, guessing, joking, greeting.” This list can be indefinitely extended and shows that, as all the speech act theorists would argue, the communicative function of language, wherein people refer to objects and report their thoughts or feelings about them in a verifiable way, is only one among many modes of linguistic usage.

When social scientists regard language in this dynamic sense, as intimately tied to action, a seemingly simple problem still looms large for the investigator: How are we to know what the illocutionary force (action) of an utterance is? It is not tenable that the performative aspect of an utterance is somehow built into its form, for the reason stated above—the “same” utterance can perform a variety of acts. Put differently, the “form” of a sentence or utterance, including its syntactic structure, is often misleading about its status as an activity. For example, Levinson (1983, p. 275) mentions imperatives, which, despite their grammar as commands or requests, rarely appear as such in natural conversation.

²The source here is a transcript entitled “Virginia,” and the utterance is on page 27 at lines 27–28.

Rather, they occur “in recipes and instructions, offers (Have another drink), welcomings (Come in), wishes (Have a good time), curses and swearings (Shut up), and so on ...”. As Levinson nicely formulates the problem of knowing the force of an utterance, it is one of mapping speech acts or social actions onto utterances as they occur in actual contexts. As we have seen, in ordinary language philosophy, there are two main solutions to this mapping problem, one being the rule-based approach of Austin, Searle, Grice and others, and the other being the practice-based approach of Wittgenstein. In contemporary social science, we also find these two approaches.

Sociolinguistics and Discourse Analysis

Language use as a topic is almost notable by its absence in social psychology, particularly of the psychological variety. Accordingly, we look elsewhere for sources of understanding the role of language in social interaction and social life. Prominent fields that relate linguistics, sociology, and anthropology include sociolinguistics and discourse analysis.

Sociolinguistics

Pioneers in sociolinguistics, such as Gumperz (1972), Hymes (1974), and Labov (1972b), were wrestling with a legacy of theorizing about language that posited its fundamental forms as being cognitive or minded phenomena. This legacy started with Ferdinand de Saussure’s (2011[1916]) famous distinction between *langue*, which comprises an underlying systematics across variations in social context, and *parole*, which consists of the actual speech that people produce. In de Saussure’s view, the proper focus of study was *langue*, the idea being that human cognition was the seat of linguistic structures and categories that guided people’s behavior. In more contemporary times, Noam Chomsky (1965) continued the cognitive legacy with his very influential notion of generative grammar, a set of psychologically based universal structures whose systematic transformations result in an infinite variety of human speech productions. With its emphasis on Cartesian mental properties, structural linguistics has always sought to decontextualize linguistic phenomena in favor of finding certain ideal properties of abstracted sentences. That is, the overwhelming tendency has been to view linguistic structure as extant outside of time and place, and hence not subject to social influence.

Sociolinguists, following scholars such as Firth (1935), Malinowski (1923), and others, were utterly dissatisfied with such a view. As Hymes (1974) has argued, the frame of reference of the social scientific investigation of language could not be linguistic forms in themselves, and must substitute the community context as a frame. Indeed, Labov (1972b) resisted the term sociolinguistics because he could not conceive of linguistic theory or method that did not incorporate a social component. The social component would include cultural values, social institutions, community history and ecology, and so on (Hymes, 1974). While sociolinguists agree that social influence is crucial to understanding linguistic structure, there are different perspectives on the relationship between society and language (Grimshaw, 1974) and varying strategies for investigating this relationship. The earliest sociolinguistic studies used dialect surveys to study speech variation among social networks and communities, finding that dialect variables were an excellent gauge of both social class and ethnic identity (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972).

Variation in linguistic patterns is a prominent theme in sociolinguistics. Besides dialect usage, another example of variation is *code switching* (Ervin-Tripp, 1972), or the manner in which members of a single community juxtapose, in the same situation, speech belonging to different grammatical systems (Auer, 1999; Breitborde, 1983). The uses of code-switching include but are not limited to quoting others, selecting a particular addressee (by using his or her native language), marking something as an interjection,

reiterating a remark in one language by using another, and qualifying or specifying a generalization. Here are two examples from Gumperz (1982, pp. 77–78), where the code switching goes from Spanish to English or vice versa:

[Interjecting:]

A: Well I'm glad I met you.

B: *Andale pues* (O.K. swell). And do come again. Mm?

[Reiterating:]

A: I was ... I got to thinking *vacilando el punto ese* (mulling over that point) you know? I got to thinking this and that reason.

In terms of a classic topic in social psychology—that of identity—sociolinguists suggest that code switching reflects speakers' ability to categorize situations, interlocutors, and social relationships and thereby to make inferences and judgments about the appropriate and relevant speech forms to produce. Accordingly, sociolinguists examine the relation of diverse languages to self-concept, personality, and status attitudes. Other core topics in sociolinguistics are language conflict, loyalty, and maintenance, as well as the structure and organization of pidgin and creole languages.

Methodology in Sociolinguistics

Methodologically, the field of sociolinguistics relies on sampling a particular *speech community* (Gumperz, 1972, p. 16) or group whose speakers “share knowledge of the communicative constraints and options governing a significant number of social situations” to interview subjects or informants and record how they talk. Investigators use a variety of interview-based elicitation techniques (Chambers, 2008). In order from most formal to most casual style, these techniques include “word list” (subjects read a prepared inventory); “minimal pairs” (words with one phoneme that is different, as with cat and bat); “reading passage” (a prepared text); and “interview style” (subjects recall a car accident, or a fire in the toaster or other experience); and “casual style” as when a subject talks to someone else in the household or takes a telephone call.

The best data from a sociolinguistic standpoint is that which minimizes the speaker's self-awareness, but there is what Labov (1972b, p. 209) famously termed the *observer's paradox*: “the aim of linguistic research in the community must be to find out how people talk when they are not being systematically observed; yet we can only obtain these data by systematic observation.” Among the most successful of attempts to resolve this paradox—because it stimulates spontaneous talk—involves asking subjects to talk about a situation in which their life was in danger. Labov also points to the importance of recording and studying language use in natural groups, which anticipates the techniques in conversation analysis and discursive psychology.³

Discourse Analysis

Related to sociolinguistics, and representing an effort to become more theoretically sophisticated⁴ about the relationship between language and society, is discourse analysis. The term “discourse analysis” can be used to refer to a number of quite different research traditions. Along with the linguistic

³For a critical view of sociolinguistics from a sociological perspective, see Williams (1992).

⁴Grimshaw (1974, p. 80) reviews the early literature comprehensively and suggests that sociolinguistics is a “hybrid discipline” that is “largely atheoretical.”

discourse analysis discussed here, there is historical discourse analysis that usually focuses on written texts (Armstrong, 1983; Foucault, 1979), “critical discourse analysis” which combines social criticism with the analysis of textual material (Fairclough, 1992), and the social psychological discourse analysis that has come to be called “discursive psychology,” which will be discussed later in this chapter.

“Discourse” broadly includes both textual and spoken forms of language and refers to language production as it is organized external to the unitary sentence or clause (Stubbs, 1983), although, as van Dijk (1997b, p. 6) suggests, the field could include studies of what ordinarily is called *prosody*, including “pronunciation, emphasis, intonation, volume and other properties” contributing to the “sound structures of discourse.” Usually, discourse analysis is concerned with the orderly connections between clauses and sentences, rather than with the structuring of those units alone. That is, even when concerned with small units or characteristics of speech, discourse analysts go beyond these boundaries to discover how contexts of various kinds enter into the constitution of such units. Thus, as Coulthard (1977) notes, discourse analysis overlaps partially with pragmatics, a subfield in linguistics that is distinguished from traditional concerns with syntax and semantics by the interest in how language users take the social environment into account when producing and understanding speech forms. Discourse analysis is multitopical and multidisciplinary, with scholars from anthropology, artificial intelligence, communications, philosophy, psychology, and sociology contributing to the enterprise (Stubbs, 1983; van Dijk, 1985).

Some discourse analysts are interested in formalizing the relationship between language and other sociological variables. For example, Grimshaw (1989) models the discourse process as involving a “source,” or originator of some manipulative speech move, a “goal,” or target of the move, an “instrumentality,” which is the speech act itself, and a “result” or outcome that the source pursues. The particular speech act a source employs is constrained according to the three variables of power, affect, and utility. Grimshaw’s approach complements Labov and Fanshel’s (1977) concern with rules of discourse by emphasizing rules deriving from essentially social considerations of appropriateness as based on participants’ cultural and social knowledge. A less formalistic approach to describing discourse and its social parameters—how discourse as action involves topic selection, overall or schematic organization, local meanings, choice of words, style, and rhetorical devices—can be found in van Dijk (1997a). Viewing discourse as action, van Dijk also stresses the importance of context and power in the analysis of text and talk.

Given the multitopical and multidisciplinary character of discourse analysis, it is difficult to define any unitary methods. As Wood and Kroger (2000, p. 28) put it, “In discourse analysis, the units of analysis are variable and may range from words, phrases, and sentences to paragraphs or even larger units.” Starting small, one could consider a progressive approach to discourse analysis, where linguistic methods would be appropriate for studying the order of words, phrases, or clauses in sentences—their syntax. Semantic and cognitive psychological approaches might take on the next level, having to do with the assignment of meaning to whole sentences or clauses. Ethnographic methods would be appropriate for analysis of style and variation in speech and text, which discourse analysts consider particularly important because of their relation to the accomplishment of social identity. As Gee (2010, p. 28) states:

People build identities and activities not just through language, but by using language together with other “stuff” that isn’t language. If you want to get recognized as a street-gang member of a certain sort you have to speak in the “right” way, but you also have to act and dress in the “right” way, as well. You also have to engage (or at least, behave as if you are engaging) in characteristic ways of thinking, acting, interacting, valuing, feeling, and believing. You also have to use or be able to use various sorts of symbols (e.g., graffiti), tools (e.g., a weapon), and objects (e.g., street corners) in the “right” places and at the “right” times.

Gee (2010) proposes that the “same is true of doing/being a corporate lawyer,” and it is clear that getting at the various components to style and identity may best be accomplished through field research. Beyond stylistic matters, critical communication methods may handle rhetorical aspects of discourse and other schematic themes or global meanings that discourse may constitute.

As van Dijk (1997b, p. 13) notes, each step along this methodological pathway involves “structures that are further removed from the traditional scope of linguistics” until the social sciences become especially relevant for the study of *action* and *interaction*. For these topics, many discourse analysts such as van Dijk consider ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to provide the relevant methodological tools (see below), although these subfields tend not to deal with the formal and written aspects of language that discourse analysis includes as part of its concerns (Stubbs, 1983). It is clear that discourse analysis is not only multitopical and multidisciplinary, but also multi-methodological.

Goffman and Frame Analysis

Sociolinguistics and discourse analysis emphasize the importance of microanalysis of minute particles of speech and single interactional events as a means for understanding the social and social psychological dimensions of language use. Akin to the speech act tradition, both areas invoke rule-like mechanisms for connecting social conditions, environments or structures to these particles and events. In Goffman (1983)’s work—which, in the latter part of his career, involved an increased interest in language use—we see less emphasis on the connective or even causal approach to rules and more concern with social actors’ agency and rule usage. As background to discussing Goffman’s (1981) later focus on talk, we consider the theoretical context in which that focus resides.

Goffman (1983) argues that the corporeal and interactional “face to face” or “body to body” situation—whether in urban or rural areas, business or family, and independent of socioeconomic class, gender or ethnic categories—should be the primary focus for understanding social interaction. That is, the same rules and conventions, applying to turn-taking, physical distance between speakers, and other matters, prevail in social interaction regardless its broader context. Or to take a more specific example: Goffman refers to a “contact” ritual, such as any service encounter where customers may form a queue as they await their turn at being helped. Although the queue could be organized according to externally structured attributes of involved parties (e.g., age, race, gender, or class), normal queuing “blocks” or filters out the effects of such variables in favor of an egalitarian, first-come, first-serve ordering principle.

Such an ordering principle belongs to what Goffman (1983: 5) calls the *interaction order*, which consists of “systems of enabling conventions, in the sense of ground rules for a game, the provisions of a traffic code, or the syntax of a language.” The interaction order is relatively autonomous order of organization, both in relation to the broader social organization and to the psychological properties of the actors. Hence, Goffman wanted to promote it as a target of social scientific study in its own right. Although the interaction order consists largely of rules or conventions, violations do not threaten the game or the language as much as they serve as resources for accomplishing the very projects that adherence itself involves, including the definition of self and the creation or maintenance of social meaning (Goffman, 1971, p. 61):

Given that a rule exists against seeking out a stranger’s eyes, seeking can then be done as a means of making a pickup or as a means of making oneself known to someone one expects to meet but is unacquainted with. Similarly, given that staring is an invasion of information preserve, a stare can then be used as a warranted negative sanction against someone who has misbehaved—the misbehavior providing and ensuring a special significance to overlong examination.

Actors, in this view, do not range between naive conformity and blatant rule breaking. Rules, says Goffman (1971, p. 61) make possible a set of “nonadherences” which, according to how we classify the interactional work they do, have a variety of meanings. In social psychological terms, actors’ orientation to the interaction order rests on commitments that in one way or another (through adherence or violation) enable the self to emerge and be preserved (Goffman, 1971; Rawls, 1987). The interactional rules do not tightly constrain actions; they are more like rough guidelines that permit actors to

accomplish a variety of social projects, depending on how they align themselves with respect to those rules or guidelines.

This point about actors' capacity for flexible alignment to rules is most fully developed in *Frame Analysis*, Goffman's (1974) major treatise on the "organizational premises" of ordinary activity and the "reality" of everyday experience. This work, and particularly a chapter entitled "Frame Analysis of Talk" brings full attention to the use of language in interaction. Much of everyday experience goes beyond literal activity and has numerous figurative aspects, which are especially visible in talk (1974). In particular, Goffman argues that rather than using terms such as speaking and hearing to characterize the production and understanding of utterances, analysts must see how participants display a stance with respect to those utterances. A speaker, for instance, may employ a variety of production formats when talking, so that he/she says something as *principal* (one whose position is represented in the talk) or as *animator* (who simply speaks the words representing another's position). As principal or animator, one can also project a particular identity or *figure* (ranging from that of the speaker to identities of fictitious and actual others). Finally, a speaker can be a *strategist* who acts to promote the interests of an individual on whose behalf he/she is acting. In a way complementary to speakers, hearers also take up different alignments or participation statuses—ratified recipient, overhearer, eavesdropper, and so on. Eventually, Goffman (1979) referred to the frame analysis of talk as an investigation of the "footing" or *stances* that participants constantly change over the course of an utterance's production.

Methodologically, Goffman based his research on a combination of ethnography and observation. Some contemporary scholars have used these methods to develop and critique his work. For example, in her studies of gender in public places, Gardner (1989, 1995) argues that Goffman's claim about public order is that it is gender-neutral. This caused him to overlook the inherently gendered quality of social interaction. In analyzing public behavior from a feminist perspective, Brooks-Gardner foregrounds how women, who (along with minorities) are vulnerable to various forms of harassment and discrimination, experience public places differently from men.

Goffman's method of frame analysis, and the corollary concept of footing or stance, has been taken up in a variety of ways. This method provides tools for distinguishing among and structural bases for the multiple identities people enact in a given situation. Where Goffman often utilized fictitious examples, more recent studies of actual interactions demonstrate the utility of his methodological orientations. Maynard (1984) analyzes how in plea bargaining, district attorneys and public defenders strategically shift footings to align with, and distance themselves from, the structural roles in which they are embedded. Thus, a public defender may animate his client's wishes while also distancing himself from them. Similarly, Clayman (1988) shows how news interviewers achieve neutrality by shifting to the footing of animator, rather than principal, of challenges to an interviewee. That is, interviewers attribute challenging questions to a third party. For example, an interviewer on a public television station in the U.S. once asked the South African ambassador to the United States about a state of emergency that had been imposed in his country in this way: "Finally Mister Ambassador, as you know, the critics say that the purpose of the state of emergency ... is to suppress political dissent, those who are opposed to the apartheid government of South Africa. Is that so?" (Clayman, 1988, p. 482 with simplified transcript). By referring to "critics," the interviewer tacitly claims that the challenge originates with others and not himself.

Other research further extends Goffman's concepts by deploying them for the analysis of multi-modal activities, including gesture and environment as well as talk (Mondada, 2012). C. Goodwin (2007a) shows how "participation frameworks" are enacted in the physical *alignments* of actors' bodies toward one another. When people engage in teaching activities, for example, they configure their bodies to establish joint attention to an object. Disruptions of this organized embodied expression lead to shifts in participants' affective stance in the interaction. Similarly, M. Goodwin (2006) shows how embodied alignments ("facing formations") can affect whether children comply with their parents' directives, and also how bodily stances can accomplish inclusion and exclusion within young girls' peer groups (M. H. Goodwin, 2007b).

Discursive Psychology

Discursive psychology is a European (mostly British) social psychological approach that takes an “action oriented” understanding of language as its point of departure. Scholars such as Billig (1987), Edwards (1997), Edwards and Potter (1992), Potter (1996), Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Antaki (1994) have questioned the “cognitivist” presuppositions predominant in current social psychology. The cognitivism that discursive psychologists critique coincides with the conduit metaphor. In cognitivism, “we start with a given, external world, which is then perceived and processed, and then put into words” (Edwards, 1997, p. 19), and language is understood as a transparent medium used for transfer of ideas concerning the external reality and inner worlds of humans. In contrast with this view, discursive psychologists study accounts and accounting—how everyday descriptions of people, their behavior, and their mental states are in themselves actions (Antaki, 1994). Descriptions are produced in particular occasions to do particular things, such as blaming, justifying, explaining, and so on (Buttny, 1993). Descriptive themes as *accounts* involve courses of action, mental and emotional states, and identities. We discuss these themes in order.

Accounts of Courses of Action

Following Schegloff (1989), and Potter and Wetherell (1987), Edwards (1997, p. 8) remarks, “accounts of actions are invariably, and at the same time, accounts *for* actions.” Two distinct aspects of these accounts involve scripts and dispositions (Edwards, 1997). In describing events in terms of scripts, the speakers often implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) propose that what happened followed a routine pattern in the given circumstances. The course of action is then presented as expected, as ordinary, and as “natural:” in short, as one that follows a script. On the other hand, events can also be described as breaches of the script, as something unusual and unexpected. When events are described as breaches of the script, dispositions often come into play. Dispositions are “pictures” of the actor implied by the description of the course of action; two such relevant dispositions are the personality and the moral character of the actor. Speakers use scripts and dispositions as explanatory resources in pursuing their local interactional goals (Edwards & Potter, 1992). For example, a speaker complaining about another party’s conduct may propose that it is part of a recurrent—or scripted—pattern of violating social norms (Edwards, 1995).

Accounts of Mental and Emotional States

Discursive psychologists are interested specifically in the ways in which the participants’ states of knowledge figure in talk (Edwards, 1997). They examine how emotional and cognitive states are practically accomplished, and how local interactional goals are pursued in and through them. Cognitive states are achieved, for example, through the ways in which statements, stories and descriptions are designed and received in conversation. As conversation analysts have shown (see below), speakers produce their talk carefully to show their understanding of the recipients’ knowledge or “epistemic” states. By the same token, recipients may show, through their own action, whether the things that were told were new information or already known by them (Sorjonen, 2001).

Discursive psychology also investigates descriptions of affect, or the ways in which speakers avow their own emotions and ascribe them to others. In line with other social constructionist approaches (Harré, 1986), this research centers on the use of emotion words (rather than non-lexical expressions of emotion) and their role in actions such as “assigning causes and motives of action, in blaming,

excuses, and accounts” (Edwards, 1997, p. 170). Thus, during an argument, one spouse may blame the other’s jealousy as the source of his anger and their fights (Edwards, 1995). Emotion descriptions are an essential resource in accounting for action. Moreover, as Edwards (1997) points out, emotion descriptions can be embedded in routine scripts—as when, for instance, a particular event, such as having a child, evokes a particular emotion, such as happiness. Emotion descriptions also can be part of dispositions—e.g. when a specific emotion, such as inclination towards jealousy, is used to explain non-routine courses of action.⁵

Accounts of Identity

Identity is a third theme in discursive psychology. In and through their talk, speakers present themselves, those to whom they talk, and those about whom they talk, as having particular identities, and being particular kinds of persons. Like mental states, identity is, as Antaki and Widdicombe (1998) put it, both an achievement and a tool in performing particular actions in talk (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Thus, in blaming another, or defending one’s own (or the other’s) actions, speakers ascribe and avow particular motives and personality features, and thereby construct identities (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). For example, a speaker criticizing protesters may divide them into two groups—those who have genuine motives and those who do not. This, in turn, allows the speaker to support the protest in general while objecting to certain aspects of it, such as violence. The speaker’s construction of the protesters’ identities has reflexive implications for her own: she is someone who supports the protesters’ cause, but not the protesters per se.

Drawing on Sacks’ work in conversation analysis, Antaki and Widdicombe (1998) emphasize the centrality of categorization in the construction of identity: “to have an identity” entails being “cast into a category with associated characteristics or features.” Categories can, of course, be numerous, the most general ones including age, ethnic, gender and professional categories. A key challenge in investigating categorization, as Antaki and Widdicombe point out, is to show how participants orient to a particular categorization, and how this orientation is consequential for their joint courses of action.

Methodology in Discursive Psychology

In this section, we have reviewed three broad and interrelated areas of description as action: accounts of courses of action, accounts of mind and affect, and accounts of identities. In all these fields, discursive psychologists seek to show how the design and reception of descriptions contributes to particular social actions. This research program raises once again the mapping problem: on which basis can we say that a type of description contributes to a particular social action? Discursive psychology tends to blend the methods of both discourse analysis and conversation analysis. More specifically, Potter (2012) traces three strands of methodological influence that developed over the years. First, with influences from Billig’s rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1987), are open-ended interviews and group discussions from which investigators identify “interpretative repertoires,” or categories and idioms such as those surrounding identities. Second, in a discourse analytic way, discursive psychology began dealing with naturalistic data including talk (legal arguments, parliamentary debates, news interviews) as well as texts (newspaper reports). This strand has been important for the studies of

⁵For a recent conversation analytic approach to emotion and emotion display in talk, see Peräkylä and Sorjonen (2012).

course-of-action accounts as well as socially constructed mental and emotional states. Third, in recent years, the research methodology of discursive psychology has come very close to that in conversation analysis: “Indeed, at times these two fields blur together” (Potter, 2012, p. 122). Accordingly, we postpone further discussion of methodology in discursive psychology to explore the interrelated traditions of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis and their associated methodological practices.

Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

Ethnomethodology proposes that there is a self-generating order in everyday activities (Garfinkel, 1967) and takes a unique approach to the problem of mapping utterances onto actions in at least two ways. First, where Goffman’s frame analysis relaxed the theoretical hold that rules could have in explaining linguistic conduct, ethnomethodology argues that rules should instead be treated as topics and features of the activities they are said to organize. In so doing, it extricates rules from their traditional conceptual status in social theory. That is, in ethnomethodology there is no attempt to explain linguistic or other behavior by reference to rules. Instead, the analytic tactic is to examine rules empirically as resources for actors, who use them for various situated projects and ends of their own. It is not that behavior is unconstrained, disorderly, or arbitrary, but that rules, if they are operative at all, figure as part of actors’ own practices of reasoning and ways of organizing a social setting. People are artful users of rules, often invoking them in an *ex post facto*, rhetorical manner to describe the morality of some way of life. For example, jurors retrospectively invoke legal standards to depict how they arrived at a verdict, even when the route involved substantial commonsense, non-standardized reasoning (Garfinkel, 1967). Ethnomethodologists also have shown how residents at a halfway house use the “convict code” to account for disregard of the official ways of doing things (Wieder, 1974). In another study, Zimmerman (1970) demonstrates how staff members at a social welfare agency get their “people processing” job done, in part, through departing from routine policies while still providing an accountable (defensible) sense of having conformed to them. Rules, to repeat, are features of actions rather than explanations for them.

The Transition to Conversation Analysis

Another unique aspect of ethnomethodological research is its concern with *indexical expressions* (Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970), or utterances whose meaning and understandability depend on the context or circumstances in which they appear. While it is generally recognized that “deictic” utterances, such as “this,” “that,” “here,” “there,” and so on, assume particular meaning according to their speech environment, Garfinkel developed this insight further (1967) arguing that all talk is fundamentally indexical and context- dependent. One major, orderly aspect of “context” is an utterance’s sequential placement. Conversation analysis theorizes that an utterance’s force as an action of a particular type derives from such placement (Heritage, 1984; Maynard & Clayman, 1991). Thus, rather than linguistic or social rules, it is sequential organization and the interaction between speakers and hearers that have primary analytic utility in describing utterances as action (Schegloff, 1991). Overall, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have affinities with the Wittgensteinian “form of life” approach to the mapping problem, in which actual, orderly linguistic practice (rule usage and sequence organization) is brought to the fore of analytic inquiry.

With its commitment to the study of naturally occurring talk, conversation analysis in particular aims to rebuild sociology as a natural observational science (Sacks, 1984, 1992) in three senses: (1) it is possible to formally describe social actions and activities, because (2) these actions and activities

are methodical occurrences, and (3) the methods by which a single action or activity is composed are generalizable to and reproducible in other situations. In pursuing the goal of studying talk and building a science of interaction, conversation analysts have generated a sizable research literature over the past 35 years (Clayman & Gill, 2012; Heritage, 1984; Sidnell & Stivers, 2012). Furthermore, conversation analysts have published on a wide variety of social psychological issues related to interaction. Many of these publications appear in other journals, but if we confine ourselves to *Social Psychological Quarterly*, these issues include relationship and ritual in relation to topical talk (Manning & Ray, 1993; Maynard & Zimmerman, 1984), doctor-patient communication (Gill, 1998; Heath, 1989; Lutfey & Maynard, 1998; Peräkylä, 1998; Stivers, 2007), epistemological orientations in ordinary as well as institutional settings of talk (Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Speer, 2012), and emotion displays (J. Whalen & Zimmerman, 1998; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006), among others (Hepburn & Potter, 2011; G. H. Lerner, 1996; Whitehead, 2009). In 1987, there was a special issue of *SPQ* on “Language and Social Interaction” (Maynard, 1987) that included topics such as single episode analysis (Schegloff, 1987), forgetfulness as a resource (C. Goodwin, 1987), the job interview as an interactional event (Button, 1987), and the organization of 911 calls for help (Whalen & Zimmerman, 1987).

In maintaining a commitment to examining naturally occurring social action, conversation analysis avoids treating language as a variable to be manipulated, tested, or related to other variables. We explore the implications of this stance in the next section. Here, the point is that conversation analysts’ major social scientific concern has been with endogenous (internally orderly) features of “talk-in-interaction” (Schegloff, 1991). The primary focus in conversation analysis is *sequence organization*. In the next section, we illustrate one form of this organization, while also identifying others.

Organization of Sequences: Adjacency Pairs

It is well established that conversational interaction occurs in a tightly ordered serial or (as mentioned) sequential fashion. Sequential structure is exemplified in the *adjacency pair*, a ubiquitous type of unit that includes such conversational objects as questions+answers, requests+grantings or refusals, invitations+acceptances or declinations, and many other such pairs. Characteristically, adjacency pairs are (1) two-utterances in length, (2) adjacent to one another, (3) produced by different speakers, (4) ordered as a first part and a second part, and (5) typed, so that a first part requires a particular kind of second part (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973).

Moreover, adjacency pairs are characterized by “conditional relevance”—conditional on the occurrence of an item in the first slot, or first pair-part (e.g., the question), the occurrence of an item in the second slot, or second pair-part (e.g., the answer to the question), is expected and required. When second pair parts do not occur, their absence is noticeable and treated as accountable by first speakers, who may then interpret the recipient as “ignoring” them, “snubbing” them, not hearing them, or otherwise resisting the their initial action. Importantly, it is the participants themselves that make inferences concerning these kinds of actions. Conversation analysts work secondarily with these participant-based inferences, insofar as they are displayed in the ongoing interaction.

Adjacency pairs can be expanded in three ways. One way is through an insertion sequence between first and second pair-parts of a basic sequence. With invitation sequences, for example, a recipient may need pertinent details before providing a reply (Schegloff, 1972, p. 78):

1. A:	Are you coming tonight?	[First pair part of base adjacency pair]
2. B:	Can I bring a guest?	[Insertion first part]
3. A:	Sure.	[Insertion second part]
4. B:	I’ll be there.	[Second pair part of base adjacency pair]

Here, the “base” sequence—an invitation (line 1) and its reply (line 4)—is separated by the insertion sequence at lines 2 and 3.

Two other ways of enlarging the adjacency pair involve “pre-” and “post-”expansions (Schegloff, 2007, p. 27), both of which are illustrated below. The base sequence includes the invitation and its acceptance at lines 3 and 4. A pre-invitation sequence occurs at lines 1 and 2, where A checks out B’s circumstances and B indicates a possible availability with a “go-ahead” signal. Other responses to a “pre” are a “blocking move” that forestalls the production of the base sequence, and a “hedging” move that is a kind of wait-and-see response.

1. A:	Whatcha doin’?	[Pre-Expansion]
2. B:	Not much	[Go-ahead signal]
3. A:	Ya wanna drink?	[First Pair Part of base adjacency pair]
4. B:	Yeah	[Second Pair Part of base adjacency pair]
5. A:	Okay	[Post-Expansion]

In this example, subsequent to the base sequence can be a post-expansion, which in this case is a “sequence closing third” (line 5). By doing closing, this move minimizes the post-expansion (which can be more extensive) and allows for movement to a next topic.

Other Kinds of Sequence Organization

Turn-Taking

Conversations may consist of a series of adjacency pairs and their expansions that also involve recurring transfer of speakership. The ordering of speaker change, as well as the size and content of a speaker’s turn, is not predetermined in ordinary conversation but instead is free to vary (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). Moreover, change of speakership is so tightly articulated that both gap and overlap are minimized (Lerner, 1989; Sacks et al., 1974; Emanuel A. Schegloff, 2000). Participants methodically allocate turns of talk through a set of ordered options, including current speaker selecting the next speaker, the next speaker self-selecting, or current speaker continuing to speak (Sacks et al. 1974). In coordinating exchange of speakership and tightly articulating sequences, participants who take a turn of talk are required to display their understandings of a previous speaker’s turn. Methodologically, this is considered a *proof procedure*: the second speaker’s turn serves as a resource by which the first speaker may check whether a turn was heard correctly. Moreover, the second speaker’s turn aids the analyst in characterizing the action of the first turn.

Repair Sequences

Given the elaborate and systematic organization of adjacency pair sequences and turn-taking, how are interactional troubles managed? That is, how do participants handle errors, mishearings, glitches in turn transition, problems of meaning, and the like? The answer is that there are ways of both initiating and accomplishing repair, including devices by which the turn-taking system itself is deployed to fix problems. For example, “if two parties find themselves talking at the same time, one of them will stop prematurely” (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 701), thereby permitting the other “current speaker” to talk in the clear. Dropping one’s own turn effectively enacts the practice of a current speaker selecting a next speaker, and ensures the “one speaker at a time” feature of conversation. The devices and sequences involved in repair organization are many and complex and are important resource for the preservation of mutual understanding and the achievement of intersubjectivity (Hayashi, Raymond, & Sidnell, 2013; Schegloff, 1992).

Overall Structural Organization

Single conversations can be said to have discrete aspects to their organization, such as openings, topical structure, and closings. One import of this is that an utterance may obtain its status as an action through its relation to this overall organization. When a caller, just after introducing herself to a call recipient, produces “Was Bryan home from school ill today?” its placement just there (after self-identification) helps inform the call recipient that this inquiry is the “reason for the call.” In general, overall structural organization has to do with how participants form an entire occasion of interaction from beginning to end. Analysis may involve how the placement of utterances and other embodied devices in this overall organization informs the construction and understanding of these devices as turns, adjacency pairs, and social actions (Schegloff, 2007, p. xiv).

Conversational Epistemics

Domains of sequencing (adjacency pairs, turn taking, repair, overall structural organization, and others) provide the basis for much of the vigorous research agenda in conversation analysis. A recent addition to this literature, although reaching back to discussions of “practical epistemology” (Whalen & Zimmerman, 1987) and related phenomena, has involved what is called “epistemics in action” (Heritage, 2012a) and the “epistemic engine” (Heritage, 2012b) of conversational interaction. In an early exploration of these topics, Heritage and Raymond (2005) show how, in doing “assessments” or evaluating social objects and experiences, speakers exhibit their epistemic stance or knowledgeable position regarding the object or experience. Consider this example (Heritage & Raymond, 2005, p. 30, simplified transcript):

Emma: How was your trip?
Lottie: Oh god wonderful Emma.
Emma: Oh isn't it beautiful down there?

As Heritage and Raymond (2005, p. 30) observe, Lottie is the most knowledgeable about her trip and her assessment (“Oh god wonderful”) reflects that direct knowledge, which Emma lacks. Emma, however, follows with an oh-prefaced negative interrogative (“Oh isn't it beautiful down there”), whose referent is the location rather than the trip and asserts Emma's own “generalized experience of Palm Springs rather than Lottie's more immediate experiences there.”

More than exhibiting epistemic positions, participants manage their rights to assess such objects and experiences according to their own states of knowledge. They do this management by way of what they say and how they say it in their turns as these occupy first or second position in assessment-type adjacency pair sequences. With regard to other kinds of action besides assessments, it is the case that access to knowledge or who has “primary epistemic status” may take precedence over syntax and intonation in forming such actions. A good example is the conveyance or requesting of information. Using declarative syntax (“Things have arrived from Barker and Stone House”) when one has primary access to the state of affairs suggests the conveyance of information. However, using the same kind of declarative syntax (“You're divorced currently”) when a recipient is the knowledgeable one, asks for confirmation (Heritage, 2012a, p. 8). An upshot of this line of research is that participants in conversation must monitor the distribution of knowledge between themselves and others as a condition of being competent interactants. It follows that professional analysis of conversational interaction also needs to pay attention to epistemic work going on in the construction of turns and actions.

Methodology in Conversation Analysis

Conversation analysis (CA) involves several methodological orientations: (1) analyzing utterances as actions, (2) engaging in sequential analysis, (3) analyzing participant orientations, (4) regarding interactional detail as a site of social organization, and (5) using both single and multiple episodes along with deviant cases for analyzing phenomena.

We have already discussed (1) how utterances perform actions, which is a tenet that cross-cuts the various perspectives on language use and social interaction. In everyday conduct, participants perform an immense variety of social actions that include informing, criticizing, insulting, complaining, giving advice, requesting, apologizing, joking, and so on. For CA, the crucial element in identifying actions and their interactional force is (2) sequential analysis, which includes features of turn-taking and adjacency pairs along with (3) the above-mentioned “proof procedure” whereby investigators discipline their characterization of actions by attention to a recipient’s displayed understanding of a speaker’s talk. (4) Transcription conventions developed by Jefferson (1983, 2004) depict silences and their duration, overlapping talk, sound stretches, emphasis and other such matters. These details are important to CA because they enter into and help constitute social actions. Once unique to CA, the transcription process and its capture of interactional detail have been adopted by discourse analysts and other investigators as well.

The CA perspective aims to develop claims about systematic structural organization in interaction. Such claims are supported by substantial accumulations of instances of a practice, each instance of which the investigator examines as an individual case. In fact, there can be analyses in which the analyst uses resources developed from past work to explicate a single episode of talk (Schegloff, 1987). A prominent methodological device is examining departures from an interactional regularity, or what is known as deviant case analysis, which allows researchers to validate empirical findings and discern larger patterns in which a practice helps achieve particular social actions. For example, in a study of diagnostic news about HIV infection, Maynard (2003) found a practice contrary to patterns documented in a variety of health care settings where clinicians, in delivering diagnostic findings, overwhelmingly work to shroud bad news and expose good news. In the HIV clinic, counselors often delivered the bad news of being HIV-positive as forthrightly as they presented the good news of HIV-negative status. In other words, rather than shrouding the bad news, they exposed it. Examining these deviant cases revealed that the counselors were attempting to “crack the emotional nut”—the often stoic way in which clients would receive bad news about HIV infection. The tactic was meant to prompt the discussion of what Peräkylä (1995) calls dreaded issues that are associated with HIV and AIDS by facilitating the flow of interaction between counselor and client.

Language Use, Action, and Social Structure

Thus far, we have concentrated on interaction, suggesting that social psychology benefits from understanding how parties use language in an immediate sense to perform joint endeavors of all sorts. Of course, as parties talk and gesture to one another, more than completely local interests and social organization may be at stake, and this means that questions regarding “social structure” come to the fore. Roughly following Zimmerman and Boden’s (1991) reflections on talk and social structure, we consider two main approaches to probing the interrelation of language, action, and social structure. First, we consider a macrodirectional approach in which facets of social structure are seen to affect patterns of language in use. Second, we consider a more dialectical approach in which there are reflexive relations between language use and social structure.

Macrodirectional Approach: Social Categories and Language Use

Investigators often see social structure as consisting of such forms as age, gender, class, and other socio-demographic categories—as well as culture, institutions, and complex organizations—which condition the use of language in specifiable ways. “In such a framework,” Zimmerman and Boden (1991, p. 5) remark, “talk and, indeed, all interaction of actual actors in social situations is seen as a product of those social forces.” This is the strategy in experimental and survey-based social psychology that examines how social structural arrangements condition language and social interaction, and emphasizes the relationship between social statuses or categories (e.g., race, gender, class, and age) and language.

Social Class

Perhaps the best known work in this area is that of Bernstein (1961, 1972), who proposed that middle and working-class children learn two very different linguistic “codes”—an “elaborated” and “restricted” code, respectively, with the features of each determined by the forms of social relations in different communities. Middle-class subcultures assert the primacy of the individual “I” over collective “we,” which results in an elaborated code characterized by flexible organization and a range of syntactic options. In contrast, in working-class communities the collective “we” is used over the “I,” and the result is a restricted, more rigid code with low levels of syntactic and vocabulary selection, and implicit rather than explicit meanings (Bernstein, 1972). These two class-based codes, Bernstein argues, help account for middle-class children’s success and working-class children’s lack of success in school.

Bernstein’s argument generated a vigorous response. The argument was related to the notion that, in the U.S., low-income African American children upon entering school were “culturally deprived” and capable of engaging only in “emotional cries” and a “non-logical mode of expressive behavior” (Bereiter, Engelman, Osborn, & Reidford, 1966, pp. 112–113). Portraying Bernstein’s as well as Bereiter and Engelmann’s (1966) analyses as deficit models, Labov (1972a) demonstrates that the “nonstandard English” spoken in U.S. African-American communities is not “restricted” in its flexibility or range of options for syntax or vocabulary and, in certain ways, exhibits impressive linguistic, social, and cultural complexity and competence on the part of the speakers. More recently, Goodwin (1990) shows how skilled urban African-American youth are in various linguistic activities (especially disputing) whereby they display and generate “character” and achieve localized social organization. Thus, Labov has argued that there is no relationship between language use or the “codes” employed in poor and working-class African-American communities and failure in school. Instead, “failure” may lay within the school as a social institution that does not adapt to the cultures of the diverse communities it serves. Controversy about whether linguistic repertoires represent “differences” or “deficits” continues (Baugh, 1999; J. Edwards, 1979; Giles & Robinson, 1990).

Gender

Studies of the relationship between language and social stratification are related to numerous comparisons of speech practice—based on cross-cultural, gender, and ethnic differences. Perhaps most prominent are investigations of linguistic divergences between women and men. Differences between men’s and women’s speech appear to be enough for Tannen (1990) to propose that males and females speak different “genderlects.” Early research suggested that women are more expressive in intonation; that they use more adjectives and intensifiers, including “so,” “such,” “quite,” “vastly,” and “more”; that they make more precise determinations of color (Key, 1972); that they employ more

fillers, such as “um” and “you know;” and that they more often use affectionate address terms, such as “dear,” “honey,” and “sweetie” (West & Zimmerman, 1985). As it turns out, when researchers examine these items as simple markers or indicators of female speech, only a few show any consistent patterning. Compared to men, women produce speech in phonetically more correct forms (Thorne & Henley, 1975) and vary their pitch and intonation more (West & Zimmerman). Also, there is evidence that females are more likely to interpret remarks indirectly rather than directly (Holtgraves, 1991), and that men may initiate more “unilateral” (as compared “collaborative”) topic changes in interaction (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1992; West & Garcia, 1988).

Whether there are distinct “genderlects” is controversial, however. Conversation analysts have “de-gendered” certain actions that are commonly thought to be distinctive to women or men (Speer & Stokoe, 2011a). The tradition of research concerned with asymmetries between men and women that was initiated by West and Zimmerman (1983), which found that men interrupt women more than the reverse in cross-sex conversations, has shown few consistent results (Aries, 1996; Kitzinger, 2008). Other status and power differences (Kollock, Blumstein, & Schwartz, 1985) as well as processes intrinsic to the interaction (Okamoto & Smith-Lovin, 2001), including participation rates and manner (topic-changing behavior) may overshadow a characteristic such as gender. In her detailed analysis of interruptions in mixed and same-sex conversations, Kitzinger (2008) found no evidence that males interrupt more often than females. Following Sacks et al. (1974), she reports that actions commonly coded as “interruptions” are simply instances where two incipient speakers begin to talk at the same time because they projected the grammatical and pragmatic completion of a turn. Moreover, where an action is in fact an interruption, it is often not done in a competitive way to prevent someone from completing a turn at talk, but rather is cooperative. For example, a listener may offer help in a word search in which a current speaker is engaged.

Similarly, investigators have contradicted a common claim that women use *tag questions*—where the speaker appends (“tags”) a question to the end of a declarative statement—more often than men (Lakoff, 1975). However, Potter and Hepburn (2011) show that, contrary to the belief that such questions make statements less assertive and more polite they can in fact be used in ways that are both coercive and invasive. For example, speakers can use tag-questions to propose that recipients know, or ought to already know something, and thereby predispose those recipients into a position that aligns with the speaker. Finally, in her analysis of mixed-sex meetings, Ford (2008) shows that contrary to the belief that men and women have different participation styles, both use the same strategies to assume and retain speakership.

Talk and Social Structure: Dialectics and Reflexivity

Dialectics

A dialectical approach to talk and social structure involves social structure as both the cause and outcome of spoken interaction. Language is the site of the production and reproduction of socio-demographic, cultural, institutional, and organizational forms characteristic of the overall society. It is therefore important to know both the local and broad context in which utterances occur, making it incumbent on the investigator to engage in ethnographic inquiry to complement the analysis of recorded speech. Indeed, there is considerable writing about the role of ethnography in studying talk, and Duneier and Molotch (1999) provide an excellent example as well as methodological discussion.⁶

⁶On conversation analysis and ethnography, also see Moerman (1988) and Maynard (2003: Chapter 3), among others.

The dialectical premise is central to cognitive sociology (Cicourel, 1981), informing the work of students of talk in such institutional settings as preschools (Corsaro, 1979, 1996), schools (McDermott, Gospodinoff, & Aron, 1978; Mehan, 1979; Phillips, 1982), universities (A. Grimshaw, 1989), doctor's offices or hospitals (Cicourel; Fisher, 1983; Silverman, 1987; Strong, 1979; Waitzkin, 1991) and courts (Danet, 1980; Molotch & Boden, 1985). As an example of this approach, Mehan (1991) argues that the "social facts" of school systems—including designations of disability and special needs—derive from the "practical work" of educators engaged in interaction with students, parents, and other professionals in a series of "microevents" that occur in the classroom, testing sessions, and meetings.

As another example of the dialectic approach, Corsaro (1992) develops an "interpretive" approach to childhood socialization, which challenges the view of socialization as a linear progression from the tabula rasa of infancy and childhood to full fledged adulthood, as if the individual only gradually and in an individualistic stage-like fashion becomes more competent and social over the course of years. Drawing on the classic works of Piaget and Vygotsky and adding more contemporary views of Bourdieu (1991) and Giddens (1991), Corsaro observes that children are from the outset embedded in social relations and networks (including those of peers) enabling them to discover and construct a meaningful existence. Thus, the social structural context in which children are embedded is important because it provides these relations and networks. However, children are not acted upon so much as they shape in their use of language and in social interaction the contours and structures of their everyday lives. The study of socialization, accordingly, demands close attention to children's lifeworlds as well as social structural contexts (Eder, 1995). The dialectical approach is compatible with the work of European theorists including not only Bourdieu and Giddens (1984), but also Habermas (1979) and others and their concerns with language, ideology, and social reproduction.

Reflexivity

A reflexive analysis of language use, action, and social structure sees the interaction order and the institutional order of formal organizations as having complex interrelationships not adequately described in causal—or even reciprocally causal—terms. The interaction order is comprised of mechanisms of turn taking and other sequential organizations, which provide the resources for producing and understanding what is being said and done in concert (Zimmerman & Boden, 1991). As Goffman (1983) pointed out, the interaction order and its constituent devices are basic or primordial in the sense of underlying, preceding, being organized independently of any social structural context in which talk occurs. Further, it is invariant with respect to historical and cultural variation, while nonetheless being sensitive to it.

If the interaction order is primordial in this sense, conversation analysts have shown the implications in various ways. One implication is that the fundamental organization of conversational turn taking may be different in institutional as compared with ordinary settings. Thus, where in ordinary conversation turn size, turn content, and turn order are free to vary and are subject to local management, in settings such as courtrooms (Atkinson & Drew, 1979), the jury deliberation (Manzo, 1996), classrooms (McHoul, 1978; Mehan, 1979), psychological testing (Marlaire & Maynard, 1990; Maynard & Marlaire, 1992), news interviews (Clayman & Heritage, 2002), clinical settings (Heritage & Maynard, 2006), and the survey interview (Maynard, Houtkoop-Steenstra, Schaeffer, & Zouwen, 2002), this is not the case. Attorneys, teachers, newscasters, clinicians, or survey interviewers ask questions, and witnesses, students, interviewees, patients, or respondents must answer. From these elemental observations, a wide range of consequences follow in regard to how professionals, in collaboration with lay and other participants, organize such actions as accusing and denying in the courtroom, teaching, testing, and showing learning ability in classrooms and diagnostic clinics, being "neutral" and expertly informative in the news interview, eliciting talk about delicate and sensitive personal matters in the medicine, or achieving the "standardization" of social measurement in the survey interview.

Race and Gender as Categories-in-Interaction

A reflexive approach to language, action, and social structure means understanding how sequential organization and other aspects of the interaction order can be deployed in ways that are sensitive to the contingencies and relevancies of a society's larger structures. In recent years, conversation analysts and discursive psychologists have devoted much attention to the interactional organization of social structural categories in everyday and institutional settings. Rather than look at correlations among category membership and social outcomes, or at the subject positions created by abstract discourses, this line of research focuses on how social categories are realized in concrete interactions, and with what consequences. Here, we review recent interactional research on two social categories that occupy a significant place in contemporary society: race and gender.

With respect to race, conversation analytic research (Whitehead, 2009; Whitehead & Lerner, 2009) has shown how racial categories are managed in everyday interaction. Because the invocation of race categories of which one is not a member could invite negative inferences about oneself—for example, that one is racist—participants use various strategies to deflect them when talking about race. In particular, they use formulations that refer to race in general, rather than a specific group; qualify racial references by implying or claiming that they are only relevant to the instance being discussed; and mention race as an afterthought about someone who has already been adequately described. Moreover, when using race to explain an event, speakers allude to it instead of mentioning it explicitly, leaving listeners to fill in the gaps through what is known in common about racial groups.

Other research, by Stokoe and Edwards (2007) and Buttny (1997) has examined how race categories are used in reports about absent third parties. For example, Stokoe and Edwards show how race is incorporated into complaints to mediators about troublesome neighbors, and how police and suspects deploy these racial categories in interrogations. Suspects use such categories to make counter-claims against alleged victims, while police use them to question suspects about the specifics of an offense. In these cases, participants use race and allegations of racism to amplify the egregiousness of a reported transgression. Such usage strengthens a speaker's focal action, such as complaining or accusing. Finally, Stivers and Majid (2007) examined the relationship between race and talk in medical interactions involving physicians, children, and parents. After coding physicians' practices for speaker selection—such as gaze and terms of address—they correlated these with socio-demographic variables, including race and educational attainment. With respect to race, they found that when a parent is black, or less educated and Latino, physicians are more likely to direct their questions to parents than children. In contrast with other correlation-based studies reviewed above, Stivers and Majid combine statistical analysis with a careful, systematic coding schema grounded in a conversation analytic examination of concrete, interactional practices.⁷

As with race, recent research on gender-in-interaction has examined how participants orient to, enact, and reproduce gender categories and norms in everyday interaction (Speer & Stokoe, 2011b). In line with path-breaking studies by Garfinkel (1967) and West and Zimmerman (1987), this line of research understands gender as an ongoing accomplishment, rather than a socio-structural attribute that people simply possess. People actively bring their actions into line with prevailing gender norms and expectations. In so doing, they reproduce taken-for-granted, commonsense beliefs and assumptions about what is "natural" for males and females, and hold one another accountable for violating them. For example, Land and Kitzinger (2011) show how participants produce gender as an interactional phenomenon by positioning themselves as members of one particular category—e.g., woman, as opposed any of the others from among which they could have selected, such as mother, daughter, friend, employee/employer, colleague, patient, etc. In this way, gender can be made relevant to, and

⁷A number of other researchers have begun to combine conversation analysis with statistical methods. See, for example, Heritage, Robinson, Elliott, Beckett, and Wilkes (2007), Maynard, Freese, and Schaeffer (2010), and Gibson (2010).

procedurally consequential for, the interaction underway (Kitzinger, 2005). Similarly, Speer and Parsons (2006) and Speer (2011) examine how transgender individuals who seek access to cross-sex hormones and ratification from their psychiatrists for sex reassignment surgery, provide evidence that other people perceive them as having attributes of the opposite sex. This evidence is inserted into the conversation by means of reported third-party compliments about their gender-relevant attributes (Speer, 2011, p. 157–158).

Other research has focused on the reproduction of commonsense gender norms and expectations. Stokoe (2008, 2011) shows how repair practices associated with word selection in everyday conversation—e.g., replacing the word “girl” with “woman” mid-sentence—is a pervasive way in which participants abide by and enforce gender norms in local interactions. In her analysis of police interrogations, Stokoe (2010) shows how suspects use gender to perform a particular action—denying an accusation—as well as how this trades on and reproduces normative beliefs about the proper way for males to treat females. Thus, male suspects construct themselves as particular kinds of men to refute allegations of criminal conduct. For example, in response to officers’ allegations, suspects will produce “category-based denials” in which they claim that they are “not the kind of men” who would hit women. Such denials partition men into two groups, those who hit women and those who do not, and locate suspects in the latter category.

Conclusion

Language is a primary medium of social behavior and, as such, deserves center stage in the panoply of social psychological topics. Indeed, other topics in social psychology, including exchange, bargaining, justice, socialization, deviance, health, ethnic relations, and collective behavior (to name a few) necessarily involve interactive speech processes, which makes language use perhaps the most basic of all social psychological phenomena. This is, we have argued, not so much because language is a vehicle of communication; rather, it is a resource for action and activity. One action humans sometimes perform is “communicating” information of various kinds, but this is one among many other activities, such as arguing, promising, requesting, apologizing, joking, and greeting.

Influenced by ordinary language philosophy, recognizing that words do not have stable dictionary or ostensive meanings, and that the “same” utterance has different interpretations according to its context of use, researchers oriented to language use wrestle with the basic question of how utterances perform or are mapped onto specifiable actions. Sociolinguistics and discourse analysis answer this question in one way by suggesting that some combination of linguistic and social rules link words and activities together. This answer comes close to the theoretical model provided by the speech act theory of Austin and Searle. Frame analysis also presumes some normative connection between utterances and actions, while giving freer rein to actors’ strategic calculations and decision making in regard to rule adherence as participants exhibit different stances in relation to the talk being produced. Finally, ethnomethodologists, conversation analysts, and discursive psychologists propose that in their ongoing conduct, participants themselves use rules in the service of performing various activities. Rules, therefore, are only one possible facet of the *practices* whereby actors order speech productions to accomplish and understand the active force of these utterances. This way of solving the “mapping problem” by attending to user practices is closer to Wittgenstein’s idea of language games.

Moreover, in the conversation analytic view, importance is attached to how actors combine their utterances in a sequenced fashion. That is, the sequential organization of talk-in-interaction is a “primordial site of social action,” which implies that this organization needs investigation and explication before the orderliness of conduct and action in institutional and other social structural arenas can be analyzed fully. This assertion implies a point of contact between conversation analysts and Goffman’s concern with the interaction order. Among sociolinguists, discourse analysts,

and cognitive sociologists, however, the argument is that participants' actions are not completely local in terms of either genesis or effect. It behooves the analyst to import the context or setting of talk ethnographically to analyze speech patterning and interactive order properly.

Overall, the understanding of spoken language has moved from the conduit metaphor to an "action" orientation (Heritage & Clayman, 2010), and ever more realms of language use related to social psychology are coming under the microscope and set an agenda for further study. Scholars (Hayashi et al., 2013; Kitzinger, 2012) are renewing the investigation of repair—or how participants correct errors in hearing, speaking, and understanding in achieving mutual understanding. Emotions and affect, which did not garner sociological attention until late in the twentieth century (Turner & Stets, 2006), are also now getting conversation analytic scrutiny (Peräkylä & Sorjonen, 2012; Ruusuvuori, 2012). Studies in clinics are deepening our understanding of doctor-patient communication not only in primary care medicine (Gill & Roberts, 2012; Heritage & Maynard, 2006; Stivers, 2007), but also in psychotherapy (Peräkylä, 2008) and other clinics, and in circumstances involving aphasia (C. Goodwin, 2003), autism (Maynard, 2005), and other disabilities (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2012). Morality as expressed in and through talk-in-interaction is a burgeoning area of research (Rawls, 2010; Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011; Turowetz & Maynard, 2010). As such studies attest, and as we noted at the outset of this chapter, language and its use are distinctively human and also complex. Nevertheless, recent and forthcoming developments demonstrate strongly that talk, text, and social interaction are eminently susceptible of scholarly investigation. Such investigation documents the orderliness and organization that inhere in language as participants use it in their everyday social and social psychological contexts.

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Chapter 10

Motivation, Motives, and Individual Agency

Alexis T. Franzese

Introduction

There has been a longstanding tension between individual agency and social motivation within the field of sociology. This tension is evident in research on motives and motivations, related but distinct constructs which will be explored within this chapter. In fact, the interest in exploring these tensions is evident in even the first issue of the landmark journal *Symbolic Interaction*. In an important article in that opening issue, Perinbanayagam (1977) proposes a theory of the relationship between actor and motives. The tension has not yet been resolved.

Much of the tension between individual agency and social motivation is rooted in a disciplinary confusion about what a motive is, and what constitutes motivation at the most basic level. Sociology has long neglected the ideas of both motivation and motive, at least in some ways (see for example, Bruce & Wallis, 1983; Campbell, 1996; Turner, 1987).¹ Those who argue for the importance of motives emphasize their importance in social behavior. “Motives, both avowed and imputed are an important type of social phenomenon to be explained, since they function as social instruments that enable the speaker to influence others” (Wilmoth, 1982, p. 244). Motives are distinct from rationales² in that motives are meanings for behavior and rationales are reasons or justifications (Serow, 1991). Rationales are more akin to vocabularies of motive, defined below.

The difference between motivation and motive is not precisely made within the field of sociology (see Smith & Preston, 1984 for discussion). *Motivation* is generally understood as the underlying reason for action, and *motive* as the specific reason for action and/or is sometimes used to describe the presented linguistic account. The phrase *vocabularies of motive* refers exclusively to the presented linguistic account. Motives may or may not reveal insights into motivation, and actors may or may not have the self-awareness to understand why they do what they do (Smith & Preston). For example, if a person experiences thirst and then drinks, thirst could arguably be a motive. If a person’s reason for responding to their feeling of thirst was a desire to respond to their needs broadly, this would be a motivation. If a person is asked why they drank and they say “I was thirsty” it is a vocabulary of motive. Or they might say “Everyone else was having a drink,” a vocabulary of motive that does not match their true motivation or their motive. Some have suggested that the neglect of motive is due to

¹ Some scholars argue that this is not problematic (e.g., Sharrock & Watson, 1984, see also 1986).

² Freudians might call the motive talk studied by those working with the vocabulary of motives tradition *rationalizations* (see Lindesmith & Strauss, 1975 for discussion).

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a preoccupation with the idea of motive talk and sociolinguistics as the expense of theoretical and empirical inquiry on Weberian subjectivity and meaning (Campbell, 1991). Stephens described the role of motives as “verbalizations learned in interaction that are integrated and elaborated into systematic vocabularies of intent and meaning” (Stephens, 1984, p. 245); it has been observed in literature reviews that motives are dynamic. Motives can conflict or compete with other motives; they can be complementary and can cooperate; they are dependent on context.

In the course of this chapter, the terms motives, motivation, and vocabularies of motive are all used. In the historical literature, the term motives was used to refer to what may now be called motivations, and efforts were made in this chapter to both acknowledge the terms used by prominent theorists and consider their work through the definitions used here. In cases in which this author is offering perspectives or interpretation, the distinction made between motive, vocabularies of motive, and motivation above will be employed. Vocabularies of motive are primarily discussed in a specific portion of this chapter that discusses applications of scholarship on motives.

Akin to the many understandings of motives and motivation, there is also disciplinary confusion regarding agency. The historic debate between agency and social structure has served to limit the development of a cohesive approach to agency across sociological social psychology. Although there is some consensus that agency is a general capacity for action, the temporality and depth of that capacity, as well as its inhibiting factors are debated. Hitlin and Elder synthesize the work on agency in their (2007) scholarship which defines four types of agency: *existential agency* (free will), *pragmatic agency* (agency in a given moment), *identity agency* (action related to role commitment), and *life course agency* (the ability to shape one’s life in the longer-term). These distinctions are relevant to understand motives as reasons for actions, vocabularies of motive as stated linguistic accounts, and motivation as the underlying reason and perhaps process for action. A sense of agency is critically connected to the process of motivation. Considering motivation as that which motivates illustrates the fact that an individual must feel that they have the capability for action (agency) in order to have underlying reasons for action (motivation). Agency then- in illusion or reality- can serve as a motivation. Agency can also serve as motive- a specific reason for specific action- in that individuals may do something because they can- because they gave the agency to do so. Finally, agency can be used as a vocabulary of motive; an individual might report that they did something just because they felt that they could.

The most profound factor limiting the advancement of the study of motive may be that the study of motive is constantly being redefined, and as such lacks an accumulation of knowledge that might otherwise advance an understanding of the topic (Berard, 1998). Motives have very different meanings across disciplinary boundaries. Within the field of sociology, motives refer to subjective meanings that people engaging in or observing action ascribe to that behavior. Vocabularies of motive refer to the linguistic accounts of those motives. Within the field of psychology, motives are used to denote the conscious or unconscious drives an individual may hold. Sociological social psychologists and particularly symbolic interactionists may argue that the psychological notion of motives is flawed in its denial of the extent to which drives are the product of social structure and socialization. The classic writings of sociology flesh out understandings of motives and offer insights into the symbolic and negotiated nature of motives (Mead, 1934). Motives are portrayed as the product of socialization (Parsons, 1940). The literature describes the extent to which motives are imputed on behavior (Weber, 1947), the notion of anticipated consequences of motives (Gerth & Mills, 1953), and the face work of assuring one is approved by others (Goffman, 1959). Review of the classical literature describes the ways individuals look within themselves for future and past actions with which motives can align (Schutz, 1967), and discusses the situational nature of motives (Burke, 1935, see also Burke, 1945, 1950). The most cohesive approach to the understanding of motive and the communication of motive has been that of C. Wright Mills, and as such, Mills’ framework will play a large role in this chapter.

This chapter has five main sections following this Introduction. In the next Part II, Non-Sociological Theories of Motivation, a brief review of theories of motivation and motive are provided. Part III includes a thorough presentation of C. Wright Mills’ (1940) vocabularies of motive. This section also

includes a review of social motivation as a construct and explores the role of individual agency and resistance in social motivation. In Part IV, specific motivations will be reviewed and consideration will be made of their effects on behavior. Part V returns to the topic of individual agency, considering displays of individual agency and the interplay between social structure and individual agency. Part VI discusses the symbiotic relationship between agency and structure and reviews directions for future theoretical and empirical work.

Non-sociological Theories of Motivation

There are many theories of social motivation, and most converge on the ideas that social motivation is evolutionarily adaptive, reflects a developmental process, and is contextually dependent. The study of motivation (the underlying reason for action) has historically been the foundation of later theories of motive and vocabularies of motive (specific reasons for action and the presented account of those reasons). Of course, motive and vocabularies of motive may align or differ, and both may align or differ with motivation.

Evolutionary Approaches to Motivation

An evolutionary approach to social motivation emphasizes the extent to which individuals engage in behaviors in order to gain resources that ultimately allow one access to propagating his or her genes (Park & Buunk, 2011). Scholars of motivation theory and research have spent considerable effort observing human needs or motivations and then considering what function those needs serve from an evolutionary standpoint. For example, under what circumstances does aggression occur and what functions does it serve evolutionarily? This view of motivation is evident in the expansive literature on aggression and violence, and also on sexual choices. David Buss, a scholar in both areas, considers for example, problems of social living for which aggression may have become an adaptive solution (Buss & Shackelford, 1997).

Similarly, this acknowledgement of the evolutionary development of forms of motivation is evident in the expansive literature that examines sexual behavior. For example, David Buss (1989) finds that cross-culturally males value reproductive capacity more than females, while females value resource acquisition in males. These differences carry evolutionary significance given the historical reliance on males to provide and on females to bear children as contribution to the family. This research supports the idea that our motivations- to seek a partner who can provide, to seek a partner who we can reproduce with- have evolutionary value and are shaped by forces outside of our individual preferences. More recent research by Buss (2009) goes beyond more commonly studied motivations like aggression and sex to understand evolutionary influences on personality and individual differences. Aggression and sexual behavior as motivations have evolutionary value in ensuring survival.

Economic/Rational Actor Approaches to Motivation

Economic approaches to motivation build on the concepts of exchange theory (Homans, 1961) and rational choice theory (Coleman, 1990). Rational choice theory posits that actors essentially function with an evaluation of the costs and benefits of given behavioral choices. Within this framework decisions are seen as rational processes and individuals are motivated by a desire to secure goods. There

are many challenges to these views. In addition to the concerns about the rationality of decisions, and the extent to which individuals have free will in their decision-making process, the theory rests on the underlying view that individuals are rational actors. What is expected to motivate a rational actor may not be transferrable to understanding what motivates an irrational actor (which most of us are).

This perspective is considered the foundation of Marxist approaches to exploitation. Marxian notions of motivation consider motivation (and motives) within a certain sphere- power and economics, which limits the scope of the Marxian approach to understanding motivation (and motives) (Mills, 1940). Imagine one who uses acceptable business motives in the home and relationship spheres, as Mills suggests they might. Expanding on Mills' suggestion, imagine a woman who returns home from her corporate job to inform her partner that the cost-benefit ratio of her plans for the evening suggests that she will not be engaging in a transaction (be it discussion, a walk) as they had planned. Thus, although economic and rational choice theories provide important insights about human motivation and certain conditions and in certain contexts, the views lack universality.

Psychological Approaches to Motivation

In perhaps the earliest psychological writings about motivation, William James, a pioneer in the field of psychology argued that instincts shaped behavior ([1890], 1981). This focus on instincts laid the groundwork for later psychological work on needs. In the wake of James' writings, Sigmund Freud was one of the earliest scholars to write about the needs of the self and the instincts and drives of the self (see Freud [1923], 1994, series 1953–1964). His psychoanalytic theory emphasized two basic drives, one for life and one for death and focused on the unconscious aspects of self. Although psychoanalytic theory provided a great contribution that has shaped the field, the Freudian approach to motives and motivation has a limited scope through its attention to the experience of “an upper bourgeois patriarchal group with strong sexual and individualistic orientation” (Mills, 1940, p. 912).

Henry Murray (1938), a founding father of the scientific study of motivation, conceptualized motivations as stable dispositional states- for example, motivation to belong, motivation to gain power, etc. Another psychologist who wrote about motivation, Clark Leonard Hull, explained processes of motivation using laws of behavior. Hull's view of motivation, much like Freud's, was centered on the idea of needs. According to his drive reduction theory (Hull, 1943), when organisms are deprived they experience needs that activate drives that in turn influence behavior. The purpose of behavior is to satiate needs in order to ensure survival.

In contrast to Murray's approach, psychologist Kurt Lewin (1951) saw motivation and motives differently. For Lewin, motivations were goal-directed forces that serve to support the individual's efforts to achieve certain goals; these can be activated by valued states and were conceived of as goal-directed forces within his framework. Lewin distinguished three factors as follows: ultimate goals, instrumental goals, and unintended consequences. *Ultimate goals* are essentially the ends- the desired state, while *instrumental goals* are the means- the steps to be taken to achieve the desired state. In this framework the ultimate goals define motives and each ultimate goal defines a different motive. The unintended consequences in Lewin's framework are the outcomes of actions that were, perhaps, unanticipated, but which were not motivating forces of those actions. Since consequences can be intended or unintended, and behavior can be unreliable, Lewin placed his emphasis on understanding the motives themselves.³ A key distinction between the writings of Murray and Lewin pertains to whether

³ Within the psychological literature, there has been debate about the extent to which measures of motivation may be reliable and valid (see Atkinson, Bongort & Price, 1977; Entwistle, 1972; Sorrentino & Short, 1977; Winter & Stewart, 1977).

there is a potentially endless list of motivating forces (which Lewin believed), or whether there is a core set of motives, as Murray professed (see Batson, Ahmad, & Stocks, 2011 for more comprehensive treatment of this topic).⁴ According to Murray (1938) the primary motives that shape human behavior are grouped into five categories: ambition needs, materialistic needs, power needs, affection needs, and information needs. Atkinson (1964) provides another early psychological account of motivation and emphasizes an individual's need for achievement, which is akin to ambition needs.

A review of psychological approaches to motivation must also mention the work of Abraham Maslow (1943, 1954, 1962). His canonical hierarchy of needs suggests that motivation to attain higher order achievements requires realization of more basic needs. For example, people must meet their physiological needs before addressing their safety needs, their safety needs before their needs for belongingness and love, their need for belongingness and love before their needs for esteem, and finally when all other needs are met, they can pursue self-actualization.

A psychological issue related to understanding motivation concerns the accuracy of self-perception. One may have the illusion that one is acting on an impulse because it serves the other, but in fact one is only acting on the impulse to the extent that it serves one's own goals. A historical example is illustrated by Bernard Mandeville (1714/1732) (as cited by Batson et al., 2011) in the case of an individual who saves a baby about to fall into a fire, not out of altruism to protect the baby ultimately, but to save oneself the agony of witnessing such a tragedy. A more modern example may be the parent who drives the child to a play date not out of a desire to serve the child in that moment, but out of the desire to have peace from a child's relentless requests.

Later psychologists built upon the early understandings of motivation. Since the writings of Murray, Lewin, and others, several middle-range theories of the self have been introduced, which have implications for understanding motivation (e.g., regulatory focus theory and self-discrepancy theory). These theories are targeted and testable and suggest that the self, which is malleable and dynamic, is itself a source of motivation. Other psychological work on specific needs has been performed and suggests that each need can motivate behavior. For example, there is an extensive literature describing how the need for social approval may be a specific form of motivation (e.g., Martin, 1984). Within the psychological social psychology tradition, research on self-regulation and self-monitoring has shed important insights into individual difference variables that motivate behavior. For example, empirical studies of self-monitoring provide insights into variations in the extent to which individuals monitor their own behavior, and the ways that people differentially respond to social cues. Low self-monitors are less sensitive to external influences than high self-monitors (e.g., Kulik & Taylor, 1981; Synder & Monson, 1975). However, much to sociologists' satisfaction, studies that distinguish between private and public self-consciousness behavior reveal that it is not only important to consider the influence of the individual's innate nature (i.e. high or low self-monitoring behavior), but also the influence of social context (see for example, Doherty & Schlenker, 1991; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990). This line of work has implications for understanding individual differences in motivation.

A desire for self-consistency, a desire for self-enhancement, and a desire for self-verification can also shape how an individual chooses to behave. Research spearheaded by William Swann examines the influence of self-conception on performance. This work reveals important insights for understanding agency and motivations. Early experimental work on self-consistency suggests that the self-consistency of data seem to be the predominant determinant of cognitive reactions to feedback about the self, while self-enhancing data appear to fuel affective reactions to feedback about the self (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). There are numerous nuances within this work that show how individuals are uniquely motivated- some by a desire to enhance their self view, others by a need to receive feedback that confirms their self view. Swann, Pelham, and Krull (1989) demonstrated that

⁴Murray is an example of a scholar who explicitly used the term motives to refer to what may now be considered motivations or motivators, as described in this chapter (broader, deeper, more general factors that serve to motivate).

whether people seek self-enhancing or self-verifying feedback depends more on whether the topic at hand represents one's positive attributes or negative attributes, than by self-esteem. Thus, in regards to seeking feedback, self-esteem can be less powerful than the motivations of enhancement and verification. Comparing the need for self-enhancing feedback with self-verification needs, Swann, La Ronde, and Hixon (1994), evaluated married and dating couples. The authors found support for their hypotheses that enhancement was most important for dating couples, whereas verification was most important for married couples. The authors suggest that marriage marks a movement from the need for self-enhancement to the need for self-verification which suggests that a critical life-course transition (marriage) can have an important influence on motivation.

Although research on self-verification comes primarily from psychological literature, a sociological article by Burke and Stets (1999) suggests that self-verification leads to trust and commitment in relationships. The authors posit that self-verification will lead to self-feelings, which are associated with trust, and that trust should be associated with commitment, emotional attachment, and group orientation. The authors find that, first, self-verification increases subjective commitment and emotional attachment indirectly through self-feelings and trust. Second, self-verification has a direct effect on behavioral measures of commitment and group orientation. Subjective commitment addresses how subjects say they would act and behavioral commitment addresses reports of how they do indeed act. The authors take these findings to suggest tentatively that two types of processes may occur in relationships, "one based on trust and emotional responses, the other on information and cognitive processes" (p. 361). This study, like Swann's research, reveals the intricate nature of the construction of self, and the complexities behind behavioral choices.

Psychologists have also enhanced the understanding of motivation through attention to whether a task is intrinsically or extrinsically rewarded. This scholarship indicates the interactions between the types of rewards and the types of motivations, and the influence of these complexities on investment and performance in tasks (see the edited volume by Sansone & Harackiewicz, 2000 on this topic). Finally, a notable contribution of the psychological literature on motivation and motives is attention to a life course approach. For example, Carstensen (1998) distinguishes two classes of social motivations ("motives"); needs to acquire information about self and world, and needs for emotional gratification. Carstensen argues that these motives follow distinct developmental trajectories over the life course.

Sociological Theories of Motivation

Within the sociological literature, there has been little consideration paid to the fit between the needs of the self, which may shape behavior, and social expectations. Despite the important contributions of many working within the symbolic interactionist tradition, this topic has been largely overlooked; however, Erving Goffman paid some attention to this issue (e.g., Goffman, 1959). Goffman's work suggests that there is a self to be monitored and filtered in human interaction. "combined rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that a person tends to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants" (Goffman, 1967, p. 11). Individuals naturally move between sincere and cynical performances (Goffman). A sincere performance is one in which individuals feel a sense of belief in their own performance, and a cynical performance is one in which the individuals have a level of self-knowledge that they are putting on a front. Goffman's work speaks to the complexities of behavior in which individuals are faced with both their own self-perceptions and interactions with others. Using Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor, the terms front region and back region are used to distinguish how individuals present a manufactured social reality to the observer. The term dramaturgical is used to describe Goffman's framework because Goffman's ideas map social interaction onto the metaphor of the stage. An exemplar of the SI

tradition, Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor was novel in its de-construction of the components of social interaction, and focus on the process of social interaction; "In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the conception we have formed of ourselves—the role we are striving to live up to—this mask is our truer self, the self we would like to be." (1959, p. 19). Acknowledging, however, that there may be a distinction between what we verbalize and what we desire (between vocabularies of motive and motives themselves), Goffman named the behaviors we engage in privately as *secret consumption*. He states, "When a performer guides his private activity in accordance with incorporated moral standards, he may associate these standards with a reference group of some kind, thus creating a non-present audience for his activity" (1959, p. 81). It is this reference group- which can be real or perceived- that is relevant to understanding vocabularies of motive.

Mills' Vocabularies of Motive

Within the field of sociology, the most-well known theory of motives is that of C. Wright Mills (1940) on what he deemed vocabularies of motive. It should be noted explicitly that Mills' treatment of motives is not a theory of motivation. It is not concerned with what basic needs or drives encourage human action, but rather the constructed language and vocabulary that is considered an acceptable reason for a given behavior. In this way the theory supersedes the question of why we actually do things, with attention to the socially acceptable reasons for why we do things, which in turn limit and impose possibilities of acceptable action. Mills fashions his theory as consistent with both Mead and Weber through its acknowledgement of an external and social approach to conduct, and its attention to imposed meaning, respectively. His work has also been described as an outgrowth of Dewey and Weber with its view of motives as forward-looking and functional through the meaning they give to behavior (Stephens, 1984). Mills' work explores the idea that the roles put forth by institutions shape the ways that people choose to express why they are doing something.

There are a number of points to be understood about Mills' vocabularies of motive. First, motives must be socially acceptable to both the actor and to others- they must be legitimate. A motive must not leave the actor or observer questioning. Second, vocabularies of motive are situationally dependent- they vary according to both culture and context. Vocabularies of motive are determined by "each man's dominant group about whose opinion he cares"⁵ (1940, p. 910) Vocabularies of motives exist in "historic epochs and specified situations" (Mills, 1940, p. 913). "Motives are of no value apart from the delimited social situations for which they are the appropriate vocabularies" (Mills, 1940, p. 913). For example, caring for an ailing parent may be received as a more acceptable motive for a Chinese business woman who misses a week of work than it would be for a businesswoman in the United States. However, it may be completely unavailable as an acceptable motive for a businesswoman from either country to miss a week of work during a hostile takeover. In addition, the extent to which caring for an ailing parent may be acceptable may depend on gender norms within a culture and cultural perspectives about work and home. In addition, if the individual woman- regardless of culture- cares only what she thinks of herself, or only what her employer thinks, or only what her ailing parent may think of her, her behavior may deviate from the expectations of the other two referents. Third, vocabularies of motive have anticipatory influence. Prior to initiating a behavior, an actor may consider how a behavior would fit in within existing vocabularies of motive. If the behavior cannot be rectified

⁵However, it should be noted that some individuals regulate their behavior according to their current dominant group and others to their aspirational group. Individuals who regulate to aspirational vocabularies may be ostracized within their current group.

within this framework than the actor may choose not to engage in the behavior.⁶ As Mills notes, vocabularies of motive serve as social control, a form of Mead's generalized other, referring to the individual's sense of the beliefs and actions of those surrounding him or her (see Mead, 1934). Fourth, while an initial motive may drive behavior, individuals may adopt a second motive as they continue to engage in a behavior, and this adopted motive may become the socially-voiced motive. Fifth, motives can serve as "strategies of action" (Mills, 1940, p. 907) when socially-relevant. In this way vocabularies of motive can serve to shape other people's behavior. Sixth, people influence others by imputing their motives. People make evaluations based on shared vocabularies of motives about whether an individual was acting within acceptable reason. At the minimum people ask if somebody had good intentions. Expanding on Mills' idea, people also sanction others when their behavior deviates from accepted vocabularies of motive.

From where do these vocabularies of motive originate? According to Mills' theory, people are socialized to vocabularies of motive. The earliest socializing agent is family, and individuals later internalize these vocabularies. People learn as children what language and justifications can account for others' and their own actions, in addition to learning what is deemed acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Mills also suggests, drawing on the work of Weber, that motives are tied to socioeconomic status- that they vary according to education and occupation. For example, the acceptable continuum of motives for alcohol consumption would be quite different for a janitor as compared to an advertising executive. Advertising executives can explain their alcohol consumption by claiming it helps them deal with their long hours and creative work. This explanation would not work for a janitor. A janitor's alcohol use will be considered acceptable if it is thought to be a coping mechanism for having a less socially desirable occupation. In addition, the alcohol consumption of the janitor will be questioned as it fits with other variables (marital status, parental status), whereas the alcohol use of the advertising executive may not be scrutinized in the same way. Motives are learned and are inherently connected to people's work roles, as Weber suggests.

In his framework, Mills is not concerned with the sincerity of pronounced motives but rather their social function. However, enacting a motive "will often induce a man to become what at first he merely sought to appear" (1940, p. 908). Aligning with the adage "fake it till you make it," when we play a role it can be internalized into self. Similarly, Mills addresses the debate regarding real motives versus presented motives (see Taylor, 1979 for review, see Nisbett & Wilson's classic 1977 paper for consideration of whether what people say is accurate). He concludes that this debate is futile as both would be inferred from the same source, language, and reflect similar processes. "The quest for the 'real motive' a person's verbalization expresses presumes some metaphysical, internal state of the organism that must be inferred. The relation of the avowed motive to the 'real motive' amounts to establishing the sincerity of the speaker" (Wilmoth, 1982, p. 246).

Reactions to Mills' Vocabulary of Motives and Expansions of Mills' Framework

In the years since Mills' seminal publication, many scholars have expanded upon his original framework. An early criticism of Mills' (1940) vocabulary of motives was that it did not address the discrepancy between verbalizations and behaviors- between what one says, does, and ultimately who one is; Foote (1951) suggested that the idea of identity needed to be integrated into Mills' framework

⁶Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (1957) addresses the feelings individuals have when their behaviors do not align with their values or beliefs. In Festinger's framework values are self-imposed. Mills' vocabularies of motive concerns the influence of the Meadian concept of the generalized other (Mead, 1934, see Murphy, 2004 for discussion of Mead's influence on Mills). Cognitive dissonance may also result when one cannot generate an acceptable motive for a desired behavior.

Table 10.1 Scott and Lyman’s (1968) typology of justifications and excuses

Justifications (6)	Excuses (4)
Denial of injury (Sykes & Matza, 1957)	Appeal to accidents
Denial of the victim (Sykes & Matza, 1957)	Appeal to defeasibility
Condemnation of the condemners (Sykes & Matza, 1957)	Appeal to biological drives
Appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957)	Scapegoating
Sad tale	
Self-fulfillment	

in order to resolve this discrepancy. Yet, in the years following Foote’s suggestion, and perhaps to date, identity continues to be neglected. Later, Sykes and Matza (1957) contributed to this literature. Although Sykes and Matza did not mention Mills or his vocabulary of motives, they advanced the understanding of the motive talk component of Mills’ framework in their concept of techniques of neutralization. They present a typology of five mechanisms through which individuals justify their deviant behavior. These include the denial of responsibility, the denial of injury, the denial of the victim, the condemnation of the condemners, and the appeal to higher loyalties. While acknowledging the utility of these justifications for deviant behavior in protecting self and maintaining social order, Sykes and Matza acknowledge that they do not entirely block the actor from his or her own self-judgments as well as from the reactions of others.

Acknowledging the influence of Mills (1940), Scott and Lyman’s (1968) article on accounts has driven much of the empirical research purporting to assess Mills’ vocabulary of motives. Noting that accounts have a “family resemblance” to motives (as defined by Weber), Scott and Lyman (1968, p. 46) are credited with first introducing the idea of an account, which addresses vocabularies of motive after a negative⁷ act has occurred. More specifically, they define an *account* as “a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to valuatve inquiry” (1968, p. 46). Their work brings attention to the content of the motives in the form of accounts. Accounts include justifications and excuses- the former involves responsibility for an act that was not ‘wrong,’ the latter denies full responsibility but admits wrongdoing (Scott & Lyman).⁸ Scott and Lyman’s work (1968, 1970) has been described as pertaining exclusively to the analysis of accounts in deviant behavior (Stephens, 1984). In addition, although many of the more recent studies pertaining to motive acknowledge the critical work of Scott and Lyman (1968), as well as the foundational of work of Mills (1940), it is interesting to note that the research of Blumstein et al. (1974) on the extent to which accounts are honored does not mention Mills at all. This omission is an early indicator of the narrowing of Mills’ original conceptualization of motive, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Table 10.1 presents a summary of the typology of justifications and excuses documented by Scott and Lyman (1968).

For Scott and Lyman, an account is illegitimate when its severity is too great for the event or when the account’s vocabulary of motives is not accepted (due to context, which can be considered as social, cultural, and historical). Buttny (1985) later extends the research on accounts by looking at how accounts dynamically change meanings of events.

Blum and McHugh (1971) expand on Mills’ work by attending to the interactional nature of motives and the way in which motives are socially produced and show an awareness of the normative and dominant social system. They review the ways in which motives have historically been treated in sociology (as causal antecedent variables, as states of individuals, as talk) and describe the limitations of those

⁷Within the literature of the time, there was an emphasis on understanding motives and motivation pertaining exclusively to negative or deviant behaviors.

⁸Terms are not offered for conditions in which full responsibility is taken and the act is deemed wrong, as well as times when no responsibility is taken and the act is not deemed wrong.

approaches. They offer conclusions about the nature of motives: First, they are set by observers, second, actor and observer are aware of them, third, they have a language, and finally, they are embodied in personhood and behavior.

The next step in the area of vocabularies of motive came in Hewitt and Stokes' work on disclaimers⁹ (1975). Hewitt and Stokes offered the term *disclaimer* to refer to vocabularies of motive used to explain negative behavior before it has occurred. Disclaimers are unique from accounts due to their emphasis on preemptive accounts for action. Hewitt and Stokes offer a five part typology which includes hedging, credentialing, sin licenses, cognitive disclaimers, and appeals for suspension of judgment

An additional contribution of Hewitt and Stokes (1975) was the introduction of the concept *aligning actions*, used to refer to behavior performed to preemptively or in post hoc fashion, account for atypical behavior. Stokes and Hewitt (1976) described strategies used by actors to make one's behavior socially and culturally acceptable. Culture in this sense is referring to normative expectations. These efforts to make behavior align with culture come in the form of Mills' (1940) vocabulary of motives, as one example- specifically motive talk. But it should be noted that Stokes and Hewitt explicitly note that it is not their purpose to produce a typology of modes of aligning action.

Hewitt and Stokes (1975) and Stokes and Hewitt (1976) consider the process through which actors preemptively consider acceptable vocabularies of motive. This process of consideration, and ultimately selection, reflects a decision-making process that ultimately determines whether the actor carries out the behavior (Perinbanayagam, 1977). This preemptive consideration largely has been overlooked by sociologists (Campbell, 1996). Perinbanayagam notes this perspective- that behavior is in fact meditated, and as such does not acknowledge needs or drives as historically emphasized in the psychological literature, goes against the theories of motivation that have dominated social science. Challengers to this theory (e.g., Dewey, 1922, Peters, 1958, and Burke, 1936,¹⁰ 1945, 1950, according to Perinbanayagam) argue that "Even a human who mysteriously feels a drive within him however, must take steps to mobilize the culturally and socially relevant vocabularies to proceed to the next step" (Perinbanayagam, 1977, p. 105). In making these decisions, actors consider both factual and value premises (Simon, 1960) and decision makers carry both responsibility and accountability (Perinbanayagam, 1977).

Writing around the same time as Hewitt and Stokes, Lindesmith and Strauss' (1975) emphasize the extent to which motives are learned and that people only have access to motives that have been learned. Purpose is synonymous with motives and we make statements of purpose to ourselves and others (Lindesmith & Strauss). Although they disregard the idea of motives as solely an explanatory concept or as causes of behavior, Lindesmith and Strauss acknowledge the persisting value of knowing the purposes that drive action. The ways actors construct their own purposes and assess each other's purposes are crucial components of interaction (Lindesmith & Strauss). Table 10.2 summarizes the differences between motives and causation described by Lindesmith and Strauss.

An important contribution made by Lindesmith & Strauss' work is support for the idea that "people and groups may do the same things for different reasons and different things for the same reason" (1975, p. 158). This realization is coupled with the view that "There is almost always a tendency to explain other people's behavior in terms of one's own vocabulary of motives" (Lindesmith & Strauss, 1975, p. 160). Much like humans have a tendency to anthropomorphize animal behavior, people look at other actors through their own lenses. Lindesmith and Strauss address the implications of this for understanding historical events, and the requirement to understand the historical and cultural conditions that facilitated a certain vocabulary of motives that may now be outmoded.

⁹The extent to which the term disclaimers has been incorporated into popular jargon should be noted. In American culture individuals will commonly use the term disclaimer as they prepare to state information.

¹⁰Burke's (1935) *Permanence and Change*.

Table 10.2 The distinction between motive and cause (Lindesmith & Strauss, 1975)

Motive	Causation
Forward reference in time	Backward reference in time
Concerned with purpose of acts	Concerned with classes of events
Concerned with anticipated consequences of acts	Concerned with antecedent conditions
Personal and private	General and public
Includes the concepts of force and needs	Does not include the concepts of force and needs

Franzese: Motivation , Motives, and Individual Agency




Fig. 10.1 Summary of the role selection process (Zurcher, 1979. Reproduced with permission from John Wiley and Sons, publishers of the journal *Symbolic Interaction*)

Several years later, there was an effort to consider the influence of internalized vocabulary of motives within the process of role selection. The question of whether our roles meet our vocabularies of motive is explored in this work by Zurcher (1979). Figure 10.1 displays this process as originally presented by Zurcher in his 1979 publication.

The theoretical work conducted during this time period yielded important conclusions about the utility of Mills’ vocabularies of motive. First, Mills’ work focused on what transpires when motives are vocalized. Motives are deeper and broader than vocalizations of motives. The work of this time also indicated that motives and accounts communicate information to both self and others. “Motives and account can be used to justify one’s actions to others, but they also can be used to justify one’s proposed course of action to oneself” (Buttny, 1987, p. 127). An example of the cultural and historical specificity of motives comes from Buttny who writes “For instance, ‘marrying for love’ counts as an acceptable motive for marriage in middle-class North American society; but in parts of India, such motives may be viewed with suspicion, being considered a kind of temporary madness which interferes with appropriate mate selection” (pp. 127–128).

Campbell argues that while Mills’ language explicitly notes that social roles drive motives, motive vocabularies are also inherently connected to who people are- their character, beyond mere socialization. As individuals with competing status sets, it is the person- the unique combination of roles and statuses, who must choose from competing vocabularies of motive. “Although motive vocabularies are indeed tied to roles and statuses, their use relates to the problems that people encounter as a consequence of multiple role occupancy, in other words, as individuals” (Campbell, 1991, p. 93).

The ways in which individuals resolve motive demands had been largely overlooked prior to Campbell’s analysis. In situations with competing motives, “individuals resolve the problem in terms

of who they are (or consider themselves to be)” (Campbell, 1991, p. 93). This is a process of identity construction and identity negotiation. The concept of character has been suggested by Campbell as the answer to the dilemma for how individuals resolve discrepant motives. Defined as “the name for the entity that individuals consciously strive to create out of the raw materials of their personhood,” *character* is distinct from *personality*, but also transcends being the product of socialization or culture alone (Campbell, 1991, p. 93). Distinct from *personality*, which may refer to both willed and more intuitive or responsive behavior, *character* refers to willed behavior alone, behavior that the person must be responsible for and as such is more ethical in nature than *personality* (Campbell).¹¹ When considering courses of action, individuals impute meaning to action which in turn makes that action indicative and evidential of a certain type of character that people wish to convince themselves (and others) that they possess. Campbell is quick to note however, that these efforts to present a certain self are not concerned with impressing others as Goffman may have argued in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Rather, Campbell argues that behavior is performed to convince oneself that one is a certain kind of person, and while impressing others may be a means to that end, it is not the end itself. An additional critique of Goffman comes in Campbell’s statement that the dramaturgical framework disallows an integrated view of behavior, instead parsing behavior into discrete acts. Further, Campbell notes “a Goffmanesque perspective does not help to explain how people conduct themselves when not subject to scrutiny by others. Once, however, one recognizes that action governed by character considerations is primarily self-directed, it becomes possible to include private and covert conduct in the explanatory scheme” (Campbell, 1991, p. 95). This logic seems flawed, however, in that it could be argued that people are always subject to the scrutiny of others through the sociological principle of real and imagined others.

In sum, Campbell advocates for a revival of Mills’ approach, but with an emphasis on broader vocabularies of motives rather than narrowly on motive talk, and with attention to vocabularies of character that drive and reflect motives. Since Campbell’s (1991) publication the empirical analysis of motive continued along the trend he identified (motive talk). The importance of reevaluating the concept of motive has since been put forth by others (e.g., Berard, 1998), and the importance of distinguishing whether vocabularies reflect true reasons or if they are being presented to influence others- the persuasive effects of vocabularies of motive- have been identified as priorities for this line of research (see Hopper, 1993).

Research Utilizing Mills’ Vocabulary of Motives

Mills’ vocabulary of motives has received attention across disciplinary boundaries and in a number of interesting applications. A literature review reveals more than 50 articles spanning the years 1968–2011, which could be considered as applications of Mills’ (1940) framework. These articles appear in sociological journals including *The Sociological Quarterly*, *Sociological Perspectives*, *Social Problems* and *Symbolic Interaction*, as well as journals from other disciplines such as *Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior*, *Semiotica*, *Law & Society Review*, *Communication Quarterly*, *Social Science & Medicine*, and *Journal of Vacation Marketing*. The empirical and theoretical literature that

¹¹This framework of character addresses not only the individual’s actual self, but their aspirational or ideal self. Two frameworks in psychological social psychology also acknowledge the extent to which an alternate and specifically a desired, aspirational, ideal self can shape behavior. The first is Hazel and Markus’ theory of possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986, see also Markus & Nurius, 1987) which addresses positive and negative possible selves. The second, and perhaps more relevant, is self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) acknowledges the distinct existence of aspects of self: the ideal (who one would like to be), the actual (who one is), and the ought (who one should be).

has unfolded since Mills' seminal publication has focused more heavily on motives for past acts rather than future acts (Murphy, 2004). The literature review that follows provides an extensive sampling of the type of empirical work being done in this area. The articles reviewed here have been classified into three categories: vocabularies of motive applied to deviance, vocabularies of motive in relationships, and vocabularies of motive in social movements. These articles were selected for the extent to which they illustrate an important point about the vocabularies of motive scholarship.

Vocabularies of Motive in Deviance

Research on vocabularies of motive has most often focused on the topic of deviance. Forms of deviance explored in this literature include behaviors that are benign but against the rules (absences from class, choosing not to breastfeed, use of pornography), those that are considered socially non-normative and may be illegal (e.g., steroid and drug use, wildlife poaching), as well as behaviors that are in complete violation of social norms and law (e.g., rape and murder). Reviewing a sample of this literature provides important insights into how motive is defined and measured, and reflects the debate within the broader literature.

Examining the most benign class of behaviors that are considered deviance reveals important insights about motives. Kalab (1987) sought to understand the explanations students provide for class absences. The research design required students to submit written documentation of the reason for their absence. Results revealed that the overwhelming majority of students provided excuses rather than justifications. That is, their notes indicated an understanding that the absence was inappropriate, but also included information suggesting that it was unavoidable- these included sickness and/or the need for sleep for health, having commitments to other groups (e.g. sports teams), oversleeping, other class-work, and accidents. The small number of students who provided justifications suggested, through their notes, some sense of responsibility for the absence, but that their absences ultimately were in the greater good of society. Justifications included ill relatives, the need to attend the funeral of a family member or friend, and less frequently, to serve family or friends in need of help.

Also, studying atypical, but legal behavior, Murphy (2004) explored whether individuals who have more elaborate anticipatory accounts of the possibility of their engaging in a behavior that they would prefer not to engage in are in fact more likely to engage in that deviant behavior. The study examined the accounts and behaviors of women who expressed a desire to breastfeed, and so abandoning that behavior is considered a negative or untoward behavior.¹² Murphy found evidence of both justifications and excuses as well as support for the hypothesis that women providing more elaborate anticipatory accounts were more likely to discontinue breastfeeding at earlier time points.

A review of literature on vocabularies of motive applied to behaviors that are considered more deviant reveals that issues of identity come into play. Weinstein's (1980) analysis of accounts of illicit drug use applies the excuses and justifications identified in the Scott and Lyman (1968) typology to understanding drug-use behaviors. Weinstein documented the six excuses and eight justifications described in Scott and Lyman's work. However, Weinstein's work goes further by specifying the different situational contexts in which accounts of drug use may occur: intimate situations, casual situations, consultative situations, and formal situations. Mechanisms to avoid having to account for one's drug-using behavior were also identified. One of these, concealment, also appeared in Scott and Lyman's work. The two new techniques identified were *identity switching*, in which the actor essentially tries to act as if they are not the person engaging in the deviant act. The other new technique identified, *transcendence*, occurs when the actor invokes an air of superiority almost to communicate

¹²It is not being suggested that non-breastfeeding is deviant. However, the study is being included under the subheading of deviance because it concerns a behavior that (at least by the study participants) is considered less preferable.

that it is not necessary for them to even have to explain their behavior. Alternatively, the actor may attempt to create an impression that the behavior in question is actually normative. This study uniquely brings attention to the tension that exists between individual agency and social norms. Of course, the extent to which an account is deemed reasonable by the observer as compared to unreasonable also matters (Scott and Lyman, 1968). Within this framework, the status of the actor is important and those with higher statuses are less susceptible to scrutiny of their accounts (Weinstein, 1980). Occupational role of the observer can also influence the extent to which the account is accepted (Weinstein, 1980). Situational context matters too: certain accounts that may pass in a casual social setting may be unacceptable within a courtroom (Weinstein, 1980).¹³

Identity issues were also important in Smith and Preston's (1984) analyses of gambling behavior.¹⁴ Their study inquired about 11 different potential motives for gambling that were identified based on a thorough review of the interdisciplinary literature on gambling. Notably, the study also asked respondents (who had already admitted to gambling behavior) about their sense of identity. Forty-two percent of respondents described themselves as "nongambler" which is inconsistent with their behavioral reports, the authors consider this an effort of neutralization of a stigmatized identity. Yet, issues of identity are also at stake in situations people may not consider as deviant. For example, May's (2008) study examined mothers' presentations of self in written narratives, and how women who faced competing demands of self and children described themselves in ways that allowed them to save face.

Monaghan (2002) examines the vocabularies of motive used by bodybuilders to account for illicit steroid use. Bodybuilders who use illicit steroids predominantly justify rather than excuse their actions. The justifications that they provide can be grouped into three classes including, the idea that the use is legitimate as a form of self-enhancement and means to an end, that people who object to it are inherently judgmental, and that there is really no harm to self or others in their use. This study illustrates the ways in which individuals construct justifications and how they rationalize their actions. Justifications may hold for less severe forms of deviance as this, but may be rejected by others for more extreme acts.

Studies of vocabularies of motive with regard to more severe and universally sanctioned behaviors (e.g., rape) indicate that individuals create accounts that allow them to hold themselves in a certain view, and that at a larger societal level, acceptable motives can be manipulated to facilitate otherwise inappropriate behavior. Jackson (1978) considers sexual behavior not as expression of inner drives (in any kind of Freudian way), but rather as behavior that is limited and structured by a vocabulary of motives. Within this framework, individuals evaluate situations in terms of their appropriateness for sexual behavior before actually behaving sexually. Jackson argues that the scripts that govern typical sexual behavior can be used by rapist to justify his actions. For example, Jackson argues that it is part of sexual script that men be dominant and women be passive in sexual acts. Combined with a popularized sexual script that suggests that male sexual desire must be quenched, the groundwork of rape has been laid. Jackson argues that subscribing to this belief in the urgency of male desire provides male rapists with a vocabulary of motive in which he can deny responsibility for his behavior. Jackson goes as far as to state "It may not be that rape is forced seduction but that seduction is a subtler form of rape" (Jackson, 1978, p. 32).

In a later study applying the vocabularies of motive framework to rape, Scully and Marolla (1984) examined the excuses and justifications used to explain the act of rape by convicted and incarcerated rapists. Notably, 83 % of the incarcerated rapists conceptualized themselves as non-rapists. Justifications were largely employed by those who denounced the rapist identity, while excuses were put forth by those who admitted to the rapist identity. Men who justified their acts used five frameworks; describing women as seductresses, the notion that women may say no but actually mean yes,

¹³See also Weinstein (1976) for addition analysis related to vocabulary of motives and substance use.

¹⁴See also Oldman's (1978) research on vocabularies of motive and gambling.

that women enjoyed the act, that nice girls don't get raped or women were 'asking for it,' or, that what they did was a minor wrongdoing, but not rape. The men who excused their rape used three sets of explanatory motives: that alcohol and/or drugs fueled their behavior, that they have emotional problems, or they are "a nice guy" that had a slip. Other work by Scully (1988) provides insights into the perceptions rapists hold of themselves and other and similarly demonstrates the profound influence of accounts in shaping self-identity.¹⁵

Other work examines motives that are presented in media or culture as opposed to motives expressed by individuals to explain their own actions. It is of importance to note that the motives presented in culture/media are made available to individuals and in turn may shape available individual motives. Stephens' (1984) work suggests the inherently social nature of acceptable reasons and the shared nature of acceptable motives, even for such a controversial act as suicide. The research of Gecas (1972) expanded the scholarship on vocabularies of motive by examining motives and aggressive acts in popular fiction spanning 1925–1965, rather than individual behavior. Wilmoth (1982) continued this tradition examining the vocabularies of motive of pornography (a social media) and not the vocabularies of individual users of pornography. Other scholars have continued in the trend of considering vocabularies used by social institutions.

This literature suggests many important insights. First, environments may make otherwise unacceptable behaviors more acceptable (e.g., Jackson, 1978). Second, the ways in which identity is at stake in motive (Weinstein, 1980) are illustrated by the studies. People take actions to save face to themselves and to others (e.g., May, 2008). The concept of a *spoiled identity* (Goffman, 1963; May, 2008) is akin to McCaghy's (1968) concept of *deviance disavowal*, and both concern the need for an individual to re-legitimize themselves in the face of discrepant data. Third, creating motives in advance is associated with a higher incidence of non-normative behavior (Murphy, 2004). Finally, there is consistency between the motives individuals use and the degree to which they are socially acceptable. It is unclear whether individuals select motives that they know to be acceptable, or, whether in situations like suicide, the motives that individuals offer, change the discourse regarding what is acceptable (e.g., Stephens, 1984).

Scholars of vocabularies of motive describe a mechanism for understanding deviance, and set the boundaries for what is considered deviant. As Buttny (1987, p. 127) wrote, "Persons can deviate from norms without being labeled deviant to the extent that they can excuse, justify, or legitimize their actions (Buttny, 1985; Scott & Lyman, 1968)." Through the effective use of vocabularies of motive behavior that might otherwise be considered deviant can be reframed and made socially acceptable – both for the individual engaging in the behavior and for the individual(s) who may interface with the individual who engaged in the behavior. In this way, vocabularies of motive serve as loopholes for making otherwise 'bad behavior' socially acceptable. Consider for example, the idea of overindulgence in food. In American society if a woman is pregnant it is socially acceptable for her to eat as much as she desires. Men and women alike understand this and it is used as a way to excuse behavior that in a different context would be interpreted as deviant. While researchers have found that a woman's caloric needs are only minimally higher during pregnancy, no one would judge a pregnant woman for eating four slices of pizza and a sundae when calorically an additional half of a slice of pizza might adequately fulfill her additional caloric needs. In addition, in a society like the United States that is infatuated with 'celebritydom' (see Gamson, 1994 for review), the actions of those in the spotlight can serve as examples that bring new justifications and excuses to light as acceptable vocabularies of motive. The line between normal and deviant can be very thin. "The moral prescriptions and proscriptions that define the limitations of acceptable conduct may well contain escape clauses allowing behaviour that would generally be considered immoral to be seen as justifiable under certain conditions" (Jackson, 1978, p. 30).

¹⁵Other applications of vocabulary of motives work on formally sanctioned behaviors include research on child molesters (McCaghy, 1968) as well additional studies of sex offenders (cf. Mann & Hollin, 2007; Taylor, 1972).

Other studies of interest, not reviewed here, include motives for how members of a religious group explain their behavior to others (Turner & Edgley, 1974), homosexuality (Lee, 1977), how women negotiate their gender identity in medical school (Hammond, 1980), poaching (Forsyth & Marckese, 1993), choosing childlessness (Park, 2005), and alcohol intoxication and coupling at college (Vander Ven & Beck, 2009). Other acts studied include the motives of battered women (Dunn, 2005; Loseke & Cahill, 1984), accounts of mental health providers who sexually exploit clients (Pogrebin, Poole & Martinez, 1992), accounts offered by other violent criminals (Pogrebin, Stretesky, Unnithan, & Venor, 2006), analysis of murders' accounts of crimes (Ray & Simons, 1987), and fatal child abuse (Margolin, 1990).

Vocabularies of Motive in Relationships

Vocabularies of motive in relationships is the least researched application of the topic. Studies that fall under this heading often focus on dyadic relationships. Buttney (1987) applied Mills' vocabularies of motive framework to the issue of intermarriage between United States servicemen and Philippine women. Findings suggest that the vocabularies of motive used by men and women differ but for both the motives serve as justification for intermarriage. The research also highlights the culturally-specific nature of vocabularies of motive. For the men in the study, vocabularies of motive included criticizing North American women, indicating that North American women are less desirable than Filipino women, and denying or minimizing the cultural differences between oneself and one's partner. For the women in the study, the vocabularies of motive centered on the ideas of fate and economic security. For both groups, romantic love was an important explanation.

Vocabularies of motive have been applied to understanding marital dissolution as well: specifically lawyer/client interactions in divorce proceedings.¹⁶ The extensive qualitative research conducted by Sarat and Felstiner (1988) documents the ways in which lawyers establish and exert their professional authority and avoid engagement with the clients' efforts to employ vocabularies of motive. Clients attempt to explain both their own behavior and that of their spouses to their lawyers using vocabularies of motive that are socially acceptable and create a narrative that allows them to proceed with the divorce. The vocabularies of motive employed by the lawyers in response suggest that they are working within the constraints of a system (judges, opposing lawyers), which allows them to relinquish personal responsibility for outcome, while appearing to have the clients' best interests at heart. A later analysis of vocabularies of motive in divorce examines the distinct languages used by initiators of divorce as compared to non-initiators (Hopper, 1993).

Another, perhaps more benign application of vocabularies of motive in relationships is Hockey's, 1996 analysis of vocabularies of motives of doctoral supervisors. Uniquely, Hockey not only considers the vocabularies of motives of supervisors (including three dimensions: intellectual, functional, and subjective), but also considers the vocabulary within institutional context and as reflective of a distinct value system. Hockey describes the ways in which the vocabularies reflect the value system and how the system legitimizes stated vocabularies.

Several important insights can be gleaned from the literature. First, individuals' social structural position (e.g. demographic variables such as gender) determines the available vocabularies of motives. An individual's role is also influential. The extent to which they hold power determines the vocabularies of motive available to them. Second, within the context of relationships, vocabularies of motive are temporally sensitive; in-moment and retrospective accounts may vary widely. Finally, social

¹⁶ Allen and Tompkins (1996) apply the vocabularies of motive framework to examine the dissolution of relationship between a formal organization and employee and argue that marital dissolution vocabularies of motive are akin to those that are used within organizational settings as well under certain circumstances.

institutions proscribe the available continuum of vocabularies of motive and are shaped in response to the vocabularies individuals employ.

Other studies of interest not reviewed here, demand a broader view of relationship. For example, an early application of vocabularies of motive framework is in Ivie's (1974) analysis of presidential addresses regarding motives for war. While the unit of relationship in that study is between an individual and a group, it suggests the ways in which vocabularies are crafted for ease of consumption.

Vocabularies of Motive in Social Movements and Social Institutions

In recent years there has been a growing interest regarding vocabularies of motive within social movements and within social institutions. These include the nuclear arms movement/environmental movement, volunteerism, and the social institutions of business and education. The application of Mills' (1940) vocabulary of motives to social problems is described first in Hewitt and Hall's (1973) paper. They draw on it in considering how social problems are defined. A later theoretical piece on vocabularies of motive in social movements addresses the role of vocabularies of motive in empowering individuals to participate in social movements. According to Benford and Hunt (1992), vocabularies of motive provide reasons for action, justification for behaviors performed in support of the movement, and allows individuals to feel a sense of purpose in their actions and contributions. Social movements themselves are constructed to create and maintain vocabularies of motive regarding the state of the problem to be addressed and the benefits of action (Benford & Hunt). For example, social movements have specific means for challenging and negotiating power which are constructed and enacted within established bounds.

Research on vocabularies of motive applied to understanding social institutions and systems first addressed educational systems and childcare. In an early study on this topic Dixon (1972) analyzed the motives assigned to disruptive behavior in the context of a Headstart program. Dixon considered the consequences of motives for the individual child: (a) socializing the child to appropriate reasons for behavior, (b) allowing for responsibility to be negotiated, and (c) allowing acts to be solitary rather than social. Dixon goes on to consider the ways in which vocabularies of motive are situationally dependent—for example, what would be acceptable in a public school. Dixon concludes that environments have a *guided options management strategy* that includes a rhetoric of allowable and acceptable motives for behavior. A study conducted around the same time (Mangan, 1975) examined the literary documents used by educational institutions for a specific time period and the vocabularies of motive inferred to students by those selections.¹⁷ That analysis describes the ways in which institutional documents and materials are used to transmit cultural morals. This certainly still occurs within educational materials prompting scholars in the field of education to incorporate materials that display a broader history which does not as subtext reinforce the status quo.

Research examining student involvement in community service projects and the motives students offer for their involvement, finds that often students who participate are driven by the needs of specific individuals in need rather than by a more sophisticated understanding of the social and political factors that underlie the need itself. For example, people may feel called to help a woman in a domestic violence shelter who reminds them of themselves but may lack an understanding of the social and cultural factors that contribute to acceptance of violence, or of the legal issues surrounding treatment of offenders. Kemp (1990) addressed an aspect of the environmental movement on public response to radioactive waste disposal; he demonstrated how sometimes the vocabulary of motives are limited and

¹⁷Of note, this research employs the vocabularies of motive framework of Mills— including in its title— but at no point references Mills by name. A later publication by Bramham (1982) does not name Mills or the vocabulary of motives framework but explores how staff make interpretations of child behavior in an educational setting.

that sometimes true motives are subsumed by overarching socially normative vocabularies of motive. Examining the nuclear disarmament movement, Benford (1993) identified predominant motives and described the functions of each of these in maintaining the social movement. Four motives—severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety—are used by groups to shape collective behavior.

Kemp found in his empirical study of a social change organization, that there were two forms of vocabularies of motive within social movements (Silver, 1997); i.e., instrumental vocabularies of motive serve to recruit new members, while expressive vocabularies of motive serve as ways for members to justify their involvement in the movement in a way that supports collective identity. A similar emphasis emerges in Johnson's (1997) analysis of three civil disobedience movements. In her analysis she revealed that movements use *mobilizing vocabularies* and that there are distinct characteristics of the vocabularies of motives of movements that employ violent tactics: dehumanization of opposition, punitiveness, and a sense that action is necessary to prevent disaster. Backman (2011a) explores vocabularies of motive surrounding access to criminal records and traces how the vocabulary of motives has changed over time and reflects the sociopolitical climate.¹⁸ Applied to international migration, Gold (1997) considered vocabularies of motive of Israeli immigrants in the United States. In his analysis, Gold emphasized the great extent to which vocabularies of motive are contextually situated. Other studies of vocabularies of motive in social movement not reviewed here include analysis of the extent to which the concept of performance is emphasized in science (Herzig, 2004).

Many important insights can be drawn from the findings of this literature. There is acknowledgement in the literature that settings both construct and maintain vocabularies of motives for their constituents. To understand a work culture means to understand the boundaries of acceptable actions and explanations for those actions. Vocabularies of motives reflect social and political norms within institutional settings. In addition, through their work on social movements, researchers have emphasized the profound extent to which motives are socially and politically bound. Furthermore, motives are used to both sustain social movements and allow participants a framework in which to continue their participation. Motives can be instrumental or expressive and can be transformed in ways that allow movement participants to employ tactics that they might otherwise reject. The work on social movements build on Goffman's (1974) view that vocabularies of motives serve to create the frames in which behavior is viewed, and that these frames provide a way of interpreting a given account. In addition, although there are no empirical studies identified regarding vocabularies of motive within the feminist movement, the conceptual work of Green (1979) deserves mention. Green argues that it is the vocabulary of motives employed by feminists, which distinguishes them from non-feminists. This could be said of any group that distinguishes itself from another. Within social movements and institutions, vocabularies of motive contribute to group cohesion.

Conclusions About Vocabulary of Motives Applications

The negotiation of self-identity is a consistent and clear emphasis across these empirical evaluations of vocabularies of motive. Table 10.3 presents a builds on the scholarship of Weinstein (1980) to provide a summary of the relevant characteristics described by Weinstein (1980) to consider in understanding vocabularies of motive. As indicated in the table, there are a variety of factors that influence the types of vocabularies of motive individuals will invoke in different situations. Important characteristics of the actor include the individual's status, as well as whether the behavior is of the self or of another. Characteristics of the observer that may be relevant include the observer's occupation, and other status characteristics. In addition to the players in the drama, situational variables shape vocabularies of

¹⁸In another study, Backman (2011b) describes the actual vocabularies of motive used by employers who check criminal records in the employee screening process.

Table 10.3 Factors to consider in understanding vocabularies of motive (Weinstein, 1980)

Relevant characteristics	
Characteristics of the actor	Status Self or other (Smith & Preston, 1984)
Characteristics of the observer	Occupation
Characteristics of the situation	Is the situation (1) intimate (2) casual (3) consultant (4) formal
Characteristics of the account	Justifications or excuse (Scott & Lyman, 1968) Legitimacy (Scott & Lyman, 1968) Reasonableness
Characteristics of the behavior in question	Level of deviance (more deviant, justifications better)

motive that are deemed socially acceptable. For example, different explanations may carry weight in intimate settings as compared to formal settings. Characteristics of the account that may vary include the legitimacy of different accounts, their reasonableness, and whether they are justifications or excuses. Finally, the level of deviance of the behavior in question is relevant; the more deviant the behavior is, the more effective are justifications.

Understanding Social Motivation

In this part of the chapter social motivation will be defined and the construction of social structures will be discussed. The roles of social identity and social influence will be considered as they influence social motivation.

Defining Social Motivation

Social motivation can be considered as a noun and a verb. In its noun form, social motivation is a specific form of motivation, an attitude or sense that shapes behavior. But social motivation is also a process. The study of social motivation spans disciplinary boundaries. Insights can be gained from exploring the work of sociologists, psychologists,¹⁹ behavioral economists, anthropologists, and even biologists, whose work on biomarkers provides important perspectives to understanding human behavior. Because so many disciplines address social motivation, it is empirically evaluated in a number of ways- from ethnographic studies to laboratory experiments.

A nuanced study of social motivation reveals the importance of understanding the equifinality and multifinality of motives (see Dunning, 2011 for discussion). The *principle of equifinality* states that there may be (and often typically are) multiple motives for any given behavior. For example, in terms of timing, motives (social motives included), can be either proximal or distal (Park & Buunk, 2011); behavior can be driven by both a more urgent desire (e.g., to make a good impression in an interview) as well as more distal goals (e.g., to secure employment in order to have resources to attract a mate). Other motives for going to a job interview well-prepared may be to gain the approval of ones’ parents

¹⁹See Brody (1980) for a review of psychological perspectives on social motivation.

upon securing a job, or perhaps to win a bet. The *principle of multifinality* provides that behaviors can have multiple consequences and that although a certain consequence may result from a given action, the forethought of that specific consequence may or may not have been the motivation for the behavior. For example, in the course of a job interview a person might meet someone with whom he or she becomes romantically involved. However, in this case the act of preparing for and attending the interview was not the result of a desire to attract a romantic partner. Some behaviors that appear to be motivated and displays of efforts to achieve a certain result may just be habitual acts or what Park and Buunk call *fixed action patterns*.

Dunning (2011) specifies three motives that constitute social motivation. These motives- to belong, to help, to have power and influence- shape social behavior and allow us to understand conformity, obedience, and compliance. Social motivation is not something that individuals hold universally at equal levels. As De Dreu (2010) stated, "Social motivation is assumed to vary as a function of the parties' relationship (friends vs. strangers), whether they expect cooperative future interaction or not, whether they have prosocial or prosocial value orientation, whether they are rewarded for joint or for personal performance, and whether they are categorized as members of the same or different social groups" (pp. 1005–1006).

There are costs and gains to social influence and conformity- although conformity has a negative connotation, it is not an inherently negative phenomenon. Costs of social influence can include negative deviance (in which people can conform to antisocial others) and positive deviance can include individuating behavior that is prosocial. Benefits of social influence, and the conformity it may demand, include maintenance of social order, and conformity to prosocial norms and civilities. It is important to note that all deviance is not alike, and in addition to the distinction between prosocial and antisocial deviance, one can distinguish between deviance that results from conformity and deviance that results from individuation. Sutherland's (1947) concept of differential association is relevant, and explores the processes through which individuals learn, evaluate, and commit criminal acts. An example of negative deviance that results from conformity is an individual who is raised in a violent community who becomes violent in his or her actions. An example of positive deviance that results from conformity would be a student who joins an environmental protest at school because all of his friends are joining. An example of negative deviance that results from individuation would be committing a violent act in a non-violent setting (e.g., Columbine High School massacre), whereas an example of positive deviance resulting from individuation would be an individual that pulls to the side of the road to help a stranger in need (helping behavior). Collective behavior and social movements, previously discussed, are examples of processes that demand social motivation.

The Role of Individual Agency and Resistance in Social Motivation

To understand social motivation it is crucial to acknowledge the tension between individual agency and resistance. This topic has been addressed most explicitly by psychologists who define social motivation as concern for others, and distinguish between prosocial motivation and prosocial motivation. In this framework, resistance to yield- or holding on to one's aspirations- is thought to reflect a higher concern for self. Researchers have documented a positive relationship between increased levels of resistance and higher levels of concern for self (see Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Van de Vliert, 1997). Resistance to social motivation does not necessarily indicate that someone is antisocial, but rather that he or she may have a view that more heavily emphasizes individual agency and autonomy. Along these lines, major cultural differences are expected in the extent to which individuals are influenced by social motivation. For example, we would expect to see lower levels of resistance to social motivation within collectivist cultures than within individualistic cultures (see Kim & Markus, 1999 for an example of this type of scholarship, and Miyamoto and Egan, this volume, for review of culture and motivation more broadly).

McFarland (2004) in his recent sociological account of resistance considers it as a change-oriented process and describes four distinct stages in that social drama: (1) breach, (2) crisis, (3) redress, and (4) reintegration. Using the language of *protagonists of change* and *antagonists of change*, McFarland focuses on the behaviors of high school students. It can be argued that a protagonist of change has more concern for others (fighting the status quo), but it could also be argued that a protagonist of change has less concern for others and more concern for self. Viewing resistance as an “*oppositional form of nonconformity*” (McFarland, 2004, p. 1252), allows for the distinction McFarland attributes to McLaren (1986) between passive resistance and active resistance. Complaining is a form of passive resistance because it is a statement against something, but then requires no change. Considered within the context of a vocabulary of motives, the four stage process of resistance, and the social drama it entails, are described as a socially acceptable form of nonconformity. “*Framing*²⁰ is a process by which actors make definitional claims and seek agreement as to what meanings to include and exclude in a social encounter” [italics added] (McFarland, 2004, p. 1259). In his study, McFarland considers three frameworks as follows: academic, social, and person. Within the academic framework, in which emphasis is placed on roles and organizational expectations, resistance can occur both from within (*mutiny*) as well as from a standpoint outside the framework (*piracy*). In addition, episodes of resistance may alternatively be embedded within a social framework or a person framework. When acting within a social framework, individuals represent their collective identities (e.g., ingroup or outgroup). When acting from a person framework, the individual may invoke a personal identity, for example, insult to character or person.

McFarland (2004) continued by elaborating on differences among resistance, unintended deviations, and intentional acts of deviance. Within this model, unintended deviations may be behavior that is not the status quo that is done unintentionally. However, “The main distinction between deviance and resistance is that the deviant acts out of self-interest and does not try to present himself or herself as an agent of social change” (McFarland, 2004, p. 1262). Resistance is about social change, intentional acts of deviance are not; both are forms of nonconformity. “Social change is often commenced by episodes of resistance” (McFarland, 2004, p. 1311) and as such can play a role in social movements and collective behavior.

A Review of Specific Motives and Their Effects on Behavior

Understanding Motive to Understand Motivation

In this section, seven key points about motives will be discussed. Following review of these seven points, two specific motives will be reviewed that are relevant to understanding social motivation—trust and altruism.

First, social processes determine what motives are acceptable; society can contribute to making a class of motives socially acceptable. For example Scully and Marolla (1984) argue that psychiatry has contributed to the vocabularies of motive used by rapists. In some ways, popularizing something may serve to normalize it and provide a linguistic framework through which the behavior can be excused. Weber addresses motivation as institutional, cultural, and psychological contributions to behavior (Campbell, 1996).

Second, socially available motives may or may not be internalized. Emmet (1976) distinguished between motive as an internal condition that guides behavior and incentive, an external condition,

²⁰See Benford and Snow (2000) for more extensive analysis of framing and vocabularies of motive.

Table 10.4 Types of motives (Perinbanayagam, 1977)

Types of motives	Usage
First ^a person vocabularies of motive	Vocabularies actors use to convince themselves (Jenkins, 1966)
Second ^a person vocabularies of motive	Vocabularies used to negotiate identities (Scott & Lyman, 1968)
Third ^a person vocabularies of motive	Vocabularies observers use to interpret actions (Jenkins, 1966)

^aFirst person: I, we, me, us, Second person: you, your, and yours, Third person: he, she, it, they

which may or may not be internalized, in which case it could be transformed into a motive; Emmet’s distinction is often overlooked. A motive may be an affective state that when combined with belief that planned action would address this state, can serve to shape behavior, but could also be limited by a desire to act within social order (a counter motive) (Emmet). The role of agency within that process is clear. Equating motives, beliefs, and moral judgments as contributors to actions as well as justifications for those actions, Emmet challenged Peters’ views of motive as limiting and narrow. Mills (1940) denied the self-relevance of motives, but Campbell (1996) argued that motives do not only emerge when individuals are challenged by others, but in the process of introspection or self-evaluation.

Third, individuals may have mixed motives (multiple sources of influence) and cases of seeming self-deception may actually be cases of mixed motives, and mixed motives may be mutually reinforcing (Emmet, 1976).

Fourth, motives may or may not be accessible to the individual. This point was previously reviewed in discussion of Mills’ framework. However, it should be noted that motives are limited by social desirability (Serow, 1991).

Fifth, consider that motives reflect a dynamic and are dialectic; this point is most compellingly offered by Perinbanayagam, 1977, p. 119:

It seems that instead of a simple cause and effect theory of motivation, the human predicament demands a dialectical one: one that would incorporate the datum that a human is both subject to himself and object to the other and that programs of action are undertaken in such an object-subject matrix, reached and realized through communication. It is dialectical, then, in the sense that the twin processes of self-acceptance and objectification interact in delimited situations to produce **persuasive vocabularies** that enable a human to engage, and at times permit himself to engage, in programs of action. In other words human conduct is implicated in structures of relationships—actual or presumptive—and mediated by structures of motives.²¹

Consistent with this view that motives are dynamic, Perinbanayagam (1977), offers three types of motives as follows, building on the work of Jenkins (1966) and Scott and Lyman (1968) and presented in Table 10.4.

Six, motives are not only verbal discourse. It should be noted that while Mills limited his formulation to verbal discourse, motives can also be considered within the context of nonverbal discourse (Wilmoth, 1982). In addition, motives may be internal states. Campbell (1996) speaks out against the tendency to reject the notion of motive as referring to an internal state, suggesting that in doing so, human conduct is considered “as if it were unmotivated” (Campbell, 1996, p. 101). Campbell traces the history of the misuse of Mills construct of motives, noting that the history of misuse had two stages. In the first, the construct moved from including current and future states, to referring to reasons for choosing selected ends. Second, it moved from reasons to words. In these changes, much of Mills’ original construct motive meaning was lost.

Philosopher R.S. Peters (1958) put forth and empirically evaluated the view of motives as examples of reasons.²² Other philosophers (Peter Winch, I. Melden) also aligned with this view (Campbell, 1996). Although Mills’ (1940) vocabularies of motive are often seen as focusing heavily on

²¹In completing this manuscript, the author elected to include this passage. This author later noted that entire passage was also quoted in Zurcher (1979). This is taken to reflect the value of this statement.

²²See Jenkins (1966) for review of Peters’ conceptualization of motives.

sociolinguistics and accounts, Mills' acknowledges in his framework (in its original form) both linguistic aspects of motive as well as underlying systems of meaning (Campbell, 1991). In addition, the distinctions between motives and motivation are not fully understood. The extent to which motives (vocalized or not) contribute to broader processes of motivation demands theoretical and empirical clarification.

Seven, vocabularies of motive and motives themselves serve as a link between behavior and value: "...vocabularies of motive link behavior to value by avowing the purpose of behavior as the attainment of values specified by the person's internalized ideology" (Wilmoth, 1982, p. 245).

Specific Motivations and Motives

In this section the psychological literature on two specific motivation and motives will be reviewed: altruism and trust. Altruism and trust are considered here both as motivations- underlying reasons for action, and motives- presented linguistic accounts, consistent with the distinction made in this chapter. Relying on the definitions I have employed, altruism and trust can be considered as motivations and motives- my treatment is more in line with the view of altruism and trust as motivations than motives. For example, altruism can be a motive pure- a specific reason for action in a specific action. For example a person with a motive of altruism in responding to Hurricane Katrina may have uprooted his or her life to be in that place to help people. Yet, that same person may have a low level of "altruism: motivation" broadly defined. Due to space constraints this chapter is limited to addressing empirical research from these two specific motivations/motives. Other motivations/motives that have received extensive attention include aggression (see Baumeister & Bushman, 2004) and cooperation (see Fehr & Gintis, 2007).

Altruism

Altruism is the desire to benefit another as an ultimate goal. It is different from other forms of prosocial behavior: *egoism*, which is concerned with benefitting another as a means to benefit oneself; *collectivism*, which is concerned with benefitting another to benefit a group; and *principism*, which is concerned with benefitting another to uphold a moral principle (Batson et al., 2011). Altruism, in its purest form, is the extent to which people act to benefit others as one's ultimate goal rather than as merely a means to an end designed to enhance one's own experience. This view does not argue that pleasure or positive self-feeling cannot be a 'side effect' of the behavior, but rather argues that it is not the motivating force behind the behavior itself. There are both sociological and psychological mechanisms that contribute to altruism. That is, both social norms about giving and caring as well as individual characteristics (e.g. empathy) shape behavior (Simmons, 1991).

Some scholars have historically been in disbelief about the existence of altruism- that human beings may act in ways that are entirely motivated by a desire to benefit others. Yet, such behavior has been documented (see Piliavin & Charng, 1990 for review). The empathy-altruism hypothesis proposed by Batson (1991) addresses the role of emotion in this process. Individuals who engage in altruism experience other-oriented feeling and empathic concern (Batson, 1987). Such empathic concern is empirically associated with increased helping behavior (see Batson, 1991, and Eisenberg & Miller, 1987 for reviews of this literature). Scholars have empirically evaluated possible alternatives to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which include the aversive-arousal reduction explanation, empathy-specific punishment explanation, and empathy-specific reward explanation (See Batson et al., 2011 for review). Efforts have been made to understand the competing motives of altruism and egoism (e.g., Hu & Liu, 2003).

An area for future research is consideration of the evolutionary value of pure altruism. It is typically viewed in a positive light, but it may also have costs. Consider the research of Batson,

Klein, Highberger, and Shaw (1995), which found that individuals who experienced empathy-induced altruism acted in ways that violated their own moral principles. In their study, individuals who experienced empathy-induced altruism were significantly more likely to preferentially allocate resources to persons for whom they felt empathy, in the face of behavior that would be morally just. Empathy-induced altruism may be another mechanism through which people behave in biased ways. Yet, understanding these biases may help people to understand why societally people respond to some groups more than others, and how when empathic response is not activated people may feel appropriate in overlooking individuals in real states of need. These points raise the question of whether people can shape for whom their empathic response is activated. As previously noted, there is debate in the framework of vocabulary of motives regarding accurate vs. stated motives for behavior. Neuroimaging methods have the potential to elucidate physiological structures and pathways for why people participate in altruistic behavior. An additional area for future study is on altruism within organizations. The research has focused heavily on individual levels of altruism, but corporate philanthropy (for example, Sánchez, 2000) is an important area for sociological study, and an area that bridges multiple disciplines.

Trust

A core component of trust is the idea of vulnerability- that there is something to be lost or damaged if trust is betrayed. Trust has been defined in a variety of ways and its meanings are often contextually dependent (Dunning & Fetchenhauer, 2011). However, trust is a concept that is relevant on the individual level (trusting one's self), the dyadic level (trusting that one's spouse or partner will be faithful), on the group level (trusting that a leader will reflect the group's interests accurately), an institutional level (trust that an organization or institution will act in accordance with its stated mission), and at a societal level (trust that a government will act in ways that protect the public good). The importance of trust has been recognized by sociologists and psychologists for decades (see Simpson, 2007 for review).

The role of trust in relationships and organizations has long been studied, yet there are many facets of trust that go unstudied or understudied. Trust is a social lubricant that is ever present in the functioning of the social world, which is relied upon for the smooth functioning of society. This aspect of trust is evident when restaurant patrons assume that chefs and cooks will prepare their food in a sanitary way. Breakdowns in this form of trust cause notable dysfunctions for society; if members of a society do not have this trust they will not engage in transactions. This trust is normative, and when people question whether others will follow through on acts of assumed trust there is a social awkwardness. For example, when purchasing something on the phone there is an expectation that credit card information will be put into a computer system and not written down elsewhere (possibly for fraudulent use). If a caller says "You didn't write that down anywhere, did you?" there is an awkwardness that may be hard to overcome. The individual who is not trusted may internalize the distrust and respond defensively. Another example is that many accountants will complete a client's taxes and only send a bill after the taxes have been filed, rather than require payment before the tax return can be filed. There is a trust that the individual will pay for the service rendered.

There are five fields that inform an understanding of trust: sociology, philosophy, economics, biology and neurobiology, and psychology. Borrowing the paradigm of economic games, psychologists have experimentally evaluated rates of trust and found that there are times when people over trust and under trust, and that there is an emotional dimension to trust (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009). Philosophical writings related to trust emphasize the extent to which agency is driven by self-interest, and as such, people are expected to distrust one another. Analyses of trust from an economic perspective largely consider trust at institutional levels. Biological and neurobiological researchers have found that trusting has positive effects. For example, when study participants were given oxytocin they were found to be more trusting than those given a placebo (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher,

& Fehr, 2005). Perhaps even more notable, being the recipient of trust is associated with a surge in oxytocin that prompts reciprocal trust at a higher rate (Zak, Kurzban, & Matzner, 2005). Dual-process theories that distinguish between central and peripheral routes of processing also have also been applied to the understanding of trust (see for example, Chaiken & Trope, 1999). People may make explicit calculations regarding likelihood of reciprocity of trust (central route), or alternatively may trust based on a feeling (peripheral route). Some may trust with an intention to create an image of oneself as a giving and trustworthy person, and with expectations of reciprocity, reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971).

An especially relevant example of research on trust as motive is Cressey's (1953) study of trust and embezzlement. Cressey describes the ways in which trusted individuals adjust their self-views so that they can continue engaging in misuse of money that others entrusted to them.

Future research on trust should address the idea that trust is contextually dependent. Specifically, what situational conditions are associated with greater trust, and for whom? Are there person-situation interactions in predicting trust? In addition, the extent to which trust is rational is debated and should be an area of continued study. The influence of social and political factors on individual and group levels of trust is also an area that warrants further consideration.

Methodological Issues

There are many social motivations and many motives that shape behavior. Research in these areas has been heavily reliant on experimental paradigms conducted in laboratory settings. There is a clear need for ethnographic studies to yield more nuanced understandings of motives. The methods that researchers use to study motivation, motives, and vocabularies of motive vary according to discipline and substantive focus. Scholarship on motivation is often theoretical and conceptual in nature. When empirical analyses of motivation are undertaken, they often rely on scalable questions- how motivated an individual is, for example. The difficulty in studying motivation is that it is essentially a process. Unlike motives and vocabularies of motive which may be more fixed and specific, motivation may be unearthed through interviews, through observations, and through surveys. It has long been a struggle for social scientists to figure out the best way to measure these constructs. For example, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) designed in the 1930s by Morgan & Murray, a projective test, has been used to understand motivation (see Geiser & Stein, 1999 for discussion). Applying Morgan & Murray's TAT, McClelland identified several types of motivation and has developed theories of motivation based on his work (c.f., McClelland, 1987). The TAT involves showing individual's images and having them create stories about those images. A number of specific scales of motivation have been introduced and in some cases revised, including a religious motivation scale (Hoge, 1972), an academic motivation scale (Vallerand et al., 1992), and a six-factor sport motivation scale (Pelletier, Vallerand, & Sarrazin, 2007). There are efforts to understand motivation as both a state factor as well as a more dispositional, trait-like variable (see for example, Choi, Saperstein, & Medalia, 2012). Research on motives and vocabularies of motive have followed different trajectories than scholarship on motivation. Research on vocabularies of motive is the most easily classifiable of these approaches. That line of research, reviewed extensively here, often relies on qualitative interviews. This makes good sense given its emphasis on linguistic accounts. To address the differences between motives- which may or may not be reported, and vocabularies of motive- which are stated, scholars have employed both direct and indirect measures. The direct measures (asking) have advantages and disadvantages compared to indirect methods (inferring). The direct/indirect distinction also applies to the study of motivation.

The greatest challenge for scholars working in the area of motives, vocabularies of motive, and motivation is the need to look across disciplinary boundaries. Sociological studies are rarely cited in

psychological accounts of motive and motivation and psychological studies are rarely included in sociological publications. Relatively recent publications include the three volume *Handbook of Motivation & Cognition* (1996, Sorrentino & Higgins, eds.), the *Handbook of Motivation Science* (2008, Shah & Gardner, eds.), and Fiske's (2010) *Social Beings: Core Motives in Social Psychology*. Overall, there is a need to account for the influence of motives in social psychological research. In addition, there is a need for scholars to examine stated needs, actual needs, and the occasional discrepancy between the two. In addition, social science would be enhanced by identifying situations in which motive is irrelevant- do such circumstances exist? For example, consider individuals choosing to drive a hybrid vehicle. Does it matter that some individuals do this exclusively to save money on gasoline, while others do so exclusively for environmental impact? When is motive-level data useful?

Historically, sociologists have been hesitant to consider the needs of the self, with the almost sole exception of Erving Goffman. By recognizing the power of the need for social approval, Goffman was able to gain important insights into self-presentation. Sociologists have long overlooked motives such as the need to belong, to understand, to control, to self-enhance, to self-verify, to trust, etc. To understand these motives is not to venture into the unfamiliar ground of psychology but to acknowledge interactions that shape behavior and social processes.

Individual Agency

Understanding Agency

Much like the terms motivation and motives, agency is a vague and misunderstood term that has not been evaluated systematically (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). The complexity of agency has been described as "a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment)" (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 963). Social institutions and social stratification influence how people act and influence their sense of agency. This socialization occurs over the life course and reflects the dynamic processes of the self. Charon (2013) asks the question of whether human beings are free. This question explores the power of society and social expectation on the ways that humans think (our attitudes) and act.

The question of individual agency supposes the existence of a *self*. But what is the self? According to Gecas and Burke (1995), "The concept of self essentially refers to the process of reflexivity that emanates from the interplay between the 'I' and the 'Me'" (p. 42). This distinction between the *I* and the *Me* denotes reflexivity and can be traced back to sociologist George Herbert Mead (Mead, 1934). The *I* is the subjective impulse-oriented part of the self, and the *me* is the other-oriented objective component. This distinction posits that individuals can think of themselves as both subjects and objects. But it is through interaction that people see the *I* and *Me* at work. Identities do not come solely from within but are both assigned by self and assigned by others, and as such, are inherently public (Gecas and Burke, 1995). Herbert Blumer, a pioneer of the symbolic interactionist tradition (SI), emphasized this point when he described the extent to which social structures and social reality are socially-constructed products of human interaction (Blumer, 1969). Scholars of the SI perspective focus on the shared views and meanings that individuals apply to the social world. SI is characterized by a distinctly process oriented perspective, more so than traditional role theory and identity theories. Hitlin and Elder's (2007) model of agency may be considered the most comprehensive model of agency available to scholars in this area.

Awareness and Performance of Self

Social scientists debate the extent to which individuals are aware of their psychological processes, and in essence aware of self. Freud's [1923], 1994 model identified three components of the self that interact to determine an individual's thinking, feeling, and behavior: the ego, id, and superego. Freud's tripartite model serves as the underpinning of more modern models of human agency and of self-awareness, in which thoughts and feelings can be overridden in a conscious attempt to shape behavior. More recently, scholars have explored individual differences in active self-awareness, which includes the study of self-consciousness, and subsequently, the extent to which individuals self-monitor their presentation of self. Scholars who have contributed to this literature, which they derive largely from the psychological tradition, suggest that there are individual differences in the extent to which individuals are aware of and monitor their self-presentations. There are multiple motives for why an individual may self-monitor, including the desire for accurate communication, to conceal emotion, or to appear to have an emotion (Snyder, 1974). Similarly, scholars of sociological impression management make a similar point- that there are individual differences in the extent to which individuals are aware of and monitor their self-presentations. See Scheier and Carver (1988) for a model of behavioral self-regulation and Carver and Scheier (2000) for discussion of other theories of self-regulation.

The self is both constructed and performed, which Goffman (1959) best illustrated using a dramaturgical metaphor. Goffman deconstructed the components of social interaction, which helps sociologists understand the way in which an actor constructs a face and performs his or her role to an audience. He explores in his work how the social actor works to create a front that is both believable and elicits the approval of others. The performer may or may not believe that the way he or she acts is 'real,' and cynics do not believe their own acts. The relationship between performers and their audiences is governed by the performer's need for social approval, as implied by Goffman but not explicitly named. This need to maintain the approval of others is responsible for the strategic ways in which the performer elects to present himself or herself. As can be imagined, and undoubtedly has been experienced, social interaction has a tenuous and fragile nature (Goffman, 1959). Goffman states, "In other words, we must be prepared to see that the impression of reality fostered by performance is a delicate, fragile thing that can be shattered by very minor mishaps" (1959, p. 56).

The Search for Authenticity

Authenticity, to be one's true self, can be considered a motivating force of the self (Gecas, 1986; George, 1998). The self-motive of authenticity is closely related to self-esteem and self-efficacy, both of which also motivate behavior (Gecas). Authenticity, like self-esteem and self-efficacy can be considered in three domains: interpersonal, structural, and cultural (Gecas, 1991). Of these domains, Gecas suggests that the cultural domain is most salient to authenticity; stating, "Authenticity, which deals with matters of reality and meaning for the individual, is primarily addressed at the symbolic level in terms of such cultural content as ideologies, systems of beliefs, and values" (Gecas, 1986, p. 180). He continues, "Commitment to identities and the ideologies within which they are embedded leads to a sense of authenticity" (Gecas, 1986, p. 181). Erickson (1994) put forth a similar definition emphasizing commitment to identities, which is also quite similar to Stryker's identity theory. George traced the linkage of authenticity and social approval to the pioneering work of Goffman (1959) and boldly suggested that desire to attain and maintain a sense of authenticity is a motivating force of humans, and a way to enhance the self.

The recent lines of sociological social psychology research on authenticity grow out of a critique of the literature on the self based on motivational bias. Historically, sociologists focused on the desire to protect the self at the expense of understanding self-enhancement (Vannini & Franzese, 2008). George considers whether the desire for authenticity is a universal desire and how authenticity relates

to people's choices to favor either self-enhancement or self-protection. Similar considerations about motivation are evident in the writings of Erickson (1995) who suggested that in addition to identities and role partners as sources of behavioral motivation, "the **self**, acting on its own behalf and from its own concrete and biographically based perspective, can also serve as a primary motivational force" (emphasis in original, p. 134). In contrast to George's (1998) suggestion that authenticity can be a means of self-enhancement alone, Marková (1997) suggests that both valences of sincerity (which is the other-referential side of authenticity) can be used for strategic self-enhancement: "Both sincerity or insincerity may, whether in a positive or in a negative sense, enhance the self. For example, as Machiavelli has already shown, one has to understand others in order to manipulate them. However it is when one conforms because of fear, and when this becomes a matter of habit, that authenticity is at stake" (p. 274). Integrity can be compromised when our behavior is driven exclusively by self-protection (Marková). Harter and colleagues (1996) have demonstrated with their empirical work that the motivation for inauthentic behavior affects how the individual responds to behaving falsely. That is, individuals behaving falsely and motivated by devaluing the self had more negative outcomes than both those being false to please others and those enacting a false self as part of role experimentation (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996). Authenticity has been found to be a motivator of behavior (Franzese, 2009; Vannini & Burgess, 2009) and is valued by some individuals more than others (Franzese). In addition, the desire to behave authentically varies according to social context (Franzese). An area for future research is the understanding of authenticity as a motivating force of behavior, and how that motivation relates to understanding authenticity and inauthenticity by choice versus being influenced by structural constraints. Psychologists also have an interest in the topic of authenticity (e.g., Kernis & Goldman, 2005).

The Social Construction of Reality

Individuals working together in coordinated ways to create a social order benefit all of society. Social science scholars overwhelmingly agree that reality is socially constructed. Those who resist this idea often do so with a reluctance to admit that their personal beliefs and subsequent actions reflect socialization as much, if not more, than their 'true' selves. Yet, sociologists must contend with this fact, and grieve the loss of never having the opportunity to be who they might be in the absence of social forces. As what is considered functional is socially constructed, so is what is considered deviant. Behaviors considered deviant are not inherently deviant, but rather are agreed upon in the dominant social order.

Part of the social construction of reality is the way people construct presentations of self, but part of the interchange is also how we react to others when we are the audience.

When we think of those who present a false front or "only" a front, of those who disassemble, deceive, and defraud, we think of a discrepancy between fostered appearances and reality...When we discover that someone with whom we have dealings is an impostor and out-and-out fraud, we are discovering that he did not have the right to play the part he played, that he was not an accredited incumbent of the relevant status (Goffman, 1959, p. 59).

Individuals as Agents of Change

While understanding that reality is socially constructed may at first appear to deny individual agency, this is misleading; reality is socially constructed and is malleable. The process of transforming reality relies on new shared meanings. Symbolic interactionism emphasizes the extent to which people make and use symbols in the process of constructing reality. These symbols thrive because people subscribe to them and the symbols can take on a life of their own. People can also create new symbols. In this way, individuals can be agents of social change.

The Interplay Between Social Structure and Individual Agency

In order to understand linkages between motivation, motives, and behaviors it is critical to understand individual agency and to understand social structure. The term social structure can be used in a variety of ways. According to Blau (1974) *social structure* is “population distributions among social positions along various lines—positions that affect people’s role relations and social interaction” (p. 616). Sociologists have largely neglected the role of individual agency which is a disservice to the field. Sociologists derive a more comprehensive view when they acknowledge that individual agency does exist, but that it is shaped by social processes. Emile Durkheim’s ([1893], 1997) notion of “collective consciousness” denotes this idea that the social world exists both within and external to the individual. Thus to support a view of individual agency is not to deny the importance of social influence, but rather to name one more mechanism through which the social world shapes behavior.

There are a multitude of social structures that both facilitate and constrict human agency. Emirbayer and Mische (1998) described a threefold purpose of their research, (1) to distinguish various components of agency, (2) to address the interplay of agency and structure, and (3) to describe the implications of this view of agency. Emirbayer and Mische argue that the debate over social structure vs. agency is in large part due to compounded notions of agency, and that reconceptualizing agency in ways that claim its temporal and dynamic nature serve to ease the debate. They state, “...structural environments of action are both dynamically sustained by and also altered through human agency—by actors capable of formulating projects for the future and realizing them, even if only in small part, and with unforeseen outcomes, in the present” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 964).

Emirbayer and Mische (1998) described three dimensions of human agency: the iterational element, the projective element, and the practical-evaluative elements. The iterational element is described as being past oriented and addresses the influence of social order and system on individual thought. The projective element is the most future oriented and addresses actors’ abilities to consider possibilities of action. The practical-evaluative element is in the present shaping the process of weighing factors and influences in decision making. Yet, each dimension has past, present, and future aspects within itself, and each has implications for research (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Specifically, the iterational dimension has clear implications in understanding, for example, the influence of culture, and life-course dynamics. The projective component has been researched through work addressing time perspectives, and change. Finally, researchers have demonstrated that the practical-evaluative dimension has implications for role negotiation, and political decision making. While agency is at play in action, people with agency are not agents, but rather “actors who engage agentially with their structuring environments” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 1004).

Inarguably there is an interplay between social structure and individual agency. This point may be best made by considering the weaknesses of a unilateral view. The social structure perspective in sociology addresses the extent to which the social order shapes individual identity. Role theory argues that people establish identities via their roles and that individuals are defined by the roles to which they have been assigned. Roles have expectations that individuals are expected to fulfill. When individuals fail to meet the requirements and expectations of their roles they are at risk for social sanctions. Arguably, role theory leaves little room for how the actor shapes the role, experiences the role, or adapts to the role. In that view, an individual is considered to be the sum of his or her role parts and the self is conceived as the summation of the various role identities that the individual occupies. Although role theory is the “...primary theoretical orientation guiding sociological investigations of the self...” (George, 1998, p.140), it may be somewhat limiting, because it pays little attention to the processes by which individuals select their roles, as well as prioritize the salience of the various roles they occupy. One can acknowledge the interchange between social structure and individual agency in order to take a more inclusive perspective.

Consider, for example, Goffman's notion of *audience segregation* (1959; 49)—the idea that people consciously keep their interactants in separate physical and temporal domains. However, this view may be outdated; within postmodern society, performers are increasingly less able to segregate their audiences in the ways that Goffman proposes. Modernity is marked by intersecting social circles, with shared meaning referents (Pescosolido & Rubin, 2000). Although the sociological truth that society shapes individuals is indisputable, it is through interaction that individuals interpret and make sense of both the social world and form a coherent sense of self. It is in this interplay that individual agency alters the social structure.

The importance of this interchange emerges in the writings of sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild. Hochschild questions the completeness or comprehensiveness of Goffman's basic conceptions of social reality and of the self. In the appendix to her (1983) book *The Managed Heart*, Hochschild suggests (1983, p. 215) that "Social structure, to Erving Goffman, is only our idea of what many situations of a certain sort add up to... To solve this problem, we should take what Goffman has developed and link it to institutions on the one hand and to personality on the other." She states, "Goffman shows us the self coming alive only in social situations where display to other people is an issue. We are invited to ignore all moments in which the individual introspects or dwells on outer reality without a sense of watchers" (1983, p. 216).

This debate continues to unfold in both theoretical and empirical research. For example, the empirical work of Merolla, Serpe, Stryker, and Schultz (2012) provide a view of the interplay between structure and agency, showing that involvement in social structures shapes self-view and sense of identity.

Conclusion/Discussion

The Influence of Structure on Agency and the Influence of Agency on Structure

This chapter has reviewed the research on motive, motivation, vocabularies of motive, and individual agency. A goal was to demonstrate the great extent to which social structure shapes choices and behavior (including resistance), and, in turn how individual agency shapes social structures. "*Actors who feel creative and deliberative while in the flow of unproblematic trajectories can often be highly reproductive of received contexts*" (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1008, emphasis in original). People can inadvertently- and agentially- reinforce the status quo. Individual choices and behaviors that are choices disguised as structure, can serve to maintain the current social order; simultaneously, "Actors who feel blocked in encountering problematic situations can actually be pioneers in exploring and reconstructing contexts of action." (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1009). Yet, it is when people are blocked or rubbed in abrasive ways by the churning of societal machinery that change can occur. Individual choices and behaviors that result from thinking outside of the available vocabularies may lead to social change.

Directions for Future Theoretical and Empirical Work

There are several areas where future research is needed to build upon what has already been studied, and to elucidate several critical unresolved issues. The first is the role of motive talk (vocabularies of motive) in creating a cohesive narrative of self. This line of work should consider how roles and

identities are negotiated through vocabularies of motive. It has been theorized that there are four phases in the process of identity negotiation, which are described in relation to a deviant behavior (Weinstein, 1980). First, the *actor identification* phase in which an individual establishes identity to him or her self with the motives available. Second is the *observer altercasting* phase in which observers impute motives to the actor, which are often less favorable than those imputed by the actor him or her self. Third is the *actor altercasting* phase in which the actor retributively denigrates the observer. Finally, *observer identification* phase in which the observer avows more favorable motives to the behavior in question. This work should be expanded to understand identity negotiation and motives for prosocial and antisocial behaviors. This work would be a significant contribution because it would describe negative connotations of the term motives and how motive can be used for self-enhancement and self-protection.

Second, there is a historical emphasis on motivation in the study of deviant behavior. Berard (1998) outlines the conditions under which he believes that motives should be studied, and links the study of deviance and the study of motives. “Problems are relative to an ethos” (Mills, 1939, p. 675). In addition, Weinstein’s (1980) work on illicit drug use revealed mechanisms for people to avoid having to account for negative behaviors. Yet, this exclusive focus on deviance is unnecessary and has left social scientists- particularly sociologists- with a lack of information related to motivation in prosocial behavior.²³ For example, do the mechanisms that account for the ways in which individuals justify not engaging in deviant behavior also apply to prosocial behavior? This would tie into the large social psychological literature on the bystander effect. Do motives and underlying motivation shape prosocial behavior in the same way as they do for deviant behavior?

Third, context matters. Stephens (1984) suggests the need for study of “cultural and historical variability of suicide vocabularies” (p. 251). While Stephens’ remark pertains to the study of suicide, there persists a need to understand cultural and historical variability of vocabularies of motive broadly. Vocabularies of motive are situated in time and place. To understand acceptable justifications and excuses for behavior is to understand people and context. “Clearly what Mills envisaged included a wide-ranging comparative and historical investigation that would relate different vocabularies of motive to different historical epochs, societal structures, and institutional positions (1940, p. 913)” (Campbell, 1991, p. 90). Largely, these ideas have been overlooked. Campbell’s observations ring as true today as they did over 20 years ago. In fact, as Campbell notes, Semin and Manstead (1983) recognized that scholars purporting to work in Mills’ tradition have even shortened the phrase vocabularies of motive to motive talk. There is promise in examining these issues through the framework of comparative-historical sociology. In addition to social context, individuals position in the life course is understudied in relation to social motivation (see Carstensen, 1998 for exception), and interactions in the form of cohort differences are an important area for future research.

Fourth, there is a need to study the implications of motivation for wellness. As Monaghan (2002) points out in his research on illicit steroid use among bodybuilders, understanding vocabularies of motive are crucial for health promoters. Extending this, if researchers truly wish to understand how and why people engage in a risky behavior, it is of paramount importance to understand the ways in which they justify their actions. If the cognitive distortions of their logic are revealed, people may be unable to persist in problematic behaviors. Researchers can use this line of logic to derive new insights into why some health prevention efforts fail to be effective. For example, there is a research literature documenting the co-occurrence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and cigarette use (see Feldner, Babson, & Zvolensky, 2007 for review). Individuals who have PTSD and smoke were found to use cigarettes as a coping strategy to tolerate their PTSD symptoms (Beckham et al., 2005). Their vocabularies of motive may have allowed them to overlook their smoking in the context of being

²³ A prosocial examination of vocabularies of motive includes Crossley’s, 2006 analysis of motives for initiation and continuation of using a gym to workout.

military personnel. The public health implications of understanding vocabularies of motive are weighty, yet these have largely been overlooked. One such application is McCaghy's (1968) discussion of the importance of understanding vocabularies of motive when treating child molesters. It is uncomfortable to engage in the process of understanding why someone would, for example, want to touch the genitals of a child, but it is that understanding which may contribute to the development of effective treatments and preventive efforts.

Fifth, scholars of motivation may benefit from simultaneously seeking to understand stated motives, behavior, and later accounts for behavior. In his 1980 empirical analysis of vocabularies of motive applied to illicit drug use, Weinstein argued that symbolic interactionists have historically stressed the importance of motives (pertaining to illicit drug use) but have not empirically studied vocabularies of motive for that population; this is an insight that can be generalized. Within psychological and sociological literatures alike researchers often recognize the importance of understanding motivation; however, actually arriving at an understanding of motivation seldom occurs. That is- scholars flout the importance of motivation but then do not take steps to capture it in their studies. One potential approach would be to hear the reasons someone presents for why they act before they act in that way. Mills took a different approach, to understand explanations for what people did. Given the demonstrated discrepancies between attitudes and behavior, social scientists may be wise to compare the two.

Sixth, scholars should evaluate how vocabularies of motive are strategically used by certain groups. For example, political sociologists might consider how the vocabularies of motive framework would apply to political scandals. Likewise, sociologist might consider how frameworks such as "Boys will be boys" are accounts that allow stereotypes to be activated and poor behavior to continue. As Weinstein, 1980 said:

The giving –and-taking of accounts in everyday life represents one of the most fundamental characteristics of the social order. People are continually explaining why they did or did not do something, and others are accrediting or discrediting the motives offered to them. The whole Watergate affair and the recent Iran hostage situation are but the most blatant examples of this phenomenon. Yet despite the significance of this ongoing process of negotiation in daily activities, few sociologists have applied an accounts framework to either theoretical or empirical studies of specific kinds of deviance or behavior generally (p. 591).

In closing, motivation matters, motives matter, and the linguistic accounts of motives matter; people create narratives in their lives to give life a sense of purpose and meaning. The key elements of these narratives are motives, intentions, and causes and these three aspects are social constructions influence how people experience themselves and how others experience them (Hopper, 1993). To understand motives and motivation is to understand both how people live life and how they make sense of their living.

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Chapter 11

Values, Attitudes, and Ideologies: Explicit and Implicit Constructs Shaping Perception and Action

Steven Hitlin and Kevin Pinkston

Introduction: A Sociological Map

Human beings act on the basis of their perceptions of the world, a notion captured in both Allport's (1954) classic definition of social psychology¹ and the ubiquitous Thomas Theorem² (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, see Merton, 1995 for a discussion). These perceptions (see Howard & Renfrow, 2003) are filtered through a variety of cognitive-emotional constructs that are socially shaped in patterned ways based on group memberships and personal experiences. This chapter offers a broad overview of these constructs, ranging from ideologies and moral systems to values and attitudes, with a special emphasis on areas that have been less covered in previous sociological social psychology handbooks, including morality, implicit attitudes, and construct measurement.

We orient this chapter around three propositions underlying sociological social psychology:

1. Where you are matters more than who you are (situationalism)
2. Who you are influences where you are (selection)
3. Where you were shaped who you are (socialization)

Situationalism (see Kelley et al., 2003) highlights the power of specific locations to shape action. Selection effects are long-standing understandings that people do not randomly put themselves into the aforementioned situations. Socialization (see Chap. 5) highlights the social process by which people develop orientations that lead to the selection of different situations. We argue that ideologies, values, and attitudes affect all three of these processes, ranging from behavior within situations, to the agentic choices to enter certain situations, to the previous experiences that shape the self and its accordant belief structures. These three propositions can be interpreted as linking to three influential sociological social psychological traditions:

1. Situated Perspective: How and when do beliefs affect interaction?
2. Social Structure and Person perspective: Where do these beliefs come from?
3. Life Course Perspective: What possibilities are most valued?

¹Social psychology deals with the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others.

²"If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."

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Certainly, these are artificial distinctions: for example, there is a great deal of overlap between the Social Structure and Personality (SSP) and Life Course perspectives (see McLeod & Lively, 2003). However, it is useful for our purposes, staking out a particularly sociological overview of the (sometimes reciprocal) relationship of individual beliefs – conscious and implicit – to social structures. We outline the global approach that suggests that orientations within the individual are socially meaningful, shaped in patterned ways yet still idiosyncratic enough to map on to individuals' situated and life course behaviors. This view is at the root of many branches of sociological work linking individuals with social structures, and we build on previous overviews of this topic by including important work on implicit aspects of these beliefs, in addition to those consciously reported by interactants. We may not always be able to articulate what we believe, though we can recognize those beliefs that 'feel' right when presented with options (e.g., Vaisey, 2009). As such, we are explicating social psychological dimensions of the constructs that motivate – often unconsciously – the conscious pursuit of goal-directed behaviors (Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010).

Definitions

We begin by defining the main concepts – values, attitudes, and ideologies. Maio, Olson, Bernard, and Luke (2003) suggest these differ in their level of abstraction, with ideologies subsuming the others. Each of these constructs is a component of social cognition (see Chap. 20), yet they collectively contain orientations toward various means and ends of social action that serve to situate the individual within social space. We know who we are based on the perceptions, feelings, goals, and relations to other people, ideas, institutions, and other social phenomenon (e.g., Smith, 2003), and these orientations are socially shaped and patterned. And, importantly, they serve as a social force for understanding behavior, operating at both conscious and unconscious levels (Baumeister et al., 2011; Evans, 2008).

Values. Values are widely considered to be largely stable social and internal constructs that guide social evaluation and action. They are classically described as “(a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p. 551). Values represent orientations toward universal human aspects including: (1) biological needs, (2) interactional requirements for social coordination, and (3) institutional demands for group welfare and survival (Schwartz, 1992). Contrary to some interpretations (Wuthnow, 2008), the study of values has increased recently within sociology and social psychology (see Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004 for an overview). Importantly, values are theorized as a structure whose constituent parts are hierarchically ranked; values rarely influence action alone, but rather as part of a system (see Hodges & Geyer, 2006; Longest, Hitlin, & Vaisey, 2012).

Attitudes. Attitudes may be one of the most studied topics in social psychology. Attitudes involve affect, cognition, and behavior (see Maio et al., 2003), and a global definition focuses on the “psychological tendency, expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). The object of an attitude can be anything that a person may think about “ranging from the mundane to the abstract, including things, people, groups, and ideas” (Bohner & Dickel, 2011, p. 392). Importantly for this review, attitudes comprise both conscious and non-conscious predispositions and action orientations toward these objects.

Ideologies. Maio et al. (2003) suggest that ideologies are the most abstract of these constructs, and that values are largely derived from ideologies (but can also reciprocally influence them). Their review focuses primarily on political ideologies in the American context, the same purview found in Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008), who expanded this notion to also focus on a critical conception of “ideology as a motivated, system-serving belief system” (p. 127). This view of *ideology* suggests that broad orientations toward justifying particular social formations subsume the values and attitudes that might

be more proximally connected to judgment, emotion, and behavior. We include conceptions of morality, understood broadly, as an element of ideologies related –but not reducible to – systems of political ideology.

The study of these constructs has been fundamentally advanced by recent understandings of the dual-processing nature of human mind (e.g., Evans, 2008; Massey, 2002; Wilson, 2002; see Cerulo, 2010; Hitlin, 2008; Vaisey, 2009 for sociological discussions). These updates to the classical understanding of attitudes and values highlight a cognitive/emotional distinction (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) that has many different labels: Baumeister (2005) terms them “automatic” and “conscious,” Metcalf and Mischel (1999) call them “hot” and “cold” systems, Zajonc (1980) referred to the “affective” and “cognitive” systems, and Vaisey refers to systems of motivation and justification. These approaches cohere around the general idea that humans have (A) a brain system under our conscious control that is powerful, slow, and can handle novel information, and (B) a brain system outside of our conscious control that monitors the social/physical world, triggers emotions, is fast but rather inflexible. Wilson terms this system the “adaptive unconscious”, which does some sophisticated mental processing but is uncontrollable and relatively inflexible. Evolution has shaped our minds such that these two processes are in play simultaneously and at different speeds; general agreement is that the emotional brain is quicker and shapes the perceptions that our conscious mind rationally analyzes. Rational-choice theories, for example, often posit that people are guided by our conscious, reasoning minds. A variety of literatures, however, suggest that attitudes and values operate well outside of conscious awareness (Haidt, 2006; see also the collected works of Freud).

Core Issues: Influences, Measurement and Application

Values

Values operate at all three propositional levels we present underlying social psychology (situationalism, selection, socialization), in addition to conceptualizing desirable goals and end-states (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; see Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011 for an extended overview of the history of the scientific study of values). They serve as goals individuals may orient their lives around (Hitlin, 2008). For a long period in sociology, values’ importance waned (Hechter, 1992; Spates, 1983; Wuthnow, 2008), but improvements in theory and measurement across the social sciences have demonstrated their utility for understanding countries, individuals, and the relationship between the two. Issues of measurement abound, but we will not delve into those here (see Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Krosnick & Alwin, 1988; Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 2010) except to say that values are almost always measured consciously through self-report (at the individual level) or with aggregated averages (at the societal level).

Values are most often measured with survey items, like the Portrait Values Questionnaire (see Schwartz, 2011), or those found on the World Values Survey (see Baker, 2005). People are assumed to be able to compare their own priorities to each other along a Likert scale. There are behavioral measures, such as experimental designs where participants allot resources and their values are extrapolated from those decisions, as well as recent attempts to develop implicit measures (see Maio, 2010, see discussion of implicit measures below) and vignette studies (Hechter et al., 1993).

At the macro level, most cross-cultural scholars suggest that a major aspect of variation in culture is captured through understanding a society’s values. The widely utilized individualist-collectivist dimension (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tirandis, 1995), for example, suggests that Western and Eastern cultures fundamentally differ on the values they prioritize and that guide their interpretations and perceptions of the social world. This distinction has been heavily researched, with much support (e.g., Grimm, Church, Katigbak, & Reyes, 1999), however, it is not without criticism (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). For example, these differences may only appear at the highest

levels of abstraction and thus be overstated (D'Andrade, 2008). Certainly, this approach obscures within-nation variation. Schwartz (2011) suggests that the typical measurement of macro-values – aggregating individual responses – misrepresents and obscures national-level value consensus.

One of the most influential theories linking values to macro-social changes involves Inglehart's Modernization thesis (e.g., 1977, 1990, 1997, 2006), which argues that Western societies are engaged in a shift from “materialist” to “postmaterialist” values (see also Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). Put differently, political conflicts in less modernized societies revolve around issues of law and order and economic stability, but as societies develop, they shift to more quality-of-life issues as they are able to take general economic security for granted. Inglehart and Baker (2000) demonstrate that societies shifting toward less absolute, more relative values do so in a path-dependent way, such that the general modernization trend is influenced by the cultural tradition (measured by national religious tradition), such that this shift occurs differentially in different aspects of Europe, Africa, Asia, and so forth.

Another aspect of modernization is the general increase in secular values that occurs concurrently with economic development. An exception is the United States, which appears to be a particularly odd paring of self-oriented and traditional-religious values (e.g., Baker, 2005; Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Nevitte & Cochrane, 2006). The American context appears peculiar in the fundamental contradictory impulses toward individualism and belonging to groups that appear at the root of American culture (Baker, 2005; Hewitt, 1989), partly stemming from conservative cultural values that interact with the deeply religious substrate of American life that is geared toward prosocial behavior (Malka, Soto, Cohen, & Miller, 2010). American religious values serve as a vehicle for solidarity among the religious but contribute to the drawing of strict boundaries signaling a lack of acceptance of non-believers (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006).

Perhaps the most widely employed model of values comes from Shalom Schwartz, whose cross-cultural analyses (1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990) consistently report that that people in literate countries recognize the following ten values, each defined in terms of its motivational goal:

Hedonism: self-centered sensual gratification

Stimulation: encourage risk taking and adventure

Self-Direction: autonomous thought and action

Universalism: tolerance and concern for welfare of all others

Benevolence: preserve and enhance welfare for those one frequently contacts

Conformity: self-restraint, subordinating one's inclinations to others' expectations

Tradition: traditional and religious activities

Security: stability, safety, and harmony of society, relationships and self

Power: status and prestige, control people and resources

Achievement: competitive personal success

These values are empirically arrayed in a circular fashion (see Fig. 11.1), with neighboring values (like hedonism and stimulation) likely related; also, people who report feeling concerned about one portion of the circle tend to be less concerned with the opposite (e.g., conformity is the opposite of hedonism). More recently, Schwartz (2006) has developed the Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001), an easier-to-understand, accessible instrument for obtaining reports on individuals' values. This theoretical model finds extensive support with other methods, as well (Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1998; Pakizesh, Gebauer, & Maio, 2007). The empirical model operates across samples and nations, though it best fits the value-structures of students and Westerners (Fontaine, Poortinga, Delbeke, & Schwartz, 2008), and some suggest that only a subset of values are properly measured across European samples (Davidov, 2010).

Values exist at both the cultural and individual levels (Fischer, 2006), and have cognitive and emotional aspects (Marini, 2000). Values' role at the micro level is less clear, given their distal influence on situated action (but see Maio, 2010 for an overview). Individuals in different cultures differ in the extent that they rely on values to guide behavior (Roccas & Sagiv, 2009). Fischer and Schwartz (2011)




Fig. 11.1 Schwartz theoretical model of relations among motivational types of values

find more value-consensus across countries than within, suggesting this weakens claims that culture determines individual values; across cultures, autonomy, relatedness and competence are highly important. They report that conformity values are the only set that seem to be meaningfully shaped by culture (in line with work by Melvin Kohn & Schooler, e.g., 1983).

The domain of behavior also matters; values predict political orientations (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010) – to a greater extent than demographic predictors – with universalism/benevolence values being related to left orientations and tradition/conformity values explaining right orientations in liberal and traditional countries. The relationship is less clear in post communist countries (Purko, Schwartz, & Eldad, 2011). Political message framing becomes important, with particular frames interacting with individual values to predict people’s reactions to various groups and issues (e.g., Nelson, Gwiasda, & Lyons, 2011; Ramirez & Verkuyten, 2011). Most scholars currently focus on values as understood by individuals, though D’Andrade (2008) separates values people feel are personally important from those that are attached to institutional roles. He suggests that the values important to being a mother are different than those related to being an entrepreneur, and argues that this creates conflicts for people within multifaceted societies.

Less is known about how values influence individual action, but evidence is increasing that values are related to concrete behaviors, even to the extent that making a particular value salient induces behaviors more in line with that particular value (e.g., Tao & Au, 2011), and potential allegiance to one’s country (Roccas, Schwartz, & Amit, 2010). Studying values allows a window into the importance of subjective understanding for social action (Hechter, 2000), and evidence suggests values motivate behavior (e.g., Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Feather, 1995; Karp, 2000; Schwartz, 2004). Self-transcendence values, for example, are important portions of a model predicting prosocial behavior (Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2011). Affirming one’s core values appears to counteract ego depletion, allowing people to

push through tiring tasks (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). Fundamentally, values are intertwined with emotion, contributing to standards that guide behavior and judgment (Schwartz, 2010).

Values are relatively stable over time, even forming the empirical core of personal identity (Hitlin, 2003), a sense of who a person is across roles and social groups. However, they are not impervious to social influence (Rokeach, 1973). Evidence suggests changes are “not chaotic”, but support the Schwartz perspective such that increasing the importance of any one value leads to a related decrease in the importance of an opposing value (Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009). Schwartz (2005, 2010) suggests that aging changes values, possibly as a result of physiology (hedonism may go as one’s senses decline), and partly as a result of changes in life situations as people transition to adult roles. Scholars must, additionally, focus on reference groups to understand individual value change (Maio et al., 2003).

Values develop in social contexts, with the family being a primary socialization agent (Gecas & Seff, 1990; Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 1986). Interestingly, perceived similarity of values within the family is greater than actual similarity (Whitbeck & Gecas, 1988). Parental values have been extensively shown to be linked to occupational working conditions and then transmitted to children (e.g., Kohn, Slomczynski, & Schoenbach, 1986), with social class thus being a prime shaper of individual values (e.g., Halaby, 2003; Kasser, Koestner, & Lekes, 2002; Kohn, 1969; Kohn, Naoi, Schoenbach, Schooler, & Slomczynski, 1990). This influence appears to extend into adulthood (Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991), perhaps as a combination of both early value-shaping and subsequent selection effects. Family socialization most often occurs from parents to children, though late adolescents can shift parents’ values, while parents also socialize each other (Roest, Dubas, Gerris, & Engels, 2006).

A final influential approach to understanding values at the individual levels examines social value orientations. McLintock (1972) argued that social values are understood as stable preferences for allocating outcomes to oneself or others. This approach often focuses on laboratory based interactions, suggesting that one’s preference for egoistic or altruistic values influences behavior (e.g., McLintock & Liebrand, 1988; Hu & Liu, 2003; Van Lange, 1999), though it has occasionally been extended into specific real life domains (e.g., Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997; Van Vugt, 1997). While there is a criticism of this approach as offering post hoc explanations by observing behavior and deciding if it is self- or other-interested (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005), others (e.g., Simpson & Willer, 2008) find *a priori* categorizations predict meaningful behavioral differences. This may occur partly through perception: people with altruistic orientations are more likely to empathize with others, while egoistic people are more likely to assume all others are acting selfishly (Declerck & Bogaert, 2008).

Attitudes

Attitudes are more proximally related to action than values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992), and in many cases are considered proximal forces representing values (Katz, 1960). Previous reviews highlight the explicit side of attitudes, the overwhelming topic of study for the latter half of the twentieth century (e.g., Howard 1995; Howard & Renfrow 2003; Maio et al., 2003). We present an overview of classical attitude research, and expand this with a special focus on implicit attitudes

Current psychological understandings of attitudes involve the dual-system model, conscious and unconscious. There are attitudes accessible by self-report, and attitudes only accessible through indirect methods like the popular Implicit Association Test (discussed below). Put differently, psychologists offer a wide range of support for the colloquial saying that we can be of “two minds” about attitude objects (see Wilson, 2002); for example, we may feel prejudice towards groups or ideologies that we wish we did not feel, perhaps having to override ‘hot’ feelings with ‘cold’ calculation to live up to our own ideals (see Devine, 1989; Devine & Sherman, 1992).

Classical Understandings of Attitudes: Attitudes are evaluations about objects, be they material, social or ideal. Classically, attitudes were conceived of as having a unidimensional positive vs. negative nature (see Maio et al., 2003 for details). People formed positive or negative associations with events, people, concepts, and other objects through experience and association of them with other attitudes and objects. More recent work complicates this picture a bit, highlighted by the classic Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) model that moderates the strength of an attitude based on relevant beliefs about the circumstances behind that attitude as well as the subjective belief about that object's relation to the social world. This model allows a positive attitude about something (e.g., a political candidate) to be moderated by a belief that the object has a low probability of success (e.g., winning an election).

More recently, the *tri-partite model of attitudes* has gained currency (Zanna & Rempel, 1988). Attitudes are, in this view, compellations of beliefs, feelings, and behavioral predispositions that combine in complicated ways toward developing an overall positive or negative sense of an object. In this view, components of the attitude might be in conflict, painting a different picture about the nature of positive or negative affect and importantly including a notion of 'behavioral predisposition' demonstrating that attitudes contain an implicit sense of action toward or away from the object.

Attitudes can be both enduring and influenced by contextual factors. Attitudes that are more central to a person's sense of self become more chronically accessible (Higgins, 1996) and demonstrate more stability across time and situation. Less important attitudes are more susceptible to situational pressures and persuasion attempts (see Bohnet & Dickel, 2011). These latter attitudes reflect a constructionist view of attitude formation that differs from the classical perspective. These newer views suggest that attitudes are formed based on the evaluations of the information presented about a concept in a particular context. According to this view, attitudes towards President Obama are based on stored information that only becomes relevant when the topic is brought up; these attitudes are not chronically salient as normal dispositions. So unless the President is being discussed, the individual's potential attitude would not be active and would be irrelevant to situated behavior.

Traditional explicit attitudes are measured through self-report instruments in which individuals are asked to indicate or rank their feelings about a particular concept. A typical example is found in Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan (1997) and their examination of whites' attitudes towards blacks; they asked respondents to rate their feelings about blacks on a Likert scale. This study showed a major improvement in white acceptance of blacks over four decades, and relies on the assumption that individuals are telling the truth about their beliefs and can recall them. These assumptions, however, are oftentimes not met. For one thing, self-reports of attitudes are of limited use where strong normative pressures shape responses (Srivastava & Banaji, 2011). Alternatively, attitudes can change once introduced to new memories about an object. According to the PAST (Past Attitudes are Still There) model (Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006), attitudes change when new information is introduced which contradicts the information stored in the individual's memory that comprised the original attitude. This new information causes the previous information to be "tagged" as false. Once this happens, the previous information becomes dated and perceived as invalid or wrong. If the new information is not tagged as false, the model predicts that both old and new attitudes can be activated at the same time and the attitude that is more strongly associated with the object would emerge. In one experiment Petty and colleagues conducted testing the model's implication that attitude change leads to ambivalence towards the object, subjects took an attitude assessment on political issues. The subjects then received stimuli to either reinforce or change their attitudes towards a particular issue based on their original political evaluations. Results showed that explicit attitudes of those who received the change stimuli had unchanged attitudes towards the issue. However, implicit attitudes for those who received the change stimuli became more neutral towards the issue. They conclude that adding new information about an object creates implicit ambivalence as a result of the two pieces being simultaneously processed.

Attitudes determine how individuals process information. Individuals tend to look for materials and stimuli that confirm their attitudes while avoiding information that contradict them. As individuals discuss and advocate for their attitude to convince others they begin to believe it more themselves. This is the “saying is believing” phenomenon (SIB) as explained by (Higgins and Rholes, 1978).

Implicit Attitudes. Implicit attitudes develop within a schematic categorization system that the human mind uses to cluster cognitively structured information. Similar information is lumped into efficient categories, with dissimilar information placed into separate categories in order to efficiently process social information (Howard, 1994). For example, we don’t consciously think about a chair as having four legs and a back every time we see one; instead, that collective grouping of information is lumped into the cognitive structure of ‘chair’. Humans mentally create ideal types from these structures that contain necessary characteristics and attributes. This is the basis for developing implicit attitudes.

Greenwald and Banaji (1995) define *implicit attitudes* as, “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social aspects.” Implicit attitudes develop from previous experience and are activated without conscious awareness. They are vital for sociological inquiry as they influence judgments, perceptions, and actions toward that particular attitude object. Recent evidence supports the contention that implicit measures of attitudes are stronger predictors of behavior than explicit measures, in situations where social desirability shapes the explicit measures (Srivastava & Banaji, 2011).

Implicit attitudes demonstrate important behavioral implications across a range of actions such as racial discrimination, political preferences and voting patterns (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2009). Oftentimes the individual is not even aware of their implicit attitudes because they are unavailable for introspection and self-report (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). As a result, implicit attitudes must be measured indirectly, a core difference from studying explicit attitudes.

Measurement. There are four primary methods for measuring implicit attitudes: (1) the Implicit Association Test (IAT); (2) the priming method; (3) the Go/No Go Association Test (GNAT) and (4) the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP). The IAT (Greenwald, 1989) is currently the dominant method. The IAT is a computer-based categorization task in which participants very rapidly categorize terms or pictures associated with two selected social categories (e.g., white or black) as well as terms associated with two evaluative categories (e.g., good or bad). The social and evaluative categories are combined and participants’ response times (how long it takes them to match the terms to the categories) are measured (in milliseconds). This tradition (<https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/>) provides a great deal of evidence that individuals respond more quickly when terms associated with personally relevant categories are paired with pleasant or positive words as opposed to terms paired with unpleasant words. The extent that this positive association reduces reaction time demonstrates an implicit preference for the in-group, suggesting that shorter responses reflect faster implicit processing associating positive ideas with the in-group. On the other hand, if individuals respond more quickly when in-group exemplars are paired with unpleasant words and out-group exemplars are paired with pleasant words; this signals an implicit out-group preference. For example, Greenwald & McGhee (1998) found that whites had an implicit in-group preference because they responded more quickly when ‘white’ was matched with ‘pleasant’ and ‘black’ was matched with ‘unpleasant’. The quicker association of ‘white’ and ‘pleasant’ indicates a positive implicit in-group bias.

Before the popular IAT was developed, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986) developed the priming method, where individuals are presented with pictures of the social objects and then asked to associate positive or negative evaluative terms as quickly as possible. For example, individuals may be primed with images of cockroaches and then asked to associate several evaluative terms (e.g., pleasant, disgusting). Individuals who report few errors and quick associations with negative terms indicate a negative implicit attitude toward this object. As with the IAT, priming activates implicit

attitudes that are reflected in the latency in association with evaluative terms. In other words, those with negative implicit attitudes towards cockroaches would be able to more quickly associate the negative terms than the positive terms.

The go/no go association task (GNAT) method is another computerized measure of implicit attitudes (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). It consists of two blocks in which individuals see a social object and pair it with positive and negative evaluation terms. One evaluative term (e.g., good) is flashed on the screen with other 'distracter' terms and the participant is told to press the space bar when the correct term is present (go) and to not press anything when the correct term is not present (no-go). Then the participant must complete this same matching process with the other evaluative term (e.g., bad). Quicker and more accurate associations with one evaluative term determine the strength and direction of the individual's implicit attitude. Nosek & Banaji (2001) suggests this as an alternative method to the IAT because it has several features that the IAT does not have, including the ability to analyze implicit cognition towards individual concepts without the necessity of making a side-by-side comparison. It also allows for multiple forms of analysis. It can report implicit biases through response latencies like the traditional IAT and it can assess the accuracy of the responses. The go/no go nature of the measure allows for the assessment of errors.

A final measure of implicit cognition, the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) stands apart from the other measures mainly because it does not prime individuals by quick exposure to stimuli (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). This method primes the individual with the social object long enough for the object to be consciously observed. After that period, participants are shown neutral stimuli and asked to dichotomously evaluate them as either 'more pleasant than average' or 'less pleasant than average'. The logic of the method is that the implicit attitudes that individuals possess towards an object will be misattributed towards the neutral stimuli. The positive/negative evaluations of the neutral items represent implicit attitudes towards the primed object. Payne and colleagues used this procedure to measure implicit attitudes of presidential candidates, using several pictures of Democratic and Republican candidates as primes and Chinese pictographs as neutral stimuli. They found implicit bias as measured by the procedure was positively correlated with actual voting patterns.

Behavioral Implications. Implicit measures are gaining popularity due to increasing evidence of their validity for predicating accordant behaviors. The IAT has been shown to successfully predict a range of behavior from cola brand preferences (Maison, Greenwald, & Bruin, 2004) to political voting preferences. For example, Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner (2002) demonstrated that whites with negative implicit attitudes were less friendly to black confederates, whereas people with more positive implicit attitudes were friendlier. Greenwald, Poehlman, et al. (2009) and Greenwald, Smith, et al. (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of the predictive power of implicit and explicit attitudes and report a consistent correlation between implicit attitudes and behavior across several different types of behavior ($r=.274$), such as drug use, racial preferences and political preferences. Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles, and Monteith (2003) highlighted behavioral implications of blacks' implicit attitudes, finding blacks with an out-group bias believed that their group is less competent than the high status group (whites). Black participants told that they would be completing an intellectually challenging task rated potential black and white partners on how much they would like to work with this person. Results showed that the less black participants implicitly preferred their group, the lower their preference for a black work partner, even when controlling for explicit attitudes relating to partner preference. Additionally, blacks' implicit attitudes show more of an out-group bias when they were more invested in the task.

Correll, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2002) found further evidence of the behavioral consequences of negative implicit attitudes by creating a computer simulation of an experience of a police officer in confrontation with a potentially dangerous criminal. In this simulation, the participant was told to decide on whether to shoot the suspect in pursuit, with Correll and colleagues examining the influence of the suspect's ethnicity on that decision. They used a videogame to show black and a white male

target holding either a gun (scenario 1) or a non-threatening object (scenario 2); participants were told to only shoot the suspects who were armed. Results support the importance of implicit attitudes; both black and white subjects responded much faster and with more accuracy to African Americans with guns and whites without guns, demonstrating how implicit biases significantly influence behavioral decisions when the decisions are made rapidly and un-consciously. Correll, Park, Judd, Wittenbrink, and Sadler (2007) later replicated this research with samples of trained police officers and community members (as opposed to college students in the original study) and found that police officers were better able than community members to make correct shoot/don't shoot decisions of black and white targets. Although implicit racial biases are common, training and practice can increase an individual's ability to control their tendency to discriminate based on these biases.

Greenwald, Smith, et al., (2009) showed predictive validity of the AMP measure, in addition to the IAT, examining the effect of white and black racial attitudes on voting behavior. Those with implicit preferences for blacks on both the IAT and AMP implicit measures were significantly more likely to have expressed their voting preference for Presidential Candidate Barack Obama than those who displayed white implicit preferences. Positive implicit attitudes towards alcohol are also correlated with more alcohol use (Houben, Nosek, & Wiers, 2009). Nosek and Smyth (2011) found that women who implicitly endorsed the stereotype that men are better in math had lower math scores than those who did not implicitly endorse these stereotypes.

Implicit vs. Explicit Attitudes. Evidence is mixed on the overall correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes. Correlations range from .27 to .56, depending on the topic (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). There are two theoretical explanations of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes. One explanation says that these are two separate processes that predict behavior in different ways (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Although implicit and explicit attitudes correlate with each other across a variety of domains, models with distinct variables for the IAT and the self-report attitude measures provided a better fit than those with a combined attitudes assessment (Nosek and Smyth, 2007). A second theoretical explanation for the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes come from the MODE theory, which states that implicit and explicit attitudes represent one over-arching stream of attitudes that influences behavior through implicit and explicit processes (Fazio & Olson, 2003). MODE stands for *motivation and opportunity as determinants* of whether the attitude-to-behavior process is primarily spontaneous or deliberative in nature. This approach suggests implicit mechanisms measure deeper, spontaneous aspects of attitudes more insulated from societal pressures and social desirability biases, whereas explicit measures capture attitudes that are more susceptible to these pressures and provide a stronger motivation to deliberate. Explicit attitudes are correlated with behavior at a higher rate across several different behaviors ($r = .361$), but this is only across a certain class of behaviors. For socially sensitive topics, explicit attitudes lose predictive power whereas implicit attitudes did not. Self-reported attitudes towards personality traits and consumer preferences correlated particularly high with actual behaviors, whereas self-reported attitudes towards race and sexual preferences correlated particularly low with behavior (Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009; Greenwald, Smith, et al., 2009). This theory hypothesizes that these differences between implicit and explicit attitudes reflect an individual's motivation to consciously conform to a socially desirable response when reporting his/her attitude.

Four moderators affect the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes: (1) self-presentation; (2) evaluative strength; (3) dimensionality and (4) distinctiveness (Nosek, 2005). *Self-presentation* is the most common moderator of the two attitudes. This moderator reflects the degree to which attitudes are adjusted to fit into social pressures. *Evaluative strength* represents how strongly one possesses an attitude towards a particular object. When attitudes are high in evaluative strength they are more likely to have highly correlated implicit and explicit aspects. For example, if an individual feels particularly passionate about the New York Yankees, their implicit and explicit attitudes are more likely to correspond. *Dimensionality* represents the polarity of object in question. If the attitude represents a

phenomenon where there are two clear opposite poles (e.g., love and hate), they are easier to identify and associate automatically with indirect measures (Judd & Kulik, 1980). This increased ease of association was hypothesized by Nosek (2005) to create provide greater reliability in IAT measures of than non-bipolar concepts, leading to a greater correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes. *Distinctiveness* represents the extent to which the individual believes that their attitude towards a concept is distinct from the cultural norm. For example, an individual living in Los Angeles, who has negative attitudes towards the L.A. Lakers and perceives this attitude to be against the cultural norm, has a distinct attitude towards the Lakers.

Arguments against the study of implicit attitudes suggest that the IAT, the most commonly used measure of implicit attitudes, does not measure implicit prejudice but rather learned stereotypes (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004). While it is true that attitudes stem from knowledge of an object based on learned cultural stereotypes, there is variance in this knowledge across individuals and groups. For example, if implicit attitudes were purely assessments of knowledge then blacks would have equally negative implicit attitudes towards their groups as whites. Although there is no nationally representative data on Black implicit attitudes towards blacks, Internet samples have found blacks to be the only racial group with no positive or negative attitudes towards blacks (Nosek & Banaji, 2001).

Some scholars argue that the behavior shown by people with implicit prejudice is the same as that predicted in a model of rational behavior. The expectancy-value theory of rational behavior states that it is rational to act based on the probabilities of another groups' behavior. They argue that the behavior of feeling more anxiety when around a black person than a white person is a rational behavior in certain societies, but would be wrongfully classified as an implicit prejudice by the IAT (Arkes and Tetlock, 2004). This is an argument that, we suggest, stems from the fact that psychologists have conducted the majority of the research on implicit attitude bias. Sociological research on implicit racial biases, motivated by Quillian (2008), suggests that discriminatory behavior is not based on accurate perceptions of probabilities of a behavior but rather exaggerated perceptions of these probabilities. Quillian and Pager (2001) conducted a survey in which people from a variety a communities were asked questions about the crime rates of their neighborhood. They found that perceptions of crime levels were higher in neighborhoods with more black men and that whites exaggerate the relationship between racial composition and crime rate. The most significant evidence and argument for the relevance of implicit attitudes in sociological research is its ability to predict discriminatory behavior (Lane, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2007).

Future Directions: Implicit bias research continues to focus on the discriminatory implications of implicit attitudes, while turning toward aspects of changes in these attitudes. For example, Sabin, Nosek, Greenwald, and Rivara (2009) gathered IAT data from a large sample of physicians and attorneys to explore implicit biases towards racial minorities. Using the IAT, they found that individuals with JD and MD degrees possessed negative implicit biases toward blacks. Future work should explore how these attitudes contribute to discrimination towards minority clients. Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) experimentally exposed white students to pictures and descriptions of positively viewed black celebrities and negatively viewed white celebrities. Those introduced to these positive exemplars had significantly more positive implicit attitudes towards blacks than those who were not exposed to these exemplars ($d = .82$), an effect that remained 24 h after the original exposure. Joy-Gaba and Nosek (2010) replicated this but found a much smaller increase in implicit attitudes after exposure to the exemplars than the original study ($d = .08$). Also, we do not know enough about implicit attitudes toward racial groups other than whites and blacks.

Lastly, we support attempts to integrate the important notion of symbolic racism with implicit attitudes. *Symbolic racism* suggests individuals no longer endorse the politically incorrect negative feelings towards minorities, but rather endorse attitudes of strong protestant American values of hard work as a means of success in society and attribute the lower achievement levels of blacks and other minorities to a poorer work ethic (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Krysan, 2000). Due to the chameleon

nature of the attitudes as conceptualized in this theory, self-report racial measures cannot measure this concept (Carmines, Sniderman, & Easter, 2011). Implicit measures may be the best way to test whether or not symbolic racism exists (Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009; Greenwald, Smith, et al., 2009), how it operates, and how easy it is to change.

Ideologies

Sociologists can trace an interest in ideology at least back to Marx and Engels' (1846) focus on the power of ideas fostered by the ruling class to reflect their interests and become the taken-for-granted notions of an era. Ideologies are umbrellas for particular constellations of attitudes and values that help people interpret the world. They communicate widely shared beliefs about the world, and anchor the opinions of groups in society as well as the society as a whole (to the extent there is agreement). "Ideologies...endeavor to describe or interpret the world as it is—by making assertions or assumptions about human nature, historical events, present realities, and future possibilities—and to envision the world as it should be, specifying acceptable means of attaining social, economic, and political ideals" (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009 "p. 309"). Social psychologists focus most often on political ideologies, conglomerations of attitudes and values that cohere around general themes of freedom and self-enhancement (conservatives) or benevolence and universal rights (liberals) (Maio et al., 2003). We begin with research on political ideologies, but expand to suggest other socially important ideologies like those about gender and morality.

In the American context, ideologies appear to have been mainstreamed such that there are only facile ideas of multicultural variation, but in practice most people have cohered around an ideology of "voluntarism" (Fischer, 2010), the idea that each person is unique, self-reliant, and ultimately responsible for herself (see also Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985). American attitudes toward race and religion, for example, are more similar than different (Hartmann et al., 2011; see also Evans, 2003). As Baker (2005) puts it, "Most Americans perceive a widespread crisis of values even though Americans have not lost their traditional values...and American society is not split into two polarized camps" (p. 147). This suggests a mismatch between ideology – beliefs about one's society – and the actual distribution of values and attitudes that comprise this ideology. Political divisions appear more pronounced than actual divisions in attitudes and values.

This is not to say that political ideologies do not conflict. A great deal of evidence finds that American political ideologies do implicate quite different moral criterion for making sense of issues and dilemmas (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2009). Ideologies motivate social cognition; for example, American conservatism justifies inequality and appears resistant to change (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). The strongest advocate of this perspective, Jost (2006), reports that the "end of ideology" thesis is quite premature, and offers evidence that meaningful psychological and political differences offer distinctly different potential ideologies in the American context. People may not be able to coherently articulate these ideologies (e.g., Converse, 1964), but evidence suggests that these belief systems have important social import (Jost et al., 2008). Evidence suggests that, especially for those most informed about political issues, a single left-right continuum does an adequate job of mapping political ideology options (Jost et al., 2009).

Gender is another construct that factors into ideologies. *Gender ideologies* can be conceived of as "an individual's level of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the notion of separate spheres" (Davis & Greenstein, 2009), or versions people carry about what it means to be a man or a woman (Hochschild, 1989). Gender ideologies in particular can influence individual identity (Kroska, 2000), and as such ideologies deeply implicate emotions, especially around expectations for household labor (e.g., Hochschild, 1989). They are fundamental lenses through which we make sense of our social worlds (Ridgeway, 2011). These ideologies are shaped in

predictable ways and are influenced by social events like having children or entering the work force (e.g., Kroska & Elman, 2009). Ideologies can come into conflict, as in the ideologies that (1) women should be devoted home, and (2) women should be devoted to work (e.g., Blair-Loy, 2003; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). Societal beliefs can provide a sense of identity as well as undermine it, especially for disadvantaged groups (in this case, women) who cannot possibly fulfill the expectations of competing belief systems.

Trust, as a societal level phenomenon, can be viewed as an intertwined construct with the ideologies of a society. Some worldviews foster wider ranges of trust than others. Evidence suggests that people prefer their ingroups (e.g., Berreby, 2005; Tajfel, 1981), and that two types of trust underlie social relations; trust in a small, familiar in-group and trust in a general, undifferentiated outgroup (Glanville & Paxton, 2007). Trust can be measured by understanding the ‘radiuses’ of those whom people feel trustworthy. The popular survey question that inquires about “would you say ‘most people’ can be trusted” appears to capture the extent people in a society feel they can trust members of an out-group (Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011). People with more education tend to be more trusting (Yamagishi, 2001), as do older people (e.g., Uslaner, 2002). However, race is considered the most important factor predicting levels of trust (Smith, 2010; Uslaner, 2002); there is a large trust gap between blacks and whites (blacks, and other minority groups, report less trust) that does not get explained away by focusing on social class.

A final aspect of ideology that we will briefly touch on is morality. Like trust, morality is a precondition for the existence of society and social interaction (Goffman, 1983; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Rawls, 1987, 2010). Insofar as ideologies contain an image of how the social world ‘should’ be, they implicate moral codes at both the societal and group level. The history of moral philosophy and psychology is quite long, so we merely introduce a few notions important for social psychologists interested in engaging the issue. Importantly, morality is distinct from religion (Bloom, 2011; Smith, 2003). They may be related, but, like values, even the non-religious possess moral orientations. Morality is a special class of human experience; describing a topic as moral, alone, renders people more intolerant of divergent attitudes (Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008) and less likely to engage in debate.

Societal changes have long been hypothesized to shift the basis of collective morality (e.g., Durkheim, 1912/1965); more recently see Hunter, 2000; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987); classical shifts toward larger societal bureaucracies have shifted moral systems into a less emotive, more rational-legal basis. A tension exists in the literature between those advocating a generalized understanding of morality as focusing on justice, rights, and harm (famously Turiel, 1983) and those opening up the understanding of morality to the possibility of plural moral systems (Haidt, 2008; Shweder & Haidt, 1993; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). The modern rush to neuroscientific explanations and models of human morality, while important, can obscure morality’s inextricably social dimensions (Greenwood, 2011); it makes no sense to talk of a human person without understanding how fundamental their moral outlooks are to their sense of self (Hitlin, 2008; Smith, 2003; Taylor, 1989). Haidt and Joseph (2004, 2008) suggest five moral groupings that likely underlie potential approaches to grounding morality across societies: (a) harm/care, (b) fairness reciprocity, (c) ingroup/loyalty, (d) authority/respect, and (e) purity/sanctity.

A long-standing debate, tracing back to Hume and Kant, involves the relative weight of emotion vs. rationality in understanding moral judgment and action (see Haidt, 2006 for an accessible overview; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010 for a more scholarly one; also Hitlin & Vaisey, *in press*). Many focus on the rational aspects of morality (exemplified by Kohlberg, 1981), while others focus on its emotive and intuitive substrate (e.g., Haidt, 2001). The approach of moral heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2007, 2010; see also Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, & Younggren, 2011) is gaining traction, and suggests that situated decisions are not made rationally, alone, but through a complicated interplay between socially shaped cognitive/emotional shortcuts in the face of social pressures. People rarely strive to be what Colby and Damon (1992, 1993) refer to as “moral exemplars”; rather, we seem to be content to

satisfice (Gigerenzer, 2010), to be morally adequate. Instead of striving to be the best person we can be, most people strive to reach a socially acceptable level of moral behavior; we do not necessarily donate as much time or money to charity as possible, but are content instead to perceive giving something as better than nothing. Social reputation appears to be an additional motivation behind altruistic behavior (Willer, 2009; Willer, Feinberg, Irwin, Schultz, & Simpson, 2010).

Conclusion

We end with a recapitulation of the main themes underlying this chapter. First, we stress that each of these constructs reciprocally influences each other. Analytical and theoretical distinctions aid in empirical inquiry, but also gloss over the fundamentally intertwined nature of ideology, values and attitudes. Many scholars suggest that abstract ideologies subsume values, which in turn subsume attitudes (e.g., Katz, 1960), which are most closely linked to real-world objects. As such, attitudes are easier to change than values or ideologies, though even at this level, attitudes that are more central to a person's identity, social networks, and are linked with more other values will prove more resistant to change. Values and ideologies are idealized versions of the world: attitudes are much closer to actual interaction and behavior.

A second important theme is that each of these constructs is fundamentally social in development, enactment, and consequences. There may be rare, genetically hard-wired attitudes, but for the most part these are developed within interaction with significant others, including family, peer networks, and official organizations. This view is fundamental to sociology. Social groups certainly affect shifts in these constructs over time (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Any individual's attitudes are potentially subject for social critique, discussion, and revision, though we tend not to question the most basic values and ideologies that are socialized into our deepest belief systems. At that point, a series of biases – processing information through the lenses of these core values and ideologies – serve to protect them from easy revision, even in the face of social pressure. In the right circumstances, however, many people revisit these belief systems. What is difficult to conceptualize is a person without any such systems at all (Taylor, 1989).

Finally, we present advances in the last decade of a dual-process understanding of human cognition and emotions. This process, anchored in our brains' two systems (empirical intertwined, see Damasio, 1999, 2005), suggests that a major way values and ideologies influence our lives and senses of self is preconsciously, shaping what our minds perceive and monitor within situated interaction, as well as a nonconscious sense of what 'feels' right or just. The biggest advances in measuring this level have been with the studies of attitudes, especially with respect to prejudice, as this level is most closely aligned with behavior. All of these constructs, however, are implicated in both rational and non-rational influences on human behavior. We are not always aware of what we want, and our socialized 'generalized other' (Mead, 1934, famously) may affect our beliefs about our beliefs (e.g., Frankfurt, 1971), such that we are more or less proud of our initial, non-conscious interactions. Future inquiry suggests both levels are important, however, for properly understanding the social actor, within and across situations and the life course.

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Chapter 12

Emotions

Shane Sharp and Jeffrey L. Kidder

Emotions have been a subject of philosophical and scientific inquiry for thousands of years. From Plato's discussion of love in the *Symposium* to Freud's theories of the psychosexual origins of guilt and anxiety, emotions and emotional experience have been an important aspect of many ideas and theories of human behavior and ethical action. Emotions were also an important part of the ideas of some of the founding fathers of sociology, from Marx's (1844/1978) concept of alienation to Weber's (1925/1978) "affective" ideal type of social action to Durkheim's (1912/1995) concept of collective effervescence. In the late 1800s, psychologists and biologists began many scientific investigations on emotions and emotional experiences, stimulated by James' (1884) theory regarding the relationship between physiological arousal and emotional experience and Darwin's (1872) ideas about the evolution of emotional expressions.

Sociological social psychologists were somewhat late arrivals to the study of emotional experiences. The field began in earnest in late 1970s and early 1980s with the publication of the now seminal works of Kemper (1978), Shott (1979), and Hochschild (1979, 1983). Since then, the *sociological social psychology of emotions*—which we define as the scientific study of how social relations, interactions, experiences, and institutions influence, and are influenced by, individuals' emotional experiences—has blossomed into a vibrant sub-field of sociological social psychology that has produced several important theoretical breakthroughs and empirical findings using a variety of methods. The purpose of this chapter is to review this area of inquiry. We will review major schools of thought on emotions and emotional experiences, review some of the recent trends in the study of emotions, and finally suggest avenues of future research.¹

Why Study Emotions?

Besides the fact that emotions are fundamentally psychological phenomena, there are several reasons that sociological social psychologists should be interested in studying emotions. First, emotions are implicit or explicit mechanisms that help explain other social psychological phenomena. To take a

¹There is much overlap between the sociological social psychology of emotions and the sociology of emotions. However, the sociology of emotions also includes theory and research regarding how macrosociological phenomena and processes influence and are influenced by emotional experiences. Readers interested in more macrosociological approaches to emotions should consult Turner and Stets (2005).

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famous example, many of the social interactional dynamics identified by Goffman (1956a) are motivated by trying to avoid embarrassing oneself and others. To take another famous example, Asch's (1955) conformity studies—where he conducted experiments to see if and when individuals would conform to a group even when the group is obviously wrong—implicitly assume that individuals conformed to the majority, even when the majority is wrong, because of the fear associated with nonconformity. As these examples illustrate, much social action is based on individuals trying to experience positive emotions such as happiness and/or avoid experiencing negative emotions such as sadness and anger. As Ekman (2003, p. xxi) writes, people organize their “lives to maximize the experience of positive emotions and minimize the experience of negative emotions....Emotions can override what most psychologists have rather simply-mindedly considered the more powerful fundamental motives that drive [people's] lives: hunger, sex, and the will to survive.” As we will show, most social psychological theories of emotions explicitly or implicitly adopt this perspective concerning emotions and motivation.

That emotions are an integral part of social bonding is yet another reason social psychologists should study emotions. Individuals' bonds with others (or lack thereof) are created and reinforced by individuals' emotional experiences elicited through these bonds (Collins, 2004; Turner, 2000). These social bonds often give rise to emergent social institutions, such as marriage and religion, and thus emotions provide an important piece of the puzzle concerning the perennial question regarding how individual phenomena contribute to institutional phenomena (Turner & Stets, 2005).

A final reason for social psychologists to study emotions is because emotions can help explain macrosocial phenomena. Scholars in social movements have recently noted the importance of emotions in explaining the rise and dynamics of social movements (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001). Some scholars have used emotions to explain wars and national conflicts (Scheff, 1994). Massey (2007) identifies emotions as an important part of the cognitive categorizations that justify, motivate, and perpetuate social stratification.

Definitions: Emotions, Sentiments, Moods, and Feelings

The social psychological literature on emotions uses a variety of terms—such as emotions, sentiments, feelings, affects, and moods—that are often conflated with one another. This conflation is an unfortunate empirical reality, especially given that there are conceptual definitions of each of the terms that allow for analytic and empirical differentiation. We follow the lead of Turner and Stets (2005) and emphasize the term emotions in this review while acknowledging that scholars use other terms to refer to the empirical phenomena of emotions.

Emotions are short-term psychological and physiological states that usually consist of the following five elements: (1) appraisals of situations; (2) physiological changes; (3) gestures that express these emotions to others; (4) linguistic labels that name the combination of physiological changes and expressive gestures; and (5) a “refractory state” during which time individuals cognitively focus on how to resolve or continue the emotional state (Ekman, 2003; Thoits, 1989). For example, individuals experience anger when they are prevented from achieving a desired goal (situational cue). This situational cue causes physiological changes—such as rapid heartbeat and muscle tension—and gestures—such as downward eyebrows and tensed lips in the face and derogatory verbalizations. The assemblage of these factors has its own linguistic term (“anger” amongst English-speaking peoples). During these physiological changes and gestural behaviors, angered individuals experience a refractory state where they focus cognitive attention on how to resolve the anger while ignoring other information in the immediate environment (Ekman, 2003).

As noted, emotions are short-term experiences that typically last anywhere from a few seconds to a few hours. *Moods*, on the other hand, are “slight but continuous” emotional states that can last hours,

days, and even months (Ekman, 2003, p. 5; see also Thoits, 1989). Moods prime and motivate individuals to feel specific emotions; for example, if individuals are in a “happy” mood, they are “ready” to become happy and look for situational cues that will create happy emotions. Unlike emotions, moods do not seem to be elicited by specific situational cues; that is, individuals often are unaware of why they are in an irritable mood but are usually aware of why they are angry (Ekman, 2003).

Sentiments is a term used to refer to what several social psychologists call “social” emotions, or emotions that individuals learn during the socialization process that are elicited through and organized around social relationships and interactions (Cooley, 1902; Gordon, 1981; Thoits, 1989). For example, envy is considered a sentiment because it is elicited through social interaction and organized around social relationships, such as when an individual experiences jealousy after learning that another person acquired something that the individual desired. Other sentiments include such emotions as embarrassment, shame, guilt, pride, and reverence. Sentiments are also called *secondary emotions* (more on this below).

Feelings are the subjective experiences of specific psychological and/or physical states (Thoits, 1989). Feeling is a very general term that encompasses emotions, but also includes physical states such as hunger and pain. The term feeling is also often used to refer to the subjective experiences of emotions by individuals.

Finally, *affect*, like feelings, can simply refer to the subjective aspects of emotional experience. Alternatively, some social psychologists use the term to refer to an individuals’ evaluation of a specific object (Smith-Lovin, 1995; Thoits, 1989). Affect is a term often used in attitudinal research (Schuman, 1995), and some attitude researchers have expanded affect to include three dimensions: (1) evaluation of an object (good or bad), (2) potency (powerful or powerless), and (3) activity (fast or slow). (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957).

Typologizing Emotions

According to Turner and Stets (2005), there are around 100 different types of emotions, each with their own linguistic label, expressions, and specific set of internal sensations. Most social psychologists tend to agree that these emotions can be divided into *primary* and *secondary* emotions. However, this is about as far as agreement goes.

Primary emotions (also called *basic* or *fundamental* emotions) are emotions that are based on fundamental neurobiological processes that are common to all humans; these emotions are believed to have been evolutionarily adaptive and have common facial expressions amongst all humans. While most social psychologists believe that some emotions are primary, there is little consensus as to which emotions are indeed primary. Most social psychologists agree that happiness, anger, fear, and sadness are primary emotions, but several scholars argue that emotions such as surprise, disgust, curiosity, expectation, hope, satisfaction, guilt, boredom, and astonishment should be included on the list. An additional problem is the fact that social psychologists seem to use different terms for the same emotion (cf., Ortony & Turner, 1990); for example, some use the term *anxiety* while others use the term *fear* to refer to the feelings individuals experience when they perceive danger or threat.

Ekman’s (2003) cross-cultural research on facial expressions associated with emotions suggests that *happiness*, *anger*, *sadness*, *fear*, *surprise*, *happiness*, *disgust*, and *contempt* are the primary emotions because these emotions and emotional expressions are common to all humans and other apes, are elicited by the same types of situations cross-culturally (e.g., sadness experienced with the death of a child), have distinct, universal physiological responses, and have universally recognized facial and other gestural expressions. These emotions are likely due to a common evolutionary heritage and shared neurobiology and are considered primary (but see Ortony & Turner (1990) for a critique of the idea of using universal expressions of emotions to identify primary emotions). These

emotions (with the possible exceptions of disgust and contempt) also fulfill some of Kemper's (1987) criteria for primary emotions, such as being evolutionarily adaptive, emerging early in life, having differing autonomic patterns, and being cross-culturally universal.

While primary emotions may be universal, socialization into particular cultures and subcultures still influences when and how individuals will experience these emotions. That is, significant others in individuals' lives (especially caretakers) teach the emotional labels associated with each of primary emotions, what factors in the environment should elicit these emotions, and when it is appropriate to express these emotions (Gordon, 1981; Pollak & Thoits, 1989; Russell, 1989). When a child feels flustered and annoyed that another child has taken his toy, the child learns from significant others to associate these feelings with the label "anger." In addition, no human is born with the idea that they should associate a bear growling in the distance with fear; rather, they learn to associate these stimuli with particular primary emotions through the process of socialization. Individuals also learn the various *display rules*—or rules about the appropriateness of expressing certain emotions (Ekman, 2003)—from others; for example, many men in the US are taught gender normative display rules that they should not express sorrow and grief through the act of crying.

Scholars of emotions often use the term *secondary emotions* as a catchall concept that refers to all non-primary emotions. However, a more conceptual definition of secondary emotions would emphasize emotional experiences that are explicitly experienced in and elicited by social relationships and interactions. Such secondary emotions would include love, jealousy, envy, empathy, sympathy, grief, shame, and guilt. Most scholars agree that secondary emotions are in some way derived from primary emotions. Some social psychologists argue that many secondary emotions are socialized derivatives of primary emotions. For example, Kemper (1987) argues that shame, which he defines as the sense that one has acted in an unworthy manner, is a socialized derivative of anger. During socialization, the child learns that others (particular parents) react to undesirable behaviors with anger, and, through the process of internalization and taking the role of the other, the child eventually learns to direct this anger toward him/herself when committing untoward actions.

Most social psychological thought on secondary emotions, however, argues that secondary emotions are mixtures to varying degrees of primary emotions. For example, Kemper (1987) argues that many secondary emotions—such as anxiety, wonder, *schadenfreude*, nostalgia, and grief—are mixtures of the primary emotions of fear, anger, depression, and happiness.

Plutchik (1980, 2002) offers one of the most elaborate taxonomies of secondary emotions. In his "color wheel" model of emotions, Plutchik argues for four diametrically opposed sets of primary emotions that respond to the four big problems of life: (1) identity (membership in social groups), (2) temporality (concerns with sexual reproduction), (3) hierarchy (concerns over power and status), and (4) territoriality (establishing safe places to meet one's needs). Acceptance and disgust respond to the identity problem, happiness and sadness to the temporality problem, anger and fear respond to the hierarchy problem, and anticipation and surprise to the territoriality problem. Plutchik sets these emotions in a wheel (see Fig. 12.1) and argues that secondary emotions are combinations, or dyads, of emotions that are near each other on the primary emotion wheel, just as secondary colors are combinations of primary colors on a color wheel. Primary dyads are mixtures of two neighboring primary emotions (expectation + anger = revenge), secondary dyads are mixtures of two primary emotions that are one over from each other (joy + surprise = delight), and tertiary emotions are mixtures of two primary emotions that are two over from each other (anger + surprise = outrage). Plutchik argues that the primary secondary emotions are more stable than secondary and tertiary secondary emotions. For example, the primary secondary emotion of love is a complete fusion of joy and acceptance, whereas the tertiary emotion of guilt—the combination of joy and fear—is not fused and individuals experience oscillations between joy and fear when experiencing guilt. While bold in its agenda, some social psychologists argue that Plutchik's model is too "mechanical" (Turner, 2000), is based on some emotions that very few consider primary (i.e., acceptance and expectation), and lacks detail as to why some emotions combine easily and why others do not (Ortony & Turner, 1990).

Fig. 12.1 Plutchik's emotion wheel (Adapted from Plutchik, 2002)



Turner (2000) offers a “mixing bowl” model of secondary emotions. Turner argues that there are two general types of secondary emotions: (1) first-order and (2) second-order. First-order secondary emotions are emotions that are a mixture of two primary emotions (in his scheme, satisfaction-happiness, aversion-fear, assertion-anger, and disappointment-sadness) where one primary emotion is dominant in the mixture while the other is subordinate, just like there is more flour than baking soda in a cake mixture. For example, the mixture of “three-parts” aversion-fear and “one-part” satisfaction-happiness produces the emotions of awe, reverence, and veneration. Second-order secondary emotions, on the other hand, are secondary emotions that are mixtures, in various amounts, of three primary emotions. Turner identifies two main second-order secondary emotions: (1) shame (a combination of, in order of dominance, disappointment-sadness, assertion-anger, and aversion-fear) and (2) guilt (a combination of, in order of dominance, disappointment-sadness, aversion-fear, and assertion-anger). Turner admits that his model is “wild-eyed” speculation, but it is an important step forward in conceptualizing secondary emotions since the model hypothesizes that secondary emotions can be the combination of three, and perhaps more, primary emotions.

Most social psychologists also agree that individuals can experience emotions of various levels of intensity (Plutchik, 1980; Turner, 2000). For example, Turner argues that emotions have three levels of intensity: high, medium, and low. For example, low intensity happiness leads to feelings of contentment, medium intensity leads to cheerfulness, and high intensity leads to exhilaration.

Methods and Measures in the Study of Emotions

Researchers have used all of the major methods of sociological social psychology—experiments, surveys, ethnographies, and in-depth interviews—in the study of emotions. The methods used often depend on the specific questions regarding emotions that the researcher is attempting to answer and the theoretical framework that the research is employing. All of these methods have their strengths and pitfalls in regards to the study of emotions.

Experimental research in emotion often manipulates key variables to see if these variables elicit hypothesized emotional reactions. For example, in a laboratory setting Stets (2005) manipulated identity

feedback and familiarity with the provider of feedback to investigate how these factors influence emotional experiences. While the primary strength of the experimental study of emotions is that researchers can make stronger claims about the causes of emotions due to experimental manipulation of variables and the control of extraneous variables, a key weakness is that external validity of the findings may be suspect given that the results come from such controlled and often nonrealistic settings.

Survey research in emotion consists of asking a relatively large and representative sample of individuals about their emotional experiences and measuring other social, psychological, and demographic variables. Researchers then perform statistical analyses of these measures to test hypotheses regarding emotional experiences and outcomes. A popular and nationally representative survey dataset on emotions is the 1996 Emotions Module of the General Social Survey, which a number of researchers have used to test hypotheses and investigate sociodemographic predictors of emotional outcomes (e.g., Lively, Steelman, & Powell, 2010; Simon & Nath, 2004). A strength of surveys includes providing researchers with data they can use to estimate population parameters regarding emotions. Moreover, surveys can provide data that researcher can use to test competing hypotheses concerning emotional experiences that are generalizable to larger populations. However, a key weakness of surveys is that data often do not allow researchers to specify the mechanisms or processes that explain the association between specific variables and emotional outcomes.

Ethnographic research on emotions consists of investigating individuals' emotional reactions in real-world settings and situations. For example, Hochschild (1983) conducted participant observation with flight attendants and bill collectors to investigate how these employees conduct emotional labor. A strength of the ethnographic method in investigating emotions is that researchers can document and theorize about emotional dynamics in real-world settings. Ethnographic research can also help identify the cognitive, interactional, and institutional mechanisms between specific variables and emotional outcomes discovered in survey research. However, a pitfall of this method is that causal claims concerning emotional experiences are suspect and, given the trading in of breadth for depth, generalizing the emotional dynamics identified in one context to other contexts can be difficult, especially when contexts are vastly dissimilar.

In-depth interview research on emotions consists of asking a usually small sample of individuals open-ended questions about issues pertaining to their emotional experiences. Such questions allow individuals to describe in detail the gamut and intensity of the emotions they experienced, what attributes of situations elicited these emotional responses, and how they reacted to these emotional responses. For instance, Sharp (2010) conducted in-depth interviews with victims of intimate partner violence to show how individuals use prayer to manage negative emotions caused by stressful situations. The strengths and weaknesses of in-depth interviewing for the study of emotions are similar to those of ethnography; while in-depth interviews can help identify the mechanisms that explain the association between particular variables and emotional outcomes and can help researchers theorize about emotions in real-world settings, generalizing the results of such investigations to other populations can be difficult.

What most of the above methods have in common is that they all tend to use self-reports as measures of emotional experiences; experimenters will give participants paper-and-pencil tests regarding their emotional experiences during the course of experiments, survey researchers will ask respondents a series of close-ended questions about their emotional experiences, and in-depth interviewers will ask respondents open ended questions about their emotional responses in the past. Such use of self-reports is not surprising, given the highly subjective nature of emotional experiences. Some researchers (mostly experimenters) have used physiological indicators—such as heart rate and blood pressure—to measure emotions; however, this problematically assumes a correspondence between a specific emotion and specific physiological indicators (cf., Schachter & Singer, 1962). Turner and Stets (2005) argue that researchers should use more observations of respondents' emotional expressions (e.g., vocal inflections, facial expressions) to measure emotions. The use of observations, however, is fraught with difficulty. Social and situational norms may inhibit the full expression

of experienced emotions, and the telltale signs of mildly felt emotions (which are often elicited in experimental situations) are often hard for people to read (Ekman, 2003; Hochschild, 1983).

Biology, Culture, and Emotional Experience

Emotions are an integral aspect of social actors' lives. Because emotions seem to emanate from deep within a person's being, many scholars argue that emotions are an essentially physiological component of human biology. Perhaps most famously, Darwin (1872) argued that all humans experienced the same emotional sensations and this universality derived from our evolution from a common ancestor. Over the years, evolutionary biologists have expanded on Darwin's research into emotions. For example, McNaughton (1989) argues that the human tendency to cry when upset can be explained as an evolutionary adaptation because crying serves as a method for excreting excess bio-chemicals built up in the body during certain emotional states. Neuroscientists have also attempted to understand how the human brain's physical structure and organization dictate individual emotional responses (Hariri & Forbes, 2007).

In an effort to understand the evolutionary inherited aspects of emotion, Ekman (2003) spent decades studying the similarities in facial expressions across diverse societies. Ekman acknowledges that while every culture has *display rules* for when and how individuals can appropriately act out particular feelings, he nevertheless argues for the universality of certain emotions. Like Darwin, Ekman argues that basic emotions are part of humanity's genetic make-up, and facial movements (e.g., the raising of the eyebrows or the curling of the lips) are the essential means by which individuals communicate (intentionally or not) what emotions they experience.

For many social psychologists, however, biological determinative explanations of emotions are problematic. Namely, the physiological aspects of emotions (e.g., increased heart rates, sweat, rapid breathing, etc.) and the facial expressions individuals make when they feel them fail to address how emotional states are interpreted and acted upon by the individuals experiencing and witnessing them; an angry New Guinean, for example, might look very similar to an angry New Yorker, but the social and cultural context in which their anger is enacted and discussed will result in divergent interpretations (Lutz, 1988; Rosaldo, 1984; Solomon, 1976). This is true for both the person who is angry and for anyone witnessing the display. In the United States, for example, certain performances of anger are valorized (Bailey, 1983), but in other cultures anger is feared and rarely expressed (Levy, 1973) or ascribed to the foolishness of children (Briggs, 1970).

Essential to most social psychological approaches to emotions is an attention to socialization in the personal embodiment and external expression of emotions. Take the example of fear. Being mugged at gunpoint and voluntarily parachuting from a plane are both frightening, but the latter experience of fear is positive, arising from a culture that increasingly valorizes adventure and risk-taking (cf. Holyfield, 1999; Lyng, 1990). Thus, the social psychological study of emotions, perhaps more than any other subfield in our discipline, underscores how biology is not destiny. Humans may have evolved in a way that predisposes us to certain physiological responses, but these responses, in and of themselves, do not reveal all the aspects of human emotional experience.

Theoretical Approaches to Emotions

There are several major theoretical paradigms in the sociological social psychological study of emotions. Although most these paradigms share common assumptions about emotional experiences and expression, they all have different analytical focuses and often come to different conclusions about the role of emotions in social life.

Classical Sociological Theory and Emotions

Emotional experiences play an important role in many classical sociological theories. The foundation of Marx's critique of capitalism rests on the concept of alienation. Wage labor and factory production, according to Marx (1844/1978), *alienates* individuals from their humanity. Instead of identifying with their labor and enjoying the process of production, alienated workers feel unfulfilled—confronting themselves and the world around them as something alien to their being. The experience of alienation, thus, has clear emotional components: boredom, sadness, and frustration. Simmel would later develop a similar critique of modern life, but his focus was not on the factory floor but on urban living. For Simmel (1908/1971), the modern city was both stimulating and anomic. Cut off from traditional norms and mores and awash in constant changes to the environment, urbanites developed a *blasé* outlook towards life to avoid being cognitively overwhelmed. This *blasé* outlook was a mood Simmel believed to be characteristic of modernity more generally.

Weber (1925/1978) made important distinctions between four different types of social action: *instrumentally-rational* (action based on achieving rewards), *value-rational* (action based on achieving valued ends), *traditional* (action based on following traditions), and *affectual* (action based on emotional motivations). Unfortunately, Weber focused mostly on the first two types of action, leaving affectual action relatively undertheorized.

Durkheim was even more concerned with modernity's effects on emotional life. Durkheim (1893/1984, p. 212) believed that individuals in the West were increasingly “unable to escape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purpose?” Without an answer to this existential question, depression and suicide increased. The solution to modernity's malaise, as Durkheim saw it, was to reinvigorate the feeling of social solidarity amongst individuals. Social solidarity (which is a feeling of belonging far more than it is a belief *in* belonging) is the foundation for all social organization according to Durkheim (1912/1995). Ultimately, he argued that society arises out of emotional bonding produced in social gatherings—a concept he labeled *collective effervescence*. Collective events (e.g., football games, rock concerts, religious rituals) produce positive emotions experiences in participants, and these emotional experiences serve to bond individuals together into a collectivity.

In many respects, Cooley's (1902) work represents an important advance in the study of emotions. In his theory of the *looking-glass self*, Cooley argued that individuals interpret gestures from others to define their selves. An important part of this process is whether individuals feel pride or shame in how others view them. Individuals feel shame when they feel that others have negatively evaluated them, and pride when they feel others have positively evaluated them. For Cooley, these emotions were a core part of individuals' self-concepts and helped explain social control and organization.

Social Structural Approaches to Emotions

Sociologists define a social structure as a persistent pattern of social relationships where individuals fulfill specific roles or positions that carry specific behavioral expectations and provide individuals with varied amounts of *status*—or the prestige associated with a particular role or position—and *power*—or the ability to realize one's will even if others resist (Weber, 1925/1978). Several social psychologists have theorized and researched how the roles or positions individuals occupy influence their emotional experiences.

The main proponent of investigating how social structure influences emotions is Kemper (1978, 2007). Kemper theorizes that emotions are the result of the real, anticipated, and imagined vacillations in one's status and power that occur in social interactions and relationships. According to Kemper, these structural processes are universal and linked to underlying physiological processes. The emotions experienced during these interactions are the natural outcome of them, even though culture sometimes tries to teach individuals to experience other types of emotions during these interactions.

Kemper identifies three general classes of emotions: (1) structural, (2) anticipatory, and (3) consequent. *Structural emotions* are emotions that individuals experience within relatively stable relationships. According to Kemper, in every stable social relationship and interaction both the self and other perceive that they have an adequate, excessive, or insufficient level of status and power related to their social positions. These perceptions affect the structural emotions individuals experience. In regards to power, when an individual perceives that self and/or other has an adequate level of power, she experiences the emotions of safety and security. When the individual perceives that he has too much power and the other has too little power, he will experience guilt. If the individual perceives that the other has too much power and the self too little power, he will experience fear and anxiety. In regards to status, if the individual perceives that self and/or other have sufficient status, then he will experience contentment and happiness. When the individual perceives that she has too much status and the other has too little status, she will experience guilt if caused by the self or shame/embarrassment if caused by the other. However, if the individual perceives that he has too little status, he will experience sadness and depression if low status is caused by self, or anger if the low status is perceived as caused by the other or an outside third party.² The vacillations of perceptions of power and status in interactions leads to 81 possible outcomes in any interaction (e.g., one could gain status but lose power while the other could gain power but lose status). Each of these possible outcomes is associated with a specific set of emotions experienced by the individual.

Anticipatory emotions are emotions that occur when individuals imagine future power and status outcomes of interaction. According to Kemper, anticipatory emotions come from two factors: (1) optimism-pessimism and (2) confidence-lack of confidence. A history of successful interactions—defined as having gained status and having an adequate amount of power—will lead to optimism, while interactional failures will lead to pessimism. If individuals believe a future interaction will be successful in terms of power and/or status, they will have confidence, and, conversely if they believe that the interaction will be unsuccessful they will experience a lack of confidence. These two factors interact to produce specific types of anticipatory emotions; for example, optimism plus confidence will create the emotional experience of serene confidence, while pessimism plus lack of confidence will create the emotional experience of hopelessness. When the actual outcomes of interaction are accounted for, Kemper hypothesizes specific emotional experiences; for instance, for an individual experiencing serene confidence, if the interaction is status-power favorable, then he will experience mild satisfaction, but if the outcome is unfavorable he will experience consternation (see Kemper, 2007, p. 102) for a full listing of anticipatory emotions and subsequent outcome emotions).

Consequent emotions are emotions that are the immediate result of ongoing interactions. Consequent emotions are the result of structural emotions, anticipatory emotions, interaction outcomes, which party (self, other, or third party) caused the outcome of the interaction, and whether the individual likes their interactional partner, which is determined by whether the other confers status upon the individual. Kemper (2007) admits that there are many theoretical and empirical problems to overcome in the study of consequent emotions.

There is empirical support for Kemper's social structural model of emotional experience. Lovaglia and Houser (1996) found that, when given high status in a task-oriented group, individuals experience positive emotions. Simon and Nath (2004) found that individuals of low status and power in American society (women, the young, those with low education and income) experience fewer positive emotions and more negative emotions than individuals with high status and power (men, older, those with high education and income). Interestingly, they found that household income accounted for the differences in which men and women experience negative emotions, suggesting that inhabiting positions of low status and power cause individuals to experience negative emotions. In an investigation of the correlates of the expression of anger, Lively and Powell (2006) found that individuals are more likely to express anger at a low status or equal status target than a higher status target. This study suggests that

²According to Kemper (2007, p. 101), an other having excessive status is a somewhat "null category" since status is freely given.

status interactional dynamics that influence emotional expression are in many ways similar to the status interactional dynamics of emotional experience. Stets and Asencio (2008) found that the power and status of individuals influences whether they feel positive emotions about positive feedback from superiors, a finding which supports some of Kemper's ideas about the emotional outcomes of anticipatory emotions.

Social psychologists working in the expectation states paradigm have also investigated how power and status influence emotional experiences in task groups. According to the expectation states paradigm, the power structure of a task-oriented group—as measured by an individual's overall ability to participate and contribute to the task and whether others in the group adopt an individual's ideas—is influenced by implicit performance expectations that individuals have of fellow group members. Group members often form performance expectations from the *status characteristics*, or attributes that are culturally associated with esteem and overall competence, of group members. In American culture, whites, men, and professionals have high status because these individuals have more social esteem and because of the prevailing cultural belief that they have high levels of competency. Expectation states theory has theorized and shown that, in task groups, the status characteristics of individuals are self-fulfilling, with the power structure of the group reflecting prevailing cultural beliefs about individuals of different attributes.

While expectation states theorists focus mostly on group members' contributions to the group task, these scholars have also begun to investigate the role status plays in the emotions experienced by group members. Ridgeway and Johnson (1990) argue that there is a specific interaction between perceived status characteristics and emotional experiences. For example, when a person of lower status relative to an other has a disagreement with this other, she is more likely to attribute the disagreement to herself and consequently experience sadness. However, if the person has equal or higher status than an other, she is more likely to attribute the disagreement to the other and consequently experience anger and frustration. Moreover, group members who experience sadness because they attribute disagreements to themselves are less likely to express these emotions. Thus, low status individuals are “doubly constrained” in task-oriented groups because they have limited opportunities to establish competence and express negative emotions toward other group members. There is empirical support for these ideas (Lively & Powell, 2006).

A current debate regarding emotions in expectation states theory is whether emotions held in regard to others are constitutive of status or moderate the effects of status in groups. According to the constitutive model (Fişek & Berger, 1998; Shelly, 2001), emotions held toward a person—whether positive or negative—act as status elements that influence expectations and behavior in groups. For instance, group members will expect that fellow members they hold positive emotions toward are more competent at the group task than members they do not like. According to the moderator model (Bianchi, 2005; Bianchi & Lancianese, 2007; Driskell & Webster, 1997), emotions held toward a person do not act as status characteristics, but moderate how much individuals rely solely on performance expectations in giving other group members influence. For instance, group members may give fellow members possessing low status more opportunities to participate in the group task if they hold positive emotions towards them. Although there is empirical support for both models, the weight of evidence to date supports the moderator model.

Emotion Management and Emotional Labor

One of the largest areas of research in the sociological social psychology of emotions is how individuals manage their emotions in their everyday lives and in the workplace. This area of research began with the work of Hochschild (1979, 1983). Hochschild (1983) defines *emotion management* as the various strategies individuals employ to change the emotions that they experience or to change their

outward expressions of the emotions that they are feeling. There are two main reasons that individuals perform emotion management strategies. The first reason is to try to mitigate or stop the experience of negative emotions and to create positive emotions; as noted above, a common assumption in the study of emotions is that individuals want to experience positive emotions and avoid negative emotions. For example, Cahill and Eggleston (1994) show the various strategies wheelchair users adopt to avoid experiencing embarrassment. Schrock, Boyd, and Leaf (2009) found that transsexuals engage in emotion management to deal with the anxiety elicited during everyday interactions, and Sharp (2010) found that victims of intimate partner violence often used prayer to manage the fear, anger, and sadness caused by their experiences of abuse.

The second reason individuals manage their emotions is to align emotional experiences and outward gestures with the feeling rules of the situation. *Feeling rules* are the cultural norms of emotional experiences and expression for a given situation; for example, individuals are supposed to feel sad at funerals and happy at weddings in American society.³ When individuals' emotions do not align with the feeling rules of a situation, they align their emotional expressions through strategies of surface acting and/or deep acting. *Surface acting* occurs when individuals actively try to change their emotional expressions but not the experienced emotions, and *deep acting* is where individuals actively try to change the emotions that they are experiencing. For example, if one does not initially experience sadness at a funeral, the individual could surface act and insincerely perform expressions of sadness (weeping, moaning) or deep act and try to make herself feel sad by remembering a tragic event in her past. When individuals do not align their emotions and emotional expressions with the feeling rules of the situation, they are "emotionally deviant" (Thoits, 1985, 1990) and this is often interpreted as a sign of stress and, if chronic, mental illness.

Individuals use both behavioral (through action) and cognitive (through thought) strategies to manage their emotions on the surface and deep acting levels (Thoits, 1990). Behaviorally, people manage their emotions by changing their physiological symptoms (e.g., taking drugs), performing expressive gestures (e.g., catharsis), and acting toward the situational cues that have caused the emotion (e.g., confronting someone who has caused anger). Cognitively, people manage their emotions by changing their physiological symptoms (e.g., meditation), cognitively performing expressive gestures (e.g., expressing emotions in fantasy), reinterpreting the emotions that they are feeling (e.g., telling themselves that the emotion they are feeling is happiness rather than sadness), and dealing with the situational cues that have caused the emotion through thought processes (e.g., reinterpreting the situation, distraction).

There is also a temporal dimension to emotion management. In their study of transsexuals' everyday emotion management, Schrock et al. (2009) differentiate between preparatory, in situ, and retrospective emotion management. Preparatory emotion management is when an individual employs strategies that increase the likelihood of achieving or avoiding emotions at some future time; for example, transsexuals engage in preparatory emotion management by only going to public places they consider "safe." In situ emotion management is emotion management that occurs during the course of interactions. Retrospective emotion management refers to managing the emotions caused by past experiences; for instance, transsexuals still experiencing negative emotions because of experiences of not "passing" in public manage these emotions by reinterpreting these situations as part and parcel of transitioning between sex statuses.

Emotion management, according to Thoits (1985, 1995), plays a key role in coping with stress. Thoits (1985, p. 228) argues that "stress reactions are *emotional* reactions" (original emphasis) and thus coping with stress is, in a large part, the management of negative emotions such as sadness, fear, and anger. Several researchers have shown that stress leads to negative health outcomes (see Pearlin, 1989, 1999), and a recent review suggests that the chronic experience of negative emotions is

³Hochschild's (1983) concept of feeling rules has a family resemblance to Ekman's (2003) concept of display rules (see section "Typologizing Emotions" above). While both are concerned with the normative aspects of emotional displays, the concept of feeling rules highlights the norms that influence the emotions people actually experience.

associated with poor psychological and even physical health (Francis, 2007). Thus, the ability to manage negative emotions may have substantial implications for personal health.

Also, numerous scholars have shown that social support leads to better mental health outcomes (House, Umberson, & Landis, 1988), Thoits (1985) and others (e.g., Pearlin, 1999; Sharp, 2010) make the case that this is because social support interactions with both concrete others (e.g., friends) and imagined others (e.g., God) provide emotion management resources during these interactions. Some of these resources include reinterpetive resources (e.g., learning about different interpretations of the situation during interaction), modeling resources (e.g., learning how to manage emotions through modeling others' actions), interpersonal resources (e.g., interactions with others that allow one to carry out emotion management strategies such as catharsis), and positive reflective appraisals (see Thoits (1984, 1990) for a fuller discussion).

Emotional labor is emotion management that occurs in the workplace because of the demands of the job⁴ (Hochschild, 1983). By far, emotional labor has received the most attention from sociologists. Many occupations and careers in contemporary society—especially service-oriented jobs that require some sort of immediate (face-to-face) or mediated (e.g., over the telephone) interactions with others—require emotional labor. Social psychologists have investigated the various strategies and dynamics of emotion labor in a multitude of occupations, including flight attendants (Hochschild, 1983); beauticians (Kang, 2003); prostitutes (Sanders, 2004); professional athletes (Smith, 2008; Vaccaro, Schrock, & McCabe, 2011); fast food workers (Leidner, 1993); paralegals and attorneys (Lively, 2000; Pierce, 1995); physicians (Smith & Kleinman, 1989); morticians (Cahill, 1999); college professors (Harlow, 2003); and actors (Orzechowicz, 2008). Emotional labor occurs in occupations that span all status and income levels.

Some occupations, because of their very nature, cause negative emotions that individuals seek to manage through a variety of ways. For instance, individuals who work in animal shelters usually do so because they like animals; however, many shelters are “kill” shelters, and the act of killing animals causes negative emotions that animal shelter workers struggle to manage (Arluke, 1994). In other occupations, emotional labor often requires not only managing one's own emotions, but also the emotions of others (e.g., customers, patients). Often individuals manage their emotions in emotional labor interactions to manage the emotions of others in order to achieve a separate goal; for instance, bill collectors must act angry to induce fear in debtors in the hopes that fear will motivate debtors to pay their debts (Hochschild, 1983; Sutton, 1991). In some occupations, however, the primary goal is to cause emotional reactions in others; for instance, Smith (2008) argues that professional wrestlers' main goal during their performances is to elicit strong emotional reactions in the audience, a type of emotional labor he calls *passion work*.

Learning strategies of emotional labor is often a very important part of the occupational socialization process. In certain occupations, employers explicitly teach emotional labor strategies; for example, bill collectors learn from their supervisors that they should sound angry to debtors (Sutton, 1991), flight attendants are trained to smile at all times and seem happy to be serving drinks and snacks to belligerent passengers (Hochschild, 1983), and professional wrestlers learn how to properly express pain on the wrestling mat and contempt for the audience when they play the role of the “heel” or villain (Smith, 2008). Many occupations, however, do not explicitly teach emotional labor strategies; several researchers have shown that some occupations do teach emotional labor strategies through a variety of means, including implicit training and modeling. For instance, Smith and Kleinman (1989) show how medical students learned emotional labor techniques implicitly from their medical instruction (such as learning to approach a patient not as a person but as a problem to solve) and by modeling the actions of residents and other physicians. Furthermore, when neither explicit nor implicit emotional labor training is present, individuals create their own strategies, which others often adopt (Sanders,

⁴Although Hochschild's (1983, p. 147) concept of emotional labor refers to labor done by employees to create particular emotional states in other persons, we use the term more broadly here to refer to any emotion management performed at the workplace.

2004; Smith & Kleinman, 1989). Anticipatory socialization is also involved in emotional labor, in that certain occupations attract those with the appropriate *emotional capital*—or previous socialization experiences that prepare individuals to manage the emotions caused by these occupations (Cahill, 1999). For instance, mortuary students often have family members who were also morticians, and their socialization experiences often rendered dead bodies emotionally neutral. Schweingruber and Berns (2005) show how employers “emotionally mine” the past experiences of employees for unrecognized emotional capital.

Social psychologists have investigated the role gender and race/ethnicity play in emotional labor. In regards to gender, there is not persuasive evidence that women are more likely than men to be in occupations that require emotional labor (Lively, 2007). However, there is evidence that men and women engage in different types of emotion management, especially within the same professions and organizations. For example, Pierce (1995) found that female paralegals were expected to manage the emotions of attorneys by taking a “motherly” approach while male paralegals were expected to be emotionally neutral. Lois (2001) shows that while both men and women search and rescue volunteers engage in the same risky and horrifying events, the men tend to feel excitement while the women tend to feel anxious. These emotional differences stratified the group, with the male emotional response valorized. In regards to race/ethnicity, several studies suggest that racial and ethnic minority status complicates emotional labor. For instance, Harlow (2003) found that in addition to managing the emotions associated with being a professor—such as remaining calm during class disturbances—black professors also had to manage the emotions elicited by having their competency or objectivity challenged by students. Wingfield (2010) argues that the feeling rules in high-status occupations are often racialized, with minorities being held to different emotional standards than their white counterparts; for example, while whites are allowed to express anger in some circumstances, blacks are expected never to display anger.

Social psychologists have also looked at whether emotional labor leads to negative consequences for individuals, such as occupational burnout and emotional distress. For example, professionals in domestic violence prevention and intervention often experience occupational burnout because of the exhaustion caused by the constant management of negative and distressing emotions that come in these lines of work (Bahner & Berkel, 2007; Brown & O’Brien, 1998). The evidence for these negative consequences, however, is mixed. Several studies show that emotional labor can have negative consequences for individuals (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Smith & Kleinman, 1989). However, many individuals in certain occupations find emotional labor rewarding, especially when they have job autonomy or when emotional labor strategies learned on the job help them reach professional goals (Pierce, 1995; Zaloom, 2006); for example, the attorneys studied by Pierce found their emotional labor rewarding because it helped them achieve their ultimate goal of winning legal cases and obtaining settlements for their clients. Employees also often develop their own, specific emotion management strategies to prevent occupational burnout and emotional distress (Powers & Wolkomir, 2007). Some quantitative studies suggest that worker autonomy is more important in predicting negative outcomes than engaging in emotional labor (Wharton, 1993; Wharton & Erikson, 1995). However, Erikson and Ritter (2001) found that having to manage agitated emotions (anger, annoyance) in the workplace was a strong predictor of occupational burnout.

Identity Theory and Emotions

Several scholars have investigated how identity processes influence emotional experience. For example, McCall and Simmons (1978) argue that challenges to important identities in interactions cause negative emotions such as anger and fear. These negative emotions motivate individuals to perform actions—such as selective perception and manipulating reflected appraisals—in the service of protecting the identity.

Stryker (2004) makes similar claims. He argues that not living up to the expectations of role identities causes individuals to feel negative emotions, and, conversely, living up to expectations causes positive emotions such as pride. The more important, or salient, these role identities are in individuals' identity hierarchy, the more intense the emotions experienced when meeting or not meeting expectations. Stryker also argues that negative emotions such as anger result when others prevent individuals from meeting their role expectations.

The most developed theory regarding the relationship between identities and emotions is Burke's (1991) *identity theory* (see Chap. 2, "Identity Theory") According to Burke, identities are perceptual control systems that act to maintain congruence between identity standards and individuals' self-perceptions of how they perform these identities, which are often based on the feedback of others. When an identity becomes salient in a given situation, individuals compare their perceptions to their identity standards and act accordingly. The goal of action is to align identity standards with self-perceptions. Individuals tend to maintain their normal courses of action when identity standards align with self-perceptions. When identity standards and self-perceptions do not align, however, individuals will perform actions to attempt to align their identity standards with their self-perceptions. For example, consider a woman who identifies as a devout evangelical Christian. If her self-perceptions align with her identity standard (e.g., everyone acknowledges that she is a devout evangelical), she will continue on ordinary courses of action. However, if her self-perceptions do not align with her identity standard (e.g., someone accuses her of not being a devout evangelical), she will perform a variety of actions to align self-perceptions with her identity standard; for example, she may begin attending religious services and Bible study groups more often or read scripture more frequently.

According to identity theory, emotions play a key role in the feedback loop between identity standards and self-perceptions. On the one hand, positive emotions such as pride and satisfaction act as signals of alignment between standards and perceptions and motivate individuals to continue normal courses of action. On the other hand, negative emotions such as anger, sadness, and fear act as signals of misalignment between standards and perceptions and motivate individuals to perform various cognitive and behavioral actions to repair this misalignment (Burke, 1996). The more committed individuals are to particular identity standards, the more intense the emotions experienced when standards and perceptions do (or do not) align (Burke). Moreover, more frequent discrepancies between standards and perceptions will produce more intense negative emotions than infrequent discrepancies, and disruptions that occur because of feedback from significant others causes more negative emotions than disruptions from non-significant others. Stets and Tsushima (2001) have found evidence for this latter claim; they found that individuals experience more intense emotions when the source of a discrepancy is a family member rather than a co-worker (see also Stets, 2004). Contrary to predictions, evidence suggests that more frequent interruptions lead to less, not more, intense emotional experiences (Stets, 2005).

Recently, Stets and Burke (2005) expanded identity theory by developing hypotheses about the emotional outcomes of misalignment between identity standards and self-perceptions. First, they argue that it is important to consider whether the source of identity standards and discrepancies is the self or other. Individuals can have different standards than others for the same identity; for instance, a self-sourced identity standard of a husband could be "breadwinner" while the other-sourced (perhaps from the wife) identity standard of a husband might be "nurturing." If the identity standards are self-sourced, individuals will feel sadness when the individual is the source of the discrepancy and anger when the source of the discrepancy is the other. If the identity is other-sourced, individuals will feel shame when the source of the discrepancy is the self and annoyance when the source of the discrepancy is the other. They also hypothesized that these emotional outcomes will differ depending on the power and status of the self and other; for instance, if the standard is self-sourced and the self is the source of the discrepancy, the individual will experience shame if the other has higher status, embarrassment when the other has equal status, and discomfort when the self has higher status.

Stets and Burke (2005) also expanded identity theory by hypothesizing the emotional outcomes of misalignments between self-perceptions and different types of identity standards. When there is a discrepancy between perceptions and social identity standards—or standards related to individuals' group identities—individuals will experience embarrassment or shame. If there is a discrepancy between perceptions and role identity standards—or standards related to the roles that individuals inhabit—then individuals will experience discomfort or guilt. Discrepancies between perceptions and personal identity standards will lead to sadness and depression. Again, the intensity of these emotions varies depending of the source of the discrepancy and how important the identity is to the individual.

An interesting prediction of identity theory is that even positive misalignments between identity standards and self-perceptions will lead to negative emotions; that is, if individuals are physically weak, they will experience negative emotions even when others consider them strong. The evidence for this prediction, however, is contradictory. In a series of experimental studies, Stets (2004, 2005; Stets & Asencio, 2008) found that identity non-verification in a positive direction actually led to positive emotional experiences, although this effect has diminishing returns in creating positive emotions experiences; that is, while identity non-verification in a positive direction at first creates positive emotional experiences, continued identity non-verification in a positive direction has less of an emotional impact (Stets & Asencio).

Varieties of Interactional Theory and Emotions

Several social psychologists have also investigated how both concrete and imagined interactions influence emotional experience. For example, Goffman (1959) argued that emotions were a key factor in everyday life. In normal social interactions, competent social actors display demeanor and express deference to other interactants. Integral to successful interactions are individuals' abilities to sustain proper images of themselves to others. Specifically, actors need to demonstrate continually that they are cool and composed—that the pressures of the encounter are not too much for them to bear. Embarrassment, according to Goffman (1956b), occurs when individuals fail to maintain the image they want to portray. Embarrassment, however, is not isolated to the person failing to meet expectations. Because Goffman saw social interactions as rituals sustaining society, all participants have a stake in the encounter. Thus, others will practice tact and try to ignore the tarnish to the actor's image or even work to help repair the damage. If the interactants cannot accomplish this, embarrassment is likely to spread—with those witnessing one person's embarrassment feeling embarrassed themselves. Ultimately, Goffman viewed embarrassment as having a positive function. To feel embarrassed at one's shortcomings (or to feel embarrassed for having witnessed the inadequacies of another) is to acknowledge and respect the social norms and regulations that defined one's behaviors as shortcomings in the first place. In this sense, embarrassment is not a subjective inner state; it is society expressing itself through the individual.

Symbolic interactionists focus on the ways emotions are part of everyday social life through the process of taking the role of the other (Mead, 1934) in thought and interaction. Shott (1979), for example, argues that individuals experience various forms of physiological arousal when they role-take with individuals and generalized others, and they label this physiological arousal with emotional labels. Shott further argues that these emotional experiences engendered through role-taking serve as a basis for social control and order; wanting to avoid experiencing negative emotions and wanting to experience positive emotions motivates individuals to follow normative expectations. For example, Shott argues that guilt arises when individuals view themselves negatively for violating moral codes associated with the generalized other. To avoid the experience of guilt, individuals will tend to follow perceived normative expectations.

Over the last several decades, structural symbolic interactionists have formulated predictive models for human behavior using affect control theory (Heise, 1977, 1979; Robinson & Smith-Lovin, 2006). A primary tenant of symbolic interaction is that people's reactions to events are based on their definitions of the situation. Affect control theorists assume that such definitions always include an affective dimension (i.e., based on sentiments). Their goal is to catalogue various cultural meanings and then operationalize responses—especially when there is a discrepancy between generically held sentiments and empirical grounded impressions of specific events. For example, Westerners have positive evaluations for category of “mother.” A discrepancy exists in a situation in which a mother brutally beats her child (engages in a negatively-valued act). Individuals exposed to such events (whether it is through firsthand observation or secondhand news accounts) in some way must reconcile their definition of the situation. In the case of the extremely abusive mother, there may be no actions that can reconstruct the situation in a way in which fundamental cultural sentiments (mother is positive) are brought into alignment with one's impressions of the event (abuse is negative). In less extreme cases, for example, a mother scolding her child, other aspects of the situation (e.g., time and place of the event, the child's previous behavior, etc.) can be used by witness to assign meaning to the mother's behavior and react according (e.g., agreeing with the mother, ignoring the mother, reprimanding the mother, etc.).

Affect control theory is inspired by cybernetics and the basic principles of the theory are similar to how thermostats regulate temperatures within a room (Robinson, 2007). In other words, just as a heater turns on when it gets too cold and turns off when it gets too warm, people actively work to maintain a social environment that coincides with their sentiments—the affect control principle. Unlike more interpretivist strands of sociological social psychology, affect control theory is highly quantitative, often experimental, and mathematically based. To do this, affect control theorists have compiled cultural dictionaries that provide general meanings (translated into numbers) along three dimensions: evaluation, (e.g., good or bad), potency (e.g., strong or weak), and activity (e.g., lively or inactive). These numeric “meanings” can then be plugged into equations which predict how people will respond to various events.

Ethnomethodology is an interactional theory that is concerned with how social actors create and maintain sensible and orderly worlds in interaction (Garfinkel, 1967). Some ethnomethodologists have investigated emotional experiences, but few have offered anything resembling a comprehensive theory of emotions. Garfinkel's famous “breaching experiments,” where he had students perform actions that violated taken-for-granted assumptions, had one common outcome: people interacting with the students quickly grew agitated and became angry or distressed. Those that did not become angry either assumed the student was playing some sort of game or that the student was ill or suffering from stress. In other words, unless the transgressor's behavior can be accounted for (e.g., he is merely teasing or she has fallen sick), breaking social norms and regulations is thoroughly emotionally upsetting to other social interactants. Moreover, Garfinkel's students frequently reported emotional distress themselves, demonstrating how violating social norms can have an emotional impact on norm transgressors. This finding suggests that violations of taken-for-granted assumptions in everyday interactions cause negative emotions in individuals. Avoiding experiencing and causing these negative emotions may be a mechanism that explains why social actors rarely violate these assumptions.

An interesting ethnomethodological take on emotions is that social actors strategically use emotional labels to account for a person's conduct when the conduct does not follow the norms or rules of a particular interactional context. Whalen and Zimmerman (1998) show this in their ethnographic account of a 911-call center. When 911 callers could not meet the interactional demands of the call (i.e., answer the questions of the responder) because of the intense negative emotions they were experiencing, the responders label the callers “hysterical” to account for their conduct.

Conversation analysts have also theorized the role emotions play in social interaction. Based on the ethnomethodological idea that rules, rather than being explanations for action, are resources actors exploit, conversation analysis investigates how social actors use conversational rules in strategic ways

in interactions and how utterances find their meaning within the contexts of conversations. A main claim of several conversational analysts is that social actors use emotional expressions as strategic resources in interactions. For example, Jefferson, Sacks, and Schegloff (1987) argue that laughter is an interactional resource that allows individuals to do things in conversations, such as filling a void as participants decide how interaction should proceed. Similarly, Haakana (2001) shows how medical patients use laughter as an interactional resource to acknowledge to the physician that the medical problem they believe they have is atypical or unlikely. Also, Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2006) argue that verbal expressions of surprise (e.g., “wow!”, “oh my God!”) act as interactional resources for actors; for example, displays of surprise (or lack thereof) can denote common membership in particular cultural groups.

A recent and highly ambitious interactionist approach to emotions comes from Collins’ (2004) theory of interaction ritual chains. Combining Durkheim’s idea of collective effervescence with Goffman’s focus on the ritualism of face-to-face interactions, Collins argues that certain types of social situations produce heightened emotional energy that, in turn, produces a sense of solidarity among participants. By attending to the ways people successfully sustain emotionally charged interactions—through physical co-presence, barriers to outsiders, mutual focus of attention, and shared mood—Collins explains the conditions in which emotional energy is actually generated. Sex, for example, usually meets the criterion of co-presence, barriers to outsiders, mutual focus of attention, and shared mood, and, to the extent that it falters in one of these areas, it is far less likely to be enjoyable. Conversely, the more sexual encounters between two people adhere to these conditions, the more erotic lust is likely to result in heightened emotional energy and feelings of solidarity (i.e., romantic love). In a similar fashion, Collins explains tobacco usage (as well as campaigns against it) as an emotion arousing ritual. That is, tobacco use has always been accompanied by various symbolic markers (e.g., a Victorian age smoking jacket or a cigarette pack conspicuously rolled up in a t-shirt sleeve) and incorporated in socializing rituals (e.g., men retiring to the den for an after dinner smoke or women on the factory line sharing a lighter during a break from work). For Collins, these ritualistic (and, thus, emotional) aspects of tobacco usage offer far more explanatory power than medical explanations of physiological addiction.

Phenomenological Approaches to Emotions

Phenomenologist philosophers, most especially Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), argued that understandings of the material world, as well as beliefs about our own selves, arise from individuals’ corporeally based perceptions. Such a position denies the Cartesian division between mind and body; it also asserts the importance of tacit and non-discursive forms of knowledge. To this end, Denzin (1984) argues that social psychological theories of emotions must attend to the embodied nature of emotions. Denzin posits that emotions are a process of being-in-the-world (see Sartre, 1939/1962). Denzin (p. 85) argues that emotions are *lived* experience: “What is phenomenologically decisive in these feelings is the uncovering and revealing of the person to herself. These feelings announce themselves and make their presence felt by the person.” Emotions are thus embodied experience—what Denzin calls self-feeling. It is this embodiment that gives emotions an undoubted realness: “The emotional experience, in the form of embodied self-feeling, radiates through the person’s inner and outer streams of experience. During its occurrence emotional experience is lived as absolute reality” (Denzin, p. 59). It is the absolute reality of emotional experiences that makes them theoretically relevant for Denzin; to be absolutely real is to be undeniably meaningful. Denzin further argues that, because people develop lines of action based on meaning, emotions must be analyzed as an essential component to social action.

A more recent example of a phenomenological approach to emotional experience is Katz (1999). Like Denzin, Katz’s starting premise is in the embodied nature of emotions—something that is distinct

and separate from discursive accounts. Katz, however, offers a more rigorously empirical study of specific emotional episodes: road rage, laughter at funhouses, remembrances of shame, and cases of crying. Integral to Katz's analysis are the interactional aspects of emotions. That is, emotions are a form of communication; they communicate our inner feelings to our consciousness and they allow our inner feelings to be read externally as well. Road rage, for instance, is about an experienced world that no longer conforms to one's desires, and anger is a call for retaliation against whatever or whomever produced the problematic situation. For automobile drivers, other users of the road are interlocutors. From the perspective of the driver, when other drivers needlessly slow down, turn unexpectedly, or somehow get in the way, the driver's self is defamed. Angered responses (speeding past the other driver, slamming on the breaks, extending the middle finger) become the resolution. Through these actions, the self is given renewed dignity as the anger is expressed and the other is forced to endure it.

Social Exchange and Emotions

Social exchange theory assumes that much social interaction involves the exchange of valued resources between social actors (see Chap. 3, "Social Exchange Theory"). Early social exchange theorists often viewed emotions as somewhat epiphenomenal outcomes of goal- or pleasure-seeking motivated social exchange interactions. Homans (1961), one of the first social exchange theorists, argued perceptions of *distributive justice*—or individuals' perceptions that they have received an adequate reward for their costs in a social exchange—elicit positive emotions (happiness and satisfaction), and negative emotions when an individual perceives distributive injustice (guilt when the individual is overrewarded, anger when the other is overrewarded). Hegtvedt (1990; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999) empirically tested Homans' ideas concerning distributive justice and emotions and found support for his idea that perceptions of distributive justice elicited positive emotions. Hegtvedt also found that individuals experience anger if they feel underrewarded, but complicated matters by finding that individuals do not feel guilt if they are overrewarded unless they perceive that the overreward is a result of the other exchange partner being underrewarded (also see Lively et al., 2010).

In the past few decades, social exchange theorists have begun to view emotions not just as outcomes of social exchange interactions, but rather as an integral part of social exchange processes. The main difference between these recent developments is that they view emotions that arise during social exchange interactions as rewards and punishments in themselves that motivate individuals, not just as the outcomes of social exchange. From this perspective, individuals seek to carry out exchanges that elicit positive emotions and avoid eliciting negative emotions. This emotional motivation has important consequences for exchange relationships.

According to *relational cohesion theory* (Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2000; Lawler & Yoon, 1996, 1998), emotions are a key explanation for individuals' *commitment* to exchange relationships, or the degree of attachment to the relationship. Commitment explains why social exchange interactions persist over time, and most social exchange theorists explain commitment by arguing that repeated interactions reduce exchange outcome uncertainty by providing evidence that exchange partners can be trusted to meet the terms of the exchange interaction. Relational cohesion theory argues that frequent and rewarding exchange interactions between individuals of relatively equal power who are mutually dependent on one another produce positive emotions such as happiness and satisfaction. These positive emotions cause actors to attribute the positive outcomes of the exchange interaction to the relationship itself, creating *relational cohesion*. Relational cohesion, in turn, leads to behavioral commitments, such as staying in the relationship despite other alternatives and unreciprocated gift giving. Lawler and his associates have conducted a number of experiments with results that support relational cohesion theory, and they argue that positive emotions have more explanatory power in explaining commitment than does uncertainty reduction.

Relational cohesion theory is concerned with exchange interactions in dyads. Lawler's (2001) affect theory of social change, however, extends theory concerning the role of emotions to social exchange processes that occur in larger social networks. According to this theory, social actors direct positive and negative emotions towards different types of social objects in the exchange interaction (the exchange, self, other, and social relationship). When the exchange goes as expected, individuals feel pleasant emotions and, conversely, feel unpleasant emotions when the exchange does not go as expected. Individuals also attribute these pleasant and unpleasant emotions caused by the outcomes of exchanges to themselves and others. Actors will attribute the success of exchanges to themselves and consequently feel positive emotions while attributing failures to others and thus feel negative emotions (e.g., anger) at others. The latter emotional dynamics will decrease solidarity amongst exchange partners. Actors can also attribute the success or failure of an exchange to the social relationship itself; when this occurs, actors attribute emotional outcomes not to specific individuals in the social relationship but to the relationship itself. In cases of success, for example, individuals would feel both pride and gratitude for the other, with the effect of increasing solidarity. Also, feeling shame and directing anger at others contemporaneously can motivate the group to work harder to produce desired outcomes.

Given that individuals tend to make self-serving attributions, the key is identifying what factors influence actors to attribute success/failure to the relationship itself. According to the theory, individuals make attributions to the relationship when the task has high *nonseparability*—or when individuals cannot determine their actual specific input to the task—and when there is a strong perception of shared responsibility. Different types of exchange structures influence perceptions of nonseparability and shared responsibility: productive exchanges—or where individuals produce joint goods—are the most inseparable and shared, generalized exchange—where individuals receive rewards from actors other than the ones they originally exchanged with—are the least inseparable and shared. Directed exchanges—where individuals make agreements regarding exchange—have intermediate levels of nonseparability and sharedness. Thus, productive exchanges are most likely to lead individuals to attribute success/failure to relationships, generalized exchanges the least likely, with direct exchanges in between the two. Consequently, productive exchanges are most likely and generalized exchanges least likely to produce emotional attachments to the relationship.

The affect theory of social exchange argues that the emotions that occur in social exchange relationships spread across others in one's social network; for instance, an actor is likely to carry over the emotions caused by one social exchange relationship to other exchange relationships. The diffusion of these emotions through networks produces different effects depending on the valence of the emotion (positive or negative) and whether a network is positive (networks where interactions between actor A and actor B increase the probability that A will exchange with actor C) or negative (networks where interactions between A and B will decrease the probability that A will exchange with C). Both positive and negative emotions in positive networks increase network solidarity because individuals will attribute success or failure to the network as a whole. Positive emotions in negative networks increase the likelihood relational rather than network solidarity will increase, and negative emotions in negative networks lead to disunity because individuals will search for better options. Unlike relational cohesion theory, there is no empirical evidence for this theory as of this writing.

Evolutionary Social Psychological Theories of Emotions

Evolutionary social psychologists argue that survival and reproductive pressures that early humans faced while adapting to the conditions of the African savanna thousands of years ago led humans to develop *psychological mechanisms* to respond to these pressures (Miller & Kanazawa, 2007; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). While human evolution stopped thousands of years ago, these psychological

mechanisms still influence humans' actions in contemporary times. Several social psychologists have theorized that humans' emotional capacities evolved to respond to particular evolutionary pressures experienced by early humans.

According to Wentworth (Wentworth & Ryan, 1992; Wentworth & Yardly, 1994), evolutionary pressures lead to changes in the neurology of humans that allowed them to experience the primary emotions of anger, disgust, fear, hatred, and sadness. These emotions correspond to survival and reproduction problems; for instance, the emotion of disgust solves the survival problem of consuming poisonous and rotten foodstuffs. All other emotions, however, are the products of socialization, culture, and social experience, and are possible due to generalized neurological capacities that occurred during the course of evolution. Emotions also had survival value, according to Wentworth, because emotional expressions—especially emotional facial expressions—were the first form of communication amongst hominid ancestors, thus allowing hominids to communicate with one another quickly and build social bonds through shared emotional experiences.

Wentworth argues that emotions are a necessary ingredient for human cognition and behavior. Mimicking Damasio's (1994) argument about the importance of emotions for decision-making, Wentworth argues that emotions help humans make decisions through facilitating the rapid processing of relevant information. For example, emotions help humans make decisions by focusing attention on particular aspects of the environment that are relevant to them, recalling memories that are relevant for a given situation, labeling certain objects with affective valences, and motivating actions based on decisions. Given that humans have very few instincts to guide their decisions, emotions played a key role in the survival of early humans and continue to play an important role in the cognitive and behavioral experiences of contemporary humans.

Tooby and Cosmides (2008) argue that each emotion evolved to solve a particular recurrent problematic situation experienced by humans' ancestors. Each particular emotional experience and expression is an evolved *regulatory program* that orchestrates various perceptual, information-processing, learning, motivation, and other cognitive processes so that these processes may work cooperatively to deal with adaptive challenges. Many of these challenges occurred through social interactions. Consider anger, which Tooby and Cosmides (2008, p. 131) argue resolves "conflicts of interest in favor of the angry individual." In cooperative exchange relationships, anger motivates individuals to correct situations where they experience too few rewards for too much cost. When individuals express anger, it signals to others that they are unhappy about the outcomes of the uncooperative relationship, and anger may motivate individuals to leave these unfair relationships. Signals of anger motivate partners to repair the relationship so that they do not lose the exchange partner.

Basing his thinking on the idea that the last common ancestor of apes and humans was low in sociality, belonged to highly unstable group structures, and had high autonomy, Turner (2000) argues that early humans were most likely the same way. Given that there is no inherent tendency for humans to be social, Turner argues that changes in the subcortical areas of the human brain associated with emotional experience, expression, intelligence, and regulation allowed humans to produce a variety of emotions that led, in turn, to the creation of social bonds and large-scale social structures. Thus, emotions are the key to explaining the social nature of humans.

Some of the evolutionary pressures that led to emotional parts of the brain were "natural" in nature; for example, changes in the human brain allowed humans to regulate the expression of emotions, something that was missing from ape groups. This ability to regulate emotional expression allowed humans to survive on the African savanna because they could control their emotional expressions so as not to attract predators. However, Turner argues that most selection pressures were "social" in nature; that is, emotions solved the problem of low sociability of early humans, and solving this problem helped humans survive by creating social groupings that gave humans an advantage in the savanna terrain. Turner argues that there were six key social-oriented selection pressures: (1) mobilization of emotional energy, (2) social attunement of responses, (3) sanctioning, (4) moral coding, (5) value-exchanging, and (6) decision-making. In regards to value-exchanging, for example, Turner argues that

emotions arose so that humans could create systems of value to facilitate exchange, since the value of objects is determined by the emotions individuals attach to them.

With the changes in the human brain due to natural and social selection pressures, humans were able to experience more primary and secondary emotions. This was crucial, according to Turner, given that three of the four primary emotions that he posits (satisfaction-happiness, aversion-fear, assertion-anger, and disappointment-sadness) are negatively valenced. Given that negative emotions are not very conducive to creating social bonds, humans needed the neurological wiring to combine and transform negative emotions into ones that would promote social solidarity. Turner argues that negative emotions often “mix” together to create emotions that promote social solidarity; for instance, guilt and shame are combinations of the three negative primary emotions, and these emotions promote social solidarity by acting as mechanisms of self-control. Turner also argues that the negative primary emotions “mix” with satisfaction-happiness to weaken negative emotions or transform them into emotions that promote solidarity. For instance, when the emotion of aversion-fear mixes with satisfaction-happiness, solidarity promoting of emotions of pride and gratitude emerge.

Recent Theoretical Developments

In this section, we review some recent developments in the sociological social psychological study of emotions. In our view, two of the biggest and potentially most fruitful theoretical advances in the sub-field are theories that approach emotions from a performativity perspective and theories that explore the influence of physical spaces on emotional experiences.

Emotions as Performance

One of the recent theoretical contributions to the study of emotions involves analyzing the performative aspects of emotions. Here the focus is not on how emotions “happen” to people, but what social actions people are trying to accomplish and how they accomplish these goals when they express, display, or manage their emotions. A recent work in this regard is Ng and Kidder’s (2010) outline of *emotive performance*. From this perspective, emotions are conceptualized as reflexive, cultural, and communicative (see also Denzin, 1984). Displaying emotions means individuals must consciously reflect on their subjective feelings and make sense of these experiences through inner dialogue. More importantly, because emotional displays are often public, individuals must actively work to frame their behaviors within a culturally appropriate context. This is related to Hochschild’s (1983) concept of feeling rules, but the emphasis here is how individuals attempt to utilize successfully cultural schemas in action. That is, emotional individuals often feel compelled to justify why they are acting emotionally and use cultural schemas in their justification processes. Emotional displays are communicative, and individuals often explicitly work to narrate their emotions to others. In doing so, they must draw upon accepted cultural resources to explain themselves. Further, this is a reflexive process that helps construct how individuals subjectively experience and interpret emotions. Ng and Kidder use video footage from media interviews with former American president Bill Clinton and Chinese president Jiang Zemin to demonstrate this idea. During an interview on Fox News, Chris Wallace asked Clinton why he had not pursued Osama bin Laden more ambitiously. Almost immediately, Clinton became visibly upset, and he studiously articulated his frustration by appealing to an ideal of media impartiality. That is, Clinton developed a narrative that established himself as someone who was the victim of a conservative news organization’s smear campaign. Jiang Zemin—the president of China—was also angered by a journalist’s questions, in this case an accusation of the Central

Government of China unduly influencing Hong Kong politics. Jiang did not claim to be a victim of media bias, but instead appealed to the ideal of younger generations deferring to their elders. In other words, the young journalist challenging an elder statesman's actions was given as a legitimate reason for becoming angry. In both cases, what is notable is the substantial amount of discursive work the men put into explaining why they were angry and how such feeling were reasonable within the given circumstances. Thus, far from losing control, the anger analyzed by Ng and Kidder is a communicative performance reflexively drawing on cultural schemas available to the individuals involved.

Another approach to emotions as performative suggests that emotional expressions and management are a key way that individuals perform and construct their identities. Using ethnographic evidence from an evangelical Christian college student group, Wilkins (2008) found that members used their avowed feelings of happiness—which the group argued was the result of being a “born again” Christian—as a symbolic boundary to differentiate themselves from non-Christians. Wilkins argues that positive emotions such as happiness serve as effective symbolic boundaries because of individuals' motivation to feel positive emotions and because of the cultural link between positive emotions and moral selves. Also, Vaccaro et al. (2011) show in their ethnographic study of male mixed martial artists how controlling fear about losing matches and being injured, as well as instilling fear in their opponents, was a way fighters performed their masculine identities.

Theorizing the Effects of Physical Spaces on Emotional Experiences

Sociologists have long noted that certain physical places can have deep significance for individuals. Much of this research has focused on discursive meanings (e.g., Bell, 1997; Lofland, 1998). Several scholars have called attention to the idea that physical settings are integral to how emotions are experienced. The weak social ties of a suburban community may produce distress among its residents (Baumgartner, 1988). Baseball fans may feel pride in their rundown hometown stadiums (Borer, 2006). Women may feel dread walking the city streets alone at night (Gardner, 1999). These emotional aspects of the environment are potentially useful components to add to the sociological social psychological analysis of emotions.

Beyond the emotions attached to places, other researchers have focused on how the physical environment can be utilized by individuals in the pursuit of emotional states. Saville (2008), for example, illustrates how practitioners of a new urban sport called parkour (which involves climbing, jumping, and vaulting over urban obstacles) seek out fear-inducing experiences as they make use of their physical surroundings. Ultimately, spatial practices and emotions are often dialectically related to specific environmental conditions. In a similar fashion, there are several studies about men's emotional experiences in erotic dance clubs (e.g., Egan, 2005; Frank, 2003). The emphases of these studies have been focused primarily on the social interactions of customers and clients, but the importance of the physical setting itself is implicit. Namely, these venues allot men a bounded space that provides them an escape from the social demands and interactional ambiguities of other heterosocial environments, while still allowing an opportunity to look at and talk with females (who also happen to be scantily clad or naked). Of particular note are the various feelings sought after by patrons of such clubs. Through their relationships with erotic dancers, regular customers seek relaxation, a sense of affection, and even love (physical sexual release is not an expectation for routine clients).

Moreover, some scholars argue that emotionally laden spatial practices can be integral to the formation of social solidarity and symbolic meanings within various social worlds. Kidder (2011) shows that bike messengers develop strong affective ties to their occupation precisely because of how they move through the urban environment. Bike messengers make their living by delivering time-sensitive packages in the congested downtown cores of major cities. The messengers' occupation is felt to be meaningful because it offers positive emotions such as excitement (e.g., dodging cars) and

satisfaction (e.g., having autonomy in choosing delivery routes). The emotional components of the job, however, are only possible within the confines of densely populated urban areas, since these types of environments allow messengers successfully to dodge cars as they creatively and spontaneously make choices about their riding. Most importantly, the emotional satisfaction messengers find in their manipulations of the urban environment becomes reinforced in leisure-time rituals of bicycle racing and symbolized in the material styles of the bike messenger.

Conclusion: Directions for Future Research

The study of emotions is an ever-growing and vibrant area of theoretical innovation and research in sociological social psychology. We anticipate that this sub-field will continue to advance in theory, method, and empirical findings in the foreseeable future. In our view, there are several directions for needed research in the sociological social psychological study of emotions. Perhaps the greatest need is for synthesis in theories of emotional experiences. Although some scholars have attempted to integrate several diverse theories in their empirical studies, what would be helpful for future scholars of emotions are new theoretical frameworks that integrate the various theories of emotions explored above. Second, future scholars should try to come to some sort of consensus on which emotions are primary and which are secondary; the source of secondary emotions; and the terms that are used to label certain emotional experiences. The concepts and terms used in the study of emotions are messy, and it seems that many scholars are talking about the same emotion yet using different terms, or, conversely, they are using the same term to refer to different emotional experiences. Conceptual and terminological agreements would promote dialogue between emotion scholars working within different theoretical frameworks. Finally, it would elicit much happiness in us if more emotion scholars used qualitative research methods such as in-depth interviewing and ethnography to see how theorized emotional processes play out outside the laboratory and survey interview. Many of the theoretical frameworks reviewed above present evidence from experiments and surveys; however, qualitative research can help determine the external validity of these theories and findings. For example, future researchers could conduct ethnographic research to investigate if the face-to-face dynamics related to status and power influence emotional experiences as theorized by Kemper (1978, 2007). Also, future researchers could also use ethnographic and in-depth research techniques to investigate whether the interactions between emotional experiences and identity standards as theorized by Burke (1991) also happen outside the laboratory. Such research would go a long way in expanding current empirical and theoretical understanding of emotions and social life.

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Part IV

Interpersonal Processes

Chapter 13

Intimate Relationships

Christopher P. Fagundes and Lisa M. Diamond

With the exception of our most basic metabolic requirements, the need for regular contact with intimate social partners who know and care for us – what Baumeister and Leary called the “need to belong” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) – is one of the foremost requirements for psychological and physical well-being. Indeed, people are almost universally happier when in the presence of others compared with when they are by themselves, and reliance on close social partners for support and emotional security appears to be a fundamental component of human nature that emerges at the very beginning of life and plays a critical role in health and well-being over the lifespan. The present chapter provides an overview of contemporary social-psychological research on the basic functions and processes of close relationships. We place predominant emphasis on romantic ties, given that such relationships are usually adults’ most intimate and important interpersonal relationships, and also given the extensive evidence that romantic relationships have particularly powerful and lasting effects on physical and mental well-being. We begin by briefly discussing various methods used in the close relationships field, after which we provide a detailed review of the major behavioral and cognitive processes that govern the formation and functioning of intimate relationships over the lifespan and the theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain these dynamics. Throughout, we identify key area for future research.

Methods

Relationship researchers use a variety of different research methodologies adopted from social psychology, clinical psychology, developmental psychology, psychobiology, and neuroscience. Self-report is the most common method used in the field of relationship research, and usually takes the form of asking individuals to describe different aspects of their relationship, their partner, and their own feelings and experiences. Measures such as the Dyadic Adjustment Scale provide paradigmatic examples of this approach, asking individuals to report not only on specific behaviors, such as the frequency of disagreement, but global impressions of their relationship and how confident they are that it will endure. Of course, however, self-report measures also have numerous disadvantages (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Most notably, they are subject to inaccuracies in

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memory, biased perceptions of relationship events, and discomfort in truthfully answering questions about intimate matters.

To address issues of faulty memory, studies have increasingly gravitated toward self-report measures that involved repeated assessment of discrete events over short stretches of time (for which memory is presumed to be more reliable). For example, “daily diary” approaches ask participants to provide a sequence of daily reports on discrete events that occurred in the course of a single day, instead of asking participants to make global estimates of events transpiring “in general.” Other approaches aim at capturing events as they occur. Experience sampling (Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007) provides an example of this approach. Participants are electronically prompted (either randomly or at fixed points throughout the day) to provide information on transpiring events (such as conflicts, interactions, etc., as well as their reactions to these events) using electronic devices such as handheld computers, voice recorders, or cell phones. The advantages of these approaches are that they typically provide more reliable estimates of relationship events, and they also allow for direct comparison between partners on the degree to which they perceive discrete events similarly (for example Gable, Reis, & Downey, 2003). The disadvantages are that they are more time-intensive and expensive, and participants may have difficulty complying with study procedures (especially if the period of assessment is quite long).

Direct observation is another common method used by relationship researchers. Typically, interactions between relationship partners are recorded in a laboratory and coded for specific behaviors of interest (for example, displays of conflict, expressions of affection or support, etc.). Perhaps the most well-known example this approach comes from the influential work of John Gottman (for example Gottman & Levenson, 1992), who used detailed coding of partners’ behaviors and facial expressions during laboratory conflict to identify specific behavioral predictors of divorce in newlywed couples. Coding protocols vary widely, ranging from microanalytic schemes such as Gottman’s that focus on rapidly changing facial expressions to global coding schemes which characterize and summarize longer stretches of interaction in more general terms. Advantages of this approach include its focus on objective interpersonal behavior rather than subjective impressions and memories; disadvantages include the time-intensive, labor-intensive, and expensive nature of behavioral coding, and the fact that interactions recorded in the laboratory are not necessarily representative of couples’ interactions at home, in private.

Physiological measures are also increasingly being used by relationship scientists to assess the psychophysiological concomitants of the feelings and behaviors that accompany relationship experiences, and to investigate the mechanisms through which close relationships influence physical health (Diamond, 2001; Robles & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2003). Among the most widely used indices include autonomic nervous system measures (such as heart rate, blood pressure, skin conductance, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia), immune system measures (such as killer cells and proinflammatory cytokines), neuroendocrine measures (such as cortisol and other stress hormones), and measures of brain activity (such as functional magnetic resonance imaging or positron emission topography). The key advantage of these methods is that they allow for the objective investigation of how relationship experiences influence – and are influenced by – physiological processes, and they can help to elucidate the processes through which close relationships influence physical health over the lifespan. The disadvantages of these approaches are that they are typically much more expensive to use than self-report and observational methods, and require substantially more training and background knowledge in the specific biological processes under study.

The Centrality of Romantic Ties

The fundamental importance of interpersonal ties for human health and well-being appears to be part of our evolved legacy as a social species. As reviewed by Baumeister and Leary (1995), maintenance of mutually supportive, helpful, nurturing relationships is likely to have proven critical for survival in

the small tribal groups that played a key role in our evolutionary history. Accordingly, researchers have argued that humans evolved multiple psychological mechanisms aimed at forming, maintaining, and monitoring social ties, including a heightened emotional and psychobiological sensitivity to social rejection, social threat, and social exclusion (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Yet although such evolved processes operate within all social relationships, and although general social integration has been shown to be health-promoting, there nonetheless appears to be something uniquely important about individuals' closest and most intimate relationships (Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). In adulthood, these preeminent relationships are typically romantic ties (Trinke & Bartholomew, 1997). To some degree, this reflects the influence of social conventions: Modern western culture expects individuals to form their most emotionally significant relationships with romantic partners, and a variety of religious rituals, social practices, and governmental procedures institutionalize the significance and permanence of these bonds (DePaulo & Morris, 2005). Yet the preeminence of romantic relationships might also have an evolved basis. Specifically, Bowlby's theory of attachment (Bowlby, 1973, 1975, 1988), and its extension to adult romantic ties (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) provides a theoretical rationale for the unique influence of romantic relationships on psychological and physical well-being.

Attachment Theory

Bowlby (1973, 1975, 1988) conceptualized attachment as an evolved behavioral system designed to regulate infants' proximity to caregivers and thereby maximize chances for survival. When an infant experiences distress, he or she immediately attempts to seek contact with the attachment figure. In normative cases, this proximity reassures and soothes the infant, who subsequently comes to associate the presence of the attachment figure with emotional security and distress-alleviation. Even when the attachment figure is not consistently successful at alleviating distress, infants typically develop a unique, exclusive, emotionally primary relationship with the attachment figure, such that this person becomes the preferred target for security-seeking. Normative attachments are characterized by the presence of four distinct forms of behavior: seeking and maintaining physical closeness to the attachment figure ("proximity seeking"), turning to the attachment figure for comfort and reassurance ("safe haven behavior"), experiencing distress as a result of separations from the attachment figure ("separation distress"), and using the attachment figure as a reliable, dependable base of support from which to explore the world ("secure base behavior") (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978).

Whereas parents typically occupy this role for children and young adolescents, adults most often cast their romantic partners in this role (Fraley & Davis, 1997; Hazan & Zeifman, 1994). Hazan and Zeifman have marshalled a considerable store of evidence demonstrating that established romantic relationships are basically adult "versions" of infant-caregiver attachments, characterized by the same fundamental features and dynamics (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Most importantly for our purposes, this view suggests that romantic relationships typically take emotional precedence over the other close relationships in an individual's life.

Hazan and Shaver extended their argument regarding continuity in the attachment system from infancy to adulthood to the question of individual differences in experiences and expectations of attachment relationships. Mary Ainsworth, a student of Bowlby's, had demonstrated that children develop stable, trait-like "patterns of attachment" (eventually denoted "attachment styles") based upon the quality of their relationship with the caregiver, and specifically the caregiver's responsiveness to the child's needs and bids for interaction (Ainsworth et al., 1978). In Ainsworth's framework, "secure" infants are those with sensitive and responsive caregivers, who consistently experienced proximity to these caregivers as distress-alleviating. As a result, they come to view themselves as competent and worthy of love and to view others as willing and able to provide comfort and support. Infants with an anxious attachment style experienced inconsistent caregiving and consequently seek

repeated reassurance of the availability of their attachment figures. Infants with an avoidant attachment style did not receive adequate, sensitive care from their attachment figures and therefore learned not to seek contact with them when distressed.

Hazan and Shaver argued that if adult romantic relationships are functionally analogous to infant-caregiver attachments, then the very same individual differences which characterize children's orientations toward their caregivers should also characterize adults' orientations toward their romantic partners (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Shaver et al., 1988). Just as avoidant infants resist contact with caregivers when distressed, so too should avoidant adults with respect to their romantic partners; just as anxious infants monitor their caregivers' hypervigilantly for cues of attention and responsiveness, so too should anxiously attached adults with respect to their romantic partners. Over the past several decades, thousands of studies have confirmed these basic predictions, and have documented wide-ranging implications of adult attachment styles (assessed with the Experiences in Close Relationships Inventory, or ECR, (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000), for romantic relationship functioning. For example, anxiously and avoidantly attached individuals have less trust in their romantic partners than do secure individuals; they adopt negative and suspicious interpretations of their partners' motives, and they respond with greater anger, hostility, and resentment to a partner's negative behavior (Collins, 1996; Rholes, Simpson, & Orina, 1999). They are less likely to seek and provide support and reassurance to partners (Carnelley, Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1996; Cobb, Davila, & Bradbury, 2001; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992) and are more likely to pursue destructive patterns of escalation or withdrawal in response to conflict (Cohn, Silver, Cowan, Cowan, & Pearson, 1992; Feeney, 1994; Senchak & Leonard, 1992). Overall, anxiously and avoidantly attached individuals report lower levels of relationship satisfaction, stability, intimacy, and cohesion, and commitment (Cobb et al., 2001; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Rholes, Paetzold, & Friedman, 2008).

Given that adult attachment styles are supposedly "adult versions" of infant-caregiver attachment styles, this body of findings appears to suggest that the quality of individuals' earliest attachment to his/her caregiver has a deterministic influence on later romantic functioning. Yet such a sweeping conclusion appears far too simplistic. Rather, it appears that although individuals may develop a basic working model of attachment based on their childhood experiences, this model becomes "updated" over time by the relationship-specific models of attachment that individuals develop for particular romantic partners (Baldwin & Fehr, 1995; Collins & Read, 1994; La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman, & Deci, 2000). This dynamic relationship between childhood models of attachment and current attachment experiences helps to explain why longitudinal studies have detected varying degrees of continuity in attachment style from childhood to adulthood (Hamilton, 2000; Lewis, Feiring, & Rosenthal, 2000; Roisman, Collins, Sroufe, & Egeland, 2005; Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005) and over adulthood, from relationship to relationship (Baldwin & Fehr, 1995; Davila, Burge, & Hammen, 1997; Fraley, 2007).

Basic Relationship Processes: Initial Attraction

Some of the earliest social psychological research on romantic relationships was conducted on the issue of initial attraction (Berscheid, Dion, Walster, & Walster, 1971; Berscheid & Hatfield, 1969), whereas contemporary research tends to place more emphasis on the processes and dynamics of established relationships. The empirical findings on initial attraction are compelling in their clarity and consistency: The strongest predictors of attraction are physical appearance, similarity, proximity, and reciprocal liking. In other words, we are drawn to individuals who are (or seem!) similar to us (Byrne, Griffitt, & Stefaniak, 1967; Newcomb, 1961; Simpson & Harris, 1994), who we spend time with and hence become familiar with (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Moreland & Beach, 1992), and who show some degree of reciprocal interest in us (Backman & Secord, 1959; Kenny & La Voie, 1982).

Importantly, each of these factors has been shown to influence liking in general, as well as romantic attraction. What appears to set romantic attraction apart is the element of physical attractiveness (Regan & Berscheid, 1997; Feingold, 1990). Notably, studies have found that individuals may not be fully aware of the extent to which they value physical attractiveness. In one study, individuals rated their attraction to hypothetical people, based on information provided about the person's physical attractiveness, personality, earning potential, etc. When asked which factors influenced their judgments of attraction, women claimed to be most influenced by information about personality and earning potential, but their ratings clearly showed that physical attractiveness was the strongest predictor of attraction (Sprecher, 1989). Yet although individuals may give the highest ratings of attractiveness to the most physically desirable individuals, they do not tend to seek out such individuals as romantic partners unless they think they have a reasonable chance of success. In other words, individuals tend to date and marry those who match their own level of attractiveness (Price & Vandenberg, 1979). Some of the most powerful evidence for the matching effect comes from recent research which has taken advantage of an internet website (HOTorNOT.com) where individuals post pictures of themselves, which are then rated on a 1–10 scale of attractiveness by other users of the site. Users can also contact one another and request dates. Lee, Loewenstein, Ariely, Hong, and Young (2008) analyzed over two million dating decisions made by over 16,000 users of the website, and found that most individuals sought dates from people whose ratings of attractiveness matched their own. Individuals were unlikely to seek dates from individuals who were judged to be less attractive than they were, and perhaps because they were aware that this tendency is widely shared, they also avoided seeking dates from individuals who were much more attractive than they were (thereby avoiding rejection). The fact that these results come from actual dating decisions, rather than hypothetical scenarios, makes them particularly compelling.

Another example of the use of real dating interactions, rather than laboratory experiments, to study initial attraction is “speed dating” paradigm, pioneered by Finkel, Eastwick, and Matthews (2007). Speed dating events became popular in the early 2000s as an alternative to conventional dating (in which “trying out” each potential partner took an entire evening) and online dating (in which there were many potential partners to choose from, but no opportunity to interact with them face-to-face). At speed dating events, multiple singles gather together in the same place, and over the course of the evening every individual has the chance to interact one-on-one with every other individual there, for a short amount of time. Afterwards, participants have the opportunity to indicate which individuals they liked the most, and the organizers put individuals in contact with one another if they show reciprocal liking. To adapt speed dating for research purposes, Finkel et al. and their collaborator simply ask participants to fill out a variety of self-report measures before the speed dating session, including assessments of personality, attachment style, expectations, etc., allowing them to accurately test which factors predict actual attraction and dating decisions.

For example, one speed-dating study (Eastwick, Finkel, Mochon, & Ariely, 2007) found evidence for the importance of reciprocal liking: Specifically, after the speed dating event individuals reported strong attraction for the very individuals who also found them attractive. Yet this was not the case for individuals who reported high levels of attraction for just about everyone: These individuals received low ratings of attractiveness from the other speed dating participants. This effect was mediated by the fact that individuals who reported high attraction to multiple partners were, in fact, perceived to be unselective, and hence less attractive. As the authors suggested, these unselective individuals were somehow conveying their unselectivity to their interaction partners, and rendering themselves less attractive in the process.

Another important finding to emerge from speed dating research concerns sex differences in mate preferences. These sex differences have received extensive attention from evolutionary psychologists seeking to test sexual strategies theory (Buss, 1989, 1993), which is an extension of Trivers' parental investment theory (1972). Sexual strategies theory maintains that because of sex differences in the degree of parental investment required for men versus women to successfully reproduce in the EEA

(the environment of evolutionary adaptedness), men and women evolved distinct differences in mate preferences. Men require relatively little parental investment to reproduce: They can inseminate many different women very quickly, and they can be reasonably sure that any offspring resulting from these encounters will be cared for by their mothers. Hence, sexual strategies theory predicts that the best way for a man in the EEA to maximize his reproductive success was to seek multiple mating opportunities with numerous healthy, fertile women. In contrast, a woman in the EEA had to invest 9 months of pregnancy and then several years of lactation and intensive childcare in order to ensure the survival of a single child. Hence, the best way for her to maximize her reproductive success was to mate preferentially with men who showed a willingness and ability to invest additional resources in the resulting offspring, thereby increasing the chances of survival. Sexual strategies predicts that the legacy of these evolved preferences should be observed contemporarily in the characteristics that men and women seek in their ideal partners. Specifically, men should value physical attractiveness more than status or resources in a potential female partner, whereas women should value status and resources more than physical attractiveness in a potential male partner.

Questionnaire data has generally supported these predictions across a wide variety of cultures (Buss, 1989), although numerous scholars have noted that these data have a number of alternative explanations (reviewed in Hazan & Diamond, 2000). Perhaps the most important critique is that sex differences in self-reported preferences for “fantasy partners” may bear little relevance for actual mate choices, which are often more adventitious than strategic (Lykken & Tellegan, 1993). Eastwick and Finkel (2008) tested the predictions of sexual strategies theory by asking speed dating participants, prior to the speed dating session, what sort of characteristics they considered most important. Then, they compared these stated preferences to the actual dating preferences that emerged during the speed dating event. Consistent with sexual strategies theory, men (prior to the speed dating session) granted more importance than did women to physical appearance, whereas women granted more importance than men to earning prospects. Yet after the event, no sex differences were found in individuals’ actual preferences for the “real live” partners they interacted with. All individuals were drawn to attractive and personable individuals with good earning prospects, but the relative weighting of these predictors did not vary between men and women. Even more interesting, individuals’ own pre-event judgements of the characteristics they deemed most important did not correspond to their post-event decisions. This clearly demonstrates the limitations of conventional self-report methods when applied to dating and mating: Individuals’ perceptions of the characteristics they find attractive do not appear to reliably predict the factors that do predict their attractions.

Relationship Satisfaction

Moving beyond initial attraction to the dynamics that characterize established relationships, predictors of satisfaction and stability have received extensive research attention dating back to the 1930s (Terman & Bottenweiser, 1935). A longstanding methodological obstacle in this line of research has been ambiguity in the conceptualization and measurement of satisfaction (especially in comparison with stability, which can be straightforwardly operationalized as the continuance or dissolution of a relationship). Historically there has been no dominant theoretical framework underlying the operationalization of satisfaction, and the two most widely used scales – The Marital Adjustment Test (MAT) and the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS) – include a diverse mix of items assessing both objective relationship events and behaviors as well as subjective perceptions of the relationship (Locke & Wallace, 1959; Spanier, 1976). Another historical critique of conventional marital satisfaction measures is that they typically yield only one global score of marital satisfaction. However, researchers have noted that similar to affective states, marital satisfaction may be best conceptualized as containing independent positive and negative dimensions (Fincham, Beach, & Kemp-Fincham, 1997).

For example, some couples rarely fight with each other (yielding low scores for negative feelings/behaviors) but also rarely share moments of humor and affection (yielding similarly low scores for positive feelings/behaviors). Other couples might score high on one dimension and low on the other. Indeed, Fincham and Linfield (1997) demonstrated that the positive and negative aspects of marital satisfaction have unique dimensions and correlates for different behaviors and attributions.

Another important consideration when considering measures of satisfaction is that the subjective experience of relationship satisfaction varies as a function of the stage of the relationship. Very new relationships are often characterized by intense feelings of passion, infatuation, and longing (Tennov, 1979, 2001). Yet in long-term relationship, these intense feelings of passion are gradually supplanted (although not completely, as shown by Acevedo & Aron, 2009) by companionate love, characterized by the feelings of comfort and emotional security (Hazan, Gur-Yaish, & Campa, 2004). Accordingly, the factors that new couples may consider when judging their own satisfaction are likely different from those considered by long-term couples.

With these methodological caveats in mind, what predicts satisfaction? The most reliable predictor is negative behavior, such as hostility, criticism, invalidation, withdrawal, and disengagement, whether assessed via self-report or observation (Fincham & Beach, 2006; Gottman & Notarius, 2000, 2002). Notably, this body of research has found that destructive conflict-management patterns can be observed in couples long before their marriage began to develop signs of strain (Markman & Notarius, 1987; Notarius & Markman, 1993), in part because they stem from each partners' personality traits. Substantial research has found that individuals with high levels of neuroticism or trait negative affectivity have poor-quality relationships (Caughlin, Huston, & Houts, 2000; Donnellan, Conger, & Bryant, 2004; Robins, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000), presumably because their generalized tendencies to experience anxiety, hostility, and anger make them more reactive to day-to-day couple conflict and less likely to behave constructively (Caughlin et al., 2000; Donnellan, Assad, Robins, & Conger, 2007; White, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 2004). Although high levels of positive behaviors can "counteract" some of the effects of negativity and hostility, it takes a fairly large number of positive behaviors to do so. Gottman, for example, found that highly satisfied couples tended to report at least five positive behaviors for every negative behavior (Gottman, 1994). In such couples, a high and stable ratio of positive to negative behaviors may create a climate of warmth, support, and solidarity which facilitates adaptive responses to everyday relationship stressors.

The timing of positive behaviors also proves important: Gottman, Coan, Carrère, and Swanson (1998) found that in a sample of newly married couples, exchanges of positive affect during conflict proved to be the only reliable predictor of marital satisfaction and stability 6 years later. Similarly, a study by Driver and Gottman (2004) found that even in the context of relatively trivial, mundane interactions, humor, playfulness, and affection proved adaptive, allowing couples maintain a constructive dialogue with their partner during conflict.

Social support exchanged between partners has also received extensive study as a predictor of satisfaction, yet many of the findings in this area are somewhat paradoxical. Although individuals in satisfying relationships generally describe their partners as supportive, studies have found that specific, observable displays of support do not always prove beneficial (Bolger & Amarel, 2007), a finding that has been attributed to the multiple contextual factors which shape how support receipt is experienced and interpreted. For example, when clear-cut acts of support are interpreted by the support recipient as implying that he/she is incompetent or needful they can inadvertently reinforce his/her feelings of stress or weakness (Gleason, Iida, Shrout, & Bolger, 2008; Shrout, Herman, & Bolger, 2006).

Yet support appears to have positive consequences for both individual and relationship functioning when it is perceived to be responsive, nurturant, and equitable (Maisel & Gabel, 2009; Overall, Fletcher, & Simpson, 2010). In these cases, receiving support is beneficial.

Before leaving the topic of satisfaction, it is important to note that although assessments of satisfaction typically capture single moments in time, relationship satisfaction shows a fair degree of

dynamic change. In some cases, these changes are relatively systematic and progressive, such as the normative declines in satisfaction that characterizes new marriages, and the transitions from passionate to companionate love described earlier. Yet in other cases, changes in satisfaction appear unpredictable and nonlinear. For example, Fincham, Stanley, and Beach (2007) reviewed evidence showing that many couples show “spontaneous remission” of marital distress, such that unhappy couples become significantly happier over time, in the absence of direct intervention. They argued that such transformative processes, and their underlying cognitive, affective, and interpersonal mechanisms, deserve substantive attention by researchers investigating the basic determinants of relationship satisfaction.

Relationship Stability

As the divorce rate steadily increased in the 1960s and 1970s, researchers became increasingly interested in factors that influence relationship stability (Adams & Jones, 1999). Numerous predictors of marital stability were identified including age of marriage, education, and economic status (Bentler & Newcomb, 1978). Along with contextual factors, various theoretical models emerged to help understand how cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal factors influence one's decision to enter and stay in a committed relationship. Although these models have primarily been utilized to understand marital stability, they have also proven useful in understanding a variety of intimate relationships.

Although relationship satisfaction clearly predicts relationship stability (Adams & Jones, 1999; Hicks & Platt, 1970), a stable marriage does not necessarily have to be a marriage in which each member of the dyad is satisfied. Even marriages in which both members of the dyad are relatively satisfied may end due to financial or economic hardship (Levinger, 1966). Levinger found this to particularly be the case in economically deprived couples. Thus, relationship satisfaction is currently viewed as an important component in the multifaceted choice to be in a committed relationship but not the only component. Commitment is defined as the intention to stay in a relationship. This multifaceted choice to be in a committed relationship has been shown to be the most proximate predictor of relationship stability (Impett, Beals, Peplau, & Pallone, 2003).

In Rusbult's investment model of commitment (Rusbult, Drigotas, Verette, Canary, & Stafford, 1994), one's commitment level emerges from three separate constructs. The first construct in Rusbult's investment model is personal satisfaction. The degree to which individuals are satisfied with their current relationship increases their likelihood to be committed. Second, the quality of people's alternatives influence their level of commitment such that individuals who have many enticing partner alternatives are less likely to stay in their existing relationship compared to people who do not. Rusbult's third determinant is the degree to which one is invested in his or her current relationship. Joint financial purchases, children, and previous sacrifices all influence one's level of investment. In turn, one's commitment level influences the decision to remain in a relationship. This model has received widespread empirical support in predicting how long relationships will last, as well as whether or not both partners will be faithful to each other (Drigotas & Rusbult, 1992; Drigotas, Safstrom, & Gentilia, 1999). Furthermore, it has been shown to apply equally well to heterosexual and sexual minorities couples (Bui, Peplau, & Hill, 1996; Kurdek, 1992). Yet males and females differ on the extent to which the model variables predict commitment. Personal satisfaction and attractive of alternatives are both robust predictors of commitment for females, while only attractive of alternatives has been shown to be a robust predictive of commitment for males (Davis & Strube, 1993).

Rather than conceptualizing commitment as a unitary or global concept, Johnson (1999) asserts that there are three types of commitment. In this formulation, the first type of commitment is personal commitment, which occurs when people want to continue a relationship because they're attracted to their partners and feel the relationship is enjoyable. This type of commitment is highly associated with

relationship satisfaction. In the second type of commitment, Johnson argues that some people have to continue a relationship because it would be too costly for them to leave. This type of commitment is called constraint commitment and is characterized by the fact that people may not leave their current relationship because they might be ostracized from their community or end up in financial destitute. The third type of commitment that Johnson outlines is moral commitment. People who have a moral commitment to a relationship feel a sense of obligation to their partner that may be tied to a social or religious responsibility. Moral commitment is particularly predictive of relationship stability in instances where the relationship may not currently be immediately satisfying (Lydon, Pierce, & O'Regan, 1997). People have varying degrees of personal, constraint, and moral commitment. Males typically have less personal commitment than females (Lydon et al.).

Even though relationship satisfaction and relationship commitment are distinct constructs, the aforementioned models highlight the fact that the concepts of commitment and relationship satisfaction overlap considerably. Indeed, Rusbult's and Johnson's models treat relationship satisfaction as one aspect of commitment. Given this overlap, one might question whether commitment is actually predictive of subsequent stability over and above relationship satisfaction. In a decade long longitudinal study of marital couples, Schoebi, Karney, and Bradbury (2012) distinguished between the desire to be in a committed relationship (which has a great deal of conceptual overlap with relationship satisfaction), and behavioral inclinations to maintain the relationship. They found that those who exhibited greater behavioral inclinations to maintain the relationship were much less likely to subsequently divorce than others. Importantly, this link was independent of relationship satisfaction. However, the desire to maintain the relationship was not associated with the likelihood that one would divorce after taking relationship satisfaction into account. Accordingly, they concluded that commitment, when conceptualized as the inclination to maintain the relationship, can indeed stabilize marriages over and above the effects of relationship satisfaction.

Social Cognition

Historically, social-psychological research on relationship satisfaction and stability focused on assessing concrete, objective features of intimate relationships, and presumed that individuals' self-reports about their relationship experiences could be treated as valid (if slightly imperfect) indices of these concrete experiences. Substantial research has documented that individuals' cognitive biases regarding their relationships are just as important to the quality and stability of the relationship as the "objective" truth of relationship events. From the beginning stages of attraction onward, individuals' perceptions and judgments about their partners influence every aspect of their romantic relationships. Extensive research has documented that individuals generally seek consistency between their cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1961). Over the past 30 years, there has been a large body of work demonstrating that the principles of basic social cognition have major implications for relationship functioning and stability, as subtle biases in perceptions and interpretations of day-to-day relationship events can alter the everyday reality of relationship functioning.

People shape opinions about potential partners very quickly. Indeed, after only one-tenth of a second, people form judgments of a potential partners' attractiveness and likeability that are identical to the judgments they would form about the same person if they deliberated for 5 min (Willis & Todorov, 2006). People are able to make such quick appraisals because they automatically stereotype the people they meet based on previous experiences with those who are similar (Devine & Monteith, 1999). Once this impression is formed, people then seek out information to confirm that belief (confirmation bias). Accordingly, when people meet a potential partner, first impressions matter considerably.

These biases— both in terms of perceptions of the partner and one's own self-perceptions – have a major impact on long-term relationships, influencing the behavior and overall satisfaction of both members of a romantic dyad (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996, 2004). Most notably, research has found that those who maintain slightly idealized “positive illusions” of their romantic partner are happier in their romantic relationships than those who have accurately represent their romantic partner (Neff & Karney, 2003). In fact, viewing one's partner slightly better than he or she really is appears to actually make the partner better over time. Through progressive feedback mechanisms, partners gradually adjust their own behaviors – and, over the long term, their own self-concepts – in line with their partner's beneficent expectations and perceptions, essentially “living up” to the positive illusion over time (Murray et al., 1996). The Michelangelo phenomenon holds that individuals influence and sculpt each other as their relationship grows. The phenomenon suggests that both individual well-being and couple functioning are enhanced when partners respond to each other as if they were their “ideal selves” (Drigotas, Rusbult, Wieselquist, & Whitton, 1999).

In addition to people's current perceptions of their romantic relationships, their memories of things that previously happened are also impactful. To a large extent, people reconstruct their memories of past relationship experiences based on their current relationship satisfaction (McFarland & Ross, 1987). Couples who are happy in their romantic relationships tend to remember the positive experiences they had with their romantic partner in the past and forget the negatives. On the other hand, those who are presently unhappy in their romantic relationships forget how happy and in love they used to be (Frye & Karney, 2004; Karney & Frye, 2002). Of course, this can be both positive and negative for long-term relationship outcomes. In good times, people are able to dismiss the faults and transgressions of their romantic partners. However, in bad times they not only are unsatisfied with their current state of satisfaction, but tend to negatively bias their relationships history. Indeed the memories we have of our past relationships influence subsequent relationship functioning (Oishi & Sullivan, 2006). Those who recalled the history of their relationship as less satisfying were more likely to divorce within 3 years compared with those that recalled it fondly (Buehlman, Gottman, & Katz, 1992).

Self-esteem is an important individual difference characteristic that influences every aspect of relationship functioning (Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998). Those with low self-esteem are particularly sensitive to social rejection (Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001; Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998); accordingly they are hypervigilant of their partner's negative affect (Bellavia & Murray, 2003); they are also quicker to anticipate impending rejection compared with those who have higher self-esteem (Murray, Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002). Experimental work has demonstrated that when low self-esteem individuals are led to doubt their own intelligence, they are even more concerned about their partner's rejecting them (Murray et al., 1998).

Over time, the relational doubts that low self-esteem individuals experience turn into “self-fulfilling prophecies” as a result of the maladaptive ways that these individuals respond to such doubts (Murray et al., 1998). In a daily diary study of married couples, those who felt less valued by their partners were more sensitive to signs of negativity and rejection. Consequently, they subsequently displayed more cold, critical, and hurtful behaviors toward their partner (Murray, Bellavia, Rose, & Griffin, 2003). Importantly, although such self-fulfilling prophecies are most apparent among individuals with low self-esteem, they pose a potential risk for all individuals because close relationships always entail the risk of rejection (Murray, 2008; Murray, Derrick, Leder, & Holmes, 2008). At a trait level, low self regard and high propensity to perceive criticism and rejection overlap considerably with individual differences such as attachment anxiety and neuroticism, and these predispositions likely develop in early childhood (Besser & Priel, 2009; Feldman & Downey, 1994; Repetti, Taylor, & Seeman, 2002). Researchers have studied this collection of characteristics under the general term of rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998), which is defined as a predisposition to fear social rejection, to be hypervigilant to signs of such potential rejection, and hyperreactive to the experience of rejection. Rejection sensitive individuals generally act in a more hostile manner toward their rejecter; however, recent work suggests that in cases where the rejection

is self-defining, they actually ingratiate their aggressor (Romero-Canyas et al., 2010). Because women tend to be more self-defined by their romantic relationships than their male counterparts, rejection sensitive females are more likely to respond to rejection by their partners by ingratiating them compared with their male counterparts (Romero-Canyas et al.).

Perhaps the most widely-researched form of cognitive “bias” in the context of romantic relationships takes the form of attributions, or the explanations that individuals adopt for relationship events and for partner behavior. For example, when a partner says something hurtful, it may be perceived as intentional (he is really out to get me) or unintentional (he obviously didn’t realize how touchy I am about my weight....). Loving gestures may be interpreted as genuine expressions of affection (Flowers! So thoughtful!), or attempts at manipulation (What are you trying to cover up?). Decades of research have shown that individuals in happy, stable relationships tend to attribute positive partner behaviors to stable, enduring characteristics of the partners, whereas negative behaviors are attributed to external, situational influences. In making such attributions, individuals create a perceptual reality in which (1) my partner has my best interests at heart, (2) when good things happen, they are likely to continue, (3) when bad things happen, they are due to transient, situational factors that can be avoided in the future. These types of attributions are typically described as relationship enhancing. Unhappy individuals make the opposite set of assumptions. The partner’s motives are presumed to be selfish and/or malicious; positive partner behaviors are viewed as unpredictable “flukes,” whereas negative behaviors are attributed to stable, enduring features of the partner’s basic character. In this version of reality, there is little hope for alleviating current distress or preventing future distress, which is why this set of attributions is typically described as distress-maintaining.

The influence of attributions on the ongoing development of intimate relationships has received extensive attention, given that distress-maintaining attributions not only predict lower current satisfaction, but also longitudinal declines in satisfaction (Fincham, Harold, & Gano-Phillips, 2000; Fincham & Bradbury, 2004; Johnson, Karney, Rogge, & Bradbury, 2001). Of course, a key question concerns the direction of causation. Do relationship-enhancing attributions actually enhance the relationship, or do they result from an already well-functioning bond? Similarly, do distress-maintaining attributions actually impede the healthy development of a relationship, or do they simply provide a reliable marker of an individual’s current distress? These questions have been widely debated over the years (Johnson et al.), and research findings have not provided definitive answers. For example, Bradbury and colleagues (Bradbury, Beach, Fincham, & Nelson, 1996) found in an experimental study of couples’ problem-solving behavior that wives who initially made distress-maintaining attributions regarding their husbands tended to behave less positively and more negatively toward them in subsequent interactions. Yet this does not necessarily prove that the negative behavior was caused by the attribution – it might equally suggest that wives who tend to behave poorly toward their husbands adopt maladaptive relationship attributions to justify their behavior, or that both phenomenon spring from global dissatisfaction.

Relationships and Health

One of the most important findings to come out of the psychological literature in the past 30 years is that close relationships have a profound impact on physical health (Repetti et al., 2002; Uchino et al., 1996). Those who have supportive close relationships have lower rates of morbidity and premature mortality compared with those who do not (Uchino, 2006). On the other hand, those who have conflictual and highly distressing relationships have greater risks of disease. Indeed, the link between close relationships and physical health is comparable to well known risk factors such as smoking and exercise, and researchers have begun to substantively investigate the mechanisms underlying these associations (Uchino).

Health behaviors are one obvious mechanism linking close relationships to health. Multiple studies have demonstrated that both marital status and marital satisfaction are linked to positive health behaviors, especially for men. Wives appear to encourage their husbands to avoid high-risk behaviors such as excessive drinking and drug use and to participate in healthy behaviors such as eating regular meals and going to annual physician checkups (Wickrama, Conger, & Lorenz, 1995; Wickrama, Lorenz, Conger, & Elder, 1997; Williams & Umberson, 2004). Married men have been found to be more compliant than unmarried men in taking statin medication for secondary prevention of coronary heart disease (Kopjar et al., 2003). Yet health behavior effects have also been observed in women: One study found that both men and women who reported better marital adjustment were more likely to adhere to their prescription regimen for high blood pressure than those who reported less emotional adjustment (Trevino, Young, Groff, & Jono, 1990). Furthermore, women who were unsatisfied in their marriages gained more weight after undergoing gastric bypass surgery for severe obesity than those who were satisfied in their marriages (Hafner, Rogers, & Watts, 1990). Both men and women in unhappy marriages are also more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol; although substance use is obviously likely to contribute to marital satisfaction, as well as result from it, evidence clearly suggests a causal role for marital distress: After adjusting for baseline levels of alcohol consumption, males who reported more conflict in their marriages were more likely to have developed an alcohol problem 3 years later (Levenson, Carstensen, & Gottman, 1993).

In addition to health behaviors, biopsychosocial models of risk and resilience suggest that the positive and negative emotions experienced in the context of close relationships have direct long-term health consequences by dysregulating autonomic, neuroendocrine, and immune function (for example Repetti et al., 2002; Ryff, Singer, Wing, & Love, 2001; Seeman, 2001). Marital conflict studies have provided some of the best work demonstrating how relational conflicts can have serious health consequences. By understanding how an individual's body responds to a single interaction with their partner, researchers make inferences about how long-term participation in a hostile marriage might expose an individual to chronic psychophysiological stress. These studies have assessed a wide variety of physiological indices including cardiovascular, neuroendocrine, and immune function (Graham, Christian, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2006; Uchino, 2006). For a comprehensive understanding of these indices, we refer the reader to the excellent reviews of these systems (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson, 2000; Diamond & Otter-Henderson, 2007; Loving, Heffner, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2006).

Hostility appears to be a key component linking marital conflict to poor physiological outcomes. Ewart, Taylor, Kraemer, and Agras (1991) found that hostile behavior during a 10-min spousal discussion was associated with significant elevations in women's blood pressure. Smith and Gallo demonstrated that among husbands, but not wives, hostility was associated with greater systolic blood pressure reactivity under high but not low threat conditions (Smith & Gallo, 1999). In another study, couples who were more hostile to their spouse during marital problem discussions produced more epinephrine, norepinephrine, and ACTH than those who were less hostile (Kiecolt-Glaser, Glaser, Cacioppo, & Malarkey, 1998). Among couples who engaged in a supportive discussion and a marital problem discussion across two separate sessions, those who were more hostile toward each other produced more IL-6, a proinflammatory cytokine, after the conflict discussion than the supportive discussion. However, less hostile couples' IL-6 production was similar after both discussions (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2005).

Women appear particularly reactive to their partners' behavior, showing heightened endocrine and immunological reactivity to male withdrawal during conflict discussions (Heffner et al., 2006; Kiecolt-Glaser, Newton, Cacioppo, & MacCallum, 1996). The tendency for women to show greater physiological reactivity than their male partners to conflict discussions – especially in response to a partner's negative behavior – has emerged across numerous studies (Dopp, Miller, Myers, & Fahey, 2000; Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001; Mayne, O'Leary, McCrady, & Contrada, 1997), and stands in notable contrast to the fact that men tend to show greater physiological reactivity to general laboratory stressors (Earle, Linden, & Weinberg, 1999; Kirschbaum, Wust, & Hellhammer, 1992).

Notably, these findings concord with a large body of literature suggesting that women generally show fewer long-term health benefits from marriage than do men (Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001; Ross & Mirowsky, 1989). Overall, women appear especially sensitive to the cumulative “downsides” of long-term marriages (conflict, hostility, etc.) whereas men appear especially sensitive to their benefits (support, companionship, etc.). Numerous factors may contribute to this pattern of results. As reviewed by Kiecolt-Glaser and colleagues (2001), women are typically socialized to maintain a relational, interdependent sense of self that prioritizes the maintenance of close social ties (Acitelli & Young, 1996). Accordingly, women may be more vigilant in monitoring their relationships for conflicts and problems, and may interpret such conflicts and problems as more threatening. Women also tend to be more empathic than men (reviewed in Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983), particularly with respect to decoding nonverbal cues, which may render them particularly sensitive to signs of negative affectivity in their partners. This is consistent with the fact that distressed wives tend to be more accurate in interpreting their husbands’ negative messages than vice versa (Notarius, Benson, Sloane, & Vanzetti, 1989), and also that wives’ negative emotions are better predicted by their husbands’ negative emotions than vice versa (Larson & Almeida, 1999; Roberts & Krokoff, 1990). In addition to these psychological factors, women may also experience greater day-to-day stress than their husbands because of their disproportionate responsibility for child care and household labor (Hochschild & Machung, 2003), and these stressors often accumulate over the course of many years. Given the ongoing changes in the social roles afforded to men and women, as well as evolving standards and expectations for men’s and women’s interpersonal behavior within their intimate relationships, a critical question for future research concerns whether gender differences regarding the lifespan health implications of intimate relationships will gradually decline.

Jealousy and Infidelity

Researchers have outlined two types of jealousy: reactive and suspicious. Both types are associated with feelings of hurt, anger, and fear when one member of the dyad perceives a threat to the relationship (Bringle & Buunk, 1991). Reactive jealousy occurs when one member of the relationship dyad becomes aware of a real threat (such as unmistakable evidence of a partner’s interest in another person). Suspicious jealousy occurs when one member of the dyad is worried or mistrustful that the other member of the dyad is cheating, yet in the absence of direct support for the suspicion. The distinction is important given that it is adaptive to feel reactive jealousy when one realizes that one’s partner may have the potential to be unfaithful (Rydell & Bringle, 2007). However, excessive suspicious jealousy is maladaptive given that it undermines the relationship by creating a climate of mistrust and paranoia.

People who perceive themselves as unable to attract alternative partners (should the current relationship end) report greater jealousy than people who perceive themselves as having romantic alternatives (Knobloch, Solomon, & Cruz, 2001). Likewise, people who feel inadequate as a relationship partner and have low self-worth experience more jealousy (DeSteno, Valdesolo, & Bartlett, 2006). From an evolutionary perspective, Buss (2000) argues that this is the result of perceived mate value. The less desirable member of the dyad is likely to be aware that others could be a better match for his or her partner and therefore excessively worry about preventing his or her partner from straying. Attachment style has been shown to predict jealousy as well (Guerrero, 1998). In general, more anxiously attached individuals experience greater jealousy than securely attached individuals due to their excessively worries about abandonment (Buunk, 1997). Fearfully attached individuals also experience greater jealousy (people who are more anxious and avoidant) but they tend not to be sad or scared by the competition that a rival may present (Guerrero, 1998). However, as will be discussed below, the type of infidelity that elicits the most distress also may depend upon attachment style.

Both men and women experience jealousy at approximately the same rate and intensity (Pines & Friedman, 1998). However, they appear to differ in the types of relationship threats that provoke jealousy. Evolutionary theorists have focused particular attention on gender differences in jealousy, and on their implications for sexual strategies theory (reviewed earlier). According to sexual strategies theory, men should be primarily distressed by the prospect of their partner's sexual infidelity, since their reproductive success is directly threatened if their female mate engages in sexual contact with another man (particularly because they have no way to confirm who is the father of any resulting offspring). Women, in contrast, should be primarily distressed by the prospect of emotional infidelity, since their reproductive success is maximized by obtaining high levels of parental investment on the part of their mate. This would be directly threatened if their male partner became emotionally motivated to make these investments in another woman. Harris (2000, 2003) has referred to this prediction as the "JSIM" or "jealousy as a specific innate module" effect, since it purports an evolved, genetically-based psychological "module" for the detection of threats to one's reproductive success.

Numerous social psychological studies have been conducted to test the existence, magnitude, and context of these predicted gender differences in sexual versus emotional jealousy. In early studies that simply asked men and women which type of infidelity they found most troubling, the results confirmed the predictions of sexual strategies theory (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Yet studies using different methodologies and samples (particularly samples that are not comprised of undergraduate students) have sometimes failed to replicate the effect (reviewed in DeSteno, Bartlett, Braverman, & Salovey, 2002; Harris, 2000; Sabini & Green, 2004). One well-known critique of this effect is the "double shot hypothesis" (DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Harris & Christenfeld, 1996), which suggest that women should be more distressed by emotional jealousy because they presume that if a man became emotionally involved with another woman, he would almost certainly become sexually involved with her as well (thereby providing a "double shot" of infidelity), whereas men are more distressed by sexual jealousy because they presume that if a woman became sexually involved with another man, she was probably emotionally involved with him as well (also thereby providing a double shot). Additionally, recent work by Sabini and Green (2004) failed to confirm a key tenet of the JSIM hypothesis, namely that women have a greater fear of resource withdrawal from men that are emotionally involved with another woman than from men who are sexually involved with another woman.

Variation in the findings across samples has been interpreted to suggest that in some cases, the JSIM may reflect local norms, and also life-course specific perspectives on mating and parenting, rather than an innate evolved and universal "jealousy module." Additionally, it has been argued that jealousy itself is not a discrete, evolved, sexually-dimorphic psychological module, but is rather comprised of multiple other affective states that are collectively "recruited" in a context-specific manner to serve the ultimate goal of mate guarding (DeSteno et al., 2002; Harris, 2000; Sabini & Green, 2004). Individual differences such as attachment style also appear to play a role. Levy and Kelly (2010) replicated findings that males are generally more distressed by sexual infidelity, while females are more distressed by emotional infidelity, but they also found that adult attachment styles independently influenced sexual and emotional jealousy. Those who were more avoidantly attached reported more sexual jealousy, whereas those who were more secure reported more emotional jealousy.

Infidelity

Whereas jealousy might occur at any point in a relationship, the prevalence of actual infidelity varies strongly as a function of relationship status, and is far more prevalent in dating relationships than married relationships. For example, in a study of American college aged students, two thirds of males and half of females said they had kissed and fondled someone other than their romantic partner when in a committed dating relationship. Furthermore half of men and one third of women said they had

intercourse with someone other than their primary partner in a committed romantic relationship (Widmer, Treas, & Newcomb, 1998). This statistic decreases dramatically among married couples. The vast majority of husbands and wives never have sex with someone other than their spouse after they marry (Herbenick et al., 2010; Tafoya & Spitzberg, 2007).

Numerous studies have attempted to determine whether there are stable individual differences that characterize individuals “at risk” for infidelity. The findings suggest that individuals who have engaged in infidelity tend to have lower levels of mental well-being, greater attachment insecurity, greater narcissism, and more permissive attitudes regarding casual sex (Buss & Shackelford, 1997; Sheppard, Nelson, & Andreoli-Mathie, 1995; Treas & Giesen, 2000).

As for relationship characteristics, individuals with low levels of commitment to their current partner have higher rates of infidelity as well as greater reported willingness to engage in infidelity (Buunk & Bakker, 1997; Drigotas, Safstrom, et al., 1999; Treas & Giesen, 2000). Particularly among women, emotional dissatisfaction with the primary relationship is associated with greater infidelity (Buss & Shackelford, 1997; Prins, Buunk, & VanYperen, 1993). The detrimental effects of infidelity appear to cut across gender: Around the world, infidelity is a primary cause of divorce (Betzig, 1989; Buss, 1994) particularly when dissatisfaction with their primary relationship is one of the triggers or justifications for the extramarital affair (Buunk, 1987; Spanier & Margolis, 1983).

Gender differences in infidelity have received extensive attention: Males report higher rates of infidelity than females, at an average rate of 25 % among men and 15 % among women (Laumann, Gagnon, Michael, & Michaels, 1994). In addition to gender differences in the prevalence of infidelity, men’s and women’s motives for infidelity differ, with men more likely to report that sexual variety was their primary motive, whereas women are more likely to report that emotional connectedness was their primary motive (Blow & Hartnett, 2005). Although hotly debated in the literature, evolutionary theorists argue that men have a strong proclivity to cheat because sexual selection has favored males who mate with as many women as possible. However, this argument is problematic when considering that promiscuous males would have greater difficulty determining which child to invest the most resources in if they had sex with a variety of women at random rather than one woman (Starratt, Shackelford, Goetz, & McKibbin, 2007). Given the difficulty involved in raising one child to reproductive age, some researchers have argued that risks would outweigh the benefits for men to be promiscuous (Klusmann, 2004). The good gene hypothesis suggests that women with less desirable mates profit from a dual mate strategy in which they have sex with someone other than their long-term romantic partner in order to obtain the best genes possible, while keeping their primary partner to protect and feed their young. Recent research has provided evidence for this theory (Flinn & Alexander, 2007; Friedl & Klump, 2002). Pillsworth and Haselton (2006) showed that women are more attracted to extra dyadic mates when they are fertile. This tendency is more pronounced when their primary partners are relatively unattractive. Additional support for the good gene hypothesis comes from the tendency for women to be attracted to more masculine qualities during ovulation compared to any other time of the month, suggesting that that women are more attracted to alternative mates of high quality only when they are fertile (Gangestad, Garver-Apgar, Simpson, & Cousins, 2007; Gangestad & Thornhill, 2003).

Of course, the very notion of “infidelity” depends upon the assumption that a successful committed relationship must be monogamous, and since the sexual revolution of the 1970s many individuals and groups have challenged this notion and have attempted to maintain “open” or “polyamorous” relationships (Bettinger, 2006; Rust, 1996; Sheff, 2005). Polyamory has increasingly garnered the attention of social scientists, yet its prevalence is impossible to estimate given that all studies of polyamorous individuals have involved non-random samples. Individuals who practice polyamory are diverse in their sexual orientations, including heterosexuals, bisexuals, lesbians, and gay men (Weitzman, 2006), but there is some indication that among nonheterosexual individuals, bisexuals are more likely to practice polyamory than lesbians or gay men (Rust), perhaps because the process of questioning restrictive cultural standards regarding the authenticity of bisexual attractions prompts such individuals to question cultural standards regarding the supposed moral and psychological preeminence of monogamy.

Labriola (1999) identified three models for polyamorous relationships: the primary/secondary model, the multiple primary partners model, and the multiple non-primary relationships model. Research to date indicates that the primary/secondary model, also known as hierarchical polyamory, is the most prevalent, at least among bisexuals and lesbians (Labriola, 1999; Rust, 1996; Weitzman, 2006). In this model a couple views their relationship with each other as their “primary” bond, and devote the majority of their time, energy, and loyalty to this bond, but remain open to additional lovers (Weitzman). In the multiple primary partners model, an individual might have two partners, each of which is considered to be equal importance. In some cases, the two partners will also be involved with one another, thereby establishing a triadic relationship (Rust). Some of these arrangements are “open,” meaning that all of the participants are free to enter into other relationships, and some are closed.

Polyamorous relationships clearly pose fundamental challenges to many of our established notions about the nature and functioning of romantic relationships, all of which are based on an assumption of monogamy (Ritchie & Barker, 2006). They also require different models and terminologies regarding relational commitment and relational maintenance. For example, although “attention to attractive alternatives” is considered a key factor potentially undermining commitment in the context of a conventional monogamous couple, within polyamorous arrangements the “attractive alternative” of the secondary partner poses no such threat (at least not in theory). The degree to which it is necessary to modify existing models of relationship functioning in order to accommodate polyamorous relationships, versus jettisoning monogamous models altogether and developing new frameworks for understanding polyamorous arrangements, is not yet clear, and is an important question for future research. Additionally, given that polyamory remains highly stigmatized, invisible, and/or misunderstood, the strategies through which polyamorous individuals preserve a sense of identity, community, and well-being is a critical area for research (Barker, 2005). Investigating the cognitive, affective, psychological, and behavioral processes through which individuals maintain these unconventional arrangements, and whether polyamory poses different challenges at different stages of the lifespan, can address a range of fascinating, fundamental questions about the nature of adult sexual-romantic bonding.

Intimate Partner Violence

Intimate partner violence is increasingly acknowledged as a major public health concern (Black & Breiding, 2008; Lamberg, 2000). In a recent survey by the National Violence Against Women in the U.S., 22 % of women and 7 % of men had experienced a violent assault by an intimate partner. Although, 62 % of injuries that occur within a relationship dyad are suffered by women, the most common forms of physical violence appear to be relatively mild manifestations of violence (pushing, grabbing, shoving) perpetrated by both partners against one another (Williams & Frieze, 2005). The high prevalence of mutual physical violence runs counter to longstanding stereotypes portraying men as the exclusive perpetrators of violence against their female partners. However, men undoubtedly cause greater damage to their female partners than vice versa. Also, some research suggests that women are less likely than men to initiate violence, and that they tend to aggress against their partners in defense and retaliation for violence directed at them, a pattern called “violent resistance” (Johnson, 2006). This may account for the fact that whereas lesbian women are half as likely to encounter relationship violence as heterosexual women, gay men experienced twice the violence of heterosexual men (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000).

One of the important shifts in research on intimate partner violence over the past 20 years has been the growing emphasis on its larger psychological and dyadic context, and the factors that make it a possible outcome in any relationship. In contrast to historical perspectives which viewed intimate violence as a problem of domineering, pathological husbands exerting dictatorial control over their wives, research now shows that most instances of violence between intimate partners represent

“situational” violence, in which high levels of anger, tension, and emotion between partners escalate into mutual (and often unexpected) physical aggression. Situational couple violence has been observed across a wide range of relationships, including short-term dating relationships (Jasinski & Williams, 1998; Johnson & Ferraro, 2000). Hence, the key goal of contemporary research is identify the constellations of individual, interpersonal and situational factors give rise to different forms and degrees of violence in intimate relationships. Toward this end, Finkel (2008) proposed an organizing framework to understand why intimate relationship violence occurs. He argued that situational couple violence can be understood in the context of three influences: instigating triggers, impelling influences, and inhibiting influences. Instigating triggers cause one or both members of the dyad to be frustrated or on edge, which can facilitate the adoption of violent behavior or restraint. Impelling influences make it likely that partners will react to instigating triggers, while inhibiting influences make it more likely that partners will refrain from acting on those triggers. Finkel argues that both impelling and inhibitory influences can be distal, dispositional, relational, and situational. Distal influences include cultural, economic, and family experiences that contribute to the way one responds to an instigating situation. For example, people raised in a culture with gender equality would be less likely to engage in violent acts because of their upbringing, while people who were raised in a violent household would be more likely to engage in violent acts (Archer, 2006; Rosenbaum & O’Leary, 1981). Dispositional influences include personality traits and attachment style, as well as beliefs and cognitions about relationship violence. Situational influences include what is immediately occurring that is causing the impelling influence. Finkel argues that when instigating triggers are high, impelling influences are high, and inhibiting influences are low, violence is much more likely to occur. One of the key strengths of this approach is that it provides a way to understand, predict, and prevent violence as a property of an ongoing relationship rather than the exclusive purview of certain “types” of dysfunctional partners, and seek to understand the specific dynamics between a couple that shape the antecedents, manifestations, and consequences of violence at different stages of the relationship.

Breakups and Divorce

In the 1960s, approximately 30 % of US marriages ended in divorce. This figure increased to a little over 50 % by the mid-1970s and has stayed relatively stable ever since (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002). Approximately 30 % of U.S. couples divorce within 10 years of marriage. For people under the age of 45 years, 50 % of first marriages will end in divorce for men and 45–50 % for women. Given that these rates do not account for long-term cohabiting couples, the actual rates are arguably much higher (Kitson, 2006). The rate of divorce has increased in most industrialized and urbanized societies around the world with the United States having the highest divorce rate followed by the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom. Yet given the difficulties in collecting, translating and interpreting cross-cultural data, cross national comparisons of divorce require a lengthy review and thus are beyond the scope of this chapter (see Simon & Alstein, 2003 for a detailed review).

Divorce has been consistently rated as one of life’s most stressful events (Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999). Not surprisingly, people who divorce are at a higher risk for a variety of poor mental and physical health outcomes (Braver, Shapiro, & Goodman, 2006). Is this because of the short and long-term stress people experience as a result of getting divorced or because poorly adjusted people are selected out of marriage? Proponents of the divorce-stress-adjustment perspective argue that the stress associated with divorce lasts well beyond legal divorce because divorced people have co-parenting responsibilities, continuing conflict with ex-spouse (especially when children are involved), loss of social support due to declined contact, as well as a decline in economic status (Amato, 2010). Proponents of the selection into divorce perspective argue that divorced people are more likely bring a general history of psychological problems into their marriage, which makes divorce extremely likely,

along with a variety of other life stressors. Hence, they argue that it is not the divorce that causes these issues but the individual's general propensity for numerous adjustment problems and life stressors. The divorce literature suggests that both perspectives are correct (see Amato, 2000 for a review). In other words, some of the stress associated with divorce can be attributed to individual adjustment problems that predated the divorce (and made it more likely to occur), but some of the stress arises from the experience of divorce itself.

Given the negative concomitants of divorce, a large body of research has attempted to identify reliable predictors of divorce. Yet the results are challenging to interpret, given that well over 200 reliable predictors of divorce have been identified across different studies conducted within different disciplines (Karney & Bradbury, 2005). We will highlight some of the most robust risk factors here, and then discuss an integrative model of marital instability which attempts to tie them together.

Income remains one of the most powerful predictors of divorce (Kurdek, 1993). In general, couples' risk of divorce decreases as their income increases. However, there is some evidence to suggest that a couple's overall income is not as predictive of divorce as whether the female member of the dyad is dependent on the male for financial security. Rogers (2004) found that the probability of divorce increases as wives' income increases. This is likely due to the fact that women who are more financially stable are more likely to see divorce as a viable option if they are unsatisfied. It is interesting to note that when asked to cite reasons for their impending divorce, people in lower socioeconomic groups claimed income was to blame, while people in higher socioeconomic groups cited emotional or relationship issues as the underlying cause (Amato & Previti, 2003; Rodrigues, Hall, & Fincham, 2006).

People who marry at a younger age are a higher risk for divorce. There is a linear negative association between age of marriage and divorce up until one's late 20s (Lehrer, 2008). Increased behavioral problems among young adults such as drug use, alcoholism, jealousy, and infidelity have all been cited as reasons for this risk factor (Amato & Rogers, 1997). Other researchers have argued that people who marry younger are likely more incompatible with each other (Kitson & Holmes, 1992). Self-selection may also partially explain the high divorce rate among those who marry younger. Young people who marry because of accidental pregnancy rather than compatibility may be more likely to divorce. However, even after controlling for children, people who marry younger are still more likely to get divorced (Heaton, 2002). Another possible self-selection effect comes from that fact that children of divorce are more likely to marry at a younger age (Glenn & Kramer, 1987), and children of divorce are much more likely to divorce themselves (Wallerstein, Corbin, Lewis, Hetherington, & Arasteh, 1988).

Studies generally show that educational level is inversely related to the probability of divorce (Kurdek, 1993; Orbach, Veroff, Hassan, & Horrocks, 2002). Researchers have proposed that problem behaviors associated with having less education may explain these findings (e.g. jealousy, infidelity, substance abuse, etc.) (Amato & Rogers, 1997). Given that educational level is so closely related to other sociodemographic variables, some researchers have proposed that educational level may be better seen as a proxy for other sociodemographic variables rather than a unique predictor (Orbach et al., 2002; Rodrigues et al., 2006). Some research has demonstrated an important within couple gender difference associated with educational level and marital outcomes. Although educated women are less likely to get divorced, divorce rates are much higher if the female is at a greater educational level than her husband (Heaton, 2002). Given that education typically increases people's income and opportunities, this finding is likely closely related to the notion that women have more options to leave in bad marriages if they are not dependent on their husbands for support.

Finally, a couple's risk of divorce decreases the longer they are married. The divorce rate dramatically decreases after the first 3 years of marriage. Furthermore, over one third of all divorces occur within 5 years of marriage ("U.S. Center for Health Statistics," 2009). Researchers tend to agree that the risk for divorce dramatically increases early in marriage as people gain new information about their partner that they view as incompatible with themselves (Rodrigues et al., 2006). Another important explanation for this finding centers on the fact that newlyweds are much more unlikely to

have children, and couples who have children are much more likely to remain married even if unsatisfied (Kurdek, 2002, 2004).

Given the large number of risk factors that have emerged across different studies, the need for an integrative model to explain why this set of factors predicts marital instability is clearly needed. Karney and Bradbury (1995) developed one such model highlighting three separate influences that contribute to divorce. According to this model, marital satisfaction and stability are influenced by three interacting sets of variables: enduring vulnerabilities, stressful events, and adaptive processes. Enduring vulnerabilities include the stable characteristics that each member of the dyad brings to the relationship such as educational level, parental divorce, etc. Stressful events include any difficult life event that the couple must face together. Examples of stressful life events that a couple may need to go through could include the loss of a job, a home, or a close family member. Adaptive processes refer to any encounters experienced in the marriage that facilitate adaptive relationship behaviors and appraisals. Karney and Bradbury argue that the enduring vulnerabilities and stressful life events that couples experience influence marital quality indirectly through the adoption of adaptive or maladaptive relationship processes.

Thus far, we have discussed predictors of divorce; we will now direct our attention toward the process of dissolution. Stage models have proved useful to understand what to expect as this process unfolds. Of course, these are parsimonious, normative depictions of a very complex process and should be treated as such. In this section, we will first outline a classic stage model specific to the divorce process. We will then evaluate models of loss and detachment more generally.

One of the first, but still widely cited, models of the divorce process is Bohannan's six stations of divorce. Focusing on process, Bohannan (1968) proposed that individuals go through different "types of divorce." First, individuals go through an emotional divorce in which they no longer feel emotionally connected to their partner. The next stage of this process is a legal divorce, which is thought to be a response to no longer feeling emotionally connected. This stage usually involves a great deal of hostility as individuals free themselves of joint obligations and interpersonal responsibilities tied to marriage. Around the same time, people experience an economic divorce as the dividing of assets and property take an economic toll on both couples. This is usually coupled with dramatic life style changes. If the couple had children with each other, these stages are also coupled with a co-parental divorce that includes the emotional strain involved with sharing children, being a single parent, and living apart from one's children some of the time. The fifth stage of Bohannan's divorce process is a community divorce characterized by the change in one's social network as friendships are divided and some family relationships are lost. Finally, the sixth and final stage of Bohannan's model is the psychic divorce in which one has to separate the self from their personality and influence of the ex-spouse. This process is thought to be the most challenging as one must reflectively look back on the failed marriage in order to learn and grow.

A recent process model proposed by Duck focuses more on communication and fluidity in both marital and non-marital dissolution processes (Rollie & Duck, 2006). Duck suggests a five stage model. In the first phase, the personal phase, one member of the dyad feels frustration and discontent. Then, in the subsequent phase, the dyadic phase, the unhappy partner reveals this discontent to the other member of the dyad. Next, in the social phase, the dissatisfied member of the dyad reveals his or her dissatisfaction to friends and family members seeking support and understanding. As the relationship ends, the grave-dressing phase begins. Mourning decreases during this phase and both members of the dyad reflect upon the relationship in order to revise their memories in order to come up with an acceptable account or narrative of their former relationship. In Duck's final stage, the resurrection phase, both members of the dyad re-enter society as singles, often telling others that their experiences have changed them in a way where they are now wiser and smarter.

From an attachment theoretical perspective divorce and non-marital dissolution both require that individuals sever an existing attachment bond, meaning that they must stop perceiving (and turning to) their former part as a source of support and security. As observed by Weiss in an early study of

divorce (1975), this can be exceedingly difficult for partners, even those whose marriages were distressing and contentious. Yet until an individual truly detaches from the former partner (meaning that attachment functions like security and support are no longer directed to that person), he/she cannot fully recover from a breakup, since he/she will be unconsciously “relying” on a person who, by definition, can no longer be relied upon for attachment-related needs (Sbarra, 2009). Fagundes (2011) demonstrated that after relationship dissolution, most people continue to psychologically desire to utilize their ex-partners as attachment figures, but this desire hampered their postbreakup emotional adjustment.

Individual differences in attachment security also predict adjustment to a relationship loss. Individuals who are anxiously attached to their romantic partners show poorer adjustment to the loss of this relationship (Davis, Shaver, & Vernon, 2003; Fagundes, 2011; Fraley & Bonanno, 2004). This is not surprising given that the loss of a romantic partner represents the realization of an anxious individual’s worst fears. Contrary to individuals with high attachment anxiety, individuals with high attachment avoidance do not reliably report poorer adjustment to the loss of a romantic partner. Some research suggests the emotional distancing strategies used by avoidantly attached individuals may enhance their capacity to cope with relationship loss (Davis et al., 2003; Fraley & Bonanno, 2004). Yet other research suggests that the classic distancing strategies of more avoidant individuals – who often function adequately in the face of day-to-day stressors – might break down in the case of relationship loss, given the magnitude of this form of stress (Birnbaum, Orr, Mikulincer, & Florian, 1997). Recent work suggests that avoidant individuals’ capacity to cope successfully with relationship loss is moderated by the avoidant individual’s other self-regulatory capacities.

Alternative Relationships: Nonmarital Cohabitation

Most of the research that we have reviewed thus far has focused on married heterosexual couples, yet this provides an incomplete picture of intimate relationship functioning, given the incredible diversity of contemporary romantic relationships. Fifty years ago, social norms strongly encouraged heterosexual marriage, and strongly discouraged (and stigmatized) participation in alternative relationship forms such as extended nonmarital cohabitation, participation in multiple romantic and sexual ties, and same-sex relationships. Yet these social norms have changed dramatically. Perhaps the most notable changes include the increased prevalence and social acceptability of nonmarital cohabitation, later age of first marriage, increased divorced rates, and increased social acceptance and visibility of same-sex relationships. Taken together, these changes mean that a larger percentage of adults than ever before will experience, during their lifespan, a significant romantic relationship that is not a conventional heterosexual marriage, and many of them will go on to raise children within these unconventional arrangements (Gates & Romero, 2009; Kennedy & Bumpass, 2008; Lichter & Qian, 2004). Nonetheless, heterosexual marriages continue to receive the bulk of empirical research attention. Greater investigation of the basic similarities and differences among different relationship forms, with respect to their formation, functioning, and long-term mental and physical health implications, remains one of the most important areas for future research in this area. Toward this end, we now review what is currently known about one of the fastest growing alternative relationship types – nonmarital cohabitation – after which we review research on same-sex relationships.

Rates of cohabitation have increased dramatically over the past several decades. In 1960, there were approximately 400,000 heterosexual cohabiting couples in America, compared with 4.6 million such couples in 2004 (Seltzer, 2004). The specific pattern of cohabiting prior to marriage has also increased: Between 1965 and 1974 approximately 10 % of couples cohabited prior to marriage, compared with over 60 % currently (Bumpus & Lu, 2000; Kennedy & Bumpass, 2008). Rates are even higher internationally: For example, 75 % of Australian couples and 90 % of Norwegian couples cohabit before

marriage (reviewed in Jose, Daniel O'Leary, & Moyer, 2010). Hence, it is now more common for couples to cohabit prior to marriage than not to, although cohabitating arrangements are less likely now than in the past to result in marriage (Lichter, Qian, & Mellott, 2006). Rather, individuals increasingly pursue long-term cohabitating relationships instead of marrying (Bumpass, Sweet, & Cherlin, 1991), and an increasing number of individuals reporting participating in a series of cohabiting arrangements over time: The number of individuals who report having participated in more than one cohabiting arrangement increased by nearly 40 % between 1992 and 2002, whereas rates of overall cohabitation increased by 26 % during the same period of time (Lichter, Turner, & Sassler, 2010). Furthermore, the group of individuals most likely to report serial cohabitation are young adults who have never married, suggesting that for this cohort, serial cohabitation may be viewed as a viable and socially acceptable alternative to marriage (Lichter et al., 2010).

The rise in cohabitation can be interpreted in both negative and positive terms, depending on the specific factors and outcomes under consideration. On the positive side, some have argued that the increased prevalence and acceptability of cohabitation signals large-scale cultural movement away from rigid adherence to a single model of "correct" romantic relationships, and toward cultural norms that encourage individuals to exercise more autonomy in determining what relationship forms meet their own needs (Duncan, Barlow, & James, 2005; Giddens, 1992). Marriage, as well, has long been critiqued for its patriarchal history (perhaps best symbolized by the practice – still surprisingly widespread – by which the woman gives up her "maiden" name and takes her husband's last name) and cohabitation provides a means for pursuing a long-term intimate relationship while avoiding the traditional institutional trappings of conventional marriage. Consistent with this view, some research suggests that couples who cohabit instead of or before marrying have more feminist perspectives on gender roles, and less gender-stereotyped patterns of household labor distribution, than couples who marry without cohabiting (Cunningham & Antill, 1994).

Yet on the negative side, cohabitating relationships appear to be more unsatisfying and unstable than marital ties. Contrary to the intuitive notion that cohabitation gives couples the chance to "test" their relationships, prepare for married life, or to "weed out" bad matches before making a lifelong commitment, studies have consistently found that couples that cohabit before marriage have higher divorce rates after marriage, higher rates of relationship conflict, lower levels of commitment (reviewed in Jose et al., 2010; Willoughby, Carroll & Busby, 2012). These negative effects have been found (although smaller in magnitude) even in countries where cohabitation is more common and more socially accepted (Hansen, Moum, & Shapiro, 2007), and even among the youngest contemporary cohort of US cohabitators, who have grown up in an environment in which the social distinctions between cohabitation and marriage are smaller than they have ever been (Jose et al.).

In explaining these robust effects, researchers have proposed that a couple's choice to cohabit rather than marry may reflect one or both partners' ambivalence about committing to the relationship, a generalized acceptance of untraditional relationships, and a greater psychological tolerance for divorce (Bennett, Blanc, & Bloom, 1988; Stanley, Whitton, & Markman, 2004). From this perspective, cohabitation does not necessarily lead to divorce; rather couples who elect to cohabit have higher probabilities of divorce to begin with (reviewed in Dush, Cohan, & Amato, 2003).

Yet recent research has begun to complicate this picture. A number of studies have failed to replicate the association between cohabitation and negative relationship outcomes (Bouchard, 2006; Lichter & Qian, 2008; Skinner, Bahr, Crane, & Call, 2002), and research increasingly suggests that cohabitating couples represent a more diverse group than has previously been thought, whose diverse motives and contexts for cohabitation appear to play a pivotal role in shaping their eventual relationship outcomes (Manning & Smock, 2005).

Perhaps the most important factor differentiating subtypes of cohabiting couples is their intention to wed eventually, both in the context of their current cohabiting arrangement and more generally. The tendency for cohabiting couples to show lower relationship quality and stability is not typically found among cohabiting couples who became engaged to be married before moving in together

(Kline et al., 2004; Rhoades, Stanley, & Markman, 2009; Stafford, Kline, & Rankin, 2004). Yet of course, partners in cohabiting couples often disagree about the importance and likelihood of marriage in their future, and research now indicates that both marital plans and agreement about these plans distinguishes between cohabiting couples with good versus poor relationship outcomes. Willoughby et al. (2012) studied over 8,000 heterosexual couples (with an average relationship length of 7–12 months) who filled out an online survey of relationship quality, including questions about intentions regarding marriage. Using latent class analysis, they found several clear patterns that contribute critical new information about the importance of treating cohabitation as a dyadic phenomenon involving both partners' expectations and intentions. Specifically, they found that engaged cohabitators in which both partners agreed about how quickly they were moving toward marriage had the highest levels of satisfaction and stability, and showed no significant differences from engaged couples that were not cohabitating (similar to the findings of previous studies). Yet engaged cohabiting couples in which partners disagreed on how quickly they were moving toward marriage (denoted "incongruent" cohabitators) had poorer quality relationships on a variety of dimensions, and in some dimensions scored lower than all other couple types, including cohabitators that had no marital plans at all. Even more notable was the fact that incongruent cohabitators constituted the majority of cohabitators in this study, constituting 70 % of the cohabiting couples. Because this was not a representative sample, it is not clear whether incongruent cohabitators are similarly overrepresented among cohabiting couples more generally, but Willoughby and colleagues make the reasonable speculation that this particular group of cohabitators might, in fact, be driving the widely-documented negative associations between cohabitation and relationship outcomes.

The findings of this study are particularly striking given that the vast majority of previous research on cohabitation has collected data from only one couple member, and has not been able to systematically assess the degree of correspondence in partners' attitudes and expectations regarding marriage. Clearly, assessment of both partners' perspectives is critical for reliably determining why, and under what circumstances, cohabitation leads to poor marital outcomes. Longitudinal research is also necessary, given that many cohabiting couples "slide" into cohabiting arrangements without clear cut plans (Manning & Smock, 2005), and develop their intentions to marry over time (Guzzo, 2009; Lichter, Batson, & Brown, 2004). Men appear more influential in these decisions than do women (Brown, 2000; Sanchez, Manning, & Smock, 1998), and men appear to have notably different views of the likelihood and importance of marriage than do their female cohabiting partners. Men are more likely than women to view cohabitation as a "trial period" for marriage or a substitution for marriage, rather than an intermediate stage on the way to marriage (Huang, Smock, Manning, & Bergstrom-Lynch, 2011). Hence, the discrepancies in marriage motives documented by Willoughby and colleagues (2012) appear to show sharply gender-differentiated patterns, such that "incongruent cohabitators" typically contain marriage-minded women paired with marriage-avoidant men.

Thus far, the extant research suggests that the negative relationship outcomes associated with cohabitation are attributable to selection effects: In other words, they are due to the attitudes and expectations that partners bring with them to the cohabiting arrangement. Yet some research suggests that the experience of cohabitation itself has implications for relationship functioning, potentially by undermining partners' attitudes toward marriage and their determination to make a relationship work (Axinn & Thornton, 1992; Dush et al., 2003; McGinnis, 2003). This notion is consistent with research demonstrating that cohabiting couples become progressively less likely to marry (but no less likely to break up) the longer that they cohabit, whereas married couples become progressively less likely to break up the longer that they have been married (Wolfinger, 2005). Also, if selection effects were entirely attributable for the link between cohabitation and divorce, then this association should become progressively weaker over time, as overall rates of cohabitation increase and cohabitation becomes a more normative component of young adults' relationship trajectories. To test this hypothesis, Dush and colleagues compared two U.S. marriage cohorts: those married between 1964 and 1980 and those married between 1981 and 1997. They found that after controlling for self selection factors such as

income, education, history of parental divorce, and whether a marriage was a first or second marriage, couples who cohabited prior to marriage had significantly poorer marital functioning and lower marital happiness in both cohorts, and these associations did not significantly vary across cohorts.

This surprising finding highlights how little is known about the subjective meaning and phenomenology of marriage versus cohabitation within the long-range developmental trajectory of an established couple, and the conditions under which that subjective meaning might change over time as couples traverse different stages in their own respective lifespans, and also the lifespan of their relationship. Clearly, this is an area in which we need longitudinal qualitative research to investigate the potentially non-conscious processes through which cohabiting couples' intentions regarding marriage and other major relationship decisions gradually change over time.

Same-Sex Couples

Up until now we have focused exclusively on heterosexual couples, yet one of the most notable developments in psychological research on intimate relationships over the past two decades has been the increased attention to the relationships of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (collectively denoted sexual-minority) individuals. Research on same-sex relationships has increased dramatically over the past several decades, both with regard to the sheer number of empirical studies as well as the sophistication of the research. Historically, issues of sample selection have proven particular hurdles for research on same-sex couples. Given that this is a small, stigmatized and relatively invisible population, recruiting large, diverse, and reasonably representative samples proves exceedingly challenging. Most early research recruited participants via advertisements placed in lesbian and gay publications and disseminated through lesbian and gay community organizations. Yet these recruitment strategies tended to undersample bisexually-identified individuals (who remain marginalized within many lesbian and gay communities, despite the fact that individuals with bisexual attractions and behavior actually outnumber individuals with exclusive same-sex attractions ([Chandra, Mosher, Copen, & Sionean, 2011](#); [Laumann et al., 1994](#)), as well as individuals who do not openly identify themselves as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. In recent years, the growth of the Internet has made it much easier to recruit these under-investigated subsets of the sexual-minority population, as has the inclusion of non-judgmental questions about same-sex partnerships in a number of large-scale representative surveys ([Biblarz & Savci, 2010](#)). These changes have allowed researchers to study larger and more diverse populations of sexual minorities than ever before. Along these lines, it is important to clarify that although discussions of same-sex couples in the research literature are often couched as discussions of gay/lesbian/bisexual couples, such terminology is misleading, since the majority of individuals experiencing same-sex attractions and behavior do not, in fact, openly identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual ([Chandra et al., 2011](#); [Laumann et al., 1994](#); [Wichstrom & Hegna, 2003](#)). Some of these individuals are actively hiding their same-sex sexuality; others may find that the "gay/lesbian/bisexual" terminology is irrelevant to their own self-concept, that it provides too restrictive a model of sexuality, or that it conflicts with their religious or ethnic identity (see [Diamond, 2008](#)). This is why researchers increasingly use the term sexual minority to refer to any individual whose same-sex attractions and/or behavior place him/her outside conventional heterosexual norms, regardless of sexual identity label. The present chapter uses this terminology, but nonetheless retains the descriptors "lesbian," "gay," and "bisexual" when summarizing studies and/or research traditions that specifically recruited research participants on the basis of lesbian/gay/bisexual identification.

Historically, sexual-minority individuals were stereotyped as uninterested and incapable of forming long-term committed partnerships, but contemporary research provides strong evidence to the contrary. Between 40–60 % of gay men and 50–80 % of lesbians are partnered ([Peplau & Spalding, 2000](#)), and their relationships are a significant part of the American interpersonal landscape. The 2000

census found that 1 in 9 of the 5.5 million cohabitating, unmarried couples in the United States were same-sex couples (Simons & O'Connell, 2003). An increasingly sophisticated body of multi-method research has investigated whether same-sex couples meet, fall in love, and maintain their relationships through substantially different processes than heterosexual couples, and the answer is largely "no." Same-sex couples show similar communication and conflict resolution skills as heterosexual couples, similar degrees of interpersonal empathy, similar appraisals of intimacy, autonomy, equality, and mutual trust, similar day-to-day cognitive and behavioral strategies for maintaining their relationships, similar struggles over equity, housework, and fairness, and even similar strategies for deciding to parent and cope with the birth of a new child (Baucom, McFarland, & Christensen, 2010; Carrington, 2000; Conley, Roesch, Peplau, & Gold, 2009; Goldberg, Downing, & Richardson, 2009; Goldberg & Perry-Jenkins, 2007). What, then, distinguishes same-sex from heterosexual couples? The answer to this question is surprisingly consistent from study to study: social stigmatization and invalidation.

Although attitudes toward same-sex sexuality have grown more tolerant in recent years (Loftus, 2001), stigma and intolerance remain pervasive. One large survey of American lesbian-gay-bisexual adults found that three-fourths had experienced some form of discrimination as a result of their sexual orientation, and almost one-third had suffered violence against themselves or their property (Kaiser Foundation, 2001). Same-sex couples are also frequently disparaged or denied legitimacy by their families of origin and the culture at large (Caron & Ulin, 1997; Gillis, 1998; LaSala, 2000; Oswald, 2002b). Even couples who do not face stark and explicit rejection must typically contend with everyday stressors such as poor service and rude treatment when shopping together (Walters & Curran, 1996), difficulty making hotel reservations as a couple (Jones, 1996), and discomfort when attending family functions together (Caron & Ulin, 1997; Oswald, 2002a).

These challenges exemplify the many ways in which same-sex couples are exposed to "minority stress" – the unique strain experienced as a direct result of occupying a socially marginalized category. Minority stress has been advanced as an explanation for the finding that although same-sex sexuality is not a mental disorder, sexual minorities do exhibit higher rates of anxiety and mood disorders over the lifespan, and these problems are amplified among subsets of sexual minorities who report greater prejudice and stigmatization (Meyer, 2003). Although most research on minority stress has focused on its implications for sexual-minority individuals, researchers have begun to extend the minority stress perspective to explain the distinctive dynamics of same-sex couples.

Hence, although minority stress began as a theory of intrapsychic functioning, it is increasingly being used to understand and explain interpersonal processes and cognitions. Much of this work has focused on the detrimental implications of internalized homophobia, the phenomenon by which sexual-minority individuals gradually internalize societal denigration and stigmatization, developing a negative sense of self and a chronic sense of conflict between their same-sex sexuality and their desire for social validation and affirmation (Herek, 2004). Meyer and Dean (1998) described internalized homophobia as the most insidious form of minority stress because although it originates with external social marginalization, the gradual internalization of stigma, negativity, and stereotyping makes these stressors impossible to escape. Hence, even in the absence of objective forms of social stigma and rejection, individuals with high levels of internalized homophobia continue to suffer from feelings of illegitimacy and shame, expectations of rejection, and low self-esteem. Internalized homophobia has been linked to a number of negative mental health outcomes, such as depression, risky sexual behavior, eating disorders, and suicidality (Meyer, 2003; Meyer & Dean, 1998; Remafedi, French, Story, Resnick, & Blum, 1998; Williamson & Hartley, 1998). Notably, it is also related to same-sex relationship quality: Sexual-minority men with higher levels of internalized homophobia have lower rates of romantic relationship participation, and their romantic relationships are shorter, more problematic, and more conflict-ridden (Meyer & Dean). Importantly, sexual-minority individuals with high levels of internalized homophobia also report lower quality in their non-romantic relationships, such as those with friends, family, and colleagues, suggesting that internalized shame and negativity might have a

general negative effect on core interpersonal processes and cognitions (Balsam & Szymanski, 2005; Otis, Rostosky, Riggle, & Hamrin, 2006). Investigating the processes by which marginalization and stigmatization gradually “get under the skin” to erode individuals’ own well-being and the quality of their social ties is a provocative and important direction for the next generation of research applying minority stress theory to the study of same-sex couples.

One particularly elegant line of research has taken advantage of the “natural experiment” provided by statewide ballot initiatives outlawing same-sex marriage to investigate how sexual-minority individuals and their relationships are affected by living in communities that take active, visible steps to deny legitimacy to their partnerships. These studies have found that sexual-minority individuals living in states that passed laws against same-sex marriage experienced significantly higher levels of psychological distress, consistent with minority stress theory (Rostosky, Riggle, Horne, & Miller, 2009) and also heightened fears about the status of their relationships (Rostosky, Riggle, Horne, Denton, & Huellemeier, 2010). Furthermore, studies have found that sexual-minority stress can “spill over” from one partner to another, potentially magnifying the negative repercussions for the couple as a whole (Rostosky & Riggle, 2002).

Lack of Opportunities for Legal Formalization

As of 2012, in the United States, same-sex marriages are legal in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, and the District of Columbia (California’s recognition of same-sex marriage remains under legal challenge). Yet because of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, same-sex marriages cannot be recognized at the federal level, and no US state is obligated to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in another state (although Rhode Island, New York, and Maryland currently do so). Same-sex marriages performed in other countries are also denied recognition (currently, same-sex marriage is legal in Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, and Sweden). In addition, 39 American states have explicitly banned gay marriages, either through state laws or constitutional amendments. Poll data consistently show greater public support for “civil unions” or “domestic partnerships” (which provide many of the same rights as marriage, but are not legally considered marriages, and do not offer benefits such as sponsorship for immigration) than for same-sex relationships, sometimes by nearly 20 percentage points (Brewer & Wilcox, 2005). Yet currently, civil unions are only available in Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, and New Jersey. Altogether, only 25 % of the country’s 581,000 cohabiting same-sex couples live in an area where some form of legal recognition for their relationship is an option (Gates, Badgett, & Ho, 2008).

The fact that same-sex couples lack formal recognition for their relationships has been posited as a key factor explaining why they have higher break-up rates than married (but not unmarried cohabiting) heterosexual couples (Kurdek, 1992, 1998, 2000). A 12-year longitudinal study found breakup rates of 19 % among gay male couples and 24 % among lesbian couples. Notably, after controlling for demographic factors such as length of cohabitation, these rates were not statistically higher than the breakup rate (14 %) among unmarried cohabiting heterosexuals (Kurdek, 2004). We might therefore expect that same-sex couples with the opportunity and inclination to marry or enter civil unions (which provide the same rights as marriage at the state level) would show greater stability than their unmarried counterparts. Recent findings from a 3-year follow-up of same-sex couples who had civil unions in Vermont are consistent with this expectation. Balsam, Beauchaine, Rothblum, and Solomon (2008) found same-sex couples who had formalized their relationship with a civil union were less likely to have ended their relationships than same-sex couples without civil unions supporting the notion that barriers to dissolution play a key role in influencing couples’ attitudes about, and motivations to deal with, hurdles in their relationships (Kurdek, 1998).

Along the same lines, same-sex couples report that formalizing their relationships make them feel more “real” (Lannutti & Lloyd, 2005) and enhances their sense of commitment, even if they had already been committed to one another beforehand (Alderson, 2004). Perhaps for this reason, Solomon, Rothblum, and Balsam (2005) found that 54 % of same-sex couples reported increased love and commitment to one another after having had a civil union. One question which awaits future longitudinal research is whether other methods of legally acknowledging and formalizing same-sex relationships, such as naming one another as insurance beneficiaries and/or legal heirs, purchasing property together, giving one another power of attorney, designating one another as medical proxies, legally taking the same last name, or merging finances (Badgett, 1998; Beals, Impett, & Peplau, 2002; Impett & Peplau, 2002), have the same repercussions for couple functioning, commitment, and stability as more “official” forms of recognition, such as civil unions and domestic partnerships.

Such investigations call for careful attention to the specific mechanisms through which relationship formalization relates to relationship functioning, and in this respect it is important to distinguish between symbolic and legal formalization: Fingerhut and Maisel (2010) found that couples who had formalized their relationships symbolically (through commitment ceremonies or weddings with no legal bearing) reported greater life satisfaction and relationship satisfaction, whereas those who formalized their relationships legally (through registered domestic partnerships) reported greater investments in their relationship. This suggests that symbolic formalization has particularly strong implications for personal and moral aspects of commitment, whereas legal formalization has relatively stronger implications for structural aspects of commitment (Johnson, 1999).

Both symbolic and legal formalization, however, appear to play a role in reducing what has been called “relational ambiguity,” or the lack of standard cultural “rules” by which partners can gauge the progress and future status of their relationship, as well as their own responsibilities and duties at different stages of development (Green & Mitchell, 2008). Green notes that heterosexual marriage comes with a set of cultural expectations that partners can rely upon to guide their behavior, such as cohabitation, pooled property and finances, and caring for one another (and one another’s extended families) in times of illness. Without the clear demarcation of marriage, same-sex couples must make such decisions on a case-by-case basis, and must openly and repeatedly revisit questions – and conflicts – about whether their relationship is “serious” or “long-term” enough to warrant certain commitments and sacrifices (such as giving up a job opportunity, allowing elderly parents to share the household, etc.). In some cases, same-sex couples cannot even identify a reliable marker of when their relationship began (Reczek, Elliott, & Umberson, 2009). Hence, pursuing either symbolic or legal formalization may help to decrease relational ambiguity and create a set of shared expectations about the status and future of the relationship.

Perhaps most importantly, relationship formalization may help to buffer couples from the day-to-day stress of their social marginalization. Fingerhut and Maisel (2010) found that the association between internalized homophobia and psychosocial adjustment (life and relationship satisfaction) was attenuated among individuals who had either legally or symbolically formalized their relationship. Similarly, Riggle, Rostosky, and Horne (2010) found that same-sex couples in legally recognized relationships reported significantly less psychological distress than those in committed – but not legally recognized – relationships. This does not, however, suggest that formal recognition for same-sex relationships would provide a “magic buffer” against the stress of social stigmatization. In their study of same-sex couples who entered into civil unions in Vermont, Todosijevic, Rothblum and Solomon (2005) found that many of these couples continued to struggle with familial rejection of their relationship. Similarly, Eskridge and Spedale (2006) note that same-sex married couples in Denmark and other Scandinavian countries (which have significantly more accepting attitudes toward same-sex sexuality than does the United States) continue to confront daily prejudice and social rejection. The often-vociferous debates over same-sex marriage have been observed to take a notable toll on same-sex couples’ views of themselves and their relationships (Rostosky et al., 2009).

Magnification of Gender-Related Emotional Dynamics

Gender differences in interpersonal attitudes, cognitions, and behaviors have long been fruitful topics of social-psychological research, and one of the signature characteristics of same-sex couples is that both partners have the same gender role and same history of gender-related socialization. Contrary to stereotypes portraying gay men and lesbians as “inverted” with respect to gender (such that gay men are expected to resemble heterosexual women, and lesbian women are expected to resemble heterosexual men), research has consistently shown that sexual-minority men and women show largely the same gender-related patterns of relationship behavior that have been observed among heterosexuals (for example Bailey, Gaulin, Agyei, & Gladue, 1994). To some degree, this should not be surprising: Not only have sexual-minority men and women received the same gender-related socialization as heterosexuals, but the vast majority have had extensive romantic experience (and sometimes their earliest and most formative experiences) in conventional heterosexual relationships (Bailey, Dunne, & Martin, 2000; Laumann et al., 1994). Hence, they have internalized the same heteronormative cultural scripts regarding gender-related interpersonal behavior as have heterosexuals. The end result appears to be that same-sex relationships provide for a “double dose” of gender-typed attitudes and behavior.

Importantly, similarity with respect to gender-related roles and skills appears to facilitate effective communication, support, and negotiation (Gottman et al., 2003; Roisman, Clausell, Holland, Fortuna, & Elieff, 2008; Stacey & Biblarz, 2001), especially for female-female couples, potentially owing to women’s relationally-oriented socialization. Lesbian couples tend to exhibit more emotional connectedness, cohesion, and intimacy than gay male or heterosexual couples (Green, Bettinger, & Zacks, 1996; Kurdek, 1998; Zacks, Green, & Marrow, 1988), greater capacity for mutual empathy (Ussher & Perz, 2008), more egalitarianism and more shared and flexible decision making (Eldridge & Gilbert, 1990; Green et al., 1996; Matthews, Tartaro, & Hughes, 2003), and more adaptability in dealing with emotional needs and household tasks (Connolly, 2006; Connolly & Sicola, 2006). Importantly, there is more evidence for interpersonal strengths in female-female couples than for interpersonal deficits in male-male couples. Initially, researchers expected that because men are socialized to value independence and autonomy over connectedness and intimacy, male-male couples would be characterized by distance and disengagement (Kresten & Bepko, 1980). Yet this does not appear to be the case. Most studies detect no differences (or trivial differences) between levels of support, intimacy, cohesion, and satisfaction between male-male and male–female couples (Kurdek, 2004, 2006).

Clearly, research on how each partner’s gender – and gender socialization – shapes same-sex relationship dynamics has important implications for understanding such dynamics in all couples. Yet future investigations of such topics must be paired with more systematic assessments of individual differences other than gender in order to more clearly specify the mechanisms through which gender-related effects operate. For example, how might individual difference dimensions such as locus of control (Kurdek, 1997), attachment style (Birnbaum, Reis, Mikulincer, Gillath, & Orpaz, 2006), rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 1996), sociosexuality (Simpson & Gangestad, 1991; Simpson, Wilson, & Winterheld, 2004) and affective states such as anxiety and depression (Kurdek, 1997; Oetjen & Rothblum, 2000) mediate or moderate the effects of each partners’ gender on couple functioning? Future research along these lines will enable researchers to explain not only differences between female-female, male-male, and heterosexual couples, but to identify and explain differences within each relationship type.

Directions for Future Research: Greater Integration of Relationship Research and Sexuality Research

Despite the explosion of rigorous social-psychological research on close relationships over the past 20 years, during which practically every aspect of intimate social ties has been scrutinized both within the laboratory and “in the field,” one domain of romantic relationship functioning has remained strikingly

under investigated: sexual behavior. Despite the fact that sexual behavior is arguably the preeminent feature distinguishing romantic relationships from other emotionally significant ties (Schwartz & Young, 2009), relationship researchers have devoted surprisingly little attention to couples' regular sexual practices. This is not to say that relationship researchers have ignored sexual matters altogether, but they typically focus exclusively on individuals' sexual satisfaction rather than their actual sexual practices – i.e., what they think and feel about what they do, instead of what they actually do. Although the extant research on predictors of sexual satisfaction has yielded important insights into basic relationship processes (Byers, 2005; Schwartz & Young, 2009; Sprecher & Cate, 2004), it has nonetheless left a notable gap in our understanding of couples' sexual functioning. Quite simply, what exactly are couples doing, and how do they develop their specific arrangements? How do they establish and maintain their own particular sexual repertoire, including the manner and frequency with which they signal sexual interest, who typically initiates (and/or refuses) sexual activity, the specific behaviors they pursue, the degree of flexibility in their routine, the occurrence or non-occurrence of orgasm, and “post-sex” routines and practices. Knowing whether an individual is satisfied or dissatisfied with his/her sex life tells us nothing about these concrete practices.

Understanding couples' specific sexual practices is important because the process of developing a mutually satisfying and comfortable “sexual script” (Gagnon, 1990) requires considerable (and delicate) negotiation. By the time two individuals come together in a sustained partnership, they might have developed drastically different preferences, attitudes, habits, fantasies, fears, and insecurities to the dyad, where they interact with those of the other partner to create a unique erotic dynamic. Over time, couples must develop a mutual sexual script specifying appropriate and desirable sexual behaviors, roles, and practices. As their mutual sexual script evolves over the course of the relationship, each new element involves the risk of rejection and/or disapproval. Hence, there is nothing “natural” or “automatic” about a couple's sex life. Even during the earliest stages of relationship development, when sexual activity is typically highest, partners' unfamiliarity with one another's preferences and their own self-consciousness can lay the groundwork for awkwardness and performance problems (Bozon, 2001). Contrary to the notion that sexual problems are largely a concern for older individuals, studies increasingly indicate that many young, unmarried individuals report experiencing periodic sexual problems, including difficulties with arousal, orgasm, premature ejaculation, and pain during sexual activity (O'Sullivan & Majerovich, 2008). Script negotiation is delicate and difficult, and evidence suggests that many individuals are somewhat dissatisfied with their current script. For example, both men and women report wanting to have more frequent sex with their current partner than they are currently having (McNulty & Fisher, 2008), suggesting that individuals prefer to “settle” in this regard than to risk making an overture that might be rejected.

In summary, sexuality research and relationship research have proceeded along parallel, non-intersecting trajectories for far too long. Many of the basic questions posed by researchers in each “camp” are fundamentally similar: What promotes happiness and satisfaction within a couple? How are discrepancies in needs and expectations resolved? How do partners manage their own securities and vulnerabilities in the process of achieving mutual intimacy? Relationship researchers have demonstrated considerable proficiency in addressing these questions within domains such as commitment, communication, social support, physical affection, and conflict. It is now time to extend this focused, systematic inquiry to couples' sexual lives. Our current understanding of the factors that predict couples' overall sexual satisfaction will be greatly enhanced by more rigorous inquiry into couples' specific sexual practices and scripts, and how these practices and scripts develop and change over the course of a relationship and over the course of individuals' lifespans. Perhaps most importantly, relationship researchers need not reinvent the wheel: All of the necessary theoretical and methodological “ingredients” for such inquiry are already available in the growing body of knowledge produced by sexuality researchers. Hence, active collaborations between sex and relationship researchers will undoubtedly benefit both disciplines, enriching and expanding the range of questions that we pose about the role of sexual behavior in romantic relationship and our strategies for answering these

questions. Yet for these new directions to yield fruit, we must commit to a “culture shift” within the discipline of relationship science that takes more seriously the day-to-day, physical practice of sexual intimacy.

Conclusion

Over the past 30 years, relationship research has exploded, mostly within the field of social psychology. By adopting a wide array of theories and methods within social psychology, the field has produced a considerable body of research that not only sheds light on basic human processes, but has also provides a scientific basis to understand and ultimately improve relationship functioning. If relationship science is to continue to expand and progress, it will be important to take a multidisciplinary perspective incorporating novel theories and methods from neighboring disciplines, including developmental psychobiology, neuroscience, psychoneuroimmunology/psychophysiology, and genetics. Understanding how relationships influence quality of life and disease progression in the context of certain illnesses such as cancer by working with medical professionals may have important physical health implications. In order for relationship science to grow into a multidisciplinary field of investigation, relationship scientists must be willing learn the language of these neighboring disciplines, and help researchers in these disciplines understand just how important relationships are to every aspect of human health and well-being.

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Chapter 14

Interaction in Small Groups

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Introduction

Ivan Steiner in 1974 lamented in an infamous article “whatever happened to the group in social psychology?” Certainly an examination of published research in social psychology shows a sharp decline in research on small groups, and in particular face-to-face interacting groups (Wittenbaum & Moreland, 2008). However, in an answer to Steiner’s question, Levine and Moreland (1990) replied “groups are alive and well and living in other disciplines.” *Small groups* can be generally defined as three or more people interacting together with a common purpose (Moreland, 2010; but see Williams, 2010). Although there are no longer concentrated centers for research on these small groups, researchers interested in their operation now have homes in a multitude of host departments, from psychology, sociology, and communications, to organizational behavior, education, and industrial engineering. A comprehensive review of literature on interaction in small groups requires a much broader search than in earlier years.

Despite this recent spread of group research across disciplines, research on small groups originated at the intersection of sociological and psychological perspectives. Sociologists were interested in how religious, political, economic, and educational systems function to sustain society, that is, how groups served to maintain the social order. For example, Durkheim (1897) described the loss of group ties as a loss of identity so important to the individual that it could lead one to commit suicide. Cooley (1902) also described the central importance of the group to the individual, suggesting for example that primary groups, such as the family, provide a focus for socialization of the individual. Psychologists were interested in issues of how individuals react in group settings. For example, LeBon (1895) described how groups or mobs could take over an individual’s will to create a collective mind. Triplett (1898), who is often credited as conducting the first experiment in social psychology, was interested in how the mere presence of others can affect our behavior. Somewhat different research traditions have grown out of those two originating fields with varying emphasis on the groups versus the individuals as the important foci, with sociology treating each person as an element of a larger system and psychology focusing on the individual as the key to understanding the group.

As small group research grew as an empirical science, theoretical perspectives emerged that reflected these two historical influences. For example, *expectation states theory* (Berger, Conner, & Fisek, 1974) describes the emergence and development of status hierarchies in small groups and has been particularly

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useful in more recent years in understanding processes that underlie role differentiation, status, and leadership in groups. *Social exchange theory* (Homans, 1961) described the exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, costly or rewarding, of individuals in interaction with one another and has been particularly useful in understanding processes that underlie inclusion and exclusion in groups, such as cohesion and coalition formation. *The functional perspective* (Hollingshead et al., 2005; McGrath, 1984) describes processes that lead groups to behave efficiently and has been particularly useful in understanding processes that underlie group performance.

These theoretical perspectives are reflected in the content sections of this chapter. Research on power and status structures in groups is somewhat more identified with the sociological tradition, whereas research on performance processes in groups is somewhat more identified with the psychological tradition. However, all of the content sections of this chapter stress interaction processes in small groups as they gain status, coordinate efforts, and exchange information.

We begin with a brief review of the primary methods used to study small groups. That is followed by a discussion of research on power, status, and leadership, reviewing research on role differentiation, the development of status structures, and theories of leadership. A discussion of inclusion and exclusion processes in groups follows, including research on cohesiveness and social identity versus ostracism, social rejection, and schisms in groups, as well as a discussion of majority and minority influence. The final content section covers motivation and coordination processes in groups, including social facilitation and social loafing, transactive memory systems, and information exchange.

Methodological Approaches

Researchers have applied a variety of methodological approaches to the study of small groups (Forsyth, 2006). Forsyth describes the three primary approaches as case studies, experimental studies, and non-experimental correlational studies.

Case studies are in-depth examinations of a single or just a few select groups. Classic examples of the case study approach include Janis's examination of decision making in high profile groups that made historically poor decisions (Janis, 1972) and Whyte's (1943) detailed observations of a street gang. More recent examples are Hackman's (1990) descriptions of groups that work and groups that don't, Pescosolido's (2002) detailed examination of leadership and emotional processes in jazz groups and rowing crews, and Pascoe's (2003) description of negotiated identities among adolescent boys. The advantage of the case study approach is that the researcher can create a highly in depth description of the structure and functioning of the chosen groups. However, the drawback is the potential lack of generalizability of those details to other groups (McGrath, Martin, & Kulka, 1982).

Experimental studies have been a constant presence in the field since Lewin's influence in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Lewin, 1947; Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939). Lewin demonstrated that important group processes can be measured and manipulated, and his Center for Group Dynamics legitimized the study of groups as an experimental field (Lewin, 1951). Examples of contemporary research using the experimental approach are bountiful and include Williams (2009) experimental work on ostracism using a virtual ball toss paradigm (Cyberball) and Stasser and Titus's (1985, 1987) work on information sharing in decision making groups. The advantage of experimental studies is the researcher's ability to manipulate processes of interest in order to establish causal relationships among variables, as well as to carefully control for possible confounding variables. Drawbacks, however, include the limited number of factors that can be examined, as well as the potential lack of realism of context and lack of representativeness of many research participants (McGrath, Martin, & Kulka, 1982).

Non-experimental approaches explore the correlational relationships among variables, such as in Newcomb's (1943) classic study of opinion change among college students over time. Many recent examples of non-experimental approaches can be found in organizational psychology, where the

ecological validity of using intact groups often takes precedent over experimental rigor (Austin, 2003; Cole, Walter, & Bruch, 2008). Although interesting relationships can be documented in this manner, causal relationships cannot be established given that there is no manipulation of potential causal agents.

Perhaps the most interesting methodological contributions of group research have been in the creation of observation systems or other methods for investigating unique group processes. Much of what we know about role differentiation in groups is based on research by Bales' (1950) using the *Interaction Process Analysis* (IPA) system. The IPA system classifies group behaviors into one of 12 categories, half of which quantify task activities (e.g., questioning or attempting answers) and the other half of which quantify socioemotional activities (e.g., positive actions such as agreement and negative actions such as disagreement). At one time, the IPA was the most widely used method for studying group interaction. In the more recently developed SYMLOG system (Systematic Multiple Level Observation of Groups; Bales, 1980, 1988), observers code group members' behaviors in terms of the dimensions of dominance/submissiveness, friendliness/unfriendliness, and acceptance/non-acceptance of authority. The coding of interaction content has risen again recently with the development of the information sharing paradigm mentioned above, given its fairly simple coding of information that is contributed to the group discussion as either shared across members or unique to specific group members.

Another assessment technique that was developed for studying patterned relationships among group members by mathematically indexing group relations was *sociometry* (Moreno, 1934, 1960). In this approach, individuals are asked an attraction question regarding their group members (e.g., whom do you like the most?). Based on these responses, researchers construct a sociogram, or a graphical representation of a pattern of relationships among group members. Various group members' positions in the sociogram can be described using a mathematical summary. Research using sociometry also seems to be increasing. More advanced statistical techniques have aided in this mathematical representation (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), as has the development of computer programs such as Sociometrics (Walsh, 2003) that can generate sociograms.

These different methodological approaches tend to characterize different topical areas of research. Research on power and status has tended to use non-experimental approaches, although research on leadership in particular has combined different approaches. Research on inclusion and exclusion processes has tended to use experimental approaches with many exceptions. Research on motivation and coordination has been somewhat exclusively dominated by experimental approaches. These areas are reviewed more thoroughly in the following sections.

Power, Status, and Leadership

The roles of power, status, and leadership have been at the forefront of small groups research since early work by Lewin and Bales. This section begins with a discussion of role differentiation, followed by work on status structures with a theoretical focus on expectation states theory. We conclude with a discussion of leadership, a topic that continues to generate abundant research.

Role Differentiation

As mentioned above, work on role differentiation comprises some of the earliest and most influential small group research on status and power. The current section focuses on Bales and Moreno's early contributions to this area.

Bales (1950, 1970) documented the development of roles in unstructured groups of Harvard students, finding that stable roles developed within the first hour of interaction. For example, the most talkative member in the group was addressed most by other group members, his/her ideas were rated the most favorably, and he/she was indicated as the leader. Similar effects have also been found in more heterogeneous groups such as juries (e.g., Strodbeck, James, & Hawkins, 1957).

Bales and colleagues also found evidence for the emergence of two types of leaders: task leaders and socioemotional leaders (Bales & Slater, 1955). *Task leaders* are those group members who engage in behaviors that are designed to facilitate task completion. Task activities involve behaviors such as delegation and the coordination of group communication. *Socioemotional leaders* are those group members who engage in behaviors that are designed to facilitate positive relations within the group. Socioemotional activities involve behaviors such as encouragement and compromising. Bales and colleagues argue that task and relationship roles emerge because these activities are often at odds with one another (Bales, 1955, 1958). When task leaders work towards the completion of goals, they necessarily engage in behaviors that do not promote positive group relations, such as criticizing and giving orders. Thus, most groups have two leaders: one specializing in task activities and the other specializing in socioemotional activities.

Bales investigated the emergence of task and relationship roles using *Interaction Process Analysis* (IPA) (Bales, 1950), which as discussed above, classifies communicative behaviors into either task or socioemotional activities. Bales found that the majority of group members performed either task or socioemotional activities, with few group members performing both. Although in the first session a little over half of leaders engaged in a good deal of task and socioemotional activities, by the fourth session less than 10 % of leaders specialized in both types of activities (Bales, 1953, 1958; Bales & Slater, 1955; Slater, 1955). It is important to note, however, that these role differentiation effects are not obtained when the task leader is assigned by the experimenter (Burke, 1968), nor when group members are given strong motivation to complete the task (Burke, 1967). Thus, role differentiation between task and socioemotional activities may be more likely in low legitimization circumstances (Burke, 2003).

Moreno (1934, 1960) also conducted early work on role differentiation using the sociometric technique described above. By assessing patterns of attraction and influence among group members, the sociogram depicts the group structure and can be used to calculate roles. For example, those group members who are liked by many other group members have high status and are called “populars.” In sum, work by Bales and Moreno set the groundwork for studying status and power in small groups.

Status Structures

A wealth of research has come out of Bales' early work on role differentiation. In particular, Berger and colleagues developed *expectation states theory* in an effort to understand the development of group status structures (Berger et al., 1974; Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Berger & Zelditch, 1998). This theory was developed to explain the status structure specifically in task groups that have a collective orientation (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003). A *collective orientation* is the perception of group members that working in a group is necessary to complete their task goals.

The main idea of expectation states theory concerns the influence of performance expectations on the development of status hierarchies. Expectation states theory argues that people use available social status cues to form performance expectations, anticipations of each group members' likelihood of making meaningful contributions to the group task. These expectations are often unconscious, but substantially influence subsequent behavior. Those group members who are expected to make more valuable contributions to the group are given more opportunities to contribute to the group. For example, they are given more opportunities to speak and offer ideas. Additionally, these ideas are more likely to

be perceived positively by group members. Thus, performance expectations influence the development of status hierarchies in self-fulfilling ways.

Expectation states theory posits three processes that impact the development of performance expectations: socially significant status characteristics, social rewards, and behavioral interchange patterns (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003). *Socially significant status characteristics* are characteristics that differ across people and for which there are normative beliefs regarding the advantages of certain characteristics over others. Expectations states theory posits two types of status characteristics, specific and diffuse. *Specific characteristics* are those characteristics associated with performance expectations for only a certain set of relevant tasks. For example, group members' mathematic ability may be used as a status characteristic in groups performing a primarily mathematical task, but not in groups performing a primarily verbal task. *Diffuse characteristics* are those characteristics associated with general performance expectations. For example, gender is a diffuse characteristic, as men are generally expected to be more competent than women (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004). Other examples of diffuse characteristics include race, physical attractiveness, and seating position (Berger, Webster, Ridgeway, & Rosenholtz, 1986; Strodbeck & Hook, 1961).

Although the majority of work on performance expectations focuses on the influence of socially significant status characteristics, social rewards and behavioral interchange patterns can also play important roles in the development of performance expectations. In particular, individuals form performance expectations that are congruent with the relative distribution of rewards (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Wagner, 1985; Stewart & Moore, 1992). Thus, performance expectations can serve to legitimize the differential allocation of rewards among group members. Individuals also form performance expectations that are congruent with behavioral interchange patterns, such that group members who exhibit more assertive and dominant behavior (e.g., high frequencies of participation) are associated with more favorable performance expectancies than group members who exhibit more deferential behavior. Although space constraints prevent a more detailed discussion of expectations states theory, a great deal of research has grown out of this theory (for a more in-depth review see Correll & Ridgeway, 2003).

Leadership

Perhaps the majority of current small group work on power and status concerns leadership. Indeed, there are a variety of current psychological and sociological journals devoted to the study of leadership. Work on leadership often explores either leader emergence or leader effectiveness (Forsyth, 2006). As the previous section briefly mentioned some leadership emergence work, the current section focuses on leadership effectiveness.

Psychological and sociological research on leadership effectiveness has a long-standing tradition, stemming in part from seminal work by Lewin and colleagues (1939). These researchers proposed three types of leadership: *authoritarian leadership*, in which the leader does not take followers' opinions into account, *democratic leadership*, in which decisions are made by the group as a whole, and *laissez-faire leadership*, in which the leader seldom engages with the group. These types of leadership were shown to differentially affect group processes, including the time followers spent working when the leader was present, the time followers spent working when the leader was not present, and aggressive behaviors. In general, the followers favored democratic leaders over authoritarian and laissez-faire leaders.

More recent work also posits leadership typologies that impact group performance. For example, the theory of *transformational leadership* (Bass, 1997) distinguishes between transactional and transformational leadership. *Transactional leadership* involves an emphasis on clear expectations, rewards, and punishments, including active strategies such as managing by exception and passive strategies

such as addressing severe problems. *Transformational leadership* is associated with charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. Empirical support has been obtained for Bass's assertion of the superiority of transformational leadership on some outcome measures, such as productivity and follower satisfaction (Conger, 1999; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; Wang, Oh, Courtright, & Colbert, 2011).

Other theoretical approaches to leadership, such as the *contingency model*, the *situational leadership model*, and *leader-member exchange theory*, propose that situational factors operate in concert with leadership style to impact leader effectiveness. Fiedler's (1978, 1981, 1996) contingency model suggests that leadership effectiveness is a function of the leader's motivational style and situational control. Motivational style is measured using the *least preferred co-worker scale*, a uni-dimensional measure indexing degree of task- versus relationship-orientation. A leader's situational control is posited to be a function of leader-member relations, task structure, and leader power. Favorable situations involve good leader-member relations, structured tasks, and strong leader power. Task oriented leadership is expected to be associated with greater effectiveness in either highly favorable or unfavorable situations, while relationship oriented leadership is expected to be preferable in moderately favorable or unfavorable situations.

The situational leadership model also proposes that leadership effectiveness is a function of both leader behavior and group situation (Hersey & Blanchard, 1976, 1982; Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 2001). This model suggests that leader behavior varies along two dimensions, supportive and directive, and that leadership effectiveness depends on a match between this behavior and the maturity of the followers. While initially followers require high degrees of directive behavior and low degrees of supportive behavior, high degrees of supportive behavior are also required as time progresses. When the group is near to their goal, followers may not require much leadership, benefiting from low degrees of both directive and supportive behavior.

Finally, leader-member exchange theory emphasizes the dyadic relationships between the leader and each single follower and its impact on leadership effectiveness (Deluga, 1998; Linden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997). This theory suggests that leaders have different relationships with each follower, and particularly good working relationships are associated with a variety of positive outcomes. For example, in these relationships leaders may provide followers with greater responsibilities or rewards. Additionally, these followers express greater satisfaction with the leader and are less likely to leave the group (Gerstner & Day, 1997). These relationships often also affect group structure, as groups divide into an inner group, those followers with particularly positive relationships with the leader, and an outer group, those individuals with less positive relationships with the leader.

Gender and Leadership

Within work on leadership there is a substantial sub-literature investigating gender and leadership. Although recent progress towards gender equality in leadership has been made, women continue to be underrepresented in leadership positions such as electoral offices and Fortune 500 committee board chairs (Catalyst, 2011; Center for American Women and Politics, 2010). Research in this subarea explores gender differences in reactions to and perceptions of leaders, in addition to gender differences in leadership emergence and style.

Traditional gender stereotypes describe and prescribe women as having communal characteristics, such as kindness and sensitivity, and men as having agentic characteristics, such as self-confidence and aggression (Burgess & Borgida, 1999). However, traditional leadership stereotypes are primarily agentic. This incongruity between females and leadership stereotypes puts female leaders at a disadvantage, requiring them to achieve a delicate balance of agentic and communal behavior (Eagly & Sczesny, 2009). Notably, this incongruity can be thought of in the context of expectation states theory, as gender is a diffuse characteristic that signals competence (Ridgeway & Bourge, 2004).

The incongruity between females and leadership stereotypes can result in women receiving backlash for success in stereotypically male domains and in less favorable attitudes towards female leaders as compared with male leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004). Research also suggests that stereotypes play a role in ratings of leader effectiveness. For example, leader effectiveness ratings are more favorable when the description of the leader's role is congruent with the leader's gender (Eagly, Karau, & Makhijani, 1995).

Although backlash against agentic women continues to be demonstrated, there is evidence that leadership stereotypes are becoming less masculine (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011). Thus, while early work on gender and leadership investigated the "glass ceiling," a concealed barrier to women's rise in leadership, more recent work takes a different approach, suggesting that the obstacles to female leadership are better described by the term "labyrinth," which emphasizes their intricate nature (Eagly & Carli, 2007). For example, work by Ryan and Haslam (2007) suggests that female leaders may be disadvantaged as they are perceived as better suited than men for risky leadership positions, a phenomenon they refer to as the glass cliff. By appointing women to more risky leadership positions than men, female leaders are more likely to fail than male leaders. Thus, this differential appointment can serve to perpetuate the stereotype that men are better leaders than women.

Although there is little evidence of subject gender effects on reactions towards female leaders, there is evidence that women operate differently than men in groups with respect to status behaviors. In mixed sex groups men tend to engage in greater task-oriented behavior than women, including talking more and making more suggestions regarding the task (Ridgeway, 2001; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999). In mixed-sex groups men also tend to engage in more nonverbal displays of power than women, including looking more at group members when speaking but looking less at group members when listening (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 1998). However, these verbal and nonverbal findings reverse when groups engage in stereotypically feminine tasks (Dovidio et al., 1998). Additionally, there is little evidence for similar gender differences in same-sex group behavior (for exceptions see Hutson-Comeaux & Kelly, 1996; Ridgeway, Diekema, & Johnson, 1995).

Gender differences have also been documented in leadership emergence and style. Eagly and Karau's (1991) meta-analysis suggests that men are more likely than women to emerge as leaders of initially leaderless groups. However, there were moderators of this effect. Men were especially likely to emerge as leaders in short-term groups, and consistent with gender stereotypes, women were more likely than men to emerge as social leaders.

In addition to work demonstrating differences in the circumstances in which women and men emerge as leaders, gender differences have also been documented in leadership style. Eagly and Johnson's (1990) meta-analysis suggests that male leaders tend to be task-oriented and more autocratic while female leaders tend to be interpersonally-oriented and democratic. Notably, female leaders were evaluated more negatively to the extent that their leadership style reflected more masculine, autocratic elements (Eagly et al., 1992). More recent work also suggests that female leaders are more likely than male leaders to engage in transformational leadership and contingent reward behaviors, one component of transactional leadership (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & van Engen, 2003). There is also evidence suggesting that all female groups develop less centralized leadership structures than all male groups, a structure that can be associated with positive outcomes including better performance (Berdahl & Anderson, 2005).

Current Directions in Leadership

As mentioned earlier, leadership research is currently a very popular topic of study within small group work on power and status. Similar to small group work in general, research on leadership spans a variety of disciplines, such as social psychology, industrial/organizational psychology, and sociology. To conclude our discussion of power and status, we briefly discuss some of the current directions in leadership research.

Recently, researchers have not only been interested in exploring ideal forms of leadership, but in exploring destructive leadership as well. Einarsen, Aasland, and Skogstad (2007) define *destructive leadership* as leadership that results in outcomes that are detrimental to the legitimate goals of the organization. There are many different types of destructive leadership, although laissez-faire leadership may be the most common (Aasland, Skogstad, Notelaers, Nielsen, & Einarsen, 2010). Destructive leadership has been linked to individual difference variables such as low self-efficacy, as well as situational variables such as the support of authority (Mumford, Gessner, Connelly, O'Connor, & Clifton, 1993). Indeed, theoretical work by Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser (2007) proposes that the damaging outcomes of destructive leadership are a function of destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and environments that are conducive to destructive leader behaviors.

Recently, small groups researchers have also been interested in the effects of mood on group dynamics. In particular, researchers have been exploring the process of emotional contagion, whereby moods are transferred among group members (Barsade, 2002; Kelly & Barsade, 2001). This interest has also expanded to work on leadership. For example, Sy, Cote, and Saavedra (2005) demonstrated that the mood of group leaders transfers to their followers and can subsequently affect group dynamics. Groups in positive moods demonstrated greater coordination but less effort than those groups in negative moods.

Research has also explored the effects of *leadership prototypicality*, often from a social identity perspective (discussed in greater detail in the upcoming section). Generally, leaders who are more prototypical of the groups they lead are linked to a variety of positive outcomes. For example, prototypical leaders are evaluated more positively than non-prototypical leaders following a failure to reach an ideal goal (Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008). These positive perceptions of prototypical leaders are most likely to occur for group members that are highly identified with the group (Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001). This relationship is due in part to the fact that highly identified group members perceive leaders as acting in line with the group's interests (van Dijke & De Cremer, 2010).

Processes of Inclusion and Exclusion in Groups

This section will discuss processes of inclusion and exclusion in groups. We will discuss why people exclude others and detail the consequences of exclusion. Schisms in groups, particularly coalition formation, will also be discussed in this section. Finally, minority and majority influence will be discussed including details of how these factions form and the benefits and consequences of their formation.

Inclusion Processes in Groups

Attraction (how attracted an individual is to the group), liking (how much an individual likes the group), and staying (how much the individuals want to stay in the group), are three things that determine a group's cohesion (Forsyth, 2006). Schachter (1953) defined *cohesion* as the "total field of forces acting on members to remain in the group." This definition combined many different aspects of cohesion into one. However, Hogg (1987) separated attraction to the group itself (social attraction) from attraction to members in the group (personal attraction). Thus, Hogg considers the attraction to the group itself as the main determinant of cohesion.

Many different theories provide explanations as to how groups become cohesive. *Lawler's exchange theory* perspective discusses how emotions may influence group cohesion. This theory suggests that multiple positive interactions lead to positive emotions that will lead to cohesion

(Lawler, 1999, 2000). Mutual self-verification may also play a role in how groups become cohesive. *Mutual self-verification* occurs when group members develop a mutual dependence by each verifying others' identities while in the process of verifying their own group identity (Burke & Stets, 1999). This leads to increased trust and commitment resulting in positive emotions toward the group that increase cohesion. Cohesion can also develop through the reduction of *cognitive dissonance*, whereby individuals are motivated to relieve the discomfort they feel when they experience inconsistency (e.g., undergoing a negative initiation into a group that one doesn't feel very positively about) (Festinger, 1957). Aronson and Mills (1959) demonstrated this when they had participants engage in a severely embarrassing test, a mildly embarrassing test, or no test at all in order to participate in a group discussion. Those who engaged in the severely embarrassing test rated the group discussion and the group members more positively than those in the other conditions. This presumably occurred because the high cost of taking the embarrassing test caused people to change their beliefs about the group in order to justify the embarrassment.

Impact of Cohesion

Cohesive groups sound like they should work well together and be effective entities. Therefore, a lot of effort is put into making teams cohesive, for example with businesses employing team-building activities. However, while cohesion may result in positive effects for the group, it can also lead to negative effects.

Though seldom empirically studied, cohesion is a necessary antecedent condition for the phenomenon of groupthink (Janis, 1972, 1982). *Groupthink* occurs when highly cohesive groups tasked with making a decision attempt to minimize conflict to the detriment of actually discussing and evaluating alternative courses of action. Groupthink has been implicated in several catastrophic events (Janis, 1971; Moorhead, Ference, & Neck, 1991). For example, in January of 1986, the Challenger shuttle exploded after take-off. After investigating why this tragedy occurred, it was determined that a faulty piece of equipment and abnormally cold temperatures had contributed to the explosion. Engineers had expressed concerns about this equipment, but because the launch had already been delayed for many days, the officials were eager to launch the shuttle immediately and encouraged the engineers to change their diagnosis. This led to the engineers proclaiming that the shuttle was good to launch, leading to a national tragedy. These poor group decisions were believed to have occurred due to groupthink (Moorhead et al., 1991).

Highly cohesive groups may encourage conformity to group norms and ideas and discourage dissent amongst group members. If individuals do not provide alternative options or produce unique output, it could lead to poorer decision-making. On the other hand, meta-analytic studies have shown that cohesion is generally related to better performance (Mullen & Copper, 1994). However, the reverse relationship, with better performance leading to improved cohesion, is stronger. In addition, cohesion that is based on commitment to the task is more strongly related to performance than is cohesion that is based on interpersonal attraction to group members.

A largely accepted view of cohesion is that members of highly cohesive groups will adopt and adhere to the norms of that group, and therefore cohesive groups will perform well or poorly depending on the level of these performance norms. When the group has a norm of high productivity and high performance, then cohesive groups will perform well. However, when the group has a norm of low productivity and low performance, then cohesive groups will perform poorly. Seashore (1954) found that cohesive groups with high performance goals were more productive, and cohesive groups with low performance goals were less productive, demonstrating that the norms of highly cohesive groups determine how the group performs. Gully, Devine, and Whitney (1995) similarly suggest that if the group develops norms that encourage playfulness, openness, and disagreement, performance may improve. If dissent is encouraged, people are free to speak up about new and different ideas and

suggest alternatives to decisions that may improve performance. However, if the norms that a group develops lead to conformity or take attention away from the task at hand, performance will suffer (Gully et al., 1995).

Social Identity Theory

Other potential sources of cohesion are identified by *social identity theory*, which suggests that some sources of cohesion can lead to positive consequences for one's ingroup while leading to negative consequences for one's outgroup. Social identity theory explains how an individual's identity may be derived from their group membership. It suggests that an individual's self-concept is tied to their group membership, primarily through the process of social categorization. Individuals distinguish between their ingroup and their outgroup in ways that enhance the positive qualities of the ingroup, and thus enhance their self identity. Notably, although the current work focuses on social identity theory as it applies to small groups, this theory also applies to large groups and social categories (see Chap. 18 by Hogg, 2013).

Social identity theory posits several important principles (Brewer, 2010). First, the *ingroup accentuation principle* states that perceived within-group differences are minimized and perceived between-group differences are maximized. Second, the *ingroup favoritism principle* suggests that people selectively associate positive characteristics with members of the ingroup but not with members of the outgroup. Finally, the *social competition principle* suggests that there is comparison and perceived competition between groups (Turner, 1975).

These three principles help to accomplish the motives associated with social identity theory. The *self-esteem enhancement* motive suggests that attributing positive characteristics to the ingroup, and simultaneously perceiving few within-group differences, allows people to be able to vicariously enhance their self-esteem through their group identity (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). An example of how self-esteem enhancement relates to social identity theory is through the process of *BIRGing* (Basking In Reflected Glory) (Cialdini et al., 1976). When a person associates the self strongly with a group and a member of that group succeeds at something, the other members can then associate that positivity with themselves, thus enhancing their own self-esteem.

Another possible motive considered by social identity theory is a need for security and belonging. Baumeister and Leary (1995) suggest that there is a universal *need for belonging* that motivates us to attach ourselves to groups. However, Brewer's (1991) theory of *optimal distinctiveness* suggests that this motive may be selectively applied. This theory posits two identity needs: inclusion, which is satisfied through the ingroup, and differentiation, which is satisfied through differences between the ingroup and outgroup. Thus, there is an optimal level of distinctiveness that balances differentiation and inclusion. Research has shown that threats to inclusion enhance self-stereotyping on traits characteristic of the group (Brewer & Pickett, 1999). Thus, it seems a need for security and belonging may be a motive that acts through finding the perfect balance between inclusion with the ingroup and differentiation from the outgroup.

Social identity theorists have used the *minimal group paradigm* to investigate many of these propositions (Tajfel, 1970). This paradigm allows researchers to examine the minimal conditions required for intergroup dynamics to occur. In this paradigm, groups are formed based on arbitrary traits that individuals share. For example, groups may be formed based on preferring a certain artist (Tajfel) or being overestimators or underestimators on a dot-estimation task (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974). When using this paradigm researchers have found that individuals will allocate more rewards to ingroup members than to outgroup members (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) and individuals will evaluate ingroup members more positively than outgroup members (Brewer, 1979). The minimal group paradigm has shown that intergroup bias can develop in the absence of interaction, history, personal identification of group members, or any direct benefits to the self (Brewer, 2010).

Outgroup derogation, or negative behavior directed towards other groups, has also been explained by social identity theory. However, it is not thought to be an inevitable component. Research using the minimal group paradigm has shown that while individuals consistently provide the ingroup with more rewards, they are not very likely to provide the outgroup with more negative outcomes.

The famous Robber's Cave experiment provides an example of social identity theory at work (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). Young boys were admitted into an experiment under the guise of going to summer camp. The boys first interacted with all of the others at the camp. They ate meals together and engaged in activities together. However, after a bit of time, the camp counselors (experimenters) separated the boys into two different groups (the Eagles and the Rattlers). Once separated, the boys ate meals and engaged in activities only with the boys in their own groups and not with the other boys. Competition between the two groups became fierce and liking and cooperation within groups increased. Putting labels on the two separate groups led to increased positivity within each group and negativity toward the other group.

There has also been qualitative research done examining social identity in adolescents in everyday life. Adler and Adler (1995) discuss how cliques function as a socialization experience, particularly through inclusion and exclusion. *Cliques* are friendship groups with internal hierarchies that are exclusive in that they do not grant membership to anyone who wants to join, thus forming a strong social identity for those in the clique and perhaps even those not in the clique (through their identification as an outsider). There are efforts to become included in cliques by those not in them. Additionally, once in a clique, there are inclusionary efforts directed toward reaching a higher position within the clique or simply maintaining membership in the clique. These techniques include recruitment (being invited to the group), application (seeking membership), realigning friendships within the clique, and ingratiation. Because cliques are exclusive in nature, they exclude others by requiring permission to join. There are many exclusionary techniques used by cliques, such as subjugating the out-group (including excluding and rejecting children not in the clique), subjugating those within the group (usually done by higher status members to members with lower status), compliance (getting lower status members to do things they don't necessarily want to do), stigmatization (particularly of in-group members), and expulsion from the clique. If expulsion occurs, it is often difficult to form new friendships because the people outside the clique remember how former members treated them and see them as elitists. This shows how social identity can be both a benefit to those in the in-group, and a detriment to those in an out-group, yet it also displays how the benefits of being in the in-group are potentially harmful.

More qualitative research on identity in adolescents has shown the importance of the masculine identity to adolescent boys (Pascoe, 2003). In high school, athleticism and sports are key to this masculine identity, and so the "jocks" are the epitome of masculinity. However, not every teenage boy is a "jock." Those who are not create their own way of displaying a masculine identity through their associated group identity. For example, one boy who was involved in drama and performing in plays discussed how the drama parties are very sexually charged and emphasizes his pride in flirting with girls during his first play. Thus, he is able to emphasize an overall masculine identity while also emphasizing his identity with his social group.

Processes of Exclusion in Groups

Being included in groups is important to the self and an individual's need for belonging. More importantly, having an ingroup that satisfies the need for inclusion and an outgroup that satisfies the need for differentiation seems to help individuals reach an optimal level of distinctiveness. However, people also exclude members from their groups. Although excluding members of one's own group may be seen as more unusual than including them, we discuss why people may exclude fellow group members and the consequences of such exclusion.

Belonging is considered a fundamental human need necessary for survival (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Evolutionary theory suggests that belonging developed as a need because in prehistoric times people needed the protection of a group to survive. Belonging to a group helped people retrieve food and water necessary for survival and provided safety. When people's belonging needs are thwarted, they experience exclusion, rejection, loneliness, or even nothing at all (a numbness). In addition to threatening the need to belong, being excluded also threatens individuals' needs for self-esteem, control, and a meaningful existence. Experiencing exclusion then leads to the activation of an internal system designed to help fortify the threatened need for belonging (Williams, 2009).

This system includes three stages: reflexive, reflective, and resignation. The first reflexive stage occurs quickly and crudely. Because belonging to a group was necessary for survival, Williams (2009) proposes that there is likely to be over-detection of *ostracism* (being excluded and ignored) in order to protect people from being alone and vulnerable. There are very few moderators of this reflexive stage of ostracism, and people's needs are depleted regardless of the circumstances. Much of the experimental research on ostracism has been conducted with *Cyberball*, a virtual ball-toss game where pre-programmed figures throw a ball back and forth to each other and to a naïve participant. In the ostracism condition the participant is thrown the ball a couple of times and then never again. People feel ostracized when they are not thrown the ball and report negative psychological and emotional consequences. Research has shown that people detect and react to ostracism even when they are told the other opponents are a computer (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004), when they believe they are being ostracized by hated groups (e.g., the KKK) (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007), when the ball is a "bomb," and when being thrown the ball decreases one's payoff (van Beest & Williams, 2006). Additionally, the phenomenon of being "out-of-the-loop" occurs when people are excluded on particular information, yet they are not ignored, thus representing a form of partial ostracism (Jones, Carter-Sowell, Kelly, & Williams, 2009). While this may seem like a minor form of ostracism, people who are out-of-the-loop also experience the depleted needs and negative emotions that occur with full ostracism experiences.

The reflection stage occurs when people attempt to repair the negative psychological consequences of being ostracized. People may respond in one of two ways – through aggression in an effort to fortify their need for control, or through attempting to be included which fortifies the need for belonging. For example, female participants were less likely to socially loaf after being ostracized (Williams & Sommer, 1997), perhaps due to a motivation to gain favor with those who ostracized them. On the other hand, when participants were ostracized and stripped of control, they were more likely to show aggressive behavior towards a stranger by allocating more hot sauce to a person who did not like hot sauce (Warburton, Williams, & Cairns, 2006). Additionally, Wesselmann, Butler, Williams, and Pickett (2010) had naïve participants "get-acquainted" by interacting with other participants (confederates) and then told them that either all or none of the group members wanted to work with them further. When participants expected rejection they were less aggressive, but when participants did not expect rejection their need for control was depleted and thus they were more aggressive. Thus, the reflection stage can lead to fortifying the need for belonging through prosocial acts, whereas fortifying the need for control can lead to aggressive acts.

The final resignation phase deals with the long-term effects of chronic ostracism. Two key components of this phase are affective numbness and a lack of self-regulation (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2006). Williams' (2009) model suggests that over time a person's resources become depleted and they are no longer able to fortify their threatened needs. However, there is little experimental research on this phase.

Power structures can affect whether certain people are excluded. Markovsky and colleagues (Markovsky, Skvoretz, Willer, Lovaglia, & Erger, 1993) suggest that when there is a stronger power structure, such as in organizations, it is easier to exclude those lower in the hierarchy. However, when there is a weaker power structure, such as in friendship groups, where everyone is equal and there is no hierarchy, it is more difficult to exclude others. The power structure can also affect how a group

functions. When there is a stronger power structure, people may be less committed as they feel their position is not secure. Thus, people may take precautions against investing too much in those who may later abandon them, leading them to feel the negative effects of exclusion.

Schisms in Groups

When groups experience difficulty operating or clash on their opinions or ideas, schisms may occur leading to the development of factions or coalitions. *Schism* refers to when members of a group decide to leave the group to form a separate group or to join an already existing but different group (Sani & Todman, 2002). Caplow (1956) developed a typology of three-person groups useful for predicting the factions that may form in them. The coalitions that form include everyone being of equal strength, everyone being unequal in strength, or somewhere in between these extremes. For example, one member may have slightly more strength than the other two, one member could have more strength than the other two combined, or the combined strength of any two members could be more than the third alone. One consistent finding was that the weakest member was likely to initiate the formation of a coalition (Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). However, this research was criticized for only focusing on the outcome of coalition formation and not on the process that led to that outcome.

Sometimes coalitions can no longer function within the group. When this occurs, group schisms can result where a former subgroup leaves the group entirely to form a new group or join with a different existing group. Sani and Todman (2002) developed a model detailing what makes schisms occur in groups. Schisms often occur because a new norm changes a central aspect of the group's identity. Sani (2005) later found that first there is a feeling that the group identity has been changed, which leads to negative emotions and a decrease in group identification and perceived group entitativity. The combination of decreased group identification and negative emotions then increase schismatic intentions.

Minority-Majority Influence

While schisms can be very negative, sometimes having a faction with a different opinion may not be detrimental to the group and may even improve its functioning. Having minority opinions in groups often leads to positive consequences for the group and its effectiveness, despite the fact that majorities often prevail over minorities. This section will detail how majorities and minorities develop and the ensuing consequences of having minorities and majorities.

When a group has a majority it may be difficult for those who don't agree with them to express their opinions. Asch (1956) first demonstrated this by having participants make a judgment about which of three lines matched a target line. On critical trials, confederates chose a noticeably incorrect line to see if the participant would conform to the incorrect majority. Asch found that participants conformed about one third of the time. He also found that when even one confederate disagreed with the incorrect majority, the participant was more likely to disagree as well.

One important key to majority influence is that they stick together and do not falter. If one person dissents, it leads the way for others to dissent and minorities may form within the group. Latané and Wolf (1981) suggest in their *social impact theory* that when the size of the majority is kept constant, increasing the size of an opposing minority leads to less conformity to the majority. They also suggest that the first few minority members have the most impact, and each additional minority member adds less impact than the previous member. Tanford and Penrod's (1984) *social influence model* suggests something similar in that after the first few minority members, each additional minority member does not increase the amount of minority influence. Their model also showed that minority influence was most likely to occur in smaller groups with at least two minority members and when the minority was consistent.

Moscovici (1985) developed a dual-process theory of minority versus majority influence that described when each would be likely to emerge in a group and when they would have influence. Conflicts arise in groups due to differing viewpoints which leads one of two salient norms to be activated – a norm of reduction of conflict or a norm of originality. When a norm of reducing conflict arises, the conflict will be resolved through normative influence and agreement with the majority because majorities hold status. A *comparison process* occurs whereby minorities will compare their views with the majority view. Agreement with the majority results because of a need for consensus, not because of an actual change in viewpoints, leading to compliance with the majority's viewpoint (i.e., public agreement without private acceptance).

On the other hand, the norm of originality leads to the goal of creating conflict rather than reducing it in order to challenge the majority view. If a minority is consistent and confident, the others will undertake a *validation process* whereby they critically evaluate the minority viewpoint and attempt to verify it with reality (Moscovici, 1985). This can lead to conversion to the minority viewpoint, which is shown through private judgments and indirect measures but not necessarily publicly (for fear of being seen as a deviant). A meta-analysis conducted on minority influence showed that consistent behavioral styles mediated minority influence (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). Wood and colleagues (1994) also showed that minority influence had the largest impact on private and indirect measures rather than on the public opinion. Thus, both majority and minority factions may exert influence on the group, though through different means.

As seen in Moscovici's theory, minorities may stimulate different thought processes in groups. Minorities are more likely to appear and be convincing when a norm of originality is salient. Nemeth's (1986) theory of *convergent-divergent thinking* also suggests that minorities can be beneficial to a group. In her view, it is not important that majorities conform to the minority, but rather that divergent thought processes accompany a minority viewpoint. Divergent thinking leads to the generation of more original ideas and the detection of more unique and novel solutions. Majority viewpoints, on the other hand, lead to convergent thinking, which involves focusing on the majority position and no other possibilities. Convergent thinking can therefore lead to poorer decisions and less original ideas. It often does not even matter if the minority is correct or incorrect, but rather simply that different types of thinking emerge when a minority opinion is present (Nemeth, 1976; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983). In addition to coming up with more original ideas, groups with a minority have also been shown to make better decisions (Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006).

While the evidence supporting minority viewpoints leading to more creativity is very strong, majority viewpoints can also lead to more creativity. When judges rated arguments generated for a position by the minority or the majority, they found that the minority arguments were more original and convincing than the majority arguments (Kenworthy, Hewstone, Levine, Martin, & Willis, 2008). However, when comparing minority arguments, majority arguments, and arguments of people in an "equal-faction" condition, both the minority and majority arguments were seen as stronger and more persuasive than those in the equal-faction condition, though the minority's arguments were rated as more creative than both the majority's and the equal-faction's (Kenworthy et al., 2008).

If minorities are successful in converting others to their view then they become the majority, which can have both positive and negative effects on both the minority and the majority. Those losing the majority position experienced decreases in perceptions of group-self similarity, attraction to the group, and expectations of positive interactions with the group (Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). However, those gaining the majority position did not experience increases in these factors. Thus, Prislin and colleagues (2000) suggest that after changes in power, a group may be particularly fragile due to the disintegrative forces that result from the loss of power of the previous majority. When these power changes occur, the new minority group experiences a decrease in desire to belong to the group. Over time, there was no positive evaluation of the group from the new majority. There was, however, an increase in preference for belonging to the group from the new majority (Prislin & Christensen, 2005). So the new minority experiences more negative consequences, and at least initially, does not

necessarily experience more positive consequences. In addition, new majorities also show stronger identification with the group when they think people moved to their new positions for genuine reasons, as opposed to superficial or unexplained reasons (Prislin, Levine, & Christensen, 2006). A more negative finding was that new majorities who were low in perceived control abused their newfound power by displaying in-group favoritism and outgroup hostility (Prislin, Sawicki, & Williams, 2011). Out-group hostility was more likely to occur when the new majorities were low in perceived control *and* received social support for their negative behaviors. Thus, it seems there may be more negative consequences to a drastic power shift in a group than positive.

Motivation and Coordination

Successful group interaction involves the coordination of many processes. Group members must coordinate both physical and mental efforts, and must be motivated to put forth effort within the group. Group members must also coordinate the exchange of information among group members both within ongoing group interactions and in the retrieval and storage of information important to the group. Much of the research that has examined these coordination processes looks at group performance as the primary dependent variable of interest, and thus takes a more functional perspective on group interaction (Hollingshead et al., 2005). That is, these studies focus on describing the relationships of inputs and processes to effective group performance.

Process Losses and Gains

Some of the earliest studies of coordination problems in groups were conducted by Max Ringelmann (1913), an agricultural engineer. Ringelmann was interested in measuring the efficiency with which various agricultural tasks could be accomplished given a variety of configurations of resources (Kravitz & Martin, 1986). For example, is a field plowed more efficiently with a team of three horses or with a team of two horses. In comparing workgroups (both human and animal) of varying sizes, Ringelmann found a consistent tendency for groups to work less efficiently as group size increased, a tendency referred to now as the *Ringelmann effect* (Steiner, 1974). That is, when predicting the efforts of a group based on the performance of individuals, groups always performed less efficiently than individuals. Ringelmann attributed this loss of efficiency primarily to two processes. First, groups suffer from physical coordination problems as group members each apply their efforts at fractionally different times (Kravitz & Martin). Second, when interacting in a group, members simply are less motivated to work hard, a phenomenon now known as social loafing (Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981).

Although physical coordination losses have not received a great deal of empirical attention, social loafing has been widely studied (see reviews by Karau & Williams, 2001, and Williams, Harkins, & Karau, 2003). More specifically defined, *social loafing* is the reduction of individual effort exerted by people when working in groups compared to when working alone. Social loafing is widespread across many different types of effortful tasks – from shouting and cheering to generating unusual uses for common objects. However, the presence of certain conditions seems to decrease the amount of social loafing: (1) As identifiability of individual efforts increases, loafing decreases. The presence of other people often makes individual contributions difficult to distinguish, therefore increasing the likelihood that loafing will occur (Williams et al., 1981). (2) As the potential for evaluation increases, loafing decreases (Harkins & Symanski, 1988). (3) When the task is described as meaningful, loafing also decreases. That is, people loaf more on tasks that are easy or perceived as unimportant (Harkins & Petty, 1982).

Free-riding and the sucker effect are both potential causes of social loafing. Free-riding also describes a situation where effort is reduced in a collective setting. *Free-riding* refers to situations where individuals reduce their efforts when there are others who will do the work (Kerr & Bruun, 1983), that is when one feels that one's efforts are dispensable, or not essential to completion of the group's goal. The *sucker effect* is similar, and refers to a reduction in effort that is at least partially motivated by not wanting to be the victim of loafing who ends up doing most of the work (Schnake, 1991).

Although motivation and coordination processes can lead to less effective group performance, groups can also be the setting for motivation and coordination gains (Kerr, 2001; Williams & Karau, 1991). For example, Williams and Karau found evidence of *social compensation*, or the tendency to increase effort in group settings, under conditions where the task was meaningful, but one's partner was unskilled at the task. Two factors must be present for social compensation to occur. First, the individual must think that effort from their partner will not be forthcoming. Second, the outcome on the task must be valued by the individual (Karau & Williams, 2001). More generally, Karau and Williams (1993) argue in the *collective effort model* (CEM) that motivation is determined by the joint factors of expectations about one's ability to reach a goal, and the value of that goal. Therefore in situations where expectations are high concerning reaching a goal and that goal is highly valued, motivation is also high, and collective performance can actually exceed predictions.

Motivation gains when working in a group have also been identified by Kerr and colleagues (Hertel, Kerr & Messé, 2000; Lount, Kerr, Messe, Seok, & Park, 2008). When working on a conjunctive task, where performance is determined at the level of the weakest group member (Steiner, 1972), performance of that weaker group member is sometimes improved relative to their individual performance. This phenomenon is referred to as the *Kohler effect* in honor of Otto Kohler who identified it in the mid-1920s (Kohler, 1926). In contrast to free-riders, the Kohler Effect stems at least in part from the weaker members feeling indispensable to the group's efforts (Hertel et al., 2000).

Transactive Memory

Social loafing, social compensation, and social facilitation often occur in the context of coordination of cognitive efforts, although they have been applied to physical efforts as well. However, another type of coordination of cognitive efforts that occurs in groups involves the management of memory. *Transactive memory* refers to a shared division of cognitive labor within a group or dyad with respect to the encoding, storage, retrieval, and communication of information (Wegner, 1987). Transactive memory is defined as having two components (Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985). (1) An organized store of knowledge contained entirely in the individual memory systems of group members, and (2) a set of knowledge-relevant transactive encoding, storage, and retrieval processes that occur among group members.

The successful operation of these processes is dependent on the formation of transactive memory structures – the organizing schemes that connect knowledge held by each individual to knowledge held by others in the system (Wegner et al., 1985). These transactive memory structures are therefore meta-memory processes that contain knowledge about what information others in the group know. Meta-memory may prompt a group member to remind another group member that he or she possesses knowledge that they may have failed to retrieve on their own. In such a way, a group's memory may actually exceed the sum of individual memory systems (Wegner, 1987).

Transactive memory systems can have both differentiated and integrated structures (Hollingshead, 2001; Wegner et al., 1985). A *differentiated structure* represents the specialized knowledge held by each individual in the transactive memory system (Gupta & Hollingshead, 2010). An *integrated structure* represents the shared knowledge systems; it specifies what individuals know in common and that they all know it. Differentiated structures may be particularly important when a group is attempting to

collectively store and retrieve large amounts of information. On the other hand, integrated systems may be particularly important in situations where mistakes are particularly dangerous, and therefore redundancy of information is necessary. Hollingshead examined the role of cognitive interdependence in the development of differentiated or integrated memory structures in collective information processing. She demonstrated that differentiated structure developed when interdependent individuals have an incentive to remember different domains of information, whereas an integrated structure developed when interdependent individuals have an incentive to remember common information.

Transactive memory processes have been examined within two primary research paradigms. In the partner paradigm, individuals work on a task that requires that they learn and retrieve information in different knowledge domains with an assigned partner (e.g., Hollingshead, 1998a, 1998b; Wegner, Erber & Raymond, 1991). In some conditions, the partner is known by the participants (e.g., an intimate partner, a coworker), and in other conditions, the partner is a stranger (Hollingshead, 1998a). Prior to working on the task, the participants are asked about their own and their partner's expertise in each knowledge domain. Participants who knew their partners had more shared agreement about relative expertise, were more likely to specialize in their areas of relative expertise, and performed better than did pairs of strangers (Wegner et al., 1991).

The second research approach involves training group members either together or individually, with transactive memory processes more likely to develop when members are trained together and therefore are exposed to the areas of expertise of other group members (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Moreland, 1999; Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996, 1998). Across a series of studies, Moreland and colleagues were able to show that the benefits to performance from having been trained together were indeed due to the development of transactive memory systems, and not simply greater cohesion (Moreland et al., 1996), more practice (Moreland et al., 1998), or better communication (Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000).

Information Exchange

Effective group interaction also involves the coordinated exchange of information among group members. In order to solve problems and make effective decisions, group members must gather information, identify and evaluate alternatives, and ultimately choose an alternative to be implemented. This focus on information exchange has been referred to as *group level information processing* – the degree to which information, ideas, or cognitive processes are shared among the group members and how this sharing of information affects both individual- and group-level outcomes (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Propp, 1997).

Group Decision Making

Much of the research in the area of group decision making, both past and present, has focused on barriers to the effective pooling of information. For example, the faulty decision making processes involved in groupthink (Janis, 1972, 1982), such as self-censorship and stereotyping, lead to symptoms of groupthink, such as poor information search and a deficient generation of alternative courses of action, ultimately resulting in disastrous decisions. Janis and Mann (1977) listed a number of potential techniques that group members use to limit discussion and avoid making a decision, such as ignoring alternatives and/or satisficing – adopting a minimally acceptable solution rather than searching for an optimal one.

For the past two and a half decades, a dominant paradigm has arisen for examining factors that lead to more or less optimal patterns of information exchange in groups. In the mid-1980s, Stasser and Titus

(1985, 1987) developed the *information sharing paradigm*, whereby information to be used in making a decision is distributed unequally among group members, such that some information is distributed in common to all group members, and some is distributed uniquely to only a few group members. Although optimal decision making usually involves the appropriate pooling of all information, both that known in common and that known uniquely, Stasser and Titus (1985) found that group members tended to focus on information that they knew in common, an outcome that became known as the *shared information bias*. Note that focusing the discussion on shared information will generally only lead to defective decision making under conditions where information that is uniquely known conflicts with information that is known in common, a situation known as a *hidden profile* (Stasser & Titus). However, dozens of studies have demonstrated that the shared information bias is particularly difficult to overcome and that hidden profiles are difficult to uncover (Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Larson et al., 1998; Wittenbaum & Park, 2001).

A number of factors have been identified that contribute to the shared information bias. First, shared information simply has a greater probability of entering a discussion since more people are aware of that piece of information. Winquist and Larson (1998) have found that this sampling advantage is particularly true early in the group discussion. However, the quality of information changes as well once it becomes shared, through a process known as *mutual enhancement* (Wittenbaum & Bowman, 2004). Shared information is seen as more credible and valid because it is known by more than one person (Wittenbaum & Bowman, 2004). In addition, providers of shared, credible information are seen as better contributors to the group discussion. And finally, being agreed with (e.g., someone else can agree that the information exists) is positive and validating for the self (Wittenbaum & Bowman, 2004).

Although the shared information bias has proven to be a fairly robust phenomenon, there are some factors that have been found to improve information exchange. For example, making group members responsible for domains of expertise increases the likelihood that they will contribute the information, both shared and unshared (Stewart & Stasser, 1995), to the group discussion. Framing the decision as an intellectual task, one for which there is a correct answer, rather than as a judgmental task, where consensus simply consists of resolving preferences, also increases information exchange (Kelly & Spoor, 2004; Stasser & Stewart, 1992). In the original experiment, creating a situation where there is pre-discussion disagreement concerning the best option, rather than creating a hidden profile, also increases information exchange (Stasser & Titus, 1985). Aspects of how the information is presented, such as making unshared information salient, providing a low total amount of information, or providing a low proportion of shared to unshared information, can also increase the exchange of unshared information (Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). Finally, eliminating or reducing temporal constraints on discussion time can also increase the discussion of unshared information (Kelly & Karau, 1999; Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbott, 1998; Winquist & Larson, 1998).

Group Polarization

Group members not only exchange facts in coming to a decision, but they also exchange persuasive arguments and preference information. A pervasive phenomenon that results from the exchange of initial thoughts and opinions about a decision is that group members shift their own positions in a direction that is consistent with the most popular trend in the group. That is, the group's opinion shifts toward either a more risky or a more conservative position depending on the initial average inclinations of group members (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976). This phenomenon, known as *group polarization*, has been demonstrated in dozens of studies across many different types of groups. For example, work by Davis and colleagues (Davis, Bray, & Holt, 1977; Davis, Kameda, & Stasson, 1992) on jury deliberations has shown that if a two-thirds majority of jurors are initially in

favor of a verdict (either guilty or not guilty), that verdict, in most cases, will ultimately prevail as a unanimous verdict.

Two primary processes are thought to underlie group polarization. First, *social comparison theory* suggests that we prefer to hold positions that are slightly more correct than the positions held by others (Festinger, 1954). Once group discussion shows us that, although we hold a popular position, we are not much different than others in our correctness, we shift to a more extreme position (Myers, 1978; Weigold & Schlenker, 1991). That is, polarization occurs because of a group's ability to exert *normative social influence*, or influence based on a member's desire to be well thought of and liked (Kaplan & Miller, 1987).

Second, group polarization is thought to occur because of exposure to more persuasive arguments that are generated for the majority position (Brauer, Judd, & Gliner, 1995; Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Thus, *persuasive arguments theory* emphasizes the initial distribution of positions. It assumes that arguments for each position are distributed in proportion to the distribution of pre-decision positions of the members. According to this theory, group polarization occurs due to *informational influence*, or influence that is based on an exchange of facts and information (Kaplan & Miller, 1987).

Both of these processes have been shown to be sufficient to induce group polarization. For example, if group members are provided with arguments concerning a group decision, but no actual positional or preference information, polarization will still occur (Sanders & Baron, 1977). Conversely, if group members are provided with positional or preference information only, but no actual arguments in favor of those positions, polarization again occurs (Goethals & Zanna, 1979). In most situations, however, these processes work in tandem to produce the positional shifts.

Social identity theory researchers suggest that when group members identify strongly with the group, polarization effects are likely to be even greater (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990). To the extent that initial preferences are seen as an indication of a shared norm within a valued group, group members will be more likely to move in the direction of that norm (Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990).

Conclusions

Despite the shift in emphasis within sociology from interaction in groups to issues of status and power structure, social exchange, and emotions, a more disciplinarily inclusive look at the field demonstrates that research on groups is plentiful. Recent developments in technology may also open up new avenues for group research. For example, highly portable and reliable recording devices are readily available for use in studying groups outside a laboratory setting. Social media platforms, such as Facebook, have expanded the definition of what constitutes a group by making interaction with large numbers of people easily attainable. Indeed, computer-mediated group interaction has allowed for group members to be distributed over distances rather than being co-located.

One of the implications of these technological advances is a possible change in the type and structure of groups under investigation. These shifts in what constitutes a group may change the relative importance of various group processes across different group types. These changes may also once again change the focus of group research to new topics.

Finally, the multi-disciplinary nature of today's group research is apparent in this review. In fact, Wittenbaum and Moreland (2008), in their review of trends in small group research, conclude that although group research is abundant, it is not particularly active in the area of social psychology. Whether the technological changes mentioned above will reinvigorate group research in social psychology will need to be examined in future reviews.

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Chapter 15

Interaction in Social Networks

Diane Felmlee and Robert Faris

Introduction

Social network research represents one of the fastest growing academic areas in the past decade (Rivera, Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010), and it is a field of inquiry with particular relevance for social psychology. Social psychology is the study of the relationship between the individual, or the self, and larger social units, and often is referred to as the study of social interaction. A social network perspective emphasizes the importance of social ties among actors in shaping individual behavior, and networks emerge out of, and mold social interaction. Social networks embody the quintessential, socio-structural dimension of human behavior. They place the “social” into social psychology.

The concept of a social network is relevant not only to social psychologists and social scientists, but also to scholars in other disciplines, including computer scientists, who investigate the proliferation of ties in the virtual world of the internet, as well as physicists, engineers, and biologists. Interdisciplinary work between researchers in these seemingly disparate fields is growing. The fundamental concepts of a set of nodes, and ties between those nodes, serve as a common dividing rod, triggering innovative studies across multiple fields. Thus, network research also warrants attention, because it serves as an inspiration for creative, interdisciplinary work.

The development of virtual communication on the Internet via email, Facebook, Twitter, and other electronic venues, further highlights the importance of studying interaction in social networks. The phenomenal growth in electronic, networked communication represents one of the most visible changes in the field since earlier reviews of the topic (Felmlee, 2003). Virtual exchanges raise a host of new questions of particular relevance to social psychological inquiry regarding the patterns and consequences of these novel forms of social interaction. Internet communication also leaves a trail of traceable connections between actors, providing a ready source of network data that can be used to address micro-level queries. Today scholars can locate data, often over time and for samples of enormous sizes, consisting of information regarding email exchanges, who becomes friends with whom on social network sites, and who repeatedly follows whose Twitter account. The increased

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reliance on electronic interaction within our society makes it particularly important to study the networks that compose these interactions and their ramifications for the participant, themselves, social groups, and our broader society.

Social network analysis is emerging as a particularly hot topic in the broader field of sociology. An examination of co-citations within sociology journals reveals a substantial increase in attention to social networks during the period 1990–2005 (Lazer, Mergel, & Friedman, 2009). Furthermore, one-third of the most highly cited articles in two influential journals, *American Sociological Review* and *American Journal of Sociology*, during the period between 1995 and 2005 concentrate on social networks, most of which examine forms of social interaction. Given this veritable explosion of network research, in this chapter we focus only on a sample of current and classic work, and only work that focuses on relations between actors who are individuals, as opposed to larger collectivities.

The field of social networks represents both a unique, relational perspective on the study of social interaction, as well as a specific, methodological approach to empirical investigation, referred to as social network analysis. Several social psychology research traditions have embraced this perspective, in particular, the fields of friendship, close relationships, health, social support, small groups, social exchange, and social influence. As we will discuss subsequently, research in these areas has found new applications for network concepts, due in part to the increased availability and interest in global, social network data. We also identify several areas of inquiry where deeper engagement with social networks could be profitable for social psychologists. Finally, social networks is emerging as a stable field of inquiry in its own right, with a focus on relationships that renders it exceptionally suitable for the examination of social interaction.

We begin the chapter with a discussion of several, basic principles of a social network paradigm, and then we define and illustrate certain elementary concepts utilized in a social network approach to interaction. Next, we discuss processes involved in network formation and we describe elements of social network theories. In the following section, we summarize several key findings in the micro-sociology areas of interpersonal relationships, health, social exchange, social influence, and the new, expanding area of internet networks. The chapter ends with suggestions for future research in this promising area of social psychological inquiry.

A Social Network Perspective

A number of propositions underlie a social network perspective, according to several scholars (Emirbayer, 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Wellman, 1988), and these principles differentiate such an approach from that of other social psychological perspectives. Here we discuss several such principles that are of particular relevance to the study of social interaction. These include:

- *The relationships, or ties, among actors represent core concepts in the study of social interaction and individual behavior.*

The relations among actors serve as the focal point for network research. A variety of types of relations are possible, including positive, interpersonal ties such as friendship, work ties, social support, social exchanges, and communication. Negative ties also exist, and include aggressive relations, enemies, and deleterious exchanges and communication.

- *The behavior of actors is interdependent with that of others to whom they are connected.*

One of the basic assumptions inherent in most statistical analyses within the social sciences is that each case in a data set is independent of the other, an assumption necessary for model adequacy. Yet in classical, social network analyses, the fundamental assumption is that actors' behavior is interdependent, rather than independent. This assumption is not always realized fully in applied, social network analyses, often due to data constraints, but the ideal remains.

- *Beyond those with whom they are directly tied, actors also are shaped by the structure of their broader social networks, and their positions within them.*

Most micro-level studies of social networks use characteristics of the network to help in accounting for a range of individual outcomes, such as physical or mental health, satisfaction with interpersonal relationships or with work, and the likelihood of connecting with someone online. The network characteristics used as predictors include the concepts that we describe in the subsequent section of this chapter, such as centrality, mutuality, density, cliques, transitivity, as well as many others.

- *Networks serve as the conduit for the flow of information, support, resources, and other types of exchanges that consist of either positive or negative content.*

Networks influence actors' behavior, in part, because they serve as a medium of social exchange, in which one actor transfers a message, object, or a range of other financial, physical, social, and/or emotional resources to the other. Exchanges could be positive, supportive, and involve beneficial, social resources. On the other hand, they can consist of negative flows, such as the transfer of a disease, rumor, illegal substance, or a destructive act.

- *Social networks enable the observation and measurement of social structure by capturing regular patterns in actors' relationships and interactions.*

In a network approach, social structure is captured in a more explicit manner than in other, micro-level theories. Here ties, or social links, themselves, represent a form of structure. This explicitness encourages a "social structure and individual approach" to the study of social psychology, examining the links between individuals and the broader structure of relationships within which they interact. A social structure and individual/personality approach, which focuses on associations between the individual and larger, patterns of social regularities, represents historically one of the important, "three faces" of sociological, social psychology (House, 1977).

Conceptual and Methodological Issues

Next we define several, central network concepts to which we will refer later in the chapter (for more detail, see Wasserman & Faust, 1994). We illustrate each concept using one or more of three network data sets, each using different links – work ties, Facebook wall posts, and friendship and aggressive relations – and each representing varying visual displays. For ease of explication, the first data set is small and contains information gathered over time regarding the regular, daily work ties between six members of the administrative staff of an academic, University department (Felmlee, 2003) (see Fig. 15.1). The second illustration is derived from an Internet data set consisting of millions of interactions on the social networking site, Facebook, taken from a Facebook application, called "Get Love" (see Fig. 15.2). The final network data set (Faris & Felmlee, 2011b) that we use to construct an additional illustration consists of friendship and aggression ties gathered from adolescents who reported on their friends and harmful associations with classmates from a New York school consisting of grades 8 through 12 (see Fig. 15.3).

Network Concepts

Density

Density refers to the proportion of network ties that exist out of all possible ties, or in other words, the number of links between actors that do exist, divided by all potential links. Density can be taken as an indicator of the overall amount of social interaction that is occurring within a given population of




Fig. 15.1 Daily work ties among a department’s administrative staff




Fig. 15.2 Wall posts among a sample of Facebook users for the application “Got Love;” network ties arranged in ascending order of nodal degree, from *bottom* to *top*

actors. The density of the work ties in the university department displayed in Fig. 15.1 has a value of .47, that is, there are 47 %, or 7 of the 15 possible ties between the 6 actors. The density of the wall post network in Fig. 15.2, on the other hand, is close to zero; posts emanate from a relatively small number of users, and there are extremely few ties among those on whose walls they post, nor do the initial posters link to each other. The density of the friendship and aggressive ties in Fig. 15.3 is low, with a value of .075. The low density occurs in part because of the relatively few instances of links that cross grade level.




Fig. 15.3 Aggressive and friendship ties between students in 8th through 12th grade in a New York high school

Degree

The number of lines, or ties, incident to, or associated with, a node, represents its *degree*. The minimum degree is 0, which occurs when a node has no ties to other nodes, and the maximum is $n - 1$, when a node has ties to all others, where n is network size. In graphs with asymmetric ties (i.e., directed graphs), *indegree* refers to the number of ties directed toward a node. *Outdegree* is the number of ties originating with a node. Degree is a simple indicator of how connected an actor is to the rest of the network. People with high degree centrality often act as ‘hubs’ in a network, shortening the social distance between people who would otherwise be distant or disconnected.

In Fig. 15.2, we see the sociogram that contains network ties among a set of users of the social networking site, Facebook. The ties represent the presence of a message posted on a wall, in which a person uses the application “Got Love” to specify a Facebook friend as a special, loved connection. These wall post ties are arranged in the sociogram in order of nodal degree, with the lowest degrees at the bottom of the figure (e.g., degree = 1), and the highest nodal degrees at the top. At the very top of the sociogram, for example, we see instances in which certain people extend “Got Love” wallposts to numerous Facebook friends (e.g., degree = 32).

Centrality

A *central* actor is one who is tied to many people, who are themselves tied to many people, and so on. Alternatively, an actor may be considered central if he or she lies between many actors, that is, the central actor is located on many of the shortest paths of ties (i.e., geodesics) that link other actors (Freeman, 1979). There are numerous measures of centrality, including degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality, but they all measure these ideas in one form or another (for discussions of centrality measures and their importance see, for example, Faust [1997]). Centrality is among the most important dimensions of social networks, because central actors are apt to be those in positions of social prominence, prestige, and influence. Since they tend to have many ties, central actors are less likely than those on the network fringe to be dependent on a small set of actors for information and other resources. Not surprisingly, the head staff person, the Administrative Assistant, Nicole, represents a highly central figure in the departmental work group displayed in Fig. 15.1. Nicole has the most work ties to others within this group, and she lies on the path of ties between several sets of workers. Over time, Nicole's centrality led her to become a hub of communication.

Tie Strength

Ties can vary in *strength*, which refers alternatively to their degree of intimacy, frequency of interaction, durability, or connectedness. Measures of relationship "closeness" or intensity represent particularly good indicators of tie strength, according to Marsden and Campbell (1984). In addition, ties between actors that have many links in common often are considered "strong," whereas those with only one or few links are "weak." In mathematical graph theory terms, weak ties are often network "bridges," that is, they represent the only link between two groups of actors, and thus are important conduits of information.

In Fig. 15.1, for example, the administrative assistant, Nicole, has weak ties to both the Department Chair, John, and to the Computer Technical Assistant, Peter. She represents a bridge, therefore, both to the faculty, and to the departmental computer support system. Over time, Nicole, a network bridge and highly central actor, came to be known as a primary decision-maker in the department and subsequently received a substantial, external job promotion.

Cliques

A *clique* is a collection of actors (at least three) in which all actors are linked to each other by ties. Less stringent definitions of cliques, also called cohesive subgroups, are commonly used in empirical research, because the absence of just a single tie among actors in a subgroup prevents the subgroup from meeting the formal clique definition. Identifying cliques, either in their strict or relaxed forms, assists in identifying tightly knit subgroups in larger networks of actors, a process of particular relevance to the study of small group interaction. There exists one formal clique in Fig. 15.1 between the three, regular secretaries, Rachel, Chris, and Laura, all of whom work with each other. In Fig. 15.3, which consists of friendship and aggression ties within a high school, we can see five large, loosely defined, cliques, one for each grade level. See for example, the 8th grade clique in the upper right corner of the figure. Cliques become fuzzier as the grade level progresses, with 12th grade students (upper left of Fig. 15.3) being those most likely to form cross-grade friendship, or aggressive, links.

Transitivity

A triad containing actors A, B, and C, is *transitive* if whenever A has a tie with B, and B has a tie with C, then A also has a tie with C. If A does not have a tie to C, then the triad is *intransitive*. Other situations, such as when A and B are tied, but neither has a tie to C, are considered *vacuously transitive*. Transitivity in triads is useful for examining the network implications of cognitive balance theories, as addressed below.

In Fig. 15.1, we can easily see illustrations of types of triads, some of which are transitive (e.g., staff members Rachel, Laura, and Chris). Others are intransitive (e.g., John, Nicole, and Paul). There are no vacuously transitive triads.

Equivalence

Actors are equivalent when they have similar relationships to and from all other actors in a network. Two actors are *structurally equivalent* if they have identical ties to and from all other actors in the network (Burt, 1980). Structurally equivalent actors occupy network positions that are “substitutable” for each other, in terms of patterns of ties. One common assumption is that structurally equivalent actors will behave similarly in terms of their attitudes and performance, which makes the concept useful for predictions of interaction.

In Fig. 15.1, ironically, the Chair, John and the Computer Technician, Paul, both have structurally equivalent ties in this network. Each has one and only one connection to Nicole and no others. Yet both are similar to the extent that they operate on the periphery of the main, secretarial, administrative group and connect to that group solely via Nicole.

Social Network Types

Networks vary as to type in a number of ways. Here we differentiate between several, basic genres of networks, such as *directed*, *egocentric*, and *one-mode* networks. A *directed* graph is one where A may ‘send’ a tie to B, but B does not necessarily ‘send’ a tie to A. For example, one person may like or respect a coworker even though the coworker dislikes or disdains him or her. *Undirected* graphs, on the other hand, are ones where, if A is tied to B, B is necessarily tied to A (if A is a coworker of B, then B is a coworker of A).

Global, or *sociocentric*, networks include data on the relations among all actors in a bounded population. *Egocentric* networks are ones where a set of focal actors (egos) is selected and information on their ties (alters) is collected (either from the egos or the alters themselves).¹ Global networks allow researchers to fully investigate network structures using all available analysis techniques, but they require that researchers identify a population boundary (e.g., a school) when even the most ‘bounded’ populations generally have ties beyond their social borders (e.g., out-of-school friends). Analytical possibilities are more limited with egocentric networks (e.g., global network measures are not usually meaningful), but they can accommodate large probability samples, including nationally-representative samples; recent research has used egonetwork data to estimate the prevalence of social isolation in the United States (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears, 2006).

¹“Snowball” network studies, where a seed population of focal actors is interviewed about their ties, who are then interviewed about their ties, and so on, are something of a hybrid approach. Depending on the size of the population from which the seeds are drawn and how many links away that data are collected, snowball designs can sometimes approximate global network data.

Network mode refers to the number of distinct types of entities in the network. A one-mode graph involves just one set of actors (e.g., individual people), and represents by far the most common type of social network. Yet in some cases, social psychologists also define entities at a higher order, such as events, groups, or organizations. People attend some events but not others, for instance, and thus a tie can be used to indicate that two people attended the same event. But the dual-mode nature of the data allows researchers to analyze the network of events, linked by shared attendees, as well as the “coaffiliation” network of people linked by shared events (i.e., a two-mode, or dual mode, network).

Social Network Data Collection

Social network data can be collected through various means. When collecting data from a defined population (e.g., a school or workplace), researchers typically provide respondents with a roster of all potential network connections, with names and id numbers, and then provide surveys asking respondents to fill out the names or ids of their network connections (friends, those from whom they seek advice, etc.). In many cases (e.g., the widely researched AddHealth study (Harris & Udry, 1994)), practical constraints restrict the number of nominations respondents can make. In other cases, respondents may be presented with a roster and allowed to nominate as many alters as they wish, without any restrictions. The risk of the first approach is that some individuals may be inaccurately constrained to fewer connections than they actually have, while an unconstrained approach introduces the concern that individuals will inflate their number of ties. In both cases, the success of data collection hinges on having an accurate roster (which can be augmented with pictures for large organizations).

However, surveys are not the sole means of collecting social network data. Some populations (e.g., gang members, young children) may not be receptive to survey methods, but ethnographic researchers have been able to generate network data by observing patterns of interaction (Fleischer, 2005; Martin, 2009). Of course, observational network data are limited to what can reasonably be observed, and are only practical for small, well-defined groups.

The most promising new source of social network data is through cellular or internet technology. Recent scholarship has shown that it is possible to infer friendship network structures from cellular phone call data (Eagle, Pentland, & Lazer, 2009). Online social media sites are another obvious source of network data. Early manifestations of online social networks suffered from reliability problems, as pseudonymous individuals accrued thousands of “friends” whom they had never met. However, expansions of social media sites like Facebook mean that more nuanced data about real life interactions (e.g., being “tagged” in the same photograph) are at least theoretically available. While most of Facebook’s network is not publically available, the bulk of Twitter is public, and methods for harvesting network data are readily available (Caren, 2012). Given the size and scope of sites like Facebook and Twitter, it is clear that online social media will be a particularly promising source of data for social psychologists seeking to study social networks.

Network Characteristics

Formation of Networks

We begin our discussion of the social network literature by examining how networks arise. Two of the most basic social processes that guide network formation are those of proximity and homogamy or similarity. In one classic investigation, Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) found that proximity

was a major determinant of social ties in two new housing complexes, and that residents who lived in less centrally located housing units in the buildings were more likely to be labeled as deviant. In another influential, early study, Newcomb (1961) examined the friendship patterns of male college students in a boarding house. Proximity determined initial patterns of liking in the house, but similarity of age, background, and attitudes also emerged over time as a powerful influence on mutual liking.

Recent research continues to find that homophily, the principle that similarity breeds connection, remains a fundamental characteristic of various types of networks, including those of friendship, marriage, support, work, advice, information, and exchange (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Personal networks tend to be homophilous with regard to several sociodemographic and behavioral characteristics. Dissimilarity with respect to race and ethnicity poses the strongest barrier to the development of network ties, followed by disparities in age, religion, education, and gender. Status homophily, in which similarity is based on informal or formal social status, has been distinguished from value homophily, which depends on attitudes, values, and beliefs (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954), and both types of homophily shape links between people (McPherson et al., 2001).

According to Kadushin (2002), there also are noteworthy psychological motivations for the evolution of networks, in particular, those relating to a person's safety and efficacy. Safety involves searching for support and comfort, whereas efficacy emerges from the quest for mastery and effectiveness. Safety corresponds to, and is generated by, networks of cohesion with many interrelated ties. Efficacy, on the other hand, emerges from separation and is characterized by brokerage and networks with structural holes (Burt, 2001). Both motivations occur simultaneously, according to Kadushin's theory, with network formation typically exhibiting both some degree of cohesiveness but also structural holes, characteristics often framed as contradictory network dimensions.

Network Theory

Next, we discuss basic social network theories and arguments. One key aspect of a network theory is that it relies on concepts and processes about relationships that link social actors. We describe primarily perspectives in which the focus is on aspects of network structure and composition that influence micro-level behavior and interaction. On the other hand, the bulk of conceptual work remains relevant to research at both the micro- and macro-level and can be difficult to pigeon-hole along standard disciplinary divides. A social network perspective aids in bridging the micro-macro gap in sociological work, according to Granovetter (1973), and its associated theories exhibit this tendency.

Weak Ties

Mark Granovetter's theory of *weak ties* (1973) concerns connections (often of acquaintanceship) between people who have few, if any, mutual friends, and it represents perhaps the most widely cited work within the field (Lazer et al., 2009). Granovetter's theoretical argument maintains that weak ties in a network serve crucial roles in social processes. Weak ties act as a locale for the diffusion of influence and information, and provide opportunities for mobility, and community organization. Individuals with strong, close ties to each other, such as family members and good friends, tend to possess the same kinds of information, due to homophily, whereas new information is more apt to be obtained from those whose ties are relatively weak and distal (e.g., a fellow member of a civic organization). In support of this argument, Granovetter found that job seekers were likely to obtain employment through people they saw occasionally, rather through those with whom they were in frequent contact.

Granovetter's argument is not without flaws. The evidence provided for the theory remains mixed and Granovetter's definition of "weak" is vague (Krackhardt, 1992). Yet there are several reasons why his propositions remain noteworthy. First, the theory emphasizes the fundamental importance of network structure in shaping interpersonal interaction. The overall flow of information between a set of individuals, for example, depends on the location of their contacts within the web of ties that link them. Second, Granovetter's argument points to the strength of network links, rather than simply their presence or absence, as being worthy of investigation. As a result, it is not uncommon for research today to distinguish network connections by their strength in both theoretical and empirical work (see, for example, Feld & Carter, 1998). The theory also provides clear, testable propositions that have wide implications for scientific inquiry, which has allowed its influence to spread and enabled scientists to entertain these propositions in multiple disciplines. Finally, the theory vividly illustrates the most basic principle of the social network paradigm, that connections among people mold behavior, in this case the behavior of the individual, group, and community.

Balance, Transitivity, and Triadic Closure

Another influential, foundational, network theory is that of balance. Balance theory concerns relations among triads, or sets of three nodes. The theory of structural balance in triads was generalized from Heider's (1958) cognitive balance theory, which proposes that when two people like each other and agree about a topic, such as their feelings about a third person, then cognitive balance occurs. When two people like each other and disagree, however, then imbalance transpires, and an unpleasant cognitive state is aroused. One of the underlying ideas to emerge from this theoretical perspective is that subgroups consisting of three people, i.e., triads, are noteworthy units of social psychological study that have import for the individuals composing the triad.

Cartwright and Harary (1956) used mathematical graph theory to formalize Heider's *cognitive balance theory*, developing a theorem suggesting that social systems will tend to develop into two cliques, with positive ties within each clique and negative ties between members of different cliques. Nevertheless, groups often do not split into exactly two cliques, according to empirical data, and thus subsequent theorists continued to modify balance theory, attempting to provide a better fit to data than previous formalizations (e.g., Davis, 1967). The most influential model was based on the transitivity principle for positive relations, as proposed by Holland and Leinhardt (1970): If actor a chooses (or likes, admires, etc.) actor b, and actor b chooses actor c, then actor a will choose actor c. If either of the first two parts of this statement is not true, that is, if a does not choose b, or if b does not choose c, then the cycle is "vacuously transitive," i.e., it does not contradict the principle of transitivity. Otherwise, cycles are "intransitive."

Several trends emerge with regard to transitivity. First, intransitive triads occur less frequently than would be expected by chance in face-to-face groups (e.g., Hallinan, 1974; Holland & Leinhardt, 1970), in interactions among nonhuman animals (Faust, 1997), and within Facebook wallposts (Doroud, Bhattacharyya, Wu, & Felmlee, 2011). The balance theory explanation for this finding is that intransitive triads are cognitively stressful, and thus avoided. An alternative explanation is that actors elude inequality in their dyadic relationships, and in doing so, sidestep intransitivity as well (Feld & Elmore, 1982). Moreover, people may cognitively impose transitivity onto affiliative interaction patterns that they observe in order to simplify these patterns and make them easier to recall (Freeman, 1992; Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999).

A second finding receives less attention but has a number of potentially notable implications. The absence of intransitive triads produces a group network structure that consists of disjoint cliques that are equal or rank ordered (e.g., Davis & Leinhardt, 1972). This finding is noteworthy because it demonstrates a fundamental link between the micro level triadic composition of a group and overall group structure, that is, 'local' rules governing triad formation dictate the 'global' structure of the network.

In sum, this work shows that one actor's tie to another is influenced by third parties in their network. In other words, even very personal, relational choices on the part of two people are affected by the network in which they are embedded. A person's friendship choices, for instance, are a function of their friends' friendship choices. In addition, this research demonstrates that a link exists between macro-level group structure and micro-level triadic structure. Processes at the micro-level, in which individuals avoid stressful, intransitive triads, result in hierarchy and cliques in the overall group; or vice versa, perhaps it is network hierarchy and clique formation that produce a relative lack of intransitivity at the micro-level.

Finally, note that researchers across a broad spectrum of disciplines now routinely control for "triad closure" in their network models, where triad closure refers to the balance tendency of a tie to emerge between two connected nodes. The basic balance notion has spread widely.

Social Influence and Power

Network Effects Model

Theories of influence, power, status, and centralization (e.g., Freeman, 1979, 1992) represent some of the most common concerns in the field. One theoretical model that describes the network influence process is the "network effects model," in which actors' opinions are assumed to be a weighted average of influential opinions of other network members (Friedkin, 1998). The opinions of actors endogenously influence that of the other, and exogenous factors affect initial opinions. In an application, Friedkin (1999) demonstrates that choice shifts are a product of a group's social network structure, where certain members have more influence than others when opinions are formed. Group pressures cause a group's opinions to converge to a weighted average of members' initial opinions. When revising their own positions on an issue, in other words, people consider and combine their position with that of others. The network effect model, thus, offers a dynamic, structural, social cognition mechanism as the basis for group decision shifts, as opposed to more traditional theories that emphasize persuasive messages, group norms, or decision rules.

Structural Hole Theory

Network theories of centrality emphasize the extent to which an actor is highly connected to the other actors in a network, either directly, or indirectly via other highly connected actors. Burt (1992) proposed a variation on the basic idea of centrality such that simply being well-connected is insufficient for developing influence or other advantages. What is important, rather, is whether an actor links otherwise disconnected actors, or, in Burt's terms, "bridges structural holes." These bridging actors find themselves in the advantageous position of the middleman, and enjoy leverage in their relationships with the actors they indirectly connect. The structural holes argument also stands in contrast to social capital arguments concerning the importance of densely connected subgroups (Coleman, 1990). Burt (2001) provides empirical analysis in support of the structural holes argument in a business context, where he finds that work groups that bridge structural holes had higher productivity.

Influence and Selection

The tendency of people to be similar, and behave similarly, to their friends and associates ("network auto-correlation") is among the most robust findings in social science, observed across a variety of cultures

and characteristics. This correlation can be attributed to *influence*, the tendency for people to become similar to their friends, or *selection* (“homophily”), the tendency for people to befriend similar others. Determining which process is at work is a thorny problem. Even with respect to race, which is relatively immutable, it is difficult to accurately estimate the extent to which people prefer friends of their own race. While race generally exhibits the highest levels of network autocorrelation (McPherson et al., 2001), this tendency is also partially explained by the inclination of people to reciprocate friendship overtures and to make friends with the friends of friends and indeed, these network effects are stronger than pure racial homophily (Wimmer & Lewis, 2010). In addition to these network effects, propinquity – and especially residential segregation – account for as much as one third of the racial homophily effect (Moody, 2001; Mouw & Entwisle, 2006).

When behaviors rather than traits are concerned, the complexity of the influence vs. selection problem intensifies. Historically, researchers tended to emphasize influence processes (e.g., Friedkin, 1998), though some accounted for selection processes as well (e.g., Ennett & Bauman, 1994). In rare cases, quasi-experimental arrangements provide evidence of strong peer influence effects when selection is randomized (Zimmerman, 2003). Controlled selection processes via random dormitory assignment have limited applicability in other settings, and the dyadic structure of such analyses offers little insight into how influence is manifested in broader social networks.

Recent methodological advances by Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich (2010) (e.g., Pattison & Robins, 2002), however, are designed to enable researchers to estimate selection and influence parameters while simultaneously accounting for network structural parameters. These dynamic actor-based stochastic models assume that actors are maximizing, have complete knowledge of the network, and make behavior and network decisions sequentially in continuous time (Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). If these assumptions are met and multiple waves of social network data are available, then a simulation-based model attempts to estimate selection and influence parameters separately from network structural effects. While longitudinal social network data sets are not yet common, most existing applications of these models find evidence that both processes are at work. Among adolescents at least, smoking, drinking, musical preferences, delinquency, and depression are all subject to both selection and influence effects (Dijkstra et al., 2010; Shaefer, Kornienko, & Fox, 2011; Snijders et al., 2010). Research using Facebook data, however, finds evidence of selection but weak contagion effects, and indeed, among indie rock enthusiasts, a tendency for people to abandon bands once their friends like them (Lewis, Gonzalez, & Kaufman, 2012).

Social Exchange

An additional perspective garnering growing attention is Network Exchange Theory (Markovsky, Willer, & Patton, 1988). The roots of network exchange theory can be found in the principle that power is not a property of individuals, but of the relations between them (Emerson, 1981). Actors variously accrue advantages or are marginalized and exploited based on the pattern of their relations with alters, the relations those alters have with still other alters, and so on. An important premise of Network Exchange Theory is that relationships can be understood in terms of exchange, not solely of material goods or services, but also of social exchange, or the intangible benefits derived from participating in a relationship. A core idea is that while each actor is better off exchanging than not exchanging, the benefits each partner draws from exchange are not distributed equally. Differences in network position generate differences in power, measured in terms of the ability to demand favorable exchange conditions. Social exchange theory, and Network Exchange Theory, are treated in more detail elsewhere in this volume (see Chap. 3).

Applications of Social Network Theories

In addition to these foundational, theoretical contributions to the literature, extensive, noteworthy empirical applications deserve attention. We focus on the substantive topics in social psychology that are most amenable to social network analysis: friendship, sexual behavior, health, and computer networks. We begin where much of systematic, social network research originated, with the topics of friendship and acquaintances, inspired by the pioneering, sociometric work of Jacob Moreno (1934).

Friendship and Acquaintances

Network Size and Composition

The literature on friendship and acquaintances addresses basic questions regarding social network size and composition. In one focal study using nationally representative data, McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears (2006, 2009) found that the core discussion networks of Americans decreased in size over a period of two decades. The network size of confidants showed a mean decrease from 1985 to 2004 of around one less confidant, on average, after taking into account missing data, and the effects of sociodemographic variables. These conclusions have been the subject of some debate (Fischer, 2009; and see rejoinder by McPherson et al., 2009). Putnam's (2000) well-known, and sometimes controversial book, *Bowling Alone*, also posits a downward trend in social connectedness within society in recent years.

A question for future research on network breadth concerns the role of the expanding Internet in influencing social ties. According to Wellman (2001), the proliferation of computer networks in our society has led to the development of networked societies that are sparsely knit and loosely bounded, with less emphasis on tightly formed, face-to-face work groups and communities than in the past.

The Small World

The "small world phenomenon," the principle that people are connected to one another by surprisingly short chains of acquaintances, draws repeated, intense, attention within sociology (Lazer et al., 2009) and the broader literature. Stanley Milgram's (1967) classic small world experiment found that it took about five intermediary acquaintances, or six separation stages, for a message originating with a sample of US citizens to successfully reach a target person. This finding served as part of the impetus for the rise of the well-known phrase: "six degrees of separation." Critiques of Milgram's study include sample selection issues and the existence of high rates of noncompleted messages, characteristics likely to bias estimates of the length of the true, average path (Schnettler, 2009). A recent variation of the Milgram experiment based on email chains, however, found that the average chain length connecting people to 18 targets around the world continued to be close to six, varying between five and seven after accounting for attrition (Dodds, Muhamad, & Watts, 2003).

The small world question remains a frequent topic of both experimental and mathematical research today. The notion that a relatively small number of people in our world can connect a random pair of adults, continues to have an appeal to researchers and the public alike, perhaps due to what many perceive to be an increasingly distal world.

Friendship Ties

The unequal distribution of friendship ties within networks also has interesting ramifications for network members. In an application of a mathematical paradox to friendship groups, Feld (1991) notes that when individuals compare themselves with their friends, it is likely that most would feel relatively inadequate because the highly skewed distribution of friendships implies that most people are friends with one or more people who have vastly more friends than they themselves have. Yet individuals may psychologically overcome this paradox through a self-serving bias that leads them to imagine that they are actually more popular than their friends (Zuckerman & Jost, 2001).

In addition, qualities of the friendship network can shape people's group identity. Social network characteristics of prominence, homogeneity and bridging affected imbalances in perceptions of group identity among high school students, and these perceptions resulted in increased changes in identity (McFarland & Pals, 2005). Network contexts were more influential determinants of identity change than were categorical characteristics like the "crowd" with which a student affiliated. A key component of a student's group identification, thus, was location in the friendship network.

Friendship and acquaintance ties influence a range of additional outcomes, such as loneliness in work organizations (Bell, 1991), work effectiveness (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988), gendered power dynamics (Martin & Fuller, 2004), and attitudes towards the U.S. president during national crises and war (Gartner, 2008). Moreover, friendship networks affect not only the life course stages that are typically studied, those of childhood, adolescence, and middle-age; they remain highly influential in the lives of older adults as well (e.g., Blieszner & Adams, 1992).

Adolescent Sexual and Delinquent Behavior

Networks of friends affect the lives of adolescents in several realms, including their sexual behavior and their illegal activities. For example, a young adult's position in the school's friendship network is connected to the sexual behavior of boys and girls. Greater numbers of sexual partners are positively associated with peer status in the friendship network for boys, but negatively associated for girls, showing evidence of the sexual double standard (Kreager & Staff, 2009). Friendship and romantic ties also influence problematic behavior, such as drinking. The drinking activity of romantic partners, friends, and the weak ties of partners' friends, each contributes uniquely to adolescent daters' drinking frequency and future binge drinking (Kreager & Haynie, 2011). Substance abuse in early adolescence also is shaped by location in the adolescent friendship network. Popular youth are more likely to engage in substance use over time, while controlling for past use, and this association increases at later ages (Moody, Brylidsen, Osgood, Feinberg, & Gest, 2011). Instability in levels of popularity in the network predict substance use, as well, findings that may be accounted for by a status-seeking interpretation of young adults' illegal, use of substances.

In another study of adolescent interconnections, Bearman, Moody, and Stovel (2004) mapped out the complete sexual network of a predominantly white, Midwestern high school using a subset of Add Health data. Approximately 35 % of the romantically involved students in the school were located in small, disjoint dyads and triads. The network of sexual contacts among the majority (52 %), however, resembled a "spanning tree," characterized by a surprisingly long chain of interconnections that stretched across the population, extending to link individuals connected by up to 37 degrees, or steps. Over half of the students in the school, in other words, were connected to each other through sexual relationships that could increase dramatically their risk of contracting an STD, even for those with only one partner.

Health

The network perspective receives extensive theoretical attention within the area of health sciences (e.g., Pescosolido, 2006), and there is little doubt that networks exert a hefty impact on people's physical and mental health, and do so in numerous ways. In the first place, a person's social network directly shapes his or her health, according to repeated empirical evidence that the presence of social ties is associated with lower levels of stress, and reduced levels of morbidity and mortality (e.g., House, Umberson & Landis, 1988). Networks also have buffering effects on mental health. The presence of an intimate confidant, and the perception of support availability, reduce the impact of stressful life events on negative mental health outcomes such as depression and anxiety (e.g., Brown & Harris, 1978; Kessler & McLeod, 1985).

In addition, support from one's social network is associated with life satisfaction, self-esteem, and happiness. According to a meta-analysis of 286 studies, networks are linked positively with life satisfaction, self-esteem, and happiness of older adults (Pinquart & Sorensen, 2000). Quality of contacts correlates more highly with well-being than quantity. Yet the quantity of contact with friends is of greater salience than the quantity of family contacts, presumably because friendships are voluntary and unsatisfactory ones can be dropped. However, the quality of ties to adult children, as compared to that of friends, becomes particularly influential for life satisfaction. Finally, according to the meta-analysis, social network contacts relate more closely to life satisfaction and happiness for women than for men, probably because of the greater importance of social relations for women.

Social support is multi-faceted and can be divided into various types, such as emotional aid, services, and financial aid, with various network members providing differing forms of support (Wellman & Wortley, 1990). Women, for instance, contribute much emotional support. Social support located in the community tends to be provided by friends and relatives, rather than by work ties.

In addition to the extensive literature on health and network support, certain recent studies take a global, network perspective, employing extensive maps of individuals' networks to examine the role of social connections. In one example using 30 years of data from the Framingham Heart Study, Christakis and Fowler (2007) showed that obesity can spread through networks in a pattern of development that resembles an infectious disease. Obesity clusters in the network extended to "three degrees of separation," that is a person's likelihood of being obese increased if he or she was connected to someone who was obese, up to a connection that existed three steps away (i.e., ego's friend's friend's friend). Reciprocal nominations, in which two people named each other as friends, had particularly large effects, and increased the likelihood of obesity by 171 %. Additional analyses of this data set uncovered evidence of similar patterns of network influence on the cessation of smoking (Christakis & Fowler, 2008), as well as the psychological states of loneliness (Cacioppo, Fowler, & Christakis, 2009) and happiness (Fowler & Christakis, 2007).

Perennial, methodological debates emerge (see "Influence and selection" section above), regarding whether peer influence directly causes such network effects, with one obese person influencing another to become obese, for instance, or whether selection processes predominate, in which people of similar BMI's choose each other as friends (e.g., Noel & Nyhan, 2011; VanderWeele, 2011). See Cohen-Cole and Fletcher (2008), for example, for a critique and a demonstration of the importance of controlling for environmental confounders as measured by school level fixed effects. Additional limitations in the methodology of Christakis and Fowler are introduced by the inability to adjust for the "unfriending problem," whereby dissimilar friendships dissolve, and hence, lead to an exaggerated influence effect among intact friendships (Noel & Nyhan). Christakis and Fowler (2012) challenge these various critiques, noting that sensitivity, and other supplementary, analyses support their main conclusions.

The social network opportunity structure also influences the help-seeking process. For example, people who are employed are more likely to use co-workers or friends in addition to physicians when

seeking health related assistance, whereas those that are married are more likely to rely on family members (Pescosolido, 1992). Finally, social networks themselves can be structured by the health of individuals (Haas, Schaefer, & Kornienko, 2010). For reviews of additional research on social networks and health, see, for example, Pinquart and Sorensen (2000), Smith and Christakis (2008), and Walker, Wasserman, and Wellman (1993).

Aggression and Negative Tie Networks

The bulk of social network research focuses on ties that are either explicitly or presumably positive in nature, such as friendship, romantic ties, and affiliation ties. Though the theoretical roots date back to the earliest propositions of balance theory, until recently, little empirical research has examined conflict, antagonism, and aggression. The bulk of studies on balance and transitivity have focused on whether “a friend of a friend is a friend,” skirting the questions of whether an enemy of a friend is an enemy, whether a friend of an enemy is an enemy, and finally, whether an enemy of an enemy is a friend. New research on youth aggression has analyzed networks where ties represent conflict and aggression (Faris & Felmlee, 2011a; Veenstra et al., 2007; Rodkin & Berger, 2008). Rather than view aggression as an individual behavioral tendency, this growing body of work considers it as a relationship. Aggressive youth may target schoolmates who are vulnerable (Veenstra et al.) or those they consider status rivals (Faris & Felmlee, 2011b), but their attacks are not random.

In a longitudinal study using social network data on both friendships and aggressive ties, Faris and Felmlee (2011a) examine network processes that influence the development of physical, and non-physical, aggression among 3,722 adolescents in a sample of schools. In the presence of individual, dyad, and school controls, increases in friendship network centrality for both males and females were accompanied by subsequent increases in aggression – until a student approached the pinnacle of the social hierarchy. Those in the top 98th percentile, where aggression peaks, engaged in aggression at an average rate that was 38 % greater than students at the very bottom and 40 % greater than students at the very top. Students at the very top 2 % of the school, friendship hierarchy – along with those at the bottom – were the least aggressive. The findings suggest that social psychological processes emerging out of the social network, rather than mainly individual deficiencies, contribute to the onset of deleterious, school bullying behavior.

This vein of research proposes an instrumental perspective on aggression, suggesting that it is often strategic and intended to win social status rather than a maladjusted reaction to psychological deficiencies or problematic home lives. In the cross-section, characteristics of targets are correlated with aggressors’ status: boys who harass girls, for example, tend to be lower status than boys who pick on other boys (Rodkin & Berger, 2008). Whether their status deficiencies force them to target girls, or they lose status because they do so, is not clear, although a study of summer camp demonstrated the importance of aggressive confrontations for the emergence of dominance hierarchies (Levi Martin, 2009).

More recent research examines the status consequences of aggression among adolescents over a 2-year period, using status indicators derived from high school yearbooks (Faris, 2012). Aggressive youth are generally more likely than other students to join elite social circles, but the status benefits are largely contingent on the characteristics of their victims. Aggressors climbed higher up the social ladder when they victimized peers who were themselves aggressive, high status, or socially close (e.g., members of the same social circle).

Summary of Friendship, Health, Aggression, and Networks

In sum, network research in these domains has generated innovative theoretical ideas concerning transitivity in triads, positions in group structure, and the role of tie strength. A network perspective also has proven to be beneficial to research within the areas of friendship, acquaintances, adolescent

sexual ties, negative ties, social support and health. Findings demonstrate the power of the social network to influence the intimate bonds of friendship, link strangers, affect the development of aggressive relations, shape an individual's opinions, and improve a person's mental state, happiness, physical health, and life satisfaction.

Dyadic Relationships

Opportunities, Information, and Support

Social networks widely influence not only friendships, but intimate relationships as well, although the social environment receives relatively little attention in the literature on couples (Berscheid, 1999; Felmlee & Sprecher, 2000). Networks affect close pairs in at least three major ways, via behavioral, cognitive, and affective channels. First, they provide behavioral *opportunities* for individuals to meet a prospective partner (see, also, Sprecher, Felmlee, Orbach, & Willett, 2002). Parents initiate the process by which the social environment shapes opportunities by choosing the "correct" schools, neighborhoods, religious institutions, and activities for their children and by attempting to influence their adolescents' courting behavior. Network members also directly influence the initiation of close relationships by introducing pairs and providing a place for them to meet. Approximately one-half of individuals were introduced to their partners by a friend, according to a study of 858 people, and two-thirds had at least one friend in common (Parks & Eggert, 1991).

Second, on a cognitive level, social networks provide *information* about possible partners. A friend who knows a potential date, for example, can reveal facts that enhance that person's attractiveness. Network members also act as a source of information regarding the appropriateness of prospective mates, and typically emphasize similarity, or homogamy (Kerckhoff, 1974). By sharing knowledge of the characteristics of a partner, family members and friends serve the crucial function of reducing uncertainty about a relationship (Berger, 1979).

Finally, social networks can provide socioemotional *support* for a blossoming romance. Support could take several forms, such as practical or financial assistance in arranging a first date, maintaining a household, or assisting a couple in times of ill health. Relationship advice also can be beneficial, by getting couples to meet or by improving an existing liaison. Support can be emotional, as well, and it is this type of support and approval that receives the most scholarly attention.

Numerous positive relationship outcomes result from social network support, including attachment, closeness, expectations of relationship survival (Parks, 2007), as well as satisfaction, commitment and love (Sprecher & Felmlee, 1992). Social support intensifies a couple's identity, or the degree to which they view themselves as a couple (Lewis, 1973) and predicts growth in commitment and attachment (Lewis, 1973; Sprecher & Felmlee, 1992). Couples themselves may aid in producing this positive support by manipulating the information they provide their network, and by eliminating relationships with disapproving network members.

Social network support also shapes marriages. First, network support increases marital satisfaction (Bryant & Conger, 1999), and greater marital happiness relates to increases in the number of potentially supportive family members (Veroff, Douvan, & Hatchett, 1995).

The link between marital well-being and connections with kin appears to be stronger for husbands than for wives (Cotton, Cunningham, & Antill, 1993; Milardo & Allan, 1996) and more important for black husbands than for their white counterparts (Orbach, Veroff, & Hunter, 1999; Timmer, Veroff, & Hatchett, 1996). Family interaction and support are particularly relevant to the well-being of African-American marriages, as compared to white marriages (Orbach et al., 1999; Taylor, Chatters, & Jackson, 1993). Networks are apt to play a crucial role in withstanding the strains of poverty and inequality faced by African-Americans in U.S. society (Stack, 1974).

Relationship Stability

We see, thus, that social networks produce many positive, attitudes and emotions in relationships. The following question remains, however: Can networks influence the actual trajectory of relationships over time? According to several studies (Parks & Adelman, 1983; Parks, Stan, & Eggert, 1983), one of the strongest predictors of a relationship breakup over a period of several months is the perception of low levels of support from social networks, even while controlling for a number of individual and dyadic predictors (Felmlee, Sprecher, & Bassin, 1990). Perceptions of the friends of the female member of a couple are particularly successful in predicting relationship dissolution (Agnew, Loving, & Drigotas, 2001; Sprecher & Felmlee, 1992), according to some studies. Support from a female partner's network produces a subsequent decrease in breakup rates for couples over a lengthy period of 5 years (Sprecher & Felmlee, 2000). Finally, network approval, and in some cases, low levels of friendship network centrality, significantly predicted relationship stability over a 3–5 month period, according to a study utilizing global, friendship network data (Felmlee, 2001).

Moreover, social networks affect the stability of marriages. Married couples report more network support before and during marriage than do those who divorce (e.g., Thornes & Collard, 1979), and closeness to husband's family significantly reduced the risk of marital instability for couples (e.g., Veroff et al., 1995). Greater network support for marriage also is associated with a decreased intention to divorce or separate (Bryant & Conger, 1999). Positive ties to family and friends, therefore, appear to serve as potent forces to keep both married, as well as dating, couples together.

The “Romeo and Juliet Effect”

Social networks do not always affirm close relationships, however, and instead can act in ways that interfere with their development. Instead of providing opportunities, helpful information and support, networks sometimes place barriers to couples, provide damaging information, or express disapproval towards a date or mate. Members of the network also can harm a couple by providing substitute sources of companionship or romance (Felmlee, 2001; Marsiglio & Scanzoni, 1995). Friends and family may disapprove of a couple, too, because of the tendency of newly formed pairs to withdraw from their networks (Huston & Burgess, 1979). In some cases, network opposition may cause couples to fall deeper, rather than less, in love, according to the “Romeo and Juliet effect” (Driscoll, Davis, & Lipetz, 1972). Subsequent research finds that the “Romeo and Juliet effect” tends to emerge only under special situations, however, such as when personal reactance is high (Sinclair, Felmlee, Sprecher, & Wright, 2012) or when parents and friends disagree on the suitability of the pairing (Felmlee, 2001).

Post Breakup or Divorce

A separation or a divorce alters a couple's social network. Network size and network density decrease in the aftermath of divorce (Milardo, 1987; Spanier & Thompson, 1984; Weiss, 1975), and network overlap shrinks as individuals withdraw from a former spouse or partner's connections (Rands, 1988). Yet positive reactions from social networks continue to be salient to intimate pairs even while in the process of ending their relationship. A key phase of the breakup process is one in which individuals seek support from their social network for the termination (Duck, 1982). Couples who broke up reported network support for the dissolution, even in cases in which network members initially approved of the relationship (Sprecher & Felmlee, 2000). It is also likely that network members unintentionally contribute to breakups by introducing people to attractive alternatives.

Summary of Dyadic Relationships and Networks

The bulk of research suggests that social networks facilitate intimate relationship beginnings, development, well-being, and stability. They do so by providing opportunities to meet and establish a joint identity, by communicating positive information about a partner, and via emotional support. In some cases networks play a more disruptive role, but there is scant research on this topic, and the bulk of studies reports a great deal of network approval, not opposition, for couples. The networks of close dyads also may evolve with time, especially following a breakup or divorce.

Internet Networks

Social networks no longer rely solely on face-to-face interaction or slow, “snail mail” modes of communication. Instead, in a 21st societal revolution, millions of people throughout the globe connect with others via the Internet. Not surprisingly, the newest and vastly expanding arena for social network research involves Internet sites, such as Facebook and LinkedIn, and other modes of cyber communication, including email, text messages, and Twitter. One major debate in the field concerns the extent to which the Internet either enhances, or detracts from, individuals’ sense of connectedness and satisfaction. Findings from empirical surveys regarding this debate are mixed. One study found that greater use of the Internet by new users was associated with increases in depression and loneliness over time (Kraut et al., 1998), although others criticize this study and argue that the conclusions are misleading (e.g., McKenna & Bargh, 2000). Another report showed that intensive time spent interacting online reduced time spent with connections in the nonvirtual world (Nie & Erbing, 2000), whereas some scholars maintain that the Internet acts as a complement to existing ties (Koku, Nazer, & Wellman, 2001). Several recent studies, however, find that the Internet actually *enhances* community interaction and ties, both for those living near and far away. According to Wellman and colleagues (Wellman & Hampton, 1999), a common misconception is that the Internet results in the seclusion of people, but that on the contrary, it can pull people together by increasing the amount of ties and the maintenance of contacts.

The Internet possesses a number of intriguing social psychological features that deserve additional attention, including the possibility for relatively egalitarian links (in which people’s social demographic characteristics are not always obvious). Other unique aspects include the absence of non-verbal communication, high speed exchanges across great distance, and the development of on-line, small group communities (Wellman et al., 1996). Additional research also needs to address the debates concerning the role of the Internet and people’s perceptions of connectedness and satisfaction, especially studies based on extensive, longitudinal, data.

Future Directions

The topic of social networks represents a thriving and expanding arena for social psychological inquiry and a promising paradigm for future work. Here we discuss several options for additional scholarship. We begin by noting the need for studies to examine negative, as well as positive, ties. Connections to others are not always rewarding. They can be irritating, disturbing, obnoxious, painful, and even deadly. People form “enemyships” as well as friendships, for instance, and yet almost no network data sets exist regarding enemy relationships. Information regarding conflictual, social ties has important implications for the development of network theories, such as those of balance, weak ties, and transitivity. Cognitive balance theories tend to focus on subgraphs of positive ties, but not enough is known about situations in which the ties are negative (for an exception, see Doreian &

Krackhardt, 2001). We know little as well, about what happens when a weak tie between two subgroups is negative, such as when a link exists between two alienated, former friends or between a pair of competing workers. It seems likely that information diffusion in such a situation will be impeded, rather than facilitated.

Furthermore, the limited work done on adverse links has been restricted primarily to children and adolescents, but in principle such data could be collected among adults. Contexts in which people are more or less confined together for significant periods of time, and without formal role organization, are likely to foster the emergence of status hierarchies, with the prospect for enduring antagonisms. In addition to schools, environments which might sustain relatively dense negative ties among adults include prisons, retirement communities, and “flat” workplaces. Of even greater importance than expanding the empirical scope of research on negative ties is elaboration of network theory. The highly directed nature of aggressive ties, for instance, renders some centrality measures (e.g., betweenness) meaningless, and requires that others be interpreted with caution. Hopefully, future scholars will build upon the basic propositions of network theory to better accommodate the “dark side” of social networks.

One limitation of applied research, furthermore, is that studies often limit analysis to egocentric social network data and lack information on the larger web of social connections among participants. Research on the effects of social support on health and relationships, for example, only rarely examines webs of ties, relying instead on egocentric network measures and perceptions of network characteristics. In such situations, researchers apply a social network theoretical argument to their subject matter, but lack the extensive data necessary to examine chains of ties among their sample members. The typical ego-centric analysis limits the questions addressed, and with some exceptions (Marsden, 2003), makes it difficult to examine many nonobvious mechanisms of network influence, such as those of extended ties, triad closure, structural holes, and network topology. Utilizing a global perspective would add a much-needed, socio-structural dimension to the topic matter.

Further attention needs to be assigned to the issue of change in networks, as well. Most research focuses on a snapshot of the relations among actors at one point in time, nonetheless we know that networks evolve, and sometimes collapse, with time. Our ability to examine causal questions remains limited, in particular, when we concentrate solely on cross-sectional, network data. In order to test carefully the noteworthy implications of many network theories, additional longitudinal social network data sets are needed, as well as continued application of innovative experimental designs.

Moreover, future research should persist in refining dynamic network models used to examine processes of influence and selection, by relaxing stringent assumptions and continuing to improve on problems such as model degeneracy. Yet it is also hoped that scholars will build on the influence versus selection debate by considering conceptual and substantive questions such as the direction of influence: who influences whom? What enables them to do so? Of the innumerable personal characteristics that could drive friendship choices, which are the most important? Finally, do the influence and selection processes in social networks of adults differ substantially from those of adolescents and are there divergences by gender, race, and class?

On the other hand, the network field devotes a great deal of time and attention to developing measures and techniques. For example, centralization alone can be measured at least six different ways, and each approach has its own supporters. Numerous techniques exist for capturing cliques, including *n*-cliques, *k*-cliques, clans, and so on. More recently, exponential random graph models exist in numerous forms. These competing measures and technological innovations offer multiple options for researchers, but the seeming plethora of advanced measures and techniques can come at the cost of substantive and theoretical advances. In addition, the surfeit of methodology poses a potential roadblock to the well-intended, novice investigator in the field who must decide among measures and approaches.

This is not to say that methodological work is not necessary. Clearly methodological advances continue to be a key contributor to the ongoing debates in the field regarding network size, the role of

peer influence, and the societal impact of the Internet. At the same time, it remains important to not lose sight of the fundamental concepts, theories, and processes that we are examining. Note, too, that sometimes the most straightforward idea, with no associated analytic technique, has the greatest impact (see, for example, the notions of “weak tie” and that of a “small world.”) Therefore, just as social psychological work can benefit from a network perspective, social network research can gain from a tighter connection to the core concepts and processes in social psychology, such as those of the self, identity, relationships, status, power, culture, exchange and so on.

Integration of social network theory and knowledge within the larger social psychological field remains an important additional task of future research. Research remains relatively scattered, with applications to a wide range of both micro and macro topics within a varied number of disciplines and subspecialties, and a seeming overemphasis on technique. Such subareas include social network exchange (e.g., Markovsky et al., 1988), health (e.g., Pescosolido, 2006), close relationships (Felmlee & Sprecher, 2000), culture (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010), and small group research (Katz, Lazer, Arrow, & Contractor, 2004). As a result, the social network literature does not always integrate easily into the overarching domain of any one subdiscipline. Social network concepts and theories run the risk of remaining pocketed within their own academic walls. Work that highlights connections between social psychology and social network studies can aid in bridging the divide.

In a related vein, further consideration is due to the mechanisms by which social network effects occur. We are accumulating extensive evidence regarding the power of networks to shape an array of individual outcomes. Yet we know less about why, and how, loneliness may spread through networks, what produces “the small world” phenomenon, or the processes by which network structures shape sexual and romantic behavior. More attention to the underlying social psychological concepts and mechanisms will be invaluable in bridging that divide.

We already noted the surprising frequency of social network articles within the discipline. Yet paradoxes arise. The field of social networks is not yet fully recognized as a separate area of study within the larger discipline. Job offers for sociologists or social psychologists are unlikely to be framed in terms of: “Wanted: Social Network Analyst.” Social network research as a specialty remains somewhat “betwixt and between,” a specialty, but not always treated as an established area of inquiry on its own. The rapid expansion of network scholarship across a range of theories and subareas, also means that it is less well-integrated, and not as carefully digested, as more developed specialties. Nevertheless, this high rate of development and an interdisciplinary nature provide opportunities for innovation and creativity that may be harder to obtain in well-established, more stable, fields of inquiry.

Conclusions

In conclusion, a social network perspective offers unique strengths and weaknesses relevant to social psychology. It provides distinct concepts, creative theory, and novel, methodological approaches useful for the study of the social relations among human actors. A network approach remains relevant to a broad range of social psychological questions, and it represents a natural paradigm for the study of the Internet revolution and its societal ramifications. Yet there remain weaknesses of this perspective. One is that a true, empirical network investigation places a premium on demanding data, with a requirement for information on all the relevant ties among a set of interrelated actors. As mentioned above, the network perspective has much to offer the subfield, but it also could benefit from enhanced intersection with more mainstream, concepts and theories. Nevertheless, its promise for directly infusing structure and social ties into social psychology makes it a particularly appealing, and increasingly popular, paradigm for contemporary, micro-level scholarship.

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Chapter 16

The Social Psychology of Stress, Health, and Coping

Deborah Carr and Debra Umberson

Introduction

That stress affects health is a truism. Laments like “I’m worried sick” convey the conventional wisdom that being “stressed out” harms health. The study of stress and health is one of the richest areas of research in both the social and biomedical sciences, generating hundreds of scholarly studies each year (Thoits, 1995; Wheaton, 1999). The notion that stress makes us sick, anxious, or depressed traces back to the classic book *The Stress of Life*, in which endocrinologist Hans Selye (1956) wrote that any noxious environmental stimulus would trigger harmful biological consequences. Early social science research similarly argued that any change in one’s social environment, whether positive (e.g., a new baby) or negative (e.g., a death in the family) could overwhelm one’s ability to cope, and increase vulnerability to ill health (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). In recent decades, researchers have moved away from asking whether stress affects health, and have delved more fully into questions of why, how, for whom, for which outcomes, and for which types of stressors does stress affect health. These investigations draw heavily on core concepts of social psychology, and underscore that the extent to which one is exposed to stress, the psychological and structural resources one has to cope with stress, and the impact of stress on health vary widely based on social factors including race, *socioeconomic status* (SES), gender, age, and psychological attributes including coping style.

In this chapter, we first describe core concepts in the study of stress, coping, and health. Second, we summarize key theoretical perspectives that frame social psychological research on stress and health. Third, we review the methods and measures used, as well as limitations associated with these approaches. Throughout these sections, we draw on examples of empirical studies exploring stressors across multiple life domains, including early life adversity, work, family, and environmental strains, and show their impact on a range of physical and mental health outcomes. We also highlight gender, race, SES, and life course differences regarding the prevalence and nature of stress, coping resources, and stress outcomes. We conclude by suggesting directions for future research on stress, health and coping.

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Core Concepts

Stress and Stressors

“*Stress*” or “*stressor*” refers to any environmental, social, biological, or psychological demand that requires a person to adjust his or her usual patterns of behavior. Early stress research was conducted on animals, where stress was conceptualized as exposure to noxious environmental stimuli such as extreme temperature (Selye, 1956). Human subjects research, by contrast, typically focuses on social stressors (Holmes & Rahe, 1967; Wheaton, 1999).

Social stressors fall into three major categories: life events, chronic strains, and daily hassles. *Life events* are acute changes that require adjustments within a relatively short time period, such as job loss. In general, the impact of a stressful life event depends on its magnitude, desirability, expectedness, and timing, where events that are unexpected (e.g., sudden death of spouse) or that happen “off-time” (e.g., being widowed prematurely) are particularly distressing (George, 1999). One subtype, *traumatic life events*, defined as “extreme threats to a person’s physical or psychological well-being” such as sexual assault or military combat, have especially harmful and lasting effects on health (Thoits, 2010, p. S43). While early perspectives viewed all disruptive life events as distressing (Holmes & Rahe, 1967), contemporary research finds that the impact of an event is contingent on one’s “role history” (Wheaton, 1990), or qualitative aspects of the role one is exiting or entering. Divorce from an abusive spouse, or being fired from an intolerable job may enhance well-being. Conversely, loss of particularly salient and valued roles may especially compromise well-being. A related, but rarely investigated concept is the *non-event*; recent empirical work shows that *not* experiencing an event that one had expected, such as marrying or having a baby, can harm one’s mental health (Carlson, 2010).

Chronic strains are persistent and recurring demands that require adaptation over sustained periods, such as a strained marriage, stressful job, or living in a dangerous neighborhood. Chronic strains typically fall into three subcategories: status, role, and ambient strains. *Status strains* arise out of one’s position in the social structure, such as belonging to an ethnic or racial minority, or living in poverty. *Role strains* are conflicts or demands related to social roles, such as juggling work and family demands. *Ambient strains* refer to stressful aspects of the physical environment, such as noise or pollution (Pearlin, 1999). Given their persistent nature, chronic strains are generally found to be more powerful predictors of health than acute events, with the exception of traumatic events (Turner, Wheaton, & Lloyd, 1995).

Daily hassles are minor events and occurrences that require adjustment throughout the day, such as traffic jams, or a spat with a spouse (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Historically, most stress research has focused on life events and chronic stressors, although in recent years the collection of daily diary data as a component of population-based surveys has generated interest in daily or “*quotidian*” strains (Pearlin, 1999). The emotional effects of daily hassles are generally found to dissipate in a day or two (Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Wethington, 1989). Despite the fleeting nature of any one hassle, however, the frequency and type of daily hassles experienced can better explain associated psychological and somatic outcomes than do recent life events or chronic role-related stressors (Bolger et al., 1989). Moreover, daily hassles that recur over long periods of time may become chronic strains and have cumulative effects on health.

Although the three types of stressors often are described as distinctive and discrete experiences, stressors rarely occur in isolation. A life event may create new and multiple chronic strains (e.g., a divorce may create financial strains), and chronic strains may give rise to a stressful life event (e.g., workplace strains may precede involuntary job loss). A stressor in one life domain may carry over to another domain, and a stressor in one person’s life may affect members of his or her social network. Taken together, these patterns are referred to as *stress proliferation*; this is “a process that places people exposed to a serious adversity at risk for later exposure to additional adversities” (Pearlin, Schieman,

Fazio, & Meersman, 2005, p. 205). *Stress spillover* refers to the process where strains in one domain, such as work stress, “spill over” to create stress in another domain, such as one’s family relationships (e.g., Grzywacz, Almeida, & McDonald, 2002). *Secondary stressors* refer to the strains that emanate following a major life event; for example, a job loss may trigger financial strains (Price, Choi, & Vinokur, 2002).

Scholars have become increasingly interested in the ways that the stressors facing social network members affect one’s own well-being (Kawachi & Berkman, 2001). *Network events* are stressors facing significant others that spill over into one’s own life; for example, adult children’s divorces may create psychological distress for their aging parents (Greenfield & Marks, 2006). Similarly, *stress contagion* or *stress transfer* refers to the process where one person’s reaction to stress affects the health of a significant other, such as when a spouse’s depression following job loss compromises one’s own well-being (Saxbe & Repetti, 2010).

The types of stressors to which one is most susceptible vary widely by one’s social location, reflecting patterns of race, gender, age, and class stratification in the United States. For example, women historically have suffered the “costs of caring” and experienced more stress related to marriage, childrearing, work-family overload, and network events whereas men, on average, have been more vulnerable to financial and job-related stressors; however these differences may converge as men’s and women’s social roles change and converge (Meyer, Schwartz, & Frost, 2008; Thoits, 1995). Ethnic minorities are more likely than whites to experience stressors related to their minority status, including discrimination and interpersonal mistreatment (Meyer et al., 2008), and goal-striving stress (Sellers & Neighbors, 2008). Ethnic minorities, as well as persons of lower SES, are more likely than whites and higher SES persons to experience economic strains, long-term unemployment, poverty, physically dangerous work conditions, and the stressors associated with living in unsafe neighborhoods such as crime victimization (Meyer et al., 2008; Pearlin et al., 2005; Turner & Avison, 2003). Older adults, by contrast, tend to experience stressors related to their own and their spouse’s declining health, caregiving strains, the deaths of spouses and peers, and difficulties negotiating their physical environment, especially following the onset of disability (Zarit & Zarit, 2007).

Stress Outcomes

Stress outcomes are the psychological, emotional, or physiological conditions that result from exposure to stress. Early research by Selye (1956) focused primarily on physiological responses to stress, and identified three stages of reaction: alarm, resistance, and exhaustion. Exhaustion, or the depletion of the body’s defenses against stress, was linked to a range of physical health outcomes such as high blood pressure. Most contemporary social psychological studies, by contrast, focus on emotional and psychological adjustments, including depressive symptoms, anxiety, substance use, and self-reported measures of health and illness.

Over the past two decades, a growing number of population-based surveys have obtained biological indicators of health (or “biomarkers”); as such, researchers have become increasingly interested in both physiological indicators of health as outcomes, and physiological responses to stress (e.g., allostatic load) that may contribute to physical and mental health (McEwen, 1998). *Allostatic load* refers to the physiological consequences of chronic exposure to fluctuating or heightened neural or neuroendocrine response that results from stress exposure.

Most researchers concur that studies should consider multiple rather than single stress outcomes, particularly when comparing stress effects across social groups (Aneshensel, Rutter, & Lachenbruch, 1991). Particular social groups are vulnerable to specific health threats even in the absence of a stressor; thus, focusing on a single outcome may offer potentially misleading findings. For instance, women are more prone to depression and men more likely to use alcohol in the general population,

even when stress exposure is held constant. Thus, studies focusing only on depressive symptoms following divorce may erroneously conclude that divorce affects the well-being of women only; such a study could conceal the fact that men may be more likely to respond to divorce by turning to alcohol, rather than becoming depressed (Horwitz, White, & Howell-White, 1996). Similarly, older adults are believed to have lower levels of stress reactivity, because they have a greater capacity to manage or “regulate” their emotions (Carstensen & Turk-Charles, 1994). As a result, they tend to show less variability in their emotional reactions to stress; for example, older adults tend to evidence less intense and fewer grief symptoms following spousal loss, relative to their younger counterparts (Nolen-Hoeksema & Ahrens, 2001). Studies that focus solely on depressive symptoms or grief, and that neglect a broader range of outcomes including physical health, may erroneously conclude that bereavement is more distressing to young persons than older adults.

Scholars of racial differences in stress outcomes also call for multiple measures, especially given the racial paradox in mental health. Blacks in the United States have higher rates of physical illnesses such as hypertension and diabetes, and higher mortality rates relative to Whites, even after SES is controlled (Williams & Jackson, 2005). However, epidemiologic surveys generally show that Blacks either fare better than or the same as whites in their risk of most psychiatric disorders, including major depression (Kessler et al., 1994; Williams et al., 2007). Researchers disagree regarding the explanations for Blacks’ relatively good mental health, yet many point to methodological issues, including the possibility that standard depressive symptoms scales are culturally biased and may more accurately capture symptoms among whites than blacks (e.g., Breslau et al., 2006; Brown, 2003).

Coping Resources and Strategies

The extent to which a stressor affects health outcomes is accounted for, in part, by one’s coping resources and strategies. *Coping* refers to “cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141). *Coping resources* are the personal and social attributes individuals draw upon when dealing with stress (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978). The two main resources identified by social psychologically-oriented stress researchers are social support, and mastery and/or perceived control (Pearlin, 1999; Pearlin, Lieberman, Menaghan, & Mullan, 1981). *Social support* refers to the instrumental, emotional, and informational assistance that one draws from others. The number of potential sources of support is less important to one’s well-being than the perception that one can draw on others for support (Wethington & Kessler, 1986). *Mastery* refers to one’s belief that they can control and manage a stressful situation. A high sense of mastery has direct protective effects on health, and also buffers against (or moderates) the harmful effects of stress (Ross & Mirowsky, 1989). However, stress reactions, including psychological distress and depression, may deplete individuals’ usual levels of coping resources when those resources are most needed.

Coping strategies are the changes people make to their behaviors, thoughts, or emotions in response to the stressors they encounter (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The two main strategies are *problem-focused coping*, where one tries to alter the situation that is causing the stressor (e.g., exiting an unhealthy relationship) or preventing the stressor from recurring, and *emotion-focused coping*, where one alters their reactions to and feelings regarding the stressor, such as finding the humor in the situation (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). Most studies concur that problem-focused tactics are more effective than emotion-focused coping in warding off distress. Problem-focused strategies are associated with lower levels of psychological disorders, whereas emotion-focused strategies are related to higher levels of distress and hopelessness (Billings & Moos, 1981). However, emotion-focused coping may be particularly effective when the stressor cannot be altered, and in the immediate aftermath of the stressor (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2000). The selection and efficacy of a particular coping

strategy is shaped, in part, by one's coping resources (Lazarus & Folkman) as well as one's coping style. *Coping style* refers to one's general orientation and preferences for addressing problems, such as confronting versus denying (Menaghan, 1983). However, coping styles and strategies alone do not fully determine the health consequences of stress: structural, demographic, and psychosocial factors such as education, social and economic resources, and cognitive flexibility also may moderate whether and how stress affects health (Thoits, 1995, 2010).

Population subgroups vary widely in their access to and reliance on particular coping resources. For example, groups that historically have had less social and economic power tend to have lower levels of perceived control and mastery. Women, ethnic and racial minorities, and persons with lower levels of education tend to exhibit a lower sense of mastery and perceived control, relative to their non-minority counterparts (Turner & Roszell, 1994). However, some historically disadvantaged subgroups have been found to have richer forms of psychosocial support. Women typically report more social and emotional support from friends and children than do men, although men typically receive more support from spouses than do women (Antonucci, 1990).

Evidence is mixed, but some studies conclude that African-Americans have distinctive coping resources that may be particularly effective when dealing with racism and other sources of discrimination; such resources include support from their religious community, protective religious beliefs (Shorter-Gooden, 2004), and high self-esteem (Twenge & Crocker, 2002). A strong sense of racial identity also is a resource that protects against stress, especially racial discrimination. For example, ethnic pride, strong ties to one's ethnic community, and a sense of commitment to one's ethnic group protect against distress in the face of discrimination among Filipinos (Mossakowski, 2003) and African-Americans (Sellers & Neighbors, 2008).

Research on subgroup differences in coping strategies reveals clear-cut gender differences, although other subgroup differences, such as race, SES, and age-based differences have not been investigated systematically. Studies consistently show that men and women adopt coping tactics that are consistent with gender-typed expectations regarding emotional display (see Brody & Hall, 2010 for review). Men are more likely than women to use problem-focused coping, control their emotions, accept the stress-inducing problem, not think about the situation, or show emotional inhibition or a "bottling up" of emotions (Lawrence, Ashford, & Dent, 2006; Thoits, 1995). Women, by contrast, tend to seek social support, and use emotion-focused coping tactics such as distracting themselves, releasing their feelings (e.g., crying or talking it out), or turning to prayer (Lawrence et al., 2006; Thoits, 1995). Although social status differences in coping strategies are not well-documented, scholars have argued that ethnic minorities and lower SES persons may rely on strategies that are less efficacious. Pearlin and Schooler (1978, p. 18) observed that "the groups most exposed to hardship are also the least equipped to deal with it."

Theoretical Perspectives

Several theoretical perspectives, developed by social psychologists, epidemiologists, and sociologists help us to understand the ways that stress affects health, with particular attention to the social structuring of both exposure and responses to stress. The most influential perspectives, including role theory (Biddle, 1979), fundamental cause theory (Phelan, Link, & Tehranifar, 2010), cumulative advantage/disadvantage theory (Dannefer, 2003; Merton, 1968), life course frameworks (e.g., George, 1999), and the stress process model (Pearlin et al., 1981) are undergirded and integrated by the social structure and personality framework (SSP; House, 1977). One of the three "faces" of social psychology (the other two being psychological social psychology and symbolic interactionism), the SSP perspective investigates the processes through which one's social location, including one's race, SES, age and gender affects individual outcomes, with particular attention to proximal influences or pathways linking stress to health.

Role Theory

Role theory holds that most of our everyday activities involve carrying out social roles such as worker or parent. Each social role is accompanied by a set of expectations and norms that guide one's performance (Biddle, 1979). Role theory was a prominent influence on stress and health research in the 1970s, and was widely invoked as an explanation for why women typically experience more depressive symptoms. Scholars drew attention to the stress created by simultaneously holding multiple roles that taxed one's coping resources (*role overload*) or that were viewed as in opposition to one another, such as devoted mother and competent worker (*role conflict*). Stress researchers in this era attributed women's elevated risk of depression to greater exposure to role-related stress, especially juggling work and family (Gove & Tudor, 1973).

Contemporary research counters, however, that juggling multiple roles is not necessarily stressful, nor does it have uniformly detrimental effects on health. First, recent scholarship emphasizes the *salience* (or importance) of the role to the individual. Simon (1992) finds that parenting strains are particularly detrimental for psychological health when the role of parent is highly important and one is highly committed to the role. Second, multiple roles are most deleterious to health when they are involuntary; Ross and Mirowsky (2003) found that for women who wanted to both work for pay and raise children, multiple roles were not particularly distressing. However, full-time mothers who wanted to work for pay, or employed women who wanted to be stay-at-home mothers evidenced elevated psychological distress.

Third, researchers find some evidence for *role enhancement* processes; persons who hold multiple roles may find that difficult stressors in one role are counterbalanced – rather than amplified – by successful experiences in another role (Thoits, 1983). Yet the benefits of role accumulation are not universal, and reflect structural factors including access to high quality and desirable roles. For example, Jackson (1997) found that holding the multiple roles of parent, spouse, and worker provided psychological benefits to whites, but not for Blacks and Puerto Ricans, a pattern that may reflect the relatively poorer quality jobs experienced by racial minorities, as well as work-related stressors such as discrimination or tokenism.

Fundamental Cause Theory

Fundamental cause theory (FCT) was initially formulated to explain one of the most persistent findings in social sciences research: the social class gradient in health. SES, whether operationalized as education, income, occupational status, or assets, is inversely associated with nearly all indicators of health, including mortality, self-rated health, disability (i.e., functional limitations), most major diseases and health symptoms, and mental health (e.g., Schnittker & McLeod, 2005). These disparities are stark; for example, persons at the top of the income distribution experience mortality risks roughly half that of those toward the lower end of the income distribution (e.g., Sorlie, Backlund, & Keller, 1995), while life expectancy differs as much as 7 years between higher versus lower income groups (House & Williams, 2000). FCT posits that these gradients persist across a range of health outcomes because SES encompasses a sweeping array of resources, including money, knowledge, power, and beneficial social connections that may affect health regardless of which mechanisms are relevant in a particular context (Phelan et al., 2010). Pearlin and colleagues (2005, p. 207) elaborate that “salient among the circumstances linking status and health is differential exposure to serious stressors” including “the dogged hardships” for which lower SES individuals are at elevated risk.

Empirical studies document that stress partly accounts for the SES gradient in a range of health outcomes. Low SES increases one's risk of stressful life events ranging from divorce to job loss to early onset of health problems (e.g., Turner et al., 1995), and chronic stressors including poor,

overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions (e.g., Krieger et al., 2002), persistent economic strain (Kahn & Pearlin, 2006), and discrimination (Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 1999). SES also is inversely associated with coping resources including supportive social ties (Krause & Borawski-Clark, 1995), the use of adaptive coping strategies (Kristenson, Eriksen, Sluiter, Starke, & Ursin, 2004), and self-esteem (Pearlin et al., 2005). These stressors, in turn, affect health. FCT has been influential because it provides a framework for understanding persistent inequalities in health, and recognizes that there is not a “single bullet” that explains these disparities; rather, multiple pathways including chronic, acute, and ambient stressors play a contributory role.

Cumulative Disadvantage Theories

Cumulative disadvantage theories broadly propose that adversity gives rise to subsequent adversity, whereas advantage gives rise to advantage. For example, children who grow up in financially and emotionally secure households have better educational outcomes, which give rise to more stable professional and family lives in adulthood, thus minimizing risk of divorce, job loss, and other health-depleting stressors in adulthood (Gotlib & Wheaton, 1997). As such, an event, experience, or characteristic that has adverse effects in the short-term may take on increasingly vast implications over the life course, leading to a greater bifurcation between the “haves” and “have nots” over time (Dannefer, 2003; Merton, 1968).

Empirical studies provide ample evidence for these cumulative processes, especially regarding the long-term health effects of early life stressors. One longitudinal study of adolescent mothers raised in poverty showed that they were at elevated risk of poverty, family strain, and substance use in adulthood. As more psychosocial risk factors accumulated over the life course, the poorer one’s physical health (measured as functional status) in their 50s and early 60s (Kasper et al., 2008). Similarly, young people who grow up in impoverished households have lower levels of college graduation, steady employment, and earnings as adults (Wagmiller, Lennon, & Kuang, 2008). Those who grow up in families marked by conflict or parental absence also evidence poorer status attainment prospects (Caspi, Wright, Moffitt, & Silva, 1998). As noted earlier, low SES in adulthood and its accompanying strains, are among the most robust predictors of poor physical and emotional health (Phelan et al., 2010). Taken together, these accumulated risk factors help to explain “the ways that ...inequalities in health are reproduced” (Thoits, 2010, p. S44).

Life Course Frameworks

The life course paradigm, developed by Glen Elder (1995), is a useful framework for studying the origins and impacts of stress (Pearlin et al., 2005). The paradigm has four main themes: (1) human lives are embedded in and shaped by historical context; (2) individuals construct their own life course through their choices and actions, within the constraints of historical and social circumstances; (3) life domains, including work, family, and social background are intertwined; and (4) the developmental impact of a life transition is contingent on when it occurs. Stress studies conducted in the life course tradition have called attention to the importance of timing. The impact of a stressful life transition on psychological health is contingent upon the age or life course stage at which it occurred. For example, one study of the association between birth timing and women’s mental health found that women who gave birth to their first child when they were younger than average (i.e., under age 23) evidenced more depressive symptoms than non-mothers, whereas women who had their first child when they were older than age 23 evidenced fewer symptoms (Mirowsky & Ross, 2002b). Transitions that happen

“earlier” than is typical are viewed as particularly stressful because one may lack the peer support, maturity, life experience, or education essential to managing the stressor.

Similarly, the health impact of chronic and acute strains may vary based on one’s birth cohort, given that the meaning of a particular experience, such as work-family strain, may vary based on the sociohistorical context in which one was raised. For example, juggling simultaneous work-family demands (versus being a full-time parent) takes a more deleterious emotional toll on women belonging to birth cohorts who were raised to prioritize a “traditional” gendered division of labor, where women devoted their energies to raising their children rather than pursuing careers (Carr, 2002).

The life course paradigm has also been influential in underscoring the importance of childhood events and conditions for later-life health and well-being. Early studies of stress were founded on the assumption that only recent or current stressors would affect physical and mental health (Wheaton, 1999). However, empirical work now shows persuasively that childhood and adolescent experiences including parental death (Slavich, Monroe, & Gotlib, 2011), parental divorce (Amato, 2000), child abuse victimization (Slopen et al., 2010), poverty (Duncan, Ziol-Guest, & Kalil, 2010), and living in an unsafe neighborhood (Vartanian & Houser, 2010) have deleterious implications for adult health.

As discussed above, one pathway linking early adversity to adult health is cumulative disadvantage processes, where early adversity exposes one to a range of subsequent adversities and health-depleting social stressors. Yet recent studies have found that early life adversities also may trigger physiological responses that impede health in both the short- and longer-term (see Taylor, 2010 for review). Exposure to early life stress has been found to affect the body’s two major stress systems, the sympathetic nervous system and the hypothalamic pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. Sympathetic arousal leads to the secretion of hormones such as catecholamines, which may trigger stress-related changes in blood pressure and heart rate. Dysregulated HPA functioning also is linked with long-term consequences for health and functioning, including diabetes and asthma risk. Early life adversity, such as growing up in a harsh family, also has been found to affect neural functioning; each of these physiological reactions puts one at an elevated risk of multiple health problems over the life course.

The Stress Process Model

The stress process model is the most influential framework for contemporary scholars exploring stress, coping, and health (Pearlin et al., 1981), in part because it incorporates key themes of FCT, cumulative disadvantage, and life course frameworks. The model holds that most stressors are rooted in roles that link individuals to social structures and that are allocated, in part, on the basis of characteristics like age, race, and gender. Exposure to stress is not randomly distributed throughout the population, but is highly structured and reflects patterns of inequality. Additionally, the impact of a stressor on health is not universal in magnitude, and varies widely based on one’s other risk factors and resources, such as social support, self-esteem and mastery. Many of the key themes and concepts of stress research described in this chapter are derived from Pearlin’s original model (1981) and later elaborations (Pearlin, 1999). The model holds that stressors may take multiple forms (events, chronic, quotidian) and consequences may manifest in multiple ways, thus affecting a range of physical, emotional, and interpersonal outcomes.

Research Methodologies

The dominant method for studying stress, health and coping is the analysis of data from large-scale surveys, yet in recent years these data have been supplemented with biomarker, daily diary, observational, and qualitative data. Heightened interest in the use of “mixed” or “blended” methods has enabled researchers to not only document patterns, but also to explore the processes through which stress affects health, and the symbolic meanings of particular stressors.

Quantitative Research Approaches

Data Sources

Help-Seeking Samples

The data and methods available for sociological studies of stress and health have undergone important transformations over the past five decades. Early studies drew subjects from help-seeking populations, such as those seeking psychiatric treatment for grief following spousal loss (Parkes, 1965) or parents receiving counseling for themselves or their children following divorce (Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). These studies may overstate the negative impact of stress because persons with the most difficult readjustments are over-represented.

Cross-Sectional Studies

The next wave of studies relied on cross-sectional survey data, which provide a single point-in-time “snapshot” of a population. Such samples allow researchers to compare the health of persons who have versus have not experienced a particular stressor. However, cross-sectional data have important limitations. First, researchers cannot disentangle causation and selection (e.g., Goldman, 1994). *Social causation* posits that a stressor, such as divorce, causes negative outcomes such as depression. *Social selection*, by contrast, proposes that an observed difference between two subgroups may not be due to the stressor *per se*, but to differences that existed prior to the event or onset. For example, economic strains, substance use, or depression may give rise to a marital dissolution; thus, higher levels of depression among divorced persons may reflect difficulties they would have faced even in the absence of the dissolution. Second, cross-sectional data do not allow researchers to easily identify the direction of causation, or whether causation is mutual (i.e. marital strain increases depression, and vice-versa). Third, cross-sectional data do not allow researchers to document the impact of stress on health trajectories over time. Studies that focus on a single time point tend to reveal only the short-term consequences of a stressor, and fail to detect health consequences that are lagged and emerge long after the stressor has ended. This is particularly important for studying physical health consequences, as many chronic diseases have long latency periods. For example, Zhang and Hayward (2006) found that divorce increased heart attack risk in women decades after the dissolution occurred.

Longitudinal Studies

Longitudinal studies are superior in revealing causal influences, because they can better pinpoint the temporal ordering of events and experiences. Multiple data points are particularly important when exploring the consequences of stressful life events; most discrete events take time to come to fruition and often occur after a period of chronic stress (Avison & Turner, 1988). For example, job loss may occur at the end of a long period of uncertainty about one’s employer (Burgard, Brand, & House, 2009).

Longitudinal studies have limitations, however, including a high financial cost, and selective attrition (i.e., loss of particular subjects over time). The high drop-out and death rates of unhealthy persons may lead researchers to underestimate the potentially harmful health consequences of a stressor. Stress researchers should identify both the sources and possible consequences of sample attrition. More sophisticated strategies, such as weighting adjustments, imputation (Little & Schenker, 1995), and the estimation of two-stage selection models (Heckman & Singer, 1984) are effective ways to begin to address the issue of selective attrition.

Sample Surveys

Large sample surveys enable researchers to explore subgroup differences in the extent to which stress affects health, paying attention to race, gender, and SES differences in the magnitude, direction, and potential explanations for these effects (e.g., George & Lynch, 2003). Further, most sample surveys are designed to study a wide array of general topics, and include a range of health and stress measures, as well as sociodemographic and economic characteristics that might account for a spurious association between stress and health.

However, the general nature of most surveys can also be a limitation when studying specific stressors. Some stressors are so rare that even a survey with 10,000 respondents may not be sufficient for adequately powered statistical analyses. For instance, suicide rates in the United States are low, so researchers hoping to identify the effects of a spouse's suicide on survivor health may have too few cases to run meaningful analyses. General surveys also may not capture secondary stressors or contextual factors related to specific stressors. For example, surveys used to study the health implications of divorce tend not to obtain information on stressors or contextual factors specific to the transition, such as negotiating complex residential and financial relationships with ex-spouse, new spouse, and stepchildren (Carr & Springer, 2010).

Analytic Approaches

Researchers using survey data to study stress and health typically use multivariate statistical methods which allow them to build sequential, nested models that reveal the causal pathways or mediators linking stress to health. Moderation analyses, or interaction terms, allow researchers to identify the joint effects of two co-occurring stressors, or to compare the effect of a particular stressor on two different subgroups, such as men versus women.

Given the threats to causal inference described above, researchers also are using sophisticated quantitative methods to help tease out causal ordering. Structural equation models (or path analysis) allow researchers to identify mutually influential pathways. Propensity score matching, by contrast, allows researchers to adjust for selection bias. Massoglia (2008) used this method to show that the stress of imprisonment increased men's risk of infectious disease, and that these effects were not plausibly due to the myriad other stressors that preceded incarceration. Researchers interested in documenting the ways that stressors affect health trajectories over time may use latent growth curve models, which allow evaluations of the duration, course, and patterning of health symptoms. For example, Haas (2008) found that poor childhood health and disadvantaged social origins were associated with both more functional limitations among older adults at a baseline interview and accelerated increase in limitations over time.

Measurement Issues

Insights from social psychological theory and research point to limitations of past research and have driven recent advances in measurement for stress research.

Stress and Stressors

Stressful Life Events

Early measures of stressful life events relied primarily on checklists of stressful events that were weighted in terms of severity (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). Some stress researchers still rely on checklists

of events experienced in a particular time frame, and use simple counts of recent events, as they are significant predictors of disease and distress (Cohen, Janicki-Deverts, & Miller, 2007). However, event counts do not allow researchers to identify the precise pathways linking a distinctive stressor to health outcomes. The highest quality contemporary research on stressful life events relies on population-based studies that include detailed measures of physical and mental health, as well as specific stressful life events (recent life events as well as life-time traumatic events) and chronic strains. Measures of acute events often are derived from survey questions designed initially for other purposes. For instance, widowhood and divorce are obtained in marital histories, births are obtained via child rosters or fertility histories, school dropout in educational histories, and job losses captured in occupational history measures. When using such indicators of events, however, researchers must take great care to identify the number of months or years elapsed between the time at which the event occurred and the time when the health outcome is measured.

Chronic Strains

Chronic strains, like stressful life events, can be measured with inventories designed expressly to capture strain such as Wheaton's (1994) 51-item inventory of chronic strain, or from survey items designed for other purposes that capture persistent stressful experiences. Among the chronic strains measured on surveys that have been linked to health outcomes include time pressures on the job (Roxburgh, 2004), perceived job insecurity (Burgard et al., 2009), marital strain (Umberson, Williams, Powers, Liu, & Needham, 2006), intimate partner violence (Campbell, 2002), parent-child relationship strain (Greenfield & Marks, 2006), work-family conflict (Frone, 2000), caregiving (Lee, Colditz, Berkman, & Kawachi, 2003), institutional and interpersonal discrimination (Kessler et al., 1999), and financial strain (Kahn & Pearlin, 2006). Researchers have become increasingly interested in evaluating the long-term health impact of chronic early-life stressors such as child abuse (Springer, Sheridan, Kuo, & Carnes, 2007); living with a depressed parent (Repetti, Taylor, & Seeman, 2002), childhood poverty (Montez & Hayward, 2011), and parental marital strain (Amato, 2000).

Most measures of chronic strain are self-reported by study participants. However, for environmental and contextual stressors, researchers may link individual-level survey data with area- or neighborhood-level data capturing strains such as poverty (Krieger et al., 2002), crime rates (Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002), or proximity to industrial activity (Downey & Willigen, 2005). These area-level indicators are typically captured at the Census tract or neighborhood level, and are appended to an individual's survey record. For example, the proportion of persons in one's Census tract living beneath the poverty line is a powerful predictor of one's physical health (Krieger et al., 2002).

Daily Hassles

Advances in daily diary methods have contributed to a recent flourishing of research on daily hassles/strains. Contemporary methods ask respondents to report on hassles and uplifts at the end of each day (or even multiple time points each day) for a number of consecutive days or weeks. Diary methods typically have participants respond over the telephone, with personal digital assistants, or on Internet sites (Almeida, 2005). These methods are particularly useful for examining daily fluctuation in stress in relation to psychological and physical symptoms.

Stress Outcomes

The main outcomes we focus on in this chapter are mental and physical health, and health behaviors. As noted earlier, stress researchers generally agree that multiple outcome studies are superior to single

outcome studies (Aneshensel et al., 1991). This focus on multiple outcomes allows researchers to identify the distinctive health consequences of stress for particular subgroups, and pinpoint those outcomes that are *not* affected by a purported stressor. Inconsistencies across outcomes will ultimately lead to more refined theories (Thoits, 1995).

We discuss mental and physical health as separate sets of outcomes in this chapter, as most researchers tend to focus on one broad set of outcomes only, based on their expertise and training. However, the two are often mutually influential. Depression is an important pathway through which stress affects physical health; Finch and colleagues (Finch, Hummer, Kol, & Vega, 2001) found that depression is the primary mechanism through which race-based discrimination affects the symptom counts and self-rated health of Mexican Americans. Conversely, physical health problems are a consistent predictor of psychological health, reflecting pathways including physiological factors, strains of managing chronic illness, and the detrimental impact of chronic illness on the quality of life. For example, Pudrovska (2010) finds that cancer increases depression risk, in part, because it poses a challenge to one's identity and sense of control, especially for men.

Mental Health

Given that most empirical studies of health and stress draw on survey data, the mental health outcomes considered are those that can be easily and accurately measured using self- or telephone-administered (rather than clinician-administered) instruments. The most commonly studied outcome is depressive symptoms, typically measured with the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression (CES-D) scale (Radloff, 1977). Major depressive disorder (MDD) also is commonly studied, using measures such as the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI, Robins et al., 1989). Other psychological outcomes include positive and negative affect (e.g., PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and anxiety (e.g., Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Studies of bereavement also focus on symptoms of grief and loss-related distress.

Most measures evaluate symptoms that one has experienced in the past week or month, and require one to make an aggregated assessment of their feelings during that time period. However, scholars of well-being have recently called for heightened attention to an alternative measure: experienced well-being, or the momentary reports of how one is feeling. Recent studies suggest that a more immediate and momentary measure of well-being that assesses one's mood or level of physical pain during a randomly selected time period in the day prior to interview provides a more accurate snapshot of immediate stress response, and one that is not subject to recall bias (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Steptoe & Wardle, 2011).

A persistent debate in stress research is whether outcomes are best treated as dichotomies, indicating the presence or absence of a clinical condition, such as MDD, or as continuous measures such as number of depressive symptoms experienced in the past week (Horwitz, 2002). Dichotomous outcomes are consistent with clinical practice, where treatment and reimbursement are based on formal diagnosis (Horwitz, 2002; Kessler, 2002). However, most social psychologists emphasize that stress outcomes should be conceptualized and measured more broadly, as both continua and discrete categories. Studies focusing only on dichotomous outcomes, may underestimate the health consequences of a stressor; distressed individuals who barely fail to meet the criteria for the diagnosis are disregarded (Mirowsky & Ross, 2002a).

A focus on psychological disorder also precludes attention to positive mental health. Ryff and Singer (2001) observe that persons who score very low on indicators of positive psychological adjustment, such as positive mood, may find themselves at an elevated risk of MDD if confronted with additional stressors. Although, on average, stress undermines mental and physical health, emerging research on "post-traumatic growth" also suggests that, for certain individuals in certain social contexts, stressors may give rise to positive mental health especially personal growth, as individuals

recognize that they can survive and thrive in the face of difficulties (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). However, these effects typically are not evidenced until significant time has elapsed since the stressful period. For example, Carr (2004) found that widows who had been most dependent on their spouses during marriage evidenced the greatest increases in self-esteem and personal growth postloss.

Physical Health

Most studies of stress and physical health focus on general outcomes such as self-rated health, number of current illnesses or health symptoms, and all-cause mortality. General outcomes are used because they are widely available in population-based studies and are appropriate for studying all age groups and both genders. Specific health conditions also may not have a sufficiently high prevalence rate in a particular survey to allow multivariate analyses. Among the most commonly used specific health outcomes are heart disease, high blood pressure, and other health outcomes that are plausibly linked to stress and are sufficiently high prevalence to allow multivariate analyses.

A promising research avenue is the investigation of physiological pathways through which stress “gets under our skin,” with particular attention to cardiovascular, endocrine, immune, metabolic, and sympathetic nervous systems (Ryff & Singer, 2001, p. 214). Laboratory-based studies of marital strain consistently show that stressful conflict can impair immune response, slow wound healing, heighten susceptibility to infectious agents, increase cardiovascular reactivity, and ultimately compromise physical health (Robles & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2003). Although this research historically was confined to the laboratory and conducted by psychologically-oriented social psychologists, the collection of biomarker data in large-scale surveys now enables SSP-oriented researchers to explore physiological pathways. Recent work also shows how this stress process begins in childhood and has cumulative physiological effects over the life course (Repetti, Robles, & Reynolds, 2011).

Several large representative sample surveys of adolescents (e.g., Add Health) and adults (e.g., Midlife in the United States [MIDUS]) have supplemented self-reported health data with biomarker measures. Studies based on the MIDUS show that exposure to stressors including child abuse (Slopen et al., 2010), discrimination (Friedman, Williams, Singer, & Ryff, 2009), and marital strain (Whisman & Sbarra, 2012) elevate one’s inflammation levels at midlife; inflammation is a well-documented correlate of cardiovascular disease and cancer. Stress researchers also have expanded their foci to include cellular aging; both current stressors as well as those dating back to prenatal conditions may speed up cellular aging, operationalized as shortened telomere length. More rapid cellular aging has been detected among young-adult children of mothers who were exposed to psychological trauma during pregnancy (Entringer et al., 2011) and persons who anticipate stressful events in the near future (O’Donovan et al., 2012).

Health Behaviors

Health behaviors, including smoking, drinking, exercise, and sleep are important stress outcomes in their own right, and also are a critical pathway linking stress to physical and mental health outcomes. Health behaviors vary widely by gender, race, and SES, and as such, are an important mechanism in understanding subgroup differences in health (see Schoenborn & Adams, 2010 for review). In general, persons with lower levels of education and income are more likely than their higher SES counterparts to smoke and engage in problematic drinking, and are less likely to maintain healthy diets, exercise regularly, and maintain a healthy body weight. Women are less likely than men to smoke and drink have, although these gender gaps have narrowed among recent cohorts. Women typically are at greater risk for overweight and obesity compared to men, however. African American adults have smoking rates similar to whites, yet engage in less frequent exercise and are at greater risk

of obesity, especially African American women (Schoenborn & Adams). Race differences in alcohol use are complex, however; a higher percentage of African American and Latino adults abstain from alcohol use but also a higher percentage among those who drink are heavy drinkers, relative to whites (Galvan & Caetano, 2003).

Recent work merges stress and life course perspectives to demonstrate how stress influences a range of health behaviors, depending on one's life course stage. For example, stress contributes to weight gain for adults under age 55 but to weight loss for older adults (Umberson, Liu, & Reczek, 2008). Stress exposure has been associated with unhealthy diets (Ng & Jeffery, 2003), smoking (Steptoe, Wardle, Pollard, Canaan, & Davies, 1996), alcohol consumption (Steptoe et al., 1996), physical inactivity (Ng & Jeffery), and poor sleep quality (Burgard & Ailshire, 2009). Some health behaviors reflect coping strategies; overeating, smoking, and drinking may alleviate psychological/physiological arousal and regulate mood state, at least temporarily (Kassel, Stroud, & Paronis, 2003). Health behaviors, in turn, are associated with negative health outcomes, including heart disease, depression and cancer. Recent work also emphasizes that stress affects health behavior of children and adolescents, contributing to cumulative disadvantage in health over the life course (Repetti et al., 2011).

Coping Resources

Social psychological studies of stress and health have been strongly influenced by the stress process model (Pearlin et al., 1981), and focus on two main resources: social support, and a sense of mastery or perceived control over one's environment. Analytically, coping resources usually are treated as either a mediator of the impact of stress on health, or a moderator that "buffers" against its health-depleting effects (Pearlin et al.). However, researchers also acknowledge that coping may affect stress; coping resources may prevent a stressor from occurring in the first place or from spiraling out into secondary stressors (Wheaton, 1999).

Diverse measures are used to capture social support and mastery. Social support refers to the functions performed for an individual by significant others, including family, friends, and colleagues. The types of support provided may be instrumental (e.g., financial), emotional (e.g., listening to one's problems), or informational (e.g., providing advice). Early studies focused on structural aspects of potential support, such as the number of persons in one's social network. Most research concurs, however, that subjective aspects of social support are more protective than simple counts of significant others (Wethington & Kessler, 1986), although the two are highly correlated (House & Kahn, 1985). A very simple measure, asking whether one has a person with whom one can share their private thoughts has proven to be a powerful predictor of health (Cohen & Wills, 1985).

Multi-item scales capturing positive and negative relationship characteristics also are widely used (Rook, 1998). Positive aspects include feeling loved and understood, and negative aspects include criticism and conflict (e.g., Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support, MSPSS, Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988). "Ambivalence," which refers to having both positive and negative sentiments toward a single person or relationship also carries health implications (Pillemer & Sutor, 2008).

An equally important coping resource is a sense of mastery, or control over one's environment. An early measure, locus of control, captured one's attributions for the events in his or her life (Rotter, 1966). An individual could attribute a personal experience to his/her own actions or characteristics (internal) or to situational factors (external). More recent measures capture different types of control beliefs, such as the personal ability to control the events and experiences of one's life (personal control or self-efficacy). Commonly used measures of self-efficacy include Ryff's (1989) environmental mastery and Bandura's (1977) self-efficacy.

Qualitative Research Approaches

Studies based on population-level data have clearly established that stress has measurable effects on individuals in the general population, identified the psychosocial factors that protect and exacerbate the effects of stress on health, and revealed group differences (e.g., SES, gender, and race) in exposure to stress. However, quantitative methods are limited in their ability to reveal the underlying psychosocial processes and symbolic meanings linking stress to health. Qualitative methods are designed to directly study these processes and meanings. Qualitative methods involve in-depth intensive study of specific cases, in contrast to quantitative methods which require a large number of cases to generate links between variables. Qualitative methods are particularly important when social scientists are breaking new ground and when studying difficult-to-reach populations (Ragin, Nagel, & White, 2004).

The most commonly used qualitative approach in stress research is in-depth interview methods. Researchers identify issues of process and meaning to be addressed and recruit individuals for in-depth analysis. Qualitative methods then provide data to analyze the meanings and processes through which specific stressors shape mental and physical health as well as health behavior. For example, in-depth interviews and observations have been used to identify the specific nature and consequences of workplace stressors (Peterson et al., 2010).

Blended-Method Approaches

While quantitative and qualitative studies provide independent contributions to the study of stress and health, blended methods are particularly fruitful for investigating stress/health linkages. Quantitative and qualitative data have distinctive strengths than can build on one another (and partly address the limitations of each strategy) to provide a more complete understanding of social psychological processes (Axinn & Pearce, 2006). For example, Umberson (2003) presents quantitative results from a national longitudinal survey to show that the death of a parent in adulthood is associated with a significant decline in health over time. Qualitative data from in-depth interviews with recently bereaved adult children then reveal psychosocial processes that occur following the death and how those processes influence health habits that affect health outcomes. The qualitative analysis shows that adult children strongly identify with their deceased parent; the death of a parent leads adult children to become more aware of their own mortality and improve their health habits in an effort to live longer and in better health.

Used in tandem, qualitative methods can reveal psychosocial processes that account for the patterns revealed in population level data and, in turn, quantitative approaches can be used to document these processes at the population level. Qualitative findings also may generate new questions that can be addressed at the population level and suggest specific measures that should be included in future quantitative data collections (Ragin et al., 2004). Ideally, blended methods investigations should move back and forth between quantitative and qualitative strategies so that the result is a richly nuanced understanding of how structure and meaning coalesce to explain the impact of stress on individuals (Axinn & Pearce, 2006; Pearlin, 1999). While we have emphasized the blending of population level analyses with in-depth interview analyses, other strategies also are fruitful. For example, qualitative data might reveal psychosocial processes linking relationship stress to health habits. Daily diary methods could then provide a quantitative assessment to reveal how those psychosocial processes unfold in daily interactions with others.

Future Directions

We propose four avenues that we believe are fruitful areas for future research on the social psychology of stress and health: heterogeneity in the impact of minority stress; consideration of dyad, family, and network-level appraisals of stress; use of multiple outcomes and measurement modes; and attention to genetic moderators of the stress-health relationship.

Heterogeneity and Minority Stress

Researchers of stress and health have made tremendous strides in identifying the distinctive stressors, coping resources, and stress outcomes experienced by members of minority groups, broadly defined. We encourage the continued exploration of sources of heterogeneity even within specific subgroups. The concept of “minority stress” holds that members of minority groups, whether due to race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation face stigma, discrimination, and prejudice, and these processes create a hostile and stressful environment that can elevate one’s risk of mental and physical health problems (Williams, Yu, Jackson, & Anderson, 1997). However, some studies suggest that some members of minority groups are resilient in the face of stress. For instance, lower rates of depression and other mental health symptoms have been observed among African Americans relative to whites.

This advantage has been attributed to a range of explanations including measurement issues, such as Blacks’ tendency to respond to somatic versus affective items in standard depression scales, and the protective resources enjoyed by African Americans including religious coping and reliance on extensive support networks including friends and “fictive kin” (Williams et al., 1997). However, recent work also suggests that Blacks may be more likely to respond to stress with risky health behaviors that reduce psychological distress in the short-run even while contributing to poorer health in the long-run (Jackson, Knight, & Rafferty, 2010). Future studies should delve more fully into the distinctive risk factors and psychosocial resources of populations historically subject to “minority stress”, including immigrants, gays, lesbians and bisexuals, and obese individuals who may be subject to stigma and discrimination. Future studies should use longitudinal data to document the short- and longer-term consequences of minority stress, and should focus on multiple outcomes to pinpoint the precise ways that minority stress affects the well-being of distinctive subgroups.

Moving Beyond the Individual

Many of the most commonly studied stressors, such as family transitions, relationship strains, poverty, and environmental strains, occur at the dyadic, family, or social network level. However, one of the most ironic limitations of studies on “social” stressors and health is that most focus on *one individual* within the larger social network. This limitation is due, in part, to traditional modes of data collection where one person reports on his or her own union and parental statuses, relationship quality, and self-rated health as well as the health of one’s spouse or a randomly selected child. Although studies based on such data are immensely valuable in documenting associations and causal pathways, they fail to capture the complexities of social life – including the possibility that two romantic partners, siblings, co-parents, coworkers, or neighbors experience their social context (and its health consequences) in starkly different ways.

Dyadic data analysis allows researchers to use data from multiple reporters, such as husbands’ and wives’ reports of marital strain, to estimate how much each person’s outcome is associated with both

own and partner characteristics. This approach enables researchers to explore how both spouses' reports of marital conflict are associated with each spouse's health outcomes (Heffner et al., 2006; Sandberg, Harper, Miller, Robila, & Davey, 2009), for example. We suspect that these pathbreaking studies and methods will set the stage for more nuanced studies of social stressors, their impact, and potential proliferation.

Reconciling Multiple Outcomes and Methods

Considering multiple stress outcomes is an essential step to understanding the health impacts of stress (e.g., Aneshensel et al., 1991); however, we urge researchers to also consider diverse modes of measuring these outcomes, including biomarker and self-reported measures of physical health, as well as general/aggregated versus momentary measures of psychological health. We also encourage researchers to expand their analyses of general health measures (e.g., all-cause mortality, self-rated health) to include specific and high-prevalence outcomes, such as specific health behaviors, risk of heart disease, high blood pressure other relatively common conditions that can be studied at the population level.

Current research on cardiovascular disease provides an exemplar of how knowledge is successfully accumulated across measures and methods. Survey data reveal that divorced persons are more likely than their married peers to die from heart attacks and have a poorer likelihood of recovery after receiving a diagnosis of cardiovascular disease (e.g., Idler, Boulifard, & Contrada, 2012). Laboratory and biomarker studies show that persistent high quality emotional and instrumental support both reduce risk of a coronary event and facilitate recovery (Robles & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2003). Small-scale qualitative studies have identified modifiable factors such as spouse and patient strains and fears that are associated with poor recovery from a coronary event (e.g., Santavirta, Kettunen, & Solovieva, 2001). This kind of cumulative knowledge building, through the use of multiple data sources and methods sets an example for future studies of stress and its influence on the etiology, onset and progression of mental and physical health conditions.

Gene-Environment Influences

Researchers have long attempted to understand the relative contributions of genetic versus social influences on health. In the last decade, however, scientific knowledge and available data have become sufficiently sophisticated to accurately identify specific gene/environment interactions that affect health. One line of research builds on early sibling studies, but uses new data sources (e.g., survey data on adopted, biological, and twin siblings) and modeling techniques (fixed- and random-effects models) to assess the distinct contributions of genetic factors and shared social stressors on health outcomes (Pudrovska, 2008).

A highly promising development is the identification of specific genetic polymorphisms (i.e., genetic variations that produce different outcomes within the same species) that affect health risks both directly and in conjunction with stress. For example, Caspi and colleagues (2003) found that a specific polymorphism in the promoter region of the serotonin transporter (5-HTT) gene moderated the influence of stressful events on young adults' depression and suicidality. These provocative findings suggest that a genetic predisposition may heighten or suppress the health impact of a stressor, and conversely, a stressor may enhance or suppress the effect of a genetic propensity on one's health. Future research may reveal both those individuals at greatest genetic risk of health problems, and the stress processes that exacerbate (or protect against) these risks. Despite the potential of behavioral

genetics research to uncover pathways linking stress and health, we caution researchers to carefully assess the policy implications of this work. Studies revealing that a particular subgroup has a genetic predisposition for a particular mental or physical health condition raises the potential for stigmatization of individuals who belong to that group (Duffy, 2000). In the worst case scenario, genetic explanations might be used to support racial, gender, and other stereotypes regarding the superiority or inferiority of specific subpopulations.

Taken together, research in these four realms will help to clarify why, how, for whom, for which outcomes, and for which types of stressors stress affects health. Ultimately, social psychological research on stress and health has high potential to identify potentially modifiable factors, and to generate policies and practices to minimize persistent social inequalities in health.

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Part V
The Person in Sociocultural Context

Chapter 17

Social Psychology of Gender and Race

Daniel G. Renfrow and Judith A. Howard

This edition of the *Handbook of Social Psychology*, like its 2003 predecessor, is organized by theory and levels of analysis, rather than by substantive themes. The earlier volume did not include chapters on specific structural or cultural systems. For this volume, in contrast, we have been asked to write a chapter on gender and race and to address how these systems are theorized by and influence social psychology. We begin by discussing this specific inclusion of structural/cultural systems, and then ask: why gender, and why race?

Although social psychology is typically defined as the study of the relationship between individuals and society, how “society” is treated varies considerably across theories, methods, and empirical applications. Sociological social psychologists tend to be sensitive to the power of social structures, institutions, and organizations. They (we) attend to the dynamics of key social structures and their historical and sociopolitical contexts, and how these shape interpersonal and intra-individual experiences.

Social categorization is core to understanding a social psychology of social structures. The process of social categorization is a principle of social cognition. Human cognitive capacities are limited; we often need to streamline information to manage the demands of everyday interaction. Categorization is one mechanism for organizing, saving, and retrieving information. There are vulnerabilities, however. Categorization is a reduction of information; potentially valuable information is lost. Equally significant, categorization seems always to be accompanied by differential evaluation. Some categories are evaluated as better, others as worse. Gender and race are two central systems of social categorization. Both systems are associated with powerful mechanisms for the allocation of resources, both material and symbolic, and therefore both are core to understanding contemporary societal inequalities.

One could well imagine both greater attention to each system (e.g., separate chapters) as well as more attention to other prevailing systems of social categorization in a *Handbook* such as this. There is an enormous amount of social psychological research on both gender and race. The scope of this work has mirrored the significance of these systems in society more generally, with considerable growth of work on gender generated by the feminist movement and considerable growth of work on race generated by the civil rights movement. That said, there are also major differences in how each research tradition has fared over the past 60 years since the civil rights movement began; we trace

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those differences in a subsequent section of the chapter. Treating both systems together in a single chapter highlights the intersections between them, reflecting that societal inequalities do not exist in separate vacuums but almost always work together, sometimes to deepen, sometimes to lessen, inequalities.

Other key systems of social categorization have not received as much social psychological attention. To the extent that theory and research (and space) allow, we include those systems in this chapter. We also speculate about why there is differential attention to gender, especially, with somewhat less on race and dramatically less on socioeconomic systems, which arguably are just as influential to social psychological and sociological dynamics and inequalities. Age, nationality, religion, physical and mental abilities, sexuality, all are used as bases for categorization and the allocation of resources. Importantly, our review reflects a western/northern hegemony of social psychology. Other cultures have developed other principles for categorization and differential allocation of resources. The caste system in India and the hukou system in China are both guided by similar principles, but use different criteria for categorization. We do not address all of these, but rather highlight the social psychological principles and processes that explicate these patterns and hope that the reader herself will pursue these lines of research. Importantly, because categorization may be unavoidable, it is critical to explore how its principles could be harnessed to undermine the parallel processes of differential evaluation and differential allocation of resources.

The chapter is organized in terms of definitions, theories, methodologies, and future directions. We offer specific definitions of the key concepts: gender, race, and intersectionality. The definitions of these terms may seem self-evident, but a closer look suggests otherwise. We also take up other significant social structural and/or cultural systems that organize inequalities. We then turn to an overview of four approaches that have organized extant approaches to gender and to race; this overview is organized historically, as approaches have emerged, dominated, and, in some cases, waned. In the second major section we review how three key social psychological theories – social exchange, social cognition, and symbolic interaction – have addressed gender, race, and intersectionality. We highlight where there is overlap and where there are incompatibilities. In the third section we address key methodological themes: what methodological techniques have been prominent in social psychology generally and how these methods have been used to address dynamics of gender and race. We explore also how reliance on these methods may advance and/or constrain the kinds of questions about gender and race that can or cannot be asked and explored. In the final section, we locate the research on gender and race in current and possible future trends shaping the field of social psychology. Here we address the continuing schism between sociological and psychological social psychologies, and the rise of public sociology and positive psychology. We also highlight a few of the themes throughout the chapter, specifically, cultural and demographic shifts in these systems, the continuing destabilization of these very categories of gender and race, and technological advances that facilitate new methodological and theoretical approaches to gender and race.

Defining Concepts

One important theme in defining gender, race, and other related constructs is the distinction between biological and social components. In the early years of social psychology, the term “sex” was often used to refer to a broad domain that included both biological and social components. In contemporary times, it is conventional to distinguish between these. The history of theorizing about biological and social aspects of race is quite different. Attribution of race to biological factors, once taken for granted, has been complicated greatly. Sociologists and social psychologists have paid much closer attention to the social factors that have created prevailing systems of race. However, developments in genome science have led to discovery of some genetic correlates of race (see Owens & King, 1999; Schwartz, 2001). The contemporary challenge for social and natural scientists is to identify the intersections and mutual influences among these social and biological factors.

Defining Gender

Sex

Sex typically refers to biological characteristics that distinguish females and males: chromosomes, reproductive characteristics, physiological features. For much of human history, sex has been assumed to be both dichotomous and unchangeable, a conviction that has the characteristic of an “incorrigible proposition” (Mehan & Wood, 1975). In interactional practice, individuals assess the sex of others indirectly, through observation of the size and shapes of their bodies, how they move, what they wear, the tone of their voices, e.g. through self-presentations. The sex to which we assign someone is, then, a *sex category*.

In recent history there has been considerable challenge both to the dichotomous nature of sex and to the immutability of sex. A meta-analysis of the medical literature from 1955 to the new millennium estimates that in as many as 2 % of live births the child is born with reproductive organs, chromosomal structures, and/or secondary sex characteristics that are not uniformly female or uniformly male (Blackless et al., 2000). In earlier days such individuals were typically treated socially as one consistent sex, with discrepancies ignored, hidden, or altered, as possible. Today there is more widespread recognition of the existence of such discrepancies, e.g., the treatment of Caster Semenya by the IAAF, the governing body of track and field competition (Clarey, 2010; Yaniv, 2009). (Semenya is a South African middle-distance runner. After she won the 2009 World Championship in the 800 m with a dramatic performance improvement, the IAAF asked her to undergo a medical examination to determine her biological sex and initially suspended her eligibility for international competition.)

Intersexuality (the presence in one person of physical features that are typical of both female and male) challenges the dichotomy of sex; *transsexuality* (identification with a gender inconsistent with one’s assigned sex) challenges the immutability of sex. Transsexuals change their sex, either physiologically through surgical and hormonal techniques, and/or socially, through altering their self-presentations. Sex change suggests that sex is mutable. There are variations in this conviction among transsexual communities, however. In that transsexuals have the genetic structure of one sex and the self-presentation (and sometimes physiological) appearance of another, they challenge the assumed dichotomy of two distinct sexes.

Gender

Gender is typically defined as the social and cultural behaviors and characteristics associated with, but not determined by, biological sex. The most comprehensive approach is that gender is itself a social structure, a social system that creates the two categories associated with sex and the differential allocation of resources typically associated with gender. Regardless of whether one endorses this strong view, it is certainly the case that gender is learned, performed and institutionalized, as we detail below.

There are other gender-related concepts of particular relevance to social psychologists: gender identity, gender stereotype, and gender role. *Gender identity* refers to one’s internal sense of gender, e.g., to one’s self as female, male, or some combination, or neither (in contrast to the terms typically used to categorize sex: woman, man). Gender identity is not necessarily congruent with assigned sex, as our discussion of transsexuality indicates. These incongruities typically cause sufficient anguish that transsexuals change their gender performance and sometimes also their physiological characteristics. The anguish, of course, is an indication of the core role that gender plays in interactional smoothness. Were gender not so core, there would be less reason for anguish (Garfinkel, 1967; although see also Connell, 2009).

Gender stereotypes, like all stereotypes, are generalizations about individuals in particular social categories, in this case, female and male. These generalizations provide the information necessary for

satisfactory gender performance. Gender stereotypes are the beliefs about normative female and male behavior, dress, speech style, interactional style, and societal positions.

Gender roles, although often treated as distinct in the literature on gender, are really a subset of gender stereotypes. The concept of role derives from a functionalist view of society in which social behavior functions most effectively when different actors perform different, non-overlapping and presumably complementary roles. Gender roles include behavioral expectations for females and males. There is a substantial history of critiques of the concept of gender role (see Stacey & Thorne, 1985 for a particularly incisive and well-known critique); the core point is that the concept ignores power and inequality. Gender roles characterize the role expectations of women and of men as neutral and complementary, but in reality they are differentiated profoundly by power. To illustrate with an iconic example, the mid-twentieth century marital roles of husband and wife were, according to Parsons (Parsons & Bales, 1955), integral to maintaining a smoothly functioning social order. From the perspective of the twenty-first century, those husbands and wives were not equally empowered; rather, marital roles served to maintain patriarchal structures. For our purposes, we can view gender roles as the behavioral correlate of cognitive gender stereotypes, and extend the critique of roles to the concept of stereotypes. Gender stereotypes also support gender inequality through legitimizing distinctions that reverberate throughout societal institutions.

With each of these concepts, it is important to note that there are always situated, contextual factors that qualify normative expectations of gender and sex. Gender identity, for example, is not necessarily experienced by everyone. Bem's (1974) early work on *androgyny*, stresses that in addition to stereotypic patterns whereby men are masculine and not feminine, and women are feminine and not masculine, individuals may be high on both masculinity and femininity, e.g., androgynous, or they may lack a sense of either masculinity or femininity. Gender itself may not be an important part of a given individual's sense of self. The salience of gender identity also varies markedly across social contexts. Same gender vs. mixed gender groups affect the salience of gender identity (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Turner & Brown, 2007). Group identity is typically more salient for those in any subordinate social category, a point relevant to both gender and racial identities (Hollander, Renfrow, & Howard, 2011). Similarly, gender stereotypes vary by subtypes within gender, such as those defined by race (Devine & Baker, 1991; Green & Manzi, 2002), class (Lott & Saxon, 2002), or sexuality (Geiger, Harwood, & Hummert, 2006). These variations do not typically lead to modifications in the belief in a dichotomy of gender.

Sexuality

Sexuality is distinct from gender, but the cultural association between gender and sex means that people often infer sexuality from sex category and the gender assumed to accompany sex category. *Sexual orientation*, the preferred sex of sexual partner, is a component of sexuality, but sexuality is by no means reducible to sexual orientation. *Sexuality* refers to sexual behavior, eroticism, sexual orientation, and one's overall inclination to engage in sexual activity (Hollander et al., 2011). Gender stereotypes include expectations for gendered expressions of sexuality, as they do for other forms of gendered behavior. There are cultural variations in these expectations but as with gender, there is an underlying dichotomization to gendered expectations about sexual behavior.

Sexual orientation, although just one component of sexuality, is a critical, indeed some might say, core, component. Like gender, sexual orientation is stereotyped as dichotomous: preference for opposite-sex or same-sex partners. But like gender, sexual orientation can be considerably more varied and fluid than a dichotomy would suggest (Rosenthal, Sylva, Safron, & Bailey, 2011; Rutter & Schwartz, 2011). Individuals may be *bisexual*, attracted to and/or sexually active with same-sex and opposite-sex partners (Rust, 2000) or *asexual*, not attracted to and/or sexually active with others (Bogaert, 2012). Moreover, Diamond's (2008) study of love, desire, and identity among women finds considerable

intra-individual fluidity in each construct over the life course. However, sexual orientation is heavily freighted with assumptions of normality, with opposite-sex preferences being normative. Historical context matters: in contemporary times there has been a pronounced shift toward general acceptance of same-sex partnering (at least at the level of civil rights), particularly in the western/northern world (Saad, 2007). Sexual orientation is also highly gendered. Stereotypes about sexuality, both opposite-sex and same-sex, are deeply imbricated with gender. Heterosexuality entails stereotypic femininity for women, stereotypic masculinity for men. Following the logic of dichotomy, same-sex female (or male) couples are often assumed to include one masculine-type partner and one feminine-type partner.

Questions of the etiology of sexual orientation are not the purpose of this chapter. The key point for social psychologists is that the meaning of sexual orientation is socially constructed (see below). Same-sex practices, and their prevalence and social meaning, vary considerably across cultures.

Defining Race and Ethnicity

Race is another key dimension of social categorization, stereotypically based on visible physical characteristics, primarily skin color, body size (weight, height, build), and other physical features. Race is often discussed together with *ethnicity*; the latter is a less physiologically based concept, referring to people who share a common culture and background. Race is often assumed to be a biological characteristic inherited through biological reproduction. Although there are genetic variations by racial categories, race is largely a social construction. Mayr (2002), among others, has demonstrated that there is more genetic variation within races than between them. Moreover, the physical characteristics that are associated with particular races are often more difficult to identify in practice than in theory. Some Whites have darker skin than some labeled as Black or Chicano; some Asians have lighter skin than many Whites. Nonetheless, as with gender, the science does not necessarily affect the social conception of the system.

Racial classification, unlike gender, is not dichotomous. Historically, three racial groups were identified: Caucasian, Negroid, and Oriental. The very way these terms resonate for a contemporary reader says a great deal about the politicization of racial classification. In the history of the United States, there has been and still is a particular resonance to the Black/White distinction. Members of other racial categories have commented on a degree of invisibility of other racial groups and a tendency of U.S. historians to blur these distinct histories into this particular dichotomy (Fernandez, 2007).

Unlike gender, which has been a primary categorization scheme for centuries, race only became a significant social category with the rise of the scientific revolution, presumably through the spread of colonial exploration and conquest (Marks, 1995). Also unlike gender, what groups of people have been defined by racial distinctions has varied considerably across history. At one time in U.S. history, Irish immigrants were considered to be Black. Individuals from a variety of Asian countries have been defined variously as not White, or Oriental (Espiritu, 2008). Hispanic continues to exist as a sort of hybrid classification, with Census responses for both racial classification and Hispanicity (Kilty & Vidal de Haymes, 2004). Indeed, tracing the racial and sometimes ethnic categories on the Census throughout time is itself a testament to the social construction of race (Omi & Winant, 1986). (Census categories do not necessarily represent popular conceptions of race or ethnicity, but they may be a reasonable indicator, at a temporal lag.)

Native American history highlights another aspect of racial categorization; members of this general category often think of their memberships in terms of nationality, rather than race or ethnicity. The Census treats Native Americans as a racial category, but other units of the U.S. government recognize the national sovereignty of many native groups, demonstrating the structural inconsistencies that can and do exist. Structural inconsistencies in definitions of racial categories, and temporal

and historical changes in these definitions, suggest that racial classification, like gender classification, is very real socially and politically.

Paralleling the social construction of gender, there are identifiable racial stereotypes, conceptions that themselves are historically specific. Racial stereotypes have been assessed in a rare longitudinal manner through the use of scales developed originally by Katz and Braly (1933), then administered again in 1951 and 1967, enabling an examination of historical changes in racial stereotypes (Karlin, Coffman, & Walters, 1969). Also paralleling gender, there is variation in the strength of racial identities. Rockquemore and Brunsma (2007) report considerable variation in Black/White biracial identities. Their typology ranges from exclusively White or Black, to a border identity between the two categories, to a protean identity that is contextually sensitive, and a transcendent identity that is, in some sense, raceless.

Politicization of Social Categories: Sexism, Racism, Ethnocentrism

We address in this section the ways in which different social psychological theories incorporate (or not) gender and race into their frameworks. For at least most of these theories, there is some degree of recognition of political bias often associated with categories within these systems, that is, various forms of derogation directed toward members of subordinate categories – women, people of color, disenfranchised ethnicities. Sexism, racism, ethnocentrism are social psychological phenomena, enacted through cognitive, interactional, and structural processes. There has also been some backlash, with members of majority categories sometimes asserting a reverse sexism (toward men), reverse racism (toward Whites), and/or reverse ethnocentrism (toward, say, Anglos). It is certainly the case that any human being learns biases as a part of the cultures and societies in which we are raised and live. Women can be sexist; people of color can be racist. Indeed, one might argue that any member of contemporary U.S. society is sexist, racist, and ethnocentric, also able-ist, age-ist, and so forth, because it would be virtually impossible not to be. Social power relations structure how these biases are expressed and what influences they may or may not have. But individuals have agency; they – we – can actively become conscious of and work against such prejudicial stereotypes and identities (Devine, 1989).

It is a social psychological truism that names and language matter. As Richards (1997) notes, because language provides the terms in which we understand the social world, language is also a key arena in which attempts to alter those understandings are fought. The terms used to describe the social systems we focus on in this chapter have at times been the focus of intense struggles. We attempt to use the terms preferred by the people and groups to which they refer, where that is ascertainable. It is important to note, however, that there is often considerable slippage. “White” is a misnomer, but “Caucasian” is no better. “Black” has different connotations in the U.S. than in, for example, Brazil. “Straight” meant something quite different in the 1950s than it does now. We simply ask the reader to be aware of the insufficiencies of language.

Intersections of Gender and Race

In labeling the two previous sections “[Defining gender](#)” and “[Defining race and ethnicity](#),” we do violence to the lived reality of these systems. Neither gender nor race can be adequately understood without analyzing their intersections with each other and with other social positions. Thus much sociological scholarship argues that various forms of stratification need to be conceptualized as matrices of domination (Collins, 1990) or “complex inequality” (McCall, 2005). We use the term

“intersectional” (Crenshaw, 1991) as shorthand for this complexity. (See special issue of *Gender & Society*, 2012 for extended discussion of intersectionality.) Not all social psychological theories focus explicitly on power and/or inequality; therefore, when we turn to specific theories, we see varying degrees of emphasis on gender and race, and also on intersectionality.

“Intersectionality” carries several important connotations. The term can imply the importance of including the perspectives of multiply-marginalized people; a shift from the addition of multiple independent strands of inequality toward a multiplicative analytic, e.g., shifting from a focus on main effects to a focus on interactions; and modeling multiple institutions as overlapping in their production of inequalities (Choo & Ferree, 2010). Empirically, research with this degree of complexity can be extremely challenging. As McCall (2005) notes, multi-group studies must analyze the intersections of the full set of dimensions of multiple categories; if we take a relatively straightforward profile of two categories of gender, three categories of race, three categories of socioeconomic position, we already have 18 different configurations. We discuss these methodological challenges below.

In addition to race and gender, other particularly significant status systems that have been incorporated to some extent in social psychological research include socioeconomic status (social class), sexual orientation, (dis)ability, age, national origin, and religion. Socioeconomic status is particularly significant, but in some ways it is also particularly difficult as a research concept. There can be considerable mismatch between objective and subjective definitions (Bettie, 2003). Many studies indicate that far more people identify themselves as middle class than economic data would suggest (Pressman, 2007; for a real-world example, see Achen, 2011). A further complication is that socioeconomic position is an almost “unspeakable” concept in the U.S. (Hollander et al., 2011). Class variation clearly exists, but talk about class is not normative. This may be related to a distinction between ascribed and achieved social statuses. Race and gender are both traditionally considered to be ascribed statuses, consistent with the view that both are fixed and permanent. The individualism characteristic of the U.S. and other western societies leads to the conviction that social class is an achieved characteristic; that is, any individual can achieve a socioeconomic position to which s/he aspires, through hard work and their own skills. Yet, as is perhaps painfully evident in the larger economic profile of the recession era of the 2008 period forward, socioeconomic standing cannot meaningfully be considered a purely achieved status. Current and historical family circumstances, structural factors, historical societal circumstances, all affect socioeconomic possibilities. Likely for all of these reasons, there is considerably less social psychological research on social class than on gender and race, and less work on the intersections among gender, race, and class, than on intersections between gender and race.

We offer a few examples here to illustrate the value of an intersectional approach. We begin with some examples of intersections in cognition. In defining gender stereotypes, we noted that subtypes exist within any given set of stereotypes. Stereotypes about women and men vary by race, class, sexuality, and various indicators of social locations. Landrine (1985) found that middle-class White students rated White women as more dependent, emotional, and passive than Black women, and rated poorer women as more dirty, hostile, inconsiderate, and irresponsible than wealthier women. Note that both the social characteristics of the observed and of the observer are critical. It is much more common for researchers to document the characteristics of the observed, than of those whose perceptions are measured.

Gender and race intersections may have greater significance for those in subordinate categories. Settles’ (2006) mixed-method study explored Black women’s gender and racial identities and reported that the combined “Black woman” identity is more important to women of color than either “woman” or “Black” alone. Context is critical as well. Bell (2002) considered identities of Black women across different types of institutions – White coed, Black coed, and Black women’s colleges – finding that their gender identities were stronger at Black coed schools and their combined race and gender identities were stronger at White coed schools. The identity or combination of identities that separate one from the dominant group become more central to one’s sense of self in that context.

Other examples of intersections of gender and race derive from interactional perspectives. Pate (2006) shows that “acknowledgment rituals” such as the nod of a head to strangers in public are much more frequent among African American men than among African American women or members of other racial groups. Pate suggests that this pattern reflects the unspoken need for support among this markedly visible racial and gender group, a disproportionate target of racial discrimination.

Conceptions of Gender and Race in Social Psychology

There are historical variations in the recognition of the importance of gender and race. Research on gender, although present to some degree in the early years of social psychology, began to increase markedly in the 1970s and has remained robust to the present day. During these years researchers began to attend to gender-based inequalities, not only to gender difference. The growth in social psychological research on gender coincided with the active feminist movement of the 1970s; it seems reasonable to assume at least some effect of the broader political environment on academic pursuits. Moreover, more women began to earn PhDs – currently one-third of the doctorates in Sociology (Spalter-Roth & Scelza, 2008) and two-thirds of the doctorates in Psychology (Keita, Cameron, & Burrwell, 2006) are earned by women.

Social psychological research on race also intensified during the 1970s, again presumably at least in part due to the civil rights movement. This activity has declined since then, continuing with emphases primarily on attitudes, stereotypes, and other cognitive structures and processes. The marked difference (from gender) is in the demographic profile of the disciplines. In contrast to the ever increasing presence of women scholars in sociology and psychology (now a majority in both disciplines), only a very small proportion (lower than overall population proportions) of the membership in either discipline includes people of color. Moreover, over the past several decades there has been a marked decline in the proportion of published articles in which African Americans are research participants. There is not a one-to-one relationship between the gender and race of the scholar and the focus of their research, but clearly these factors do influence choices of scholarly topics.

In this section we articulate a more comprehensive historical analysis of social psychological theorizing about gender and race, and other social positions where possible. We focus on four distinct theoretical orientations, approaches that mirror historical periods to at least some extent. These four orientations can be viewed as different points on a continuum that ranges from material to structural, in some sense from objective to subjective.

Essentialism

Essentialist approaches are rooted in biologism. Biology is thought to determine the social behaviors of males and females; gender is seen as something literally essential to females and males. Thus essentialism treats sex and gender as equivalent. This approach was prevalent within the social sciences more generally in the first half of the twentieth century (and earlier). Perhaps the best known social psychological manifestation of essentialist approaches to gender is the M-F Test, a tool that measured masculinity and femininity (Terman & Miles, 1936). Test items were based on the assumption that masculinity and femininity are polar opposites and that sex and gender were effectively one and the same: being male meant being masculine, being female meant being feminine, and one individual could not be both. Women and men whose scores did not support these assumptions were often viewed as having homosexual inclinations; thus sexuality too was seen as isomorphic with sex and gender.

This stark form of essentialism sounds dated, but indicators of essentialist thinking are present in contemporary work (and culture). Many studies even today use sex as a variable representing gender. Participants are categorized as females or males, but any differences that result are either labeled or attributed to gender differences. “Sex as variable” research remains common in sociology, indeed throughout the social sciences. This practice ignores critical distinctions between the two concepts. As we have noted, sex category is, for most people, constant and dichotomous. Gender, however, is expressed quite variably and depends greatly on context. Moreover there is considerable overlap between women and men on many characteristics (this is true for sex as well as for gender).

Research on race has also been driven by essentialist assumptions until relatively recently. Although it is more normative to reject essentialist beliefs about race than about gender, Herrnstein and Murray’s *The Bell Curve* (1994) argued relatively recently that racial differences in intelligence exist and are genetically determined. Although there were numerous articulate critiques of their arguments (see Devlin, Fienberg, Resnick, & Roeder, 1997), *The Bell Curve* seemed to strike a cultural chord. In the first several months after its release, 400,000 copies of the book were sold, and several thousand reviews and commentaries were written within months after its publication. Indeed, in response to the controversy the volume generated, the American Psychological Association’s Board of Scientific Affairs established a special task force to prepare an investigative report on the research.

Socialization

Socialization is a core social psychological perspective. According to this perspective, individuals learn behavior from their environments through a variety of processes, from modeling and imitation (Bandura, 1977), to the application of rewards and punishments (Cahill, 1986; Thorne, 1995), and/or through intra-psychic processes (Chodorow, 1978). Through socialization, individuals internalize various prescriptions and proscriptions associated with particular characteristics. Gender socialization is one of the most heavily studied of these forms of socialization.

What elements are learned during gender socialization? Gender stereotypes are more than description; they are also prescriptive, hence the attributions of abnormality when individuals do not conform. Gender stereotypes, whether of self or of others, include expectations about personality, bodies (see Chap. 7), occupations, and other role-related behaviors (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998). Whereas Terman and Miles’ M-F Test was an example of essentialist conceptions of personality, Sandra Bem’s Sex Role Inventory (1974) and work on androgyny (Bem, 1975, 1993) illustrate socialization of gender through their assessment of patterns of femininity and masculinity. Her scales treat masculinity and femininity as distinct dimensions, allowing for the possibility of opposition, absence of both, or presence of both (androgyny) in a given individual. The concept of androgyny was in favor for some time, but eventually fell into disuse as paying insufficient attention to power and as reproducing the very gender polarization it sought to move beyond (Pyke, 1985). More recent work has characterized these dimensions not by gender labels but rather by substance, as instrumentality and expressiveness (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998). There is substantial overlap in the distributions of each dimension within most women and men.

The prescriptive implications of gender stereotypes are instantiated in gender roles. The concept of gender roles reflects a profoundly functionalist view of society, as we have discussed above. Despite the apparent contemporary rejection of such a model, the normative power of gender is still strong. Moreover, gender prescriptions legitimize a division between public and private spheres that entrenches women’s subordination and men’s domination (Kimmel, 2006).

Socialization processes and the concept of roles do not work so well for analyzing race and class. Stacey and Thorne (1985) point to this discrepancy, noting the absence of concepts such as “class role” or “race role.” Such concepts would imply that the social order depends on the allocation of

social roles to members of different racial or socioeconomic categories, an implication few would accept. The concept of gender role does not sit as uncomfortably, which says a great deal about the underlying resilience of the functionalist argument (and of sexism).

This does not mean there are no tinges of socialization in analyses of race and class. For example, the notion of the *culture of poverty*, a theory that there is a set of values among the poor that tends to perpetuate their poverty (Lewis, 1969), is certainly present to some degree; this implicates both race and class. But, there has been considerable debate about this concept (Goode & Eames, 1996). Where socialization does seem relevant to race and to class is in the learning of racial and class prejudice by dominant group members, and acculturation to the experience of subordination by racial and socioeconomic minorities. Again, a telling contrast between literatures on race and on gender is that there is little work on how men learn to discriminate against women, and how women come to live with that. Thus, socialization, rather than systematic and structured inequalities, remains the primary explanation of gender difference. Things may be changing. One analysis of introductory sociology textbooks shows that discussions of gender increasingly emphasize both macro and meso level structures and processes, in addition to socialization (Manza & Van Schnydel, 2000). Ferree and Hall (2000) are skeptical, however; they maintain that the apparent increase in sensitivity to structural factors is overstated by Manza and Van Schnydel's conceptualization and measurement. In summary, gender is analyzed primarily in terms of socialization and difference rather than inequality, and race (and class) are analyzed more in terms of systematic and structured inequalities.

In stressing that gender is learned, not innate, socialization goes beyond essentialism. But in some ways the distinction is weak. In that gender (less obviously, race and class) differences are such a major part of what is learned, the distinction between learned and innate characteristics is almost semantic. If gender socialization is so powerful that gendered behaviors remain throughout the lifespan, then in some sense gender is still conceived as unchangeable, once learned. In moving to two other social psychological perspectives, we see more attention to situational and cross-cultural variations in gender.

Social Constructionist Approaches

Other approaches to understanding human behavior view social realities as created through human action and interpretations of those actions. Constructionism assumes that there is no inherent meaning in objects and behaviors, but rather that human beings create meaning. Social order would not be possible unless there were agreed upon meanings, so a key purpose of the rituals of social interaction is the negotiation of common interpretations of the situations in which we act.

The quintessential social constructionist analysis of gender is Garfinkel's (1967) classic case study of a transsexual named Agnes. Agnes appeared male at birth, but developed female secondary sex characteristics at puberty and subsequently had sex reassignment surgery. Garfinkel used Agnes' situation to illustrate the interactive performance of gender. Because Agnes transitioned from male to female, she went to great lengths to appear and behave in ways consistent with female gender stereotypes. Because she did not become female until her adolescent years, she had to be more intentional and self-conscious about gendering her performance than do those identified as female at birth. On the basis of his observations of her behavior, Garfinkel identified some core assumptions that define the performance of gender. The key themes are that gender is dichotomous, invariant, "natural," and that everyone has a gender. Agnes' performance, of course, suggests that these assumptions, while normative, are not accurate, but that gender is actually accomplished through everyday behavior. That is, gender is socially constructed.

Kessler and McKenna (1978) go one step further and argue that the idea of two distinct sexes is itself a social construction. As we noted in defining sex and gender, intersexuality and, to some extent,

transsexuality, do undermine this assumption of dichotomous sex. To make conceptual room for these identities and experiences, Fausto-Sterling (2000) has proposed a revised classification scheme that includes five sexes (i.e., males, females, true hermaphrodites, female pseudohermaphrodites, and male pseudohermaphrodites). Nevertheless, the cultural resilience of the dichotomous construction of sex means that we categorize intersexuals as “really” one sex or the other. Transsexuals who engage in sex reassignment surgery in some sense reaffirm this construction, altering sex to conform to gender. This would not be necessary if the socially constructed sex/gender system allowed a lack of correspondence between genitals and gender.

There has been a great deal of social psychological research on the performance of gender, conceived by West and Zimmerman (1987) as “doing gender”. Although socially performed, the ways in which gender is “done” are strongly constrained by normative definitions. Gender is such a central dimension of social identity that failures or breaches in this performance can be used to discredit other aspects of an individual’s identity. Goffman’s (1977) work on public bathrooms illustrates this point. Bathrooms, at least in the U.S., are segregated by sex. One could imagine that bathroom segregation occurs because of biological reasons, but the fact that private homes do not segregate bathrooms demonstrates that the segregation occurs for social, not biological, reasons. When individuals enter the “wrong” bathroom, they are breaching gendered norms. This does happen, most often when there is a long line at one category of bathrooms and not in the other. The breach can be repaired if the individual acts embarrassed or in other ways communicates that s/he understands the anti-normative character of the behavior. More serious, however, is when someone whose sex is not clear is identified as being of the wrong sex for the bathroom. This is the basis for advocacy for private, un-sex-identified bathrooms at public institutions (Molotch & Noren, 2010).

West and Fenstermaker (1995a) published an update to the “Doing Gender” article titled “Doing Difference.” Their goal in this article was to extend their analysis of the performativity of gender to other key systems of power with which gender intersects. In other words, they reconceptualize differences of race and class, as well as gender, as ongoing interactional accomplishments. We offer two examples that demonstrate “doing difference”; these examples also underscore the intersectionality of the “Obama moment.” President Obama’s specific configuration of cross-cutting race, gender, and social class locations enables the creation of unique, emergent identities, as well as reflects experiences of both oppression and privilege. Consider two recent events: first, public reaction to a photograph of Arizona Governor Jan Brewer pointing her finger at President Obama when she met him at the airport during his visit to her state (Hennessey, 2012). The event was a heated exchange between political opponents with divergent views on ethnic studies in public schools. It was not taken that way by the public, however, but rather as a racist confrontation: a White woman trying to put a Black man in his place. The race-sex positions of Obama and Brewer allowed observers to find meaning in this image through associations stored in our nation’s collective memory of countless acts of violence directed at men of color. Pundits framed this as unprecedented public behavior toward a sitting president; Governor Brewer framed it as a misunderstanding. Still others framed it as proof that blatant racism exists in the twenty-first century. By contrast, in a second heavily publicized situation, Obama’s location as a man of relatively “modest” means (compared to other politicians), as well as his heterosexuality and masculinity, provided him with advantage. When White police officer Sgt. James Crowley arrested African American scholar Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and ignited a nationwide controversy about claims of racial profiling, Obama was able to reduce racial tensions by inviting both men to the White House to talk it out over beers (Nicholas, 2009). “Doing gender” provided the common ground needed to eclipse racial differences. Although one status may be emphasized over others in these situations, neither situation can be reduced to the workings of only race, of only gender, or of any single social location. Understanding the social meaning of each of these performances requires an intersectional lens.

A subsequent symposium of responses to the “doing difference” article was incisive in critiquing the authors for a perceived insensitivity to social power, history, and structure (see Collins et al.,

1995). The authors' response (West & Fenstermaker, 1995b) offers points that are useful to consider in evaluating a social constructionist approach to intersections of inequalities. They point to the distinction between process and outcome. Social construction focuses on the processes whereby inequalities are, literally, done. Social structures help us identify the outcomes of unequal systems. They highlight as well the accountability to which social actors are held, accountabilities defined by these social structures. Their summary identifies one of the formidable challenges for sociological social psychologists: "The challenge we face – theoretically and empirically – is to describe a system that manifests great interactional variation *but, at the same time*, rests on far more stable structural and historical legacies... the impact of the forces of social structure and history is realized in the *unfolding of those relationships* as the sites for the doing of difference..." (Fenstermaker & West, 2002, p. 98).

Social constructionism helps to explain why, despite empirical findings that women and men are more similar than different on most characteristics, they seem to behave systematically differently. There are many examples of social psychological research that demonstrate the self-fulfilling nature of gender expectations. The stereotype that women are naturally more nurturing caregivers than men may produce men who do not feel they are capable fathers (Coltrane, 2004). A second cost of these stereotypes is that agentic and confident women working outside of the home may be viewed as self-interested and unfeminine, and therefore penalized in hiring and promotion decisions (Ridgeway, 1987; Rudman & Glick, 2001). Moreover, individuals often align their performances with what they believe others expect of them. Snyder and Skrypnik (1981) found that men and women applying for a job they believed to be either masculine or feminine emphasized personality traits that confirmed their suitability for that specific job regardless of their sex role identity.

Other studies document how racialized beliefs shape the social construction of race, that is, the self-fulfilling nature of racialized expectations. Harlow's (2003) study of Black professors finds that even though they are reluctant to point to racial difficulties in the classroom, they often encounter students who view them as less credible than White professors and who are likely to perceive mistakes and to attribute these perceived mistakes to incompetence. Conversely, race becomes an important resource affording these professors more credibility than White professors when (minority) race is central to course material. Together, the discrediting nature of blackness and the responsibility of representing an entire race forces these professors to engage in considerable emotional and physical labor (e.g., suppressing anger, setting extremely high achievement goals) to manage the racial double standard in the classroom.

The expectations held by members of a majority group shape their own behavior, in turn eliciting confirming behavior from members of minority groups. These processes can occur even without the actual application of majority expectations. Behavioral confirmation can occur simply through people's awareness of expectations others hold for them. Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999) show that the awareness that others hold a negative stereotype about one's group, can, in and of itself, interfere with behavioral performance. They also demonstrate that experimental manipulations that contradict the stereotypes can reduce this effect of stereotype threat. Cognitive and interactional strategies combine to create a social psychological system in which preconceptions about selves and others are performed and entrenched.

While the social constructionist approach is often employed by sociologists to study macro-level phenomena, social psychologists emphasize interaction and the social contexts in which behavior occurs. For example, in her study of young women at Waretown High in California's Central Valley, Bettie (2003) explores the ways that gender/race/class identity projects among the smokers, cholas, "las chicas," skaters, hicks, and preps are both performance and performative. Conceptualizing identity projects as performance, Bettie blends the notion that individuals "do difference" (West & Fenstermaker, 1995a, 1995b) with Butler's (1999) observation that identity projects are constituted by the social and cultural structures in which individuals live and by the social scripts available to them (see also Wilkins, 2008). The expectations of those with whom one interacts, differential opportunities for interaction, and differential consequences of interaction are all important elements in the

effectiveness of social construction. At the same time, there are broader aspects of society that constrain or enable the possibilities for individual actors, which brings us to our fourth approach. In focusing on gender, race, socioeconomic position, and others systems of stratification, we explicitly highlight the power of social structure.

Structural Approaches

Gender, race, social class, are all bases for the macro-level allocation of material and social resources and opportunities. At the same time, social structures are always implemented, negotiated, and sometimes redefined through individual action and interaction (Schwalbe et al., 2000). Our task as social psychologists is to consider how social structures shape the cognitive patterns and the micro-level interactional possibilities of social actors, and, in turn, how cognitive and interactional processes can ultimately alter social structures.

Indeed, it is this approach to social psychology that most distinguishes sociological social psychology from psychological social psychology. Considering gender and race forces attention to structure. If we take the processes of socialization, for example, why is it that certain behaviors are rewarded when performed by men and punished (or are at least less effective), when performed by women? If we turn to social construction, do Black actors have the same degree of behavioral choice and control as do White actors? A structural approach turns our attention to social power, to the effects of the pervasive systems of male dominance, White dominance, and other such interlocking systems. Focusing on structure and power can lead to a sense that social change is not possible. The beauty of social psychology is that it recognizes individual agency. Men, Whites, have structural advantages whether or not they desire or consciously enact them. But, as agentic individuals, they can behave self-consciously in ways that undermine those advantages and create advantages for those who do not have the same degree of access. Members of disadvantaged groups can and do also act to contradict stereotypes. As one example, Staples (1994), an African American man, reports a simple strategy he implements when he is walking after dark and encounters women in a public space: he whistles well-known tunes of classical music. This simple strategy resists the association of black men with danger (see section “[Resisting social expectations](#)” below). When social groups as a whole act collectively, social structural change is indeed possible. In this important sense, social constructionist and structural approaches are complementary and interdependent. Social structures could not persist without interactional patterns that maintain them. Those interactional patterns occur within structural constraints and possibilities. Explicit recognition of both construction and structure undermines popular assumptions that gender, or race, or class, is natural (Martin, 2004).

Social Psychological Theories

Within the sociological tradition, three primary perspectives offer varying approaches to understanding the relationship between individuals and their societal environments: social exchange theory, social cognition, and symbolic interaction. Each emphasizes a particular set of assumptions about social actors, social interaction, and society, and offers a distinct framework for analyzing complex social situations. We limit this brief review of these major social psychological theories to their treatment of gender, race, and where possible, their intersections with each other and other systems of categorization.

Social Exchange Theory

Social exchange theory is the most widely used of the three perspectives within both sociology and social psychology, possibly because its more formal analytic approach leads it to be viewed as more rigorous or scientific. This theory applies economic models to everyday decision making. For this reason, it is the theory most compatible with individualist societies. Early theorizing by Homans (1961) outlined the fundamental processes of social behavior, guided by the belief that everything that emerges in groups originates in the behavior of individuals. Blau's (1964) work departs from this assumption, arguing instead that social exchange should be concerned with group properties. Contemporary social exchange theorists attempt to specify the conditions under which exchange takes place. Thus the exchange relationship, conceptualized as a series of transactions between two or more actors, is the unit of analysis (Emerson, 1972a; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

Social exchange theory assumes that individuals pursue rewards and attempt to avoid punishments, and considers an individual's past history of rewards and punishments to be important for predicting future behavior. Exchange theory postulates that interaction takes place when it is mutually rewarding to the parties involved. The resources transferred during social exchanges may be material (e.g., money, property, etc.) or social (e.g., social approval, respect, etc.) (Blau, 1964). Social actors decide whether the exchange in question is a "good deal" or whether they can find a better deal with a different exchange partner. Based on their perceptions of available information, assessments of the costs and benefits of possible alternatives, and estimates of the probability of receiving anticipated outcomes, individuals choose the alternative they believe will be best.

According to exchange theorists, interaction occurs because of individuals' *interdependence*; each person depends on others for valued resources. An important distinction between social exchange and the other social psychological theories we discuss in this chapter is its attention to power as a central mechanism of social interaction. Following Emerson (1962), *power* is conceptualized as an actor's ability to achieve a favorable outcome at the expense of another and is a quality of a relationship, rather than of an individual. One's power over another person depends on the value of one's resources to the exchange partner, together with the availability of alternative suppliers of this resource. Thus power and dependence vary together in exchange relationships. The person who is least dependent on a relationship has the greatest power in it, because that person can more easily abandon the relationship (Homans, 1974). Power is not a static quality of a person, but a dynamic, shifting property of a relationship. Social exchange theory's explicit attention to issues of power should equip the perspective to explore societal inequalities associated with race and gender. Unfortunately this potential has not materialized.

Most research by social exchange theorists does not attend to gender, let alone race, social class, or other statuses. Studies that do include sex as an independent variable (e.g., through equal inclusion of male and female research participants) do little to move the social exchange tradition beyond "sex differences" and toward a more sophisticated conceptualization of gender. Consequently available studies offer few insights into the origins or persistence of societal inequalities. Three areas of exchange research, however, have paid more attention to gender and race than most, as we discuss in the next section.

Justice and the Distribution of Resources

The devastation wrought by natural disasters, such as Hurricane Irene and the 2011 tsunami in Japan, highlights the difficulties associated with allocating limited resources in high need situations. Resources can be distributed in a number of ways, not all of which may be seen as fair. Fairness is a subjective concept; at its root are perceptions of justice, which are strongly influenced by social norms. To be seen as just, the actual distribution of rewards (or punishments) should match individuals' expectations

about what they deserve and what they are entitled to receive. Space does not allow for a comprehensive review of the justice literature. We limit our discussion here to how gender, race, and other statuses impact preferences for resource distribution.

Eckhoff (1974) identifies five “distribution rules” that are commonly used to allocate resources among individuals or groups. First, resources can be divided equally among individuals. Second, resources can be allocated to individuals on the basis of need, such that those who have the greatest need receive the most resources. Third, an assessment can be made of the contributions each person has made to the group, and resources allocated relative to those contributions, according to the principle of equity. Fourth, resources can be allocated according to status, such that those with higher status (e.g., men, economically privileged, etc.) receive a greater share of the scarce resources. Finally, procedures (such as drawing straws or participating in a contest) can be established such that each person has an equal opportunity to receive a needed resource, although the final outcomes may not in fact be equal.

Which of these rules will apply in a given situation? Many studies investigate this question using experimental paradigms that ask participants to allocate a reward (usually money) between themselves and another person based on their performance on some task. These studies suggest that individuals’ positions in various stratification hierarchies impact their preference for particular distribution rules (Deutsch, 1975; Mikula, 1980). People in advantaged or powerful positions are likely to perceive an unequal distribution as just, while those in disadvantaged positions are more likely to feel it is unjust (Cook & Hegtvædt, 1986; Molm, 2006; Stolte, 1987). Studies conducted outside a laboratory setting similarly find that people in lower social classes are less likely to perceive inequality to be fair (e.g., Robinson & Bell, 1978) and more likely to prefer an economic distribution based on need than are people in upper classes (Form & Hanson, 1985; Kluegel & Smith, 1986). People in lower socioeconomic groups are also less likely to believe that people in general, and themselves in particular, have a fair opportunity to get ahead (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). Kluegel and Smith report that Blacks are far more likely than Whites to express doubts about the fairness of the American stratification system. They also found similar, although smaller, differences between women and men: women, on average, believed the economic system was less fair than did men. Moreover, sex, race, and class interact to produce variation in such beliefs. Wealthier Whites (and, wealthier Blacks to some degree) expressed more faith in the economic system than did poorer Whites and Blacks. Black men perceived more opportunities for Blacks and the poor than did Black women. Despite these differences, faith in the system of economic distribution remained surprisingly high throughout the 1980s. Kluegel and Smith conclude that “most Americans believe that economic inequality is just in principle, and correspondingly, endorse individual and societal equity as just criteria for the distribution of income” (p. 141).

More recently Page and Jacobs (2009), Newman and Jacobs (2010), and McCall and Percheski (2010) have all documented Americans’ increasing concern about rising levels of economic inequality. Over the last 20 years, half to two-thirds of Americans were dissatisfied with levels of income inequality or the rationale that economic prosperity among the most wealthy drives economic prosperity for the whole (McCall & Percheski, 2010). This dissatisfaction is illustrated by the 2011–2012 Occupy Wall Street movement, whose website defines it as “the 99 % that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1 %” and who participates in protests aimed at empowering “real people to create real change from the bottom up (Occupy Wall Street, 2012).”

Social Exchange in Intimate Relationships

Intimate relationships, like less personal relationships, are arenas for the exercise of power and control. Early studies conceptualized marriage as an exchange in which women traded household labor for financial support and men traded money and status for a comfortable home life. Researchers noted that husbands tended to have more power (i.e., influence over decision making) than wives, especially

when wives were not employed outside the home (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Turk & Bell, 1972). Later work by England and Farkas (1986) refined the equation of money with power, arguing instead that money is a key determinant of power not because it is a more valuable resource but because it is a transferable resource that can be taken from one situation to another. Given that men's resources (i.e., money) can more easily transfer to another relationship than can women's resources (i.e., bearing and looking after the husband's children), husbands are assumed to have more marital power and to be less invested in the relationship (see Lewis & Spanier, 1979). Due to the division of labor and the continued wage gap, men and women tend to have different types of resources, and consequently, marital power is fundamentally gendered. Numerous studies document how this power translates into other real-world inequities, such as the character of leisure time (Bittman & Wajcman, 2000) or sleep differentials among husbands and wives (Maume, Sebastian, & Bardo, 2010).

Despite women's increased presence in the formal, paid labor market, numerous studies report that women continue to do the bulk of household chores (Bergen, 1991; Coltrane, 2000; Kessler-Harris, 2003). This difference has been found to occur across racial groups (Cunningham, 2007; Hossain & Roopnarine, 1994) and classes (Tichenor, 2005; Wright, Shire, Hwang, Dolan, & Baxter, 1992) in the U.S., as well as cross-culturally (Fuwa, 2004; Knudson & Wærness, 2008; Sanchez, 1993). Brines (1993, 1994) finds that when the husband is the primary earner and his wife is dependent on him for financial support, housework is distributed according to the predictions of exchange theory (i.e., women do the majority of the housework and men do very little). However, when the division of labor is nontraditional, with the woman acting as the primary bread-winner, the man actually does less housework on average. This finding runs counter to exchange theory predictions. Brines (1994) argues that marriage is an institution through which women and men can display masculinity and femininity. In traditional marriages both women and men are able to fulfill gender expectations. When women out-earn men, the situation becomes more complicated. These couples solve the dilemma by distributing housework even more markedly along traditional lines, rather than having the man compensate by doing most of the housework. This allows both men and women to maintain their adherence to gendered norms, despite their nontraditional financial arrangements. In the language of exchange theory, symbolic exchange trumps material exchange.

More recent studies comparing the allocation of household chores in gay and lesbian couples with that of heterosexual married couples finds that the three types of couples have very different patterns of housework allocation (Kurdek, 1993, 2004, 2005). Heterosexual couples tend to follow a pattern of segregation (e.g., each partner does separate tasks, with one partner doing the bulk of the household labor). Gay male couples tend to follow a pattern of balance (e.g., each partner specializes in an equal number of specific and non-overlapping tasks). Lesbians follow a pattern of equality (e.g., partners share tasks either by doing them together or by alternating responsibility). Taken together, these studies of housework allocation highlight how individuals' gender performances and the gendered nature of some intimate relationships alter processes of social exchange.

Status and Power

Expectation states theory, a distinct offshoot of social exchange theory, incorporates social exchange's conceptualization of power with insights from symbolic interaction, a perspective we discuss below. Focusing on conditions in which individuals share both collective (i.e., cooperative) and task orientations, expectation states theory holds that individuals form *performance expectations*, implicit and often unconscious anticipations for their own and others' abilities to execute the focal task, by assessing observable status characteristics and making comparisons among group members (Berger, Conner, & Fişek, 1974; Berger, Fişek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Correll & Ridgeway, 2003). According to this theory, these expectations act as self-fulfilling prophecies, guiding behavior in two important ways: individuals act consistent with their expectations for self, and individuals allow or deny others

the opportunity to act based upon relative expectations for their ability. For example, studies document that students of color often withdraw and fail to engage within the classroom, while White students dominate intellectual tasks – patterns that reflect racially based expectations (Cohen, 1982). Higher expectations ensure individuals more action opportunities. Accordingly these individuals are more likely to offer suggestions (i.e., performance outputs), and other group members are more likely to evaluate these suggestions positively (i.e., agreements and disagreements) and accept them in reaching consensus (i.e., influence and deference) (Moore, 1985; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995).

Expectation states theory argues that individuals look to status characteristics, or characteristics on which individuals hold differently evaluated states, to evaluate self and others' potential performances. Theorists differentiate between types of status characteristics: *task-specific status characteristics* emphasize correspondence between an individual's traits and her expected performance at a specific task (e.g., a feminine person should perform well on a feminine task), while *diffuse status characteristics* emphasize expectations for an individual's general competency across tasks – even those not directly connected to the status (e.g., even nonsense tasks such as “contrast sensitivity” or “meaning insight” used in laboratory experiments) (Ridgeway & Erikson, 2000; Troyer, 2003; Wagner & Berger, 1993). One goal of current expectation states scholarship is to identify the characteristics that act as diffuse statuses and the conditions under which they do so.

Considerable empirical work centers on sex category. Lockhead's (1985) meta-analysis suggests sex category acts as a diffuse status, with men generally displaying higher levels of influence compared to women. Using experimental data from mixed-sex problem-solving groups involving masculine, gender neutral, or feminine skills, Balkwell and Berger (1996) find that: males exhibit more status power activity (e.g., time speaking, chin thrusts, looking while speaking, etc.) than females while completing a neutral task. Males exhibit even higher levels of status power activity while completing a masculine task; while the feminine task reverses the sex difference, the gap is less than the males' advantage on the masculine task. In other words, the process is not symmetric, as males retain some diffuse advantage of gender as worth/power. Researchers interpret these effects as signs of a gendered double standard and the power of diffuse statuses (Balkwell & Berger, 1996; Foschi, 1992). A wealth of studies documents the effects of other diffuse statuses including race (Cohen, 1982), occupation (Webster, Hysom, & Fullmer, 1998), ethnic accent (Foddy & Riches, 2000), sexual orientation (Childers, 2000; Renfrow, 2005), and physical attractiveness (Webster & Driskell, 1983). Taken together, this research clarifies how micro-interactions facilitate the performance of societal inequalities.

To varying degrees, these three streams of research have incorporated gender and race. So why has the majority of social exchange research neglected these social statuses? To answer this question, we must consider both the perspective's key assumptions and researchers' methodological choices. Social exchange theory assumes that all behavior is based on the same exchange principles. Regardless of gender, race, or class, every individual is believed to be guided by rewards and punishments, power and dependence. Although structural position and its effects on the availability of resources is a central part of the theory outlined by Emerson (1972a, 1972b), in practice structure tends to be operationalized narrowly, as a set of relationships among a small number of individual actors. The connection to real-world social structures based on gender, race, or social class is rarely explored.

Moreover, England and Kilbourne (1990) problematize the approach's assumptions that actors are selfish and pursue only what will benefit themselves, and that rationality, rather than emotion or empathy, guides behavior. Proponents, however, challenge these criticisms, arguing that they result from a misreading of exchange theory, and that in fact such theories can help to explain gender inequality by showing how women and men make choices within different sets of social constraints (Friedman & Diem, 1993).

The experimental paradigm that has become normative in social exchange research is also partly responsible for the neglect of gender and race. When subjects never see or hear each other, the everyday social cues associated with sex, gender, race, social class, and other statuses are artificially

removed from the situation, and their effects on exchange behavior go unanalyzed. Other social psychological perspectives, such as the cognitive approach we discuss next, have been much more successful in integrating these statuses into the experimental paradigm.

Social Cognition

Social cognition theorizes the ways in which we think about our social worlds. The perspective's basic assumption is that thought influences both feeling and behavior. As we noted in the introduction, human thinkers have limited cognitive capabilities and must often act as "cognitive misers" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Needs for cognitive speed and efficiency streamline the process through which we take in and synthesize information from social situations. Because it is impossible to incorporate all incoming information in a given situation, we develop systems of categorization that separate information into distinct categories. Categorization directs our attention as we take in information, aids in the storage of new information, and supports the retrieval of information housed in memory.

Cognitive Structures

Information about gender and race must be represented in some mental form. Social cognition emphasizes verbal representations, which provide the basis for our cognitive structures. Research on cognitive structures explores the content of and shifts in gender and racial attitudes, as well as the organization of knowledge about each into social schemas, including stereotypes.

Attitudes have been conceptualized as psychological tendencies "expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). Early cognitive models characterized humans as "consistency seekers," motivated to find or create consistency among their attitudes, feelings, and behaviors (Festinger, 1957). Research results have never fully supported the assumption that knowing someone's attitudes aids our understanding and prediction of behavior. Kraus' (1995) meta-analysis of 88 attitude-behavior studies, however, finds significant associations between attitudes and behavior – particularly when studies use self-report measures of behavior, non-student samples, and attitudinal and behavioral measures that are equally specific. Current research continues to qualify the relationship between attitudes and behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Improved methodologies may allow social psychologists to better predict behavior today than in the past, but the relationship between attitudes and behavior remains complex (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Luke, 2003).

Research on gender and racial attitudes has often focused on the attitudes of individuals in positions of power toward those with less power. As Eagly and Mladinic (1989) note, studies of gender attitudes tend to examine respondents' preferences for gender role accommodation (e.g., Spence and Helmreich's "Attitudes toward women scale" 1972). Studies of racial attitudes, in contrast, have emphasized general evaluations, often anchoring them to real-world conflicts, as opposed to role-related assessments (e.g., Persson & Musher-Eizenman, 2005). Considerably less scholarly attention has been directed to attitudes toward men or minority attitudes toward Whites (for exceptions, see Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Stephan et al., 2002); a small but growing body of literature investigates intergroup attitudes among peoples of color (Gay, 2006).

Until recently, studies of the gender attitudes held by power-advantaged groups toward those with less power reported trends toward liberalization and egalitarianism. Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman's (2011) analysis of the most recent General Social Survey data reports only small changes since the mid-1990s, indicating that the liberalization of gender attitudes has stalled. This pattern holds across cohorts and for men and women of all ethnicities, education levels, and incomes. Cotter and

colleagues attribute this stall to increased “egalitarian essentialism,” which they describe as endorsement of both feminist equality principles and traditional motherhood roles.

Recent studies of Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks indicate that the norms of egalitarianism have increased with race as well, and that racial prejudice and negative stereotyping of Blacks has declined (Parks & Hughey, 2011). Bobo (2001) summarizes this pattern: “The single clearest trend in studies of racial attitudes has involved a steady and sweeping movement toward general endorsement of the principles of racial equality and integration” (p. 269). Policy studies, however, indicate that this attitude change has not been accompanied by endorsement for policies that would ensure equal opportunity, citing racial resentment as an enduring obstacle to social change (Tuch & Hughes, 1996).

Contemporary societal norms may make the acknowledgement or expression of biased attitudes unlikely (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Sears (1988) argues that *symbolic racism*, the tendency to indirectly discriminate towards persons of color through implicit assumptions that members of this group do not uphold American values such as the Protestant work ethic, has replaced blatant “old-fashioned” racism, but nevertheless continues to support the racial status quo. Symbolic racism operates at both the individual and institutional levels (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Similarly, Gaertner and Dovidio (2005) have reported evidence of an *aversive racism*, in which individuals balance their preference for egalitarianism with the desire to avoid contact with members of another race. Denis (2011) takes an opposite tack, demonstrating that interpersonal contact between Whites and indigenous peoples, even under conditions that should optimize the reduction of prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) does not necessarily eliminate Whites’ sense of superior group position. Denis shows that subtyping (Lamont & Molnar, 2002), ideology-based homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), and political avoidance norms (Eliasoph, 1999) all lead Whites to maintain prejudice and indigenous peoples to avoid challenging the systematic racism that shapes interpersonal relations in these communities.

Research documents a parallel shift in gender attitudes. Swim and Cohen (1997) propose that a modern sexism that is hidden or unintentional now exists in our culture along with the visible, intended, and unambiguous sexist attitudes and behaviors of the past. Glick and Fiske (1996) distinguish between *hostile sexism*, resentment toward women who transgress traditional gender roles, and *benevolent sexism*, the paternalistic and ostensibly chivalrous attitudes that seek to “look out for” women’s interests (e.g., Day, 2001). These new conceptualizations of racism and sexism indicate that social psychological assessments must advance beyond the overt measures of the past in order to detect these subtle attitudes.

New computer technologies allow social psychologists to record individuals’ near instantaneous associations with target words or images to assess *implicit attitudes*, or unconscious attitudes (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; and see Chap. 11, “Values, attitudes, and ideologies”). This builds on cognitive models that assume that much of our cognitive functioning is automatic and occurs outside of our awareness (Correll, Judd, Park, & Wittenbrink, 2010; Langer, 1989). Studies consistently find evidence of implicit sexist/racist attitudes among individuals who do not believe they are prejudiced (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). In fact, research finds evidence of such associations where we might otherwise expect to find preference for one’s ingroup. Dunham, Baron, and Banaji (2008), for example, report that Hispanic and Black children do not display an explicit preference for their ingroup, in comparisons with White children. Instead, these children of color display implicit associations favoring Whites over their ingroup (i.e., associating White faces rather than ingroup faces with positive words). Similarly, Jost, Banaji, and Nosek (2004) observe this pattern even among adults: a surprising number of Black adult respondents display White favoritism rather than preference for their ingroup. Social psychologists have consistently documented implicit associations regarding gender (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000), sexual orientation (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Geer & Robertson, 2005), age (Hummert, Garstka, Greenwald, Mellot, & O’Brien, 2002), and other characteristics.

Implicit associations appear to be influenced by contextual factors. Studies have shown that racial bias can be reduced in conditions that emphasize another characteristic, such as sex (Mitchell, Nosek,

& Banaji, 2003, and see President Obama example above) or foreign accent (Kinzler, Duponx, & Spelke, 2007). Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) find that showing respondents photographs of popular Black celebrities before assessing implicit associations resulted in less bias than when individuals did not see such photographs. Furthermore, implicit preference for Whites appears to decrease in the presence of a Black experimenter (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). These studies suggest that while individuals may not be aware of their implicit preferences, such associations can be interrupted. These studies also document the considerable power of social context.

The concept of implicit associations has faced some skepticism. Tetlock and Mitchell (2008) and Arkes and Tetlock (2004) offer both methodological and conceptual critiques. These scholars suggest that implicit bias studies may actually assess individuals' awareness of cultural stereotypes rather than their "endorsement" of these beliefs, and they propose that seemingly prejudiced results may in fact reflect processes of statistical discrimination associated with respondents' awareness of group differences. In short, they are suspicious of methodologies that nearly always find evidence of a hidden prejudice among ostensibly open-minded college students (see Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2004; Quillian, 2008; and Sears, 2004 for responses to these critiques). Real racial and/or gender differences in societally meaningful variables can and do exist; we argue that it behooves social scientists to consider the historical conditions that have given rise to them.

Attitudes emphasize the content of thought and evaluations of that content; *social schemas*, in contrast, emphasize the organization of social information. Schemas reduce knowledge through processes of categorization, allowing individuals to make sense of specific cases by treating them as a part of a general category. Schemas act as theories that inform cognitive processes: directing what we attend to and what we ignore in situations, shaping the mental storage of new information, and aiding the retrieval of information stored in memory. While schemas streamline cognitive processes for speed and efficiency, they are implicated in the perpetuation of social expectations associated with gender and race.

We create schemas for both groups and the self. *Group schemas* are essentially stereotypes. Early work on group schemas, whether based on gender or race, focused on personality attributes. Classic studies by Katz and Braly (1933) and Karlins et al. (1969) (noted above) provided White Princeton students with a list of adjectives and asked them to indicate which traits were typical for specific racial, ethnic, and national groups. Students characterized Blacks as superstitious, lazy, and ignorant, while they viewed Jews as shrewd, intelligent, and industrious. While studies indicate that the content of some group schemas has changed over time (e.g., students were less likely to characterize Jews as shrewd following World War II), many components of racial group schemas endure.

Similarly, studies of gender group schemas consistently report that men are perceived to hold instrumental attributes (e.g., objectivity) more than are women, who are believed to hold expressive attributes (e.g., concern for others' feelings) (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972). Traits are not the only component of gender (or race) group schemas. Carpenter and Trentham (2001) report that schemas include occupational types (e.g., nurse) and interpersonal roles (e.g., grandmother). Research consistently indicates that an awareness of gender as an organizing principle appears early in the lifespan, as toddlers have well developed gender categories and can correctly stereotype everyday activities and objects. Commitment to gender schemas oscillates throughout the life course: gender schemas appear rigid during a childhood consolidation period, but become more flexible in early adolescence before turning rigid again in the early and middle adult years (Signorella & Frieze, 2008) and more fluid again among elderly people. Furthermore, contextual factors, such as having nontraditional parents, may decrease the intensification of adolescents' endorsement of traditional gender expectations (Crouter, Whiteman, McHale, & Osgood, 2007).

Beliefs about gender and race are represented at different levels, as individuals develop more specific subtypes within each general group (Deaux, 1995). Eagly and Mladinic (1989) note that gender subtypes may help explain an unexpected but consistently replicated finding: attitudes and stereotypes toward women tend to be more favorable than those for men. This finding is inconsistent with other

reports that women are viewed less favorably than men in high achievement contexts (Sandler & Hall, 1986), particularly when these women are perceived as taking charge (Ridgeway, 2001). Glick and colleagues (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997) find that sexist men have subtypes for both “good” and “bad” women. The “housewife” type is viewed as more favorable than the “feminist” type. Furthermore, reported preferences for the global category of women may reflect assumptions of Whiteness and middle class standing, and therefore not hold for lower class women or women of color (Landrine, 1985). Green, Ashmore, and Manzi (2005) recently documented subtypes for men (e.g., nerd and wimp) and women (e.g., bitch and whore) who transgress gender norms. Subtypes often are marked by intersections of gender, race, and other statuses (Stangor, Lynch, Daun, & Glass, 1992).

Self schemas organize knowledge about one’s self, including information about one’s gender and racial identities. Gender self schemas influence cognitive processing, including individuals’ ability to retrieve from memory experiences in which their behavior was consistent or inconsistent with their gender schemas (Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Sildai, 1982). Moreover, gender self schemas may dictate which situations we choose to enter or avoid. Bem and Lenney (1976) found that both men and women with strong gender schemas avoided situations requiring them to behave in gender incongruent ways. Gender congruency appears to be more important for men and boys than for women and girls (McCreary, 1994).

Whereas gender is often assumed to be a dichotomous variable with masculine and feminine poles, multiple racial groups exist, which make possible a multitude of racial identities (see section “[Defining race and ethnicity](#)” above). Racial self schemas have received less attention than gender self schemas, perhaps a consequence of social psychology’s reliance on primarily White student samples. The available research, however, examines important patterns across racial identities. Brown (1999) finds that older African Americans and those from lower social classes prefer to self-identify as “Black,” whereas younger and more educated individuals prefer “African American.” Other studies report that ethnic identification among Native Americans has risen in recent years. Nagel (1995) attributes this “ethnic renewal” to increases in opportunities now available to ethnic minorities. These patterns stand in stark contrast to those for White ethnics. Waters (1990) and Alba (1990) report decreases in ethnic identification among Whites, where ethnic affiliation is often embraced or discarded at will. These studies point to considerable variation in racial identifications both within and across groups.

Numerous studies document situational variation in racial identification. In a study on the effects of incarceration on racial identity, Saperstein and Penner (2010) find that the incarcerated are more likely to identify as Black rather than as White, independent of how they viewed themselves before incarceration. A parallel pattern holds for others’ racial perceptions for these individuals. Racial identities thus appear to be more fluid than essentialist perspectives assume.

Cognitive Processes

Cognitive structures focus on how individuals organize social information; cognitive processes address how this social information is used. Drawing from the literatures on attention, memory, and inferences, we briefly trace how each cognitive process informs our social psychological understanding of gender and race.

Attention

Thinking begins with attention, whether directed at a social object in the environment or to one stored in memory. Our attention varies in direction and intensity; some objects are more salient than others. *Salience* refers to the degree to which an object stands out from others and captures our attention. The schemas we hold for gender and race, together with situational cues, influence what we are likely to

focus our attention on, which then has implications for inferences and behavior. Steele and Aronson (1995) suggest that situations making salient both one's racial identity and cultural expectations associated with race may trigger a *stereotype threat effect*, which produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. Racist beliefs associating people of color with lower intellectual abilities have a long history in the U.S. To assess the impact of these beliefs in an academic context, Steele and Aronson administered portions of the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) to White and Black college students and found significant differences in performance, with White students outperforming Black students. By changing the instructions of the exercise to indicate that the test does not accurately assess intellectual abilities, the researchers were able to reduce, but not eliminate (Sackett, Hardison, & Cullen, 2004), the performance gap between White and Black students. Stereotypes may bear upon situations even when individuals do not endorse the beliefs (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Gorham, 1999). Research consistently finds stereotype threat effects based on race (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999), sex (Koenig & Eagly, 2005; Spencer et al., 1999), age (Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhota, Tam, & Hasher, 2005), social class (Croizet & Clare, 1998), and (dis)ability (Quinn, Kahng, & Crocker, 2004).

Memory

Once information has captured our attention, it is then encoded into memory for later retrieval. Both the encoding and retrieval of information are influenced by social schemas. Hitchon and Chang (1995) assessed viewer recall of information communicated in political advertisements and found that respondents tended to recall content related to a female candidate's family and appearance, while they tended to recall details about a male candidate's campaign activities. Fyock and Stangor's (1994) meta-analysis of 26 memory studies concludes that individuals better remember information about social groups that confirms rather than disconfirms *a priori* expectations. Other studies have found that individuals tend to recall negative information about outgroups but more positive details about ingroups. Moreover, we tend to recall differences between ingroup and outgroup members rather than their similarities. In these ways, memory helps confirm our expectations. Taken together, these observations suggest that schemas direct us to attend to some pieces of information, to encode them into memory, and to then easily recall them – even when the information is not entirely accurate (Cohen, 1981; Kleider, Goldinger, & Knuucky, 2008). Thus the operation of social schemas contributes to the perpetuation of those stereotypes.

Inferences

Individuals draw on information – either information we have stored in memory or that which is available in the immediate situation – to make a variety of social inferences and judgments. *Attributions* are judgments made to explain the origins or causes of events. Group schemas for gender and race have considerable influence on attribution processes. Comparing student attributions of blame in bias crimes with gay, lesbian, and Black victims, Lyons (2006) finds that individuals display sympathy for Black victims of hate crimes; however, they are less likely to display sympathy for gay and lesbian victims. Furthermore, these latter groups of victims are held more responsible for their victimization. These judgments may be due to individuals' reliance on widely held lay theories suggesting that sexual orientation is a "choice" whereas race is ascribed and to their greater familiarity with the racial rather than sexual power asymmetries operating within American society. Similarly, Howard's (1984) study of attributions for male and female victims in rape and robbery scenarios illustrates how gender schemas promote differential evaluations. In general, participants assigned more blame to female victims. This blame resulted from assessments of the female victims' character (relatively unchangeable factors), whereas male victims were blamed for their behaviors (relatively changeable factors). Inman,

Huerta, and Oh (1998) clarify how power relations associated with the race of a hypothetical perpetrator influence whether respondents perceive the perpetrator's behavior as discriminatory toward another person. White and Black perpetrators can both be seen as discriminatory, depending upon whether participants expect this type of person to be in control of the specific situation. Individuals who are expected to be in control are held more accountable for their behavior, and actions that violate a norm of responsibility (e.g., actions seen as harming the disadvantaged) tend to be perceived as discriminatory. Taken together, these studies suggest that individuals' lay theories for gender, race, and sexuality affect judgments about responsibility. These judgments can produce real-world consequences, such as offering or withholding help (see Hollander et al., 2011).

Symbolic Interaction

In theorizing the relationship between the individual and society, symbolic interaction is guided by three central premises outlined in the work of Herbert Blumer (1969). First, humans act toward social objects based on the meanings that these objects hold for them. From this perspective, gender and race are significant symbols whose markers are laden with social and cultural meaning. Second, meaning emerges in interactions between individuals or between individuals and social objects. Third, interpretation is central to the processes through which meanings influence interactions (Snow, 2001). Interpretation allows actors to make sense of the situation, to reassess the situation as necessary, to negotiate meanings with others, and to decide among lines of action. Symbolic interaction conceptualizes social actors as agentic, creative beings. While this capacity is often unobservable, instances in which everyday interactions break down provide reminders. The symbolic interactionist frame assumes "[n]either society nor its subparts exist as static entities; rather, these are continuously created and recreated as persons act toward one another" (Stryker & Vryan, 2003, p. 4). It is this negotiation, rather than the individual, that is central to an interactionist analysis. As the examples in the following sections illustrate, the cultural assumptions that undergird the symbols that guide interaction are, in a sense, cognitive stereotypes. Behavioral interactions are guided by these stereotypes in action repertoires motivated both to attain individual goals and to affirm (or disconfirm) broader normative systems.

Gender and Racial Identities

Divergent approaches within the symbolic interactionist tradition tend to emphasize either the structures of identity or the processes of identity construction. Whereas a cognitive approach to identity stresses social categorization, symbolic interactionists concerned with the structures of identity focus on role identities. This focus on role identities follows from the interactionist emphasis on relationships, because role identities are generated through ties to others. In a classic study, Kuhn and McPartland (1954) asked individuals to provide 20 responses to the question: Who am I? Responses included numerous social role identities (e.g., husband, daughter, good wife, etc.), many of which were clearly gendered, that respondents held to be central to their sense of self. Later work by Stryker (1980) suggests that such role identities are organized hierarchically: ties to other people and the emotional strength of these connections impact one's commitment to a particular identity. These role identities are embedded within social relationships, and consequently, they anchor individuals to social groups, and by implication, also to social structures.

Given the focus on the concept of roles, this branch of symbolic interaction attends to gender more than to race. Role identities associated with gender are defined in part by our positions in social structures and institutions such as the family. This perspective emphasizes the importance of role

expectations and performance and the potential for role conflict. Cairns, Johnston, and Baumann's (2010) study of foodies, or "people with a passion for eating and learning about food", provides an example of how some women seek to balance the role of "foodie" with gendered expectations associated with being a "good mother." The motherhood endorsed by these women has clear middle class undertones, illustrating how the meanings associated with social roles, the importance one places on a given role, and one's sense of success in fulfilling roles are shaped by the intersection of social positions.

Another line of research emphasizes the processes of identity construction through exploring strategies that individuals employ to manage others' impressions. Drawing on Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical analysis, these studies highlight the dramatic, performative nature of everyday encounters. In order for social actors to interact with each other, they must first *define the situation* by establishing who each individual is, what role each is playing, and what expectations each is bringing to the encounter. Consequently, how individuals project information about themselves to others is a chief concern.

As we noted in an earlier section, West and Zimmerman (1987) blend phenomenological and interactionist insights to argue that gender is an accomplishment of everyday interaction – individuals "do gender." From this perspective, gender is embedded in the mundane, routine activities of everyday life. Ramirez' (2006) interviews with pet owners from a dog park, for example, describe how men and women use their pets as props in the presentation of gendered selves. From their initial selection of a particular pet based on cultural associations defining animals as either masculine or feminine to the ways these individuals frame their relationship with their pet in conversations with the researcher, informants are doing gender. Scholars note how gender is accomplished in other taken-for-granted cultural rituals, such as engagement proposals (Schweingruber, Anahita, & Berns, 2004) and weddings (Ingraham, 2008). It is through our participation in these activities that individuals (re)produce gender.

Building on the notion that difference is also an accomplishment of everyday interaction, scholars have examined the accomplishment of other identities, such as race (Ahmed, 2007; Wilkins, 2008), class (Bettie, 2003; Dressman, 1997), and sex (Dozier, 2005). For example, Best (2003) examines the ways that both researcher and research participants "do race" through the talk of qualitative interviews. While reviewing a taped interview completed with two young women, one an African American and the other a Latina, Best noted several long breaks in the conversation. She also noted that moments of "narrative bracketing/translating" followed these pauses. This strategy of interrupting a story to define a slang word or interjecting a quick "You know what I mean?" allowed these young women of color to linguistically position the White researcher in relation to the stories they recount. Best is an obvious racial outsider; thus, these young women want to ensure that their stories are actually heard by her. Best concludes, "Their acts of translation – their speech acts – were a way to solidify their racial (and age) identities and to remind me of my own. These young women deployed language in ways that constructed (and sustained) my identity as an outsider and in so doing, discursively sustained my status as 'White'" (pp. 903–904). Through these methodological reflections, Best argues that both researchers and the people they study actively produce race in the research setting (see also Sprague, 2005; Warren, 2001).

Numerous scholars have begun to apply this analytical lens to the intersection of identities (Bettie, 2003; Higgins & Browne, 2008; Wilkins, 2008). Warren's (2009) study of the Mapuche people of Argentina describes the intersectional process whereby gender displays, such as wearing traditional garments during public appearances, allow female activists to construct an authentic indigenous identity to promote their movement's struggle for rights. Women bear primary responsibility for undertaking this identity work on behalf of their community, a gendered pattern that is consistent with other studies on the maintenance of racial and ethnic identities (see Phinney, 1990).

Other scholars are beginning to theorize the "undoing" of gender. If as West, Zimmerman, and Fenstermaker argue, gender and race are done, then they may be "undone" (Deutsch, 2007; Risman, 2009). Social psychological studies might move beyond just describing the production of everyday inequalities and begin to identify strategies that may interrupt these social inequalities.

Identity performances are negotiations based upon social expectations that originate in a shared symbolic universe. However, negotiation has limits. In his study of passing, Renfrow (2004) reports that individuals must stylize their identity performance such that it aligns with social expectations consistent for the identity they are attempting to convey, while simultaneously masking characteristics that may betray the performance. In this way, performances are idealized representations of prevailing stereotypes; individuals are not entirely free to improvise or construct novel performances. Moreover, negotiation does not require that interactive partners be equal partners in the collaboration. Negotiation may reflect structural power asymmetries associated with the actors. Furthermore, the working consensus achieved may be independent of each actor's private beliefs. Interactionist work characterizes processes of *impression management*, whereby individuals strategically share and control information about themselves with others during interaction and attempt to shape the information offered by their interaction partners, as smooth, seamless encounters; however, room exists for interactions to break down, stall, or come to an embarrassing halt. Consequently individuals often must direct considerable efforts to repair interactions, particularly when questions arise about who an actor "really" is. Studies document numerous impression management strategies, including the use of cover stories (Roschelle & Kaufman, 2004) and concealment (Thorne & Anderson, 2006). These observations underscore the nature of negotiation: social actors enjoy some flexibility in how they construct and perform their identities, but they must do so in ways that are recognizable and convincing to their social audience.

Behavioral Confirmation

Over 80 years ago, Thomas and Thomas (1928) observed that if people "define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (p. 572). The implication is that objective differences need not exist for difference to be perceived. Numerous studies have since documented how beliefs – either those held by one's self or by others – come to bear on real-world behaviors, often reifying preconceived notions of between-group differences and within-group similarities. (e.g., the stereotype threat effects discussed above [Spencer et al., 1999; Steele & Aronson, 1995]). For example, Frederickson and Harrison's (2005) study of girls in athletics found that girls tended to internalize gender expectations emphasizing physique over performance. These internalized expectations promoted self objectification, or turning a third-party gaze onto their own bodies. This process inhibited the girls' self-efficacy and athletic performance.

Another line of research documents how social expectations held by others produce and maintain the gendered and racialized order. In the classic study of self-fulfilling prophecies, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) provided elementary school teachers with information about their students' performance on an IQ test at the beginning of the school year and found that at the end of the year the students met teacher expectations. Rosenthal and Jacobson attribute this pattern to the influence of teacher expectations on their own behavior toward students. Subsequent studies have connected teachers' lowered performance expectations for Black and poor students with a low sense of academic self-efficacy and lack of effort toward school work in these children, and with teachers' unwillingness to provide academic challenges for these students (Farkas, 1996; Ferguson, 1998). Eccles and Blumenfeld (1985) argue that teachers passively contribute to the beliefs that girls are less likely than boys to excel in mathematics and science. They conclude that teachers fail to "to provide boys and girls with types of information that might lead them to reevaluate their sex-stereotyped beliefs. In this way teachers passively reinforce the sex-typed academic and career decisions made by their students, thus contributing to sex inequity in children's educational attainment" (p. 80). As these studies show, internalized social expectations can produce self-fulfilling prophecies. Expectations associated with gender and race influence which individuals have access to opportunities and how individuals navigate the opportunity structures available to them. These examples highlight the compatibility of symbolic interaction with social cognition, as both theories can clarify these same processes.

Resisting Social Expectations

Symbolic interaction emphasizes human agency, which guards the perspective against constructing an “oversocialized” social actor (Wrong, 1961). Recent review chapters note that identities can serve as resources for resisting social expectations (see Callero, 2003; Howard, 2000). Anderson’s (2005) observations of male cheerleaders in traditional leagues – those he calls “orthodox” – illustrate how young men committed to hegemonic masculinity attempt to resist cultural stereotypes assuming they are feminine or gay. These men often display “defensive heterosexuality” and engage in “guy talk.” These strategies may be less important for men who are known to be active in other masculine activities, as they often possess “jock insurance,” or greater ability to resist the feminizing influence of a single activity (Pascoe, 2003).

Other studies illustrate how the intersection of positions adds complexity to acts of resistance. Duneier (2000) explores the sexually provocative comments unhoused, Black men selling printed materials on the sidewalks of Greenwich Village use to entangle women into unwanted conversations. Although these men are positioned lower in the social hierarchy along several dimensions (e.g., race, social class, etc.) than are female passersby, they are able to use their position as heterosexual men to dominate women, deflect stigma, and reaffirm their sense of self as men through talk. Santos’ (2009) fieldwork in East Los Angeles tattoo parlors provides another example. Santos characterizes these sites as masculine domains in which men act as cultural gatekeepers by controlling the “Chicana canvas” and setting limits for how women “do Chicana”. However, by taking charge of their bodies and embellishing them as they choose, women reclaim and redefine their Chicana identity. Thus their tattoos “represent a counter-hegemonic choice to achieve autonomy from patriarchal ideals and self-definition against class oppression, heteronormative standards, gender legacies, sexism, and racism” (p. 98). While these studies illustrate successful attempts at the individual level, resisting social expectations can be fraught with difficulties.

Individuals with higher status hold more power with which to enforce their expectations for others, while those with less power may not be able to resist (Cast & Cantwell, 2007; Stets & Burke, 2005). In the context of romantic relationships, for example, individuals’ self-views and spouses’ views of them converge over time (Cast & Cantwell). Where economic and/or relational power imbalances exist, “those with more power are more able to behave in ways consistent with their identity, more able to impose an identity on their spouse, and more able to resist the identity that the spouse, in turn, seeks to impose” (Cast, 2003, p. 185; Cast, Stets, & Burke, 1999). As we noted above in our discussion of the expectation states literature, numerous studies find that an individual’s expectation for an interaction partner based on his or her perceived minority status in systems of race (Cohen, 1972), gender (Pugh & Wahrman, 1983; Ridgeway, Backor, Li, Tinkler, & Erickson, 2009), or sexuality (Childers, 2000; Renfrow, 2005; Webster et al., 1998) – even in cooperative settings in which these statuses are irrelevant – contribute to an unwillingness to allow this partner to contribute to the group’s efforts. Individuals’ ability to resist social expectations must not be overstated. Symbolic interaction concentrates on micro-interactions, and consequently, it often fails to adequately analyze the structural obstacles to resistance.

Together, social exchange, social cognition, and symbolic interaction offer the potential to elucidate the micro-foundations of systems of gender and race. Social exchange theory examines the conditions under which individuals make choices about allocations of resources. Social cognition attends to the structures and processes of thought. Symbolic interactionism examines how meaning is created and shared, and how individuals develop (or resist) a sense of a gendered/racialized self through situated action. Although these theoretical lenses can be applied to and provide insights into the same social phenomena, social psychologists by and large continue to use them independently. Consequently, the full promise of these social psychological theories to explain the complexities of gender, race, and their intersections has not been fully realized.

Methodologies

In considering the social psychological theory and research on gender and race, it is critical to consider how that research is actually done, that is, the methodological choices that guide research. This is considerably more than a technical question. Harding (1987) distinguishes three elements: epistemology, method, and methodology. *Epistemology* is a theory about knowledge, about who can know what and under what circumstances knowledge is developed. *Methods* are techniques for gathering and analyzing “data,” information. *Methodology* delineates the implications of an epistemology for implementation of a particular method (Sprague, 2005). The technical details are located in their social and political context. In earlier years, social scientists tended to see their work as value-free, neutral, objective. Many social psychologists no longer feel that objectivity is possible; therefore, it is critical to engage in methodological reflection.

It is important to ask where research questions come from, whose interests they reflect, whose interests are not represented, what consequences follow from conducting research in certain ways, and with certain populations. Considering the substantive focus of this chapter, we ask which social distinctions are most salient, how questions vary depending on the social category under investigation, or what consequences follow from the prevailing tendency to approach social problems as outcomes of individual rather than societal factors.

As we have noted, social psychology, and sociology more generally, has chosen to explore the differences between some groups that are hierarchically related to each other, especially men and women, and Whites and non-Whites, primarily African Americans. We have seen numerous examples of research on the differences across members of the categories within these systems. We see much less research that considers the relative size of cross-group differences compared to within-group variation. So, for example, many of the stereotypic traits associated with women, on the one hand, or with men, on the other, actually vary more among women and among men, than they do across women and men (see Hyde, 2005; Sprecher & Toro-Morn, 2002).

Also, as we have suggested, questions posed about socioeconomic standing differ considerably from those posed about gender and about race. Indeed, there is much less research overall on social class than on gender or race (Frale, 1997). More generally, researchers ask different questions about the privileged than about those who are subordinated, tending to explore deficiencies of those in subordinate positions. Sprague (2005) cites some telling examples: there is considerable work on women’s lack of self-esteem, but very little on men’s lack of modesty. Moreover, social scientists tend to “study down” (Fine, 1994). Part of the reason for this is that those with considerable social power can usually protect their space such that research cannot be done on them (Fine, 1994). This has begun to change. There is now a body of research on whiteness (Frankenberg, 1993), masculinity (Connell, 1995), and heterosexuality (Herek, 1995; Maynard & Purvis, 1994), and some of their intersections (Robinson, 1996). But there still is very little research on those who are affluent; socioeconomic status has been the most unapproachable system.

Moreover, most social psychological research focuses on individuals, conceptualizing them at a remove from societal context. As Sprague notes, this can lead to a reliance on logical dichotomies that mask important social dynamics. So, for example, Howard and Hollander (1997) maintain that altruism and aggression, two forms of behavior included in virtually all social psychological texts as distinct, are intimately linked through the workings of social power. Power determines who needs help, who has the resources to offer help, and who cannot turn down help. It determines what is even defined as help (e.g., public assistance is help, tax breaks are not) and what is defined as aggression (e.g., stealing is, tolerating hunger across the globe is not).

Social exchange research tends to employ experimental techniques. This is a research paradigm that emphasizes tightly controlled research procedures and discrete, easily measured variables. The experimental procedures typically constrain interactions such that subjects may never see, hear, or

encounter each other. These procedures have the advantage of reducing effects of ostensibly extraneous factors, allowing stronger causal claims. This is the key advantage of high internal validity. But they lack external validity; factors that do influence real-world interaction may be considered “extraneous” only in that narrowly constrained context. The process of interaction disappears.

The kinds of tasks used in these experiments also limit the scope of conclusions that may be drawn. Monetary rewards are common in exchange research because money is assumed to be a reward that has equal value for participants. This assumption, however, is insensitive to the socioeconomic positions of those participants. A few dollars may be meaningless to a relatively well-off participant, but be of considerable value to another participant. Indeed, in situations in which people are not participating as part of a course requirement, the very fact of choosing to participate may reflect their need for income. And, symbolic factors may be just as powerful, if not much more powerful, resources in real-world exchange relationships.

The lack of external validity in exchange research is also associated with the lack of attention to relationship history. Exchange histories in real-world cultures can be the cement that allows them to endure (Emerson, 1972a, 1972b). Yet groups used in experimental studies are most often composed of people who have never met. A relationship history is sometimes created by transactions that occur a short time before an experiment begins; this is a far cry from grounded exchange relationships. As we noted earlier, some have argued that these patterns reflect a deep gender bias in social exchange research (e.g., England & Kilbourne, 1990).

Methodological factors underscore the striking absence of race in social exchange research. A key epistemological assumption is that actors come to the marketplace as equals. Although they may have different levels of resources and positions, these are treated as malleable and transferable, an assumption that most often is true neither for women vs. men nor for people of color vs. Whites.

Social cognition uses a greater variety of methods, falling somewhere in the middle between the experimental reliance of social exchange and the field work and ethnographic preferences of symbolic interactionists. One important feature of social cognition is that cognition itself, unlike exchange, cannot be observed. Measures of cognition are necessarily indirect, whether they be self-reports, reports by others, or inferences from behaviors. Social cognitive researchers also use experimental methods, with the same advantages and disadvantages noted in discussing social exchange. The difference is that cognitive researchers are more likely to add elements of social context either within the experimental design, or by adding other methodological components to the overall studies. Social cognitive studies often use survey techniques, asking participants to complete questionnaires, whether they be attitudinal inventories, personality trait assessments, inferences about causal claims, probabilities, or other cognitive judgments. It is common for such studies to combine these assessment techniques with experiments. So, for example, researchers might have participants complete the written instruments a month prior to engaging in an experiment, as a way of measuring cognitive predispositions that can be used as a predictor or correlate of the experimental behavior. If the cognitive measures are assessed well in advance of an experimental procedure, any influence can be viewed as potentially causal.

Studies can be carried out in multiple contexts, allowing cultural comparisons, as evident in the study cited above in which intersections between gender and race led to variations in the prominence of identities across different types of educational institutions, such as coed or single sex, and primarily White or primarily Black colleges (Settles, 2006). Similarly, experiments can be conducted in the “real-world,” outside of laboratory settings. Experiments can be built into survey instruments as well. Field experiments are increasingly common (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Dutton & Aron, 1974; Paluk, 2009), because they can have more external validity than a lab-based experiment, without significant cost to internal validity.

The extent to which external validity can be achieved depends greatly on the design of the specific instruments and the design of the experiments with which they are combined. As we have seen in our discussion of the M-F scale and of androgyny, a trait assessment can be designed to impose a dichotomy between M and F, on the one hand, or to allow variation in both dimensions, as in androgyny.

Deliberately comparative cross-group frameworks can be built in, or avoided, through assessment of within-group characteristics only, or investigated indirectly, through comparing responses to within-group inventories of two or more groups. These choices are in the hands of the researcher. Social schemas influence researchers as strongly as they do others (Hollander et al., 2011). Howard (1988), for example, reconsiders a study that concludes that women are more sexually conservative than men (Hendrick, Hendrick, Slapion-Foote, & Foote, 1985), arguing that this study failed to consider the societal context in which sexual attitudes are formed.

Symbolic interaction research tends to rely on ethnographic methods, with the advantage of greater external validity, but the weakness of lower internal validity, and the consequent inability to make strong causal claims. Some interactionists might go so far as to say that this is not a weakness, arguing that causal assertions about processes that might not be replicable in the real-world are not as meaningful as grounded, embedded research. A number of symbolic interactionists do also use survey instruments, especially to measure identities and to explore the structure of identities. But most also recognize that a deeper understanding of identities may require interviews and conversations. Karp (1986), for example, studied a group of currently upper-middle-class professionals who had been raised as children in socioeconomically deprived circumstances. These upwardly mobile individuals reported having difficulty integrating these different circumstances, and continued to feel uncertainty, inauthenticity, and marginality. More structured methodological techniques would likely not have allowed Karp to detect these complex patterns. Some interactionist analysis entails observations of others who may or may not even be aware of being observed, at least for social psychological purposes. Presidential elections, for example, offer interactionists remarkably rich opportunities to watch the workings of interpersonal dynamics. Goffman's concept of impression management is an exemplar: when Barack Obama chose to wear – and not to wear – an American flag pin presumably reflected the impressions he sought to communicate.

Experiments can be used by symbolic interactionists, but typically they include some awareness of social context. For example, Word, Zanna, and Cooper (1974) found that White interviewers used different interview styles in interviewing Black as opposed to White job applicants, using a “nonimmediate” interview style for Blacks, entailing a greater physical distance, less eye contact, more speech errors and shorter interviews, in contrast to an immediate interview style for Whites. In a second stage of the study interviewers were trained to work with both styles; applicants subjected to the nonimmediate style, both Whites and Blacks, performed less adequately. This study entailed both experimental methods and contextual sensitivities.

Because language is so critical to interaction, linguistic methods and analyses may also be used by symbolic interactionists. One important feature of interaction is that sometimes it fails, impressions are not successfully created, or relationships are damaged. The study of “repairs” is a hallmark of symbolic interaction. Linguistic analysis is necessary to identify accounts given for behavior, whether they be excuses or justifications.

That symbolic interactionists tend to be much more attuned to the importance of social context, and therefore use methods with strong external validity, does not mean they are necessarily sensitive to the workings of social power. Some scholars treat both negotiation and exchange (a subset of negotiation) as if the actors come to the scene with equal resources, equal opportunities, equal skills. The choice of a method strong in external validity does not in and of itself ensure a full appreciation of societal inequalities.

Current Trends and Future Directions

The current state of the social psychology of gender and race reflects two trends within the parent fields of sociology and psychology. Despite calls for integration from both sociologists (Hollander & Howard, 2000; House, 1977) and psychologists (Ryff, 1987), social psychology remains theoretically,

methodologically, and institutionally fragmented. House's (1977) classic article outlined three faces of social psychology – a psychological social psychology, symbolic interactionism, and psychological sociology – each theorizing in isolation, using unique methodologies to analyze phenomena of common interest, and publishing in separate outlets to different audiences. More than 30 years later scholars continue to ignore House's impassioned call to abandon intellectual and institutional tradition to establish “new interfaces”. As our review of the largely unintegrated theoretical approaches to the social psychology of gender and race illustrates, these literatures are no exception.

Reflecting on the growth of these different knowledge communities on the centennial of the publication of the first two social psychology textbooks, Gergen (2008) argues that social psychology needs more than to unify its theoretical and methodological traditions. According to Gergen, these social psychological discourses have become so compelling to scholars that they often view orienting concepts as “real” rather than as the social constructs they are. His solution is a call for social psychologists to embrace an ontology of social life, which would free social psychology from the “dualistic distinction between mind and social world” (p. 335). The result, he argues, will be a social psychology “in which prediction and control become secondary, and the uses of research for collaborative transformation of society will flourish. It will be a science centrally concerned with pressing issues of the day, and offering creative options for more viable life forms” (p. 337).

Gergen's vision for the development of a more critical social psychology dovetails with two contemporary trends: the emergence of *public sociology*, which seeks to replace disinterested scholarship in the academy with practical research shared with a popular audience (Burawoy, 2005; Clawson et al., 2007; Jeffries, 2009), and the emergence of *positive psychology*, which seeks to replace a focus on disorder and pathology with a focus on happiness, love, and justice (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Scholars link these values to early work in each discipline – for example, to work by Durkheim and Du Bois in sociology and Terman in psychology. Sprague (2008) argues, however, that by and large contemporary academics have not fulfilled this potential because they have been “disciplined.” Knowledge discourses determine who can be a knower and what can be known, academic disciplines organize professional activities, and our disciplinary training (re)produces the social construction of the disciplines.

Movement toward a public sociology and positive psychology holds the potential to foster a social psychology with a critical eye and an activist conscience, one whose impact can already be seen in scholarship on gender and race. Studies of stereotype threat, for example, not only seek to document the conditions under which the effect occurs, but many identify conditions that deactivate the threat, enabling the elimination (or at least reduction) of performance gaps associated with gender and race (e.g., Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003). Similarly, numerous experiments attempt to identify conditions that reduce individuals' reliance on implicit associations (e.g., Lowery et al., 2001; Mitchell et al., 2003). Moreover, important scholarly insights with obvious real-world relevance now are being disseminated to the public through the popular press: so, for example, the finding that being Black is more detrimental to one's chances of finding a job than having a criminal record (Pager, 2003) and that implicit associations linking people of color with criminality may help account for racial profiling (Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003). *Contexts*, a relatively young quarterly magazine published by the American Sociological Association (ASA), serves as a vehicle for sharing sociological insights with “educated lay readers.” We should note that not all scholars share our optimism about this trend. Tittle (2004), for example, challenges the notion of a public sociology on the grounds that it is built on false assumptions, that it questions sociology's cultural legitimacy, and that public sociology is incompatible with scientific practice.

Gender and race remain foundational concepts for social scientists. The ASA sections on sex and gender; race, class, and gender; and race and ethnicity continue to be among those with the highest memberships (among 40 plus sections). (All three have larger memberships than the social psychology section.) This sustained interest yields thousands of scholarly articles each year, many of them by social psychologists.

Future social psychological work on gender and race and their intersections will be shaped by continued technological advances, important demographic shifts in the population, and growing debates about the stability of the concepts themselves. Technological advances over the past decade have facilitated a more sophisticated social psychology. Computer interfaces have become standard tools for maximizing researcher control in laboratory settings. Software applications measuring implicit associations through split-second response latency measures provide just one example of how new technologies continue to advance social psychological understandings of the impact of gender and race. As Correll and colleagues (2010) note, these research tools not only improve our ability to observe the seemingly unobservable, they make possible new conceptualizations of sexism and racism. We expect future technologies to continue to enrich the social psychology of gender and race, both methodologically and theoretically.

In addition, shifts in immigration and intermarriage patterns within the U.S. will continue to move social psychology beyond analyses of the Black-White divide that has long characterized American race relations. Lee and Bean (2004) report that immigrants and their children currently make up 23 % of the population, and since the 1980s approximately 85 % of “legal” immigrants to the U.S. are arriving from Asia, Latin America, or the Caribbean, compared to only 12 % from Europe and Canada. Latinos and Asians are expected to make up approximately one-third of the U.S. population by 2050. This represents a dramatic shift from the largely European immigrations of the past. Along with these new waves of immigration, the rate of racial/ethnic intermarriage continues to increase. Recent estimates suggest racial/ethnic intermarriage hit an all-time high in 2010 at 8.4 % of all marriages (Wang, 2012), up from 5.4 % in 2000 (Lee & Edmonston, 2005). Over 50 % of couples with a self-identified Latino or Asian member marrying during the 1990s included a partner of another race (Lee & Bean, 2004; Waters, 1999). From 1970 to 2000, the number of children born to parents of different races increased from 900,000 to over three million (Lee & Edmonston, 2005). Currently, one in 40 Americans self-identifies as multiracial. Some estimates project that this ratio will be 1 in 5 by the year 2050 (Bean & Lee, 2002).

Research has only begun to investigate how these demographic shifts are influencing social psychological processes. Snipp’s (2003) recent review notes that while the majority of people who report their race as Black or White on the U.S. Census mark a single category, American Indians, Asians, Pacific Islanders, and Latinos frequently report multiracial identities. The literature suggests multiracial individuals have more flexibility in their racial identification (Harris & Sim, 2002; Nobles, 2000). Nevertheless, Doyle and Kao (2007) find consistency in 53–57 % of the self-reported racial identities for most multiracial groups when comparing initial and follow-up longitudinal data. Individuals initially self-identifying as Native American-Whites stand out as the most flexible group, as only about 19 % report the same racial identification over time. In fact, this group displays a greater likelihood of identifying as White in subsequent interviews. Lee and Bean (2004) identify contextual factors such as nativity and generational status, bilingualism in the home, and proximity to non-White communities as important determinants of racial identifications in multiracial children. Taken together, these demographic shifts not only change who will be the focus of social psychological research in the future, but they also point to the need to revise our models of racial identity (Rockquemore & Brunsma, 2007). In pointing to the instability of racial identities and highlighting that many individuals have “ethnic options”, multiracial identifications raise fundamental questions about the meaningfulness of race as an orienting concept.

Similarly, increased scholarly attention to transgender identities and lifeways has begun to reveal a significant destabilization in the concept of gender. Transgender emerged in the 1990s as an umbrella concept widely used to describe individuals who “cross over, cut across, move between or otherwise queer social constructed sex/gender boundaries” (Stryker, 1994, p. 251). Transgender bodies and identities trouble the assumption of a static sexual binary upon which our sex/gender system is constructed.

We are encouraged that many scholars are striving for a more critical social psychology. We urge social psychologists, particularly the next generation of scholars, to continue to pursue research agendas that promote the goals of social justice and fulfill the promise of an integrated social psychology.

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Chapter 18

Intergroup Relations

Michael A. Hogg

Intergroup relations refers to the way in which people who belong to social groups or categories perceive, think about, feel about, and act towards and interact with people in other groups. If you replace the word ‘group’ in intergroup with, for example, the words ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’, then what is meant by intergroup relations becomes clear. We know that inter-ethnic relations refer to how ethnic groups view, treat and interact with one another. We also know that inter-ethnic relations are often competitive and fraught with conflict and exploitation, and characterized by hostility, intolerance and prejudice. One of the greatest challenges faced by humanity is to reduce intergroup conflict and exploitation, and banish intolerance and prejudice, and to build cooperation, tolerance and social harmony. This is a challenge where the stakes are enormously high in terms of human suffering.

In this chapter I overview what we know about the social psychology of intergroup relations. Although this overview is necessarily selective and cannot go into great detail, I include discussion of personality, self-conception, identity, cognitive processes, motivation, goals, cooperation and competition, attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice, disadvantage, stigma, collective action, conflict and harmony, and so forth. For more extensive and detailed coverage see Brewer (2007), Dovidio and Gaertner (2010), and Yzerbyt and Demoulin (2010).

Defining Intergroup Relations

Before beginning we should define the term “intergroup relations.” This is not an easy task. A definition of intergroup relations must rest on a definition of “group” – and this is in itself problematic. Within social psychology there are almost as many definitions of a group as there are people who research groups. For example, there are those who believe a group is a small collection of individuals who are interacting with one another in some kind of promotively interdependent manner (e.g., Arrow, McGrath, & Berdahl, 2000); others believe a group exists when people define themselves in terms of the defining attributes of a self-inclusive social category (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986); and yet others believe the group is a nominal fallacy and that “there is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals” (Allport, 1924, p. 4). Differences in definition often

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rest on deeper metatheoretical wrangling over the scope and aims of the social psychology of group processes and intergroup relations (see Abrams & Hogg, 2004).

In this chapter I adopt the cognitive definition of the social group that underpins social identity theory (for most recent overviews see Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Hogg, 2006, 2012a). A *group* exists psychologically when two or more people define and evaluate themselves in terms of the defining properties of a common self-inclusive category. However it is important to acknowledge that group life involves more than self-definition – it involves social interaction, interdependent goals, emotions, and so forth. Consistent with this definition I adopt Sherif's classic and relatively widely accepted definition of *intergroup relations*:

Intergroup relations refer to relations between two or more groups and their respective members. Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identifications we have an instance of intergroup behavior. (Sherif, 1962, p. 5)

Research Methods

Social psychological research on intergroup relations is methodologically enormously diverse. Most theories and hypotheses have been examined with a variety of different methods, with the particular methodology governed primarily by the specific research question asked but also by practicalities associated with access to research participants. Many studies have used university students as their research participants – partly because it is convenient, as many psychology departments have a research participation scheme (a “subject pool”), but also because generalization of basic social psychological processes is usually not considered to be constrained by who the research participants were. But, many studies also use as participants the general public and a range of specific populations related to the specific intergroup context that is being investigated – participants, and thus intergroup relations, defined by age, gender, ethnicity, race, nationality, religious orientation, sexual orientation, political affiliation, and so forth.

Recently a range of web-based methods and resources, including MTurk, have become very popular for obtaining research participants and conducting studies, as they allow fast, efficient and inexpensive data collection from diverse populations. Web-based methods are prone to unreliable data (e.g., random responding, missing data); however there are now a number of screening measures that can be used to minimize this potential problem.

As is the case with social psychology in general controlled laboratory experiments reign supreme because they facilitate a focus on basic social cognitive processes and allow relatively unambiguous causal inferences to be made. For example, a large number of studies of the effects of social categorization per se on intergroup perception and behavior, unconfounded with the rich and complex baggage of real intergroup relations, have been tightly controlled laboratory experiments. These “minimal group studies” (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) are an important empirical foundation of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) – their methodology is discussed below.

However, the nature of the topic of intergroup relations invites the entire range of social psychological research methods – and many if not most studies incorporate a number of methods (for example experimental manipulation and survey measures). Field experiments in which independent variables are experimentally primed or manipulated via context are another particularly important research method. Some of social psychology's classic research has employed field experiments – for example Sherif's boys' camp experiments in which cooperative and competitive goal relations within and between groups were established to observe their effect on intragroup and intergroup behavior (see Sherif, 1966).

More contemporary experiments are also taken into the field to measure the effect of cognitive-perceptual primes on behavior – for example, the effect of feelings of uncertainty on intergroup

perceptions can very simply be cognitively primed as a paper-and-pencil (or lap top) task in natural contexts such as students lounging around campus, people on commuter trains, and even people at the beach (e.g., Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007). Although there is some impoverishment of the experimental control one has in laboratory experiments, field experiments are particularly effective if one wishes to embed experimental manipulations in natural contexts and if one wants to access non-student populations.

Another very common type of methodology is surveys and questionnaire studies conducted in the lab, in the field, or more recently online. These studies largely measure people's self-perceptions, and their intergroup attitudes, attributions/explanations, and behavioral intentions. For example, research on authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2006) and social dominance orientation (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) rests heavily on surveys and questionnaires, as do studies of the role played by dispositions such as need for cognitive closure in intergroup phenomena (e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Surveys and questionnaires allow one to study the interrelationship among people's existing perceptions and attitudes, but do not often provide reliable answers to causal questions and do not often monitor social cognitive processes.

Simulations and observational and participant observation studies, and archival studies and secondary data analyses tend to be significantly less common in social psychological research on intergroup relations. One reason for this is that these methods tend to provide descriptive societal-level data rather than individual-level data that answer causal questions concerning social cognitive and social interactive processes. However, these methods can sometimes be useful to explore intergroup phenomena that are difficult to study fully in controlled or lab settings. Thus, some exceptions include Fogelson's (1970) archival analysis of 1960s riots, Simonton's (1980) archival and secondary data analyses of battles, and Reicher and colleagues' analyses of schisms (e.g., Sani & Reicher, 1998).

Because stereotyping and prejudice are significant aspects of intergroup relations and, particularly in Western countries, many people try to hide their prejudices, an array of methods involving unobtrusive and indirect measures of prejudice have been devised. These include observation of non-verbal behavior, for example how far people choose to sit from an object clearly labeled as belonging to a temporarily absent member of an ethnic outgroup, and the careful deconstruction and analysis of discourse (what people say and how they say it), for example van Dijk's (1987) analysis of how racism is subtly reflected in people's discourse.

The most widespread contemporary method for researching hidden prejudice is the measurement of non-conscious implicit associations – the Implicit Association Test (IAT – Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) which can be accessed on line by anyone to discover that almost all of us have hidden prejudices. The principle behind the IAT is that people react more quickly (usually measured by how quickly someone presses a key to respond to a stimulus) to concepts that are linked in their mind than those that are not – so, if you have a negative stereotype of, say, Republicans, you will more quickly respond “yes” to the word “nasty” and “no” to the word “nice” than if you had no such stereotype.

Social psychologists have also become intrigued in recent years to discover biochemical and brain activity associated with different forms and aspects of intergroup behavior. For example, some studies focus on cortisol levels to measure stress and anxiety associated with identity threat, intergroup encounters and intergroup emotions (e.g., Townsend, Major, Gangi, & Mendes, 2011). Other studies use fMRI techniques to map electro-chemical brain activity associate with a range of behaviors including group rejection, and intergroup fear, disgust, hostility and so forth (e.g., Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). These kinds of methods do access biochemical and brain activity correlates of behavior, but they typically require expensive equipment and extensive methodological training, and participants are placed in very unnatural settings that can make it difficult to draw reliable causal conclusions or to generalize to more realistic intergroup contexts and behaviors.

Personality Dispositions and Individual Differences

Intergroup behavior tends to be competitive and ethnocentric. In intergroup contexts people generally act so as to gain or maintain an advantage for their own group over other groups in terms of resources, status, prestige, and so forth (e.g., Brewer & Campbell, 1976). Sumner put it beautifully when he described *ethnocentrism* as:

a view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it ... Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right one ... Ethnocentrism leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is peculiar and which differentiates them from others. (Sumner, 1906, p. 13)

Although intergroup relations are intrinsically ethnocentric, relations between groups can vary widely in their extremity – from harmless generalized images, tolerance, and friendly rivalry to deep-seated hatred, intolerance, and violent conflict.

Because the latter form of intergroup behavior is responsible for appalling injustices and inhumanities the study of intergroup relations has tended to focus on this extreme form of intergroup relations – prejudice, discrimination, bigotry, intergroup aggression, and so forth. Social psychologists, like most other people, have wondered whether there may be something “wrong” with people who behave in this way – perhaps these people have dysfunctional personalities that are innate or grounded in early childhood experiences, and predispose them to be extremely ethnocentric and intolerant. This perspective has spawned one of social psychology's major and enduring explanations of prejudice and intergroup conflict – Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950) *authoritarian personality theory* (also see, Titus & Hollander, 1957).

Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, and Closed-Mindedness

Adorno and colleagues adopted a psychodynamic framework to argue that early childhood rearing practices that are harsh, disciplinarian, and emotionally manipulative, produce people who are obsessed by status and authority, intolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty, and hostile and aggressive toward weaker others. These people have an authoritarian personality that predisposes them to extreme forms of intergroup behavior. Research on the authoritarian personality confirms the existence of such a syndrome, but does not provide good evidence for its origins in early childrearing or for its relationship to prejudice and discrimination (see Duckitt, 2000). People who do not have an authoritarian personality can be prejudiced, and people who do have an authoritarian personality can be free of prejudice.

For example, Pettigrew conducted a now classic study of authoritarianism and racism in South Africa and the United States (Pettigrew, 1958). Pettigrew administered a survey measuring authoritarianism and intergroup attitudes among a large sample of white South Africans. He was able to show that prejudice was less related to personality than it was to socialization within a culture of prejudice that legitimized prejudice as the background to everyday life. This perspective is now widely accepted by social psychologists who study prejudice and intergroup relations (e.g., Billig, 1976; Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & Ryan, 2001).

Nevertheless, social psychologists have an enduring penchant to explain extreme and pathological behaviors, such as prejudice, in terms of individuals who have extreme and perhaps pathological personalities – rather than in terms of “extreme” circumstances. The notion of authoritarianism continues to be popular, but without the psychodynamic and personality emphasis. Altemeyer's (1998) theory of *right wing authoritarianism* characterizes authoritarianism as an attitude or ideology that promotes conventionalism (adherence to societal conventions that are endorsed by established

authorities), authoritarian aggression (support for aggression towards social deviants) and authoritarian submission (submission to society's established authorities). It is an individual ideology that legitimizes and maintains the status quo, and varies in strength from person to person. Altemeyer's ideas have broad empirical support, particularly when they are integrated with concepts to do with, for example, social dominance and group identity (e.g., Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002).

Another "individual differences" explanation of prejudice is Rokeach's (1960) idea that some people have a dogmatic and closed-minded personality that predisposes them to ethnocentrism, intergroup intolerance and prejudice. Somewhat related to this, Kruglanski and his colleagues have more recently argued that a general *need for cognitive closure* (a motivation to resolve cognitive inconsistencies), that can be an individual difference but can also be primed by contextual factors, can produce *group centrism* – described as a constellation of behaviors that includes extreme intergroup behaviors (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006).

Social Dominance and System Justification

In a slightly different vein, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have described a relatively sophisticated, but ultimately largely "individual differences," analysis of exploitative power-based intergroup relations – called *social dominance theory*. Social dominance theory explains the extent to which people accept or reject societal ideologies or myths that legitimize hierarchy and discrimination, or that legitimize equality and fairness. People who desire their own group to be dominant and superior to outgroups have a high social dominance orientation that encourages them to reject egalitarian ideologies, and to accept myths that legitimize hierarchy and discrimination. These kinds of people are more inclined to be prejudiced than are people who have a low social dominance orientation.

Originally focused on people's desire for ingroup domination over outgroups, social dominance theory has more recently been extended to address a general desire for inequality between groups, irrespective of whether one's own group is at the top or the bottom of the status hierarchy (e.g., Duckitt, 2006). This development resonates with *system justification theory* (e.g. Jost & Hunyadi, 2002; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012), which argues that certain social conditions cause people to resist social change and instead justify and protect the existing social order, even if it maintains their own group's position of disadvantage.

Overall, psychological social psychologists prefer an account of prejudice that focuses on socialization, cognitive processes, and the role of a culture of prejudice. This is because pure personality and individual differences explanations leave the context specificity and situational and temporal variability of prejudice poorly explained. Prejudices can change in form and strength faster than personality (i.e., enduring properties of the individual that are largely uninfluenced by context) would be expected to change. Interactionist perspectives that focus on an interaction between personality and social context are more versatile. But one wonders, then, if the interaction is actually between enduring contextual influences (e.g., culture), and immediate situational influences (e.g., an intergroup atrocity) – in which case the notion of personality may not be needed at all.

Goal Relations and Interdependence

In contrast to those who emphasize personality and individual differences as an explanation of intergroup behavior – a bottom-up analysis – are those who emphasize the goal relations between groups or individuals – a top-down analysis. A champion of this perspective is Sherif, who maintained that "we cannot extrapolate from the properties of individuals to the characteristics of group situations" (Sherif, 1962, p. 5).

Realistic Conflict

Sherif proposed a *realistic conflict* or *interdependence theory* of intergroup relations (Sherif, 1958). It was predicated on the belief that behavior is driven by goals and by people's perceptions of their relationship to one another with respect to achieving goals. If two groups have the same goal (e.g., prosperity) but the goal is such that one group can only gain at the expense of the other (there is a zero-sum goal relationship, with mutually exclusive goals, and negative interdependence between groups) then intergroup relations will be competitive and dis-harmonious. If two groups have the same goal and the goal is such that it can only be achieved if both groups work together (there is a non-zero-sum goal relationship, with a superordinate goal, and positive interdependence between groups) then intergroup relations will be cooperative and harmonious. At the interpersonal level, mutually exclusive goals lead to interpersonal conflict and group dissolution, whereas superordinate goals lead to interpersonal harmony, group formation, and group cohesion.

This idea was tested by Sherif and his associates in a classic series of field experiments at boys' camps in the United States (e.g., Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; see Sherif, 1966). In these studies, often referred to as the Robbers Cave experiment as the studies were conducted at Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma, Sherif manipulated goal relations between individuals and between groups and was able to create cohesive groups, intergroup conflict and hostility, and to some extent intergroup harmony.

More specifically there was a group formation phase where the boys were allocated to two separate cabins that did not interact with one another. Each cabin engaged in its own separate and cooperative camp activities designed to build group cohesion, norms and structure. For the next stage the two groups (who had now named themselves "The Rattlers" and "The Eagles") engaged in an array of organized tournaments (e.g., a tug-of-war) in which they competed for highly valued prizes. Intergroup behavior became quite extreme. Negative outgroup attitudes developed, and there was derogatory name calling and marked ingroup favoritism. For the final stage Sherif created situations in which the two groups had to cooperate to in order to achieve a goal they both valued but could not achieve on their own (for example, pulling a very heavy broken down camp truck back to camp). Over a number of different cooperative activities intergroup relations gradually improved – Sherif recounts that on the trip home the boys sang together on the bus and several of them from opposing groups exchanged addresses.

Variants of the boys' camp paradigm have been used by other researchers (Fisher, 1990). For example, Blake and Mouton (1961) ran 2-week studies with more than 1,000 business executives on management training programs, and others have replicated Sherif's studies in different cultures (e.g., Andreeva, 1984). The results of these replications are consistent with the original Robbers Cave findings.

The idea that goal relations determine the complexion of intergroup behavior continues to be a powerful theme – for example, in the work of Morton Deutsch (1973), in the field research of Brewer and Campbell (1976), in the research of Insko and associates (Insko et al., 1992), and in work by Rabbie on his behavioral interdependence model (e.g., Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989; see Turner & Bourhis's, 1996, critique). Because realistic conflict theory is a top-down analysis of intergroup relations, it is metatheoretically consistent with more sociological analyses of social behavior. Not surprisingly, it has a substantial legacy in research that traces ethnic and race relations to perceived intergroup threat and to competition over scarce resources (e.g., Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996).

Frustrated Ambitions

Interdependence or realistic conflict approaches to intergroup behavior view conflict as arising from situations where other groups threaten ingroup goal achievement. The idea that people can act aggressively towards others who frustrate goal achievement, or can locate scapegoats to aggress against, has

a long tradition in social psychology; reaching back to the *frustration aggression hypothesis* (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) and subsequent variants that fed more into the social psychology of aggression (e.g., Berkowitz, 1962). Later in this chapter we discuss the role of frustrated ambitions in collective protest.

Another way to consider the role of frustrated goals in intergroup behavior is from the perspective of research on *social dilemmas* – a situation in which individual short term benefits conflict with longer term collective benefits (Dawes & Messick, 2000). An intergroup social dilemma exists when a group has to sacrifice its own benefits for the sake of a larger collective that includes outgroups. Social dilemmas are crises of trust – and given that groups typically do not trust one another one can quickly see how groups can selfishly pursue their own goals in competition with outgroups and to the detriment of the overarching good (e.g., Brewer & Schneider, 1990; cf. Hogg, 2007a).

Where an outgroup frustrates group goals that relate to the prestige or distinctiveness of one's own group and one's identity as a member of that group a genuine threat is experienced. This invokes an array of actions aimed at protecting the status of the group and the integrity of the group's boundaries. Group members can align themselves with an autocratic ingroup leader (Hogg, 2010), fixate on and persecute marginal and "deviant" fellow members (e.g., Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010), exert pressure towards ingroup uniformity and homogeneity (e.g., Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997), and adopt a variety of strategies designed to consolidate or improve the group's status (e.g., Ellemers, 1993).

Social Categorization

Goals and goal relations play a critical role in intergroup behavior, and are an important component of social psychological explanations of intergroup relations. There is little doubt that groups that can only see themselves as competing over a zero-sum resource are likely to have conflictual intergroup relations, and that this relationship could be improved if those groups could only view themselves as having superordinate goals or non-zero-sum goal relations. However, there may be a more fundamental reason why groups find it difficult to maintain harmonious intergroup relations – perhaps the very existence of separate categories generates competitive behaviors. After all, social categorization is the foundation of intergroup relations – relations between groups can only occur if the social world can be categorized into separate groups (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Hogg, 2001).

Minimal Groups

This idea was investigated in a series of minimal group studies originally conducted in the late 1960s (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971), that has now been replicated countless times (see Diehl, 1990). *Minimal group studies* are experiments, mainly conducted in the lab, where people are categorized into two groups ostensibly either randomly or on the basis of some trivial criterion. They then allocate resources (often only points) between anonymous members of their group and anonymous members of the outgroup, and complete various other measures about their feelings about themselves, their group, and the other group. The groups have no prior history and no future, there is no interaction, there is no material gain for individuals from membership, and people do not know who is in their group or in the other group. The highly robust finding from these experiments is that relative to people who are not explicitly categorized, those who are categorized discriminate in favor of their group, show evaluative ingroup bias, and indicate that they feel a sense of belonging to their group, and similarity to and liking for their anonymous fellow ingroup members. There is evidence that categorization-based

evaluative bias in favor of the ingroup is relatively automatic and outside conscious control – it occurs implicitly (Otten & Wentura, 1999).

From the minimal group studies it seemed that competitive intergroup behavior might be an intrinsic feature of the mere existence of a social categorization into ingroup and outgroup. Competitive goal relations might accentuate the effect or serve as a criterion for the existence of categories, but there was clearly a deeper social-cognitive dynamic at play. This finding and its conceptual implications were a critical catalyst for the development of social identity theory, described below. Subsequent research has identified a number of factors that moderate the relationship between social categorization and intergroup discrimination (see below).

Automatic Schema Activation

People cognitively represent physical or social categories as *schemas* that describe the attributes of the category and the relationships among those attributes. Category schemas vary from concrete exemplars of the category to abstract fuzzy sets of loosely related attributes (prototypes) – e.g., Rosch (1978). Categories themselves vary in *entitativity* – the degree to which they have the properties of a tightly organized, distinctive, and cohesive, unitary construct (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Degree of entitativity is associated with a wide range of group processes and intergroup relations, such as degree of conformity to group norms, rejection of deviants, hierarchical leadership, and polarized intergroup perceptions and behavior (see Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004).

Social cognition researchers describe how perceptual cues, in particular distinctive visual cues (Brewer & Lui, 1989; Zebrowitz, 1996), cause us to categorize people and imbue them with the attributes that are described by our schema of that group (see Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010). The entire process can be slow and deliberate, but in general it is fast and automatic (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Stereotyping of outgroup members may be largely an automatic categorization-contingent process that we have little control over (Bargh, 1994; Devine, 1989) – category attributes are implicitly linked to and associated with categories (Greenwald et al., 2002), and this process largely occurs in that part of the brain (the amygdala) where automatic cognitive processing in general occurs (Lieberman, 2007).

Other research suggests that this automatic process may be moderated by a number of factors. For example, the category-attribute link is weaker among those who are less prejudiced (Lepore & Brown, 1997) and those who are able to take the perspective of the target (Galinsky & Mosko-witz, 2000). However there is also intriguing evidence for a *stereotype rebound effect* – if people consciously think about the automatic category-stereotype link, the process paradoxically strengthens the link and increases automatic stereotype activation (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Zhang & Hunt, 2008).

Accentuation and Illusory Correlation

Another robust effect of social categorization is that it causes us to perceptually accentuate similarities among members of the same category and differences between members of different categories. This accentuation effect appears to be a general consequence of categorization (Tajfel, 1959), but one that is asymmetrical because we tend generally to view outgroups as more homogenous than ingroups (e.g., Judd & Park, 1988).

A popular explanation for this asymmetry is that we are more familiar with the ingroup and therefore have more individuating information about ingroup than outgroup members (Linville, Fischer, &

Salovey, 1989). Other research has questioned this explanation (e.g., Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981), with Simon and Brown (1987) showing that relative homogeneity effects may be influenced by strategic considerations. For example, active minorities often consider themselves to be relatively more homogenous than the majority outgroup – this is clearly quite functional as active minorities need to be consistent and consensual in order to survive and have a realistic opportunity to create social change (see, Mugny, 1982).

Related to the accentuation effect is the *illusory correlation* effect (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Hamilton & Sherman, 1989) where people associate distinctive behaviors with distinctive categories; thus laying a foundation for correlating unfavorable attributes with minority groups (unfavorable attributes and minority groups are both believed to be perceptually distinctive).

Self and Social Identity

Social categorization segments the social world into groups, and cognitively represents such groups in terms of schemas, usually in the form of prototypes. Social categorization profoundly affects person perception, but also, as shown by the minimal group studies described above, influences how we behave. To fully explore the relationship between social categorization and the array of behaviors we associate with groups and intergroup relations we need to invoke the self-concept. After all, when we categorize other people, perhaps we also categorize self.

Social Identity Theory

The link between social categorization, self-conception, and group and intergroup behavior is most fully explored by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see Hogg & Abrams, 1988); for contemporary overviews see Abrams and Hogg (2010) and Hogg (2006, 2012a). Social identity theory has two main foci that are conceptually integrated; the *social identity theory of intergroup relations* (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which focuses on positive intergroup distinctiveness and the role of subjective beliefs about intergroup status relations on intergroup behavior (cf. Ellemers, 1993); and the social identity theory of the group, usually called *self-categorization theory* (Turner et al., 1987), which focuses on the generative role of categorization in all group and intergroup phenomena.

Within this conceptual framework a number of compatible sub-theories and conceptual extensions have been developed. There is a focus on the structure of social identity (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996) and on the motivational role in social identity processes of self-enhancement (the self-esteem hypothesis – e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988), self-uncertainty (uncertainty-identity theory – Hogg, 2007b, 2012b) and conflicting drives for distinctiveness and assimilation (optimal distinctiveness theory – Brewer, 1991; Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010). There is a focus on intergroup social comparisons (see Hogg & Gaffney, *in press*), social influence and conformity to norms (e.g., Turner, 1991; also see Hogg & Smith, 2007), and leadership processes within groups (the social identity theory of leadership – Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003) and between groups (Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012). There is also a focus on deindividuation in groups (the social identity model of deindividuation (SIDE) – Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995), on stereotyping (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994), and on processes associated with marginalization of deviants (the subjective group dynamics model – Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Pinto et al., 2010).

Social Identity Processes and Phenomena

Social identity theory argues that people define and evaluate themselves in terms of the groups to which they belong. Groups provide people with a collective self-concept, a *social identity*; and people have as many social identities as the groups to which they feel they belong. Social identity is differentiated from *personal identity* which is tied to interpersonal relationships and idiosyncratic personal traits. However, social identity can be structured in different ways that emphasize shared category attributes or networks of tight relationships among group members (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Cameron, 2004; Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994).

Because social identities define, prescribe and evaluate who one is and how one should think, feel and act, people have a strong desire to establish or maintain the evaluative superiority of their own group over relevant other groups – there is a fierce intergroup struggle for evaluatively positive group distinctiveness. This struggle is, however, tempered by people's understanding of the nature of the relations between their group and relevant outgroups – their *social belief systems*. In particular people attend to status differences and the stability and legitimacy of such differences, to the permeability of intergroup boundaries and thus the possibility of passing psychologically from one group to the other, and to the existence of achievable alternatives to the status quo. For social identity theory, group behaviors (conformity, stereotyping, ethnocentrism, ingroup favoritism, intergroup discrimination, ingroup cohesion, etc.), as distinct from interpersonal behaviors, occur when social identity is the psychologically salient basis of self-conceptualization; and the content of group behavior rests on the specific social identity that is salient. Social identity is context specific in so far as different social identities are salient in different social contexts.

Social identity phenomena are cognitively generated by social categorization of self and others. People represent groups as *prototypes* – fuzzy sets of attributes that describe and prescribe perceptions, thoughts, feelings and actions that define the ingroup and distinguish it from relevant outgroups. Prototypes capture the optimal balance between minimization of intragroup differences and maximization of intergroup differences. In this respect, prototypes tend to be the group ideal rather than the average. They also accentuate *entitativity* – the extent to which the group is viewed as a coherent and distinct entity (cf. Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Social categorization perceptually assimilates people to the relevant ingroup or outgroup prototype and views them, not as unique individual people, but through the lens of category membership – a process of depersonalization occurs. *Depersonalization* refers to a change in the basis of perception, and does not have the negative implications of terms such as 'deindividuation' or 'dehumanization.' Applied to self, social categorization has the same effect as the categorization of other people. It transforms self conception so that people feel like group members, and it depersonalizes attitudes, feelings and behaviors such that they conform to the ingroup prototype. Thus, self-categorization is responsible for conformity, normative behavior, and the rest of the edifice of group and intergroup behaviors.

Social identity theory has made an enormous impact on the social psychology of intergroup relations, and has also contributed significantly to a revival of research on group processes in general (see Moreland, Hogg, & Hains, 1994). A recent literature survey revealed that 36 % of publications between 1997 and 2007 on intergroup relations in social psychology's top eight journals invoked social identity as a key concept (Randsley de Moura, Leader, Pelletier, & Abrams, 2008).

Motives and Motivation

Why do people engage in intergroup behavior, and perhaps more fundamentally why do people identify with groups – what motivates intergroup behavior, and what motivates specific types of intergroup behavior? One answer is in terms of specific goals that people or groups may want to achieve – goals

that can only be achieved by interpersonal or intergroup cooperative interaction (superordinate goals), or goals that are mutually exclusive and can only be achieved by interpersonal or intergroup competition. Functional theories of intergroup relations, such as that proposed by Sherif (e.g., 1958) fall in this camp (see above).

Personality- and Affiliation-Related Motivations

Personality approaches like Adorno et al.'s (1950) authoritarian personality, or Rokeach's (1960) dogmatic personality treat people's need to compartmentalize and order their social world as a core aspect of authoritarianism or dogmatism. Authoritarian or dogmatic people are powerfully motivated to discriminate starkly between groups, and, in the case of authoritarianism, to displace negative feelings onto lower status outgroups (see above). Enduring individual differences, such as need for cognitive closure (e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), have also been proposed as a predictor of why some people engage in more extreme and destructive intergroup conduct than others.

Theories of why people affiliate in the first place have identified a range of motives, of which social reality testing through social comparison is an important one (e.g., Festinger, 1954) – people affiliate with similar others to obtain from those others validation for their perceptions, attitudes and feelings. Terror management is another motive for affiliation (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997) – people affiliate with others because they recognize their own mortality and experience “paralyzing terror” in the face of the inevitability of dying. To manage this terror people can go to extremes to protect their worldview. Leary and Baumeister (2000) argue that people simply have a fundamental need to belong that underpins the existence of groups and the way in which groups struggle against one another for survival – the consequences of not belonging, or of being ostracized (e.g., Williams, 2001), can be quite extreme.

Social Identity-Related Motivations

Social identity research focuses on contextual factors that cause us to categorize ourselves and others in particular ways, and on the consequences of categorizing in that way. According to *uncertainty-identity theory* a fundamental motive for social categorization, which also underpins categorization more generally, is a need to reduce feelings of uncertainty about who we are in a particular context, and thus about what we should think, feel and do, and how we will be perceived and treated by others (Hogg, 2007b, 2012b). Social categorization and thus group identification is a very powerful and effective way to reduce self-uncertainty – it allows us to predict people's behavior, plan our own actions, and socially locate ourselves relative to other people. Indeed, people may find uncertainty so aversive that they resist change and instead support the status quo, even when it casts their own group in a relatively low status position (cf. system justification theory – Jost & van der Toorn, 2012).

Highly entitative groups are better suited to self-uncertainty reduction and so people strive to identify with them or enhance the entitativity of groups they already identify with. Where self-uncertainty is particularly self-relevant, chronic and acute, people may go beyond entitativity to identify with “extremist” groups that are prototypically homogeneous, ideologically orthodox, highly ethnocentric and suspicious of outsiders, rigidly and hierarchically structured, intolerant of diversity, dissent and criticism, and so forth (a “syndrome” labeled group-centrism by Kruglanski et al., 2006). Such groups will go to extremes to protect and promote their identity and world view. This analysis has been used to account for the attraction and emergence of strong and autocratic leadership (Hogg,

2005), the appeal of organized religions and religious fundamentalism (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010), and the appeal for adolescents of risk-taking groups (Hogg, Siegel, & Hohman, 2011).

Another powerful intergroup motive is self-enhancement. According to social identity theory, intergroup behavior is motivated by a struggle between groups to promote or protect their positive distinctiveness from one another, and thus secure a relatively favorable social identity. People engage in this struggle because, at the individual level, group membership mediates self-evaluation via social identity, and people tend to be motivated to feel good about themselves; to have a positive sense of self esteem. In intergroup contexts self-esteem may motivate social identity processes, but how this is pursued is significantly impacted by social conventions and social belief systems (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). An alternative view is that self-esteem may not motivate intergroup behavior, but rather act as a psychological monitor, or rather *sociometer*, of satisfaction of other motives to do with social connectedness and belonging (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000).

According to Brewer's (1991; Leonardelli et al., 2010) *optimal distinctiveness theory* people simultaneously strive to be the same as other people (assimilation/inclusiveness) and to be different from other people (differentiation/uniqueness). Because these are contrasting human motives, the equilibrium state is one of optimal distinctiveness. Over-satisfaction of one motive engages the contrasting motive to reinstate optimal distinctiveness. Large groups tend to make people feel insufficiently distinctive, whereas very small groups tend to make people feel too distinctive. Optimal distinctiveness is, therefore, best satisfied by intergroup contexts in which the ingroup is not overly large – there is sufficient intergroup and intragroup distinctiveness to balance ingroup assimilation.

Generally, there is good evidence that threats to group distinctiveness or group valence, and thus to self-conception and self-evaluation, motivate protective reactions that can, depending on available material and psychological resources, manifest as intergroup conflict, “backlash”, more subtle forms of intergroup behavior, or dis-identification (e.g., Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Shelton, Richeson, & Vorauer, 2006). For example, self-affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988) describes how people whose identity in one domain is evaluatively threatened, engage in practices that publicly affirm a favorable identity in another domain.

Affect and Emotion

Social psychological analyses of intergroup relations tend to privilege social cognitive processes. However, intergroup relations are notable for the strong feelings, and associated emotions, people have about their own group and about outgroups. Indeed, the most troublesome aspects of intergroup relations are precisely those that involve strong emotions, and powerful affect.

Intergroup emotions theory draws on social identity and self-categorization processes to show how people who identify with the same group can collectively experience very similar emotions (e.g., Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Smith, Segar, & Mackie, 2007). People in salient groups feel other people's emotions as their own because self-categorization merges self and other via prototype-based depersonalization – people experience, or include the other as part of the self (e.g., Tropp & Wright, 2001). In this way, intergroup feelings (which are often negative) can readily become powerfully consensual collective intergroup feelings. Similarly positive ingroup feelings can transform into consensual positive regard and ingroup solidarity.

Intergroup emotions theory provides a research based explanation for an older concept, the Group Mind that McDougall (1920) used to explain how emotions, particularly primitive ones such as fear and anger, spread rapidly and widely in crowds to generate volatile and often violent and extreme crowd behavior. However, much of the research on intergroup relations-related emotions has focused on collective guilt and collective shame – powerful emotions of self-condemnation that are believed to regulate intergroup interactions where one's group has violated a moral or social code (e.g., Brown,

Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006).

In particular, these aversive emotions of guilt and shame, when experienced collectively on behalf of one's group as a reaction to the way one's group has treated another group, impact the extent to which a group intends to perform acts of reparation, specifically public apologies, political action intentions, and so forth. For example, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears and Manstead (2006) examine the way in which a dominant group experiences collective guilt (a feeling that "we" have unjustly disadvantaged and caused suffering to "them"). This occurs if members identify strongly with the group, the identity is central to self-conception, and members believe that the group's position of superiority is illegitimate because it rests on the group's violation of a moral value to which the group adheres.

Intergroup Attitudes

Stereotyping and Prejudice

Earlier we saw how categories are cognitively represented as schemas or prototypes, and that the link between category cues, categorization, and prototype-based perception of self and others is relatively automatic (Greenwald et al., 2002) – the process of stereotyping that we normally associate with outgroup perceptions and prejudice.

Stereotypes, although held by individuals who apply them to outgroups, need also to be understood more broadly as shared intergroup attitudes that are embedded in wider explanatory belief systems grounded in social identities that are configured by intergroup relations. Tajfel (1981), in particular, makes a strong case for the various social functions that stereotypes serve. For example, he explains how stereotypes may emerge to justify actions that have been committed or planned by one group against another group; if one group exploits another group it may be useful to justify this action by developing a stereotype of the outgroup as unsophisticated and dependent. Stereotypes become more extreme and more resistant to change under conditions of intergroup conflict.

Although stereotyping is relatively automatic, the expression of stereotypes is significantly affected by the wider normative and legislative environment in which intergroup relations exist. People are adept at hiding their prejudices when it is socially undesirable or dangerous to express them. But social psychologists are clever at detecting hidden prejudice by the use of unobtrusive and implicit measures that look through the veil of conscious impression management and focus on non-verbal behavior (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980) or the subtleties of language and discourse (e.g., van Dijk, 1987). Perhaps the most widespread and best established implicit measure of prejudice is the *implicit association test* (IAT) in which implicit cognitive associations are elicited by measuring how quickly people press computer keys to associate evaluative words with social categories (Greenwald et al., 1998).

Stereotypes also change their structure and form over time. For example, racist attitudes take different forms depending on whether the normative environment is one that inhibits overt racism or one that allows overt racism. Researchers have pursued this idea in order to understand modern forms of racism (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; McConahay, 1986). In Western societies there is a long history of racism that produces deep-seated racial prejudice, fears and suspicions. However there is also a tradition of tolerance and egalitarianism that has become enshrined in social norms and legislation that proscribe racist behavior. For many people, therefore, there is an uncomfortable psychological conflict between two sets of contrasting beliefs. People can resolve the conflict by avoiding the racial outgroup, avoiding the issue of race, denying the existence of disadvantage, opposing preferential treatment, and so forth. Overt forms of racism have, in many sectors of society, been replaced by this "modern" form. A similar analysis has been used to explain modern forms of sexism (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 1996; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995).

Social Explanation

As noted above, intergroup attitudes and stereotypes are typically embedded in shared explanatory belief systems. These systems are best characterized as ideologies or world views (cf. Duckitt et al., 2002), or perhaps social representations (cf. Lorenzi-Cioldi & Clémence, 2001). For example, Crandall (1994) has shown how unfavorable attitudes towards people who are obese are configured by a wider ideology about “fat” people as a social category of people who “choose” not to take responsibility for their health or appearance. Negative attitudes towards categories such as the unemployed, and even rape victims, may be configured by a wider ideological belief in a just world (cf. Furnham, 2003).

There are also causal attribution dimensions of stereotyping (Hewstone & Jaspars, 1982). Pettigrew (1979) draws on classic attribution theory, in particular the actor-observer effect in which people over-attribute others’ behavior to dispositions and their own behavior to the situation (see Watson, 1982), to describe what he calls the *ultimate attribution error*. The ultimate attribution error is a group level attribution in which people behave ethnocentrically. Good acts are attributed dispositionally if performed by an ingroup member and situationally if performed by an outgroup member, and vice versa for bad acts. Research conducted in India (Taylor & Jaggi, 1974) and Malaysia (Hewstone & Ward, 1985) certainly supports this analysis (also see Islam & Hewstone, 1993). In the Malaysia study Malays showed a clear ethnocentric attribution bias – they attributed a socially desirable positive act by a Malay more to internal factors than a similar act by a Chinese, and a negative act by a Malay less to internal factors than a similar act by a Chinese.

A particularly disturbing attribution dimension of stereotyping is *essentialism* (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 1998). This is a tendency to attribute outgroup attributes to underlying dispositions or essences, and is thus a process that transforms the objects or traits associated with intergroup attitudes into immutable properties or essences of outgroups and their members. Miller and Prentice (1999) argue that intergroup perceptions that rest on such essentialism create insurmountable *cultural divides* that can make it extremely difficult to improve intergroup relations. When this process of essentialism focuses, as it often does, on highly negative outgroup attributes that effectively diminish the targets’ humanness then a process of *dehumanization* has occurred (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Loughnan, & Kashima, 2008). Viewing people as non-human makes it easier to do harm to them – and to commit widespread intergroup atrocities such as genocide (e.g., Staub, 2010).

Prejudice and Discrimination

Intergroup relations are not just about perceptions, attitudes and explanations. They are very much about how one group behaves towards another group. The main behavioral feature of intergroup relations is discrimination, which can range from relatively innocuous ingroup favoritism, through name-calling and verbal abuse, to systematic intergroup violence and genocide. A key question is what is the relationship between intergroup attitudes and intergroup behavior – a question that is part of the broader attitude-behavior issue.

Attitudes and Behavior

Attitude-behavior research reveals that people’s attitudes and their behavior do not often correspond very closely (see Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010) and a number of conditions need to be met to strengthen the correspondence (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). For example, LaPiere’s (1934) classic study of attitudes towards Chinese Americans revealed that a young Chinese American couple was almost

never denied service at hotels and restaurants as they travelled across the United States. However, almost all those same establishments when subsequently contacted by phone by the experimenters expressed the strong anti-Chinese sentiment that they would not serve Chinese people. The research was conducted mainly in the western United States where, at the time, anti-Chinese sentiment was strongest.

As we saw above, unfavorable intergroup attitudes can be well concealed when a normative environment exists that proscribes prejudice or that mutates it into modern forms (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). Because the absence of overt discrimination may not indicate the absence of underlying negative intergroup sentiments, a great challenge for social psychology is to be able to detect prejudice in environments in which the expression of prejudice is normatively (and often legally) prohibited. The key is use of unobtrusive measures – if people do not know they are being observed or measured then they are more likely to behave in accordance with their “true” attitudes. Unobtrusive measures include the analysis of the subtext of what people say in natural conversation (e.g., van Dijk, 1987), the analysis of behaviors that people have little conscious control over (Crosby et al., 1980; Maass, 1999), and, as noted above, the analysis of implicit associations (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998, 2002).

Overt Discrimination

Discriminatory behavior is, however, rather easy to obtain in minimal group studies (Tajfel et al., 1971) – probably because the groups have no history and thus no social norms exist to proscribe discrimination against the other group. This research has sometimes been interpreted as leading to the rather gloomy prognosis for humanity that, all things being equal, social categorization per se leads to discrimination. Fortunately, this inference is not completely accurate. Social categorization may be a necessary condition for intergroup discrimination, but it is not sufficient.

At very least, according to social identity theory, people must psychologically internalize the social categorization as a self-definition. This is more likely to happen when they feel uncertain about themselves (Hogg, 2007b, 2012b), when the category is positively distinctive relative to other groups, or if the category is lower status and people have no realistic option to identify with a different category (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In addition research shows that whether people discriminate or not is influenced by the nature of the dimensions that are available on which to discriminate. For example, there is a *positive-negative asymmetry effect* (Mummendey & Otten, 1998) – although people discriminate against outgroups when they are giving rewards, they do not do so when they are giving punishments, unless their group is under threat by being disadvantaged or being in a minority position. “Real” groups exist in a socio-historical environment containing societal norms that prescribe, proscribe or direct discriminatory behavior. Furthermore, people have social belief systems relating to status stability and legitimacy, intergroup permeability, and realistic alternatives to the status quo (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) – in the pursuit of positive social identity these beliefs influence the form that intergroup behavior takes.

Although discrimination is often viewed unfavorably from the perspective of liberal democratic societies, ingroups generally view it positively – discrimination conveys ingroup loyalty and commitment. People are prepared to accept, even praise unfair or unjust practices when they are directed towards outgroups. However, the story is different when such behavior is directed towards the ingroup. Tyler and his colleagues (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992) have shown across a variety of experiments and surveys that people in groups are not overly concerned about having less than fellow group members (*distributive inequality*), but they are very concerned about being treated fairly (*procedural justice*). Ingroup procedural fairness signifies respect, and is an important influence on members’ sense of belonging and thus the extent to which they bond with the group.

One implication of Tyler’s analysis is that intergroup discrimination can serve a strategic function. The primary audience for discriminatory behavior may be the ingroup; people may overtly discriminate

against an outgroup in order to bolster their own ingroup credentials and standing. For instance, jingoistic rhetoric and overt outgroup discrimination on the part of leaders may serve this function (e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 2003), as may the publicly verifiable nature of delinquent behavior (Emler & Reicher, 1995).

Stigma and Disadvantage

The power and status inequalities that almost always exist between groups in society have far reaching consequences, and are in many ways the essential problem of intergroup relations. If intergroup relations were characterized by groups of equal status and power, disadvantage and all that flows from it would not be present. As it is, intergroup relations are almost always associated with differential status, power, prestige, resources and so forth. Dominant, majority groups do well out of this arrangement, and their members generally experience a positive sense of identity and esteem. Subordinate, minority groups do not do so well, and their members can carry a stigma that has profound effects on self-conception. "Stigmatized individuals possess (or are believed to possess) some attribute, or characteristic, that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context" (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, p. 505). Stigmas can be visible (race) or concealable (sexual orientation), and can vary in perceived controllability (race has low perceived controllability, whereas obesity has high perceived controllability) – stigma visibility and perceived controllability affect the extent and form of prejudice or discrimination that a member of a stigmatized group suffers.

Because stigmatized groups know exactly the negative stereotypes that others have of them, they experience what Steele and his associates have called *stereotype threat* (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002; also see Inzlicht & Schmader, 2011). Stigmatized individuals are aware that others may judge and treat them stereotypically, and thus, on tasks that really matter to them they worry that through their behavior they may confirm the stereotype. This worry can interfere with and thus impair task performance. Stigmatized people can also suffer attributional ambiguity – they are very sensitive to the causes of others' treatment of them and may over-attribute it to prejudice (Crocker & Major, 1989). Stigmatized groups suffer material and social disadvantage, and can find that their goals and aspirations are continually frustrated relative to other groups. A sense of reduced efficacy and motivation can set in, and rather than fight for change, groups can sometimes acquiesce to these conditions – some groups can prefer disadvantage to the uncertainties and dangers of struggling for social change (e.g., Jost & Hunyadi, 2002).

In general, although some stigmatized individuals are vulnerable to low self-esteem, diminished life satisfaction, and in some cases depression, most members of stigmatized groups are able to weather the assaults and maintain a positive self-image (Crocker & Major, 1989). One way in which this is accomplished is by denying personal disadvantage. Although stigmatized groups are clearly disadvantaged, members of those groups often deny any personal experience of discrimination (e.g., Major, 1994). For example, Crosby (1982) found that employed women who were discriminated against with respect to pay, rarely indicated that they personally had experienced any sex discrimination.

Deviants and Marginal Members

Intergroup relations impact and are impacted by intragroup relations in a variety of different ways. For example, a group that feels that its distinctiveness or entitativity is under threat from an outgroup can close ranks around an ingroup prototype that is polarized away from the outgroup, and can treat marginal or deviant members harshly – particularly, according to the theory of subjective group

dynamics, if they occupy a normative position that leans towards the outgroup's normative position (see Pinto et al., 2010). A related tendency is the *black sheep effect*, where individuals whose attributes (attitudes, behaviors, etc.) are a poor normative match to the ingroup and thus place them on the ingroup-outgroup boundary are treated far more harshly if they are classified as ingroup than outgroup members (Marques & Páez, 1994).

However, people who criticize a group's normative practices are treated more harshly and are less effective if they are outgroup than ingroup members – outgroup critics provoke normative reaction, whereas ingroup critics, particularly if they are viewed as being constructive, can be potent agents for normative change within a group (Hornsey, 2005). Critics who are organized as a coordinated and active minority within the group may be particularly potent agents of change – but only if they are viewed by the group as ingroup members (e.g., Crano & Seyranian, 2009). Under these circumstances change may mainly occur on peripheral normative dimensions, with more dramatic normative change occurring somewhat later and suddenly in the form of a conversion (Hogg, 2010; Martin & Hewstone, 2008).

Collective Action and Social Protest

Although disadvantaged or stigmatized groups have an impressive armory of protective or avoidant strategies to redirect energy from direct intergroup conflict, this is not always effective. When deprivation is acute and a recipe for effective social change is available, disadvantaged groups will eagerly challenge the status quo by political means, or through social protest or other collective behaviors including demonstrations, riots, and uprisings.

Crowds and Riots

According to theories that focus on frustration and relative deprivation, disadvantaged groups will engage in protest only when they actually experience acute frustration. For example, Berkowitz (1972) offered a detailed analysis of how riots occur. He suggested that in addition to a sense of frustration three other conditions needed to be met: (a) aversive environmental circumstances that would amplify chronic frustration – e.g., heat, overcrowding, (b) aggressive environmental cues that would introduce a social learning component – e.g., armed police, and (c) social presence that would engage a social facilitation process – e.g., many people assembled in the streets. Berkowitz, famous for his “long hot summer” analysis of the late-1960s urban race riots in the United States, emphasized the emotional and impulsive aspects of collective behavior. The riots mainly occurred during heat waves.

Reicher (2001; Reicher et al., 1995) acknowledges that aversive environmental circumstances might make people irritable and short tempered, alone or in the presence of others, but goes on to note that this is not a social process. He provides a quite different analysis of the crowd – focusing on it as a genuinely collective phenomenon. Reicher adopts a social identity perspective to argue that crowd behavior is a set of deliberate and logical actions that are directly related to the goals and objectives of the group that defines the social identity of the crowd. The apparent volatility of crowd behavior is less extreme than media reports lead one to believe, because it occurs within limits set by the crowd's identity, and reflects a search for situation specific behaviors that are consistent with the wider identity of the group. For example, a crowd of pacifists will have different behavioral limits than a crowd of National Rifle Association members – the former might stubbornly sit down, lock arms and sing, whereas the latter might shout loudly and fearsomely wave automatic weapons in the air.

Collective Action and Social Change

Although disadvantage, particularly acute disadvantage, can translate into riots and demonstrations, it also of course sponsors enduring campaigns for social change; campaigns that can last decades or even centuries. Relative deprivation researchers (e.g., Davis, 1959 – see Walker & Smith, 2002) suggest that disadvantage translates into social action when people suddenly become aware that their expectations and attainments have parted company; in particular, when there is a sudden drop in attainments against a background of rising expectations (the *J-curve hypothesis* – Davies, 1969). These conditions have been invoked to explain the rise of anti-Semitism in 1930s Europe, the French and Russian revolutions of 1789 and 1917, the American Civil War of the 1860s, and the Black Power movement of the 1960s.

Runciman (1966) introduced an important distinction between fraternalistic (intergroup) relative deprivation (a feeling that one's own group is deprived relative to relevant other groups), and egoistic (interpersonal) relative deprivation (a feeling that oneself is deprived relative to specific other individuals). The former is associated with social protest, whereas the latter is more likely to be associated with acquiescence and depression. For example, racist attitudes in the United States and Britain may be more extreme among skilled blue collar people than any other group, because this group is most vulnerable to competition from other (e.g., immigrant) groups and thus feels most threatened and fraternalistically most deprived (Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; see Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998). Walker and Mann (1987) provide a similar analysis of reactions to unemployment among unemployed Australians.

According to social identity theory disadvantaged groups will engage in direct competition with the dominant group if they perceive intergroup boundaries to be impermeable, and if they perceive their lower status to be illegitimate and unstable, and if they can conceive of a new status quo that is achievable (see Ellemers, 1993; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This analysis attributes protest on the part of disadvantaged groups to a conjunction of social-cognitive factors and social belief systems and ideologies. For example, according to research by Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990), if members of a disadvantaged group believe that entry to an advantaged group is open, even only slightly open (only a token percentage of people can pass) they shun collective action and instead individually try to gain entry to the advantaged group. Collective action is most likely to be taken when entry to the advantaged group is closed, and then it is only taken by those who believe they were closest to entry, because they feel the strongest sense of relative deprivation. Collective action is only likely to be extreme (e.g., riots, terrorism) when socially acceptable normative means (e.g., peaceful protest, lobbying) are unavailable, perhaps due to authoritarian repression by the dominant group.

Social Protest and Active Minorities

The study of social protest is the study of how individual discontents or grievances are transformed into collective action: how and why do sympathisers become mobilised as activists or participants (e.g., Klandermans, 1997, 2003; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008)? Klandermans (1997) argues that mobilization is a facet of the attitude-behavior relationship – sympathizers have sympathetic attitudes towards an issue, yet these attitudes do not readily translate into behavior. Participation also resembles a social dilemma. Protest is generally *for* a social good (e.g., equality) or *against* a social ill (e.g., oppression), and as success benefits everyone irrespective of participation but failure harms participants more, it is tempting to 'free ride' – to remain a sympathizer rather than become a participant. Social protest can, however, only be fully understood in its wider intergroup context, where there is a clash of ideas and ideologies between groups, and politicized and strategic articulation with other more or less sympathetic organizations.

Social protest is often engaged in by minorities who actively try to change majority attitudes and practices. Laboratory and field experiments as well as questionnaire studies of minority influence suggests that majority and minority groups have access to different influence resources, and may actually influence through different processes (Martin & Hewstone, 2008; Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994; also see Hogg, 2010). Active minorities need to adopt a particular behavioral style to influence members of a majority group (Mugny, 1982): they need to present a consistent and consensual message, they need to be seen to have made some sacrifice for their cause, and they need to be seen to be acting out of principle. They should also try to be viewed by the majority as an ingroup rather than outgroup minority (Crano & Seyranian, 2009).

This behavioral style, particularly consistency of message, creates cognitive conflict in the mind of majority members between majority and minority views. Majority members are not immediately influenced, but experience a sudden conversion to the minority point of view at a later time. Consistent minorities have latent, deep-seated, influence over majorities that produces a sudden and enduring conversion effect (Moscovici, 1980; Nemeth, 1986). Minorities that are inconsistent have little impact because their message is easily disregarded. Majorities are taken for granted, and people simply comply with their views without internalizing them or undergoing any deep-seated cognitive change.

Social Harmony Between Groups

The goal of most intergroup relations researchers is to learn enough about intergroup relations to be able to know, and perhaps advise, how to improve intergroup relations and build social harmony.

Intergroup Contact

To this end, a prevalent belief is that close and pleasant direct contact between people from different groups is the best way to achieve social harmony – the *contact hypothesis* (Allport, 1954; also see Amir, 1969; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The idea that appropriate intergroup contact could improve intergroup relations was a central plank in the policy put in place in the United States in 1954 to improve race relations by desegregating the school system (Cook, 1985; Schofield, 1991). The practice of “busing” children in and out of racially homogenous school districts was partly aimed at increasing inter-racial contact.

Contact is notoriously ineffective at changing intergroup attitudes or improving intergroup relations; but if the right conditions are met it can work. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) report a meta-analysis of 515 contact studies conducted between 1949 and 2000 with 713 samples across 38 nations that reveals a robust effect – there is good evidence for Allport’s core contention that cooperation, shared goals, equal status and the support of local authorities and norms are the most important and beneficial preconditions for intergroup contact to produce positive intergroup attitude change.

These conditions can be difficult to satisfy. Charged intergroup relations are often associated with groups that are profoundly different and effectively despise one another – contact simply confirms one’s worst fears. In addition, as we have seen above (e.g., Sherif, 1958), intergroup conflict may rest upon real conflicts of interest over scarce resources – until perceived or actual goal relations are changed, contact will simply provide a forum for conflict. One specific problem is that there can be substantial anxiety associated with intergroup contact, which renders the interaction aversive. According to Stephan and Stephan’s (2000) *integrated threat model*, there are four sources of a feeling of threat and anxiety that people can experience about and in anticipation of intergroup contact: (a) realistic threat (a threat to the existence of one’s group, well-being, political power and so forth);

(b) symbolic threat (a threat posed by the outgroup to one's values, beliefs, morals and norms); (c) intergroup anxiety (anxiety about personal embarrassment and rejection experienced during contact); and (d) negative stereotypes (imagined or anticipated anxiety based on negative stereotypes of an outgroup). Together these perceived threats and associated anxiety can produce intergroup avoidance, and stereotype-confirming perceptions, evaluations, and feelings.

Contact that is not associated with threat and anxiety can be pleasant – sufficiently pleasant to encourage the development of enduring friendships across group boundaries. Being close friends with people from another group does not guarantee that one develops positive attitudes towards that group as a whole (see below). However, according to the theory of extended intergroup contact (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997) knowing and observing fellow ingroup members who have rewarding and successful cross-group friendships can be effective in reducing intergroup anxiety and changing ones attitudes towards the outgroup as a whole (Davies, Tropp, Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2011).

Categorization

A key issue with intergroup contact is that even if it is pleasant and leads to a close personal friendship across boundaries this does not necessarily generalize to improved intergroup attitudes. Whether interaction across boundaries is interpersonal, intragroup or intergroup may matter. It has been suggested that people in contact situations should be encouraged to de-categorize themselves and treat each other as unique individuals, or to re-categorize themselves as members of a shared superordinate identity. Research, mainly laboratory and field experiments, by Gaertner and Dovidio and their colleagues (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) shows that both strategies reduce intergroup discrimination, but by different routes: re-categorization improves outgroup attitudes, whereas de-categorization worsens ingroup attitudes.

One problem with re-categorization is that it can, particularly in non-laboratory contexts, represent a threat to the distinctiveness of the separate groups, and associated social identities, that are being encouraged to re-categorize themselves as a single entity. For instance, many organizational mergers fail for precisely these reasons (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Ullrich & van Dick, 2007). This problem surfaces at the cultural level in the relative ineffectiveness of assimilationist strategies to forge a single harmonious cultural or national identity out of many cultural groups. Social harmony may be better served by a multicultural strategy that avoids the distinctiveness threat raised by assimilationism (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Verkuyten, 2006).

Since re-categorization has a tendency to backfire, perhaps improved generalized intergroup attitudes and relations are more likely to emerge from contact that is framed in intergroup terms. But the problem here, as we have seen above, is that intergroup contact is often sufficiently stressful to render it unpleasant or even hostile. It can be difficult to produce pleasant intergroup contact, which is a pre-requisite for improved generalized images. More generally, it is difficult to create enduring pluralistic contexts where people identify at the subgroup and at the superordinate group level simultaneously, and thus do not experience identity threat and do not interact in a hostile intergroup manner, but do view each other in group terms that permit generalization.

The main aim of contact is that pleasant interaction will change enduring intergroup images – that is, for generalization to occur through the accumulation of favorable outgroup information (book-keeping), or through a sudden encounter with counter-stereotypic information (conversion), or through the development of a more textured outgroup representation (subtyping) (Weber & Crocker, 1983). Research (e.g., Wilder, 1984) shows that people who have pleasant contact with an outgroup member who is clearly viewed as being representative or stereotypical of the outgroup, do develop improved attitudes towards the outgroup as a whole.

Diversity

Intergroup contact is actually extremely prevalent. For example, most people work or study in organizations and groups that are socio-demographically diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and so forth. Such groups act as a crucible for intergroup relations to play out. Social identity based research shows that because roles within such groups tend to correlate with societal category membership, intergroup relations are highly salient (e.g., Brewer, 1996; Brewer, von Hippel, & Gooden, 1999). If such relations are hostile in society as a whole, then the interactive group accentuates that behavior. So, for example, a restaurant in Iraq in which the waiters were all Sunni and the cooks all Shi'ia would draw attention to a charged intergroup relationship and possibly generate conflict.

Better relations are achieved by cross-cutting roles with category membership (see Crisp, Ensari, Hewstone, & Miller, 2003; Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). However this can be difficult to implement, because of the human tendency to automatically assign high status roles to people who belong to high status social categories (see Ridgeway, 2001). Thus, sharp status differentiations in society are recreated within the group; and this further reinforces intergroup differences that make pleasant equal status contact impossible.

Leadership

Many other factors that might encourage improved intergroup relations have been investigated – for example, the ability to feel empathy for (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002) or take the perspective of (Galinsky, 2002; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) the outgroup have been shown to help. One key factor that often seems to be underemphasized in social psychological research on improving intergroup relations is leadership.

Leaders tend to provide a focus for a group's distinctive identity and goals and lead the group against an outgroup— a leader that is seen to be too cooperative with and compromising towards an outgroup may be viewed as not “one of us” and thus not to be trusted or followed (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003). This is clearly a psychology that entrenches intergroup barriers and works against improving intergroup relations. However, leaders who strive to build intergroup bridges and harmonious intergroup relations can sometimes be surprisingly effective. For example leaders who build a common identity among individuals or groups who are competing over a scarce resource and lack trust for one another can be very effective at resolving the social dilemma and thus reducing conflict and hostility (Brewer & Schneider, 1990; Kramer, 1991; De Cremer & van Vugt, 2002).

Most leadership situations are actually ones in which the leader is very explicitly leading across (sub)group boundaries and is, in effect an intergroup leader. Under these circumstances effective leadership hinges on the leader's ability to construct an inter-subgroup relational identity that preserves and celebrates subgroup distinctiveness, but defines the group as a whole in terms of the mutually beneficial and cooperative relationship between the subgroups (Hogg et al., 2012).

Concluding Comments

In this chapter I have overviewed the social psychology of intergroup relations. By necessity I have sacrificed some detail and inclusiveness. For more detailed and extensive coverage see Brewer (2007), Dovidio and Gaertner (2010), and Yzerbyt and Demoulin (2010).

At the social psychological level, intergroup relations hinge on some very basic social cognitive processes. Social categorization segments the world of people into groups, and represents groups

schematically, mainly in terms of prototypes. Prototypes of groups are generally shared by people within a group (i.e., they are stereotypes) – they describe and prescribe perceptions, attitudes, behaviors and feelings that define one group and clearly differentiate that group from other groups. The social categorization process strives to maximize entitativity. The link between category cues, social categorization, and stereotyping is generally relatively automatic.

People define themselves in terms of the groups they belong to – they derive their social identity from group memberships. Because of this, intergroup relations are characterized by a struggle over status and prestige – membership in a prestigious high status group reflects well on self-conception, whereas membership of a low status group is a stigma that is often associated with disadvantage. People are, however, very creative in avoiding the self-evaluative consequences of stigma.

Intergroup relations are underpinned by people's need to feel positive about themselves (self-enhancement), and by their need to feel certain about themselves, their place in the world, and how they relate to other people (uncertainty reduction). They are also motivated to achieve a balance between feeling distinctive from others and feeling assimilated with others (optimal distinctiveness). These motives guide intergroup behavior, but they are moderated by strategic intergroup considerations that rest on people's understanding of the nature of the relations between groups, in terms of the stability and legitimacy of intergroup status differences, the permeability of group boundaries, the goal relations between groups, and so forth.

The relationship between intergroup attitudes and intergroup behavior is a manifestation of the wider issue of attitude-behavior relations – prejudice does not always express itself very obviously in discrimination, and oppressed minorities do not always engage in minority influence, social protest, and collective action.

Finally, because intergroup relations are intrinsically competitive and ethnocentric it is very difficult to improve them. Intergroup contact and diversity only improve relations under restricted conditions, and attempts to merge groups often backfire because of the identity threat that is usually present. Conditions that respect group differences and affirm identity but reconfigure intergroup relations within a superordinate identity are most promising.

Social psychological research on intergroup relations has never been conducted in a socio-historical vacuum – it has always been guided to a greater or lesser extent by societal events. In recent years it has not been immune from the wider trend in psychology as a behavioral (not social) science to adopt methods that allow mapping of neurological and biochemical correlates of behavior. This trend, although not that significant in this area of psychology, will probably continue. But if one were to gaze into a crystal ball to predict where future intergroup relations research activity may grow one might look at least to (a) consequences of massive population relocation due to environmental, economic and political degradation, (b) how groups will be affected by and manage zero-sum intergroup resource dilemmas stemming from climate change and overpopulation, and (c) how ready access to information via the web may affect ideological conviction and associated identity-related intergroup behaviors.

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Chapter 19

Social Psychological Perspectives on Deviance

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Social psychological perspectives on deviance refer to discussions of the nature of deviance and explanations of the definition, antecedents, or consequences of deviance that implicate both personal (behavioral or intrapsychic) and social (interpersonal, group, macrosocial) structures and processes. With regard to deviance, social psychological perspectives address any or all of six related questions:

1. What is the nature of deviance? That is, what are the criteria according to which particular attributes or behaviors are defined as deviant?
2. How do particular contextually situated attributes or behaviors come to be defined as deviant while other attributes or behaviors are not so defined?
3. How do people become motivated to engage in ways that are defined as deviant according to a particular set of normative standards, whether those standards are of one's own membership group, or of a group that one neither belongs to nor aspires to belong to?
4. What factors influence the acting out of motivations to deviate?
5. Having acted out initial deviance, what factors influence the (dis)continuity of deviance?
6. What are the consequences of deviance for the individual and the social systems of which the individual is a part?

The state of our understanding of the social psychology of deviance is defined by the answers to these six questions. To answer each question, this chapter draws on theory and research conducted in

Howard B. Kaplan, 2003 (original version revised posthumously by Feodor A. Gostjev and Robert J. Johnson). The theoretical foundation laid out by Howard Kaplan is left largely intact from its original publication. This chapter is revised from the earlier version primarily in two ways. First, as Howard noted recently to one of the co-authors, he had renewed a conversation with others about the application of a general theory of deviance to the field of criminology. This chapter extends that conversation. Second, we expand the chapter to include more discussion about the implications for a wider range of methodological issues and how they can be advanced or informed by the foundations of the theory. Some of these were mentioned briefly in the original, and Kaplan himself was well-known for his interest in these methodological advances particularly as they related to longitudinal research. We were honored to be asked (by Diane Kaplan) and entrusted with this task (by John Delamater and Amanda Ward) to revise the chapter for this edition of the handbook. However much the reader finds this chapter falls short of the goals to remain faithful to the original theory and indicate its wider applicability both substantively and methodologically, they should attribute it to our shortcomings in the efforts at revision and not necessarily the scholarly strength and merit of the original chapter.

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various subfields of social science and on an integrative theory of deviant behavior (Kaplan, 1984) developed over the course of several decades. First presented is a brief explanation of how deviance is defined by drawing in part on the discussion provided in Kaplan and Johnson (2001). Then several perspectives (such as consensus, labeling, feminist, and conflict) that address the questions of how particular behaviors and attributes come to be defined as deviant are discussed. The question of why individuals become motivated to engage in behavior that deviates from normative standards of their own membership groups is answered in part by the insights from various forms of strain theories and from some symbolic interactionist theories that focus on the role of feelings associated with deviant and criminal behavior. Furthermore, learning and subcultural theories are used to explain how deviant motivation can be attained in the process of interaction within groups that do not subscribed to normative standards of the broader society. Factors that facilitate or inhibit the acting out of deviant motivations are explained respectively by opportunity theories or control and deterrence perspectives. The discussion of continuity and change in deviant behavior draws on both the life-course theories and on the theories that explain why deviant behavior, once performed, is repeated and escalated rather than stopped or reduced. Kaplan and Tolle's (2006) study of intergenerational continuity of deviant behavior is discussed as a recent development in the scholarship of (dis)continuity of deviant behavior. Insights from classical as well as more recent works in sociology contribute to the discussion of various consequences of deviant behavior for deviant actors, social groups and society more generally. Finally, a discussion of how methodological practices have both advanced and constrained further progress in research and theory of deviance is presented. The chapter concludes with some suggestions for ways to advance the field in the future.

The Nature of Deviance

The very definition of deviant behavior as it is generally understood in contemporary social science is essentially social psychological. Although definitions vary widely, most social psychologists would agree that *deviance* refers to behaviors or attributes manifested by specified kinds of people in specified circumstances that are judged to violate the normative expectations of a specified group. *Shared normative expectations* refer to group evaluations regarding the appropriateness or inappropriateness of certain attributes or behaviors when manifested by certain kinds of people in certain circumstances. The term deviance is applied to attributes as well as behaviors. The very terms "disfigured," "obese," "short," and any of a variety of racial epithets connote deviant attributes. Crime is a concept closely related to deviance in large part because of the substantial overlap between the behaviors that can be classified as deviant and criminal. Hagan (1994), for example, defines *crime* as "a kind of deviance that is proscribed by criminal law" (p. 11). The formal prohibition of behavior by criminal law is central to most definitions of criminal behavior (for review and critique see Agnew, 2011).

The absence of prescribed (required) behavior or attributes, or the presence of proscribed (forbidden) attributes or behavior violates shared expectations of a specified group. Violations of normative expectations and the attribution of deviance to the quality or behavior in question, are signified by the application of negative sanctions to the people manifesting the undesirable attributes or behaviors. Negative sanctions can be formal or informal. *Formal sanctions* are punishments imposed by legitimate agents of social control such as police, courts of law and penal institutions. *Informal sanctions* are negative consequences originating from reactions of others such as shaming and stigmatization (Tittle, 1980; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973). The presence of deviance, and indeed the degree of deviance, is indicated by the seriousness of the formal and informal punitive responses that are administered. Sanctions may be relatively mild (shaking of the head, an exchange of glances, or a few days in jail) or severe (ostracism or long periods of incarceration). The administration of more severe sanctions is an indication that the group considers the violations more important. If the sanctions are applied only

to certain kinds of people in certain circumstances, then the implication is that the same behavior or attributes may be manifested without punitive responses by other people in other circumstances. For example, in Western industrialized societies women are expected to conceal their sexual impulses and desires while males can attain the esteemed masculine status through a display of their sexual drive (Messer-schmidt, 1993). If the sanctions are uniformly applied regardless of person or circumstance, then there are no exceptions to the rule.

In general, people take into account the abilities of the person to conform to the normative expectations although they need not do so. A person may be stigmatized (negatively sanctioned) for being physically impaired but would not be expected to perform in the same way as non-impaired individuals.

A group that shares a normative system may apply their standards to and negatively sanction even non-group members who deviate from them. Indeed, often individuals who do not belong to a group are penalized for that very reason, that is, are stigmatized (e.g., as barbarians or Philistines) by virtue of not being a member of the in-group. Depending upon the group's access to sanctions that are meaningful to the non-group members, the application of negative sanctions may have great adverse impact on the outcomes of non-group members. By enforcing the normative standards of the group, the sanctions can in part serve a self-enhancement purpose for those who belong to it (i.e., who share the social identity), as discussed in various aspects of social identity theory (Turner, 1975).

The de facto deviation from the expectations of specified normative systems may be motivated or unmotivated. *Motivated deviance* arises from either of two sets of circumstances. In the first set, the person is a member of a group that defines the attributes or behaviors in question as deviant. However, because of a variety of circumstances, the person loses motivation to conform to the normative expectations of the group and becomes motivated to adopt deviant patterns that are expected to satisfy the person's needs better than conventional patterns. Failing or unwilling to achieve according to the normative system's standards but having the ability to do so through deviant behavior provides one such set of circumstances. For example, Messerschmidt (1993) argues that working class boys are unable to achieve the desirable positive masculine identity by doing well in school because for them the opportunities to utilize their education in the future are limited and so these boys construct masculinity by acting in a deviant manner while in school. In the second set of circumstances, the person is a member of a group in which the attributes or behaviors under consideration are normative though other groups may define the attributes or behaviors as deviant. The person is motivated to conform to the normative prescriptions or proscriptions as one who has been socialized in the group. The person is either unaware or considers it to be irrelevant that another group judges the attributes or behaviors to be deviant. For example, "Italian immigrants who went on making wine for themselves and their friends during the Prohibition were acting properly by Italian immigrant standards, but were breaking the law of their new country" (Becker, 1963, p. 15). The person's motivation stems from the need to conform to group standards and to evoke approving responses from group members who share these standards for conforming to the group's normative expectations. *Unmotivated deviance* refers to instances of failure to conform to the normative expectations of the person's membership or reference groups, where the failure to conform is contrary to the person's volition. The person would conform if it were possible to do so. However, a variety of circumstances (conflicting role expectations, biogenetically given attributes, inadequate socialization, paucity of social resources) impede the individual from fulfilling the expectations of others (for discussion see Kaplan & Johnson, 2001).

Social psychological perspectives on deviance are generally aimed at explaining the antecedents and consequences of motivated deviance. Unmotivated deviance is relevant as an explanatory factor of motivated deviance, rather than as a dependent variable itself reflecting deviant behavior. The involuntary manifestation of deviant traits and behaviors influences judgments of deviance and the administration of sanctions which in turn can generate motivation to deviate and lead to the voluntary onset or continuation of deviant behaviors. For example, an individual suffering from severe mental illness may be unable to conform to the expectations that form standards of "decent" behavior in

public. Despite not being motivated to behave in a deviant manner, the behavior of the mentally ill individual might be interpreted as deviance by an observer. Such evaluation of unmotivated deviance by others may lead to labeling of this person as dangerous (Link & Phelan, 1999). Labeling may lead to the self-fulfilling prophesy (Link & Phelan) which can be interpreted as the initial act of unmotivated deviance leading to the subsequent deviant acts motivated by the need to conform to the label. Instances of unmotivated deviance do not require the presence of mental pathology and include such situations as failure to achieve high grades in school despite student's genuine effort, or failure to succeed as an athlete despite training and preparation.

Defining Deviance

A number of perspectives address the question of how and why certain behaviors, attributes, or classes of individuals come to be defined as deviant. This general question encompasses the more specific question of why certain laws are passed and enforced against those who perform the behaviors or display the attributes that are prohibited by the laws in question or that fail to behave in ways or display the attributes that are required by the laws.

Social groups make the rules (including laws that define specific acts performed by specific categories of individuals as deviant) the violation of which constitutes deviant behavior. It is important to understand the processes by which specific behaviors when performed by specified categories of people in specified situations come to be defined as deviant because the process is part of the explanation of the onset, continuity, and consequences of deviant behavior. The fact that certain behaviors are defined as deviant: (1) will serve (under specified conditions) to stimulate or inhibit motivation to perform deviant acts; and, (2) will evoke social responses that (depending upon moderating conditions) influence the (dis)continuity of deviant behavior. If the social definitions of deviance have these effects, it follows that any variable that influences the social definition of behavior as deviant will have indirect effects upon the onset and continuity of deviance. Deviant behavior, in turn, influences the social definition of deviance. As behavior initially defined as deviant becomes increasingly common, greater pressure is exerted to redefine the behavior as within the realm of acceptable responses.

One of the dimensions along which social psychological perspectives vary is the degree to which deviance comes to be defined as violations of consensual norms as opposed to violations of the norms of more influential segments of the population.

According to the *consensus perspective*, in any group, agreement will be observed regarding core values and goals. Any behavior that is recognized as facilitating approximation to those values will be regarded positively and rewarded, while any behaviors or attributes that are regarded as inhibiting approximation of the values will be disvalued and punished. The criteria for the definition of deviance rest upon common recognition of consensual needs, goals, or values (Tittle, 1994). For example, if it is consensually agreed that the heterosexual family as a basic institution must be protected, then behaviors that are regarded as threatening the stability or functions of this institution will be defined as deviant. Such behaviors might include extramarital intercourse or homosexual behavior (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). Consistent with the consensus perspective are research studies that observe that widespread agreement exists as to the nature of deviance and the sanctions that should be administered for various degrees of deviance (Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk, 1974; Tittle, 1980). Most societies share condemnation for the most serious acts of deviance that lead to injury of other persons or that deprive others of their property (Agnew, 2011; for review of studies see Stylianou, 2003). Thus, the normative structure may reflect common values as well as, or rather than, the special interests of contending groups.

Not all legislation and administration of laws stem from compromises and victories by identifiable group interests. The core of criminal law—prohibitions for and sanctions of personal violence, destruction of property,

fraud, and other predatory crimes—mirrors and protects the interests of the entire society. This core outlaws offenses that are *mala in se*, wrong in themselves, and that would be abhorred by society even if not condemned by the law. (Akers, 2000, p. 172)

While the consensus perspective focuses on commonalities in values and goals, a number of perspectives emphasize value differences between groups. These differences are consequential for how deviance in society is defined because some groups may exercise greater influence, power, or political control and are better able to impose definitions of deviance that serve their interests while the less powerful groups or segments of the populations are unable to resist the imposition of these definitions. Among the perspectives representing this point of view are labeling, feminist and conflict theories.

From the *labeling perspective*, deviance is not a quality, a person, act, or attribute. Instead, deviance is the result of the evaluations of others, the applications of sanctions by others, and the labeling of the person, act, or attribute as deviant (Becker, 1963). People who are labeled tend to be those who have less power to resist being labeled. Defining particular acts or attributes as deviant occurs through complex processes involving among others the sponsorship and diffusion of the deviant definitions by “moral entrepreneurs” (Becker) who have a special interest in achieving widespread acceptance of the definition. A case in point is a study of the process by which marijuana use came to be defined as illegal with the passage of the Marijuana Stamp Tax Act of 1937. This act was preceded by the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act (1914) that outlawed distribution of opiates. Prior to the passage of these legislations in America “narcotics were openly consumed (...) [and] medicines containing morphine, cocaine, and heroin could be bought in the stores or by mail” (Hagan, 1994, p. 5) The passage of the law outlawing marijuana was said to be motivated by the felt need of the functionaries of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to increase their sphere of influence. Passage of the federal felony law was facilitated by a mass media campaign to which the Bureau of Narcotics apparently contributed stories that associated marijuana use with violent behavior. Some scholars have argued that the legislations discussed above were also motivated by the prejudice against racial and ethnic minorities that were seen as threatening the dominance of America’s upper-middle class at the turn of the twentieth century (Hagan, 1994).

In a similar vein, various *feminist theories* argue that more powerful males use their power to maintain status and privilege in part by domination over women. To that end, males define and enforce normative expectations intended to maintain male domination in society (Daly & Chesney-Lind, 1988; Messerschmidt, 1993; for review see Akers, 2000). For example, Chesney-Lind and Pasko (2004) argue that “juvenile justice system should be understood as a major force in the social control of women, because it has historically served to reinforce the obedience of all young women to the demands of family authority, no matter how abusive or arbitrary” (p. 15). A case in point is the ongoing debate regarding the changes in the gender gap in offending behavior (Heimer, 2000; Lauritsen, Heimer, & Lynch, 2009; Schwartz, Steffensmeier, Zing, & Ackerman, 2009). Decades ago, Adler (1975) proposed that while women have been much less involved in most types of crime and deviance than man, the difference in rates of offending behavior between men and women (the gender gap in offending) in the U.S. has been shrinking. More recently, studies using the crime statistics from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) found that the ratios of male-to-female arrests for the most serious crimes have been decreasing (except for homicide) since the 1990s (Heimer, 2000). While some scholars argue that these trends in the crime statistics are indicative of actual behavioral change among women (Heimer, 2000; Lauritsen et al., 2009), other argue that the shrinking of the gender gap is observed due to changes in social definitions of crime (e.g. a school yard fight involving girls is now interpreted as an assault while a fight involving boys is seen as “normal”) and crime enforcement practices leading to harsher treatment of women by the criminal justice system (Chesney-Lind & Pasko, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2009). The latter studies suggest that the unequal standing of women in the American society may indeed affect the formation of definitions of crime and deviance.

Consistent with these orientations is *conflict theory*. From this perspective, the enactment of formal laws and the implementation of formal social controls that are legitimized by the political structure

function to validate and represent the interests of the more powerful groups in the society (Chambliss, 1974; Quinney, 1970; Turk, 1964; Vold, 1958). Conflict theory addresses the question of why certain laws are passed, that is, why certain acts, attributes, or individuals are defined as criminal while others are not. Although conflict theory focuses on the genesis of laws and their enforcement, the same principles are applicable to the question of why certain normative expectations hold sway and evoke informal sanctions while others do not. That is, in any group those who are more influential by virtue of having greater control over that which is consensually valued influence definitions of right and wrong and have the capacity to coerce conformity through application of sanctions. More powerful segments of society enact laws (define normative expectations) that represent the interests of more powerful segments of the group and apply formal sanctions (or informal sanctions) to those individuals that deviate from the normative expectations that reflect the interests of the dominant or more powerful segments of the group. For example, the protests and sit-ins of the civil rights era presented challenges to a social order based on racial superiority that was unprepared to deal with the vast amount of civil disobedience. More powerful whites became increasingly anxious to find effective means to sanction this disobedience and restore order, but often law enforcement efforts were being increasingly scrutinized. Metzl (2009) documents the story of a state hospital during this era that increasingly relied on diagnosing African American protesters with schizophrenia as a means of political social control. He coined the term “protest psychosis” to explain the practice of using psychiatry to apply formal sanctions to those who were seen as threatening the interests of the dominant groups of society during the 1960s and 1970s.

The conflict model may be extended to the small group and interpersonal levels as well. Individuals exercise power over each other and so may require conformity to their expectations to the extent that they have access to resources that the other person requires, regardless of the nature of the resources. To the extent that one person requires affection and the other person is able to dispense it, the latter exercises power over the former. To the extent that each requires affection from the other, both exercise power over the other and they define what is appropriate and inappropriate behavior in the situation accordingly. Insofar as teachers are able to dispense grades, and students require high grades, teachers are in a position to define what is normative and deviant in the context of the classroom. However, to the extent that teachers require the respect of their students and a good reputation, students are in a position to negotiate for definitions of what is acceptable and unacceptable. From these frames of reference, then, the process by which particular behaviors come to be defined as deviant cannot be understood apart from a consideration of such major influences as diversity and political influence. In modern society, different, frequently conflicting, value systems shared by more or less inclusive segments of the population that have in common regional, racial, ethnic, social class, and perhaps maturational (age or stage of development) characteristics, exist side by side. In part, the diversity is the result of the convergence of representatives of different cultures within common geographic limits. In part, the absence of cultural consensus is the result of rapid and uneven rates of cultural change among the different segments of the population, thus ensuring that over time even in a group that initially shared a value system, diversity of value judgments would emerge.

Those segments of the population that differ in the system of values to which each segment subscribes often do not exercise equal influence in the formal institutions whereby rules are implemented and enforced. The segments of the population that are more influential are more likely to successfully implement and enforce rules that reflect their concepts of high priority values and protect their interests. Any behaviors that threaten these values, although they may be compatible with the values shared by other less powerful segments of the population, will be defined as deviant. The exercise of undue political influence in the passage of legislation that reflects primarily the values of powerful minorities is nicely illustrated by an early research report by Lind (1938). The report suggested that Westerners in Honolulu represented a politically powerful minority group that was able to legislate patterns that were contrary to the values of other groups. In particular, the high illegitimacy rate among the Polynesians was consistent with the acceptability of premarital sexual activity in this group

that was contrary to the values of politically influential Westerners. Other examples are provided by Sellin's (1938) seminal discussion of the relationship between crime and culture conflict.

If diverse groups exercise equivalent power over each other, they may accommodate each other's expectations. In effect, they agree to disagree and each group conforms to its own socionormative system and regards the other as deviant without attempting to change the existing socionormative frameworks. However, where one group exercises greater influence or power over the other group and where they consider it to be in their collective interest to do so, that group may exercise sanctions that adversely affect the outcomes of the other group and, in doing so, influences at least overt conformity to the socionormative system of the more powerful group. This accommodation is tentative, however, and exists only so long as the less influential group perceives the more dominant group as capable of adversely affecting salient outcomes for the less influential group.

The recognition of the roles of cultural diversity and political influence in the deviance defining process arguably is most apparent in conflict theory. As Farrell and Swigert summarize this perspective:

Deviance is the result of social and cultural diversity. Modern society is made up of a proliferation of collectivities, each attempting to satisfy its own needs and promote its standards of value. By gaining access to the institutions of social control, successful competitors are able to establish their norms and interests as the dominant ones and derogate groups that would challenge their position of superiority. Nonconformity, therefore, is intimately related to the socio-political organization of society. Whether because of the cultural differences found among groups or because of the privileges and obligations that accompany the various levels of class, status, and power, minority populations are subject to deviance-defining processes that render their situation and behavior condemnable. (Farrell & Swigert, 1982, pp. 226–227)

It is likely that both consensus and conflict theories are valid in some respects and each contributes to the explanation of why certain things are defined as deviant. Core values relating to the right to be free from capricious physical harm and from theft of one's property might lead to near universal condemnation of the arbitrary taking of life or theft of property. At the same time, individual and group differences may persist in which the interests of the individuals or groups collide. In these instances it is inevitable that different definitions of deviance and morality will arise. Those who are able to exercise greater influence over shared social institutions through the exercise of power will be in a better position to define morality. However, this becomes an issue only when the ability to administer sanctions in support of the definitions of morality is able to influence salient outcomes for other groups. If groups defining deviance in one way are unable to effectively apply meaningful sanctions to other groups who do not define the behavior as deviant, then it becomes irrelevant that different definitions of deviance exist. However, insofar as one group is able to exercise coercive power over another group, then the conflicting definitions of deviance do become an issue. In any case, each group will continue to define as deviant any behavior that threatens their own interests, and will define as normative any behavior that appears to enhance the interests of their group.

Motivation to Deviate

A number of social psychological perspectives address the question of why individuals become motivated to engage in deviant behavior. These perspectives suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that deviant behavior will be performed if it is anticipated, whether consciously or unconsciously, that satisfaction of strongly felt needs will ensue. To say that an individual is disposed or motivated to commit a deviant act is to say that the act symbolizes for the person the achievement of a goal, and therefore, the satisfaction of a need to reach the goal. These perspectives may be divided into two categories: (1) those that address the question of why individuals become motivated to violate the expectations of their own membership group, and (2) those that address the question of why individuals are motivated to engage in behavior that is defined as deviant by other groups although not by their own membership group.

Motivation to Deviate from Conventional Norms

Essential to an understanding of deviant behavior is an explanation of why people become motivated to engage in behaviors that deviate from the normative expectations of their membership group(s). A number of social psychological perspectives address motivation to deviate as a variable to be explained. *Strain theories* focus upon motivations to forestall or assuage strain associated with frustration of the ability to achieve valued ends. Among the earliest of these positions is that espoused by Robert Merton (1938) who observed a disjunction between culturally approved goals and the distribution of the social means to achieve those goals. When individuals are taught to aspire to achieve culturally sanctioned goals but are unable to approximate these goals because of the paucity of resources at their disposal, they experience strain to which they adapt in any of a number of ways. Generally, people will respond to such strain through conformity. The person will accept the culturally approved values and strive to approximate these values through the use of whatever legitimate means are available, and with greater or lesser success. Alternatively, the individual may adapt with any of a number of deviant responses. "Innovation" describes the tendency to accept and strive for culturally approved goals but to do so through the use of illegitimate means. "Rebellion" reflects the rejection of both the legitimacy of the goals and of the means that are socially approved for achieving the goals, while replacing both the goals and means with novel goals and means. "Retreatism" refers to the rejection of socially approved goals and means as this is manifested in such behavioral patterns as forms of mental illness, substance abuse, or vagrancy. "Ritualism" refers to the rejection of conventionally approved goals but maintenance of slavish adherence to the socially approved means for achieving conventional goals (recognizing the implausibility of approximating these values).

The idea that delinquent behaviors reflect responses to the failure to achieve conventional goals through conventional means is apparent in a number of theoretical formulations that might be subsumed under the rubric of *subculture theories*. These formulations concern the origin and functioning of subcultures in which deviant activities are endorsed. Various students of gang delinquency have suggested different deviant adaptive processes. Implicit in Sutherland's (1937) descriptions of behavior systems of crime, Shaw and McKay's (1942) discussion of criminal traditions in high delinquency areas and Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) identification of criminal subcultures is the proposition that subcultures arose in response to the need to successfully achieve the goals endorsed by the conventional society but through the use of illegitimate means that were the only effective means available to those who formed or joined criminal subcultures. The goals were conventional ones but the patterns used to achieve the goals were illegitimate. For example, in Cloward and Ohlin's typology members of one type of subculture (criminal) can become specialized to commit crimes (illegitimate means) intended specifically to generate income (legitimate goal).

Albert K. Cohen (1955) suggested that the inability of youths to achieve the middle-class values that they had learned in the course of the socialization process and that were reflected in the schools they attended led to a deviant form of adaptation. Rather than accepting the worth of the conventional values and adopting illegitimate means to achieve these values, the youths collectively reject the values and reflect their contempt for the values by engaging in nonutilitarian acts of aggression and vandalism and related forms of deviant behavior. As Kobrin described such a process:

One of the several adaptive responses available to young males in this situation is to reject the imputation of inferiority and degradation by emphasizing those activities and personal traits which distinguish them from striving, upward mobile persons. The common response inaugurates new norms of conduct out of which develop the distinctive criteria of status in the delinquent group. Thus a coherent social milieu is created in which status is distributed according to success in attacking the symbol of middle-class respectability. Since property represents a central symbol of merit and virtue in the culture of this class, stealing and destructiveness become a principal though not the only form taken by the attack. (Kobrin, 1951, p. 659)

Earlier theories in the tradition tended to focus on the deviance-engendering motivation occasioned by lower class-linked frustrations. Robert Agnew (1992) offers a theory that expands the concept of

strain. He distinguishes between three classes of strain that engender deviance. These include the failure to achieve positively valued goals, the removal of positively valued stimuli, and confrontation with negative stimuli. The strain that results from any of these might lead to deviance insofar as the deviant patterns function to avoid or attack the perceived source of strain. In this respect, the theory is similar to that of Kaplan (1972, 1975, 1986) who argues that deviant adaptations to stress may function to permit avoidance of experiences that lead to stressful self-devaluation, attacks upon the conventional normative structure according to the standards of which the individual is caused to devalue himself, and to substitutions of new self-evaluative standards that may more easily be approximated. Research findings are compatible with these perspectives. Thus, a general measure of strain was observed to be related to drug use and delinquency (Agnew & White, 1992; for review see Agnew, 2006); and Kaplan and Peck (1992) reported that self-derogation was related to later theft, violence, and substance use, and that these relations were mediated variously by avoidant (drug use) or aggressive (violence, theft) coping styles.

Numerous other perspectives treat deviant motivation as engendered in similar fashion. Tittle's *control balance theory* asserts that deviant behavior is an adaptation to failure to approximate valued goals. A perceived deficit in the ability to exercise control in circumstances where autonomy is valued will dispose the individual to adopt deviant patterns that would permit the individual to alter the balance of control he or she is subject to (Tittle, 1995). For Tittle and Paternoster (2000), "a desire (a) to avoid control, or (b) to exercise more control than one is subject to, constitutes the major compelling force for humans and is implicated especially in criminal or deviant behavior" (p. 550). The theory assumes a predisposing need to exercise control and to escape having control exercised over one's self. A desire for autonomy together with control imbalance (a deficit or surplus of control) and basic human impulses predispose a person to be motivated to engage in deviant behavior. Thus, "*deviance can be understood as a maneuver to alter control imbalances and thereby to overcome feelings of humiliation provoked by being reminded of one's unbalanced control ratio*" (Tittle & Paternoster, p. 557, emphasis in original.).

Katz (1988) treats the motivation to deviant behavior ("seductions of crime") in terms of needs to protect one's self-esteem, encourage a desired reputation, establish autonomy, demonstrate competence, or other motives (all of which relate to the need to enhance one's self-esteem in one way or another). Similarly, Luckenbill (1977) examined the transactions leading to homicides in terms that reflected the need of individuals to protect their reputation or to attack that of others with whom they were interacting. Both the work of Katz and Luckenbill are considered to be instances of interaction analyses in which unique sets of transactions lead to motivated deviant outcomes (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). Inspired by the symbolic interactionist perspectives, Giordano, Schroeder, and Cernkovich (2007) recently proposed that individuals are attracted to the criminal lifestyle because they associate crime and deviance with the feelings of thrill and excitement. Based on the extensive interviews with a group of ex-offenders, the authors concluded that the emotions felt by these individuals towards crime were strongly associated with their motivation to engage in deviant behavior (Giordano et al., 2007).

The positive feelings that resulted from deviant behavior may lead to continuation of deviance insofar as the deviant patterns help one to avoid or relieve the perceived source of strain (negative self-affect in particular) and incidentally do not themselves become a new source of strain. In this respect, the findings discussed above are also syntonetic with the general theory of deviance put forth by Kaplan (1972, 1975, 1980) who argues that deviant adaptations to stress may function to permit the substitutions of new self-evaluative standards that may be more rewarding. Earlier research findings with respect to the causes and (thereby) escalation of deviant drug use (Kaplan & Johnson, 1992) were compatible with this theoretical expectation. Reduced negative affect from previous conventional interactions and enhanced positive affect following deviant behavior were both expected to influence continuation of deviant behavior. Both male and female adolescents who found the initial experience of drug use to reduce negative affect in general were more motivated to use drugs again and thus were likely to escalate this behavior to heavier patterns of use. Male adolescents who found

the initial experience of drug use rewarding through an increased sense of power or potency were more motivated and thereby likely to escalate this behavior to heavier patterns of drug use. Similarly, and to the opposite effect, adolescent girls who found the initial experience associated with the presumably negative experience of attenuation of ties with valued others (a potential source of negative self-affect) were less motivated and thereby less likely to escalate this behavior.

Marxist theories (Quinney, 1980; Taylor, Walton, & Young, 1973) are compatible with Merton's (1938) viewpoint and the perspectives of those who followed him. The Marxist point of view is interpretable as arguing that crime is stimulated by the need to survive under adverse circumstances by using illegitimate means to achieve legitimate goals. In addition to these crimes of accommodation, capitalist systems instigate violent crimes that function to reject a system that is viewed as unjust. Further, Bonger's (1969) version suggests that in the process of capitalism-driven competition, or striving for gain at the expense of others, deviance often reflects the strategy of those who successfully strive as well as the adaptations of those who fail to thrive, that is, those who are deprived. *Rational choice theory* (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) is also a motivational theory insofar as it focuses on projected benefits of an act as one class of variables affecting the likelihood of behavior.

Implicit in Reckless' *containment theory* is also the recognition of the important role played by motivation in explaining deviant behavior. He and his colleagues (Reckless, 1961, 1967; Reckless, Dinitz, & Murray, 1956) recognized the relevance of negative emotional responses to the conventional world that is associated with adversity and the attractiveness of deviance (delinquency) as alternative routes to the satisfaction of one's unfulfilled needs. Psychological impulses (dissatisfaction, hostility, and deprivation) that dispose an individual to deviant behavior are called "pushes." The attractions of deviant opportunities are termed "pulls". In a like manner, implicit in Nye's (1958) statements relating to the constraints exercised by internal and external sanctions, is the recognition that deviant behaviors represent alternative ways of meeting personal needs that are unmet with conventional groups (particularly the family).

All of these approaches seem to have in common the premise that deviant behaviors are motivated by needs to forestall or adapt to the psychological distress associated with the need to achieve desirable states that could not be achieved through conventional means. This being the case, it was perhaps inevitable that integrative perspectives would arise that encompass these approaches. Thus, Kaplan (1972, 1975, 1980, 1986, 1995, 1996; Kaplan & Johnson, 2001) argues that in the course of the socialization process, the individual learns to value the possession of certain attributes and the performance of certain behaviors as standards for self-evaluation and positive evaluation by others. In specified circumstances, some individuals may experience chronic failure to approximate valued standards and so experience distressful self-rejecting attitudes and disapproval by valued others. These circumstances motivate the individual to behave in ways that will assuage the distress associated with self-derogation and rejection by others. Although the person may well be motivated to attempt to assuage or forestall further distress through normatively prescribed mechanisms, these may prove to be ineffective in reducing the person's distressful self-attitudes. In these circumstances, the person will be motivated to seek alternative (deviant) response patterns that will function to achieve conventional values, avoid further failure and rejection by others, attack the validity of the conventional standards according to which the person was judged to have failed, and substitute new (deviant) standards that the person finds more easily achievable than the conventional standards and that evoke rewarding attitudes of approval from others in the deviant group.

Kaplan offers a theoretical approach that subsumes all of the specific forms of deviance-engendering stress under the rubric of *self-derogating experiences*. He argues that motives to engage in deviant behavior, whether considered as individual or collective responses, reflect the need to avoid self-rejecting attitudes and to maintain or promote positive self-attitudes. Kaplan (1975, 1980) refers to this need as *self-esteem motive*. Specific motives to attain consensually valued goals by illegitimate means are accounted for by the need to feel positively toward one's self. Motivated acts that reflect

contempt for the conventional value system and endorsement of values that contradict conventional value systems are intended to function in the service of the self-esteem motive by destroying the validity of the standards by which the person failed and, therefore, which evoked self-devaluing responses. For example, poor performance in school may lower the child's self-esteem. One of the ways to regain positive self-feelings in this situation would be to adopt a system of values that sees teachers and school as incompetent and unhelpful and so responsible for the child's failure. Acting on this value system could result in deviant behaviors such as truancy.

According to Kaplan's theory (1975, 1980), a person can also protect their self-esteem by retreating from the source of self-derogating experiences. Deviant patterns that appear to be motivated by the need to retreat (whether by decreasing contact with others or by changing one's psychological state) from contact with the conventional value structure function to enhance self-attitudes by (1) avoiding continuing experiences of failure and rejection when measured against conventional standards, or (2) avoiding recognition of such failure and rejection. The attraction of individuals who are socialized according to conventional values to groups that endorse delinquent values in addition to serving any of the foregoing self-enhancing functions, provides a new set of (deviant) standards that the person can adopt, achieve, and, therefore, use as a basis for positive self-evaluation (Kaplan, 1975, 1980, 1995; Kaplan & Johnson, 2001).

The foregoing perspectives address the emergence of deviant motivations by considering adaptations to the failure to approximate the standards of one's conventional membership groups, and the consequent loss of motivation to conform to and the genesis of motivation to deviate from the conventional standards. Another group of perspectives to which we now turn considers deviant adaptations that account for deviant motivations in terms of needs to conform to the expectations of membership groups that are regarded as deviant by other groups.

Motivation to Conform to Deviant Norms

Frequently people are motivated to behave in ways that conform to the expectations of members of their own groups, but by doing so deviate from the expectations of members of other groups to which they do not belong and/or to which they do not desire to belong. Arguably, among the most relevant theories that accounts for the development of motivation to engage in such behaviors is *social learning theory* as is reflected in Sutherland's (1947) *differential association* perspective and the reformulations of this theory based on principles of social behaviorism (Akers, 1985; Burgess & Akers, 1966). Although Sutherland spoke of criminal behavior, the theory is clearly applicable to the performance of deviant behavior in general. According to differential association theory, the person learns motives that are favorable to performing the deviant behavior along with supporting rationalizations, attitudes, and techniques for performing the deviant acts. Motivations to engage in the deviant acts depend upon learning attitudes ("definitions") that are favorable to committing the deviant act. If the person is on balance exposed to others' definitions that are favorable to the performance of the deviant behavior, the individual will be motivated to engage in the deviant behavior. Thus, if a person differentially associates with those who communicate favorable attitudes to performance of the deviant behavior, the person is more likely to become motivated to engage in the deviant behavior. This theoretical orientation clearly is applicable to explaining why individuals perform behaviors that are defined as deviant by others from outside their group but are defined favorably from within the group. In brief, differential association theory implies that motivation to engage in deviant behavior is a function of exposure to norms that endorse the deviant behavior rather than to norms that decry such behavior in the course of membership group interaction (DeFleur & Quinney, 1966). As differential association theory is incorporated in and expanded upon in social learning theory,

motivation to engage in particular deviant acts is explained through recourse to differential reinforcement and related principles.

The probability that persons will engage in criminal and deviant behavior is increased and the probability of their conforming to the norm is decreased when they differentially associate with others who commit criminal behavior and espouse definitions favorable to it, are relatively more exposed in-person or symbolically to salient criminal/deviant models, define it as desirable or justified in a situation discriminative for the behavior, and have received in the past and anticipate in the current or future situation relatively greater reward than punishment for the behavior. (Akers, 1998, p. 50)

A great deal of research justifies these conclusions including longitudinal studies of the causes of drinking (Akers, La Greca, Cochran, & Sellers, 1989) and smoking (Akers & Lee, 1996).

The principles of differential association describe well the mechanisms through which deviant groups and subcultures, once they arise, maintain themselves. According to the strain theories discussed in the previous section deviant groups may arise as collective adaptations motivated by distressing failure to approximate salient conventional values. Once these groups arise, however, maintenance of the groups depends on mechanisms of socialization and social control that rest on principles of differential association. These principles are suggested in the context of a number of network/subcultural perspectives. Thus, Krohn (1986) notes that social networks might be constructed around deviant activities as well as around conventional activities. Depending upon which of these is in force, behavior might be constrained in the direction of deviant activities as opposed to conventional activities. If the network is organized around deviant activities, the greater the multiplexity (the number of different relationships the actor shares in common with others in the network) and the greater the network density (the ratio of actual social relationships to possible network relationships), the greater will be the constraint to behave in a deviant direction. Recently, the social network perspective was further expanded (see Chap. 15, Interaction in Social Networks). Haynie (2001) used the data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) in-school survey which asked all of the students in 129 schools included in the study to report the names of their friends. Based on the friendship nominations, Haynie was able to examine the effects of both the structure of adolescent social networks and of the normative influences of peers in these networks (based on the nominated peers' own self-reported deviance) on the subjects' own involvement in crime and deviance. The author found that the normative influences of deviant peers were amplified if the subjects were in the networks of greater density, were more central in their network (had direct ties with all or most of the network members), and were more popular in school (were nominated by many students). These findings led Haynie to conclude that the network structural constraints indeed enhanced the normative social control exercised by the subjects' peers.

Theoretical understanding of the emergence of deviant subcultures has also been informed by the early works of the scholars of the Chicago School. A number of crime and deviance theories have drawn on the *human ecology* theoretical framework developed by Robert Park (1915) and his Chicago School colleagues. Human ecology is mainly concerned with the social organization of cities and communities resulting from the city growth dynamics (Wirth, 1945). The social organization emerges as the city inhabitants settle in the areas that best suit their economic interests and resources (Park). As a result of these city population settlement dynamics, less desirable areas in the city emerge. These areas are characterized by poverty and disorder which furthermore result in high rates of population turnover. The human ecology framework inspired Shaw and McKay (1942) to relate these conditions to the emergence of urban social problems including crime and delinquency in their formulation of the *social disorganization theory* (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). According to the social disorganization theory, the areas with higher rates of delinquency lacked communal consensus concerning social norms and values (Shaw & McKay). This lack of consensus provided an opportunity for individuals to seek alternative ways to satisfy their basic needs (Shaw & McKay). Hence, the individual deviant responses to such circumstances may be viewed as adaptations that facilitated adjustment to these

distressing circumstances. The individual adaptations to distress that take the form of deviant patterns are socially transmitted and reinforced among the current residents of the neighborhood and are transmitted to newcomers in the neighborhood and to the younger generations that grow up in the neighborhood. Thus, the deviant patterns are explained in part by social learning processes through which people conform to what is in essence a deviant subculture. Residents conform to patterns that are regarded as acceptable within the neighborhood but are regarded as deviant by groups outside of the neighborhood. Consistent with these premises, research by Gottfredson, McNeil, and Gottfredson (1991) reported that indices of social disorganization's relationship to delinquency were mediated by deviant peer associations among other variables.

Once deviant subcultures arise, whether as collective responses to adversity (Cohen, 1955) or otherwise, the collective adaptive responses tend to have a life of their own. These adaptations have the force of morality. Conformity to the rules of the right ways of behaving is rewarded, while deviation from the rules is punished in terms that are valued or disvalued by the group members. If the members of the group ever recognized the origins of the collective responses, they have long since forgotten them. New members who are attracted to the group learn what it takes to be accepted and otherwise rewarded by the group. They adopt the patterns and help pass them on to still other new members of the group. The values attached to the behaviors and the goals of the group are now independent of any values they may once have had and they continued to have in resolving the original needs of the collectivity that gave birth to the subculture.

A person may be born into and reared in a group that views deviant patterns as compatible with traditional group values. The individuals are socialized to recognize the appropriateness of these responses and are motivated to behave accordingly in order to continue to evoke rewarding responses from group members. If any incongruity is noted between the group definition of the behavior as appropriate and the definition by the more inclusive society of the behavior as deviant, then group justifications are provided that neutralize the perceived discrepancy.

An alternative route to the adoption of deviant subcultures is provided by circumstances in which a person who is reared in a more conventional group becomes attracted to, and a member of, a group that defines deviant behaviors as appropriate. The attractiveness of the group is due to the anticipation that important needs will be satisfied by the adoption of the subculture. The satisfactions may be directly tied to the deviant patterns endorsed by the group. For example, vandalism or the very act of affiliation with the subculture that endorses deviant acts may serve to express the person's contempt for conventional standards by the measure of which the person must necessarily judge himself a failure. By rejecting the standards, the person feels it unnecessary to continue to feel unworthy.

However, the performance of the deviant act may be incidental to the gratification achieved from adoption of the subculture. Conforming to the deviant subcultural norms represents ways of earning group approval. That some of the norms happen to require behavior defined as deviant by the inclusive culture is incidental to the group approval that is earned. In any case, whether the person is attracted to the group because of intrinsically satisfying deviant behaviors or because of the potential satisfactions to be gained from group acceptance, the person is motivated to remain a part of the group.

Another set of perspectives addresses the circumstances surrounding the development of dispositions to perform deviant acts that are defined as deviant by other groups but nevertheless conform to the expectations of groups to which the individual belongs or wishes to belong. The deviant behaviors reflect the values of these groups. The individual is motivated to perform those behaviors that reflect group norms in order to gain the satisfaction associated with the behaviors themselves, the approval of other group members for performing the behaviors, and the person's identification with a positive reference group. These perspectives, along with the previously discussed set, address the genesis of motivation to engage in deviant activities. However, not all motives to engage in deviant behavior in fact lead to the expression of deviance. What factors, then, facilitate or impede the acting out of deviant motives?

Acting on Deviant Motives

Not all people who are disposed or motivated to behave in deviant fashion actually perform deviant acts. The perspectives that address the question of why individuals who are motivated to engage in deviant acts do or do not actually engage in them, have been classified into two categories (Kaplan, 1984). Whether or not a person acts out the motivation to commit deviant acts is viewed as depending upon (1) the strength of the motives to commit the act as compared to the strength of the motives that dispose a person not to perform the act, that is, *counteracting motives*, and (2) the situational context and other *opportunities* to perform the act.

Counteracting Motives

Whether or not a person actually performs the deviant behavior that the person is motivated to perform depends in part upon the strength of counteracting motives to perform the deviant behavior. In the course of the socialization process, the individual learns to need the approval of other people, to conform to the expectations associated with important social identities, to do what is right, and a variety of other motives (Kaplan, 1975). If anticipated deviant behavior and the consequences of that behavior appear to threaten the satisfaction of these needs, or if it appears that the needs will be better served by not performing the deviant act, then the person will be somewhat restrained from acting in a deviant fashion.

A variety of social psychological perspectives address the question of why individuals who are motivated to engage in deviant behavior do not act out these motivations. One important class of variables that moderates the acting out of deviant impulses is considered within the context of what some have termed *internal* and *external constraint* theories (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000) and others have termed counteracting motives (Kaplan, 1984). Internal constraint theories assert that impulses to deviant behavior are either blunted or forestalled by the counteracting effects of a good self-concept (Reckless, 1967), or freed by an inability to take into account potential negative consequences of the deviant acts (i.e., impulsivity) (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985), low self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) and a failure to engage in *thoughtful and reflective decision making* that leads one to properly evaluate the costs of deviant behavior (Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009).

External social controls relate to anticipated informal sanctions by parents or other significant others or to formal sanctions administered by public agencies. Examples of external constraint theories include deterrence theory (Zimring & Hawkins, 1973), social disorganization theory (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942) and collective efficacy theory (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; see also Sampson, 2012). Still other theories focus on both internal and external controls. Such perspectives are traceable to earlier statements of the relevance of internal and external constraints in explaining why people may not act out their motivations to engage in deviant responses (Nye, 1958; Reiss, 1951).

Just as differential association (Sutherland, 1947) and social learning (Akers, 1985) theories are relevant in explaining why people become motivated to engage in deviant acts that are defined as deviant by groups other than their own, so do these theories become relevant in accounting for why individuals who are motivated to engage in deviant acts fail to actually perform the deviant behavior. It is conceivable that in the course of social interaction they learn normative definitions that are unfavorable to the performance of the deviant acts and are favorable toward conforming to the normative expectations of their group that preclude the performance of such acts. These learned definitions serve as counteracting influences on the performance of the deviant acts that the person might otherwise be disposed to perform. Thus, deviant behavior will occur insofar as “reinforcement, exposure to deviant models, and definitions are not offset by negative formal and informal sanctions and definitions” (Akers, p. 60).

Deterrence theory alleges that the expectation of certain, severe, and swift punishment for engaging in deviant acts administered by formal or informal agents of social control deters individuals acting out deviant impulses (Tittle, 1980). Earlier theories focused on the deterrent effect of formal (criminal) social sanctions. Later treatments of deterrence theory expanded the concept of deterrence to include the effects of anticipated informal sanctions such as rejecting attitudes from parents, friends, or associates. Presumably, as much research suggests, if individuals anticipated that their deviant behavior would lead to informal sanctions whether in conjunction with or independent of formal sanctions, they would be less likely to actually engage in deviant behaviors (Paternoster, 1985; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973). The deterrent effect of awareness of punishment meted out to others for deviant acts on the part of individuals who have yet to commit a deviant act is called *general deterrence* (Paternoster, 1985; Zimring, 1971; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973). As we will note later, deterrence theory is also relevant to explaining (dis)continuity of deviant behavior, particularly when focusing on specific deterrents in which the experience of negative social sanctions cause the person who is punished to decrease the likelihood of future deviance.

Whether or not someone who is motivated to engage in deviant acts actually performs such acts will depend in part upon the perception that certain costs will be incurred. Such costs include the likelihood of being observed and, consequently, sanctioned for engaging in the deviant act. Thus, in *routine activities theory* (Cohen & Felson, 1979), the likelihood of deviant acts is greater in the absence of formal or informal guardians who could forestall the deviant act by virtue of the guardian's potential for administering sanctions or causing such sanctions to be administered. The lack of guardianship may also be a general feature of some social environments. For example, Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued that some of the America's urban communities today are characterized by the signs of disorder and decline which symbolically suggest that deviant behaviors in such areas will not be noted or sanctioned. According to the *broken windows theory*, such signs invite (hence, do not provide counteracting motives) individuals to commit deviant and criminal acts in such areas (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

Theories relating to social bonding and social control are arguably the most manifestly relevant approaches to addressing the question of why people act out dispositions to engage in deviant behavior or fail to do so. These perspectives take for granted that the disposition or motivation to be deviant is present but that circumstances which may impede the disposition are variable. Given the inherent motivation to engage in deviant behavior, acting on those dispositions would be inevitable were it not for countervailing social and personal controls.

On the assumption that individuals are ordinarily disposed to engage in deviant behavior, Hirschi (1969) argues in *social bond theory* that social bonds to parents, teachers, and others prevent the individual from acting out deviant motives. When these social bonds are weakened, they permit the individual to act on the pre-existing deviant motives. The social bonds consist of four main elements: (1) attachment to others; (2) commitment; (3) involvement; and (4) belief. *Attachment* to conventional others refers to having close emotional ties to others and caring about meeting their expectations. If one does not care about meeting expectations, then he is more likely to act out deviant impulses. *Commitment* refers to the investment that a person makes in the conventional normative structure and the rewards that are expected to accrue from conformity with the normative structure. The threat of lost rewards by violating normative expectations decreases the likelihood of acting on deviant impulses. *Involvement* essentially refers to the amount of time one expends in conventional activities. The more involved one is in conventional activities, the less one is able to act out deviant dispositions. In some sense involvement reflects the lack of opportunity to engage in deviant activities. To the extent that one is not involved in conventional activities, one has the opportunity to engage in the deviant activities to which one is disposed. *Belief* refers to the approval or acceptance of the conventional normative structure. One conforms to the rules of the social order because they are believed to be right, fitting, and proper. To the extent that the belief in the rightness of the normative order is weakened, the person is enabled to act out any dispositions to deviate that individual is subject to.

The elements of social bonding theory may be interpreted as asserting that alternative conventional motives counteract deviant dispositions. That is, individuals learn these motives that have greater affective significance in the hierarchy of values than the deviant behaviors or the goals that can be achieved by deviant behavior. In general, research findings are consistent with many of the premises of social bonding theory, particularly those relating to attachment, commitment, and belief in the family and other membership groups (Evans, Cullen, Dunaway, & Burton, 1995; Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986).

Much of contemporary theory and research on social disorganization focuses upon the impact of social disorganization on diminishing social controls or, in some cases, defines social disorganization in terms of disruption of mechanisms of social control (Bursik, 1988; Gottfredson et al., 1991; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997; Stark, 1987). Research by Sampson and Groves, for example, observes that the influence of low social class, residential transiency, and broken homes, as well as other such factors (components of social disorganization) on deviance is mediated by indices of community supervision, membership in formal organizations, and the prevalence of friendship networks. In the absence of motives to engage in these conventional networks, dispositions to participate in deviant acts are not counteracted.

Many studies have also found support for Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) self-control theory (Pratt & Cullen, 2000). *Self-control theory* (Gottfredson & Hirschi) premises that individuals will not act out their motivation to engage in deviant acts if they are characterized by higher levels of self-control but will act out deviant inclinations if they lack self-control. Self-control characterizes individuals who received effective socialization in the course of child rearing, and low self-control is the result of ineffective socialization practices. The family is the primary socializing agency although other social institutions such as school and local communities contribute as well (e.g., Gibson, Sullivan, Jones, & Piquero, 2010). Individuals with low self-control are more likely to engage in criminal and deviant behaviors because they are less capable of properly perceiving, and reacting to, the long term costs of such acts (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Low self-control furthermore impedes the formation of strong social bonds. Hence, unlike Hirschi's earlier social bond theory, self-control theory postulates that social ties do not predict deviant behavior after self-control is set in early childhood (Wright, Caspi, Moffitt, & Silva, 1999). Recently, Hirschi (2004) updated the self-control theory by arguing that self-control is related to crime through its effects on the ability of individuals to perceive the full scope of consequences of deviance with the breaking of bonds with the significant-others being the most important consequence.

Some theorists have argued that individual's *morality* (defined as the perception of different acts being right or wrong things to do in particular circumstances) also prevents the acting out of crime and deviance (Wikström, 2006). Wikström suggests that highly moral individuals do not perform acts of crime and deviance because they typically do not perceive such action alternatives when deciding how to act in the situations where the opportunities for crime or deviance are present. Furthermore, a person is unlikely to perform a deviant act if he believes that the act is a violation of a rule that is right. The person is emotionally committed to the rule that to him reflects valued behavior (doing what is right, not doing what is wrong). The performance of the deviant act, however, does not necessarily preclude some moral commitment to the norm. It is possible to commit a deviant act in the face of a moral commitment to a rule that proscribes it if the person is able to justify the act in conventional terms. Sykes and Matza (1957) point out a number of *techniques of neutralization* by which the deviant is able to justify the violation of conventional norms. In fact, it is the apparent need to justify the violation that suggests that there is some degree of commitment to the conventional norms.

Thus, a person may actually perform a deviant act even in the face of learned attitudes that disapprove of such acts if they are able to justify the act in terms that are normatively acceptable such as by normalizing the act, absolving oneself of personal responsibility, blaming the victim, or pointing out that a higher purpose was served by performing the deviant act (Sykes & Matza, 1957).

The countervailing motives reflected in social bonding and social control perspectives may be neutralized to the extent that individuals who are disposed to perform deviant acts can justify those acts in terms that are conventionally acceptable. Whereas conventional values would ordinarily militate against the individual acting on deviant impulses, techniques of neutralization that justify or excuse performance of the deviant acts would permit the person to act out the deviant disposition (Sykes & Matza, 1957).

Opportunities

Given the motivation to perform a deviant act, circumstances must be such that opportunities to perform the act are present. There cannot be an act of aggression in the absence of an object of aggression, and there cannot be theft without the presence of property that might be purloined. This supposition is reflected in a number of theoretical perspectives including routine activities theory that recognize suitable objects of victimization as being one of three necessary elements for criminal acts to occur, the other two being motivated offenders and the absence of guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The confluence of these items is a function of the “routine activities” that a person engages in. Particular patterns of work and play increase or decrease the likelihood that the opportunity to engage in deviance will present itself.

The role of opportunity related factors is apparent in other social psychological perspectives on deviance as well. As noted above, the opportunity construct is reflected to some extent in the component of social bonding that Hirschi (1969) refers to as involvement, that is, the degree to which one spends time in conventional activities. The more one is involved with conventional activities, the less opportunity (time) one has to engage in any deviant activities to which one is inclined.

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) recognized that the acting out of deviant dispositions depends upon the availability of illegitimate opportunity structures just as the ability to act out conventional motivations depends upon the availability of legitimate opportunity structures. In order to act out delinquent patterns, the potential deviant actors must have available to them illegitimate opportunities in their community. Depending on the social organization of the neighborhoods, illegitimate opportunities of particular kinds will or will not be available to the alienated individual. Cloward and Ohlin posit the existence of a variety of delinquent subcultures. The “criminal” subculture consisted of norms endorsing illegal money-making activities. The formation of such gangs is facilitated in neighborhoods in which stable adult criminal patterns are observed. “Conflict” gangs are those in which individuals gain prestige through their abilities and willingness to engage in violent activities. In the absence of alternative legitimate or illegitimate opportunities, the availability of such gangs invites participation by alienated youths that seek to enhance their reputation by conforming to violence-endorsing norms. The “retreatist” subculture is organized around patterns of substance abuse. In response to experiences of failure, the youths adapt by retreating from the sources of failure and gain recognition by participation in substance-abusing gangs. In each of these types of gangs, opportunities are presented for the individual to gain status through illegitimate means. Whether or not the individual engages in these activities depends upon the pre-existence of such subcultures.

Other examples are provided by social disorganization and social control perspectives. The hypothesized association between social disorganization and deviant behavior has been linked to increases in opportunities to engage in such behavior that are found in areas characterized by social disorganization (Bursik, 1988; Stark, 1987). From Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) perspective, deviant dispositions will eventuate in deviant behavior under conditions of weak self-control. However, although opportunities are said to be plentiful, they must be present for deviant behavior to occur even in the presence of weak self-control. In short, crimes are more likely to occur whenever and wherever opportunities to commit such crimes present themselves. Opportunities refer to both objective reality and subjective perception of situations that facilitate acting out deviant motives.

To summarize, the acting out of motivation to engage in deviant acts depends upon the absence of countervailing motivation to conform to conventional expectations, and the presence of opportunities to act out deviant motivations. These motivations are less likely to be acted upon in the presence of countervailing motivations to conform to conventional expectations and in the absence of opportunities to engage in deviant acts.

(Dis)Continuation of Deviant Behavior

A number of social psychological perspectives address the question of whether the individual, having initiated deviant acts, will continue/increase or discontinue/decrease involvement in deviant activities. Social learning theory is applicable to the question of why people (dis)continue deviant behavior by stating that repetition of deviance occurs because of differential reinforcement by which individuals are rewarded or punished (whether physically or symbolically) for engaging in deviant acts. Past reinforcement, whether actually or vicariously experienced, will lead the individual to desist from or continue the act depending upon whether past experiences were punitive or rewarding in anticipation that similar experiences will ensue (Akers, 1985; Burgess & Akers, 1966). The ability to be conditioned by differential reinforcement may in turn depend upon variability in biogenetically influenced individual traits such as impulsivity which precludes consideration of possible future adverse consequences of the deviant behavior (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985).

Deterrence theory is relevant to a consideration of factors affecting (dis)continuation of deviant behavior insofar as it is expected that the experience of negative sanctions in response to earlier deviance will have a greater deterrent effect on continuation of deviant behavior than the absence of sanctions in response to early deviance (Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1983; Tittle, 1980). Deterrent effects are more or less likely depending upon characteristics of potential negative consequences and of the psychic organization of individuals including the nature of things that people fear, the accuracy with which people perceive the likelihood of undesirable consequences, and whether or not internalized norms make deterrence irrelevant. Additionally, a number of other attributes affect the likelihood of people becoming conditioned as a result of receiving punishment for earlier infractions. Conditionability depends on such features of personality as the ability to anticipate negative consequences and to defer immediate gratification (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). For example, in a recent review of the deterrence literature, Piquero and his colleagues concluded that the deterrent effects of sanctions on offending may be contingent on the individual characteristics such as in “social bonding, morality, discount rate, impulsivity, social network position, decision-making competence” (Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, & Loughran, 2011, p. 335).

The labeling perspective directly addresses the (dis)continuity of deviant behavior. Once a person engages in deviant behavior or is thought to do so, the person evokes negative social sanctions and, frequently as a consequence of being the object of negative social sanctions, develops a deviant identity. The development of a deviant identity increases the likelihood that the individual will become fixed in deviant patterns. That is, the continuity of deviant behavior is increased as a result of being punished for earlier deviant behavior. As Becker (1963) notes: “treating a person as though he were generally rather than specifically deviant produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. It sets in motion several mechanisms which conspire to shape the person in the image people have of him” (p. 34).

The continuity or amplification of deviant behavior in response to negative social sanctions may be thought of as *secondary deviance*, that is, behavior that represents an adaptation to the stress experienced as a result of social sanctions to initial deviance (Lemert, 1967). However, continuity of deviant behavior or escalation of such behavior in response to negative social sanctions is not inevitable. Depending upon a number of circumstances, this continuation of deviant behavior as a consequence of mechanisms of social control may or may not occur.

Braithwaite (1989) suggests that whether or not a community attempts to reintegrate a deviant into society following the application of negative social sanctions moderates the relationship between negative social sanctions and continued or increased behavior. If the community attempts to reintegrate the deviant into society following the application of negative social sanctions, the negative social sanctions are not likely to lead to amplification of deviance. However, if the community does not attempt to reintegrate the deviant into society, then negative social sanctions will likely result in an increase or continuation of deviant behavior.

The question of etiology of (dis)continuity of deviant behavior is central to some criminological and social psychological theories. Sampson and Laub (1993) proposed the *theory of age graded informal social control* that focused explicitly on explaining the continuity and change in offending patterns over the life-course of individuals. The authors built their theory on the foundation of Hirschi's (1969) social bond theory and argued that continuity and change in offending patterns are associated with the formation and strength of bonds to conventional others that occurs throughout one's life. While the social bond theory is primarily concerned with adolescents' bonds to family and school, Sampson and Laub's (1993) theory also considers the importance of social bonds formed in the later adult life such as marriage, employment and military service. The authors argued that a good marriage or stable employment could become the turning points for the individuals with delinquent pasts and could lead to the desistance from (discontinuation of) crime. In a more recent statement of the theory, Laub and Sampson (2003) suggested that continuity in offending should be explained by both the strength of social bonds and by the influences of human agency on the formation of these bonds.

Similar view of agency as the catalyst for continuity and change in offending over the life-course is central to the theory of cognitive transformation (Giordano, Cernkovich, & Rudolph, 2002). According to the *cognitive transformation theory*, the discontinuity of offending behavior requires individuals (1) to become mindful of the desirability of change, (2) to be exposed to the pro-social elements of social environment that the authors call "hooks for change" (similar to social bonds), (3) to initiate the change in one's identity, and (4) to acquire the view of criminal lifestyle as undesirable (Giordano et al., 2002). The authors also argue that some actors can draw on the resources in their social environments which provide scaffolding that helps them to complete the transformation and to desist from crime. The author later added a neo-Meadian component to the theory of cognitive transformation by arguing that desistance from crime is also facilitated by the emotional self-development that occurs when individuals are able to engage in the conventional role-taking (Giordano et al., 2007).

The continuity and change of deviant behavior across generations, from parent to child, was among the subjects of the most recent effort to lay the groundwork for the study of the association between phenomena in one generation and the same phenomena in a successive generation (Kaplan & Tolle, 2006). Kaplan and Tolle (2006) observed simple relationships among the antecedents and consequences of the parallel phenomena in both generations. These relationships were examined in the *intergenerational parallelism* framework that depicted the intergenerational (dis)continuity of deviant behavior (Kaplan & Tolle). Kaplan and Tolle used the insights from Kaplan's (1972, 1975, 1980) general theory of deviant behavior to provide theoretical explanations for various aspects of the intergenerational parallelism of deviance. They argued that the second generation subjects were more likely to engage in deviant behavior if their parents (the first generation subjects) during their adolescent years also engaged in deviant behavior and especially if their parents (the first generation) felt alienated from the conventional social order and rejected by their peers and the conventional others. Furthermore, more intergenerational parallelism of deviant behavior would be observed if the second generation subjects had a greater awareness of deviant acts performed by the students in their schools (Kaplan & Tolle). The authors also argued that the continuity of deviance between generations was mediated by the intergenerational transmission of maladaptive strategies for coping with stress and rejection. While obviously well suited for the general theory of deviant behavior, this framework also has implications for life-course theory research and longitudinal methodologies that vary as widely as the notion of timing and linked lives in life-course theory (e.g., particular developmental stage of

adolescence and the role of parents' earlier deviance on their children's behavior) to the importance of temporal priority, life event history and elaboration strategies for complex longitudinal analyses (e.g., causal inferences of intergenerational transmission, age at initiation of deviant behavior, and historical effects).

Kaplan (1984) integrates some of these and several other perspectives within a single theoretical framework. He argues that three sets of factors account for (dis)continuity of deviant behavior. The first category concerns positive reinforcement of the need to perform deviant acts. The positive reinforcement stems from the satisfactions of important needs experienced by the individual as a result of the more or less direct consequences of the deviant behavior, especially those that the individual learns contribute to positive affect or forestall negative ones. The second set refers to the weakening of counteracting motives or controls that previously deterred the person from performing deviant acts, especially if the individual learns through interaction that these normative motives or social structure do not contribute to positive affect or actually increase distress. The third set addresses the availability of opportunities for the performance of deviant behaviors.

Positive Reinforcement of Deviant Behavior

According to Kaplan (1984) deviant behavior is self-reinforcing in two respects. First, the performance of deviant behavior may satisfy important needs for an individual. Since the behavior satisfies the needs, as the needs continue or recur, the deviant behavior will continue or be repeated in the expectation that the needs will still or once again be satisfied. Second, regardless of the motivation toward the initial performance of the deviant acts, the deviant behavior creates a need (specifically a need for self-justification) that is satisfied by continuation or repetition of the deviant act. The difference is that in the former instance, a need preceded the deviant behavior that satisfied the need. In the latter case, the deviant behavior created a need that is satisfied by repetition or continuation of the deviant behavior (Kaplan, 1984).

Deviant Acts and Need Satisfaction

Frequently, the performance of deviant acts results in the satisfaction of the person's needs. These satisfactions reinforce motives to perform the deviant acts. The various needs that the person experiences have been subsumed under the more general need to feel positively about one's self (Kaplan, 1975, 1980, 1995). It has been argued that deviant acts can satisfy this need in any of several ways. The avoidance of self-devaluing experiences is a consequence of deviant acts insofar as the acts or consequent negative sanctions lead to enforced avoidance of the negative responses of people in the conventional environment. To the extent that a person spends more time with deviant peers, is incarcerated or is otherwise excluded from interacting with conventional others, he will necessarily avoid the negative reactions that he has experienced in the conventional environment in the past.

Deviant acts that involve *attacks* upon conventional institutions may have self-enhancing consequences by causing the individual to express his rejection of the values by which he in the past rejected himself (Kaplan, 1975, 1980). Deprived of self-acceptance by being unable to approximate conventional standards and, consequently, to earn group approval, the person would find rejection of the standards and of the group that rejected him gratifying. The deviant behavior would signify that the standards by which he formerly rejected himself were invalid.

Deviant activities may provide *substitute* patterns through which the person may more easily evaluate himself in a positive light (Kaplan, 1975, 1980). By associating with a group that endorses standards that are more easily attainable than those endorsed in the conventional environment, the

person may gain gratification from approximating the new standards. Toward the goal of being accepted by the group, the individual behaves in ways that he perceives the group as endorsing and so earns their approval.

Deviant behavior may be positively reinforced as a result of consequences of replacing deviant sources of gratification with conventional ones. For example, deviant activities may give the individual a new sense of power or control over the environment, which leads the person to think of himself as a more effective individual; or, the person may achieve conventional goals (money, prestige) through illicit means.

Delinquent Acts and Self-Justification

The initial performance of deviant acts and the negative sanctions evoked by those acts threaten important needs of individuals who are socialized in conventional society, such as the need to perceive one's self as conforming to moral standards and to be accepted by the community as one who conforms to those standards (Kaplan, 1984). Among the ways an individual can reduce the resulting distress are: (1) by justifying the act in conventional terms (e.g., Sykes & Matza, 1957), and (2) by transforming one's identity in ways that justify the behavior as appropriate to the new (deviant) identity (e.g., Kaplan & Lin, 2000). Both self-justifying responses involve the continuation, repetition, or escalation of deviant involvement.

Collective justifications may be provided by the social support of others in deviant subcultures or by employing conventional neutralizing patterns that effectively normalize what would otherwise be regarded as deviant behavior. The justification of the acts in conventional terms required by the individual's socialization experiences facilitates repetition or continuation of earlier deviant acts. The repetition of the deviant behavior, in turn, testifies to the person's belief in the legitimacy of the act.

The consequences of earlier delinquent acts, including rejecting responses by others, frequently lead the person to question his or her self-worth. In order to restore feelings of self-acceptance, the person adopts a deviant identity, reevaluates that identity in positive terms, and conforms to behaviors that validate the identity. In order to accomplish this, the person selectively interacts with deviant peers who respond more positively in support of the deviant activities. The result of this process will be positive experiences associated with the deviant self-image and continued performance of deviant behaviors that are required by the now satisfying (deviant) self-image (Kaplan, 1984).

Weakening of Social Controls

The motives that restrain a person from initially performing deviant acts (the need for positive consequences of not performing deviant acts, and fear of the negative consequences that might occur if the deviant acts were performed) frequently are weakened by the consequences of early performance of the act. Thus, the loss of fear of adverse consequences and the weakening of the attraction to the reward of conformity permit continued involvement in the deviant activity (Kaplan, 1984).

Limited Adverse Consequences

As a result of earlier performance of deviant acts the person may observe that few of the anticipated adverse consequences in fact occur (Kaplan, 1984). For example, Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga (2006) incorporated the *Bayesian learning process* in to the rational choice model of crime causation. The authors argued that one's perception of risk associated with criminal acts is based on the initial

information and on the updating of this information through personal and vicarious experiences with formal social sanctions. Their study found that adolescents' perception of risk associated with performing acts of theft and violence decreased when more of their offenses went unsanctioned (Matsueda et al., 2006). However, while the experiences of formal sanctions were associated with the increased perception of risk, the youths who did not have a history of performing deviant acts, had much higher perceptions of risk than both the more and the less frequently sanctioned deviant youths (Matsueda et al., 2006). The latter finding indicates that when acts of primary deviance are performed, individuals generally learn that the risks of getting caught and sanctioned are actually lower than generally perceived by the non-deviant individuals. Hence, it is possible that the acts of primary deviance affect the level of social control by changing one's perceived risk of being caught and sanctioned.

The perception of adverse consequences of deviance also may subsequently be limited when the initial deviance is observed and harshly responded to because personal and social controls may be weakened by such response. In these circumstances, the person is effectively expelled from conventional society, and hence, the interaction between the person and representatives of conventional society is markedly reduced. These acts of expulsion that serve as negative sanctions for the earlier deviance effectively preclude the observation of further wrongdoing and, therefore, the administration of further punishment for the deviant acts. By expelling the person from conventional society, he is removed from the surveillance of those who might prevent future wrongdoing by again punishing the deviant acts as they might have been observed. Sampson and Laub (1993) provide a similar explanation of continuity of criminal behavior. The authors argue that the continuity of deviant behavior across the stages of life-course can be explained by the effects of earlier criminal acts on the future social bond formation and on the opportunities for conventional success in later life. They suggest that delinquency may "knife off" the opportunities for success and "mortgage" the future of offenders by decreasing their chances of obtaining stable employment and finding a marital partner (Sampson & Laub, 1993 p. 142).

Decreased Attraction to Conventional Values

The experience of negative sanctions in response to initial deviance (informal rejection by family or school, and the stigma associated with being the object of more formal sanctions such as being arrested) reflects both intrinsically distressful experiences and barriers to the achievement of other emotionally significant goals. On the one hand, the shame of being punished for certain infractions leads to a self-defensive rejection of the moral standards. The person is motivated by the need to evaluate himself positively, to create personal justifications for the behavior, and to ally himself with those who can offer collective justifications for the behavior (Kaplan, 1984).

On the other hand, the rejection of the deviant by members of conventional society deprives the person of access to resources that, aside from being intrinsically valued, are means to the achievement of other valued ends. Such deprivation further alienates the person from the normative order. The person no longer cares what the representatives of the conventional order think about his behavior and so the attitudes of others no longer constrain him from performing a deviant act that he is motivated to perform. Rather, the individual becomes increasingly dependent upon deviant associates for standards of self-evaluation and for the resources for approximating the standards (Kaplan, 1984).

Opportunities for Deviance

The early performance of deviant acts has consequences that increase the person's opportunity to perform deviant acts. As a result of the person's rejection of and by conventional society, the person becomes increasingly attracted to deviant associates and increases the amount of social interaction

with other deviants. Such increased interaction leads to greater opportunities to observe and learn deviant patterns in addition to being provided with numerous occasions when the enactment of the deviant behavior would be appropriate. As the person becomes symbolically and physically separated from conventional society, he depends upon deviant associates for an increasingly greater proportion of the opportunities to satisfy his own needs. In short, conventional opportunities are foreclosed, while deviant opportunities are increased (Kaplan, 1984).

Consequences of Deviance

When patterns of deviance occur, what are the consequences for the individual, the group in which the person holds membership, and society as a whole? Numerous social psychological perspectives address, implicitly or explicitly, these direct and indirect consequences of deviance. In general, the direct responses refer to (1) formal and informal social sanctioning responses to deviant behavior; (2) social functioning; and, (3) social change in the definition and prevalence of patterns of deviant behavior. The perspectives on these phenomena are social psychological in that they implicate such intrapsychic responses as, for example, perceptions of threat to personal and group interests, fear reactions, and perceptions of prevalence of deviance.

Formal and Informal Social Responses

Among the significant social consequences of deviant behavior are the formal and informal responses of community agencies and groups. Acts of deviance, when they come to the attention of representatives of the formal institutions of our society, stimulate a programmed series of activities involving the investigation of the crime, arrest of alleged perpetrators, judicial decisions about guilt or innocence of the accused, and, if found guilty, the administration of negative sanctions. Mediating the relationship between patterns of crime and such formal responses are the attitudinal responses of the public (particularly the emotion of fear), the less formal collective responses to the stimulation of fear (including petitions to legislatures, organization of neighborhood watch groups, taking other precautions, and, in rare instances, vigilante action), and the awareness of the crimes that stimulate the fear response. The fear response might be evoked by either direct (personal experience with crime) or second-hand experiences (via mass media and interpersonal communication networks) with crime (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). The nature of the social responses to the deviant acts depends upon characteristics of the offense, the offender, and the victim.

Social control mechanisms range from informal (gossip, shunning) to formal (systems of adjudication, and consequent responses relating to imprisonment, probation and parole, in-community supervision, psychotherapy, and rehabilitation). Such social control mechanisms arise in response to involuntary as well voluntary deviance. Social policies of ethnic cleansing, apartheid, and genocide represent sanctioning mechanisms in response to undesirable ethnic, racial, or religious attributes.

Whether or not the de facto deviant behavior evokes negative sanctions depends upon the willingness of the observer to define the behavior as deviant. Frequently, observers because of needs of their own or for other reasons, refuse to recognize the behavior as deviant. They either do not recognize that the behavior has occurred, or they define the behavior as within the normal range of expected events (Yarrow, Schwartz, Murphy, & Deasy, 1955). It is also possible that observers may recognize behavior as deviant but will not try to sanction the behavior because the offender and the observers are a part of the same network of communal social ties (Browning, Feinberg, & Dietz, 2004). Observers may also be reluctant to contact the authorities after observing deviant behavior if the observers or their

local community do not see the criminal justice system or the legal order as fair or legitimate (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). Additionally, whether observers choose to recognize the behavior as deviant and to respond with negative social sanctions depends upon a variety of contingencies including the characteristics of the deviant actor and the negative social sanctions applied to it. Generally, if the deviant actor is characterized by other undesirable attributes or the actor is powerless to resist the application of the negative social sanctions, the behavior is more likely to be recognized, and the sanctions are more likely to be forthcoming.

The formal and informal societal sanctions frequently are evoked in conjunction with social psychological premises held by the members of the society or surrogates acting on behalf of society. Thus, in response to deviant activities, on the premise that increased severity of punishment would deter deviant activity, society (particularly over the past three decades) has introduced a series of severe criminal justice policies including:

... restoration of capital punishment; abolishment of parole and indeterminate sentencing; ending or restricting good time and gain time reductions in sentences for prison inmates; restriction of judicial sentencing discretion through sentencing guidelines and mandated sentences; longer prison sentences for drug and violent offenses; “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” life sentences for habitual offenders; direct filing of juvenile offenders to criminal courts; and stricter intermediate sanctions such as home confinement that controls offenders in the community more than traditional probation does. (Akers, 2000, p. 27)

Deviant acts also evoke responses that are intended to forestall deviance by decreasing opportunities to engage in deviant acts. Thus, devices such as increased street lighting, self-locking doors, and providing guards for premises decrease opportunities to engage in certain kinds of deviant acts. Such precautions are suggested by social psychological assumptions such as those that are implicit or explicit in orientations such as routine activities theory that assert opportunity structure to be one of the elements that are the *sine qua non* for the commission of deviant acts (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981).

The negative sanctioning of deviant behavior in turn has its own consequences relating respectively to deterrence of deviant behavior and affirmation of moral standards.

Consequences for Deterrence

The future performance of deviant acts may be influenced by the formal and informal responses to earlier deviance. Part of this influence is mediated by the effects of the responses with regard to the reaffirmation of the moral code of the community. More directly, however, these responses, including the administration of more or less severe punishment and precautionary measures, may deter the individual from acting out a disposition or limit the opportunities to do so. Perhaps a person otherwise motivated to perform a deviant act would not do so if swift and sure punishment were anticipated. The person also would be less likely to act out a disposition to steal if the goods were not easily available. On the other hand, precautionary tactics that limit opportunity may merely displace deviant acts onto other areas (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). These consequences have been considered previously in discussions of deterrence, social control, routine activities, and related perspectives.

Affirming Moral Standards and Group Solidarity

In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Emile Durkheim introduced the idea that behavior defined as deviant stands in contrast to collective normative expectations and so functions to define collective normative standards. Farrell and Swigert expand upon this idea as follows:

Property is valued, for example, not only because respect for it is engendered by institutional efforts at socialization but also because the propertyless are shamed and the thief imprisoned. In much the same way as the moral

leader exemplified the cultural idea, the deviant stands for that to which the culture stands opposed. The group derives vitality from repulsion, indignation, and official reaction to deviant conduct. By calling attention to the sins, pathologies, and crimes of the outcast, the group reinforces its cohesiveness and reaffirms its norms. (Farrell & Swigert, 1982, p. 28)

The visible responses to violations of normative standards serve to communicate that limits are imposed upon behavior and, by implication, the behaviors that are required. Further, the collective responses to deviant behavior (particularly when group cohesiveness is threatened) reinforce a feeling of collective solidarity among the members of the society that (particularly in modern society) is otherwise divided by diverse value systems. The collective response to violation of basic norms reinforces the sense of what commonality the society does possess (Durkheim, 1938; Erikson, 1966).

Social Functioning

Deviant patterns and the social response evoked adversely affect the social functioning of the deviant, of those with whom the deviant would ordinarily interact, and of the victims of the deviance. Additionally, deviant patterns have adverse consequences for the communitywide achievement of social values.

The social functioning of the deviant is disrupted in the sense that among the immediate negative consequences of deviant behavior is the displacement of normative activities by deviant activities. Not only is the performance of current roles lost, but the normal socialization process is interrupted so that the deviant behavior forestalls the learning and performance of adult roles (Hewitt, 1970). For example, Massoglia and Uggen's study found that the individuals who continued to break the law into adulthood were much less likely to report feeling that they have attained adult status and made timely progress in the life domains including "marriage, schooling, employment, financial independence, and the start of a career" (Massoglia & Uggen, 2010, p. 563). The social functioning of others who would ordinarily act as role partners with the deviant is similarly disrupted. The proper performance of one's roles depends upon the proper performance of social roles on the part of those with whom the person interacts in the context of social relationships.

The appropriate performance of social roles on the part of victims is disrupted by the self-protective devices they use to decrease the risk of being a victim. Responses by the potential victim include such personal precautions as walking with others, avoiding dangerous places, and staying home. Recently, a case study of the individuals forcefully relocated from a housing project in Chicago into parts of the city unfamiliar to them found that these individuals developed cognitive maps governing their movement around their new neighborhoods in order to avoid encountering members of unfriendly gangs (Rymond-Richmond, 2006). Such responses in turn place constraints upon the amount of social interaction people may enjoy (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). Further, less directly, the achievement of social values is hindered both by displacement of resources and by threats to these values posed by the social reactions to deviant behavior in the service of other values. Extensive deviance requires the expenditure of scarce resources in order to protect those who conform to conventional norms. If the resources must be expended in these ways, they cannot be used to achieve other social values.

Social Change

While it may be true that occasional deviance serves the function of reaffirming the values that the deviant behavior contradicts, as deviant behaviors increase, they serve to call into question the worth of these values, and deviant behaviors become stimuli for social change. If deviant behavior is viewed

as evoking social responses that reinforce the validity of the social rules that are violated, then such behavior must also be viewed as having the potentially counteracting effect of laying the groundwork for social change in the moral code. Each instance of deviant behavior is a potential stimulus and model for the acting out of pre-existing deviant dispositions. Individuals who are disposed to violate rules may not act out their disposition because of the absence of situational stimuli or because they lack a conception of what form the acting out might take. When the person who is so stimulated observes a deviant act, he may be stimulated to act out his disposition to commit a deviant act, and at the same time, may be provided with a deviant model that provides the form that the acting out of the deviant tendency might take. In short, one of the social consequences of deviant behavior is the increased likelihood that others will act out the deviant patterns.

Over time, the increased prevalence and visibility of the socially forbidden pattern mitigates the severity of the negative social attitudes and sanctions evoked by the pattern. What was once forbidden slowly becomes an acceptable pattern. Initial violations of a rule indirectly lead to a social change in the acceptability of that pattern. How rapidly this process occurs is, in part, a function of the certainty and severity of punishments and other factors that have been observed to constrain the acting out of deviant impulses. These factors, in turn, presume changing social attitudes. That is, the failure of the legal institutions to respond forcefully to particular violations at any given time indicates that the social attitudes toward the violations have changed. The rules are no longer regarded as sacred, the violations of the rule are no longer abhorrent, and the sanctions are no longer stringent and immediately administered. Social movements which at the outset are regarded as deviant, ultimately become embodiments of respectability.

Social Psychology of Deviance: Perspectives on the Future

It was not possible to present in these pages every theoretical perspective that addresses understanding of some aspect of deviant behavior. However, those perspectives that are widely regarded as most productive as well as a representative sample of the range of perspectives that persist in the literature have been presented. These social psychological perspectives on deviant behavior taken together have matured to a point where it is generally recognized that there are many explanations of the antecedents and consequences of deviance. In the past, and to some extent continuing to the present, theories that emphasize one or another factor were pitted against each other. Often one was favored over another when in fact the several theories were addressing different questions, and, in providing answers to those questions, were making separate contributions to the overall understanding of deviant behavior.

With increasing frequency it is being recognized that the diverse perspectives may in fact be compatible or complementary, and that permanent theories of crime and deviance may be integrated within an overarching integrative theoretical framework (Akers, 2000; Barak, 1998; Messner, Krohn, & Liska, 1989; Shoemaker, 2000). The best of these address all of these questions and permit translation of constructs into concepts that compose the integrative theory or permit incorporation of research findings stemming from other perspectives within the body of research conducted under the rubric of the integrative theory. Future developments in the social psychology of deviant behavior arguably will bear sweetest fruit by continuing to develop such integrative theories. By way of illustration, Kaplan (1975, 1980, 1995) proposed a general theory that provides a general definition of deviance and addresses the questions regarding how particular traits or behaviors come to be defined as deviant, how people become motivated to engage in deviant behavior, the factors that facilitate the acting out of deviant motivations, influences upon the (dis)continuity of deviant behavior, and the individual and social consequences of deviant behavior. In addressing these questions, Kaplan offers explanations

that in effect combine strain theory, labeling theory, control theory, and social learning theory among other perspectives.

As theoretical statements become more complex, so must the research activities be more suitable to the task of testing the theories. Increasingly, research on deviant behavior permits analysis of the complex relationships among appropriately large numbers of variables using research designs that permit the determination of the temporal sequences of the variables and analytic methods that are suitable to the estimation of theoretically informed models (Kaplan & Johnson, 2001). For example, primarily through the use of structural equation modeling of multigenerational panel data, Kaplan and his associates have systematically estimated increasingly elaborated, theoretically informed models specifying the direct, indirect, and moderating influences on deviant behavior. To illustrate, in one inclusive model, later deviant behavior was accounted for by the direct and indirect antecedent influences of self-rejection, early deviance, negative social sanctions, disposition to deviance, and deviant peer associations (Kaplan & Johnson). Deviant adaptations in turn influence self-rejection (Kaplan & Halim, 2000). These linear relationships are moderated by such variables as deviant identity, gender, and race/ethnicity (Kaplan & Halim, 2000; Kaplan & Johnson, 2001; Kaplan & Lin, 2000).

Recent studies of deviance and crime have also benefited from the advances in the Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) methodology (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Much of the popularity of HLM is due to the method's ability to estimate complex relationships between variables measured at multiple levels of aggregation (e.g., the association between individual- and census tract-level variables). The application of HLM in the analyses of multiple levels of aggregation (cross-aggregation) has helped researchers to develop and test theories of community-level (compared to individual-level) causes of crime and deviance. For example, Sampson et al. (1997) used the community survey data collected from the persons residing in 343 neighborhoods in Chicago in conjunction with HLM to construct a community-level measures of *collective efficacy* (cohesion and willingness to intervene on the part of community residents) and found that collective efficacy mediated the effects of structural variables such as concentrated disadvantage, residential stability and immigrant concentration on various measures of crime and victimization rates.

A number of other applications of HLM have also benefited research on deviance. When HLM is applied in the studies with longitudinal panel data, the stable individual-level characteristics are typically modeled at the higher level and the time-variant factors are modeled at the lower level of analysis meaning that the data obtained from the multiple observations of the same persons over time are nested within these persons (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In studies of deviance, this application of HLM helped researchers to account for the unobserved population heterogeneity and allowed them to better model the social selection processes. The debate surrounding the issues of social selection and social causation has been very important in the development of theories of crime causation and has led to the proliferation of divergent interpretations of the empirical association between social factors such as peer association, education, marriage and crime (see for example, Wright et al., 1999). The ability to account for the social selection in HLM models is further enhanced by the use of the counterfactual approach (e.g., Sampson, Laub, & Wimer, 2006). For example, Sampson et al. (2006) noted that while the social control theory suggests that being married is associated with less criminal involvement because marriage is a form of social bond, the difference in criminal behavior between married and unmarried individuals may also be explained by the increased probability of social selection of the less crime-prone individuals in to marriage. The authors then used the HLM and the counterfactual approach to estimate the probability of individuals being selected in to marriage and used this estimate to adjust their analysis and estimate the magnitude of social control exerted by marriage (Sampson et al., 2006).

Some of the important methodological advances in the social psychological studies of deviance pertain to the collection of data. It is possible that the further advancement of theory and research depends on the innovations in data collection strategies. A good example is Kaplan and Tolle's (2006) study of the intergenerational parallelism of deviant behavior. The authors note that while many

studies previously examined the intergenerational transmission of behavior, most of these studies relied on the reports obtained from only one generation of respondents. Kaplan and Tolle, however, used the data from a prospective longitudinal study that surveyed the first generation respondents when they were in seventh grade and then obtained data directly from their children when they reached a similar age over two decades later. Indeed, it appears that the timing of the initiation, continuity and discontinuity of deviant behavior, particularly during adolescence when the first opportunities for observing this intergenerational parallelism occur, are important dimensions to consider in designing research. In this respect, the theoretical understanding provided by considering how the life-course influences people's lives can be helpful. Both longitudinal and life event research provide useful methodological tools for undertaking such studies. It may be useful to identify and address analytic challenges of data that can be considered as structured by groups of observations (e.g., generations) and those structured by pairs of observations (e.g., parents and their children).

Many studies of the causes and consequences of deviance today utilize survey or structured interview data and analyze these data using quantitative techniques. In the studies of crime, the survey methodology at one time was seen as superior to the use of measures based on the official crime statistics that were suspected to include high levels of bias (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000). Despite some initial problems pertaining to the survey construction and administration (Elliott & Ageton, 1980) quantitative analysis of survey or structured interview data is currently one of the most popular research methods in studies of deviance and crime (Thornberry & Krohn). It is important to note, however, that the survey data and quantitative techniques are not appropriate for investigation of all research questions in the field of deviance research (Ulmer & Wilson, 2003). The use of qualitative data obtained through in-depth unstructured interviews and ethnographic research has also been instrumental in advancing the field. A number of recent studies have built on the tradition (e.g., Becker, 1953; Liebow, 1967) of ethnographic research on deviant behavior. These studies challenged and improved the current theories of deviant behavior. For example, in an ethnographic study, Pattillo (1998) found that strong social ties among the community residents may in fact help to conceal criminal actions perpetrated by the community residents from the authorities. This finding challenged the assumptions made by the *systemic theory* which views strong communal ties as a source of informal social control of crime (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; see also Browning et al., 2004). Carr (2003) conducted an extensive ethnographic study of a white working-class neighborhood in Chicago spanning over 5 years. His study introduced the concept of *new parochialism* which improved the theoretical understanding of how urban communities control criminal behavior (Carr). Some studies broke away from strictly quantitative tradition by using a mixed-methods approach. Laub and Sampson (2003), for example, have located and interviewed a subsample of the participants in their study of criminal behavior over the life-course. This interview data helped the authors to introduce human agency in to their theory of desistance from crime (Laub & Sampson, 2003).

Finally, future social psychological theory and research should attend to the generality of perspectives of deviance when applied in different social psychological settings. Deviant behavior is widely equated with violence, theft, drug use, and other such behaviors. However, the concept of deviance has more general applicability. The concept may refer to the failure of friends or spouses to conform to each other's expectations as when one "cheats" on another. The concept may refer to the failure of an employee to give an employer an "honest day's work for an honest day's pay." Deviant behavior includes the failure of a friend to do a favor for another friend when he or she has no excuse not to do the favor. A good test of the validity of the social psychological perspectives we have been considering is their applicability in a wide variety of interpersonal and group situations that deal with behaviors other than deviance or criminality. Future research should apply the constructs presented within the context of these social psychological perspectives through a wide variety of interpersonal systems including friendship groups, marital dyads, and work groups as well as to behaviors that violate the expectations of the community in general. Arguably one of the greatest benefits of theory and research on deviance is the contribution they make to the study of social psychological processes in general.

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Chapter 20

Cultural Perspectives

Yuri Miyamoto and Amanda Eggen

Psychological research has been developed mainly in Western cultures, based primarily on Western samples (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Rozin, 2001). A recent analysis of papers published in premier journals in psychology found that, overall, 98 % of the first authors were at universities in Western or English-speaking countries and 95 % of the samples were from such countries (Arnett, 2008). This suggests that psychological knowledge is built almost exclusively in countries that account for only 12 % of the world's population. Thus, it is an open question whether the knowledge gained through the investigation of this subsample of the world's population can generalize to the entire human population. Over the past two decades, cross-cultural studies have suggested that many of the psychological processes that had been previously assumed to be universal are grounded in particular socio-cultural contexts and reflect certain cultural values or models (e.g., Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). For example, well-known psychological phenomena, such as fundamental attribution error and cognitive dissonance, have been shown to reflect models of the self prevalent in Western cultural contexts and found to be attenuated or nonexistent in other cultural contexts (e.g., Miller, 1984; Heine & Lehman, 2002).

The present chapter aims to provide an overview of studies on culture and psychology by reviewing evidence showing cultural differences in various psychological processes, as well as introducing theories and studies that examine processes underlying cultural differences. First, we provide a working definition of culture and its theoretical implications. Next, we review studies showing cultural differences in various psychological processes, including self-concepts, motivation, emotion, and cognition. Then, we outline multi-level processes underlying cultural differences.

What Is Culture?

Following the classic definitions provided by Redfield (1941) and Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) and echoed by cultural psychologists (Adams & Markus, 2004; Markus & Hamedani, 2007; Shweder, 2001), we define culture as follows: *Culture* is explicit and implicit patterns of historically derived and transmitted values and ideas that manifest in institutions, practices, and artifacts, which themselves are produced through behavior.

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One feature of this definition is that it is assumed that there are some patterns in values and ideas that have been historically selected within each culture. Although there is a debate as to what extent culture can be considered a coherent system or should be considered a collection of elements (Chentsova-Dutton & Heath, 2009), the accumulating cross-cultural evidence suggests that there are some core values and ideas, such as independence or honor (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), that characterize cultural patterns in a particular society. It is important to note that assuming the existence of such cultural patterns does not imply that all the members of the culture endorse the same values and ideas or that all the institutions, practices and artifacts are coherent with the cultural patterns. Core values and ideas are distributed in a cultural community, and thus some individuals are bound to be exposed to them more than other individuals are (Shweder, 2001). In addition, even though members of a cultural community sometimes do not personally endorse the values and ideas shared in their community, they are often aware of the existence of the shared values and ideas and are influenced by them (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010).

Another characteristic is that culture is located both inside the head, such as values and ideas, and out there in the world, such as practices and institutions (Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Among researchers who study culture, there are differences in the extent to which they focus mainly on what is inside the head or on both what is inside the head and out in the world. This has implications for how they try to identify sources underlying cultural differences in psychological processes. Researchers who focus on internalized values and ideas tend to identify sources in individual factors, such as personally held ideas or beliefs (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). On the other hand, researchers who focus on both values and their embodiment in institutions, practices, and artifacts tend to identify sources in contexts and environments. Among them, some researchers focus more on how distal-level situational factors, such as ecological, economic, and socio-structural factors, shape cultural differences (Oishi & Graham, 2010; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), whereas other researchers focus more on proximal-level situational factors, such as daily practices and interactions, and how such proximal-level situational factors and psychological processes mutually shape each other (Markus & Hamedani, 2007; Shweder, 1990).

A third important aspect is that culture is not defined in terms of ethnic or national identity of groups (e.g., European Americans, Japanese). Although culture is often operationalized in terms of ethnicity or nationality (which is the case for many of the studies discussed in this chapter), culture is not confined to such groups. To the extent that there are explicit and implicit patterns of historically derived and transmitted values and ideas that are embodied in institutions, practices, and artifacts, there is culture. More and more researchers are examining different forms of culture (for review, see A. Cohen, 2009), such as regional differences within a nation or a world region (e.g., northern and southern Italy, Knight & Nisbett, 2007; West Europeans and Central/East Europeans, Varnum, Grossmann, Katunar, Nisbett, & Kitayama, 2008), religious groups (e.g., Protestants, Sanchez-Burks, 2002; Jews, Cohen & Rozin, 2001), and social class (e.g., Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2011; Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007).

Themes That Characterize Cultural Patterns

Although researchers differ in factors on which they focus to explain cultural differences, there is some convergence in themes (“syndrome”, Triandis, 1996, “model”, Markus & Hamedani, 2007, or “ethos”, Kitayama, Conway, Pietro-monaco, Park, & Plaut, 2010) that they use to characterize different patterns of values and ideas. Among various constructs, independent and interdependent self-construal (Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010) and the related dimension of individualism and collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1989, 1995) are probably the most widely examined constructs. In *individualistic* cultures (e.g., North America, Western Europe),

the priority is given to personal goals over collective goals. In such cultural contexts, the self is viewed as a bounded entity defined by its internal attributes and separate from social relationships (i.e., *independent* self-construal). The primary task of such an independent self is to express and realize one's unique internal attributes and pursue self-set goals. On the other hand, in *collectivistic* cultures (e.g., Japan, China, Korea), relatively more emphasis is given to collective goals. In such cultural contexts, the self is viewed as fundamentally embedded in social relationships (i.e., *interdependent* self-construal). The primary task of such an interdependent self is to fit-in and adjust to the social context (Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002).

Part of the reason why independence and interdependence (and individualism and collectivism) have been most extensively studied might be because they define the fundamental ways in which the self and others are related (Heine, 2008; Kitayama et al., 2007). At the same time, it is important to note that the models of independence and interdependence (and individualism and collectivism) have been developed, for the large part, based on the comparison of Western cultures with East Asian cultures. It is thus possible that independence and interdependence might be particularly relevant themes for those two cultures, more so than for other cultures. In fact, researchers who study multiple cultures have also proposed other constructs to capture cultural patterns. For examples, based on the responses collected across many countries around the world, Hofstede (1980) identified power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity, in addition to individualism-collectivism, as important cultural dimensions, and Triandis (1989, 1996) has also proposed tightness-looseness and vertical-horizontal dimensions as additional dimensions, which could be crossed with individualism-collectivism.

Whereas general themes (e.g., individualism and collectivism) that characterize patterns of values and ideas across cultures have been studied extensively, some researchers have also identified and examined more specific patterns of values and ideas that are prevalent in a given culture. For example, a culture of honor has been proposed to characterize patterns of values and ideas prevalent in Southern regions of the United States (D. Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) and the Protestant ethic has been suggested to characterize Calvinist Protestants' values and behaviors (Sanchez-Burks, 2002; Weber, 1904–1905/1958). In addition, recent studies have shown that dialectical beliefs are prevalent in East Asian cultures and manifest in ways of thinking and feeling (e.g., Miyamoto & Ma, 2011; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010).

Methods

Examining psychological processes across cultures requires additional considerations beyond those required for examining psychological processes within a single culture. In this section, we will briefly discuss methodological issues associated with cross-cultural comparisons of psychological processes (for more extensive reviews of methods, see Cohen, 2007; Heine, 2008; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). It is important to note though that any single method is subject to certain shortcomings. One way to mitigate the shortcomings is to use more than one method to study the same question. The importance of multiple methods has been especially emphasized in cross-cultural research (Heine, 2008; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990) in part because of methodological challenges that are involved in cross-cultural comparisons that will be reviewed in this section.

Sample

The first step in conducting research is to determine which cultures to examine. The selection of cultures should be based on a cultural construct (e.g., independent and interdependent self-construal, frontier ethos) researchers assume underlies psychological processes of interest. Choosing cultures

that differ from each other on the critical cultural construct but are similar to each other in terms of other characteristics (e.g., economic development, modernization) makes it possible for researchers to link observed cultural differences in psychological processes to the critical cultural construct. In fact, many cross-cultural studies that use independent and interdependent self-construal as their guiding cultural construct compared Western cultures (e.g., North America, Western Europe) with East Asian cultures (e.g., Japan, Korea). This is partly because those two cultures vastly differ from each other in terms of independent and interdependent self-construal, though they are similar in terms of their level of economic development. At the same time, since cultures are not a randomly assigned variable in such cross-cultural comparisons, one cannot make a causal claim based only on cultural differences in psychological processes. Methods used to illuminate causes of cultural variations will be discussed later in this chapter (see section “[Multi-level processes underlying cultural differences](#)”).

Once researchers determine which cultures they should examine, they need to choose which population within each culture they should sample. Researchers typically try to sample populations across cultures that are matched as closely as possible to each other, so that any differences observed between populations can be attributed to the cultural background. For example, by comparing college undergraduates across cultures, researchers generally assume that the samples are matched in terms of background characteristics, such as age and educational background. However, whether the findings found among a certain sample can generalize to the general population in each culture is an open question. To make such a generalization, one needs to have a probability sample from each culture. Although probability samples are harder to obtain and rare in cross-cultural studies, there are a few surveys that recruited probability samples across cultures and made their data publicly available (e.g., World Values Survey; Midlife in the United States and in Japan; both are available from ICPSR, www.icpsr.umich.edu).

Translation

If researchers want to administer a study in more than one language, they need to translate materials. One of the common methods of translation in cross-cultural research is *back translation* (Brislin, 1980). In back translation, a researcher prepares materials in one language (e.g., English). A bilingual translates the materials into another language (e.g., Japanese), and a second bilingual translates the materials back into the original language (e.g., English). The researcher compares the initial materials prepared in the original language with the materials back-translated into the original language (e.g., both English) to see if there are any discrepancies. Another method of translation is the *committee* approach (Brislin) whereby a group of bilinguals translates materials into another language and compares their translations for accuracy, eventually discussing and resolving discrepancies. In either way, translation works best when materials in the original language can be modified to allow a natural translation into the second language. In contrast, when materials prepared in the original language cannot be modified, the translated materials often appear awkward or unnatural in the second language.

In addition to translating materials into another language, researchers also need to consider how the situations created in the study (e.g., scenarios, experimental setting, etc.) are transferable and whether they have equivalent meanings across cultural contexts. For example, imagine that researchers are interested in examining what behavioral responses people have when they are angry, and researchers create a scenario to invoke the feeling of anger in respondents across cultures. In the scenario, a student is criticized by a teacher in front of the whole class, and respondents are asked to take the perspective of the student and respond with what they would do in the situation. Although such a scenario might provoke the feeling of anger in the U.S., it may mainly induce the feeling of shame in East Asian cultural contexts because of Asians' common self-critical tendency (Heine &

Hamamura, 2007). If this is the case, researchers might end up comparing Americans' reactions to anger and Asians' reactions to shame. Instead, when making the scenarios, it is ideal to first sample situations that elicit the construct of interest (i.e., anger in this example) in each culture and base the scenarios on the situations that are commonly found across cultures, or conduct a pilot test to ensure that the situation activates the same construct across cultures.

Measures

Cross-cultural research often involves explicit self-report measures, both close-ended and open-ended questions. However, there are various issues associated with using self-report measures in cross-cultural studies. First, it is known that responses to self-report scales can be influenced by various response biases (Heine, 2008). For example, when making subjective judgments, respondents often compare themselves with people around them, thus each individual may be using a different reference group (i.e., reference-group effect; Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1997). If respondents compare themselves with people in their own cultures, a comparison of the ratings across cultures is not necessary valid because the ratings are based on different reference groups. Second, there is a more fundamental issue associated with a self-report measure that asks respondents to reflect on their own thought processes. That is, people are not always aware of their own cognitive processes that underlie their behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and thus may not be able to accurately report them.

Because of these limitations of self-report measures, the importance of online behavioral measures, such as behavioral reactions to an experimental manipulation or physiological reactions to stimuli, has been emphasized (Kitayama, 2002). As will be reviewed in the following section ("[Cultural differences in psychological processes](#)"), researchers have used various behavioral measures in the laboratory setting, such as participants' persistence duration on tasks (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 1999) or recognition of objects (e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). Furthermore, more and more studies are showing cultural differences using physiological measures, such as eye-movement tracking (e.g., Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005) or functional magnetic resonance image (e.g., Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007).

In addition to examining respondents' psychological processes across cultures, cultural psychologists often compare *cultural products* across cultures. According to our definition and conceptualization of culture, cultural products are the vehicles of cultural ideas and beliefs: cultural products shape and are shaped by psychological processes of individuals who are embedded in cultural contexts (Markus & Hamedani, 2007; Shweder, 1990). Therefore, analysis of cultural products provides important evidence for not only collective manifestation of cultural ideas and beliefs, but also potential sources of such cultural ideas and beliefs. Cultural differences are shown in various cultural products (see Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008, for a meta-analysis), such as mass media coverage (Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, & Kitayama, 2006), advertisements (Kim & Markus, 1999), or even townscapes (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006), which will be explained more in a later section (see section "[Multi-level processes underlying cultural differences](#)").

Cultural Differences in Psychological Processes

In this section, we will provide a brief overview of evidence demonstrating cultural differences in psychological processes, by focusing on self-concepts, motivation, emotion, and cognition. The majority of the studies reviewed in this section focus on comparisons between East Asian cultures (e.g., Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, or Asians Americans) and Western cultures (e.g., Americans,

Canadians, Western Europeans, or Australians) for the reasons specified in the Methods section. It is important to note, though, that there is also growing evidence examining cultures from other regions of the world (e.g., Russia, Grossmann & Kross, 2010; West Africa, Adams, 2005; Latin-America, Holloway, Waldrip, & Ickes, 2009), as well as other forms of cultures (e.g., region, religion, social class). Following how culture is typically operationalized in cross-cultural studies, and in consideration of space limitations, we refer to participants' culture using ethnic or national identity terms. Furthermore, we often use the shortened term "American" to refer to those members of the culture consisting of people of U.S. nationality who are generally of European descent (and use "European American" when this group is compared to "Asian Americans").

Self-Concepts and Knowledge

One of the most basic ways which psychological processes differ across cultures is in how people view themselves. This is a major foundational theme for much cultural research, as self-construal serves as a basis through which people relate to their social worlds (Markus, 1977; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010).

Self-Representations

A long line of work provides evidence for cultural variation in the view of the self, on the one hand viewed as consisting of stable internal attributes, and on the other hand, viewed as adjustable to context. In several studies utilizing the Twenty Statements Task (TST), whereby participants provide 20 responses to the open-ended prompt "I am", North Americans described themselves with relatively abstract, context-free traits (e.g., "I am easygoing") whereas Japanese described themselves more often in terms of their social roles (e.g., "I am a college student") or context-dependent traits (e.g., "I am easygoing with my friends"). These studies suggest that Americans hold self-concepts consisting of stable internal attributes, whereas Japanese hold self-concepts that include social roles and vary depending on the context (Bond & Cheung, 1983; Cousins, 1989). Research employing a modified version of the TST showed the same differences in self-concept patterns in American and Chinese elementary school children (Wang, 2004) suggesting these culturally-modeled self-concept patterns emerge early in life.

Furthermore, there is neuroscientific evidence for internalization of the independent self concept in Western cultures and the interdependent self concept in Eastern Cultures. Chinese and Westerners showed stronger activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the area known to be involved in self-representations, when making trait judgments about the self than when making judgments about a non-close other (i.e., a public figure) (Zhu et al., 2007). However, only the Chinese showed stronger activation of the MPFC in trait judgments about a close other (i.e. their mothers) than the non-close other, pointing to similar activation pattern for the self and close others for Chinese. It appears that the models of the independent self in the West and the interdependent self in the East may be internalized in the neurological system.

One potential consequence of the self-concept variation across cultures is in the different perspectives from which people view themselves. Theorists suggest (Mead, 1934; A. Smith, 1759/1984) that all "social beings" view themselves from the third person perspective in some instances, and in so doing, learn self-control. However, other research suggests that those from Eastern cultures, with interdependent selves requiring careful attention to social norms to maintain harmony, view themselves more often from the third person perspective than independent Westerners do. Researchers have found that, when recalling situations in which they were the central focus (e.g., being in an accident, giving a

presentation), North Americans remembered situations more from the first person perspective than Asians did, whereas Asians remembered the situations from the third-person perspective more than the North Americans did (D. Cohen & Gunz, 2002; D. Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007).

Another potential consequence of this variation in self-representation is in-group identification and associated group processes. *Social identity theory* (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) is a classic theory of group behavior; it suggests that people identify so closely with the in-group that they do not distinguish between the self and the in-group in their representations. This depersonalization phenomenon has been found to account for many group behaviors, at least in Western cultures, including in-group loyalty. It may appear that this phenomenon should hold across Western and Eastern cultures, with Easterners possibly relating more closely to their in-group so they perceive in-group as an even more depersonalized entity. However, Yuki (2003) proposed that, in actuality, the in-group is represented differently across cultures. Consistent with social identity theory, Westerners perceive the in-group as a depersonalized unit. Alternately, Easterners perceive the in-group as consisting of a network of interrelated individuals. In fact, Yuki found that Japanese based their loyalty and identification to the in-group on an understanding of intragroup relational structures and personal connectedness, whereas Americans additionally based their loyalty and identification with in-group on perceived homogeneity of the in-group, with the latter being more consistent with the social identity theory. Furthermore, researchers (Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005) found that when participants had to judge the extent to which they trust strangers in ambiguous situations, Americans based their levels of trust more on categorical membership in groups, whereas Japanese additionally based trust more on potential for relational connection.

Self-Consistency

Another aspect of the self-concept that has been extensively examined is the desire for the self-concept to remain consistent. Classic social psychology research has presumed that remaining consistent is a major human goal (Abelson et al., 1968). However, the cross-cultural studies on self-representations discussed above suggest that whereas Americans do indeed tend to hold stable self-concepts with attributes assumed consistent across contexts, the Japanese seem to link their attributes with social context, suggesting a more variable, less-consistent self-concept. Furthermore, other researchers found that when Japanese participants completed the TST in one of four manipulated situations (i.e., alone, paired with a peer, in a large group of peers, or alone with someone of higher status), they showed more variation in their self-descriptions they provided across the situations than the American participants did (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001; see also Suh, 2002).

Though the culmination of work suggests that East Asians tend to show less self-consistency, researchers examined another form of self-consistency (English & Chen, 2007). In addition to self-consistency across relationships, these researchers also examined self-consistency within relationships over time. Although East Asian Americans' self-views were less consistent across relationships than European Americans' self-views, East Asian Americans' and European Americans' self-views within two different close relationships (e.g., friends, parents) were equally, highly consistent within each relationship over time. Thus, it appears that, for East Asians, self-consistency takes a form of within-relationship, over time, stability, rather than across-relationship stability.

Researchers examined whether self-consistency can extend to consistency in personal preferences over time (Wilken, Miyamoto, & Uchida, 2011). These researchers found that Americans report being more consistent in their personal preferences (e.g., music, hairstyles, actors) over time than Japanese. In addition, the analyses of both surveys and nationally published rankings of consumer goods and baby names showed that Americans are more consistent in collective-level preferences (i.e., trends) than Japanese. Thus cultural differences in consistency can be found in preference consistency at both individual and collective levels.

Motivation

One of the central aims of social psychology is to understand how social factors influence and motivate human behavior. Therefore social motivation phenomena have been examined for decades and some basic human motivation understandings have been proposed (e.g., Festinger, 1957). Of course, most of this work was sourced in Western cultures and cross-cultural researchers have more recently begun to reveal how these motivation phenomena are grounded in Western cultural contexts and may or may not apply across cultures, or may manifest differently.

Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance is one of the most classic social psychology phenomena. This is a situation whereby a state of mental discomfort is induced when two personal elements are at odds with each other, such as one's self-view and one's behavior (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Festinger, 1957). When this state of mental discomfort is aroused, people are motivated to reduce that dissonance. For example, in a typical paradigm used to study cognitive dissonance (Brehm), dissonance is induced through requiring participants to choose one of two similarly preferable objects. The dissonance is produced presumably because positive aspects of the rejected object and negative aspects of the chosen object are at odds with participants' behavior (i.e., choice). Previous studies conducted in Western cultures have repeatedly shown that participants reduce their dissonance by increasing preference for the chosen object and/or decreasing preference for the rejected object after making the choice.

Heine and Lehman (2002) replicated the phenomenon with Canadian participants, but found that Japanese participants did not engage in dissonance reduction, suggesting that those with interdependent self-concepts, which do not require displaying stable, consistent attributes, may not experience cognitive dissonance. However, other research suggests that those with interdependent self-concepts do experience dissonance in situations more threatening to the interdependent self-concept than the independent self-concept. Researchers found that Japanese showed dissonance reduction when they were asked to think about preferences of a "friend" (i.e., a meaningful other) in addition to thinking about their own preferences (Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004). Americans in the same paradigm, showed evidence of equal levels of dissonance regardless of whether or not a meaningful other was primed. It appears that the interdependent self can be induced into a state of dissonance when the possibility of judgment by an important other is made salient, but that such salience does not affect the independent self's dissonance levels. Furthermore, other researchers found that those holding interdependent self-construals (Asian Canadians and Japanese) were more threatened, and thus showed evidence of dissonance, when concerned about making wrong choices for close others, but not when concerned about making wrong choices for themselves (Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005). Alternately, Americans showed the opposite pattern: dissonance ensued when making choices for themselves, but not when making choices for close others.

Adjusting Versus Influencing

Theories and research developed in Western cultures have stressed the importance of exerting personal control over one's environment (Bandura, 1977; DeCharms, 1968). At the same time, researchers have also suggested that people not only try to influence the environment to fit their goals and wishes, but also try to adjust themselves to fit the circumstances (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982), and that different cultures place different levels of emphasis on each of these behavioral approaches (Weisz, Rothbaum & Blackburn, 1984). For example, whereas Western mental health therapies tend to emphasize modifying realities to fit one's wishes, Morita therapy developed in Japan emphasizes

accepting realities and modifying one's perspective on them (Weisz et al., 1984). Reflecting such different cultural practices, research has shown that North American daily contexts provide more situations to influence the environment, whereas Japanese daily contexts provide more situations that involve adjustment (Morling et al., 2002).

Chronic exposure to situations emphasizing different levels of influence and adjustment may lead to differences in basic motivation to adjust to other people's preferences or to follow one's unique preference. For example, researchers have shown that when given choices, whereas Asians more often select objects in the majority, Americans more often select unique objects (Kim & Markus, 1999). Thus Asians seem to prefer to adjust to the majority's preferences, whereas Americans seem to prefer to act based on their own unique preferences. In fact, a large meta-analysis of conformity studies (based on Asch's classic paradigm, Asch, 1951, 1956) conducted across 17 countries revealed that those of collectivistic countries showed more conformity tendencies than those of individualistic countries (Bond & Smith, 1996).

Intrinsic Motivation

Traditional work on intrinsic motivation has shown that personal choice is intrinsically motivating (Deci, 1981; Deci & Ryan, 1985). This freedom of choice has been considered motivating, in part through satisfying a sense of control over one's environment (e.g., Rotter, 1966). Given the higher emphasis on the influence motive for Westerners, with whom this work was primarily based, this makes sense. However, with the higher emphasis of the adjustment motive in Eastern cultures, personal choice may be less important. Cross-cultural researchers have found evidence for just that. European American and Asian American elementary school children were either asked to make personal choices regarding an activity in which to participate, or assigned an activity based on their mothers' choices (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). American children persisted longer in the personal choice condition, and the Asian Americans persisted longer in the mother-choice condition. This work suggests that personal choice is a more intrinsically motivating factor for Westerners, whereas a close other's choice is a more intrinsically motivating factor for Easterners.

Self-Improvement Versus Self-Enhancement

Years of studies have provided evidence that humans are motivated and perform best when they believe in themselves (e.g., Bandura, 1982; Taylor & Brown, 1988). This would be expected for those holding independent self-construals, particularly if the attributes of such selves are believed to be unchangeable (Heine et al., 2001); this inflexibility of attributes is likely to motivate a need to view those attributes positively. Alternately, in the interdependent model, the self is seen as more context-dependent and malleable, thus those subscribing to this sense of self likely believe that the self can be improved (e.g., Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997). Heine and colleagues empirically tested the motivation implications of these different belief systems—the independent belief of the self as consisting of unchangeable personal attributes, and the interdependent belief of the self as changeable. European Canadian and Japanese participants were given a task varying in difficulty level: one that would invariably result in failure, and one that would result in success. After completing the task and receiving failure or success feedback, participants were left alone with another such task (as an optional activity) and their persistence on this task was measured. Canadians persisted longer after successful feedback than failure feedback, suggesting positive feedback motivated them. However, the Japanese persisted longer in the failure condition than in the success condition, suggesting negative feedback motivated them. These results propose that Westerners are more motivated by self-enhancement opportunities, whereas Easterners are more motivated by self-improvement opportunities.

Emotion

Emotion is one of the areas where universality and cultural variations have been most heatedly debated. Since Darwin's argument on the evolutionary basis of human emotions (Darwin, 1872), the universality of basic emotions has been extensively examined (Ekman, 1992). This universality has been most typically studied in facial expression of emotions. In these studies, respondents from different cultures are presented with photos of faces expressing different basic emotions (e.g., anger, happiness) and are asked to choose an emotion concept that goes with each photo. The findings have generally shown that people can associate facial expressions with emotion concepts at above chance level, even in a preliterate culture that has minimum exposure to Western media, thus suggesting that there are some basic emotions that can be universally recognized from facial expressions (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971; but also see Russell, 1994). On the other hand, researchers who examine cultural differences in ideas and beliefs about emotions have found cultural differences in other aspects of emotion. In this section, we will review three particular types of cultural beliefs and ideas about emotions and how they are associated with emotional experience.

Relationship-Based Versus Individual-Based Models of Emotions

How the self is construed in a certain culture may have consequences on how emotions are viewed (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Specifically, in independent cultural contexts, emotions might be perceived to be primarily individual phenomena that derive from a person's internal subjective feelings, whereas in interdependent cultural contexts, emotions might be considered to be primarily social phenomena that rest on a person's relationships (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010; Mesquita, 2001; Uchida, Townsend, Markus, & Bergsieker, 2009). Supporting this contention, Kitayama and his colleagues have demonstrated cultural differences in the kinds of emotions people experience (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006). They focused on the distinction between socially *engaging* and *disengaging* emotions; engaging emotions are the kinds of emotions that foster or regain social interdependence (e.g., friendly feelings, respect, guilt, shame), whereas disengaging emotions are the kinds of emotions that foster or regain one's independence from others (e.g., pride, superiority, frustration, anger). Across both naturally occurring situations and a controlled set of situations, Japanese respondents reported experiencing engaging emotions more intensely than American respondents did, whereas American respondents reported experiencing disengaging emotions more intensely than Japanese respondents did (Kitayama, Mesquita, et al.).

Different models of emotions are reflected not only in what kind of emotions people experience, but also in when people experience emotions. In interdependent cultural contexts, emotions should be more likely to occur when a situation has implications for social relationships. In contrast, in independent cultural contexts, emotions should be more likely to occur in a situation where the self is the primary focus. Consistent with these predictions, researchers (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010) found that European American respondents reported experiencing more intense positive emotional reactions than Asian American respondents did after describing their own personalities and past experiences. In contrast, Asian American respondents reported experiencing more intense positive emotional reactions to positive stimuli (i.e., an amusing film clip and pleasant music) than European American respondents did after describing their family members' personalities and past experiences (see also Uchida et al., 2009).

Dialectical Versus Hedonic Cultural Scripts About Positive and Negative Emotions

Different cultures have different *cultural scripts* about how positive and negative emotions should be experienced and combined. East Asian cultures have historically emphasized *dialecticism*, which is characterized by a belief that reality is constantly changing and a tolerance of contradictions by

finding the “middle way” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Reflecting this dialecticism, there is a cultural script, in Eastern cultures, which emphasizes seeking a middle way by experiencing a balance between positive and negative emotions (Leu et al., 2010; Miyamoto & Ma, 2011; Miyamoto, Uchida, & Ellsworth, 2010). On the other hand, in Western cultures, experiencing and showing positive emotions, such as cheerfulness, is valued and emphasized, whereas experiencing and showing negative emotions, such as sadness or distress, is discouraged (Bastian et al., 2012; Kotchemidova, 2005). Thus, in Western cultures, there seems to be a cultural script to maintain or increase positive emotions and to avoid negative emotions.

These different cultural scripts are also evident in how people view emotions. Although positive emotions are generally perceived to be more desirable than negative emotions across cultures, positive emotions are perceived to be more desirable and negative emotions are perceived to be more undesirable in Western cultures than in Eastern cultures (Bastian et al., 2012; Eid & Diener, 2001). Cultural scripts are also reflected in how people view happiness (Uchida & Kitayama, 2009). When asked to describe features of happiness, Americans mainly focus on positive aspects of happiness, such as positive hedonic experience. On the other hand, Japanese also refer to negative aspects of happiness as well, such as the transitory nature of happiness.

Hochschild (1979) suggested that people utilize cognitive management strategies to influence the emotions they experience, not just display, based on socially established norms, or *feeling rules*. If socially shared norms influence how people manage their emotions, cultural scripts may also guide how people manage their emotions. Specifically, due to cultural scripts involving dialecticism, Easterners might be less likely to maintain or up-regulate their positive emotions after experiencing a pleasant event. In fact, Japanese are more likely than Americans to down-regulate their positive emotions after experiencing a pleasant event and cultural differences are mediated by dialectical beliefs about positive emotions (Miyamoto & Ma, 2011).

Repeated employment of different emotion regulation strategies may result in cultural differences in emotional experiences. When judging emotional experiences over time, Americans show strong negative correlations between positive and negative emotions, suggesting that positive and negative emotions rarely co-exist for Americans, whereas East Asians tend to show weaker negative, or even positive correlations between the two, suggesting that positive and negative emotions may be more likely to co-exist for East Asians (Bagozzi, Wong, & Yi, 1999; Kitayama et al., 2000). Furthermore, a dialectical way of experiencing positive and negative emotions has also been associated with better health profiles in Japan than in the U.S., pointing out the possibility that an emotional style which fits the cultural script may be functionally adaptive (Miyamoto & Ryff, 2011).

Ideal Affect and Low and High Arousal Emotions

Cultural differences also exist in the extent to which people ideally want to feel high-arousal positive states, such as excitement and elation, or low-arousal positive states, such as calmness or peacefulness (Tsai, 2007; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). By asking participants to rate how often they would ideally like to feel various states (i.e., *ideal affect*), Tsai and her colleagues have shown that Americans are more likely than East Asians to value high-arousal positive states, whereas East Asians are more likely than Americans to value low-arousal positive states. Such cultural differences are shown to be partly rooted in religious backgrounds of each culture. Whereas Buddhism is a dominant religion in many East Asian cultures, Christianity is a dominant religion in many Western cultures. These different religions encourage different ideals; Classic Christian texts (e.g., Gospels) contain more statements endorsing high-arousal positive states (e.g., “Be strong”) than classic Buddhist texts (e.g., Lotus Sutra) do (Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007). Furthermore, reflecting such differences in religious texts, Christian practitioners value high-arousal positive states more and low-arousal positive states less than Buddhist practitioners, across both European American and Asian American groups (Tsai, Maio, et al.).

Cognition

Cultural influences on cognition have been explored for more than a century. Early studies on visual illusion found that Western groups who lived in highly carpentered environments were more susceptible to the Müller-Lyer illusion than non-Western groups who lived in less carpentered environments (Rivers, 1905; Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits, 1966), suggesting that the exposure to carpentered environments underlies the Müller-Lyer illusion. These studies were influential because they demonstrated the power of cultural and ecological environments in shaping basic visual perception.

Other researchers have suggested that there are systematic differences in cognitive styles across cultures (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett & Miyamoto 2005; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). In independent cultural contexts, people tend to focus on a focal object and their goals with respect to it without being overly constrained by the surrounding context or others' demands. In interdependent cultural contexts, on the other hand, people tend to attend to relationships and to the context. The former style of cognition has been termed *analytic* or field-independent, whereas the latter style of cognition has been termed *holistic* or field-dependent. These cognitive styles have been demonstrated in various cognitive processes, including attention, categorization, attribution, and communication.

Attention and Perception

Evidence showing cultural differences in how people attend to focal versus contextual information has been rapidly accumulating over the past decade. In an illustrative study, Japanese and American participants watched animated video clips of underwater scenes which contained focal fish and background objects (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). When asked to describe what they saw in the scenes, Japanese were more likely than Americans to refer to the background and to relationships between focal fish and the background. Such cultural differences in attentional styles have also been observed at the level of eye movements. When viewing pictures containing a focal object and its background (e.g., a tiger in a jungle; a happy-looking person surrounded by sad-looking people), East Asians were more likely than Americans to make saccades (i.e., rapid, ballistic eye movements) to background objects, whereas Americans were more likely than East Asians to fixate on the focal object (Chua et al., 2005; Masuda et al., 2008).

Researchers have also developed visual tasks to measure attentional styles with simple geometric figures. For example, the Framed-Line Task (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003) presents participants with a square frame with a line in it. The task measures the ability to either ignore or incorporate contextual information (i.e., the square frame) when perceiving a focal object (i.e., the line). Americans tend to perform better than Japanese when the task requires them to remember the length of the focal line while ignoring the contextual frame, whereas Japanese tend to perform better than Americans when the task requires them to remember the length of the focal line while incorporating the size of contextual frame.

Categorization

Cultural differences in visual attention to contextual information can be reflected in how people use contextual information when categorizing objects. To examine cultural differences in categorization, previous studies have used a triad categorization task, in which participants are presented with three objects (e.g., a rabbit, a carrot, an eggplant) and asked to choose the two that are mostly closely related (Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett, 2004). Chinese participants were more likely than American participants to group on the basis of thematic relations (e.g., grouping a rabbit and a carrot, because rabbits eat

carrots), whereas American participants were more likely than Chinese participant to group on the basis of categorical relations (e.g., grouping a carrot and an eggplant, because carrots and eggplants are both vegetables).

If Americans rely more on categorical rules to group objects, they may also be more likely to rely on a formal, unidimensional rule to group objects compared to East Asians. In one study, participants were presented with a target object (e.g., flower) and two groups of four objects, and then asked to judge to which group the target object was most similar (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). All members of one group shared a single feature (e.g., shape of the stem) with the target object, whereas all members of the other group shared a larger number of features (e.g., shape of petals, number of leaves) with the target object, though no single feature was shared by all members. The results showed that Americans were more likely than East Asians to choose the former group, which indicates that they were relying on a unidimensional rule, whereas East Asians were more likely than Americans to choose the latter group, which indicates that they were relying more on overall family resemblance.

Attribution

How people interpret and attribute the causes of social events has been extensively studied in social psychology (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967). Because attention guides attribution, cultural differences in attention should lead to cultural differences in attribution. In fact, cross-cultural studies have suggested that the *fundamental attribution error* (Ross, 1977)—a tendency to overestimate the internal causes (e.g., personal disposition) and underestimate the external causes (e.g., situational forces) of behavior—is especially strong among Westerners, who tend to focus on focal objects. In an early demonstration of cultural differences in attribution, American and Asian Indian adults were asked to describe a behavior of a person they knew and to explain why the behavior was undertaken (Miller, 1984). American adults were more likely to attribute the behavior to general dispositions of the person than to contextual factors, thus demonstrating the fundamental attribution error, whereas Indian adults were more likely to attribute the behavior to contextual factors than to general dispositions. Similar cultural differences were replicated with American and Chinese participants using controlled stimuli (i.e., animated displays of fish behavior; Morris & Peng, 1994).

Such differences in causal attribution are reflected in the type of lexicon people use to describe a behavior. According to the linguistic category model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988), the use of verbs reflects spontaneously made situational inferences because verbs provide information about the situation (e.g., Jessica helps her friend), whereas the use of adjectives reflects spontaneously made dispositional inferences because adjectives provide information about the disposition of an actor that transcends situations (e.g., Jessica is helpful). In line with cultural differences in explicit attribution, researchers found that Japanese used more verbs and fewer adjectives than Italians when describing others (Maass, Karasawa, Politi, & Suga, 2006; for similar findings with Koreans and Australians, see Kashima, Kashima, Kim, & Gelfand, 2006). Moreover, in a memory task, Japanese were more likely to unintentionally transform adjectives into verbs, whereas Italians showed the opposite pattern. These findings suggest that situational inferences can occur spontaneously for Asians, whereas dispositional inferences can occur automatically for Westerners (for relevant findings with Latinos, see Zárate, Uleman, & Voils, 2001).

Communication

How people perceive, categorize, and reason may be closely connected to how people communicate. Recent research has illuminated significant differences across cultures in communication styles, particularly regarding the level of verbalization employed in communication. Anthropologists and

communication researchers (e.g., Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey, & Chua, 1988; Hall, 1976) suggested that there are a range of means used to communicate, with those of *low-context* cultures, such as those in the West, employing relatively verbal means, and those of *high-context* cultures, such as those in the East, employing relatively nonverbal means. Cross-culture research has provided evidence for such differences, and how they implicate where in communication attention is focused. One such study presented emotion-laden words (e.g., warm) in either a congruent (e.g., positive tone) or an incongruent (e.g., negative tone) vocal tone, and asked participants to judge either the nature of the meaning of the word or the valence of the vocal tone (Ishii, Reyes, & Kitayama, 2003). Japanese were more distracted by the tone in which words were spoken when making judgments regarding the meaning of the words, whereas Americans were more distracted by the meaning of the words when attempting to make judgments about the tone of the words. This suggests that the Japanese pay more attention to vocal tone (a non-verbal cue), whereas Americans pay more attention to verbal content.

More recently, researchers have been looking at how such disparate focus on verbal versus non-verbal content may have implications for relationship quality. For example, when presented with vignettes depicting married couples and friends employing different communication methods, Americans perceived the pairs communicating primarily verbally as having higher relationship quality, whereas East Asians and Japanese chose the pair communicating primary nonverbally as having higher relationship quality (Eggen, Miyamoto, & Uchida, 2012).

Size of Cultural Differences

Taken together, a body of literature has demonstrated cultural differences in various psychological processes, such as self-concepts, motivation, emotion, and cognition. How large are such cultural differences? According to meta-analyses, the average effect size of East–West differences in self-enhancement across 91 comparisons was $d=0.84$ (Heine & Hamamura, 2007) and the average effect size of East–West differences in cognition across 93 studies was $d=0.56$ (Miyamoto, Talhelm, & Kitayama, 2008). Although there is no comprehensive meta-analysis that computed the effect size of cultural differences across all domains, these meta-analyses indicate that the magnitude of the cultural effect is moderate to large at least in the two domains (i.e., self-enhancement and cognition) that have been extensively examined.

Multi-level Processes Underlying Cultural Differences

Thus, there is a considerable amount of evidence documenting cultural differences in a wide range of psychological processes. However, the existence of cultural differences in psychological processes does not explain *why* there are such cultural differences. More and more researchers are examining various mechanisms underlying cultural differences. Here, we argue that it is important to consider multi-level processes underlying cultural differences. As our definition of culture suggests, culture does not exist either ‘inside the head’ or ‘out there in the world’, but exists in the interaction between factors from the two realms. Thus, it is important to identify sources underlying cultural differences at different levels of culture and, further, to explore the interaction between different levels.

Take an example of analytic vs. holistic cognition (Nisbett, 2003). How can we locate sources underlying cultural differences in analytic vs. holistic cognition? Some of the sources of cognitive differences probably lie in values and beliefs individuals hold (e.g., naïve theories about the world),

while other sources may also lie in the nature of proximal-level factors in which individuals are embedded (e.g., daily interactions, perceptual environments) or in distal-level factors in which proximal-level factors are, in turn, embedded (e.g., ecology, social structure). Furthermore, effects of a factor at one level may interact with one or more factors at another level, making it important to consider multiple levels simultaneously. In this section, we will provide an overview of different levels of sources underlying cultural differences and highlight the importance of taking a multi-level perspective to integrate different processes (Miyamoto, [in press](#)).

Individual Factors

Cultural themes, such as “independence”, are partly held and sustained by individuals and their actions. Such individuals’ values and ideas that reflect their cultures’ themes should be one set of the important sources of cultural differences in psychological processes. For example, as reviewed above, individuals living in Western cultural contexts are more likely to view themselves as defined by stable internal attributes and independent from contexts compared to individuals who live in East Asian cultural contexts (e.g., Cousins, 1989). Because self-concepts underlie various psychological processes (Markus, 1977), cultural differences in personally held views of the self may partly account for cultural differences in other psychological processes.

To test whether certain individual values or ideas that reflect cultural themes underlie cultural differences in psychological processes, two main approaches have been taken. One approach consists of experimentally manipulating values or ideas and examining their effects on the pertinent psychological processes; the other involves measuring individual values or ideas and examining whether they mediate cultural differences in the pertinent psychological processes.

Manipulating Core Values and Ideas

If endorsement of certain core cultural values or ideas is one of the sources of cultural differences in psychological processes, directly activating and inducing (i.e., “priming”) such values or ideas in individuals’ minds should lead to the same corresponding psychological processes. Such priming procedures could be used to activate not only declarative knowledge (e.g., concepts) but also procedural knowledge (e.g., ways of thinking; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; E. R. Smith, 1994). In the priming procedure, researchers work with a critical construct that is proposed to underlie cultural differences in certain psychological processes. Participants are typically asked to first work on a task that activates the critical construct, and subsequently work on another (ostensibly unrelated) task. Researchers examine if the primed construct influences participants’ responses on the subsequent task. If those primed with the same construct produce the same responses that parallel cultural differences, it suggests that the primed construct could be a potential source of the cultural differences.

The cultural ideas that have been most frequently examined using the priming procedure are independent and interdependent self-construal or individualism and collectivism. Multiple procedures have been proposed to prime individualism and collectivism. For example, Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto (1991) asked participants to either think of what makes them different from their family and friends (i.e., individualism-primed condition), or think of what they have in common with their family and friends (i.e., collectivism-primed condition). Other researchers have also developed a way to prime individualism without explicitly asking participants to think about the self or others. Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee (1999) asked participants to read a paragraph and simply circle all of the pronouns

appearing in the paragraph. In the individualism-primed condition, all the pronouns were first-person singular pronouns (I, my, me, mine), whereas in the collectivism-primed condition, all the pronouns were first-person plural pronouns (we, our, us, ours). These cultural priming tasks have been shown to influence various psychological processes, such as self-concepts, emotions, and cognitive styles (for a meta-analysis, see Oyserman & Lee, 2008).

Another type of priming procedure is bicultural priming. Bicultural priming relies on the fact that some individuals are bicultural (e.g., Asian Americans) and thus might have internalized two cultural knowledge systems (e.g., Asian and American cultural meaning systems), either of which can be primed with cultural cues. For example, after being exposed to Chinese cultural icons, such as a Chinese dragon, Hong Kong Chinese have been found to make more situational attributions (i.e., holistic cognition) than after being exposed to American cultural icons, such as the American flag (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000).

Although the priming procedure provides a way to test whether the primed construct causes a certain psychological response, one limitation of the priming procedure is that the existence of the priming effect does not prove that the primed construct actually is responsible for cultural differences in the psychological process of focus (D. Cohen, 2007). There is a possibility that cultural differences are driven by another factor. For example, even if participants who are primed with the feeling of hunger show an analytic attention style, cultural differences in attention styles are likely not due to the feeling of hunger. In addition, the existence of the priming effect in one context may not necessarily generalize to another context or different culture. In fact, research showed that the bicultural priming effects are moderated by social context (Wong & Hong, 2005). Nonetheless, the priming procedure provides a useful way to examine a causal link between a critical construct and psychological processes in a given context.

Mediation by Core Values and Ideas

Another way to attempt to show that personally held values and ideas underlie cultural differences in certain psychological processes is to measure the personally held values and ideas and test whether they mediate cultural differences in the pertinent psychological processes (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). In this approach, as in the priming procedure, researchers first identify a critical construct (e.g., individualism v. collectivism) that is supposed to underlie cultural differences in certain psychological processes (e.g., analytic and holistic cognition). Researchers then conduct a cross-cultural study, where they measure individual differences in the endorsement of the critical construct as well as the psychological processes of interest. Then, they examine whether the level of endorsement of the critical construct mediates cultural differences in the psychological processes, typically following the statistical procedure proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986).

This provides a persuasive way to show a source underlying cultural differences in a given psychological process. At the same time, there is a practical problem associated with this method. This method requires researchers to measure individual differences in personally held values or ideas, typically through explicit self-report measures of general cultural themes, such as the interdependent and independent self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994) or the individualism and collectivism scale (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). However, such explicit self-report measures that require participants to reflect on their personal endorsement of core cultural themes often fail to show the expected cultural differences (Oyserman et al., 2002). Such a failure might be partly due to the reference-group effect (Heine et al., 2002; Peng et al., 1997), as described above (see section “[Methods](#)”). Another reason why explicit self-report measures of core cultural themes sometimes fail to show cultural differences might be because such core cultural themes might be tacit and implicit (Bond, 2002; Kitayama, 2002). An alternative method to address this concern is the use of intersubjective perceptions rather than personally held beliefs, which is explained below.

Mediation by Intersubjective Beliefs

Whereas the above approach focuses on the role of *personally* held beliefs and values, some researchers have recently highlighted the role of *intersubjective* perceptions—beliefs and values that members of a culture perceive to be widespread in their culture (Chiu et al., 2010; Zou et al., 2009). This approach assumes that individuals perceive that certain beliefs and values are widely shared in a culture, and individuals' actions are sometimes guided by these intersubjective beliefs and values, rather than by personal beliefs and values. For example, Zou and colleagues examined whether cultural differences in compliance are mediated by intersubjective beliefs about collectivism and individualism. Americans, who live in an individualistic culture, were more likely than Poles, who live in a collectivistic culture, to comply with a request when it was in line with their own past behavior, whereas Poles were more likely than Americans to comply with a request when it was in line with others' behavior. More importantly, cultural differences in compliance were mediated by participants' perception of their cultural members' endorsement of collectivism-individualism, rather than participants' own endorsement of collectivism-individualism.

The intersubjective approach locates the source of cultural differences not exclusively either inside the head of individuals or out in the world. Rather, it locates cultural differences in the intersection of them, by focusing on the role of individuals' subjective perception of collective reality out in the world. Such attention to multi-level processes broadens approaches to the study of underlying mechanisms. A growing number of researchers are employing such an intersubjective approach to examine the sources of cultural differences (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011; Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010).

Distal-Level Situational Factors

Although showing how specific values and ideas underlie cultural differences in particular psychological processes can identify individual-level mechanisms, such evidence does not explain why there are cultural differences in such values and ideas and through what processes they influence individuals. Thus, some researchers examine how values and ideas derive from and manifest in institutions and practices, and try to identify sources underlying cultural differences in them. Here, we distinguish distal-level situational factors, such as ecological, economic, and socio-structural factors, that surround a society, from proximal-level situational factors, such as practices and artifacts, to which individuals are directly exposed and in which they are embedded (Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). We will first review distal-level factors that have been proposed to underlie cultural differences.

Ecological Threats

Recent studies have suggested that distal ecological threats, such as the extent to which infectious diseases have been prevalent in a society, underlie cultural differences in beliefs and values. By comparing more than fifty geographical regions across the world, researchers found that regions that have higher pathogen prevalence are more likely to endorse higher collectivism (Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008). This is presumably because collectivism serves an anti-pathogen defense function by limiting exposure to out-group members, who might bring novel pathogens, and by increasing conformity to traditions and norms, which can buffer against pathogen transmission. Research that examined a larger number of ecological and historical threats (e.g., population density, resource scarcity, territorial conflicts, natural disasters, pathogen prevalence) across 33 nations also

found that nations that have experienced greater ecological and historical threats have stronger expectations to conform to norms (Gelfand et al., 2011). A recent study further showed that a link between historical pathogen prevalence and collectivism is mediated by genetic variations in serotonin transporter genes (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010), pointing to a possibility that genetic selection might partly underlie cultural variations in collectivism.

Economic Activities

Ecological environments can give rise to different types of economic activities, which in turn lead to cultural variations. Dov Cohen and his colleagues (D. Cohen et al., 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) have shown that societies historically based on herding (e.g., Southern regions of the United States where the settlers came mainly from herding communities on the fringes of Britain) tend to endorse violence to protect one's reputation and property (i.e., "culture of honor") because one's wealth can be easily stolen by others while law enforcement is inadequate to prevent theft in remote areas. Such values and ideas not only manifest in individuals' beliefs and behaviors (e.g., higher aggression after insult), but are also encoded in the laws and social policies of southern states (e.g., looser gun control, less restricted self-defense laws).

Different types of economic activities have also been linked to conformity and processing of contextual information. Researchers compared three communities within Turkey that engage in different types of economic activities: farming, fishing, and herding (Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). Farmers and fishermen, whose activities require close cooperation among the family members, were more likely to show a holistic cognitive style than were herders, whose activities require individual decision making and autonomy.

Affluence and Social Class

Affluence and availability of material resources have been suggested as one set of factors that foster individualistic values because they provide individuals with more freedom and less need to rely on others for survival (Triandis, 1995). Supporting this argument, cross-national comparisons have shown that the wealth of a country, measured by gross national product (i.e., GNP), is positively associated with individualism (Hofstede, 1980; Kashima & Kashima, 2003) and with higher levels of secular and self-expression values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Even within the same country, people who live in different socioeconomic contexts have different amounts of material resources available to them. Such differences in socioeconomic status (SES) or social class might also lead to variations in psychological processes. Individuals from working-class backgrounds have been found to tend to value similarity to (rather than differentiation from) others compared to individuals from middle-class backgrounds (Stephens et al., 2007). In addition, compared to higher class individuals, lower class individuals use more nonverbal cues that signal social engagement during an interaction (e.g., head nods, laughs; Kraus & Keltner, 2009). SES contexts have been linked to cognitive styles as well. Compared to people with higher SES backgrounds, those with lower SES backgrounds are more likely to show a holistic cognitive style (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009; Miyamoto & Ji, 2011; Na et al., 2010). Furthermore, Kohn indexed social class with occupational conditions and examined how occupational conditions are linked to various psychological processes. For example, jobs that allow occupational self-direction lead to cognitive functioning, including analytic cognitive processing, and a self-directed (i.e., independent) orientation to self and society (Kohn & Schooler, 1982).

Voluntary Settlement

Societies and regions rooted in a history of voluntary settlement have also been linked to development of independent cultural values (Kitayama et al., 2010). Voluntary settlement in a frontier, which is motivated by pursuit of personal wealth and freedom, has been theorized to foster social structures which place few restraints on individuals and promote independent agency (Turner, 1920). To examine the effects of voluntary settlement, Kitayama and his colleagues compared a voluntary settlement society in Japan (i.e., Hokkaido) with a non-voluntary settlement society in Japan (i.e., mainland). Those who were born in Hokkaido were more likely than those in mainland Japan to show an independent social orientation (indicated by association between happiness and personal achievement-related emotions) and an analytic pattern of cognition (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006). Furthermore, voluntary settlement seems to have led North American societies to be even more independent than Western European societies. North Americans showed a more independent social orientation and an analytic cognitive style compared to Western Europeans, who in turn showed a more independent social orientation and an analytic cognitive style than did Japanese (Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009).

Mobility

The extent to which people freely move between relationships, groups, or locations within a society is another distal-level factor that underlies cultural values and ideas (Adams, 2005; Oishi, 2010; Schug et al., 2010; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). The mobility of a society has been linked to how people view and relate to others. Because trusting other people in general helps people move out of their existing relations to seek new opportunities, Yamagishi and Yamagishi showed that a sense of general trust toward others is higher in a high mobility society (i.e., the United States) than in a low mobility society (i.e., Japan). Furthermore, signaling one's commitment to a partner, such as disclosing one's secrets, might be more important in highly mobile communities because relationships may dissolve without active maintenance. Supporting this possibility, research showed that people were more likely to self-disclose to a close friend in the United States than in Japan, and this cultural difference was mediated by perceptions of the extent to which people in their community are mobile (Schug et al.).

In addition to societal-level mobility (i.e., how frequently people in one's community move), researchers have also linked individual-level mobility (i.e., how frequently one moves) to how people relate to others. Compared to students who had moved before attending college, students who had never moved showed more unconditional group identification with their college (Oishi, Ishii, & Lun, 2009). Furthermore, individual-level mobility has also been linked to how people view themselves. Students who had moved before attending college viewed personal selves (i.e., personality traits) to be more central to their self-descriptions than collective selves (i.e., group affiliations) were, whereas students who had not moved before attending college viewed both personal and collective selves to be equally central to their self-descriptions (Oishi, Lun, & Sherman, 2007).

Proximal-Level Situational Factors

Distal-level situational factors, such as ecological, economic, and socio-structural factors, influence the core values and ideas of a society, which are shared and embodied in proximal-level situational factors surrounding individuals in their daily lives, such as social interactions, practices, and artifacts (Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). By participating in and engaging with such

proximal-level situational factors, individuals attune their behavior to the affordances of the situations. Prolonged and repeated participation in and engagement with such factors may shape their habitual ways of behaving, thinking, and feeling. It is important to note that individuals are not mere passive recipients of situational influences. In order for proximal-level situational factors to exist and exert influence on individuals, individuals need to participate in them and sustain them. Situational and individual factors thus mutually shape and sustain each other (Fiske et al., 1998; Shweder, 1990). In this section, we will review proximal-level factors that have been found to underlie cultural differences and dynamic relationships between such proximal-level factors and psychological processes.

Cultural Differences in Products and Practices

Cultural ideas and beliefs are embodied in cultural products to which individuals are exposed in their daily lives (see Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008, for a meta-analysis). For example, different models of self are reflected in mass media coverage. When covering Olympic athletes, American mass media focused more on personal characteristics of athletes (e.g., athletic strength, personality), whereas Japanese mass media focused more on the athletes' backgrounds and other people (e.g., previous experiences, encouragement from coaches; Markus et al., 2006). Different models of emotion are also reflected in cultural products, such as children's storybooks. Reflecting culturally divergent models of ideal affect (Tsai et al., 2006), best-selling storybooks in the United States depicted larger smiles and more excited (as opposed to calm) expressions than best-selling storybooks in Taiwan (Tsai, Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 2007). Being repeatedly exposed to such cultural products may lead people to think and behave according to the models embodied in those products. Moreover, individuals are not only passively influenced by cultural products but also actively shape the products. When asked to take photographs or to draw landscape pictures, East Asians included a larger amount of context or background than Americans did (Masuda, Gonzalez, Kwan, & Nisbett, 2008).

Cultural ideas and beliefs are also embodied in parental practices. When talking with their children about past events, American mothers were more likely than Chinese mothers to engage in independently oriented conversation (e.g., talking about children's personal preferences or judgments), whereas Chinese mothers were more likely than American mothers to engage in interdependently oriented conversation (e.g., talking about social moral standards and behavioral expectations; Wang, 2001). Cultural differences in parental practices were also found in the way mothers play with toys. Japanese mothers were more likely than American mothers to engage infants in social routines, such as greeting and exchange, whereas American mothers were more likely than Japanese mothers to label toys for infants (Fernald & Morikawa, 1993; Tamis-LeMonda, Bornstein, Cyphers, & Toda, 1992). American mothers' emphasis on labeling objects could be said to lead infants to focus on objects, thus fostering analytic cognition, whereas Japanese mothers' emphasis on social practices could direct infants' attention to relationships or to the context in which an object is located, thus fostering holistic cognition.

Affordances

How do such culturally divergent products and practices shape psychological processes? When people are exposed to, and participate in, their specific cultures' practices, people may attune their behavior to the affordance of such practices. Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasak-kunkit (1997) developed a situation sampling method to demonstrate such affordances. Building on previous findings which suggest that Americans tend to engage in more self-enhancement than Japanese do (for a review see Heine & Hamamura, 2007), they examined whether the tendency to self-enhance can be afforded by culturally specific situations. They first sampled situations from the United States and

Japan by asking American and Japanese participants to list situations in which their self-esteem increased or decreased. They then presented those situations to another group of American and Japanese participants and asked them to judge how their self-esteem would be affected in each situation. The results showed that situations sampled from United States afforded more self-enhancement than did situations sampled from Japan. These findings suggest that culturally-specific features of situations afford particular psychological processes.

Culturally divergent perceptual environments can also afford particular psychological processes. Miyamoto et al. (2006) reasoned that cultural differences in holistic and analytic cognitive styles may be partly afforded by cultural differences in the nature of perceptual environments. By randomly sampling townscapes in small, medium, and large cities in both Japan and the United States, they first showed that Japanese perceptual environments are more complex and ambiguous than American perceptual environments. Next, they exposed American and Japanese participants to either American or Japanese perceptual environments and measured their cognitive styles in a subsequent task. They found that participants who were exposed to Japanese perceptual environments showed more holistic cognitive performance compared to those participants who were exposed to American perceptual environments.

Prolonged Exposure

Exposure to culturally specific practices may not only afford certain responses in specific situations, but may also have long-term effects by shaping habitual ways of thinking and behaving. To examine the effect of prolonged exposure to cultural contexts, researchers have examined the developmental trajectory of cognitive styles. If extended exposure to cultural practices shapes children's habitual cognitive styles, cultural differences in cognitive styles should become larger as children grow older and gain more experiences in their divergent cultures. Developmental studies have provided supporting evidence of this process. Miller (1984) examined reasoning styles of both adults and children (ages 8, 11, and 15 years) in India and the U.S. Although the American adults showed more analytic reasoning styles than did the Indian adults, the cultural differences were smaller among 15- and 11-year-olds, and no cultural differences were observed among 8-year-olds. Interestingly, younger children in both cultures showed a more holistic reasoning style than an analytic reasoning style. Similar developmental patterns were observed for predictions of changes (Ji, 2008) as well as for perceptual processing (Duffy, Toriyama, Itakura, & Kitayama, 2009). Together, these various findings suggest that children start out with a relatively holistic cognitive style across cultures and that children increasingly acquire patterns of cognition consistent with their cultural backgrounds as they grow older and accumulate experiences in their cultural contexts.

On the other hand, evidence of how exposure to a new culture shapes psychological processes (i.e., acculturation) is surprisingly limited. Cross-sectional studies have generally shown that Asians who live in North America show tendencies that are in-between Asians who live in Asia and European Americans/Canadians (e.g., self-esteem, Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; categorization, Norenzayan et al., 2002; perception, Kitayama et al., 2003). However, such findings may be partly driven by self-selection rather than by the effect of acculturation. There are only a few longitudinal studies that found changes in psychological processes over time (Heine & Lehman, 2004). The findings of these, together with studies that employed other methods such as cross-sectional methods, are mixed. Such lack of evidence for changes over time due to exposure to a new culture is in stark contrast to emerging evidence showing early developmental changes in culturally divergent cognitive processes. This may imply that there is something akin to a sensitive period in changing one's habitual psychological processes (Cheung, Chudek, & Heine, 2011; Minoura, 1992). Our research examined Asian international students longitudinally over their first year at the University of Wisconsin and found that although their attitude toward the host culture (e.g., preferences for American artifacts,

participation in American cultural traditions, desire to associate with Americans) did not change or slightly worsened over the course of the year, their self-construals (i.e., independent and interdependent self-construals) changed to fit the host culture (Eggen, Ma, & Miyamoto, 2012). Such findings suggest the possibility that there are particular domains which vary in level of susceptibility to change in response to exposure to new cultural environments.

Whereas developmental and acculturation studies show how prolonged exposure to cultural contexts in general can shape habitual ways of thinking, other researchers have focused on specific cultural practices, such as Oriental medicine training practices. Oriental medicine embodies core aspects of East Asian holistic thinking, such as attention to relations between parts and the whole, and an emphasis on maintaining balance. Engaging in the practices of Oriental medicine may foster holistic ways of thinking. In fact, Korean students of Oriental medicine showed a more holistic cognitive style than did those studying psychology (Koo & Choi, 2005). Furthermore, the longer the students trained in Oriental medicine, the more holistic their cognitive styles were.

The Rocky Road from Distal-Level Situational Factors to Psychological Processes

Distal-level situational factors, such as ecological, economic, and socio-structural factors, are generally considered to shape the core values and ideas of a society, which are embodied in proximal-level situational factors, which in turn influence individuals' psychological processes (Fiske et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). This seems to suggest that distal-level situational factors are the ultimate cause of cultural differences in psychological processes of individuals. However, the relationships between distal-level situational factors and individuals' psychological processes may not necessarily be deterministic. Part of this is due to the role of construal, or subjective meaning that actors attach to situational factors; the impact of "objective" situational factors depends on how actors construe their meaning (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). To predict the effect of a certain distal-level situational factor, one needs to know how the situational factor manifests in proximal-level situations and how the actors interpret it in relation to their goals, values, and beliefs. Furthermore, the individuals' construals can be influenced by the existing cultural contexts in which the individuals and the situational factors are embedded. Thus, to understand how a situational factor influences psychological processes, it is imperative to examine how the situational factor is experienced and construed by individuals in each cultural context. The same situational factor may have divergent effects on psychological processes in different cultures, if people of the different cultures construe it differently. Particularly, several studies have shown that the effects of social structure on psychological processes sometimes depend on cultural context because existing cultural contexts provide culturally-specific meaning to the social structure.

For example, cohesiveness of social structure has been linked to attitudes toward violence, but the link depends on cultural context. As previously discussed, Southern regions of the United States have been characterized by a culture of honor (D. Cohen et al., 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In Southern societies, where violence is collectively endorsed as a means to protect one's honor against insult, people who are in close-knit traditional families are *more* likely to endorse honor-related violence compared to those who are not in close-knit families. In contrast, in Northern societies, people who are in more traditional nuclear families and who are closer to their families are *less* likely to endorse honor-related violence than those individuals who are not in such traditional family arrangements or who are less close to their families (D. Cohen & Vandello, 1998). Such patterns suggest that the close-knit, cohesive social structure can be associated with either more or less honor-related violence depending on the cultural context in which individuals and the social structures are embedded.

In addition, researchers who examine the effects of occupational conditions across cultures on psychological processes have found that, while some job characteristics (e.g., occupational

self-direction) have the same effects across cultures, some are culturally contingent. Specifically, occupying higher hierarchical positions at work lead to greater authoritarian conservatism, greater idea conformity, and less personally responsible standards of morality in Japan (Naoi & Schooler, 1985), though there are no such effects of hierarchical positions in the United States (Kohn & Schooler, 1982). It is possible that those in positions of power may be especially likely to endorse such values in cultural contexts where conformity to social structure is valued, as it is in Japan, which indicates that the effects of power on psychological processes may depend on cultural context.

Furthermore, researchers have also shown that cultural contexts can moderate the effects of interpersonal power on cognitive processes. Miyamoto and Wilken (2010) suggested that interpersonal power requires a perceptual style that serves respective cultural imperatives. They assigned participants to be either a leader or a follower and had them interact with each other. When assigned to be a leader, Americans showed a more analytic perceptual style than when assigned to be a follower, presumably because such an analytic perceptual style allows them to focus on their own goals without being overly distracted by surrounding contexts. Such effects of power on a perceptual style were absent or even slightly reversed among Japanese; those who were assigned to be a leader showed a holistic perceptual style, which presumably allows them to fit into social contexts. Thus, interpersonal power seems to lead to divergent perceptual styles depending on cultural context (i.e., “culturally contingent situated cognition”; Miyamoto & Wilken).

These findings suggest that, to understand how exactly social structures influence psychological processes at the individual-level, it is important to examine how such social structures are experienced and construed by individuals in proximal-level situations in each cultural context. This illustrates how distal-level factors (i.e., social structures) may influence individual psychological process in a rather indirect, non-deterministic manner through proximal-level situational factors and how this influence is dependent upon cultural context.

Conclusion

Cross-cultural research accumulated over the past two decades has demonstrated cultural differences in a wide range of psychological processes, including self-concepts, motivation, emotion, and cognition. These studies have delineated the nature and scope of cultural differences. For example, cultural differences are shown to be moderated by various contextual factors, and the magnitude of cultural differences tends to be moderate to large. Furthermore, emerging evidence shows mechanisms underlying cultural differences at different levels; some researchers examine distal-level situational factors (e.g., economic and social structure), while some explore proximal-level situational factors (e.g., cultural practices and products), and some others focus on individual factors (e.g., personal beliefs and values).

At the same time, we believe that it is important to examine multi-level processes underlying cultural differences by paying attention to proximal-level processes that bridge the gap between distal-level processes and psychological processes at an individual level. Recent findings suggest that proximal-level factors sometimes interact with distal-level factors to shape psychological processes, highlighting the importance of taking multiple levels into consideration at once. Understanding more fully how individuals think, feel, and behave in proximal-level situations would be a fruitful way to disentangle the nexus of culture and psychological processes. Furthermore, understanding proximal-level processes will also shed light on the reciprocal relationship between situational factors and individual psychological processes. Although cross-cultural studies have focused mainly on how situational factors shape individuals, an understanding of the nature of proximal-level situational factors encourages attention to the processes through which such situational factors are shaped and sustained by individuals. It is our hope that these endeavors will contribute to a better and richer understanding of the intricate relationship between culture and psychological processes.

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Contributor Bios

Deborah Carr, (Ph.D., 1997, University of Wisconsin) is professor of sociology and co-director of the National Institute of Mental Health postdoctoral training program at the Institute for Health, Health Care Policy, & Aging Research at Rutgers University. Her research focuses on health and well-being over the life course, with an emphasis on end-of-life issues, and the influence of stressful family roles and transitions on health. Carr has authored more than 75 journal articles and book chapters, and is co-author or editor of five books including *Spousal Bereavement in Later Life* (Springer, 2006) and the *Encyclopedia of the Life Course and Human Development* (Cengage, 2009). She has served as Deputy Editor of *Journal of Marriage and Family* (2005–2008; 2011–2014) and *Social Psychology Quarterly* (2010–2014). Carr is a fellow of the Gerontological Society of America, a member of the Academy of Behavioral Medicine, and is chair of the Board of Overseers of the General Social Survey (2011–2014).

Coye Cheshire, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley. He studies social exchange, cooperation, trust, and interpersonal relationships in online and offline environments. His most recent work includes mixed-methods studies of technology-mediated social participation systems such as Wikipedia, a series of lab experiments examining trust and shifts in modes of social exchange, a longitudinal study of online romantic relationship formation, and the application of social psychological selective incentives to Internet collective action problems.

Karen S. Cook is the Ray Lyman Wilbur Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences (IRiSS) at Stanford. She conducts research on social interaction, social networks, and trust. She has edited a number of books in the Russell Sage Foundation Trust Series she co-edits with M. Levi and R. Hardin, including *Trust in Society* (2001), *Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives* (with R. Kramer, 2004), *eTrust: Forming Relations in the Online World* (with C. Snijders, V. Buskens, and Coye Cheshire, 2009), and *Whom Can Your Trust?* (with M. Levi and R. Hardin, 2009). She is co-author of *Cooperation without Trust?* (with R. Hardin and M. Levi, 2005) and she co-edited *Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology* (with Gary Alan Fine and James S. House, 1995). In 1996, she was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and in 2007 to the National Academy of Sciences. In 2004 she received the ASA Social Psychology Section Cooley Mead Award for Career Contributions to Social Psychology.

Lisa M. Diamond, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology and Gender Studies at the University of Utah. She received her doctorate in Human Development from Cornell University in 1999. Dr. Diamond's research focuses on adolescent and young adult social and sexual development, and on the psychobiological mechanisms through which intimate relationships influence physical and mental health over the life course. Dr. Diamond is particularly interested in the longitudinal course of sexual identity

development, and in the multiple environmental and psychosocial factors that influence the emergence and expression of sexual and affectional feelings for same-sex and other-sex partners at different stages of life. Dr. Diamond is best known for her unprecedented 17-year longitudinal study of 100 lesbian, bisexual, heterosexual, and “unlabeled” women, whom she has been interviewing regularly since 1995, tracking changes in their sexual identities, attractions, and behaviors over time. Her 2008 book, *Sexual Fluidity*, published by Harvard University Press, describes the changes and transformations that her respondents underwent from late adolescence to adulthood, and has been awarded the Distinguished Book award from the American Psychological Association’s Society for the Study of Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgendered Issues. Dr. Diamond has received numerous awards for her work from the American Psychological Association Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Concerns, the American Association of University Women, the Society for the Scientific Study of Sexuality, and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. In 2011 she was granted Fellow status in APA’s division for the Psychological Study of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Issues. Dr. Diamond has been awarded grants in support of her research from the National Institute for Mental Health, The W.T. Grant Foundation, the American Psychological Foundation, the American Institute for Bisexuality, and the Templeton Foundation.

Selected publications

- Diamond, L. M. (2008). *Sexual fluidity: Understanding women’s love and desire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Diamond, L. M. (2012). The desire disorder in research on sexual orientation in women: Contributions of dynamical systems theory. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 41, 73–83.
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- Diamond, L. M., Fagundes, C. P., & Butterworth, M. B. (2012). Attachment style, vagal tone, and empathy during mother-adolescent interactions. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, 22, 165–184.
- Diamond, L. M., Hicks, A. M., & Otter-Henderson, K. D. (2011). Individual differences in vagal regulation moderate associations between daily affect and daily couple interactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 37, 731–744.

Amanda Eggen, MS, is a fifth year graduate student of Social and Cultural Psychology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. She received her B.S. from Texas A&M University in 2000. One of her research lines is centered on communication mode differences across cultures, and how they are linked with relationship quality. Her other line examines how psychological processes change through acculturation, and factors that contribute to both that change and well-being for international students and other immigrants. She is currently in her third year of the NSF Graduate Research Fellowship Program which funds these lines of research.

Christopher P. Fagundes, Ph.D., is an American Cancer Society Postdoctoral Fellow at The Ohio State University School of Medicine. He graduated highest honors, with a bachelor’s degree in psychology, from the University of California, Davis. He then earned a master’s degree and Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Utah. Working in the areas of autonomic psychophysiology and psychoneuroimmunology, Chris investigates how the mind and body interact to affect those facing difficult life events – primarily cancer. He is particularly interested in how close relationships, socioeconomic status, and early adversities contribute to these processes. The goal of this work is to improve the physical and mental health of those affected by these experiences.

Selected publications

- Fagundes, C. P., Bennett, J. M., Alfano, C. M., Glaser, R., Povoski, S. P., Lipari, A. M., et al. (2012). Social support and socioeconomic status interact to predict Epstein-Barr virus latency in women awaiting diagnosis or newly diagnosed with breast cancer. *Health Psychology*, 31(1), 11–19.

- Fagundes, C. P., Bennett, J. M., Derry, H. M., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. (2011). Relationships and inflammation across the lifespan: Social developmental pathways to disease. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 5(11), 891–903.
- Fagundes, C. P., Berg, C. A., & Wiebe, D. J. (2012). Intrusion, avoidance, and daily negative affect among couples coping with prostate cancer: A dyadic investigation. *Journal of Family Psychology*, 26(2), 246–253.
- Fagundes, C. P., Lindgren, M. E., Shapiro, C. L., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. (2012). Child maltreatment and breast cancer survivors: Social support makes a difference for quality of life, fatigue, and cancer stress. *European Journal of Cancer*, 18, 728–736.

Robert Faris, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California at Davis. His research focuses on social networks and how they influence conflict, aggression, and other delinquent behaviors. His article with Diane Felmlee, “Status struggles: Social network centrality and gender segregation in same-and cross-gender aggression” (*American Sociological Review*, February 2011) received the James F. Short Distinguished Article Award from the Crime, Law and Deviance section of the American Sociological Association. In addition to ASR, his research has appeared in *Social Networks and Social Forces*.

Diane Felmlee, Ph.D., is Professor of Sociology at The Pennsylvania State University. Her research emphasizes the importance of the social network in shaping outcomes in close relationships, including friendships, intimate relationships, and aggressive ties. Her article with Robert Faris, “Status struggles: Network centrality and gender segregation in same- and cross-gender aggression” (*American Socio-logical Review*, 2011) received the James F. Short Distinguished Article Award from a section of the American Sociological Association (ASA). Recent publications appeared in *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *Social Forces*, and *Journal of Marriage and the Family*. She served as the President of the Mathematical Sociology Section of the ASA.

Alexis T. Franzese, Ph.D. is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Elon University. Her academic training includes a doctoral degree in Sociology as well as a doctoral degree in Psychology (Clinical) both completed at Duke University. She completed her clinical internship at the Durham Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Durham, NC. Her research addresses issues of self and identity, and the mental health consequences of inauthenticity. She has published her research on authenticity in *Sociology Compass* and in the text *Authenticity in Culture, Self, and Society*.

Feodor A. Gostjev, MA, is currently a doctoral student at the Department of Sociology at the University of Miami. He received his Masters of Arts degree in Justice Studies from the University of New Hampshire in the spring of 2010. His research interests include criminology and quantitative research methods.

Steven Hitlin is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Iowa. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2003. He has published on topics ranging across issues of self and identity values racial identification agency and the life course. He is currently helping to develop a sociological re-engagement with the notion of morality focusing on the interaction of cultural moral systems and individual social orientations. He is the author of *Moral Selves Evil Selves: The Social Psychology of Conscience* (2008 Palgrave) and the co-editor of *The Handbook of the Sociology of Morality* (with Stephen Vaisey 2010 Springer). He has written a number of articles about values including an empirical treatment in *Social Psychology Quarterly* (2003) a theoretical exploration in the *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research* (2011) and an overview of the topic (with Jane Piliavin) in the *Annual Review of Sociology* (2004).

Michael A. Hogg (Ph.D., Bristol, 1983) is Professor of Social Psychology at Claremont Graduate University and President-elect of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology. He is a Fellow of numerous societies including the Association for Psychological Science and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology. His research on group processes, intergroup relations, social identity, and self-conception is closely associated with the development of social identity theory and has resulted in

over 300 scientific publications. One of his most recent publications, in the *Academy of Management Review* (2012), presents a new theory of intergroup leadership. A past associate editor of the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* and foundation co-editor of the journal *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, Michael Hogg was the 2010 recipient of the Carol and Ed Diener Award in Social Psychology from the Society for Personality and Social Psychology.

DeLamater, J. D., & Ward A. (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (2nd ed.). New York: Springer.

Judith A. Howard, Ph.D., is Professor of Sociology and Divisional Dean of Social Sciences at the University of Washington. She earned her Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1982. Her research focuses on the social cognitive study of gender dynamics in their intersections with race, class, and sexuality. She is co-author (with Jocelyn A. Hollander and Daniel G. Renfrow) of *Gendered Situations, Gendered Selves: A Gender Lens on Social Psychology* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011) and co-editor (with Jodi O'Brien) of *Everyday Inequalities: Critical Inquiries* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). Professor Howard is a former co-editor (with Carolyn Allen) of *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*. She is a recipient of the 2001 University of Washington Distinguished Graduate Mentor Award and the 2010 University of Washington Graduate School Dean's Award.

Nicole E. Iannone, MS, is a doctoral candidate in social psychology at Purdue University working with Janice R. Kelly. She is primarily interested in small group performance and interaction. Nicole's research interests focus on small group interaction and performance. Her specific interests include investigating emotions and emotion regulation in groups. She is also interested in the effects of partial ostracism in groups in the form of being "out of the loop," and she has looked in particular at the effects of being out of the loop on pop culture. Nicole has presented her research at conferences for the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, the Midwestern Psychological Association, and the Interdisciplinary Network for Group Research.

Robert J. Johnson, Ph.D. is Professor of Sociology at the University of Miami. He specializes in Medical Sociology, Life Course and Aging, Longitudinal Methods, Social Psychology, and Deviance. His research interests involve the social and psychological correlates of physical health, and the social and physical correlates of mental health.

Howard B. Kaplan, Ph.D., Texas A&M University was a Regents Professor, a Distinguished Professor of Sociology, the Mary Thomas Marshall Professor of Liberal Arts, Editor of the *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 1979–1981, the recipient of the American Sociological Association's Leo G. Reeder Award (2006), a NIDA Research or Senior Scientist for 24 years, and the Series Editor of the *Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research and Longitudinal Research in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary Series*. Since 1971, he has conducted longitudinal studies of large in-community populations to test theoretically informed models of the antecedents and consequences of drug abuse and other deviant adaptations to life stress. His career of more than 50 years of research has made an indelible impact on the field of medical sociology as well as deviant behavior and social psychology.

Janice R. Kelly, Ph.D. (Illinois), is a Professor in the Department of Psychological Sciences at Purdue University. Her primary research interest is in group performance and interaction, with an emphasis on how affective processes and time pressure affect group performance and interaction. Her secondary research interests include gender issues and relational processes. Dr. Kelly has served as an Associate Editor for *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice* and serves on the Editorial Board of several other journals in social psychology. She is a Fellow of the American Psychological Society and the Society for Experimental Social Psychology. She was elected and served as President of the Midwestern Psychological Association in 2010. In addition to her research, Dr. Kelly was

awarded Purdue University's Outstanding Undergraduate Teacher Award in 2003–2004 and was inducted into Purdue University's Book of Great Teachers in 2008. Some of Dr. Kelly's significant recent chapters and books include:

- Agnew, C. R., Carlston, D. E., Graziano, W. G., & Kelly, J. R. (Eds.). (2010). *"And then a miracle occurs..." Focusing on behavior in social psychological theory and research*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kelly, J. R., & Agnew, C. R. (2012). Behavior and behavior assessment. In K. Deaux & M. Snyder (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of personality and social psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kelly, J. R., & Jones, E. E. (2012). Investigating emotions and affect in groups. In A. B. Hollingshead & M. S. Poole (Eds.), *Research methods for studying groups: A behind-the-scenes guide* (pp. 154–172). New York: Taylor & Francis/Routledge.
- Kelly, J. R., & Spoor, J. R. (2012). Affective processes in small groups. In J. Levine (Ed.), *Frontiers of social psychology: Group processes*. New York: Psychology Press.

Jeffrey L. Kidder (Ph.D., University of California, San Diego) is an assistant professor of sociology at Northern Illinois University. He is a qualitative researcher in the areas of cultural and urban sociology. He is the author of *Urban Flow: Bike Messengers and the City*. His research has also been published in *The Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, *Sociological Forum*, *Sociological Theory*, *Symbolic Interaction*, and *Theory and Society*.

Douglas W. Maynard, Ph.D., is Conway-Bascom Professor in the Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has specific interests in ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and the study of naturally occurring interaction. Among book publications are his monograph, *Bad News, Good News: Conversational Order in Everyday Talk and Clinical Settings* (University of Chicago Press 2003), an edited volume entitled *Standardization and Tacit Knowledge: Interaction and Practice in the Survey Interview* (Wiley Interscience 2002) with Sociology Department colleague Nora Cate Schaeffer and others, and another edited volume (with John Heritage) entitled *Communication in Medical Care: Interaction between Primary Care Physicians and Patients* (Cambridge University Press 2006). Recent, collaborative journal publications are on requests for participation in the survey interview (*American Sociological Review*, 2010) and telephone solicitations for tissue donation (*Sociology of Health and Illness*, 2009). A recent publication for the *Handbook on Conversation Analysis* (2012) is "Everyone and No One to Turn To: Intellectual Roots for Conversation Analysis." Presently he is conducting a study about the diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorders at a clinic for developmental disabilities.

George J. McCall, Ph.D. (Harvard University, 1965) is Emeritus Professor, Sociology and Public Policy Administration, at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Although primarily a social psychologist and secondarily a methodologist, his teaching and research efforts have increasingly centered on applied sociology (especially program evaluation and conflict intervention). Best-known for *Identities and Interactions* (with J.L. Simmons) (New York: Free Press, 1966), he has also authored (or co-authored) a dozen books, several handbook chapters, numerous other book chapters (such as "Systematic Field Observation," in Ralph H. Turner and James F. Short, Jr., *Annual Review of Sociology*, 10:263–282), and many journal articles (including McCall and Patricia A. Resick, "A pilot study of PTSD symptoms among Kalahari Bushmen," *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, 2003, 16:445–450). In 2008, McCall received the C. Brice Ratchford Memorial Fellowship Award for his sustained involvement with various South African institutions. He served as Editor of *The Sociological Quarterly*, 1988–1992.

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Selected peer reviewed publications

Perez-Felkner, L., McDonald, S. K., Schenider, B., & Grogan, E. (2013). Female and male adolescents' subjective orientations to mathematics and the influence of those orientations on postsecondary majors. *Developmental Psychology*, 48(6), 1658–1673.

Perez-Longobardo, L. (2005). Review: Latino crossings: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and the politics of race and citizenship. *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews* 34(5), 490–491.

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- Merolla, D. M., Serpe, R. T., Stryker, S., & Wesley Schultz, P. (2012). Structural precursors to identity processes: The role of proximate social structures. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 75, 149–172.
- Serpe, R. T., & Stryker, S. (2011). The symbolic interactionist perspective and identity theory. In S. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. Vignoles (Eds.), *Handbook of identity theory and research* (pp. 225–248). New York: Springer.
- Stryker, S., Serpe, R. T., & Hunt, M. O. (2005). Making good on a promise: The impact of larger social structures on commitments. In S. R. Thye, & E. J. Lawler (Eds.), *Advances in group processes* (Vol. 22, pp. 93–124). Oxford, UK: Elsevier.

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Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). *Identity theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Stets, J. E., & Asencio, E. K. (2008). Consistency and enhancement processes in understanding emotions. *Social Forces* 86: 1055–1078.

Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2011). The moral self: Applying identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 74: 192–215.

Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2012). A theory of the self for the sociology of morality. *American Sociological Review* 77: 120–140.

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