



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF  
**PREJUDICE AND  
DISCRIMINATION**

SECOND EDITION

BERNARD E. WHITLEY JR. • MARY E. KITE



# The Psychology of Prejudice and Discrimination

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SECOND EDITION

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Ball State University

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# Preface

Throughout our academic careers, we have had a keen interest in the study of stereotyping and prejudice. It seemed natural, then, that we should teach our department's course on prejudice and discrimination. When we set out to do so for the first time, however, we ran into a surprise: Although there is vast literature on the topic, there were very few textbooks. In addition, we found that none of the books struck the balance between empirical rigor and readability that we were looking for. Therefore, as so many before us have done, we decided to write our own book; the result is before you. Our goal in writing this book is to provide students with an overview of what psychological theory and research have to say about the nature, causes, and amelioration of prejudice and discrimination. As a result, the book includes somewhat more detailed discussions of theories and selected research studies than do most other textbooks on the topic. At the same time, we have tried to keep our presentation at a level that is accessible to students whose only previous exposure to psychological theory and research has been in an introductory-level course. Feedback from our reviewers and from students in our courses suggests that we have achieved that aim.

## **WHAT'S OUR BOOK LIKE?**

Although our book covers the standard topics included in textbooks on prejudice, we also set the goal of covering what we thought were important topics that had been omitted from earlier textbooks. Thus, because of our emphasis on theory and research, we have included a chapter on the research methods psychologists use to study prejudice and discrimination and how research methodology influences the conclusions drawn about the issues studied. Similarly, with one exception, previous textbooks have overlooked the question of how prejudice develops in children; therefore, we have included a chapter on that

topic. Finally, although psychologists have long understood that attitudes are poor predictors of behavior, previous textbooks have not addressed discrimination as a topic in its own right. We have therefore included a chapter that discusses the nature of discrimination and its relation to prejudice. Other topics distinctive to our book include hate group membership, hate crime perpetrators, and prejudice and discrimination in organizations.

Although we have not formally divided the book into parts, the sequence of the chapters represents a progression across several themes. First, we introduce the nature of prejudice and discrimination (including a brief history of research on the topic), followed by our chapter on research methods. The next several chapters address the psychological underpinnings of prejudice: the nature of stereotypes; the conditions under which stereotypes influence responses to other people; the role of motivation and emotion in prejudice; contemporary theories of prejudice; individual difference variables related to prejudice; the development of prejudice in children; and the social context of prejudice. The next two chapters examine specific forms of prejudice, those based on gender and sexual orientation and prejudice based on age, ability, and appearance. The following two chapters focus on the nature of discrimination and its effects on those who experience it. We conclude with a discussion of prejudice reduction. We realize that every instructor has his or her own outline for how a course should be organized, so we have tried to make each chapter as independent of the others as possible to allow instructors to assign them in the order that best fits their personal goals for the course.

We have written the book for use by junior and senior college students who have had a course in introductory psychology. Although the book takes a psychological approach to the issues of prejudice and discrimination, we have intentionally written in a style that is accessible to students in other fields as well. We did so because we believe that an important educational goal for all students is the understanding of prejudice and discrimination and the processes by which they operate. Therefore, the book is appropriate for courses in psychology but also for courses in such areas as education, social work, business, communication studies, ethnic studies, and other disciplines. Also, in addition to courses on prejudice and discrimination, the book could be used in courses that cover topics such as racism and diversity.

## **WHAT'S NEW IN THE SECOND EDITION?**

The research and theoretical literatures on prejudice and discrimination have advanced dramatically even in the few years that have passed since the first edition of this book was published. Those advances have led us to make revisions throughout the book, including some reorganization of material. These revisions include two new chapters, one on emotions and motivation and the other on prejudice based on age, ability, and appearance. We had commented in the first edition that researchers had in recent decades given relatively little attention to

the role emotional reactions to outgroups plays in prejudice. That situation has changed recently, with a number of theorists and researchers producing exciting new work on the topic. The second new chapter was based on feedback from users, who suggested that we include more information on ability and physical appearance as causes of prejudice. These chapters include both new material and information moved from other chapters. For example, the topics of empathy, intergroup anxiety, and motivation to control prejudice have been moved to the chapter on emotion and motivation, and the topic of ageism is now part of the new chapter on age, ability, and appearance. As a result the topics of gender and sexual orientation are now covered in a chapter to themselves. We have also made other minor adjustments in the placement of material, for example consolidating some of the information in the chapters on stereotyping to reduce redundancy and moving information on reducing prejudice in children to the chapter on children. We have also incorporated new research on all the topics covered in the book, adding about 10 new references per chapter. To keep the book a manageable size, we have also reorganized and trimmed material throughout. Therefore, although the current edition has two more chapters than the first edition, the number of pages remains about the same.

## **CONTINUING FEATURES**

As in the first edition, each chapter begins with an outline to provide students with a cognitive map of its contents, and ends with a summary to provide closure. Within each chapter, key terms are shown in boldface; these terms are included in the glossary and the index entry for each term shows in boldface the page on which it is defined. Each chapter also includes boxes that provide supplemental information, additional examples, or other perspectives on issues. We have also continued to include research on international populations and research that addresses the cross-cultural implications of prejudice and discrimination. A set of questions concludes each chapter. Each set includes factual review questions, designed to integrate topics within the chapter; reflective questions, designed to encourage students to think about how the chapter's contents are relevant to their lives; and more philosophical questions, designed to highlight controversies and help students clarify their positions on those issues.

To assist instructors in course development, we have written an Instructor Manual (available in electronic form from the publisher) that provides a list of resources including key readings, Web sites and handbooks of course-related activities. We also provide a list of video clips, podcasts, television shows and films, including both domestic and international feature films specifically addressing psychological concepts, and a note for which chapter they are relevant. For each individual chapter, we provide suggested classroom activities, assignments, and readings for debate or discussion. We also have created a test bank that includes at least 50 multiple-choice questions for each chapter and have provided at least 20 short answer/essay questions for each chapter. We also have Power

Point slides for each chapter. Please contact your local Cengage Learning representative to obtain a copy of the electronic Instructor Manual and Test Bank. We also invite you to explore the Wadsworth Psychology Resource Center at <http://psychology.wadsworth.com> for material relevant to this course.

We welcome any suggestions you have for improving this book. Please send electronic mail to Bernard Whitley at [bwhitley@bsu.edu](mailto:bwhitley@bsu.edu) or Mary Kite at [mkite@bsu.edu](mailto:mkite@bsu.edu).



## About the Authors



**Bernard E. Whitley** is Professor and Chair of the Department of Psychological Science at Ball State University. His research focused the role of individual difference variables in prejudice. He is author, coauthor, or coeditor of four other books. He and Dr. Kite have collaborated together on numerous research projects.



**Mary E. Kite** is Professor of Psychological Science at Ball State University. Her research focuses on stereotyping and prejudice toward women, gays, and lesbians, and older adults and she has published widely in those areas. She is a past president of the Society for the Teaching of Psychology and currently serves as Secretary-Treasurer of the Midwestern Psychological Association.

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# Chapter 1

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## Introducing the Concepts of Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination

I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out  
the true meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be  
self-evident, that all men are created equal.”

—MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., AUGUST 28, 1963

### Chapter Outline

#### **Race and Culture**

*Historical Views of Ethnic Groups*  
*Cultural Influences on Perceptions*  
*of Race and Ethnicity*  
*Group Privilege*

#### **Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination**

*Stereotypes*  
*Prejudice*  
*Discrimination*

#### **The Relationships among Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination**

*Targets of Prejudice*  
*Racism*  
*Religion*  
*Classism*

*Gender and Sexual*  
*Orientation*  
*Age, Ability, and Appearance*

#### **Theories of Prejudice and Discrimination**

*Scientific Racism*  
*Psychodynamic Theory*  
*Sociocultural Theory*  
*Intergroup Relations Theory*  
*Cognitive Theory*  
*Evolutionary Theory*

#### **Where Do We Go from Here?**

#### **Summary**

#### **Suggested Readings**

#### **Key Terms**

#### **Questions for Review and Discussions**

Looking back over the 45 years since Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his classic “I Have a Dream” speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, it is easy to see the extent to which race relations have improved in the United States. The Jim Crow laws that limited the rights of minority groups have been dismantled and overt racial segregation, such as in restaurants and on public transportation, is a thing of the past. Today, it is difficult to believe there was a time when White lynching of Blacks took place without serious investigation, let alone punishment, for example. Yet, as we stand at the beginning of this new millennium, vivid post-civil rights stories illustrate that Martin Luther King’s dream has not been fully realized.

Evidence that racial tensions persist in our country can be found in the events following what has come to be called the “Jena 6” case. It began with a direct question at a school assembly at Jena High School in Louisiana: Could Black students sit under an oak tree then known as the “white tree” (Coll, 2007)? The principal said yes but, showing stark disagreement, White students hung nooses from the tree’s branches. To them, the tree was, indeed, off limits to Blacks. The school board deemed hanging nooses “a prank” and suspended the White students from school; no criminal charges were brought. Months of high emotions led to a series of fights between Black and White students. At least one incident led to battery charges against a White youth who beat a Black youth at a party; the White student received probation. The violence culminated with six Black students assaulting a White student to the point of his being knocked unconscious (Witt, 2007). Within hours, all six Blacks were charged with attempted murder—a felony. To many, the authorities’ responses to the separate incidents represented typical race-based inequities, a belief supported by national data. In the United States’ criminal justice system punishments are harsher for Blacks than for Whites and a higher percentage of Blacks are in jail (Free, 2002). Blacks comprise about 13 percent of the population, for example, but account for 38 percent of arrests for violent crime and 35 percent of arrests for drug violations (Newman, 2007). Following the charges against the “Jena 6” Blacks, thousands who object to this reality participated in protests across the United States. A few, representing another viewpoint have engaged in a spate of copy cat incidents, many involving nooses being left at schools and workplaces (Duster, 2007). From a psychological perspective, this case provides one of many possible illustrations not only of racial tensions in the U.S. but of how firmly race is embedded in American culture. Therefore, we begin the journey through the psychology of prejudice and discrimination with an overview of the intersection between race and culture in the United States.

## **RACE AND CULTURE**

There is no shortage of stories about racial relations in either the national or local media. However, there are also countless, equally compelling, personal stories that show the importance of race in social interactions. Psychological research shows that race, sex, and age are primary categories for organizing information about other people and they are likely to be the first pieces of information people take in about another (Schneider, 2004). People do so without thinking about it and

often subsequently make assumptions on the basis of that quick reading. Historian Ronald Takaki (1993) provides one story of how this process works, writing:

I had flown from San Francisco to Norfolk [Virginia] and was riding in a taxi to my hotel.... The rearview mirror reflected [the driver,] a white man in his forties. "How long have you been in this country?" he asked. "All my life," I replied, wincing. "I was born in the United States." ... He remarked, "I was wondering because your English is excellent!" Then, as I had many times before, I explained: "My grandfather came here from Japan in the 1880s. My family has been here, in America, for over a hundred years." He glanced at me in the mirror. Somehow I did not look "American" to him; my eyes and complexion looked foreign (p. 1).

Takaki's experience illustrates how our snap judgments can lead to stereotypic assumptions. If people move beyond their initial categorization, the effects of doing so can be relatively benign. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, people can and do think past such initial stereotypic judgments under some circumstances. Unfortunately, a person need not look far to see that this does not always happen and that prejudice and discrimination based solely on group membership is alive and well:

In 1988, in Indianapolis [Indiana], state authorities established a residential treatment center for convicted child molesters in an all-white neighborhood. From the center's opening until mid-1991—a period during which all of the residents of the center were white—neighbors voiced no objection. In June, 1991, however, authorities converted the center into a shelter for approximately forty homeless veterans, twenty-five of whom were black. Soon thereafter trouble erupted as a group of whites ... loudly proclaimed their opposition to the encroachment of "niggers" and burned a cross and vandalized a car to express their feelings. An all-white cadre of child molesters was evidently acceptable [in the neighborhood], but the presence of blacks made a racially integrated group of homeless *veterans* intolerable! (Kennedy, 2002, p. 27; emphasis in original)

Clearly, in some situations at least, people view others through the lens of race and gender and doing so affects their beliefs about and actions toward them. As we will see in this book, the more relevant question may not be whether people are prejudiced but whether and under what circumstances people try to override their prejudices and, instead, step back to measure each person as an individual.

### Historical Views of Ethnic Groups

Historical events, both recent and more distant, demonstrate how quickly views of other social groups can change. Although, in the United States, attitudes toward Middle Easterners were not necessarily positive prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, negative reactions toward individuals from those countries definitely

increased after that terrible day. Human Rights Watch (2002), for example, reported a tenfold increase in the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes and dramatic increases in violence against mosques after 9/11. Moreover, the Gallup Organization (2002) reported that the majority of Americans polled agreed there are too many immigrants from Arab countries in the United States and that 60 percent of respondents favored reducing the number of Arabs granted admission. In a recent survey, over half of all Americans reported they would feel very or somewhat uncomfortable if a Middle Eastern immigrant moved to their neighborhood; fewer than 29 percent reported a similar discomfort for immigrants from Europe or Mexico (Hamilton College, 2003).

Looking further back in history to the early 1900s, when the immigration of Irish and Italians reached its high point in the United States, evidence abounds that members of those ethnic groups were the targets of ridicule. Remnants of those strongly held beliefs remain: Most people today can still readily identify the ethnic stereotypes associated with these groups (Krueger, 1996; Terracciano, et al. 2005). These days, however, individuals of European descent generally do not find that their ethnic background significantly disadvantages them.

How can it be that 100 years ago Italians were considered non-White in the United States? If, as most people believe, race and ethnicity are biological categories, marked by differences in skin color, it is not logical that the definitions of who fits a category would change. In fact, there are very few true biological distinctions between what scientists define as racial groups, as explained in Box 1.1. Moreover, the categories “White” and “non-White” shift with social conventions that, themselves, change over time. Lillian Rubin (1998), writing about the errors in historical memory of immigration in the United States, noted that “being white didn’t make ‘a big difference’ for many [early] immigrants. The dark-skinned Italians and the eastern European Jews who came in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries didn’t look very white to the fair-skinned Americans who were here then. Indeed, the same people we now call white—Italians, Jews, Irish—were seen as another race at that time” (p. 93).

### **Cultural Influences on Perceptions of Race and Ethnicity**

The fact that racial categories are arbitrary and fluid does not dilute their power. Indeed, for as long as psychologists have studied stereotyping and prejudice, there has been little reluctance on the part of individuals to share their knowledge of stereotypes nor has there been a shortage of groups who experience prejudice and discrimination (see, for example, Devine & Elliot, 1995). Although, as psychologists, we will be focusing on prejudice and discrimination at the individual level, it is important consider how people’s cultures influence their behavior, attitudes, beliefs, and other psychological characteristics (A. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998), including those related to prejudice and discrimination (Jones, 1997). As is noted in Box 1.1, race may have a questionable meaning at the biological level, but it has a profound influence at the cultural level. Even a cursory review of history shows that social hierarchies based on race have been supported by society (Jones, 2003).

**Box 1.1 What is a "Race"?**

If you ask people how they know what race a person is, they will usually tell you that the determining factor is skin color. But why skin color rather than some other physical characteristic, such as hair color or eye color? One answer is provided by anthropologist Audrey Smedley (1999) in her book *Race in North America*.

Smedley notes that the word *race* was not used in English to refer to groups of people until the 1600s, and at that time the meaning was very broad, referring to any group of people with common characteristics. For example, one writer referred to "a race of bishops." The meaning of the word *race* slowly narrowed until, in the late 1700s, it took on its present meaning to indicate groups of people sharing common physical characteristics, especially skin color. This narrowing of meaning took place at the same time as Europeans were beginning to colonize and dominate Africa, Asia, and the Americas, areas whose native inhabitants differed in skin color from Europeans. Over time, racial categories based on skin color became a means of differentiating "superior" Europeans from "inferior" others. These categories then became the focus of stereotypes "proving" the inferiority of non-Europeans and justifying European dominance and race laws limiting the freedom of non-Europeans.

It is important to bear in mind that race is a social category, not a biological one. For example, genetic studies find more differences within traditionally defined racial groups than between them (e.g., Zuckerman, 1990). People notice physiological differences between groups, such as skin color or the thickness of the nose and lips, but such differences are superficial and do not, in fact, represent reliable ways to distinguish between groups of people. In statistical terms, the differences between races that do exist are

trivial relative to the genetic factors, such as blood groups, serum proteins, and enzymes, that are common to all people. As Steven Pinker (2002) notes, "The differences in skin color and hair that are so obvious when we look at people of other races are really a trick played on our intuition. Racial differences are largely adaptations to climate. Skin pigment was a sunscreen for the tropics, eyelid folds were goggles for the tundra. The parts of the body that face the elements are also the parts that face the eyes of other people, which fools them into thinking that racial differences run deeper than they really do" (p. 143).

In addition, during the period in U.S. history when racial segregation was legal, race was defined by law and people could petition a court to change their racial classifications (Banks & Eberhardt, 1998). If race were a biological fact, it could hardly be changed by court order. Similarly, cultural shifts in perceptions of race are captured in the history of racial classification by the U.S. Census. Over the decades, census categories have shifted from five, mutually exclusive categories (in 1978) to six categories (in 2000) under a system that allows respondents to check that they belong to one or more such categories (Trimble, Helms, & Root, 2003). As Derald Wing Sue (2003) notes, the current system allowed for 63 possible racial categories—a decision wholly inconsistent with the notion that race can be biologically identified. The weight of the evidence supports Ashley Montagu's (1974) conclusion that only one biological race exists—the human race. The concept of race as we now use it developed, then, not as a set of biological categories but rather as a set of social categories. Yet its social nature does not diminish the psychological importance of race. It remains a fundamental basis for how people think about and interact with each other (Kunda, 1999).

To understand the influence these cultural beliefs have on perceptions of and actions toward social groups, we must first understand the concept of culture. As Jeffrey Mio and his colleagues (Mio, Barker-Hackett, & Tumanging, 2008) point out, culture can be difficult to define because people use the term in several ways. Culture, for example, sometimes refers to art, music, and dance. Other times it is used in reference to other groups, as when the term "teen culture" is used to signify how adolescent behavior differs from that of other age groups. Although there is no one accepted definition of culture, we will follow David Masumoto and Linda Juang (2008) and define human **culture** as "a unique meaning and information system, shared by a group and transmitted across generations, that allows the group

to meet basic needs of survival, pursue happiness and well-being, and derive meaning from life” (p. 12).

Culture influences stereotyping and prejudice because members of a culture hold sets of beliefs in common, including beliefs about behaviors, values, attitudes, and opinions. An important concept is that people operate within their cultural context, but are often unaware of it. This lack of awareness is like a fish’s understanding of the notion of water: because fish are completely surrounded by water, they are unaware of its importance to their very survival. So it is with culture: human action is often driven by cultural expectations and experiences and this process typically occurs without conscious awareness. Adam Gopnik (2000), an American journalist, notes that “[a]fter four years [living] in Paris, I have come to realize that [jokes] are where true cultural differences reside” (p. 191). He explains that there is a “zone of kidding overlaid with not kidding” (p. 191) that can only be understood when one is fully integrated into a culture. He offers the example of fathers handing out cigars at the birth of their child. On the one hand, he notes, this is a way to celebrate a major life event—a zone of not kidding. Yet at the same time, the act has an unspoken reference to popular culture, specifically to Desi Arnez of *I Love Lucy* (or other 1950s sitcom characters) handing out cigars, and so includes an element of kidding as well. Americans may not know the origin of the joke, but they are likely to grasp the duality represented by the act. Those raised outside the United States are not likely to grasp this subtlety.

As people grow up in a culture, they tend to be unaware of its influence on them until something happens, such as a stay in another culture, that draws some aspect of their own culture to their attention (see, for example, Stangor, Jonas, Stroebe, & Hewstone, 1996). Yet the effects of culture are profound. Cultural beliefs reinforce the use of race as a social category; one result is that stereotypic beliefs about social groups work to maintain the social hierarchy that gives the dominant group power and control over other groups (see, for example, Jones, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

### Group Privilege

One way in which the cultural aspect of prejudice and discrimination is expressed is through White privilege or the more general concept of group privilege. If you are White, chances are you have not given a lot of thought to your race or ethnicity—because you have had no need to. The question “What does it mean to be White?” actually can be quite puzzling to White people. When Derald Wing Sue (2003) posed this question to a group of White adults in San Francisco, common responses included “Is this a trick question?” “I’ve never thought about it” and “I don’t know what you are talking about”—reactions Sue believes represent “the invisible whiteness of being” (p. 120). Simply put, when individuals are members of the dominant group in a society, their beliefs and actions seem normal and natural and are often taken for granted.

Researchers have captured this fact of life with the concept of White privilege. A host of seemingly simple actions illustrate the idea of White privilege: when buying a house or car, driving in an affluent neighborhood, or making a

financial transaction, for example, Whites seldom consider the possibility that their race comes into play at all (A. Johnson, 2006; McIntosh, 1989). Members of minority groups, in contrast, are often well aware that even the smallest everyday action can be affected by their race. Lena Williams (2000), for example, writes about “the look” Black professionals often get from people who do not expect them to be in such roles. Well-educated Blacks, for example, often hear “You went to Harvard?” or “You’re the Wall Street Journal reporter?” from surprised Whites who simply do not expect Blacks to have those credentials.

As you might imagine, privileges associated with group membership are not limited to race. Paula Caplan (1994) uses the metaphor *lifting a ton of feathers* to describe the subtle ways in which prejudice against women and its converse, male privilege, affects our everyday lives. This male prerogative can be overt; in surveys from around the world, between 10 and 69 percent of women respondents reported being physically assaulted by an intimate male partner at some point in their lives; in the United States, that figure is 22 percent (World Health Organization, 2002). More often, however, privilege refers to subtle factors; for example, men do not have to look far to find heroes or role models of their gender, nor do they have to worry about overpaying at the car repair shop because they are male (see A. Johnson, 2006, for more examples of male privilege). Heterosexuality also has privileges. Heterosexuals, for example, are free to post pictures of their significant others in their offices, or to hold hands or kiss in public, and they can ask for legal recognition of their relationship, options that gay men and lesbians exercise at their own peril, if at all (Herek, 2003).

**Group privilege** is an unearned favored state conferred simply because of one’s race, gender, social class, or sexual orientation (McIntosh, 1989). The concept of group privilege begins with the recognition that there is a corollary to discrimination or undeserved negative treatment based on one’s group membership. The corollary is that advantages are granted to people simply because they belong to a particular group. These advantages are typically invisible to the people who hold them, but they nonetheless have frequent and positive influences on everyday life. An important aspect of these advantages are that they are unearned; that is, they are based not on ability, effort, or past success but rather are granted based solely on being a member of the privileged group (A. Johnson, 2006; McIntosh, 1989).

The advantages associated with being a member of a privileged group may, at first glance, seem small and unimportant. However, these seemingly minor advantages accumulate and their overall impact can indeed be significant. Every time a Black professional flying first class is asked to show a boarding pass before being allowed to take her seat or every time a well-dressed Black man in a hotel is assumed to be a bell hop, there is an impact on the individual’s sense of self (see L. Williams, 2000). Alvin Poussaint, a noted Harvard psychiatrist, refers to the impact of privilege on the unprivileged as *death by a thousand nicks* (cited in L. Williams, 2000). For an example of group privilege in action, see Box 1.2.

As Allan Johnson (2006) notes, group privilege makes it easy for Whites to see racism as a problem that belongs to people of color, for heterosexuals to see anti-gay prejudice as a problem that belongs to lesbians and gay men, or for men



## Box 1.2 White Privilege = Black Loss

Law professor Patricia Williams (1997) tells this story of her experience while buying a house: Because the house was in a state other than the one where I was living at the time, I obtained my mortgage by telephone.... My loan was approved almost immediately.

A little while later, the contract came in the mail. Among the papers the bank forwarded were forms documenting compliance with the Fair Housing Act, which outlaws racial discrimination in the housing market.... The act tracks the race of all banking customers to prevent such discrimination.

I should repeat that to this point my entire mortgage transaction had been conducted by telephone. I should also note that I speak a Received Standard English, regionally marked as Northeastern perhaps, but not easily identifiable as black. With my credit

history, my job as a law professor, and, no doubt, with my accent, I am not only middle class but apparently match the cultural stereotype of a good White person. It is thus, perhaps, that the loan officer of the bank, whom I had never met, had checked off the box on the fair housing form indicating that I was White.

I took a deep breath, crossed out "white" and sent the contract back.... A done deal, I assumed. But suddenly the transaction came to a screeching halt. The bank wanted more money, more points, a higher rate of interest. Suddenly I found myself facing great resistance and much more debt. To make a long story short, I threatened to sue [under the Fair Housing Act], the bank quickly backed down and I procured the loan on the original terms. (p. 10)

From "Of Race and Risk" by Patricia Williams, *The Nation*, Dec. 29, 1997. Reprinted by permission.

to see sexism as a "woman's problem." In essence, the attitude develops that prejudice and discrimination are someone else's problem, so members of the privileged groups do not have to do anything about them. This perspective, although comforting to the privileged group, ignores a critical piece of the prejudice puzzle: Privilege for one group entails loss for other groups. It is impossible to be privileged without withholding the benefits you enjoy as a member of your group from members of other groups. Because group privileges are part of the culture, those who have them take them for granted and are usually unaware of their operation: The privileges are just part of "the way things are." Therefore, unless challenged, privileges perpetuate themselves. However, if prejudice is ever to be eradicated, this "luxury of obliviousness" (A. Johnson, 2006, p. 22) is something society cannot afford. As we consider stereotyping and prejudice throughout this book, keep in mind the two sides of the coin: the disadvantages of experiencing prejudice and discrimination and the advantages of unearned privilege.

## STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION

The next stop in our journey through the psychology of prejudice and discrimination brings us to a review of the terminology used by social scientists who study these topics. In his classic book, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Gordon Allport (1954) argued that an adequate definition of prejudice must include two essential elements: There must be an attitude of favor or disfavor and there must be an overgeneralized, erroneous belief. This definition captures how most people

think of prejudice. Contemporary psychologists take a more fine-grained approach, separating beliefs, or stereotypes, from the evaluation component of those beliefs and from the behavior toward members of the groups about which the beliefs are held. We define each of these three components: stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination.

### Stereotypes

In this more contemporary model, beliefs are labeled stereotypes, a term Walter Lippman (1922) borrowed from the printing lexicon because it represented a fixed or unchanging process that reproduced exactly the same image every time it was applied (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). Writing at the beginning of the last century, Lippman (1922) described stereotypes as “pictures in our heads,” noting that “what each [person] does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by [him or her] self and given to him [or her]” (p. 16). This conceptualization is consistent with how modern social scientists think about stereotypic beliefs. There is no one, universal truth about the social world on which people can all rely. Instead, people’s experiences and perspectives color the landscape of their beliefs, for better or worse, and it is this portrait that people use to navigate their social world.

For our purposes, **stereotypes** are as beliefs and opinions about the characteristics, attributes, and behaviors of members of various groups (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). There are several key aspects of stereotypes. First, although stereotypes may be pictures in each individual’s head, they also come from shared beliefs that are an integral part of culture (see, for example, Jones, 1997). Stereotypes may be refined by each individual, but there is typically group consensus about the content of those beliefs. People learn stereotypes from the media, peers, parents, and even sources such as classic and modern literature. And, of course, people gather information about groups simply by observing the world around them. Researchers often assess these observations by asking people to estimate the likelihood or probability that an individual member of a group has a certain characteristic, but they may also allow people to freely list the characteristics they associate with a group or might ask respondents to choose which of a set of adjectives they believe apply to a group.

A second key question researchers consider is whether stereotypes are accurate or inaccurate. Departing from Allport’s (1954) view, most researchers no longer assume that all stereotypes are completely erroneous (see Schneider, 2004), but allow that, because stereotypes are based to some extent on observations made about the social world, they may contain a *kernel of truth*. However, in many cases, this bit of accuracy becomes exaggerated and often is applied with a broad brush to all group members. Even seemingly straightforward beliefs—for example, that men are taller than women—can lead to problems when applied at the individual level: some women are taller than most men. Thus, a stereotype might be accurate for a group taken as whole, but inaccurate for at least some members of that group. Moreover, examples of completely inaccurate stereotypes abound. Think back to many of the beliefs once held about women’s abilities, such as the notion that women should play half-court basketball because they were not physically able to do otherwise or that educating women would divert too much blood to their brain

### Box 1.3 Blacks Can Swim

A widely held stereotype, even among Blacks, is that Blacks cannot swim. At first glance, even research data suggest this stereotype is accurate. Blacks are more likely to report limited swimming ability than are members of other ethnic groups (Gilchrist, Sacks, & Branche, 1994) and the drowning rate for Black children is 2.6 times that of Whites (Aquatics International, 2005). Statistics such as these have led to stereotypic beliefs such as Blacks lack buoyancy or that their bone structure prohibits them from swimming. Although these beliefs have been discredited, they still discourage many young Blacks from learning to swim. However, Blacks *can and do* learn to swim. Both the ethnic group differences in drowning rates and Blacks' self-reported limited swimming ability simply reflect acceptance of an inaccurate belief.

A number of programs are in place to change this perception. One successful program was started by

Jim Ellis, a Philadelphia school teacher who, in 1971, trained 35 Black students to be competitive swimmers (Douglas, 2007). Many of his protégés have earned college scholarships and have competed in Olympic tryouts. His success story is the subject of the movie *Pride* (2007). At the local level, swimming programs, such as those sponsored by the American Red Cross, are successfully teaching Black children to swim (Aquatics International, 2005). It is hoped that nationally prominent Black swimmers, such as Cullen Jones, the first Black swimmer to break a world record, and Maritza Correla, the first Black woman to make the U.S. Olympic team, will encourage other Blacks to learn to swim (Douglas, 2007). Until that time, the consequence of an inaccurate belief is that too few Blacks are learning water skills. At best, they are losing out on the opportunity to participate in a healthy activity; at worst, they are losing their lives because of this erroneous perception.

and thus reduce their reproductive capacities (Bem, 2004). To cite a more recent example, the majority of United States residents believe most immigrants are in this country illegally, although researchers estimate only 30 percent actually are (Hamilton College, 2003). Another common belief is that the majority of the poor in the United States are Black residents of inner cities; statistics indicate that this groups represents only about 25 percent of poor people (Iceland, 2003). See Box 1.3 for one example of the negative effects of inaccurate stereotypes.

A third key aspect of stereotypes is that they can be both descriptive and prescriptive (Prentice and Carranza, 2002). That is, stereotypes can describe the characteristics group members are believed to have, but they can also tell us what people believe group members should be like and should do. As stereotypes take on more prescriptive elements, they put more limits on members of the stereotyped group. For example, it is true that most elementary school teachers are female (a descriptive stereotype), but is there a reason that this must be true? If not, should girls and women be encouraged to pursue this occupation while boys and men are discouraged from doing so (a prescriptive stereotype), thereby limiting the career choices of both women and men?

Finally, although psychologists often focus on negative stereotypes, beliefs about social group members can also be positive. Asian Americans are generally considered high achievers and highly motivated (Oyserman & Sakamoto, 1997) and men are believed to be good at problem solving and reasoning (Cejka & Eagly, 1999). Moreover, stereotypic beliefs sometimes favor a particular group, even if, at the same time, they disadvantage another. For example, the belief that women are “better with children” makes it easier for women to get jobs as preschool teachers while at the same time making it

more difficult for men. The perception that men are better at reasoning than women can similarly lead to job discrimination. Even positive stereotypes can have a downside.

As we will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, since the publication of Allport's (1954) classic work, psychologists have concluded that stereotypic processing stems from people's need to efficiently deal with a complex social world. Our ability to do so has a profound influence on what we notice, how we organize information, and what we remember (Hamilton, 1979). Unfortunately, as we will discuss throughout this book, many harmful consequences stem from relying on stereotypic judgments, even if that reliance makes it easier to navigate the social world. As explained in Chapter 4, people face a tension between the need to process information quickly and the desire to treat each other fairly which is not easily reconciled. Furthermore, as we discuss next, our stereotypic beliefs have strong affective components that influence how this tension is resolved.

### Prejudice

From a social science perspective, the affect or emotion a person feels when thinking about or interacting with members of other groups is a separate component from stereotypes, labeled prejudice. **Prejudice** is an attitude directed toward people because they are members of a specific social group (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Attitudes are considered to be evaluations of an entire social group or of individuals because they are members of that group; for example, people may see the group of older adults as positive or negative or an individual older adult as good or bad. In both cases, the evaluations stem from reactions to the general social category. As we saw with stereotypic beliefs, people can hold both negative and positive attitudes toward a social group. However, perhaps because positive associations create relatively fewer problems, the dark side of prejudice is what has captured the imagination of social scientists and lay people alike. For this reason, this textbook focuses primarily on negative attitudes toward social groups. We will, however, also consider positive attitudes about social groups when appropriate. Research on positive attitudes, for example, has focused on bias in favor of one's own group, a topic we discuss in Chapters 3 and 9.

Research suggests that evaluations of social group members are more strongly related to how a person treats those group members than are the beliefs, or stereotypes, he or she holds about them (see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007, for a review). It is important to note that these evaluations may stem from a purely emotional or gut reaction to a social group as a whole or to an individual member of that group (Cuddy et al., 2007; Mackie & Smith, 2002). As we will see in Chapters 4 and 5, these gut reactions are often automatic. Indeed, a person may make an emotional decision to like or dislike someone with very little conscious consideration. These emotional reactions also can be positive or negative or a mixture of both (see, for example, Glick & Fiske, 1996; Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995). When emotional reactions are mixed, people can have an ambivalent emotional response or their response can be determined by whether the positive or negative feelings are more salient.

Emotional reactions to social groups can originate from several sources. When people perceive that another social group threatens their own group, for example, they may experience fear, anxiety, or hostility (see Cuddy et al., 2007, for a review). Other groups can be threatening if they are perceived to interfere with the goals of one's own group, particularly if those threats take the form of direct competition for resources such as jobs or financial gains. However, other groups also can be seen as threatening simply by having different goals from one's own social group (Smith, 1993). Emotional reactions also can stem from close personal contact with members of other social groups. Some people may feel disgust, for example, when they interact with members of a stigmatized group such as foreigners, persons with disabilities, or gays and lesbians (Fiske, 1998). Finally, as we will discuss in Chapter 7, some individuals are chronically intolerant of other social groups. Right-wing authoritarians, for example, tend to be prejudiced against a variety of social groups, especially those condemned by authority figures or those perceived to violate traditional values (Altemeyer, 1996). For these individuals, negative emotional reactions stem from their personality traits rather than situational factors.

Even people who consider themselves to be unprejudiced can harbor negative attitudes toward social groups without being aware of it. Although these feelings are generally more along the lines of discomfort, anxiety, and unease rather than hostility or hate, they nevertheless affect people's behavior (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). People who feel this way do not want to be prejudiced, hold egalitarian values, and feel ashamed when they become aware of their prejudices. They have nonetheless absorbed a degree of prejudice from the often nonegalitarian culture in which they have grown up and lived (see, for example, Parrillo, 2006). Finally, people's affective reactions may depend on the contexts in which they deal with members of stereotyped groups (Deaux & Major, 1987; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). For example, a person may be more accepting of women's assertiveness in a domestic role than in a business setting. We discuss the importance of context in Chapters 4 and 10.

## Discrimination

The third factor in the trilogy of concepts is **discrimination**, which consists of treating people differently from others based primarily on membership in a social group (Sue, 2003). As with stereotypes and prejudice, although people tend to think of discrimination in negative terms, it also can result in someone's being treated more positively than he or she otherwise would be based on group membership. Many colleges and universities give a preference in admission to children of alumni, for example. As you might expect, however, the vast majority of the research on discrimination has focused on its negative aspects. When individuals are singled out and treated unfairly because of race, gender, age, sexual orientation, disability status, or any other factor, discrimination has occurred and, as a result, individuals lose opportunities and options.

Discrimination can manifest itself in many ways, both verbally and behaviorally, and in many settings. For example, David Mellor (2003) interviewed members of the Koori people, a group of urbanized Australian Aborigines, about their

experiences with discrimination. Common experiences included being spoken to in demeaning terms, such as “nigger” and “coon,” and hearing both direct and indirect derogatory comments about their people. One woman recounted that, while reporting her rape to police, “I reported it to the coppers, and um, and I had one female copper stare at me in the face, and she told me that I loved it, and that being Black, and I quote, ‘being Black, I asked for it.’” (p. 477). Comments also took the form of jokes, intentionally hurtful remarks, intimidating comments, and direct threats. Respondents experienced behaviors ranging from being ignored and refused service in shops and hotels to physical assaults by police. Discrimination can take many forms and occurs at different social levels, from the individual to the cultural. The boundaries between forms and between levels are not always clear-cut, as these distinctions represent areas along a continuum rather than hard-and-fast categories: As a result, they overlap to some degree.

**Interpersonal Discrimination.** When one person treats another unfairly because of the person’s group membership, **interpersonal discrimination** has occurred (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). This unfair treatment occurs at the individual, or person-to-person level, and may result from stereotypic beliefs, evaluations of a group, or a combination of both that results in differential treatment of that person. For example, some people might hold the stereotypic belief that all Irish are alcoholics and feel disgust toward Irish people on that account and so try to prevent Irish people from joining organizations to which they belong. Thus, individual level prejudice leads people to behave in ways that imply that their own group is superior to other groups and that this distinction between groups should be maintained. The resulting behaviors can be passive, such as when White commuters avoid sitting next to Black riders on public transportation (Jacobs, 1999) or when restaurant personnel ignore Black patrons to give priority to White patrons. Interpersonal discrimination can also be active, ranging in intensity from hostile stares (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003) through demeaning remarks and commands (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001; Swim et al., 2003) to men touching women inappropriately (Swim et al., 2001) to hate crimes, including murder (Levin & McDevitt, 2002).

Much of the research and theory we describe in this book concerns individual level prejudice and discrimination, such as how individuals process information about others, the content of their stereotypes, and individual differences in the tendency to respond in a discriminatory fashion. This perspective assumes that individuals have control over their beliefs and behaviors and that individuals independently choose or do not choose to discriminate.

**Organizational Discrimination.** When “the practices, rules, and policies of formal organizations, such as corporations or government agencies” have discriminatory outcomes, **organizational discrimination** is in evidence (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 44). Although organizational discrimination can be manifested in many ways, one area that typically comes to mind is the racial/ethnic and gender discrimination that still exist in the workplace. More than 40 years have passed since enactment of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, yet discriminatory practices are still in evidence. For example, Figure 1.1 shows the ratio of White and minority men and




**FIGURE 1.1** Representation of Members of Racial/Ethnic and Gender Groups in Selected Occupational Categories in 2005

This figure shows the ratio of the number of members of each social group employed in a job category to their number in the U.S. workforce. If members of a group were equitably represented in a category, the ratio for that category would be one. Thus, White men are overrepresented in the managerial category, women are overrepresented in clerical jobs and underrepresented in the skilled trades (such as carpenters, electricians, and so forth), minority men are overrepresented in the operators/laborers category (such as drivers, warehouse workers, and so forth), and both minority men and women are overrepresented in service jobs.

SOURCE: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2005.

women employed in selected job categories to their representation in the workforce in 2005 (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], 2005). If members of various groups were equitably represented in different job categories, the ratio would be 1.0; ratios greater than 1.0 indicate overrepresentation—more members of the group hold that type of job than would be expected based on their numbers in the workforce—and ratios less than 1.0 indicate underrepresentation. In the United States, White men make up 36 percent of the private industry workforce but hold 55 percent of managerial jobs, resulting in a ratio of 1.5; that is, White men are 50 percent more likely to be managers than one would expect from their number in the workforce. In contrast, minority women make up 15 percent of the private industry workforce but hold only 7 percent of managerial jobs, resulting in a ratio of 0.4; that is, minority women




**FIGURE 1.2** Median Income for College Graduate Full-Time Workers Age 25 to 34 in 2002 by Race/Ethnicity and Gender

Except for African Americans, men earned more than women and with the exception of Asian men, Whites earned more than minority group members despite all having a college degree.

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003.

are 60 percent less likely to be managers than one would expect from their number in the workforce. The EEOC data shown in Figure 1.1 indicate that White men are overrepresented as managers whereas White women and members of minority groups are underrepresented; women are overrepresented in clerical jobs whereas men are underrepresented, but the reverse is true for skilled trades (jobs such as carpenter and electrician); minority men are overrepresented as operators and laborers (jobs such as truck driver and assembly worker); and members of minority groups are overrepresented in service occupations whereas White men are underrepresented. In sum, White men still tend to be overrepresented in the more prestigious, higher paying occupations.

One might argue that the employment data are misleading because they include older female and minority workers who were never given the opportunity to get the kind of education and develop the skills that are required for higher paying jobs. However, consider Figure 1.2, which shows median salaries for college graduates of various racial/ethnic and gender groups aged 25 to 34 years and employed full time during 2002 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002). Members of this cohort all have the same level of education, are all at equivalent stages of their careers, and all entered the workforce well after equal employment opportunity legislation took effect. As you can see, except for African Americans, men were paid more than women and White men were paid better than any group except Asian men. The disparity is even greater for people with a high school education but no college: Men of all racial/ethnic groups were paid more than women of any group and White and Asian men were the highest paid.

**Institutional Discrimination.** When norms, policies, and practices associated with a social institution such as the family, religious institutions, the educational system, and the criminal justice system, result in different outcomes for members of



### Box 1.4 Institutional Discrimination and Hurricane Katrina

On August 29, 2005, the storm surge following Hurricane Katrina produced breaches in the levees in New Orleans, Louisiana, that led to catastrophic flooding covering most of the city. Despite attempts to evacuate the city, approximately 20 percent of its residents remained. Approximately 26,000 of these people eventually arrived at the New Orleans Superdome; many others remained in their homes awaiting rescue (Olasky, 2006). By all accounts, relief efforts were a colossal failure and the events up to and following this disaster will undoubtedly remain a dark chapter in U.S. History (van Heerden & Bryan, 2006).

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, charges of individual racism were common and such accusations continue today. On national television, for example, Kanye West, a well-known rap artist, accused President George Bush of racism (de Noraes, 2005), and Spike Lee's (Pollard & Lee, 2006) well-received documentary, *When the Levees Broke*, includes numerous examples of individual racism and classism in the aftermath of the storm. In an interview on Marketplace Morning (Moon, 2005), for example, Barbara Bush said of the evacuees in the Houston Astrodome, "What I'm hearing, which is sort of scary, is they all want to stay in Texas. Everyone is so overwhelmed by the hospitality. And so many of the people in the arena here, you know, were underprivileged anyway, so this is working very well for them."

As Kristin Henken and her colleagues note (Henkel, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2006), however, it is critical to examine charges of individual racism in the larger context of institutional discrimination, which can operate without intentional racism on the part of an individual. Without question, Black residents of New Orleans were disproportionately affected by Hurricane Katrina, both in numbers of people who were unable to evacuate and in the numbers of people who were displaced by the hurricane (van Heerden & Bryan, 2006). Institutional policies, in place well before the flood occurred, undoubtedly contributed to this. To understand these policies, it is important to first understand that race and poverty are inextricably linked in New Orleans. Simply put, Black people in New Orleans are disproportionately

likely to be poor compared to White citizens. And the poorer areas of the city, with large concentrations of Black residents, were the areas hardest hit by the flood waters when the levees broke. This fact was immediately apparent in the media coverage as the majority of the faces seen in news footage were of Blacks (Sommers, Apfelbaum, Dukes, Toosi, & Wang, 2006).

As Henken and her colleagues (2006) explain, the reason for this imbalance harkens back to legacies of slavery and discrimination in the United States, a legacy continued by current governmental policies. For example, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has long employed a system whereby fewer federally supported loans are available in neighborhoods with a high proportion of working class Blacks than in neighborhoods labeled "White, stable, and in demand." As was the case in the city of New Orleans this institutional policy makes it more difficult for working class Blacks to improve their housing situation compared to their White counterparts.

Income disparities also influenced which residents were able to respond to the evacuation orders prior to the hurricane; poorer people were less likely to have access to cars or money to pay for hotels or public transportation. The federal government was woefully unprepared for this circumstance and institutional logjams in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) led to extremely slow response in providing basic food and shelter in either the short or long term (van Heerden & Bryan, 2006). No large-scale deliveries of supplies arrived at the New Orleans Convention Center until four days after the levees broke. Although it is unlikely that these failures were the result of direct racism on the part of the decision makers, the institutional decisions that led to this outcome disproportionately affected Blacks and the poor. Many in New Orleans still await adequate housing or reparations for their situation. The events leading up to and following Hurricane Katrina demonstrate how institutional discrimination can disproportionately affect a particular group—in this case, Black residents of New Orleans—even in the absence of a conscious racism toward those individuals.

different groups, **institutional discrimination** has occurred (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Institutional discrimination often results from decisions that are neutral in regard to race, gender, and sexual orientation, but end up having a disparate impact on members of a group. Box 1.4 explains the impact of institutional discrimination on a recent national disaster, Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.

This type of discrimination can occur in subtle ways that are often below the radar in societal consciousness. Institutional discrimination also can be the result of overt practices that give one group an advantage over others by limiting their choices, rights, mobility, or access to information, resources, or other people (Jones, 1997). In both cases, the actions that lead to discrimination have been sanctioned by institutions or governing bodies. One of the most striking examples from U.S. history concerns the “separate but equal” school segregation system that was common before the U.S. Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) ruling. Although Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the majority, stated that segregated schools deprived students of equal protection under the law, this decision was not universally accepted. In his inaugural address (January 14, 1963), for example, then governor of Alabama George Wallace stated, “I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.” It was only through government intervention that these schools eventually integrated. The vestiges of this debate remain today; in December 2002, Senator Trent Lott resigned under pressure from his position as Senate Majority Leader after appearing to praise Senator Strom Thurmond’s 1948 segregationist presidential bid during a speech celebrating Senator Thurmond’s 100th birthday (Waller, 2002).

Our nation continues to grapple with issues of school desegregation and Supreme Court decisions will undoubtedly continue to have an impact. A recent ruling put limits on how far K–12 schools can go to ensure racial balance (*Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, et al.*, 2007). Although the decisions leave open the possibility that race can be used as a deciding factor in some circumstances, the justices ruled that school districts cannot classify students by race for the purpose of school assignments (Godoy, 2007). It is too soon to know whether these decisions will result in a return to de facto school segregation, as some fear. What is clear is that when legal decisions are linked to race, ethnicity, and gender, their impact will be hotly debated and closely followed.

**Cultural Discrimination.** Within a culture, one group may retain the power to define cultural values as well as the form those values should take (Jones, 1997). The powerful group establishes and maintains its dominance by rewarding those values that correspond to its views and punishing those values that do not. The result is that minority groups and their cultural heritage are marginalized. The resulting **cultural discrimination** consists of “discrimination and inequality ... built into our literature, art, music, language, morals, customs, beliefs, and ideology ... [to such a degree that they] define a generally agreed-upon way of life” (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 49). A vivid example of cultural discrimination comes from the nooses left in workplaces, apparently in response to the Jena 6 case discussed in the opening pages of this chapter. At this writing, nearly two dozen nooses had been left in a variety of locations, ranging from a Home Depot store to two Coast Guard facilities, to a police locker room (Nizza, 2007). As Philip Dray, a writer on Black history notes, “the nooses are an unmistakable act of hostility toward blacks, given the country’s history of 4,000 lynchings of black men in the 19th and 20th centuries” (quoted in Bello, 2007, p. 2). Authorities are treating

many of these events as hate crimes, motivated by racial prejudice, a topic covered in Chapter 9.

Cultural discrimination also occurs in more subtle ways, such as with the use of sex stereotypes present in advertising (Kilbourne, 2000) and the skin color of Barbie and GI Joe dolls. Many advertisements and doll features continue to represent a European standard of beauty and the assumption is that the more European one's physical features are, the more beautiful one is considered to be. Whites are not the only group to adhere to this standard. Mark Hill (2002) analyzed data from a national survey of Black Americans. At data collection, the interviewers rated both the skin color and physical attractiveness of the people they interviewed. Hill found that lighter skin was associated with higher attractiveness ratings of both male and female interviewees, although the relationship was stronger for women. Lighter skin color was also associated with higher self-ratings of attractiveness. These differences in perceived attractiveness can have real life consequences. Blacks convicted of murdering a White victim were more likely to receive the death penalty if their physical features were stereotypically Black (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006).

Government policy may formally endorse cultural discrimination. The practice on the part of the Boy Scouts to dismiss gay scout leaders, for example, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court (*Boy Scouts of America and Monmouth Council v. James Dale*, 2000). To cite another example, at the beginning of the twentieth century the Australian government became concerned with the increasing numbers of so-called half-castes or part-Aboriginal children in that country (Pilkington, 2002). Because officials believed the part-Aboriginal children were more intelligent than full-blood Aborigines, separate institutions were established so that the part-blood children could be brought up without contact with Aboriginal culture. The Department of Native Affairs assigned patrol officers to remove these children from their homes and take them to one of these settlements, which were located as much as 1,000 miles from their families. The goal was to ease these children into White culture and to encourage their eventual intermarriage with Whites so that their Aboriginal ancestry was, in effect, bred out of them. These policies remained in place until the 1970s. As these examples illustrate, the message is that the characteristics and contributions of the dominant group are valued, but those of the minority group are not.

Both institutional and cultural discrimination are difficult to recognize and sometimes their existence is difficult to accept, especially by those not directly affected by it. To see these forms of discrimination, individuals must sometimes let go of cherished beliefs or deeply held ideas. Some Christians, for example, might have difficulty understanding why groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have gone to court to prevent the posting of the Ten Commandments in government buildings. From the Christian perspective, there seems little to quibble about; after all, are the commandments not rules by which anyone would want to live? Legally, however, posting only the beliefs of one religion violates the separation of church and state mandated by the U.S. Constitution. Publicly displaying the beliefs of the dominant group is not psychologically harmless either; the underlying message is that everyone should hold those beliefs and those who do not are unworthy of consideration by governmental authorities.

## THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG STEREOTYPING, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION

The relationships among stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination can be complex. Having knowledge of stereotypic beliefs, for example, does not necessarily mean an individual is prejudiced. In a highly influential demonstration of this phenomenon, Patricia Devine (1989) had college students list the characteristics that make up the stereotype of African Americans. She found that high- and low-prejudiced individuals were equally knowledgeable of the content of the stereotype; the difference was that the low-prejudiced people rejected the stereotype but the high-prejudiced people accepted it. As we noted earlier, these stereotypes are part of a societal belief system and are learned from many sources, including parents, peers, and the media. It should not surprise you that people have knowledge of these stereotypes, even if they themselves do not accept them.

More troubling, perhaps, is that people can access stereotypic beliefs without awareness and, therefore, such beliefs influence the behavior even of people low in prejudice. To understand this phenomenon, consider the distinction social scientists make between *implicit prejudices*, reactions toward groups or individuals that are outside conscious awareness, and *explicit prejudices*, attitudes that people are aware of and can easily control (Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In Devine's (1989) studies, when stereotypic beliefs were activated at an unconscious level, research participants were unable to control the influence of these stereotypes on their evaluations. Yet, when given the opportunity, low-prejudiced research participants tried and were able to override the influence of their stereotypic beliefs and make unprejudiced responses. That is, people who believe that prejudice is wrong and try to control and eliminate their prejudices can successfully minimize the effects of stereotypes on their behavior.

As we discuss in detail in later chapters, it is not easy to predict when stereotypes lead to prejudice or discrimination or who is most likely to treat people differently based on their group membership. Yet these questions are what ultimately interests those involved in social justice, and the answer to this question is the key to reducing prejudice and discrimination.

### Targets of Prejudice

Up to this point, we have been looking at the “big picture” of how people perceive members of other groups and of how social scientists have studied those perceptions. Many of the major theories of prejudice and discrimination, and the research that has tested them, take a broad perspective, assuming, to paraphrase Gertrude Stein, that a prejudice is a prejudice is a prejudice. As we will see throughout this text there are, in fact, sets of general processes that describe how people think and react to others. For example, how people categorize race-related information does not differ significantly from how they categorize gender-related information—or information about cars, for that matter. However, prejudice and discrimination also differ in important

ways across social groups and a great deal of research has been devoted to understanding reactions to specific targets of prejudice.

One frequently hears words ending in “ism”—such as racism, sexism, and so forth—used to describe specific targets of prejudice. Are prejudices and isms (for want of a better word) the same thing? Probably not, for as Oliver Cox (1948) noted many years ago, “If beliefs, per se, could subjugate a people, the beliefs which Negroes hold about whites should be as effective as those that whites hold about Negroes” (p. 531). As we have already discussed in this chapter, it is the beliefs of the dominant groups that hold sway. What, then, are isms?

Although isms are based in prejudices, they go beyond them to encompass a belief system or ideology based on group superiority and domination and sets of behaviors reflecting that belief system. Isms have a number of defining characteristics. First, they combine prejudice with a group-centered worldview that emphasizes the “natural” superiority of one’s own group over others (Jones, 1997; Operario & Fiske, 1998). Second, isms are based on a desire to control and dominate other groups. This desire is reflected in laws, social customs, and an attempt to “scientifically” prove that the group’s beliefs are valid. We will discuss this scientific racism in a later section of this chapter. Finally, isms are typically reflected in behavior. As we explained in the section on discrimination, this behavior can be extreme, as in the case of hate crimes, but it can also be reflected in everyday behaviors that unthinkingly demean members of minority groups and their cultures. Consider, for example, any “joke” beginning “How many Polish people does it take to...?” Other unthinking, demeaning behaviors include ignoring members of a minority group to focus on members of the majority group, staring at members of minority groups in places where they “don’t belong,” and avoiding contact with members of a minority group (Mellor, 2003).

## **Racism**

When most North Americans hear the word prejudice their thoughts almost immediately turn to racial and ethnic prejudice or racism. Such a response is not surprising given the United States’ history of stigmatizing racial, ethnic, and immigrant groups (see, for example, Takaki, 1993). This history began with the institution of race-based slavery that Europeans inflicted on Africans. Although Native Americans, Hispanics, and Asians were held in either legal or de facto slavery at various times in U.S. history (Takaki, 1993), this condition lasted longest, and was most severe, for people of African descent. The institution of slavery, and the justifications for it, portrayed Africans as less than human and established a caste system that put African Americans, including free people, at the bottom of the social ladder, a position that continued after the abolition of slavery. This caste system led to what Gunnar Myrdal (1944) called the “American dilemma”: the contradiction of a society that professed equality as a basic value while denying equality to a substantial portion of its population. This contradiction led to a series of Black civil

rights movements from the 1870s to the 1960s that kept society's attention on anti-Black prejudice and discrimination. Mirroring the history of racial prejudice in the United States, until recently, most of the social science research on prejudice and discrimination has focused on anti-Black prejudice and discrimination; because of this, much of the theory and research we discuss in this book focuses on racism.

A second factor leading researchers to focus on anti-Black prejudice is that such prejudice is more pervasive than prejudice against most other groups (Jones, 1997), making it both a larger social problem and of more interest to psychologists who want to understand the roots of prejudice. In addition, Whites' anti-Black attitudes are linked more closely to their attitudes toward race-related social policies such as affirmative action than are their attitudes toward other groups. A third factor focusing attention on anti-Black prejudice was the way it changed from the blatant racism that characterized most of U.S. history to a more subtle form by the 1980s (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). This change led researchers and theorists to rethink the nature of prejudice and to examine similar changes in prejudice toward other groups, a topic we address in Chapter 6.

Interestingly, the attitudes and behaviors of minority group members toward Whites, and the effects of those attitudes and behaviors on intergroup relations, have been virtually ignored (Shelton, 2000). Indeed, most Whites might be surprised to learn that minority groups have prejudicial beliefs about them. Some stereotypic beliefs that Blacks hold about Whites include that Whites do not hug or kiss their children, are packrats, and that wet White hair smells like wet dog (L. Williams, 2000). Blacks also are puzzled by some Whites' desire to "look Black" by wearing dreadlocks or by excessive tanning (Bowman, personal communication, April 8, 2003). Although the stereotypic beliefs of the minority toward the majority are no more justifiable or accurate than the reverse, the fact remains that they deserve the same empirical attention as their more often studied counterparts.

Racism in the United States has had remarkable staying power. Although hate crimes spring to mind as examples of racist behavior, racism, like other discriminatory behavior, is also found in everyday behaviors. One behavioral characteristic of racism is the automatic and unthinking rejection and denigration of other groups' cultures, such as their beliefs, customs, language and arts. Why, for example, is rap music, which is closely identified with Black culture in the United States, so often condemned? Is it because, as many of its detractors point out, of its violent and sexist lyrics, or is it because it is an expression of Black culture? Carrie Fried (1996) had White adults read a set of violent lyrics from a 1960s folk song, telling some people that the lyrics were from a rap song, others that the lyrics were from a country and western song, and a third group that the lyrics were from a folk song. The song received the most negative ratings when it was labeled a rap song. Fried also found that the song got more negative ratings when people thought it was performed by a Black singer than when they thought it was performed by a White singer. Thus, it was the "race" of the lyrics, rather than their content, that drove people's reactions to them. Racist behavior can also be carried out under governmental authority, as illustrated by the "crime" of "Driving While Black," discussed in Box 1.5.

### **Box 1.5 DWB: Driving While Black**

In the movie *Men in Black II* (2002), a car driven by an “autopilot” stops to pick up Agents J and K. Agent K, back from a long hiatus, is impressed with the new technology. Agent J responds that the autopilot used to be Black, but he kept getting pulled over. The concept of *driving while black* (DWB) is not an uncommon reference in the comedy world and was the subject of a compelling advertising campaign, sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union, that appeared in several national periodicals. Is it really possible that Blacks are more likely to be stopped in their automobiles simply because of their race?

Evidence strongly suggests this is the case. John Lamberth (1998) conducted a census of traffic and traffic violations by race on Interstate 95 in New Jersey, finding that although African American drivers made up 13.5 percent of the drivers on this turnpike (and 15 percent of the speeders), they represented 35 percent of those pulled over. A Black driver, then, was nearly five times more likely to be stopped for a traffic violation than members of other races. Statistics from Illinois suggest that Driving While Hispanic also raises suspicions. Hispanics comprise approximately 30 percent of the motorists stopped by the Illinois State Police, yet they take fewer than 3 percent of the personal vehicle trips in that state (Harris, 1999). Similarly, in Maryland, Black drivers comprise about 17 percent of motorists, but about 70 percent of those stopped and searched on Interstate 95 (Cockburn & St. Clair, 1998).

Researchers found a similar pattern in the behavioral profile that Oregon police officers use to identify potential drug couriers (Rothbart & Mauro, 1996).

Of the motorists stopped because they fit the profile, 48 percent were Hispanic, whereas only 27 percent were non-Hispanic Whites. However, searches found drugs in only 20 percent of the cases in which Hispanic motorists were stopped compared to 30 percent of the cases in which non-Hispanic White motorists were stopped. Why were Hispanic drivers more likely to be stopped even though they were less likely to be transporting drugs? Even though the profile was designed to be race neutral, two aspects of the profile—traveling to or from a source area for illicit drugs (such as Los Angeles or Mexico) and being extremely nervous when contacted by the police—also are common behaviors for Hispanics. This led some police officers to treat “Hispanic” as if it were an additional profile item. The result of this erroneous decision was many hours of fruitless searches.

Why are minorities more likely to be pulled over than Whites? All roads lead to the stereotypic belief that minorities are simply more likely to commit crimes. Heather MacDonald, a writer for the Manhattan Institute’s *City Journal* (quoted in Schenker & Brennerr, 2002), for example, thinks targeting Blacks for crimes makes sense because she believes Blacks are more likely to commit certain crimes. As she put it, “It’s not a question of belief, it’s a fact.” The results of recent court rulings dispute this claim, or at least condemn the behaviors that follow such stereotypic beliefs. In January 2003, the State of New Jersey settled lawsuits brought by the American Civil Liberties Union (2003) by agreeing to pay more than \$775,000 to motorists who were stopped because of their ethnicity.

## **Religion**

Prejudice based on religion has existed for centuries, but has been studied less than racial prejudice in the United States, perhaps because it has been less salient. The early Protestant immigrants to America were not tolerant of other religions: Both anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic (Jewish) prejudice were common until the 1950s (Takaki, 1993) and can still be seen in the rants of hate group leaders (see, for example, Ezekiel, 1995). The Holocaust, in which German Nazis killed some 6 million Jews, made anti-Semitism salient following World War II, leading Gordon Allport (1954) to make it a major theme in his book *The Nature of Prejudice*.

Since then, research and theory have focused on race and ethnicity, but the rise of anti-Muslim prejudice, described earlier in this chapter, and the increasing influence of religious fundamentalism on all forms of politics (see, for example, Armstrong, 2000) has led to an increasing interest in religious prejudice. Mitt

Romney, a Mormon, was also a prominent Republican candidate in the 2008 U.S. Presidential primaries. His success brought a focus on what, according to public opinion polls, are somewhat prejudicial public attitudes toward Mormons. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2007), for example, found that 76 percent of U.S. respondents had favorable views toward Jews and Catholics, whereas only 53 percent had favorable attitudes toward Mormons. The most common negative word associated with the Mormon religion was “polygamy” or some other reference to plural marriage, followed by “cult.” However, respondents were equally likely to associate positive terms, such as “family values” with that religion. Similar stereotypic beliefs about Mormons—both positive and negative—were evident in media coverage of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, held in Salt Lake City, Utah, a city with a high percentage of Mormons (Chen, 2003). The influence of religious-based prejudice, prominent in much world history, continues to influence discourse in modern media, highlighting the importance of religious-based prejudices.

### Classism

The United States is generally perceived as a wealthy nation, but the reality is that our nation has a poverty rate of 12 percent (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 2007). Wealth is a strong indicator of an individual’s **social class**, defined as a person’s place in the social hierarchy. Other indicators of social class are degree of power and membership in particular racial, religious, or status groups (Parrillo, 2006). **Classism** is prejudice due to a person’s social class. In general, people hold negative attitudes toward the poor and positive attitudes toward the more affluent. As previously noted (see Box 1.4), ethnic minorities are generally overrepresented in lower social classes and race-based prejudice may be linked to negative perceptions of lower social standing. As Bernice Lott and Heather Bullock (2001) note, it is common for negative stereotypes about the poor to be openly expressed, even on the floor of Congress and other public places. Moreover, the poor are often unjustly blamed for their situation; people are more likely to believe poverty is due to personal factors causes, such as laziness and low intelligence, than to societal causes, such as low wages (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). People draw similar conclusions about the causes of poverty among women and men. However, people hold more positive attitudes toward poor women and view them less stereotypically than they do poor men (Cozzarelli, Tagler, & Wilkinson, 2002).

Classism can emerge in unexpected situations—such as in the supermarket. Richard Topolski, Kimberly Boyd-Bowman, and Heather Ferguson (2003) purchased fruit from stores in one of three neighborhoods in a large city: low socioeconomic status (SES), middle class, and upper class. Raters, who were unaware of where the fruit had been purchased, evaluated it for taste and appearance. They reported that the fruit from low-SES neighborhoods appeared and tasted less fresh than fruit from higher-SES neighborhoods, with ratings for fruit from the middle class neighborhoods falling between those for fruit purchased in the other two areas. In addition, raters were significantly more likely to refuse to even taste the fruit from stores located in lower SES neighborhoods. These results again provide evidence of the strong relationship between social class and



race: Census data showed that the low SES neighborhoods included in the study had a higher percentage of minority residents than did the middle class or high SES neighborhoods.

The implications of these findings go beyond just how well or poorly food tastes. As Topolski and his colleagues (2003) note, “all available evidence indicates that individuals in lower SES neighborhoods receive fewer options and lower quality of perishable groceries. In the absence of ... quality perishable goods, such individuals may resort to purchasing nutritionally inferior grocery items such as processed or junk foods.... As a result, they will have reduced intake of vitamins and minerals considered essential for maximally healthy development” (p. 117).

### Gender and Sexual Orientation

Prejudice against women has pervaded Western culture since its origins, restricting women's roles in and influence on society (see, for example, Shields & Eysell, 2001). Gender-based prejudice has both benevolent and hostile components (Glick & Fiske, 1996). The benevolent aspects, including much of the female stereotype, are ostensibly positive, but portray women as weak, vulnerable, and needing protection. Such benevolent beliefs are used as a justification for limiting the social roles permitted to women. Hostile sexist beliefs are derogatory, such as the belief that women demand special privileges and want to control men. Hostile sexist beliefs often have a sexual content that serves as a justification for the sexual exploitation of women. Such beliefs emerge, for example, in sexual harassment, a form of discrimination directed primarily, although not exclusively, toward women.

The term *heterosexism* describes an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community (Herek, 2007). Notice that this term reflects a bias in favor of a group—heterosexuals; the result of this bias, however, is prejudice and discrimination against people with a homosexual sexual orientation, often labeled *homophobia*. This term, coined by George Weinberg (1972), originally referred to a dread of being in close quarters with lesbians or gay men, although modern researchers often use it to reflect a more general bias.

One of the interesting aspects of heterosexism as a form of prejudice is that it seems to be more socially acceptable to be prejudiced against lesbians and gay men than to be prejudiced against members of other groups. For example, several municipalities have passed laws specifically supporting discrimination against lesbians and gay men, and some states until recently had sodomy laws on the books that make gay male sexuality illegal. The U.S. Supreme Court decision to overturn the Texas sodomy law (*Lawrence v. Texas*, 2003) served as the death knell for these remaining laws just as the once common state laws prohibiting sexual relations between Blacks and Whites all have been overturned. Even so, these laws serve as examples of how institutional discrimination can affect the lives of sexual minorities. And, although these laws were overturned, they have been replaced by others. Although gay marriage is not prohibited in every state, trends supporting this view are evident. In the 2004 elections, for example,

constitutional amendments prohibiting gay marriage were passed in all 11 states that had them on the ballot, with margins as high as six to one in favor of this prohibition (Peterson, 2004).

### **Age, Ability, and Appearance**

Robert Butler (1969) coined the term *ageism* to refer to negative reactions to older people. Although ageism, like gender prejudice, has a benevolent component, such as the doting grandparent image, it also includes negative stereotypes such as lack of competence (Hummert, 1993). Ageism can lead to subtle, almost invisible, forms of discrimination. For example, older people sometimes receive inadequate health care because physicians attribute problems to “old age,” based on the assumption that all older adults have physical problems. By doing so, they overlook the role of depression and other psychological problems in older people’s illnesses, often allowing them to go untreated (Pasupathi & Löckenhoff, 2002).

An area of growing theoretical and research interest is prejudice against *people with physical disabilities* (PWD). This kind of prejudice most clearly exemplifies the role that ambivalence, or mixed feelings, can play in prejudice: People generally feel very sympathetic toward PWD, but at the same time feel a great deal of discomfort in their presence (see, for example, Soder, 1990). In addition, the media often portray PWD in a negative light, even to the point of ridicule (Bogdan, Biklen, Shapiro, & Spelkoman, 1990). Perhaps because of the effects of these images on other children, children with disabilities often have difficulty forming and maintaining friendships, leading to low self-esteem and poor social skill development (Gordon, Feldman, & Tantillo, 2003). Finally, even researchers make a number of assumptions about persons with disabilities that affect the way they study prejudice toward them. These assumptions include the idea that PWD are victims and that having a disability is a victimizing experience, the belief that when PWD face a problem it likely stems from the disability, the assumption that having a disability is central to the self-concept of PWD, and that having a disability is synonymous with needing social support (Fine & Asch, 1993).

Finally, physical appearance, especially weight, can be a source of prejudice and discrimination. Christian Crandall (1995), for example, has found that fat people in America are seen in a negative light and are subject to discrimination, at times even by their own parents. Research on anti-fat prejudice illuminates two important bases for negative attitudes toward many groups. First, people who are perceived to have negative traits and who also are seen as responsible for those traits are devalued more than people who are seen as not responsible for them. Thus, people who are prejudiced against fat people often believe that obesity is the fat person’s own fault and is due to personal characteristics such as laziness and lack of self-discipline (Crandall, 1994). Second, people tend to dislike others whom they see as violating values they hold dear. One American value that fat people appear to violate is self-restraint (Allon, 1982).

## THEORIES OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

As students of stereotyping and prejudice, you will read about many theories, all of which seem to explain part of the puzzle of why humans behave in biased ways. You may also find yourself wishing for the one explanation that might lead people to eradicate prejudicial behavior. Psychologists also search for this kind of simplicity. However, to date, finding this single best model of the causes of prejudice has proved elusive. In this regard, the study of prejudice is not unlike the classic tale of the five blind men describing the elephant by touch. Each correctly describes the part he can feel, but the description of the tail, for example, bears little relation to the way an elephant as a whole looks. Similarly, many theories about prejudice do a good job explaining one piece of the puzzle; unfortunately, social scientists have yet to develop an overarching theory that pulls it all together.

To fully understand the reason why theories of stereotyping and prejudice often focus only on certain aspects of these phenomena, it is useful to briefly examine the history of research on prejudice and discrimination and to consider how, over time, the theoretical frameworks and the questions derived from those frameworks have changed. John Duckitt (1994) provides an excellent overview of how historical trends in the United States have influenced the questions psychologists pursue, how social scientists conceptualize prejudice, and the theories that guide the study of prejudice and discrimination.

It is important to recognize that the vast majority of social psychological work in the last century dealing with prejudice and discrimination was conducted in North America; this situation did not change until the late 1970s when Western European psychologists began to gain prominence in the field. This is not to say that stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are unique to the United States; even a cursory survey leaves little doubt that these processes are found in all nations (see, for example, Duckitt, 1994). However, because of the North American predominance, the history of research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination has closely followed societal trends and changes in the United States. Table 1.1 summarizes Duckitt's (1994) history of research on prejudice and discrimination, which we have used as the model for our discussion. As you read the following brief history of research on prejudice and discrimination, think about how researchers from other cultures might have framed their questions. Would the current understanding be different if North American psychology had not been so dominant?

### Scientific Racism

**Scientific racism** is the interpretation (and frequently misinterpretation) of research results to show minority groups in a negative light (Richards, 1997; Tucker, 1994). Although uncommon now, the goal of scientific racism is to "prove" the superiority of the dominant group and to justify racist social policies by citing scientific research. Prior to the 1920s, North American and European social scientists nearly all agreed that Whites were superior to people of color. An obvious way to document this superiority, researchers implicitly agreed, was to demonstrate that Whites were more intelligent than Blacks (see, for example,

**TABLE 1.1 Historical Trends in the Study of Prejudice**

| Time Period    | Social and Historical Context                      | Social Science Question                                                                         | View of Prejudice                                              | Predominant Theories       |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Prior to 1920s | White domination and colonial rule                 | Identifying deficiencies of “backward peoples”                                                  | A natural response to “inferior peoples”                       | Scientific racism          |
| 1920s/1930s    | White domination is challenged                     | Explaining why minority groups are stigmatized; measurement of attitudes and stereotype content | Irrational and unjustified attitudes                           | Psychodynamic              |
| 1930s/1940s    | Universality of White racism in the United States  | Identifying universal processes underlying racism                                               | An unconscious defense                                         | Psychodynamic              |
| 1950s          | Legacy of Nazi ideology and the Holocaust          | Identifying the prejudice-prone personality                                                     | An expression of pathological needs                            | Psychodynamic              |
| 1960s          | Black civil rights movement                        | How social factors influence prejudice                                                          | A social norm                                                  | Sociocultural              |
| 1970s          | Persistence of racism in the United States         | How prejudice is rooted in social structures                                                    | An expression of group interests and intergroup relations      | Intergroup relations       |
| 1980s to now   | Inevitability of prejudice and intergroup conflict | Identifying universal processes underlying intergroup conflict and prejudice                    | An inevitable outcome of normal thought processes or evolution | Cognitive and Evolutionary |

SOURCE: Adapted from Duckitt, J. (1994). *The social psychology of prejudice*. Westport, CT: Praeger, Table 4.1, p. 48.

Richards, 1997). Prejudice was viewed as a natural response to “backward” peoples; it certainly was not considered to be a social problem. Viewed through a historical lens, such beliefs served to justify White political domination and European colonial rule: Slavery, for example, was justified by the notion that slaves were a lesser class of human being and, as such, appropriately kept in that role. Following the abolition of slavery, the same “logic” was used to justify laws restricting the rights of African Americans and other minority groups (Richards, 1997; Welch, 2002).

### Psychodynamic Theory

Although slavery in the United States ended in the mid-nineteenth century, social attitudes did not start to catch up with this political change until the 1920s and 1930s. Accompanying this shift was an influx of immigration into the United States and a Black civil rights movement that challenged White social dominance. Social scientists began to question the notion that prejudice was natural and normal, moving instead to a perspective that prejudice is a social problem stemming from irrational and unjustifiable beliefs and behaviors. Researchers set as their agenda the measurement of Whites’ prejudicial attitudes and beliefs. It was during this time period that now well-known measures such as Thurstone and Likert attitude scales were developed (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and that Daniel Katz and Kenneth Braly (1933) developed their stereotype checklist, which remained a popular assessment tool for many years. The first public opinion polls also emerged during this period.

If prejudice is indeed irrational and unjustified, why is it so ubiquitous? During the 1930s and 1940s, social scientists turned to this question. The answer, they believed, could be found in psychodynamic theory and, specifically, universal psychological processes such as defense mechanisms. These were the decades that brought the Great Depression in the United States and Europe and the rise of the Nazi party in Germany. These economic and social hardships led to theorizing that people acted out their frustrations in the form of hostility and aggression directed toward minority groups. Researchers proposed, for example, that scapegoating, or symbolically transferring negative behaviors onto others, resulted when chronic social frustration was displaced onto minorities (Miller & Bugelski, 1948).

After World War II, researchers grappled with the aftereffects of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany and the troubling question of how any society could support such heinous crimes. Many scholars adopted a personality-based perspective, drawing on psychoanalytic theory to suggest that certain types of individuals are especially susceptible to prejudice; their research efforts centered on trying to identify those people. In an attempt to explain the influence that Nazism and other fascist political ideologies had had on large numbers of people during the 1930s and 1940s, Theodor Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) proposed what they called the authoritarian personality. People with an authoritarian personality were said to be strongly prone to believe and do whatever authority figures told them, including treating members of derogated groups with contempt. Thus, people high in authoritarianism embraced racism because it was advocated by authority figures such as Adolf Hitler. Adorno and his colleagues proposed that the authoritarian personality, like other psychodynamic concepts, was rooted in early childhood experiences, especially a childhood characterized by strict rules enforced by physical punishment. Although this early work was relatively unsuccessful, more recent endeavors along these lines, such as Bob Altemeyer's (1996) studies of right-wing authoritarianism, discussed in Chapter 7, have proved more promising.

The psychodynamic perspective also proposes that prejudice is motivationally based and serves to strengthen one's personal identity and self-esteem. For example, functional attitude theories stress that people can hold similar attitudes for very different reasons (Katz, 1960). Thus, two heterosexuals may both view gay men negatively, but the psychological mechanisms underlying their beliefs can be quite dissimilar. Some heterosexuals' attitudes toward homosexuality are derived from anxiety or the fear of unwanted sexual advances from gay people that, in turn, lead the actor to a defensive prevention of such advances as a means of dealing with this anxiety; these individuals' attitudes serve an ego-defensive function. Others' attitudes stem from the benefits realized through expressing the attitude, such as affirming one's sense of self and increasing self-esteem; these individuals' attitudes serve a social adjustment function (Herek, 1986).

### **Sociocultural Theory**

Perhaps because work based on a psychodynamic approach appeared to reach a dead end, the psychological study of stereotyping and prejudice lay dormant

from about the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s, when researchers began anew to examine these topics, this time from a sociocultural perspective. Historical events that co-occurred with the rise of this viewpoint include the U.S. civil rights movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Racism came to be seen as a cultural norm and one that was not easily eradicated. Accordingly, the sociocultural perspective takes the point of view that culture provides stereotypes and that the patterns of these stereotypes are consistently linked to prejudice across time and region of the country.

Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) point to two major models underlying this perspective: the structural-functionalist view and the conflict perspective. In the structural-functionalist view, society is characterized as seeking conformity to social norms, including the “proper” attitudes and beliefs people should hold, with little individual deviation in the pattern accepted within the society. In contrast to the psychodynamic approach, this model deemphasizes individual differences in prejudice, assuming instead that most individuals internalize the culture’s stereotypes to gain social acceptance. Classic research designed to determine the content of people’s stereotypes reflect this perspective (see, for example, (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969). In these studies, a checklist of characteristics was often used; research participants simply indicated agreement or disagreement that the items on the list reflect a stereotypic attribute of a group. The conflict perspective, on the other hand, puts forth the notion that society is comprised of groups with different values and interests and that individuals adopt the viewpoint of their particular subgroups. Within a society, then, the conflict perspective allows that attitudes toward a social group may vary considerably.

A recent example of a social-structural theory is social role theory (Eagly, 1987; Eagly, Wood, & Diekmann, 2000). This theory proposes that stereotypes emerge from observations about individuals in various social roles; as people make these observations, they come to associate the characteristics of the role with the individuals who occupy it. Because women, for example, are disproportionately represented in roles requiring communal traits, such as kindness and concern for others, observers draw the conclusion that all women are communal. This and similar work from a sociocultural perspective promises to expand psychologists’ understanding of how societal norms influence beliefs about social groups. This work also points to the difficulty in changing stereotypes; people are reluctant to let go of ideas that are part of a larger belief system, particularly when society itself discourages a new perspective.

### **Intergroup Relations Theory**

The optimism engendered by the Black civil rights movement of the 1960s dissipated during the 1970s when it became clear that racism persisted in the United States despite the passage of civil rights laws and apparent changes in social norms. In this context, the sociocultural perspective of the 1960s evolved into an intergroup relations perspective. From this point of view, prejudice derives from perceptions of competition with other groups. For example, relative deprivation

theory (see, for example, Walker & Smith, 2002) holds that prejudice results from the resentment people feel when they believe that their group has been deprived of some resource that another group receives. Thus, Whites who believe that Blacks are getting more than a “fair share” of societal resources experience negative emotions toward Blacks, even those White people who are objectively better off than the Black people they dislike.

Although research and theory on stereotyping and prejudice has most often originated in the United States, in the late 1960s European psychologists began to play prominent roles in both theory and research on the topic. Most importantly, the work of Henri Tajfel and John Turner (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and their colleagues highlighted the importance of people’s own identities in this process. Their social identity theory proposes that people want to have a positive self-identity. Because a large part of this identity is made up of a group identity, people can achieve this goal only by feeling positively about the groups to which they belong. One way to achieve this positive feeling is to find ways to distinguish one’s group from others, particularly by seeing one’s own group as better (see Smith, 1999 for a recent overview). We discuss intergroup relations theory and social identity theory in more detail in Chapter 9.

### **Cognitive Theory**

Three factors probably influenced social psychologists’ move to a cognitive perspective on prejudice and discrimination during the 1980s. The first was a growing belief, fed by worldwide ethnic strife, that prejudice was both universal and inevitable. The second factor was a realization that social structural explanations could not completely account for this fact. The third factor was the so-called “cognitive revolution” in psychology, in which the two predominant theories of the previous 50 years—psychoanalysis and behaviorism—were overshadowed by an emphasis on the role of thought processes in directing behavior, the ways in which information is stored in and retrieved from memory, and other cognitive factors (see, for example, Hergenhahn, 2005).

Researchers who adopt a cognitive framework view stereotyping as a normal process for reducing a complex stimulus world to a manageable level. From this vantage point, stereotyping is not considered fundamentally different from other cognitive structures or processes. Rather, it is one mechanism individuals use to help them comprehend the huge amount of information that bombards them in everyday life (see Hamilton, 1979 and Taylor, 1981, for early reviews). One such mechanism is to simplify information that is stored in memory, which leads to phenomena such as stereotyping: It is simpler to think of all (or most) members of a group as being similar in their characteristics than it is to think of every person as a complex individual. Because all humans are susceptible to these biases when processing information about people or events, stereotypes are not necessarily thought to be “bad” or invalid. Rather, stereotypes provide a framework through which individuals can comprehend all available information at a given point in time. Cognitive theorists do recognize, however, that there can be negative social consequences to this efficient information processing.

**Box 1.6 All That Is Old Is New Again**

It may surprise you to learn that one of the most cited writers on prejudice is the journalist Walter Lippman. Lippman is credited for bringing the term *stereotype* into the vocabulary of social science. Perhaps more importantly, Lippman was an astute observer of human failings and foibles. His works anticipated much of the psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice and remain widely read by students of many disciplines.

Our book focuses on theories of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination that have been empirically tested. Yet one need not be an empiricist to accurately capture the everyday consequences of prejudice. Journalists, historians, novelists, and philosophers have all written compelling accounts of this human failing. Psychologist Gordon Allport is another author who vividly described the processes involved in stereotyping and prejudice. His writings do not rely heavily on empirical data, but in his seminal work, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Allport (1954) set the stage for contemporary research on stereotyping and prejudice. Directly or indirectly, Allport's ideas continue to influence psychological thought. Check Allport's book out from your college library; we bet that you will find it is on the shelf, not in the archives, and that, like the copy in our library, it has dog-eared, copiously underlined pages. Read those pages for yourself; you'll find that many of the themes we cover in this book echo Allport's writings.

Here are just a few of the social psychological concepts that appeared in Allport's classic text. We revisit these ideas later in this book:

*Prejudice in children.* Allport discussed whether prejudice in young children is adopted by directly taking on attitudes and stereotypes from their families or cultures or whether it develops in an atmosphere that creates suspicions, fears, or hatreds that are later associated with minority groups. Allport also discusses racial awareness and the importance of language in the development of prejudice.

*Ingroups and outgroups.* Anticipating the development of social identity theory, Allport describes people's need to belong to ingroups and how ingroup loyalty can lead to the rejection of outgroups.

*The contact hypothesis.* Logically, it would seem that when ingroup members have frequent contact with outgroup members, prejudice and discrimination would be reduced. Allport reviews the conditions under which this may or may not happen.

*Re-fencing.* This idea, now referred to as subtyping, reflects how people respond to individual outgroup members who do not fit their stereotypic image. As Allport explains, people acknowledge the exceptions, but "the field is hastily fenced in again and not allowed to remain dangerously open" (p. 23), thus allowing the original beliefs about outgroups to stay intact.

These ideas were not new: As Box 1.6 shows, their roots can be traced back to the writings of Walter Lippman (1922) and Gordon Allport (1954); yet it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the cognitive revolution led psychologists to give them widespread attention. This attention to cognitive factors led to an important shift in thinking from a focus on the specific content of stereotypes to the cognitive processes that lead to prejudiced thought and action (Devine, 1989; S. Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). More recent work has considered how emotion and cognition work together to produce prejudiced thoughts and behaviors (Mackie & Smith, 2002). The many advances that grew out of the shift to a cognitive perspective are the focus of Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

### Evolutionary Theory

The belief that prejudice and intergroup conflict are inevitable led to the emergence of the evolutionary perspective as a way of explaining universal processes underlying prejudice and discrimination. A basic premise of evolutionary psychology is that all behavior derives from psychological mechanisms that evolved



to fulfill functions that promote the transmission of one's genes to future generations (Buss & Kenrick, 1998). This evolutionary function led to the development of cooperation among relatives and with one's children to ensure mutual survival (called kin favoritism). As society developed, cooperative interactions among unrelated people developed as an extension of *kin favoritism*: Cooperation with non-relatives, such as in hunting large animals, facilitates the survival of oneself and one's relatives and children. To support cooperative effort, people developed cues to allow them to distinguish between others with whom it was or was not safe to cooperate because cooperation with the "wrong" person could result in exploitation or other negative outcomes. These cues include both physical similarity to oneself and proximity—how close another person resides to oneself. People who meet such criteria are similar to kin and so it is safe to cooperate with them; people who do not meet the criteria are potentially dangerous. This perceived danger leads to avoidance, competition, and dislike of other groups rather than the cooperation extended to one's own ethnic group.

Psychologists have only begun to address the evolutionary basis of prejudice and discrimination against outgroups (for example, Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006; Kurzban & Leary, 2001), but from an evolutionary viewpoint, the explanation is straightforward. People evolved a suspicion and fear of strangers as a way to protect themselves and their communities from possible harm by outsiders. This harm ranges from seizure of, or damage to, possessions and property, through threats to the social and moral fiber of a community, to genocide. Prejudice, then, is a byproduct of the human desire to manage threats to well-being. As Steve Neuberg and Catherine Cottrell describe it "[j]ust as eyelids, blink reflexes, eyelashes, and tear ducts evolved to protect the eye ... prejudice and discrimination processes may have evolved to protect [the ingroup]" (p. 164).

Outgroups are rejected then, not simply because they are members of other groups, but rather because that group poses a *specific threat* towards one's own kind (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006). For example, people who feel particularly vulnerable to disease are likely to shun foreigners from unfamiliar countries. From an evolutionary perspective, this prejudicial tendency derives from an evolved desire to avoid disease and to feel disgust toward individuals perceived as potential disease carriers (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004). Moreover, which specific groups are targeted can change over time as the nature of perceived threats change. If perceived threats from an outgroup are reduced, stereotyping and prejudice toward that group also are reduced (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006).

Evidence for the evolutionary point of view can be found in anthropological research that shows that distinguishing between one's own group and other groups, favoritism toward members of one's own group, and ethnocentrism—seeing one's group as better than others—are found in all human cultures (Brown, 1991). Similarly, the drive to classify things into discrete categories, one of the cognitive bases of stereotyping, is another of what Donald Brown (1991) has called "human universals." Thus, the psychological underpinnings of prejudice and discrimination might be built into human nature. Further support for this perspective comes from research demonstrating that social categorization is quicker and beliefs are more negative toward

groups perceived as the most threatening. Similarly, the nature of prejudicial responses to outgroups depend on the type of threat posed to the ingroup (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006).

However, there are two problems with the evolutionary view of prejudice. One is that evolutionary theory holds that people are inherently motivated to protect kin. Yet, as Robert Zajonc (2002) has pointed out, during times of extreme ethnic conflict people will kill their spouses and even their children who are “tainted” with descent from the “wrong” ethnic group. Second, Frans de Waal (2002) has noted that although it is easy to claim that a behavior has an evolutionary basis, an effective theory must be able to account for the absence of a supposedly evolved behavior as well as its occurrence. Thus, although evolutionary theory can provide an explanation for prejudice, it provides little in the way of explanation for situations in which prejudice does not occur. For example, although ancient Egypt, classical Greece, and imperial Rome all had frequent contact with Black Africans, there is little evidence of any ethnic or racial prejudice against them; on the contrary, they were admired for their cultural and military achievements (Snowden, 1995). Evolutionary theory cannot explain why racial prejudice is present in some cultures but not in others.

Finally, it is important to note that the possibility that prejudice and discrimination have an evolutionary basis, and thus may be part of human nature, does not make them right or even excusable (de Waal, 2002; Pinker, 2002). As evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker (2002) notes, “The case against bigotry is not a factual claim [rooted in biology]. It is a moral stance that condemns judging an individual according to the average traits of certain groups to which the individual belongs. Enlightened societies choose to ignore sex, race, and ethnicity in [making decisions about individuals] because the alternative is morally repugnant” (p. 145). And, as Pinker points out, people also may have evolved a sense of morality and fairness as a means of promoting cooperation among people along with the other psychological mechanisms that support interdependent relationships. So, just as ethnocentrism is a human universal, so are the promotion of cooperation and fairness (Brown, 1991). Thus, even if an evolutionary perspective can help psychologists understand why prejudice and discrimination occur and why they seem to be universal and inevitable, taking such a perspective does not excuse them. As Pinker (2002) has written, “As soon as we recognize that there is nothing morally commendable about the products of evolution, we can describe human psychology honestly, without the fear that identifying a ‘natural’ trait is the same as condoning it. As Katherine Hepburn says to Humphrey Bogart in *The African Queen* (1951), ‘Nature, Mr. Allnut, is what we are put in this world to rise above’” (p. 163).

## WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

This book provides a narrated journey through the social science literature on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Its fourteen chapters cover a wide range of topics, beginning with the general introduction to these topics provided

by this chapter. Chapter 2 describes how research on prejudice and discrimination is conducted, with a focus on the process of conducting research and the techniques that have been used to measure stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine stereotypes, one of the building blocks of prejudice. Chapter 3 explains the basic thought processes that lead to stereotyping, the nature of stereotypes, and the psychological processes that maintain stereotypes and make them resistant to change. Chapter 4 considers the factors that affect people's use of stereotypes, such as their accessibility in memory and individuals' motivation to make accurate judgments. People's emotional reactions to social groups can be strong and can include anxiety in response to other social groups. Moreover, individuals' motives can have important consequences for how they interact with and behave toward others; many people, for example, are strongly motivated to avoid stereotyping or behaving in a discriminatory way. These topics are discussed in Chapter 5.

As we noted earlier, the ways researchers have viewed prejudice have changed over time, in part reflecting societal changes. Chapter 6 examines one of those changes, the transition from old-fashioned (or blatant) prejudice to modern (or subtle) prejudice. It also considers the more recently developed topic of "benevolent" prejudices—beliefs and behaviors that are superficially positive but have the effect of subordinating members of targeted groups. Chapter 7 looks at the question of whether some people are more prone to prejudice than others. The chapter examines the role of individual differences, such as how personality, values, and belief systems influence levels of prejudice. Chapter 8 examines a relatively under-studied topic, the origins of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in children. Chapter 9 looks at the social context of prejudice—how being members of and identifying with groups leads to favoritism toward those groups and disparagement of other groups. The chapter also examines the factors that lead people to join hate groups.

We also explore the question of discrimination in the textbook. As we noted earlier, the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is not always direct. Chapter 10 explores the topic of when and why prejudice causes discrimination. That chapter addresses the distinction between overt and subtle discrimination. Although the former is easy to identify, the latter often proves difficult to pinpoint; subtle language cues, for example, can convey messages about group members' status in society or a subgroup of society. Historically, work on prejudice and discrimination has focused on the person—who is prejudiced, the beliefs he or she holds, and how it affects his or her behavior. Chapter 11 considers the perspective of those on the receiving end. We consider how social stigmas affect the self-perceptions of people who are stigmatized and how minority status, such as being the token member of one's group in a situation, affects self-perceptions.

Social scientists who study stereotyping and prejudice have focused most often on racial prejudice and much of the book focuses on theories about this form of bias. Chapter 12 looks at two other types of prejudice. Gender-based prejudice is a special kind of prejudice, in part because most of us interact with people of the other sex on a daily basis and many people's most intimate relationships are with the other sex. Why, then, would gender-based biases be so prevalent? This chapter addresses that question. Because gender-based beliefs

are strongly linked to beliefs about sexual orientation, heterosexism also is included in this chapter. In Chapter 13, we examine prejudice toward other social groups, beginning with a discussion of ageism, or bias against people simply because of their advanced age. We then explore how ability and appearance influence perceptions of others and examine biases based on those factors.

Given all that we know about prejudice and its role in everyday life, is there hope for reducing or eliminating its negative effects? Chapter 14 discusses the psychology of reducing prejudice and discrimination, focusing on the contact hypothesis. The chapter also compares multicultural education to color blindness, noting that there is little support for the idea that the latter is effective for reducing prejudice and discrimination. The chapter concludes by describing what you personally can do to reduce prejudice.

Before U.S. citizens came to accept that no one should be required to sit in the back of the bus, Rosa Parks had to take the enormously courageous action of refusing to do so. But this acceptance also required that, since that day, millions of others have stood up in smaller ways and said “no more.” We hope you are one of them. We believe the first step in ending prejudice and discrimination is understanding their nature. With this book, we invite you to explore the contributions of the many social scientists who have offered insights into this topic. By the end of our journey, you will have the understanding you need to make changes in your own life and the lives of those with whom you interact, with the goal of reducing the negative effects of prejudice and discrimination.

## SUMMARY

Social scientists have differentiated between the concepts of stereotypes—organized beliefs about the characteristics of members of various groups, prejudice—attitudes toward group members, and discrimination—behavior toward group members. Typically, there is group consensus about the appropriateness of these beliefs and behaviors; all have a strong cultural component that guides how individuals respond to others. Each of these three concepts also has an individual and a group level basis. Discrimination, for example, can be discussed at either the individual level, based on people’s personal beliefs; at the institutional level, based on attitudes and beliefs sanctioned by institutions or governing bodies; at the organizational level, due to practices of formal organizations such as corporations and government agencies; and at the cultural level, stemming from the powerful group establishing and maintaining its dominance by rewarding the values that correspond to its views and punishing those that do not. However, as will be discussed in later chapters, the relationships among stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are not as straightforward as one might think. People have implicit prejudices, for example, that are difficult to control or describe, and explicit prejudices, that are within an individual’s control or awareness. Whether prejudice is implicit or explicit influences how directly it is linked to discrimination.

The study of stereotyping and prejudice, including racism, developed in response to laws and customs in the United States. The concept of scientific racism, defined as researchers trying to demonstrate empirically the superiority of one group over another, was introduced to explain how beliefs were used to justify the status quo. An outgrowth of accepting the status quo is the concept of group privilege, whereby one group has an unearned favored state simply because they are the dominant group. This privilege often goes unrecognized by the majority group, but always comes at a cost to the nonprivileged groups. Social scientists have examined prejudices toward specific groups, such as racism, sexism, classism, and ageism, and, although the overall process might be similar across groups, the study of each offers unique insights and concerns. Many common prejudices toward these subgroups go unrecognized, in part because people have mixed or ambivalent feelings about the group.

Historical events and shifts in societal norms have influenced the development of psychological theory. Historical events such as the Great Depression and the rise of Nazism, for example, formed the basis for psychodynamic theory. This perspective proposes that universal psychological processes account for prejudice; these processes are presumed to be motivationally based and allegedly serve to strengthen one's self-esteem. Sociocultural theories grew out of social scientists' acceptance that stereotyping and prejudice were difficult to eliminate because they were so strongly tied to culture and the structure of society. This shift occurred about the time of the Black civil rights movement in the United States, a time in history when it became clear that equality would be difficult to achieve. This slow acceptance of change also led to the development of intergroup relations theory, which proposes that competition for scarce resources, and people's resentment that their group might not be getting its fair share, is one basis for prejudice. Cognitive theory developed as prejudice came to be seen as universal and inevitable; at the same time, many social psychologists rejected psychoanalytic theory and behaviorism in favor of cognitive psychology. Stereotyping and prejudice, then, came to be seen as part of normal human information processing. Finally, psychologists have recently explored how evolutionary psychology can explain stereotyping and prejudice; this perspective proposes that these beliefs and behaviors, as does all behavior, stem from psychological mechanisms that evolved to fulfill a function that promotes the transmission of one's genes to future generations. Chapter 1 concludes with an overview of the textbook, describing how the book is structured and the topics that will be examined in each chapter.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Allport, G. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Allport anticipated much of current psychological theory on the topics covered in this text and he presents them in a readable, accessible format. His book remains a must-read for any serious student of stereotyping and prejudice.

Dovidio, J. Glick, P., & Rudman, L. (Eds.) (2005). *On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Leading stereotyping and prejudice researchers honor Allport's legacy through their contributions to this volume. The chapters carry his work forward by reexamining the issues and themes of his classic treatise, updated to reflect current knowledge.

Duckitt, J. (1994). *The social psychology of prejudice*. New York: Praeger.

Duckitt provides an excellent review of the social psychological literature on prejudice, with an eye toward the historical factors that have influenced theory development.

Johnson, A. G. (2006). *Privilege, power, and difference* (2nd ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.

This highly readable book contains a review of the literature on power and privilege, emphasizing the perspective of both dominant and minority groups. Johnson describes both the problem and the solution.

Jones, J. M. (1997). *Prejudice and racism* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

This book is a true modern classic. Jones provides a particularly good overview of the social history of prejudice against African Americans and the nature of racism toward this group.

Rothenberg, P. S. (Ed.) (2007). *Race, class and gender in the United States* (7th ed.). New York: Worth.

This is an outstanding collection of essays and readings addressing stereotyping and prejudice. Readings consider the perspective of many social groups and take many vantage points, including legal and economic perspectives, social constructionist views, and visions for the future.

## KEY TERMS

|                         |                |                   |
|-------------------------|----------------|-------------------|
| classism                | institutional  | prejudice         |
| culture                 | discrimination | scientific racism |
| cultural discrimination | interpersonal  | social class      |
| discrimination          | discrimination | stereotypes       |
| group privilege         | organizational |                   |
|                         | discrimination |                   |

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. The chapter opened with a quote from Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech. What parts of his dream of racial equality have been realized? What parts have not?
2. The oak tree outside Jena High School, mentioned in the chapter opening, has since been cut down. What effect do you believe this will have on race relations in Jena, Louisiana? Why?
3. We reviewed how historical events in the United States have influenced the study of stereotyping and prejudice. Think about the 9/11 terrorist attacks

and others that have occurred on U.S. soil. How might those events change the research agenda in the literature on stereotyping and prejudice?

4. If race is not a biological category, why do social distinctions, based on race, continue to be supported by our society?
5. Should race be included on the census? What are the advantages and disadvantages of collecting this information?
6. Describe three ways to make people more aware of their culture and its influence on their behavior. How might this awareness affect their future behavior?
7. What is group privilege? Do you believe the effects of privilege are stronger for some privileged groups than for others? Why or why not?
8. Allan Johnson (2006) has suggested that social class influences the extent to which Whites resist giving up their privileged status. If this is true, which social class would you expect to be more resistant to relinquishing these advantages? Explain your answer.
9. How do social scientists differentiate between stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination?
10. Prejudice is most commonly viewed as the dominant group's attitude toward subordinate groups. Can minority groups be prejudiced against the majority? Explain your answer.
11. Why, in the United States, is prejudice generally assumed to refer to Whites' prejudice against Blacks?
12. Why has racial prejudice had such an important influence on social science research?
13. Design a study to examine stereotypic beliefs a minority group holds about the majority group.
14. Think about the distinction between interpersonal and cultural discrimination. Can one exist without the other? Why or why not?
15. How are institutional discrimination and organizational discrimination similar? How are they different?
16. Distinguish between the psychodynamic, sociocultural, intergroup relations, cognitive, and evolutionary perspectives on prejudice.
17. Describe how stereotyping and prejudice are different for different "isms."
18. What assumptions do researchers make about persons with disabilities? How might research questions be different if researchers did not make those assumptions?
19. Why do you believe legislators find it is acceptable to propose laws that discriminate against gays and lesbians?

## Chapter 2

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# How Psychologists Study Prejudice and Discrimination

We can't solve our social problems until we understand how they come about [and] persist. Social science research offers a way to understand the operation of human social affairs. It provides points of view and technical procedures that uncover things that would otherwise escape our awareness.

—EARL BABBIE (1999, P. XX)

### Chapter Outline

#### The Research Process

*Theories and Hypotheses*  
*Hypotheses and Predictions*  
*Data Collection*  
*Drawing Conclusions*  
*Verifying Results*  
*Theory and Application*

#### Research Strategies

*Correlational Studies*  
*Experiments*  
*Ethnographic Studies*  
*Content Analysis*  
*Using Multiple Research Strategies*

#### Measuring Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

*Reliability and Validity*  
*Self-Report Measures*  
*Unobtrusive Measures*  
*Physiological Measures*  
*Implicit Cognition Measures*  
*Self-Report versus Physiological and Implicit Cognition Measures*  
*Using Multiple Measures*

#### Summary

#### Suggested Readings

#### Key Terms

#### Questions for Review and Discussion



**W**hy does a book about prejudice and discrimination include a chapter on research? It does because, as Babbie (1999) noted, research informs our understanding of what prejudice and discrimination are, how they come about, and the effects they have on people. Research also offers clues about how to reduce prejudice. Research is the primary source of the information presented in this book, so a full understanding of that information requires an understanding of where it comes from.

Research serves several purposes. First, it provides descriptive information, such as the various characteristics that differentiate people high in prejudice from those low in prejudice. This information can be used to construct theories, such as those described in Chapter 1 and elsewhere in this book, that try to explain why some people are more prejudiced than others. Research then can be used to test those theories, with researchers deriving predictions about behavior from theories and collecting data to see whether those predictions are supported. If necessary, theories are modified in the light of the data. Once psychologists are confident that a theory works well, we can use its principles to design interventions to reduce prejudice. Research is then conducted to see how well those interventions work, and the resulting data can be used to fine-tune both the interventions and the theory on which they are based.

In this chapter we first present an overview of the research process, including the steps involved. That discussion leads to two others: the methods used to collect data and the techniques used to measure stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Researchers can choose from a variety of methods, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages, and often the advantages of one research method compensate for the disadvantages of another. Finally, an important part of research is measurement: If, for example, researchers want to see what factors differentiate people who are high and low in prejudice, they must be able to measure how prejudiced people are.

## THE RESEARCH PROCESS

The goal of research in the behavioral sciences is to develop knowledge about the factors that cause some people to think and behave one way and other people to think and behave in other ways. For example, research can address the question of why some people are more prejudiced than others. Behavioral science research also tries to determine the factors that constrain or limit behavior. For instance, some prejudiced people act in discriminatory ways whereas others do not. Research can address the question of what circumstances make it easier for people to express their prejudices and what circumstances make it more difficult. The behavioral sciences have developed sets of methods and procedures for collecting data that can provide answers to questions such as those just posed. These procedures are designed to produce data that are as accurate and unbiased as possible (although it is impossible to eliminate all inaccuracy and bias). This section provides a broad overview of the procedures that constitute the research process, and subsequent sections discuss specific issues. Figure 2.1 provides a schematic outline of the topics to be discussed.




**FIGURE 2.1** The Research Process

Researchers derive hypotheses (statements of expected relationships between variables) from theories. When abstract variables are defined in concrete terms (operationally defined), hypotheses become the predictions to be tested in the research. Researchers then collect data using the appropriate research method. Researchers draw two types of conclusions from the data: How likely it is that the results found were due to chance (statistical conclusions) and the meaning of the results. Researchers then verify their results by seeing if the results can be repeated (replicability) and if the results hold up when the hypotheses are tested in different ways and in different settings (generalizability). Once the results are verified, any necessary changes can be made to the theory. Once the theory is well-verified, applications can be developed from it.

## Theories and Hypotheses

Where do scientists get the questions that they ask in research? A major source is theories. As noted in Chapter 1, theories organize knowledge by proposing links among variables, such as by proposing possible causes of prejudice. A **variable** is a characteristic on which people differ and so takes on more than one value when it is measured in a group of people; that is, it varies across people. For example, prejudice is variable: Some people are high on prejudice, some people are low, and some people fall in between. Biological sex is another example of a variable: Some people are female and others are male. Some variables can also differ for a given person across time or situations. For example, a person's level of prejudice might increase or decrease over time as a result of the person's experiences with members of other groups. Prejudice can also vary as a function of situations: For example, a person is more likely to evaluate another person in terms of group stereotypes in situations in which the evaluator is distracted or

busy than in situations in which the evaluator has the time to think carefully about the person's qualifications (see, for example, Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).

In theories, these proposed links among variables are called *postulates*. Theoretical postulates can be based on the results of research, on the theorist's observations and experiences, on speculations about the ways in which variables might be related to one another or, most commonly, on a combination of all these sources. However, theories are tentative and subject to change because their postulates may or may not be correct. Before researchers can be reasonably certain that theoretical postulates accurately describe the relationships between variables, they must test them. After all, you would not want to spend time and resources using a particular theory to develop ways to reduce prejudice unless you could be confident the theory was accurate; if it were not, your interventions may not be as effective as they otherwise could be. Researchers start the process of testing theories by deriving hypotheses from them.

**Hypotheses** are derivations of theoretical postulates that can be tested in research. Table 2.1 gives examples of hypotheses that could be derived from some of the theories outlined in Chapter 1. Generally, tests of more specific hypotheses provide data that are more useful than do tests of more general hypotheses. For example, as shown in Table 2.1, a general hypothesis of psychodynamic theory is that prejudices help fulfill psychological needs. However, because this may not be true of all needs, testing the hypothesis in the context of specific needs, such as self-esteem, can provide data that are more useful. If the results of research supported the self-esteem hypothesis, those results would suggest that finding other ways of bolstering people's self-esteem would help to

**TABLE 2.1 Theories and Hypotheses**

The following chart provides possible hypotheses about prejudice that could be derived from some of the theories discussed in Chapter 1:

| Theory               | Hypothesis                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Psychodynamic        | Prejudice helps fulfill psychological needs. For example, one might hypothesize that prejudices help people who are low in self-esteem see themselves as superior to the targets of their prejudices.                                                                                |
| Sociocultural        | Prejudice is based on social norms, so one might hypothesize that anti-Black prejudice would be stronger in areas where prejudice against African Americans is more strongly supported by social norms.                                                                              |
| Intergroup Relations | Groups compete with one another for resources and people develop a dislike of members of other groups because they are trying to get the things we want. Therefore, one might hypothesize that prejudice would be stronger between competing groups than between cooperating groups. |
| Cognitive            | People have an innate tendency to put people (and things) into categories, such as "my group" and "that other group." One might hypothesize that once these categories are established, they lead to an "us versus them" view of the world.                                          |
| Evolutionary         | People evolved a fear and dislike of strangers to protect themselves against possible aggression, so one might hypothesize that fear of and disliking for strangers would be found in all human cultures.                                                                            |

reduce the amount of prejudice they feel (this suggestion, of course, is itself a hypothesis that would also have to be tested through research).

### Hypotheses and Predictions

Hypotheses, such as “People with low self-esteem are more prejudiced than people with high self-esteem,” are usually stated in abstract terms. That is, terms such as self-esteem and prejudice are abstract nouns; the technical term for abstract concepts that are used in theories and studied in research is **hypothetical constructs**. However, researchers must be able to observe variables if they want to collect data about them, and they cannot directly observe abstractions such as self-esteem and prejudice. Therefore, researchers create operational definitions of hypothetical constructs to use in research. **Operational definitions** are directly observable, concrete representations of hypothetical constructs. Scores on questionnaires that assess people’s levels of self-esteem and prejudice are examples of operational definitions of those constructs because the scores provide directly observable indexes of people’s levels of self-esteem and prejudice. Usually, any one hypothetical construct will have more than one possible operational definition. For example, there are numerous measures of both self-esteem and prejudice, and researchers must choose the operational definitions that best fit the purposes of their research. Later in this chapter, we look at some of the ways in which researchers operationally define prejudice and other constructs such as stereotypes and discrimination.

Sometimes researchers manipulate variables rather than measuring them (experimental research such as this will be described in more detail in the next section of this chapter). For example, people have what researchers call worldviews that help them understand events by (among other functions) providing standards for evaluating them as right or wrong, good or bad. Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski (2000) have hypothesized that challenging people’s worldviews makes them anxious because worldviews are closely linked to people’s self-concepts, so that challenging those views threatens people’s self-esteem, leading to anxiety. People who are threatened in this way might express more prejudice than people who are not because expressing negative attitudes toward others is a way of bolstering self-esteem. (We will discuss this process more fully in Chapter 7.) In a study designed to test these ideas, the researchers would generate anxiety in some people but not in others and compare the levels of prejudice expressed by the people in each group. In this case, the way in which the researchers generated anxiety—by having people think about their own deaths—would constitute the operational definition of anxiety.

Once researchers have chosen their operational definitions, hypotheses become predictions. **Predictions** restate hypotheses in terms of operational definitions. Thus, the hypothesis “People with low self-esteem are more prejudiced than people with high self-esteem” would become the prediction “People with low scores on the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale [one possible operational definition of self-esteem] will have higher scores on the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) [one possible operational definition of prejudice] than people with high scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.”

## Data Collection

When it becomes time to collect data a number of methods are available, each with its advantages and shortcomings. These methods, which are listed in Figure 2.1, are discussed in the next section. For now, let us move on to the process of drawing conclusions from the data that were collected.

## Drawing Conclusions

Although researchers sometimes say that data should speak for themselves, data are often open to multiple interpretations, giving researchers the responsibility to draw conclusions from them. Two important types of conclusions that must be drawn are whether the researchers' hypotheses were supported and what the data mean.

**Were the Hypotheses Supported?** Researchers test hypotheses in their research, so a basic question in research is whether the hypotheses were supported. When the data are quantitative (that is, numerical, such as scores on a prejudice measure), the question is relatively easy to answer. Statistical analysis of the data provides information about how likely it is that a certain outcome occurred by chance as opposed to providing an accurate picture of what is happening. Imagine that researchers tested the hypothesis described earlier about the relationship between self-esteem and prejudice. If the researchers did find a relationship, there are two possible explanations for this outcome. One is that the relationship really exists. The other explanation is that some of the unavoidable errors that occur in research, such as sampling error and measurement error, combined to make it look like a relationship exists when, in fact, there is none. (A detailed examination of the sources of error that can affect research is beyond the scope of this discussion; more information is available in books on research methods such as Stern & Kalof, 1996). Statistical analyses provide researchers with criteria for deciding whether their results represent true relationships among variables and so support their hypotheses, or whether those results could have occurred by chance and so cannot be interpreted as supporting the hypotheses.

Qualitative data, such as transcripts of interviews, are narrative rather than numerical. Researchers using qualitative methods analyze their data by looking for patterns of responses or behavior. These patterns might address such questions as, what characteristics and political beliefs do members of hate groups have in common? In what ways are male and female hate group members similar and different? The patterns can be either predicted by theory or, more commonly, emerge from the data. For example, Raphael Ezekiel (1995) found that fear was a common theme running through his interviews with hate group members. Economic fears, such as that of unemployment, were translated into prejudice: I'm unemployed, the thinking goes, because minority group members, aided by government programs that exclude me, are taking all the jobs. Therefore, the way for me to get ahead is to keep minority group members down.

**What Do the Data Mean?** Once the data have been analyzed, researchers must decide what the results mean. Consider the common research finding that men

generally score slightly higher on measures of prejudice than do women. The results of research tell us that this difference exists, but what does it mean? Consider some possibilities:

- Over the course of evolution, people have evolved a fear of strangers because strangers may be a threat to their groups. Because men have historically taken the role of protecting the group (as males of most other primate species do), they have to be sensitive to possible threats and so have evolved a stronger fear of strangers, which is reflected in men's higher prejudice.
- Testosterone somehow affects the brain to make people who are higher in testosterone more prejudiced.
- Social norms teach men to be more prejudiced than women.
- Men are more willing to disclose their prejudices to researchers than are women.

Researchers who hold different theoretical orientations are likely to put more faith in interpretations that are consistent with the theories they prefer. An evolutionary psychologist is likely to prefer the first explanation whereas a psychologist who rejects the possibility of an evolved human nature is likely to prefer the third interpretation (Pinker, 2002). Researchers' personal backgrounds can also affect the interpretations they make. Thus, research findings often have more than one explanation and different people can have different views on which explanation is the correct one.

So which explanation is the correct one? Answering that question is difficult because some explanations are directly testable whereas others are not. For example, the testosterone explanation implies that higher levels of testosterone should be related to higher levels of prejudice in both women and men, and research could examine this possibility. However, it is sometimes difficult or impossible to directly test an explanation, such as the one that holds that gender differences in prejudice have an evolutionary basis. Finally, it is important to remember that a given phenomenon could have more than one cause; and it is possible that all four explanations are correct. Multiple causation is a common research finding, so one of the things you will see as you proceed through this book is that because prejudice and discrimination have multiple causes, efforts to reduce prejudice and discrimination have to take more than one route.

### Verifying Results

As noted, the results of any one study may be influenced by chance factors. Therefore, it is important to verify research results to ensure their accuracy. The verification process has two aspects. One aspect consists of redoing the study using the same research procedures to see if the same results occur. This aspect of research is called *exact replication*. The other aspect of verification consists of redoing the study with changes in the procedures, such as using different measures or research participants with different characteristics (such as college students in one study and older adults in another study). This process is called *conceptual replication* and helps determine whether the results found in the original study

generalize (that is, are similar) across variations in research procedures or whether the results are obtained only when the original procedures are used.

**Generalizability** is an important issue because if a particular psychological principle—such as low self-esteem is related to prejudice—is correct, researchers should find a relationship between low self-esteem and prejudice regardless of how self-esteem and prejudice are measured and regardless of who the research participants are. Conversely, if a study finds that a principle does not generalize well, but instead operates only for some types of people or only under certain circumstances, then the principle only applies to those people and in those circumstances. For example, although positive contact between members of different groups tends to reduce prejudice, contact is more effective in reducing prejudice in some situations, such as work settings, than in others, such as recreational settings (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

### Theory and Application

Once researchers are confident about their findings, they return to the theory that guided their research. If the research findings support the theory by confirming the hypotheses derived from it, then all is well and good: The researchers can have confidence in the accuracy of the theory. However, the results of research are sometimes inconsistent with the theory the researchers started with. In that case, the theory must be revised to take the research results into account, such as by noting the limitations those results place on the generalizability of the theory's principles. In extreme cases, the theory might have to be abandoned altogether. By their nature, then, theories are dynamic, changing in response to research findings, rather than static.

When researchers feel confident in the correctness of their theories they can begin to apply those theories in attempts to reduce prejudice and discrimination. Research can be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the application to see how well the theory works in the setting in which it is being applied. The information about the effectiveness of the application can also be used to improve the theory: If an application did not work, that failure would indicate that the usefulness of applications based on the theory might be limited to certain situations and the theory would have to be modified to take those limitations into account. Thus, theory leads to research and applications, the outcomes of which feedback into the theory, resulting in a continuing cycle of discovering, integrating, and using knowledge.

## RESEARCH STRATEGIES

A research strategy is a general approach to conducting research defined in terms of how data are collected. For example, when using the correlational strategy, researchers measure the variables that interest them and look for relationships among the variables. In contrast, when using the experimental strategy, researchers actively manipulate one (or more) of the variables that interest them to see if

changing one variable affects the other variable. This section provides an overview of some of the strategies most commonly used in research on prejudice: correlational studies, experiments, ethnographic studies, and content analysis. Each strategy has its own advantages and disadvantages. At the end of the chapter, we look at how all the methods can be used to study one aspect of prejudice, illustrating how the strengths of one method can offset the limitations of another.

### Correlational Studies

In the **correlational research strategy**, researchers measure two or more variables and look for relationships among them. Although correlational studies can take many forms, surveys are perhaps the most common way to conduct correlational research on prejudice.

**Survey Research.** As a college student, you are probably familiar with survey research. Many colleges and universities conduct surveys of their incoming first-year students and if you took an introductory psychology course, you were probably asked (or required) to participate in research, some of which probably used surveys. You also may have received a telephone call at home asking you to participate in a survey, such as one asking about your opinions about public figures or current events. In **survey research**, respondents answer questions designed to assess their attitudes, beliefs, opinions, behaviors, and personalities. Designing good survey research is a science in itself (see, for example, Babbie, 1990). This section focuses on an issue crucial to the interpretation of the results of survey research: how researchers find people to answer their questions, a process called *sampling*.

The two types of sampling most commonly used in survey research are probability sampling and convenience sampling. In **probability sampling**, the researchers first define what is called their research population. The research population consists of the people to whom the researchers want to apply their results. For example, the research population for a particular study might be the entire population of the United States, the people who live in a certain region of the country, the residents of a particular state or city, or even the students attending a particular college. Because the size of most research populations makes it impossible to administer a survey to all its members, the researchers select from the population a sample of people who will be asked to complete the survey. In probability sampling, the sample is drawn in a way that makes it a small-scale model of research population: All the characteristics of the population—people of different ages, genders, ethnicities, occupations, and so forth—are in the sample in the same proportion they are found in the population. Because the sample so accurately reflects the population, researchers can have strong confidence that any relationships they find in their sample, such as a relationship between level of education and prejudice, exist in much the same degree in the population as a whole.

However, conducting surveys using probability sampling is expensive because of the necessity of contacting people all over the country. In addition, because most probability sample surveys use telephone interviews to collect data, only a limited number of questions can be asked: People do not like to spend a long time answering questions over the telephone. As a result, a considerable amount



of survey research on prejudice uses convenience sampling. As its name implies, in **convenience sampling** the research sample consists of people from whom the researchers can easily collect data. Often, a convenience sample consists of students at the college or university where the researchers teach, but it can also be composed of people recruited at shopping malls or other places where people might gather. Convenience sampling allows researchers to collect data relatively quickly and easily, and especially when “captive” college students comprise the sample, ask a relatively large number of questions. The ability to ask a lot of questions can be important because many of the variables that interest prejudice researchers, such as personality, ideology, and prejudice itself, are best assessed using measures made up of multiple items (for example, Whitley, 2002). The major disadvantage of convenience sampling is that there is no way to know how well the sample represents any given population. Consequently, compared to researchers who use probability samples, those who use convenience samples must be more cautious about drawing conclusions about how well the relationships among variables that they find in their samples reflect the relationships that exist in the populations that interest them.

**The Correlation Coefficient.** Survey researchers often describe the relationship between two variables using a statistic known as the correlation coefficient. The **correlation coefficient**, abbreviated as  $r$ , indicates the strength of the relationship between two variables. So, for example, you might see the relationship between self-esteem and prejudice reported as  $r = -.30$ . Because we will talk about correlations from time to time in this book, let us look briefly at how to interpret a correlation coefficient.

To interpret a correlation coefficient you have to break it into two parts, the sign (plus or minus) and the numeric value (.30 in our example). Usually, if the sign is positive, the “+” symbol is left out, so a correlation might appear as  $r = .40$  rather than  $r = +.40$ . The sign of the correlation coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship, with a plus sign indicating a positive relationship and a minus sign indicating a negative relationship. In a positive relationship, as the score on one variable increases, the score on the other variable increases. To use a physical example, in the summer there is a positive correlation between outdoor air temperature and electricity consumption: the higher the temperature, the greater the electricity consumption (because people run their air conditioners more). In the context of prejudice research, there is a small positive relationship between age and prejudice: To a minor degree, older people express more ethnic and racial prejudice than younger people (for example, Wagner & Zick, 1995).

In a negative relationship, as the score on one variable increases, the score on the other variable decreases. To use another physical example, in cold weather there is a negative correlation between outdoor air temperature and heating fuel consumption: the lower the temperature, the higher the fuel consumption (because people run their furnaces more). In the context of prejudice research, there is a small negative relationship between the amount of education a person has and prejudice: To a minor degree, better educated people express less ethnic and racial prejudice than less well-educated people (for example, Wagner & Zick, 1995).

The numeric part of the correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship. The number can range from 0, indicating no relationship at all, up to 1, indicating a perfect relationship. For example, the correlation between people's heights and weights is about  $r = .70$ , indicating a strong, but not perfect relationship. That is, for the most part, taller people weigh more than shorter people, but there are many exceptions. High correlations between two variables are rarely found in psychological research; as a general guide, correlations with absolute values (that is, ignoring the plus or minus sign) of less than .1 are considered to be trivial, correlations between .1 and .3 are considered to be small, those between .3 and .5 are considered to be moderate, and those greater than .5 are considered to be large (Cohen, 1992).

**Correlation and Causality.** A major limitation of correlational research is that although it can show that two variables are related to each other, it cannot determine whether one of the variables is causing the other. This problem exists because three criteria determine when one can, to correctly conclude that one variable is causing another. Correlational research can meet only the first of those criteria, *covariation*, which requires the causal variable to be related to the effect variable. That is, most of the times that the cause is present in a situation the effect must also be present, and most of the times that the cause is absent in a situation the effect must also be absent. In correlational research this relationship is shown by a statistically significant correlation between two variables.

The second criterion for causality is *time precedence of the cause*; that is, the cause must come before the effect. Most of the time one cannot determine whether correlational research meets this criterion because, as in survey research, all the variables are measured at the same time. So, for example, if survey researchers find a negative correlation between level of education and prejudice, there is no way to distinguish between two possible patterns of causality. On the one hand, prejudiced people may put a low value on education, so that highly prejudiced people stop their schooling earlier than less prejudiced people; on the other hand, education may prevent or reduce prejudice so that more education results in less prejudice. There is no way to know which possibility is correct and, because of the third criterion for causality, both could be wrong.

The third criterion for causality is the *absence of alternative explanations* for the effect. Let us assume that we prefer the possibility that education reduces or prevents prejudice. The question then becomes, is it education itself that is related to lower prejudice, or is it some other characteristic of educated people that makes it look like higher education is related to lower prejudice when in reality it is not? For example, higher socioeconomic status, lower nationalism, and more experience with members of other groups are all associated with both higher education and lower prejudice (Wagner & Zick, 1995). Thus, a person could argue that it is not really education that is related to lower prejudice (and, therefore, a possible cause of it), but one of the other variables, such as contact with members of other groups. To be able to say that it is really education that is the important variable, researchers would have to be able to show that education is related to lower prejudice even after the influence of those variables has been

eliminated (or, in the language researchers use, *controlled*). Such controls are possible, but even if a relationship between education and lower prejudice still exists when the other variables have been controlled (as Wagner and Zick, 1995, found), a problems remains: Researchers can only control for variables they included in the study; what if they left one or more out? Therefore, it is almost always impossible to eliminate alternative explanations in correlational research.

The inability of correlational research to establish time precedence of a cause and to eliminate alternative explanations leads to the basic rule for interpreting correlational research: Correlation does not equal causation. That is, *you can never conclude from correlational research that one variable causes another*. Although it is quite appropriate to say on the basis of correlational research that two variables are related, it is not appropriate to say that one of the variables caused the other. However, because two variables must be related if one is causing the other, the lack of a correlation indicates that neither can be causing the other. For example, if researchers hypothesize that a personality trait is a cause of prejudice but their data show no correlation between the trait and prejudice, then they can correctly conclude that the trait is not a cause of prejudice.

## Experiments

So, then, how do researchers establish causality? They conduct experiments. This section provides an overview of experimental research, first looking at how experiments establish causality and then examining three settings in which experimental research can be conducted: in the laboratory, in the field, and as part of surveys. This section concludes with a caution about interpreting studies that include both experimental and correlational components.

**Experimentation and Causality.** Although the results of correlational research do not permit the conclusion that one variable caused another, the results of experimental research do. This difference exists because in the **experimental research strategy** the researchers take control of the research situation to ensure that the three criteria for causality are met. Experimental research begins with a hypothesis that specifies that one variable causes another. In experimental research, the proposed cause is called the **independent variable** and the proposed effect is called the **dependent variable**; the hypothesis is that the independent variable causes the dependent variable. A defining characteristic of experimental research is that the researchers manipulate the independent variable by creating two or more **conditions**, which are sets of experiences that represent different aspects of the independent variable.

For example, Jennifer Richeson and Nalini Ambady (2003) hypothesized that being put in a position of authority acts as a releaser for prejudiced attitudes, so that White people put in a position of authority over a Black person would show more prejudice than White people put in a subordinate position to a Black person. Richeson and Ambady ensured that their proposed cause came before the effect by manipulating two independent variables, the amount of authority the participants had over a coworker and the race of the coworker. Richeson

and Ambady manipulated the authority variable by telling the participants in the research (all of whom were White) that they would be working on a task with another person. The participants in one condition of the authority variable were told that they would be the other person's supervisor and those in the other condition were told that they would be the other person's subordinate. They were then led to believe that the other person was either White or Black, thereby creating the conditions of the other independent variable. Note that Richeson and Ambady have not yet measured their participants' level of prejudice, so in the experiment, the proposed causes of prejudice tested in the experiment—being a supervisor or subordinate and race of the work partner—were able to have an effect on the participants' attitudes before those attitudes were measured. That is, the researchers created a situation in which they knew that the proposed cause came before the proposed effect.

Richeson and Ambady (2003) used two strategies to prevent alternative explanations for any effect of authority. First, they structured their research situation to ensure that the only factors that could affect the dependent variable were authority and race of the work partner. They did so by making participants' experiences in each condition of the experiment identical except for the events that created that condition of the independent variable. So, for example, regardless of the condition they experienced, all participants took part in the experiment in the same room, interacted with the same experimenter, went through the steps of the experiment in the same order, and had the dependent variable measured in the same way. That is, the independent variables were the only factors that differed from condition to condition in the experiment and so were the only factors in the research situation that could affect participants' responses on the dependent variable.

The other way Richeson and Ambady (2003) forestalled alternative explanations was by randomly determining which condition each participant would experience. This procedure ensured that any personal characteristics of the participants that might influence their responses on the dependent variable would be evenly distributed across the conditions of the independent variables. For example, the participants in the experiment probably differed in their levels of preexisting prejudice. If participants are randomly assigned to conditions, probability theory tells us that if a highly prejudiced person is put into the high authority condition, another highly prejudiced person will probably be put into the low authority condition. Although preexisting prejudice would have an effect on prejudice as measured in the experiment, the additional amount of prejudice from the highly prejudiced person in the high authority condition would be offset by the additional amount of prejudice from the highly prejudiced person in the low authority condition. When the researchers look at the difference between conditions (which is how the data from experiments are analyzed), the effects created by the two highly prejudiced people cancel each other out, leaving only the difference caused by the effect of the independent variable. Box 2.1 provides a concrete example of this process.

Covariation, the third criterion for causality, is shown in experiments if there is a statistically significant difference between conditions of the independent variable. For example, Richeson and Ambady (2003) found that participants showed more prejudice when they thought they were going to be a Black person's

**B o x 2.1    Random Assignment as a Control Procedure in Experiments**

Let us assume that Richeson and Ambady’s (2003) hypothesis is correct, and that being in a high authority position rather than a low authority position raises prejudice scores by 15 points on a 100-point scale. Let us also assume that having a high level of preexisting prejudice adds 25 points to a person’s prejudice score. In such a case, the outcome for a highly prejudiced person in each condition would look like this:

**Condition of Independent Variable**

|                                     | High<br>Authority | Low<br>Authority |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Effect of preexisting<br>prejudice: | 25                | 25               |
| Effect of independent<br>variable:  | 15                | 0                |
| Total effect:                       | 40                | 25               |

When the researchers analyze their data, they will subtract the average prejudice score in the low authority condition from the average score in the high authority condition. In the example,

40 points – 25 points = 15 points, the effect of the independent variable; the effect preexisting prejudice had in the low authority condition offset the effect it had in the high authority condition.

It is important to note, however, that although random assignment makes it likely that personal factors such as attitudes and personality traits will balance out across conditions of the independent variable, there is no guarantee that it will happen. That is, it is possible, although highly unlikely, that a purely random assignment process would result in most of the highly prejudiced people being in one condition and most of the low prejudiced people in the other condition. If this were to happen, any differences between conditions would look like they occurred because of the effect of the independent variable. However, in fact, they would be due to either the effect of prejudice or a combination of the effects of prejudice and the effects of the independent variable. There is no easy way to prevent such errors of randomization, although probability theory indicates that they would be extremely rare. The possibility of such errors is one reason why researchers conduct replication research, as discussed in the chapter.

supervisor than when they thought they were going to be her subordinate. In contrast, having high versus low authority had no effect on prejudice when the other person was White. Any time the two conditions of the independent variable differ significantly, covariation has occurred.

**Laboratory Experiments.** Researchers can conduct experiments in a variety of contexts. In **laboratory experiments**, such as the one Richeson and Ambady (2003) conducted, the research is carried out in a highly controlled environment. This high degree of control lets researchers construct situations that meet all the criteria for causality, but it also entails a high degree of artificiality. For example, the participants in Richeson and Ambady’s experiment never met the other person, they only read a biographical summary that had a picture of a White or Black woman attached and prejudice was assessed using a measure presented on a computer. Thus, laboratory experiments provide a high degree of control that allows researchers to draw confident conclusions about causality, but with a loss of naturalism. That is, the controlled conditions of the laboratory can be very different from the free-flowing situations people encounter in everyday life. As a result, the question arises of whether the results found under artificial laboratory conditions hold up under more naturalistic conditions.

**Field Experiments.** One way to achieve greater naturalism is to conduct a field experiment. In **field experiments**, researchers manipulate an independent

variable in a natural setting while maintaining as much control as possible over the research situation. For example, Michelle Hebl and her colleagues (Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002) wanted to determine the extent to which lesbians and gay men were subject to discrimination in everyday situations. They conducted their research at a shopping mall in Texas by having research assistants who were supposedly gay or straight go to stores, ask to speak with a manager, and ask the manager for a job application. The gay versus straight independent variable was manipulated by having the research assistants wear a hat with the slogan “Gay and Proud” or one with the slogan “Texan and Proud.” To prevent the research assistants from behaving differently based on which hat they were wearing, they were told not to look at the slogan and to avoid mirrors and reflective glass. All the research assistants were dressed in a fashion common to shoppers at the mall and were trained to behave in the same way in each store they entered. The research assistants carried concealed tape recorders to record their conversations. Hebl and her colleagues (2002) used two sets of dependent variables. They assessed formal discrimination by comparing the percentage of “gay” and “straight” job applicants who were told there was a job available, were invited to fill out applications, and who were called back for a job interview. The researchers did not expect differences on these measures, reasoning that social norms forbid formal discrimination. However, they did expect differences on measures of informal discrimination: They expected the managers to spend less time with the “gay” job applicants, to say less to them, and to act in a less friendly manner. All of the researchers’ hypotheses were supported.

Although field experiments add a degree of naturalism to experimental research, they can be difficult to conduct. For example, Hebl and her colleagues (2002) used 16 research assistants, all of whom had to be trained and monitored to ensure that they followed their instructions. Also, the researchers had little control over the research setting; for example, they could not always be sure that the person a research assistant talked to had the authority to make hiring decisions. The essential problem is that it is never possible to create a research situation that simultaneously maximizes naturalism and control: To get more naturalism, researchers must give up some control; conversely, to get more control, researchers must give up some naturalism.

**Experiments within Surveys.** One shortcoming of both laboratory and field experiments is that they must use convenience samples. Not only would it be prohibitively expensive to bring a probability sample of participants to a laboratory, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of people would agree to go. Similar expense problems would accompany an attempt to use a probability sample of field settings, such as shopping malls. However, researchers can get probability samples for experiments by conducting experiments as part of surveys—having several versions of the survey, each version representing a different condition of the independent variable.

For example, Mark Peffley, Jon Hurwitz, and Paul Sniderman (1997) wanted to see how much effect racial stereotypes had on people’s opinions about women who received welfare payments. Their hypothesis was that personal

characteristics of the person being judged, such as whether she was a high school graduate or dropout, would have more influence than race. They created a survey that had four versions that varied by the target person's race and graduation status. The question read, "Now think about a black [white] woman in her early twenties. She is a high school graduate [drop out] ... and she has been on welfare for the past year. How likely do you think it is that she will try hard to find a job in the next year?" (Peffley et al., 1997, p. 36; the wording for the other conditions is shown in brackets). The survey was administered to a national probability sample of more than 1,600 people. As Peffley and his colleagues had hypothesized, the woman's dropout status had more effect on opinions that did her race: 62 percent of the people asked about the high school graduate thought it very or somewhat likely that she would try hard to find a job compared to 48 percent of the people asked about the high school dropout, but responses to the Black and White woman did not differ significantly within high school completion conditions.

A great advantage of experiments within surveys is that if the surveys use probability samples, the researchers can have a great deal of confidence in their ability to accurately generalize their results to the population as a whole. However, they are limited in that they can only incorporate independent variables that can be manipulated by changing the questions. In addition, as with laboratory experiments, naturalism is low; for example, the researchers only ask people questions over the telephone, they do not observe people's behavior in its usual context. Once again, there are trade-offs, this time between a gain in generalizability and a loss of naturalism and of the types of independent variables researchers can use.

**Individual Difference Variables within Experiments.** Although a defining characteristic of experiments is manipulation of independent variables, a study can simultaneously include manipulated experimental variables and nonmanipulated individual difference variables such as personality traits, attitudes, and so forth. It is important to bear in mind the distinction between manipulated and nonmanipulated variables because although it is appropriate to conclude that a manipulated independent variable caused any observed effects on the dependent variable, it is not appropriate to draw such causal conclusions for nonmanipulated variables.

Consider, for example, a study conducted by Jeffrey Bernat and his colleagues (Bernat, Calhoun, Adams, & Zeichner, 2001). The researchers wanted to see if there was a relationship between attitudes toward homosexuality and aggression toward gay men. In a laboratory experiment, they established a situation in which heterosexual male research participants had the opportunity to administer an electric shock to another male research participant who they thought was in a different room but who actually did not exist. The participants were led to believe that the other person was either gay or straight by being randomly assigned to see a videotape of the person. In the "gay" condition, the other person talked about his boyfriend; in the "straight" condition, he talked about his girlfriend. Thus, the sexual orientation of the other person was a

manipulated variable. However, a primary concern of Bernat and his colleagues was the participants' attitudes toward homosexuality. This variable had been measured several weeks previously, and the researchers selected 30 men who had scored very high on a measure of negative attitudes and 30 who had scored very low on the measure to participate in the study. Half the men who scored high had the opportunity to administer shocks to the "gay" man and half had the opportunity to administer shocks to the "straight" man; similarly, half the men who scored low had the opportunity to administer shocks to the "gay" man and half had the opportunity to administer shocks to the "straight" man.

One of the dependent variables Bernat and colleagues (2001) used was the percentage of time participants chose to give the most severe shock possible. They found that of the men with highly negative attitudes, 38 percent gave the most severe shock to the "gay" person but only 16 percent gave the most severe shock to the "straight" person. The men who scored very low on negative attitudes toward homosexuality chose the most severe shock less than 1 percent of the time regardless of the other person's supposed sexual orientation. What is the most appropriate interpretation of these results? Because sexual orientation of the other person was a manipulated variable, it is correct to say that thinking that a man is gay rather than straight can cause men with highly negative attitudes toward homosexuality to be more aggressive toward the gay man. However, even though the men with highly negative attitudes were more aggressive to both the "gay" and "straight" person, it is not appropriate to say that holding negative attitudes toward homosexuality causes men to be more aggressive overall. It is not appropriate to draw a causal conclusion because the attitude variable was measured rather than manipulated; as a result, that aspect of the research was a correlational study. That is, research participants were not randomly assigned to hold negative or positive attitudes toward homosexuality; they came to the experiment already holding those beliefs. Therefore, all the limitations on drawing causal conclusions from correlational data apply. The moral of this story is that researchers and readers of research reports must carefully examine all aspects of a study to evaluate which aspects are correlational or experimental, and to draw causal conclusions only on the basis of experimental data.

### **Ethnographic Studies**

**Ethnographic research** uses a variety of qualitative data collection techniques, including participating in events, observing behavior, and conducting interviews, to come to an understanding of how people experience and interpret events in their daily lives. Ethnographic research also emphasizes studying behavior in the context in which it occurs as a way of understanding the influence of context on behavior. In contrast to experimental research, then, ethnographic research emphasizes naturalism over control and understanding events from the research participants' points of view over constructing events (such as research settings, experimental manipulations, and operational definitions of dependent variables) that reflect the researchers' point of view. To some extent, ethnographic research also emphasizes the discovery of new phenomena over the testing of theories,



although ethnographic research can test theoretical propositions and the results of ethnographic research can be used to construct theories.

Kathleen Blee (2002) used ethnographic research methods to study women who were members of hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. She wanted to understand why women join racist groups, which are also extremely sexist, and how membership in the group affected their daily lives. She also wanted to learn the ways in which group members were similar to and different from women who were not members of such groups. Blee used a variety of techniques, including interviewing women and attending events their groups sponsored. Blee's results are discussed more fully in Chapter 9, but some of her findings include that, contrary to common conceptions about hate group members, most of the women were middle class, well educated, and came from stable families; they were recruited into their groups by friends who were group members; they were motivated by a number of factors, including the belief that American society was deteriorating and that the group provided a mechanism for addressing the societal problems they saw themselves as facing; and that they were not extremely racist when they joined the group, but became so as a result of group membership.

### Content Analysis

Like ethnography, content analysis is a way of studying a topic in a naturalistic manner. However, instead of studying people, researchers doing **content analysis** study products people create, such as documents, photographs, and works of art, to identify themes that help the researcher understand the topic being studied. For example, Megan McDonald (1999) examined the Web sites of 30 racist groups to examine, among other factors, how they justified their views. She found that 21 percent claimed that Whites were being victimized, 25 percent used cultural symbols such as quotations from famous people, 21 percent used historical references, 11 percent used legal references, and 4 percent claimed scientific support.

Content analysis is not limited to written materials; it can be applied to images as well. This approach is illustrated by Gerry Finn's (1997) analysis of murals painted on the exterior walls of buildings in Northern Ireland by loyalists (those who want to continue to be part of the United Kingdom) and republicans (those who want independence from England and unification with the Republic of Ireland). He wanted to determine the themes the artists used to justify violence as a means of attaining their groups' goals. He concluded that loyalists justified violence by drawing parallels between the use of violence in the original English conquest of Ireland and in suppressing rebellions against English rule and loyalist groups' current efforts to maintain that dominance. Republican murals, in contrast, justified violence by portraying it as the only effective response to the Catholic minority's victimization by the British government. However, Finn concluded that, despite their differing content, the murals of both groups had the same goal: to give the impression that the community supports violence as a means to political ends.

## Using Multiple Research Strategies

As Table 2.2 shows, the various research strategies have both advantages and limitations. Consequently, when drawing conclusions about the validity of a hypothesis, researchers like to have a body of evidence based on a variety of methodologies that have offsetting strengths and limitations. If the results of research conducted using different methods all point to the same conclusions, researchers can have a great deal of faith in those conclusions.

Consider, for example, the relative deprivation theory of prejudice (see Chapter 9). In its simplest form, the theory proposes that prejudice arises when people believe that their ingroup is being deprived of some social benefit that another group is receiving. This perception of being deprived leads to feelings of resentment and prejudice against the other group. Do feelings of relative deprivation, in fact, lead to prejudice?

Ethnographic research suggests that it does. For example, based on her interviews and observations, Blee (2002) noted that “racist groups depict hordes of nonwhite immigrants or welfare recipients as overwhelming the resources of the U.S. economy and taking tax money, jobs, and resources that rightfully belong to whites.... Members of racial minorities are seen as threatening white prosperity with their ability to turn the tables, to change from victims into victimizers” (p. 80). Recall also, that McDonald (1999) found that 21 percent of racist Web sites portrayed Whites as victims. Thus, hate groups try to appeal to White people who see themselves as losing out economically to members of minority groups.

**TABLE 2.2 Some Advantages and Limitations of Various Research Strategies**

| Strategy                | Advantages                                                                                             | Limitations                                                                                                         |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Surveys</b>          |                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                     |
| Probability sample      | Generalizability to population as a whole                                                              | Expensive to carry out; can ask only a limited number of questions; usually cannot draw conclusions about causality |
| Convenience sample      | Less expensive; can ask more questions                                                                 | Low generalizability; usually cannot draw conclusions about causes                                                  |
| <b>Experiments</b>      |                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                     |
| Laboratory              | High control allows one to draw conclusions about causality                                            | Artificiality of manipulations and measures; low generalizability from convenience samples                          |
| Field                   | Balance between control and naturalism                                                                 | Can be difficult to carry out; types of manipulations and measures used are limited                                 |
| Within survey           | High control allows conclusions about causality; high generalizability when probability sample is used | Can only manipulate question content; can ask only a limited number of questions in probability samples             |
| <b>Ethnography</b>      | High degree of naturalism                                                                              | Low control, so cannot draw conclusions about causality; low generalizability because of convenience samples        |
| <b>Content analysis</b> | High degree of naturalism; high generalizability if sampling is done carefully                         | Limited to what people write or create (may not reflect beliefs)                                                    |

But how generalizable are these results? Ulrich Wagner and Andreas Zick (1995) conducted a survey using a probability sample of residents of four Western European countries. They found a correlation of  $r = .25$  between feelings of relative deprivation and prejudice against minority groups. Thus, ethnographic and survey studies show that a relationship exists between relative deprivation and prejudice. But do feelings of relative deprivation cause prejudice?

To determine if relative deprivation causes prejudice, Serge Guimond and Michaël Dambrun (2002) conducted a laboratory experiment in which psychology majors were led to feel either deprived or not deprived relative to economics majors. The researchers then measured the students' prejudice against minority groups. As relative deprivation theory predicts, the deprived students expressed significantly more prejudice than did the nondeprived students. Thus, by looking at a variety of studies conducted using different research strategies, we can conclude that feelings of relative deprivation cause prejudice (based on laboratory experimentation), that this effect is probably found throughout the population (based on survey research), and that it operates in everyday life (based on ethnographic and content analysis research).

## MEASURING STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION

To study stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, researchers must be able to measure them. Measuring these variables is difficult because researchers cannot assess them directly. That is, although researchers can directly measure what appear to be the effects of prejudice on people's behavior—what they say and what they do—there is no way to look inside people's heads and directly see how prejudiced they are. Because prejudice (and many other psychological variables) can only be measured indirectly, researchers must be confident that the measures they use accurately assess prejudice. Therefore, the first part of this section reviews two essential criteria for accurate measurement, reliability and validity. We then discuss various ways in which stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination can be measured: self-reports, observations of behavior, assessment of physiological responses, and the use of what are called implicit cognition measures. The section concludes with a brief discussion of the benefits of using more than one measure when studying prejudice.

### Reliability and Validity

Two basic criteria for assessing the quality of a measure are reliability and validity. Although the two concepts are related, they deal with different issues.

**Reliability.** The **reliability** of a measure is its consistency in providing essentially the same result each time it is used with the same person. Researchers expect this kind of consistency, or stability across time, from measures because they assume

that the characteristics being measured are relatively stable across time. For example, we assume that although attitudes can change they usually change slowly, so that if we measure a person's racial attitudes now and do so again a month from now, those attitudes will be pretty much the same both times. Notice that we expect them to be "pretty much the same," not exactly the same. That is because no measure is perfect and there will always be some degree of error.

The reliability of a measure can be assessed in many ways, but the two most common are test-retest and internal consistency. To assess the **test-retest reliability** of a measure, researchers have a group of people complete the measure at two different times. They then compute the correlation coefficient between the time 1 scores and the time 2 scores; the higher the correlation, the more reliable the measure. The internal consistency of a measure can be assessed when the measure consists of multiple items or questions, as do most attitude measures. **Internal consistency** represents the extent to which people respond in the same way to all the items. For example, if people have positive attitudes they should consistently give high ratings to items that reflect these positive beliefs and low ratings to items that reflect negative beliefs. Researchers assess the internal consistency of a measure by having people complete it once and then using a special statistical technique to examine consistency of response. The resulting statistic looks like a correlation coefficient and can be interpreted the same way: The higher the coefficient, the more reliable the measure is. You are more likely to see internal consistency coefficients than test-retest coefficients in research reports because internal consistency is easier to assess. However, the internal consistency coefficients of measures are correlated with their test-retest coefficients (Schuerger, Zarella, & Hotz, 1989), so a measure that is internally consistent is also likely to be stable across time.

**Validity.** Although a reliable measure is assessing something consistently, that consistency does not mean that it measures what it is intended to measure; that is, it could be measuring the wrong thing in a consistent manner. The **validity** of a measure refers to its accuracy: A perfectly valid measure assesses the characteristic it is supposed to assess, assesses all aspects of the characteristic, and assesses only that characteristic. Consider racial attitudes. Researchers want a measure of racial attitudes to assess racial attitudes and not something else, such as a person's positive or negative attitudes toward people in general. Because, as we will see shortly, racial attitudes can be made up of many components, a measure of those attitudes should assess all these components. Finally, a measure of racial attitudes should not be assessing something else at the same time, such as a person's tendency to give socially desirable, or so-called politically correct, responses.

Unlike the use of the correlation coefficient in research on reliability, the validity of a measure cannot usually be summarized as a single number. Instead, researchers must collect a variety of research evidence and draw conclusions about the validity of the measure from that evidence. To do this, researchers use two broad categories of evidence, convergent validity and discriminant validity.

**Convergent validity** refers to the degree to which scores on a measure correlate with scores on measures of the same or related characteristics and with behaviors that are related to the characteristic being measured. For example,

Melanie and Todd Morrison (2002) created a measure of attitudes toward homosexuality. They reasoned that scores on their measure should correlate with scores on another measure of attitudes toward homosexuality, but that the correlation would be moderate rather than large because they were assessing subtle forms of prejudice, an aspect of the attitude that other measures did not assess. They also expected scores on their measures to correlate with scores on measures of political conservatism and traditional gender-role beliefs because previous research found correlations between these variables and attitudes toward homosexuality. They further expected people who scored high on their measure to avoid sitting next to a lesbian or gay man when they could do so without appearing to be prejudiced because people with negative attitudes toward homosexuality should want to avoid contact with lesbians and gay men. Research supported all of the hypotheses: Scores on Morrison and Morrison's measure had a correlation of  $r = .56$  with another measure of attitudes toward homosexuality and correlations of  $r = .50$  with political conservatism and  $r = .47$  with traditional gender-role beliefs. They also found that 56 percent of high scorers avoided sitting with a lesbian or gay man, compared to 11 percent of low scorers. Taken as a whole, these results support the convergent validity of Morrison and Morrison's measure.

**Discriminant validity** refers to the extent to which a measure does not assess characteristics that it is not supposed to assess. One factor researchers do not want their measures to assess is the degree to which people give socially desirable responses. For example, it is not socially desirable to be prejudiced, so if a prejudice measure were assessing respondents' tendencies to give socially desirable responses along with (or instead of) their attitudes, a low score could mean that respondents were trying to "look good" rather than that they had low levels of prejudice. For example, David Evans and his colleagues (Evans, Garcia, Garcia, & Baron, 2003) found that research participants gave less prejudiced responses to survey questions when a researcher was in the room with them than when the researcher was absent. Because there are a number of ways of measuring people's tendency to give socially desirable responses (see, for example, Paulhus, 1991), researchers can determine the extent to which **social desirability response bias** (as it is called) is correlated with scores on their measures.

### Self-Report Measures

The most commonly used method of assessing stereotypes and prejudice is **self-report**: asking people about their attitudes, opinions, and behaviors and then recording what they say. Self-reports can be used to assess the stereotypes people hold, their prejudices toward various groups, and their behavior toward those groups.

**Assessing Stereotypes.** As we saw in Chapter 1, stereotypes represent shared beliefs and opinions about the characteristics of groups; some measures of stereotypes simply assess the content of those beliefs. One classic, and still widely used, measure is the Katz and Braly (1933) checklist. This measure consists of a list of

traits, such as lazy, hardworking, religious, and so forth; respondents check off which traits they think describe a given ethnic, racial, or other group. John Dovidio and his colleagues (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996) provide a summary of the stereotypes of White and Black Americans assessed across a 60-year period using the checklist method. One benefit of using a measure consistently is that it allows researchers to see how stereotypes change over time. For example, Dovidio and colleagues' research suggests that the stereotypes of Blacks and Whites have become more similar across time. However, as Patricia Devine and Andrew Elliot (1995) have noted, when using checklists to assess stereotypes researchers must be careful to avoid two possible sources of error. First, the traits used in the checklist must assess current stereotypes; stereotypes change over time, so checklists can become outdated. Second, as we discuss in Chapter 3, a person can know what the stereotype of a group consists of but not personally accept it as valid. Therefore, researchers must distinguish between social stereotypes (what the culturally shared beliefs are) and personal beliefs (what individuals personally believe) when instructing people what to mark off on the checklist. For example, Devine and Elliot found that whereas the traits people indicated as representing the social stereotype of African Americans were generally negative, the traits they chose as representing their personal beliefs were more positive.

Researchers also assess stereotype content by asking people how likely or unlikely they think it is that group members have various characteristics. Likelihood is often measured as a probability rating (for example, Deaux & Lewis, 1984) so that, for example, a person might say that 75 percent of men and 25 percent of women have leadership skills. When these estimates are obtained for more than one group, ratio scores can be computed that indicate the extent to which people believe that members of two or more groups differ from one another (Martin, 1987). In the example just given, men were seen to be three times more likely than women to have leadership skills, a 3 to 1 ratio. Such measures have also been used to assess stereotype accuracy (McCauley & Stitt, 1978). To do this, researchers compare respondents' judgments of the degree to which a group has a characteristic with the average extent to which group members actually have the characteristic as determined by survey research or other methods. We discuss stereotype accuracy in more detail in Chapter 3.

Other researchers have used free response measures, in which respondents make their own lists of characteristics rather than using a list the researchers provide, to assess both stereotyping and prejudice. For example, Alice Eagly, Antonio Mladinic, and Stacy Otto (1994) asked respondents to list five characteristics they associated with men and five characteristics they associated with women; the respondents then rated the extent to which they thought each characteristic they had listed was positive or negative. Thus, Eagly and her colleagues collected information about both the characteristics respondents associated with women and men and the respondents' own views about whether the attributes were positive or negative. These ratings can be combined to produce a measure of prejudice. An advantage of free response measures is that respondents are not influenced by researchers' preconceived ideas about the stereotypes of any

particular group; instead, individuals provide their own beliefs about a group's characteristics.

**Assessing Prejudice.** Most prejudice measures take the form of attitude questionnaires, asking respondents to rate the extent to which they agree or disagree with statements about groups. The items on a measure can deal with emotional responses to groups, beliefs about the characteristics of group members or inter-group relations, and often with both (Biernat & Crandall, 1999). Emotional responses can be assessed in several ways. One way is to directly ask people how they feel about a group by having them respond to items such as "Thinking about [group] makes me feel [adjective]." The adjectives would be emotion-related words such as *tense*, *relaxed*, and so forth. Another approach is to ask people to rate how comfortable they feel when they interact with members of a group. Finally, researchers can have respondents rate the extent to which adjectives apply to a group as a whole. The adjectives are pretested to determine the degree to which people see them as positive or negative, and often represent group stereotypes and their opposites, such as lazy and hardworking. Thus, this type of measure assesses the extent to which people agree with stereotypes about groups as well as their emotional responses to the groups.

Asking about people's stereotypic beliefs is a rather blatant way of assessing prejudice and can lead to the problem of socially desirable responding. Therefore, researchers have developed measures that assess beliefs that are more subtly related to prejudice. These measures include beliefs indicating resentment toward a group, such as believing that the group is getting more than it deserves from government social policies; beliefs about social policies, such as affirmative action, that aid some groups; and beliefs that members of other groups violate values that respondents see as important (Biernat & Crandall, 1999). Some theorists believe that measures of blatant and subtle prejudice represent different forms of bias; we discuss that distinction in Chapter 6.

**Assessing Behavior.** Self-report measures also can assess how people behave toward members of other groups, or at least how people say they behave or would behave. Thus, self-report measures can assess discrimination as well as stereotypes and prejudice. These measures take two forms. On one type of measure, respondents report how often they have performed various behaviors, such as ignoring a member of a given group in a social situation (for example, Roderick, McCammon, Long, & Allred, 1998). On the other type of measure, people report how they would respond in various situations. One example of this type is also one of the earliest measures of prejudice and discrimination, Emory Bogardus's (1928) Social Distance Scale. On this scale and similar measures respondents report how closely they would be willing to associate with members of a given group, ranging from not allowing the group member to marry into the respondent's family to exclusion from the respondent's country. On other measures of behavior people respond to more specific situations, such as what they would do if they were present when a friend used an insulting term for a minority group (for example,

Byrnes & Kiger, 1988). As with measures of blatant prejudice, socially desirable responding can be a problem for self-reports of behavior.

**Advantages and Disadvantages.** Self-report measures are popular for a number of reasons. Self-report measures, especially questionnaires on which respondents record their own answers to questions, are easy to administer and efficient in that many people can complete them at the same time. In contrast, many other forms of measurement require that people be assessed individually. Self-report instruments can also cover multiple topics (such as prejudice toward different groups) and about behavior in a variety of situations (such as work, school, and social settings), whereas other types of measures are often limited to assessing one form of prejudice in one situation. In contrast to many other types of measures, self-report does not require special equipment that may be costly to obtain or require extensive training to use properly. Finally, self-report is the only way to find out what people think, such as their reasons for holding certain opinions or for behaving in certain ways.

Although it has many advantages, self-report also has a major disadvantage: It is easy for people to edit what they say and to conceal their true attitudes and opinions. Many factors affect people's willingness to express their true attitudes, especially when it comes to prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), and so motivate socially desirable responding. Researchers therefore have developed a number of methods to reduce motivation to give socially desirable responses and to increase motivation to give accurate responses. The simplest way to reduce socially desirable responding on questionnaires is to maintain the anonymity of the respondents: People are more likely to give accurate responses to survey questions when they feel that no one can associate their answers with them personally (Krosnick, 1999). Other ways of reducing socially desirable responding include using unobtrusive and implicit cognition measures so that people do not realize that prejudice is being measured, and assessing responses that are difficult for people to control, such as physiological responses (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007).

### Unobtrusive Measures

**Unobtrusive measures** are characterized by subtlety: They give the impression that they have nothing to do with prejudice or that they are unrelated to the research study taking place. Two common forms of unobtrusive measurement used in studies of prejudice involve behavior and judgments.

**Behavior.** In contrast to self-report measures, behavioral measures assess what people do rather than what they say, and so can be used to assess discrimination as well as prejudice. Because people can control and edit their behavior just as they can their self-reports, researchers use behavioral measures that appear to have nothing to do with prejudice or discrimination.

One unobtrusive behavioral measure is helping. For example, Ute Gabriel and Ranier Banse (2006) had a male or female actor call randomly selected telephone numbers, introduce themselves as Anna or Michael, and ask to talk with



either Maria or Peter. The combination of the caller's sex and the sex of the person asked for, along with the caller's referring to Maria or Peter as his or her boyfriend or girlfriend, implied either a heterosexual or homosexual relationship. When told that they had reached the wrong number, the callers said that they were trying to reach their boyfriend or girlfriend because the caller's car had broken down and the caller would be late in getting home and didn't want the boyfriend or girlfriend to worry. The callers then said that they were calling from a public telephone and that their phone card had run out of minutes. The callers then asked the person answering the phone to pass the message on, giving the phone number to call. The measure of helping was the percentage of people who made the call. Grabriel and Banse found that heterosexual callers were more likely to be helped than homosexual callers and that lesbians and gay men were helped at the same rate.

Researchers can also measure what might be called symbolic distance as well as physical distance. For example, Janet Swim, Melissa Ferguson, and Lauri Hyers (1999) had heterosexual women answer questions as part of a group discussion; the questions had been pretested to determine which answer people were most and least likely to give. Three members of the group (all working for the researchers) answered some questions in the least popular way. A fourth member of the group (also working for the researchers) answered those questions in the most popular way; this dissenter had identified herself as either lesbian or heterosexual based on an answer to an earlier question. Swim and her colleagues found that participants symbolically distanced themselves from the lesbian dissenter by agreeing with her less often than with the heterosexual dissenter. Other behaviors that have been used to assess prejudice include making or avoiding eye contact, leaning toward or away from another person during a conversation, and aggression (Maass, Castelli, & Arcuri, 2000).

**Judgments.** When research participants evaluate other people in a context that appears to be unrelated to prejudice, they are completing judgmental measures. For example, John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner (2000) asked people to read résumés of job applicants and decide whether a given person should be hired as a student peer counselor. The résumés included both positive and negative information. In a pretest that excluded information about the applicant's race, 50 percent of the participants recommended the person for the job. Results of the main study showed that when the race of the applicant was implied by information in the résumé, such as membership in student organizations, White participants recommended Black applicants 45 percent of the time, whereas they recommended White applicants 75 percent of the time.

### Physiological Measures

Physiological measures assess changes in the body's responses to a stimulus. Physiological measures that have been used in research on prejudice include cardiovascular responses such as heart rate and blood pressure, the electrical conductivity of the skin, voice pitch, small movements of the facial muscles, eye blink rate,

electrical activity in certain area of the brain (referred to as event-related potentials), and brain imaging (for example, functional magnetic resonance imaging or fMRI). For the most part, these measures can distinguish between positive and negative emotional reactions to a stimulus and can indicate the intensity of the reactions. They cannot, however, distinguish between different types of emotions such as fear, anger, and disgust (Guglielmi, 1999). However, as Sergio Guglielmi (1999) noted, for research on prejudice it is probably sufficient to know how intense a person's reaction to a member of another group is and whether that reaction is positive or negative rather than the specific emotion involved.

The big advantage that physiological measures have over self-report and unobtrusive measures is that most physiological responses are not under voluntary control, and so it is difficult for people to "edit" them. Even with responses that people can try to control, such as facial expression, recording equipment can detect a change even when onlookers cannot (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986). Finally, strong evidence demonstrates the validity of physiological measures as indicators of emotional valence (positive or negative) and intensity (Blascovich, 2000; Guglielmi, 1999). Despite these advantages, from the end of the 1970s until recently, researchers rarely used physiological measures to study prejudice. Guglielmi (1999) attributes this lack of use to several factors, including an emphasis on the cognitive over the emotional aspects of prejudice that began in the 1980s (see Box 2.2); a lack of training in physiological psychology on the

### Box 2.2 The Interplay of Theory and Research Methodology

Until the 1960s, theorists and researchers conceptualized prejudice in terms of motivation, personality, and emotion (Fiske, 1998): People were seen as having needs such as those for security and self-esteem, and rejection of outgroup members was seen as a strategy for meeting those needs. In addition, perceived threats of minority groups to majority group members' economic security and traditional values were thought to lead to frustration, which in turn led to feelings of hostility toward those groups. In research that was based on this perspective, one way in which emotional responses to minority group members was assessed was by physiological measures (Guglielmi, 1999).

Then, in 1967, Ulrich Neisser published the first book to bear the title of *Cognitive Psychology*, bringing what has come to be known as the "cognitive revolution" to the attention of psychologists in other fields (Hergenhahn, 2005). The primary focus in psychology shifted from factors such as personality, motivation, and emotion to cognition, and from how personality, motives, and emotion affect behavior to how thinking affects behavior. One reason for this change in emphasis was that the older theories were

coming to be seen as stale and offering no new insights into human behavior; cognitive theories, in contrast, promised and provided, useful new insights (S. Taylor, 1998). Research on the personality, motivational, and emotional correlates of prejudice was not abandoned, but those perspectives took a backseat to the cognitive perspective (Fiske, 1998). As a result, the use of physiological measures, which assess emotional responses, fell out of use in prejudice research (Guglielmi, 1999).

The pendulum began to swing back in the other direction in the 1980s, when researchers began to examine how cognition and emotion affected one another (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Spurred both by new theories of emotion and improvements in technology, physiological measures began to make a comeback in the study of prejudice (Guglielmi, 1999). Thus, theories not only provide hypotheses to be tested in research, they can also have a strong influence on the methodology used in the research. In this case, a shift in theoretical emphasis away from emotion to cognition led to the temporary abandonment of physiological measures in the study of prejudice.

part of researchers, mostly social psychologists, who conduct most of the research on prejudice; and the inherent disadvantages of psychophysiological research, including the cost of the equipment and the need for special training in the operation of that equipment. Nonetheless, some recent research shows the value of physiological measurement of prejudice.

Two studies illustrate the use of these measures. Wendy Mendes and her colleagues (Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002) measured White college students' cardiovascular responses while interacting with a Black or White student. The particular pattern of responses that Mendes and her colleagues measured assesses feelings of threat as opposed to readiness to take on a challenging but nonthreatening task. The research participants showed threat responses when interacting with a Black student and challenge responses when interacting with a White student. Eric Vanman and his colleagues (Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997) studied facial muscle responses; one pattern of muscle responses indicates a positive emotional reaction to a stimulus, another pattern indicates a negative reaction. Vanman and his colleagues measured their research participants' responses while the participants looked at pictures of Black people or White people. The changes in their muscular activity indicated negative responses to the pictures of Black people and positive responses to the pictures of White people. An important aspect of these studies was that, in both cases, self-report measures found no evidence of prejudice; on the contrary, the Black task partners in Mendes and colleagues' study and the pictured Black people in Vanman and colleagues' study received more positive ratings than did their White counterparts. Thus, the physiological measures detected a prejudiced response when the self-report measures did not.

An emerging area of psychophysiological research on prejudice uses brain imaging technology such as fMRI. For example, Elizabeth Phelps and her colleagues (2000) used fMRI technology to examine the extent to which one area of the brain, the amygdala, was activated when White research participants looked at pictures of Black and White faces. Phelps and her colleagues focused on amygdala activation because the amygdala is involved in the learning of fear responses and to the expression of learned emotional responses. They found greater amygdala activation in response to pictures of Black faces than to pictures of White faces. In addition, as in the Mendes and colleagues (2002) and Vanman and colleagues (1997) studies, amygdala responses to the pictures of Black versus White faces were unrelated to scores on a self-report measure of prejudice.

### Implicit Cognition Measures

Implicit cognition measures assess the degree to which concepts are associated with one another in memory. So, for example, a researcher could compare the strength of the link between Black and *pleasant* or *unpleasant* with the strength of the link between White and *pleasant* or *unpleasant*. If Black were associated more strongly with unpleasant compared to White and if White were associated more strongly with pleasant compared to Black, then one could conclude that Black had a less pleasant meaning than White for that person, indicating prejudice against Black

people; the stronger the difference in strength of association, the stronger the prejudice. These measures are called *implicit* because they are designed to assess associations without the research participants' being aware of what is being measured. Cognitive psychologists have used implicit measures for a long time to study memory and related processes, but these measures have been adapted to the study of prejudice only fairly recently. The two implicit cognition measures that have been used most often in research on prejudice are priming and the Implicit Association Test (Fazio & Olson, 2003).

In **priming**, exposure to an example of a member of a category, such as a picture of a Black person, activates concepts associated with the category. For example, if a person associates the concept Black with the concept *athletic*, athletic becomes activated. Because athletic has been activated, it will be easier for the person to recognize the word when he or she sees it. In most cases, a prime (the stimulus that causes priming to occur) activates a large number of associated concepts, preparing people to recognize them. When priming is used to assess prejudice, the primes are things associated with a stigmatized group (such as a picture of a Black person) and things associated with a nonstigmatized group (such as a picture of a White person); the dependent variable is the speed with which people can recognize positive or negative words associated with the primes. A faster response to negative words primed with a Black stimulus combined with a faster response to positive words primed with a White stimulus indicates anti-Black prejudice.

Priming measures assess prejudice in terms of the extent to which being exposed to one concept (such as a person's race) facilitates recognition of associated concepts (such as racial stereotypes). The **Implicit Association Test** (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) represents the other side of the coin: It assesses the extent to which unassociated concepts makes responding more difficult. To do this, the IAT uses the principle of *response competition*. Response competition pits two responses against one another, a habitual response and an opposing response. The stronger the habitual response, the longer it takes to make the opposing response. The opposing response is delayed because rather than just making the response, the person has to first suppress the habitual response. The IAT uses the principle of response competition in the following way: White people who are prejudiced against Black people will generally associate positive concepts with Whiteness and negative concepts with Blackness. Consider a situation, then, in which prejudiced White people are shown a series of words and asked to press a key that is under their left hand if a word is either negative or associated with Black people and to press a key under their right hand if the word is either positive or associated with White people. The task will be relatively easy because it requires a habitual response. However, it will be relatively difficult for such people to respond correctly if they are asked to press a key that is under their left hand if a word is either negative or associated with White people and to press a key under their right hand if the word is either positive or associated with Black people: If shown a word associated with Black people, their initial impulse, reflecting their prejudice, will be to press the *negative* key, but that is the wrong response in this case because *negative* is represented by the same key as *White*. Therefore, to make a correct response, they have to stop

### Box 2.3 Using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to Assess Anti-Black Prejudice

Measurement of prejudice using the IAT approach has five steps (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998):

1. Research participants sitting at a computer are told that a face will be shown on the screen. The face is either one of a Black person or one of a White person. The participants are to press the left of two designated keys on the keyboard if they see a White face and the right key if they see a Black face.
2. Participants are told that a word will be put on the screen. The word will represent either a pleasant concept, such as *lucky* or *honor*, or an unpleasant concept, such as *poison* or *grief*. They are to press the left key if the word represents a pleasant concept and the right key if the word represents an unpleasant concept.
3. Participants are told that they will see either a face or a word. If they see a White face or a pleasant word, they are to press the left key; if they see a Black face or an unpleasant word, they are to press the right key. For prejudiced people, this should be an easy task because they already associate Black with unpleasant and White with pleasant and they make the responses for Black

and unpleasant with the same hand and for White and pleasant with the same hand.

4. Participants are told that a face will appear on the screen. They are to press the left key if a Black face appears and the right key if a White face appears.
5. Participants are told to press the left key if they see a Black face or a pleasant word and the right key if they see a White face or an unpleasant word. For prejudiced people, this task should be more difficult than the one in step 3 because when they see a Black face, which for them has unpleasant associations, their first impulse is to press the key associated with unpleasant words. However, in this step that is the wrong response because unpleasant is indicated by the same key as White. Prejudiced participants must therefore stop the automatic response of pressing the right key and then press the left key.

Because the stop-and-restart process in step 5 takes more time than just pressing a key, a person's level of prejudice is indicated by the difference in time it takes to make the step 5 and step 3 responses: the greater the difference, the greater the amount of prejudice.

and think briefly about which key to press, slowing their reaction times. Box 2.3 contains a description of how the IAT is used to assess prejudice.

Implicit cognition measures are useful because they assess prejudice using procedures that make it unlikely that people are aware of what is being studied and that make it difficult for people to consciously control their responses. As a result, their responses are unlikely to be strongly affected by social desirability response bias. However, research using both priming and the IAT requires the use of computer equipment and an environment that minimizes distractions, and so it is usually limited to lab settings. Another characteristic of implicit cognition measures is that scores on them, like scores on physiological measures, tend to have low correlations with scores on self-report measures of prejudice.

### Self-Report versus Physiological and Implicit Cognition Measures

One of the notable findings from research on the measurement of prejudice is that there tend to be low correlations between scores on self-report measures and scores on physiological, implicit cognition, and behavioral measures (Fiske, 2005; Hoffmann, Gawronski, Gschwieder, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Fazio & Olson, 2003;

Mendes et al., 2002). What do these findings mean given that, as noted in the earlier discussion of validity, measures of the same construct should be related to one another?

One answer lies in the factors that affect how attitudes are expressed. Russell Fazio and Tamara Towles-Schwen (1999) have proposed that people will suppress unpopular attitudes that they hold and control their behavior when they are both motivated and able to do so. In the context of self-report measures, people can be motivated by social desirability concerns to suppress attitudes and behavior that will make them appear in a bad light (such as appearing to be prejudiced) and also are able to control the impression they make by how they respond on the measures. In contrast, physiological responses are so automatic that people have little ability to control them. The same is true of implicit cognition measures that use the response competition approach, such as the IAT. Implicit cognition measures that use the priming approach are designed so that people are not aware that their prejudices are being assessed, so there is little motivation to control their responses (Maass et al., 2000). Therefore, the low correlations of self-report with physiological and implicit cognition indicators of prejudice are not surprising: To some extent they are measuring different things—the controlled versus uncontrolled (or automatic) expression of attitudes (Nosek, 2007).

Anne Maass and her colleagues (2000) point out an interesting implication of the distinction between the automatic and controlled expression of attitudes: Sometimes social desirability response bias is not an issue, so self-reports are good indicators of true attitudes. For example, “If we are interested in the racist attitudes of neo-Nazi groups, it may be perfectly superfluous to investigate their implicit beliefs about Blacks through sophisticated [implicit cognition] measures” (Maass et al., 2000, p. 107). Also, some prejudices are more socially acceptable than others, so social desirability concerns will not affect expression of attitudes toward those groups. For example, Francesca Franco and Anne Maass (1999) found that social desirability concerns apparently inhibited expression of explicit negative attitudes toward Jews but did not inhibit expression of negative attitudes toward Islamic fundamentalists.

### Using Multiple Measures

Just as it is useful to study prejudice using more than one research strategy, it is useful to use more than one type of measure when studying prejudice. There are several reasons for doing so. As in the case of multiple research strategies, if the results found with different measures all point in the same direction, we can have more confidence in the validity of the results. As shown in Table 2.3, different measures have different strengths and limitations, so if multiple measures are used, the strengths of one can compensate for the limitations of another. Another reason is that prejudice has at least three aspects—the cognitive (such as beliefs and stereotypes), the emotional, and the behavioral—and, as shown in Table 2.4, different types of measures are better for assessing different aspects of prejudice.

A third reason for using multiple measures is that, as also shown in Table 2.4, self-reports assess controllable expressions of prejudice whereas the other types of measures assess relatively uncontrollable expressions of prejudice. Although one might think that the uncontrollable expression of prejudice is what researchers are

**TABLE 2.3 Some Advantages and Limitations of Measurement Techniques**

| Technique              | Advantages                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Limitations                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Self-report            | Easy to use; questionnaires are efficient and require minimal training; can ask about multiple situations; can assess all three aspects of attitudes: emotion, beliefs, and behavior                                                       | Artificiality; most susceptible to social desirability response bias (SDRB)                                                                                                                                                |
| Unobtrusive behavioral | Naturalistic: can be used in field research; in lab research, can be made to appear unrelated to study (e.g., waiting room); some may take place without the person's being aware of it (e.g., leaning toward or away from another person) | Can assess only a limited number of behaviors in a single setting; susceptible to SDRB if people become aware of purpose of study                                                                                          |
| Judgmental             | Good analog of naturalistic behavior in lab research (e.g., evaluation of job applicant); can be made to appear unrelated to prejudice                                                                                                     | Can assess only a limited number of judgments; susceptible to SDRB if people become aware of purpose of study                                                                                                              |
| Physiological          | Responses occur without conscious control; relatively pure measure of valence (positive or negative) and intensity of emotion                                                                                                              | Can only assess emotional response; cannot assess type of response (anger, fear, etc.); equipment required usually restricts research to lab setting; some equipment is very expensive or requires extensive user training |
| Implicit cognitive     | Participants are not aware that prejudice is being measured                                                                                                                                                                                | Equipment requirements usually restrict research to lab setting; complex procedures can lead research participants to make mistakes                                                                                        |

**TABLE 2.4 Use of Multiple Types of Measures in Research on Prejudice**

| Aspect of Prejudice Measured | Person's Degree of Conscious Control Over Response                                                                                |                                         |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
|                              | Less Control                                                                                                                      | More Control                            |
| Cognitive                    | Implicit cognitive measures such as priming and the IAT; unobtrusive judgmental measures such as ratings of suitability for a job | Self-reports of stereotypes and beliefs |
| Emotional                    | Physiological measures, such as cardiovascular and facial muscle responses                                                        | Self-reports of emotional responses     |
| Behavioral                   | Unobtrusive behavioral indicators such as nonverbal cues                                                                          | Self-reports of behavior                |

“really” interested in, it can be useful to know under what circumstances and to what degree people try to exert control over expressions of prejudice. For example, the conflict between people’s feelings of prejudice and various factors that inhibit and modify the expression of that prejudice plays a central role in the theories of contemporary prejudice that we discuss in Chapter 6.

Finally, it is important to use measures of both the controllable and uncontrollable expression of prejudice because they are related to different types of behaviors.

For example, John Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami, and Samuel Gaertner (2002) conducted a study in which White college students' prejudice was assessed using both a priming measure and a self-report measure. The students later held a conversation with a Black student working with the researchers. Raters who did not know the purpose of the study evaluated the White students' friendliness based on both nonverbal cues, such as eye contact, and verbal cues, such as tone of voice. Dovidio and his colleagues found that prejudice as assessed with the priming measure was related to the White students' nonverbal friendliness during the conversation,  $r = .41$ , but not to their verbal friendliness,  $r = .04$ . In contrast, the White students' self-reports of prejudice were related to their verbal friendliness,  $r = .40$ , but not to their nonverbal friendliness,  $r = .02$ . That is, the expression of prejudiced attitudes over which the students had little control was related to behaviors over which they had little control, but not to their controllable behaviors; the opposite was true for controllable expression of prejudice and controllable behaviors. Thus, prejudice-related behavior appears to exist at two levels, controllable and uncontrollable, and prejudice-related attitudes can be assessed at the same two levels, with controllable attitudes being better predictors of controllable behaviors and uncontrollable attitudes being better predictors of uncontrollable behaviors.

## SUMMARY

Research on prejudice and discrimination serves several purposes: It describes the psychological and social processes that underlie prejudice and discrimination, it aids in the development of theories that can point to ways of reducing prejudice and discrimination, and it can test the effectiveness of programs aimed at reducing prejudice and discrimination. The research process has a number of steps. First, researchers derive hypotheses from theories. Hypotheses are turned into predictions that can be tested in research by operationally defining the variables in the hypotheses. Researchers then collect the data to test the predictions and draw conclusions from those data. Two principal questions the researchers want to answer are (1) were the hypotheses supported by the data; and (2) what do the data mean? Data are frequently open to more than one interpretation, so researchers who hold different theoretical perspectives may make different interpretations of the same data.

Rather than drawing firm conclusions based on a single study, researchers try to verify their results by conducting further research. This verification process addresses two issues. The first is the extent to which the results of the original study could have resulted from the random errors to which all research is open. The second issue is the extent to which the results generalize across variations in research methods, populations, and procedures. Once researchers have confidence in the accuracy of their results, the results can be used to modify the theory as needed. Once researchers are confident that the theory is accurate, it can be used to design applications. The effectiveness of these applications can then be tested with further research.

Research can be conducted in many ways, each of which has its strengths and limitations. In correlational studies, researchers measure variables and look for



relations among them. Surveys are a common way of collecting data for correlational research. Surveys that use probability sampling try to construct a sample of respondents that is an accurate representation of the population of interest and so provide results that can be confidently generalized to the research population. Surveys that use convenience sampling have samples that are drawn from populations that the researchers have easy access to, but which may or may not reflect the characteristics of the population as a whole. Consequently, researchers must be cautious in generalizing results based on convenience samples.

The results of correlational studies are often summarized with a statistic called the correlation coefficient. A positive coefficient indicates that as scores on one variable increase, so do scores on the other variable; a negative coefficient means that as scores on one variable increase, scores on the other variable decrease. Larger coefficients indicate stronger relationships.

The major limitation of correlational research is that it provides no means for determining whether one variable caused another. This limitation derives from the fact that correlational studies are unable to determine the time precedence of the cause or rule out other possible causes for the observed effect. Experimental research overcomes these limitations by constructing situations that meet the criteria for causality. Much experimental research is carried out in laboratory settings, which—although providing the high degree of control needed to draw causal conclusions—are low in naturalism. Field experiments try to increase naturalism by collecting data in natural settings, but entail some loss of control. Researchers can also conduct experiments within surveys by varying the ways in which questions are asked. When probability sampling is used, this procedure allows the results of experimental research to be generalized to the population as a whole. When reading research reports, bear in mind that nonmanipulated variables may be combined with experimental variables as part of the research design. In such cases it is important to draw causal conclusions only about the experimental, manipulated variables but not about the nonmanipulated variables.

Ethnographic methods bring a high degree of naturalism to research by collecting data about people in the context of their everyday lives. Similarly, content analysis focuses on using products people create, such as documents and works of art, to draw conclusions about the factors that affect their behavior. However, these naturalistic methods lack the controls needed to draw causal conclusions. Because each research strategy has its own strengths and limitations, it is best to draw conclusions about the validity of a hypothesis by looking at the findings of a body of research that includes data from studies that have used a variety of methods.

To study stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, researchers must be able to measure them. Two essential characteristics of measures are reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the consistency of measurement and can be assessed in terms of test-retest correlations or consistency of response to the items comprising the measure. Validity refers to the accuracy of a measure and is assessed in terms of how well scores on the measure correlated with scores on measures of related traits and behaviors and the extent to which scores on the measure are uncorrelated with scores on measures of unrelated traits and behaviors.

The most commonly used method of assessing stereotypes and prejudice is self-report, asking people to report on their own attitudes, beliefs, and so forth. Stereotypes and prejudice are complex concepts, so researchers have developed a variety of measures for each. Self-reports can also be used to assess behavior toward members of different groups. Self-report measures are easy to administer and allow researchers to efficiently collect a large amount of data from many people in a short period of time. However, they are very susceptible to social desirability response bias, the tendency of people to give responses that make themselves look good. Alternatives to self-report measures include unobtrusive behavioral measures, which assess behaviors that people may not be aware they are performing, and unobtrusive judgmental measures, which assess responses people do not realize are indicators of prejudice. Physiological measures, which assess bodily responses to stimuli, can also be used instead of self-reports because some physiological responses indicate the valence and intensity of emotional responses. However, such measures require costly equipment. Implicit cognition measures assess the degree to which race-related concepts are associated with other positive or negative concepts in memory. People are usually not aware that the responses they make on these measures are related to prejudice, but this approach to measurement requires computer equipment and an environment, such as a laboratory, in which distractions can be kept to a minimum.

A growing body of evidence shows that self-report and other types of measures assess different ways of expressing prejudice. Self-reports assess controllable expressions, that is, what people want others to know about them. The other measures assess uncontrollable expressions of prejudice, that is, expressions that people are unaware that they are making. Not surprisingly then, scores on self-report often have low correlations with scores on other measures. However, scores on self-report measures are also related to different kinds of behaviors than are scores on other types of measures: self-reports are related to controllable behaviors, such as what a person says to a member of another race, whereas scores on other measures are related to less controllable behaviors, such as non-verbal cues. Thus, it can be useful to use a variety of measures when studying prejudice.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### The Research Process

- Pyke, S. W., & Agnew, N. McK. (1991). *The science game* (5th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Stern, P. C., & Kalof, L. (1996). *Evaluating social science research* (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Both Pyke and Agnew and Stern and Kalof provide relatively nontechnical introductions to the research process. If you are interested in a more technical approach, a number of excellent research methods books are available; ask your instructor to recommend one.

## Research Strategies

Crano, W. D., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). *Principles and methods of social research* (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Chapters 4 through 7 describe the experimental research strategy and many of its variations. Chapter 8 provides a readable description of the problems and processes involved in correlational research. Chapter 10 discusses sampling and other issues in survey research. Chapter 10 provides an introduction to the process of content analysis.

Finn, G.P.T. (1997). Qualitative analysis of murals in Northern Ireland: Paramilitary justifications for political violence. In N. Hayes (Ed.), *Doing qualitative analysis in psychology* (pp. 143–178). Hove, England: Psychology Press.

Finn provides an example of a less commonly used form of content analysis, that of visual images.

Mellor, D. (2003). Contemporary racism in Australia: The experiences of Aborigines. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29, 474–486.

Mellor's study provides a brief example of the use of interviews in ethnographic research.

Miller, P. J., Hengst, J. A., & Wang, S. (2003). Ethnographic methods: Applications from developmental cultural psychology. In P. M. Camic, J. E. Rhodes, & L. Yardley (Eds.), *Qualitative research in psychology: Expanding perspectives in methodology and design* (pp. 219–242). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Miller and her colleagues present a succinct description of ethnographic research and its use in psychological research.

## Measurement

Crano, W. D., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). *Principles and methods of social research* (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Crano and Brewer's Chapter 3 describes the issues involved in making reliable and valid measurements.

Maass, A., Castelli, L., & Arcuri, L. (2000). Measuring prejudice: Implicit versus explicit techniques. In D. Capozza & R. Brown (Eds.), *Social identity processes: Trends in theory and research* (pp. 96–116). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Maass and colleagues discuss the issue of the conditions under which implicit measures are really more useful than simpler-to-use self-report measures.

Stone, A. A., Turkkan, J. S., Bachrach, C. A., Jobe, J. B., Kurtzman, H. S., & Cain, V. S. (Eds.). (2000). *The science of self-report: Implications for research and practice*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

The chapters in this book discuss many of the issues involved in collecting and interpreting self-report data.

Webb, E. J., Campbell, D. T., Schwartz, R. D., & Sechrest, L. (2000). *Unobtrusive measures* (rev. ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. (Originally published 1966)

This is the classic book about unobtrusive measurement. Although the authors do not address prejudice specifically, they do list a wide variety of ways in which behavior can be assessed unobtrusively.

Wittenbrink, B., & Schwarz, N. (Eds.). (2007). *Implicit measures of attitudes*. New York: Guilford.

The chapters in section 1 of this book discuss the advantages and limitations of a number of implicit measures of prejudice, including priming, the IAT, physiological measures, and brain imaging.

## KEY TERMS

|                                    |                                 |                         |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|
| conditions of independent variable | field experiment                | probability sampling    |
| content analysis                   | generalizability                | reliability             |
| convenience sampling               | hypotheses                      | self-report             |
| convergent validity                | hypothetical constructs         | social desirability     |
| correlation coefficient            | Implicit Association Test (IAT) | response bias           |
| correlational research strategy    | independent variable            | survey research         |
| dependent variable                 | internal consistency            | test-retest reliability |
| discriminant validity              | laboratory experiment           | unobtrusive measures    |
| ethnographic research              | operational definitions         | validity                |
| experimental research strategy     | prediction                      | variable                |
|                                    | priming                         |                         |

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Outline the steps in the research process.
2. Explain the relationships among theoretical postulates, hypotheses, and predictions.
3. Explain the concepts of hypothetical construct and operational definition.
4. Explain the relationship between the methods used to manipulate and measure variables and the concept of operational definition.
5. What is the difference between quantitative and qualitative data? For each type of data, explain how researchers decide if the data support their hypotheses.
6. Describe the factors that affect the ways in which researchers interpret the meaning of their data. Give an example of situation that you know of (perhaps from a previous course) in which different researchers or theorists made different interpretations of the same data. Which interpretation do you agree with? What are your reasons for your choice?
7. What does the term *generalizability* mean? Why is the generalizability of research results important?
8. How are theories in behavioral science related to the applied use of behavioral science knowledge?

9. Explain the differences among correlation, experimentation, ethnography, and content analysis as ways of collecting data. What strengths and limitations does each entail?
10. What is the difference between probability sampling and convenience sampling? What is the relationship between the kind of sampling used in a study and the generalizability of the results of the study?
11. What does it mean if two variables have a correlation of  $r = .40$ ? What does it mean if two variables have a correlation of  $r = -.60$ ? Which of those two correlations represents the stronger relationship?
12. Explain the three criteria for drawing causal conclusions from research data. Based on these criteria, to what extent is it correct to draw causal conclusions from surveys, experiments, ethnographic studies, and content analyses?
13. In experimental research, what roles do the independent and dependent variables play? What does the term conditions of the independent variable refer to?
14. Explain the relative strengths and weaknesses of laboratory experiments, field experiments, and experiments within surveys.
15. Suppose a researcher found that men had higher prejudice scores than women. Would it be correct to conclude that being male causes people to be more prejudiced? Explain your answer.
16. Some researchers contend that ethnographic research and content analysis are inherently flawed because they require researchers to get too involved with their research topics and, in the case of ethnographic research, with their research participants, and to make too many subjective judgments. Other researchers contend that such involvement and subjectivity are basic strengths of the methods. Which position do you agree with? Why?
17. Explain the concepts of reliability and validity of measurement. How are reliability and validity related to one another?
18. Explain the concepts of convergent and discriminant validity. Why is it important to demonstrate that a measure has both?
19. Describe the ways in which researchers can use self-reports to assess stereotypes, prejudice, and behavior.
20. What is social desirability response bias? To what extent is it a problem for each of the four types of measures?
21. Explain the relative strengths and weaknesses of self-report, unobtrusive, physiological, and implicit cognition measures of prejudice.
22. Self-report measures assess controllable expressions of prejudice whereas the other measures assess uncontrollable expressions of prejudice. Is this difference a problem or an advantage for research on prejudice? Explain your answer.
23. Choose an aspect of prejudice that interests you. If you were going to conduct a study on that topic, what research strategy would you use and what type (or types) of measure would you use? Explain your choices.

## Chapter 3

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# Social Categorization and Stereotypes

For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it.

—WALTER LIPPMAN (1922, P. 11)

### Chapter Outline

#### Social Categorization

*Why We Categorize*

*Types of Categorization*

*Ingroups and Outgroups*

#### Origins of Stereotypes

*The Outgroup Homogeneity Effect*

*Social Role Theory*

*Illusory Correlations*

#### Transmission of Stereotypic Beliefs

*Sources of Stereotypic Beliefs*

*Interpersonal Communication  
and Social Inference*

#### Stereotype Accuracy

*Defining Accuracy*

*The Risks of Assuming Accuracy*

*Shifting Standards*

#### Functions of Stereotypes

*Cognitive Function*

*Ego-Defensive Function*

*Social Adjustment Function*

#### Stereotype Maintenance

*Perception and Recall of Social  
Information*

*Linguistic Biases*

*Self-fulfilling Prophecies*

*Stereotype Change*

*Changing Stereotypic Beliefs*

#### Summary

#### Suggested Readings

#### Key Terms

#### Questions for Review and Discussion

It happens in a blink of an eye. You see a person walking in front of you and, before you realize it, you have determined the person's age, race, gender and, depending on other available cues, perhaps her or his occupation or interests. Chances are good that your assessment is correct; people are remarkably adept at this type of information processing. As Lippman (1922) noted nearly a century ago, unless people simplify the world by quickly and efficiently sorting objects and people into categories and thinking in terms of categories rather than individuals, they will be overwhelmed by the environment. The sheer amount of information people process every day is staggering. Consider, for example, that the average person sees around 3,000 advertisements per day (Kilbourne, 2000); if you add to that figure all the other sources of information people are exposed to, you can quickly appreciate just how efficient people have to be at processing the information the world presents to them.

Unfortunately, this efficiency comes at a cost. Quickly making decisions about people and objects allows perceivers to move ahead, ready to deal with the next piece of information that faces them. But quick decisions also lead people to make snap decisions and to think stereotypically and, perhaps, to make errors of judgment. Although careful thought can produce more accurate decisions, it prevents people from attending to other information that demands attention. The challenge for perceivers is to strike a balance between efficiency and accuracy. When should people strive for careful, considered judgment and when can they safely rely on stereotypes?

To answer this question, we first explain the categorization process and describe the types of categories people use most often in social judgment. Next, we consider the origins of stereotyping: how do people develop the categories they later use for efficient information processing? We then discuss how stereotypes are shared in society through communication between parents and children, between peers, or by the media. The question of whether these stereotypes accurately reflect the characteristics of social groups is then considered. In particular, we focus on the difficulties in assessing accuracy. We next introduce the idea that two different people can hold the same stereotype for very different reasons. This research focuses on the purposes, or functions, that stereotypes sometimes fulfill. The final section of this chapter describes the factors that lead people to maintain or change their stereotypic beliefs.

## **SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION**

To address the complex question of the ways in which efficient cognitive processing can lead to stereotyping and prejudice, we begin with an explanation of how people utilize social information, focusing on the types of social categories they create and use. We then explore the subtypes, or more specific social categories, that perceivers utilize. Our discussion then turns to people's tendency to see the world in two categories, us and them, and how this tendency perpetuates stereotypic judgment and prejudice.

## Why We Categorize

**Categorization** is the term psychologists use for the process of simplifying the environment by creating categories on the basis of characteristics (such as hair color or athletic ability) that a particular set of people appear to have in common (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Through this process, people place others (and themselves) into categories called social groups. Once these social groups are created, people develop beliefs about the members of those groups. They then use these beliefs to guide their future interactions with individual social group members. As Neil Macrae and Galen Bodenhausen (2000) put it, “knowing what to expect—and exactly where, when, and from whom to expect it—is information that renders the world a meaningful, orderly, and predictable place” (p. 94). That is not to say people always see the world in terms of simple categories and use them to make simplistic judgments about others. Certainly this is not the case. As we will see, people adapt and respond to the demands of the task at hand and, when they are motivated to do so, make thoughtful, complex judgments (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). But people do use categories to make judgments about other people on a daily and perhaps even momentary basis. As a result, understanding the categorization process is fundamental to understanding stereotyping and prejudice.

Stereotypes belong to a class of categories called *schemas*, which are cognitive structures that contain a person’s knowledge and beliefs about a particular object or social group. Schemas influence what people pay attention to, how they organize information, and what they later remember (Hamilton, 1981). Hence, stereotypes operate as schemas in that they influence the perceiver’s acquisition and interpretation of information about members of social groups (Schneider, 2004). This acquisition and interpretation, in turn, sets up the expectations for how members of social groups will act.

Two aspects of categorization are relevant to the understanding of prejudice. First is the content of people’s stereotypic beliefs. What characteristics are associated with particular groups? Is that association consistent across time or group members? If not, what factors might make this content vary? As we saw in Chapter 1, historically, a great deal of research on stereotyping and prejudice has focused on answering these questions. Researchers have explored these questions because these beliefs are the foundation of stereotyping and prejudice; they form the content of schemas. More recently, psychologists have turned to a second critical aspect of categorization: what is the process by which people form and use social categories? How are these categories represented in memory? How and when are these representations retrieved and utilized? What motivations and biases influence this process? Do individuals differ in their readiness to rely on categorization? Do established stereotypes change? These questions are the primary focus of this and the following chapter.

To understand the difference between content and process, keep in mind that the human brain is not a digital storage medium—information is not simply recorded and then later retrieved in exactly the same form. For the most part, people remember information in terms of general principles rather than specific



### Box 3.1 Remembering: "The War of the Ghosts"

It is easy to think of memory as a recording of facts; when people read stories, hear newscasts, or witness events themselves, they usually assume that what they remember closely corresponds to what actually happened. Yet research on human information processing shows this is rarely the case. Consider a Native American story, "The War of the Ghosts," which Sir Frederic Bartlett (1932) presented to research participants early in the last century:

One night two young men from Egulac went down to the river to hunt seals, and while they were there it became foggy and calm. Then they heard war-cries and they thought: "Maybe this is a war-party." They escaped to the shore, and hid behind a log. Now canoes came up, and they heard the noise of paddles, and saw one canoe coming up to them. There were five men in the canoe and they said:

"What do you think? We wish to take you along. We are going up the river to make war on the people." ...

One of the young men went, but the other returned home. And the warriors went on up the river to a town on the other side of Kalama. The people came down to the water, and they began to fight, and many were killed. But presently, the young man heard one of the warriors say: "Quick, let us go home: that Indian has been hit." Now he thought: "Oh, they are ghosts." He did not feel sick, but they said he had been shot.

So the canoes went back to Egulac, and the young man went ashore to his house and made a fire. And he told everybody [what happened]. He told it all, and then he became quiet. When the

sun rose, he fell down. Something black came out of his mouth. His face became contorted. The people jumped up and cried. He was dead. (p. 65)

Bartlett's British research participants each read this story twice. He then asked them to recall the story after 15 minutes, 20 hours, 8 days, or at various intervals up to 6 years later. Over time, the details of the story were shortened; more interestingly, participants changed aspects of the story to bring it closer to their own experience. References to the canoe, for example, were changed to a boat and unusual proper names were forgotten. Moreover, the parts of the story that were difficult to interpret through British culture were changed or embellished. The role of the ghosts, for example, is fairly small in the original story, but it becomes enlarged and embellished in the retelling; the men in the canoe, for example, are often later described as a "ghost clan." Similarly, the "something black" that came out of the dying man's mouth becomes transformed into "escaping breath" or "foaming at the mouth."

Bartlett (1932) conducted experiments using other stories, with similar results, concluding that "accuracy of reproduction ... is the rare exception and not the rule" (p. 93). Instead, details quickly become stereotyped and, afterward, change very little. Finally, events are recalled more accurately when they fit with the participants' own culture and ideas; those that do not fit become rationalized so that they are more consistent with the recorder's experience. Human memory, then, especially memory for social events, is far from a digital recording and is heavily influenced by preconceptions and experience. Much of the research and theory presented in this chapter echoes the processes Bartlett demonstrated over 75 years ago.

individual facts and, when informational gaps exist, people fill in the blanks with what their experiences and beliefs tell them should be there (see, for example, Radvansky, 2006). When we factor in the complexity of our social world, it is not surprising that individual biases and situational factors influence how people perceive and remember a person or event (see Box 3.1 for an example of this process from early work in cognitive psychology). Although this point may seem obvious, it was not the perspective taken by most stereotype researchers until relatively recently (see Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, for a review). As we saw in Chapter 1, researchers in the 1920s and 1930s believed that stereotypes resulted from irrational and unjustifiable beliefs and behaviors. It was not until the early 1980s that researchers began to adopt the perspective that stereotyping

is a normal outcome of everyday information processing. This chapter focuses on how this limited information processing capacity affects the learning, retrieval, and utilization of stereotypic information.

### Types of Categorization

Think for a moment about the various social groups you come in contact with. A list of those groups would likely include general social groups, such as Blacks and Whites, or more specific groups, such as businesswomen or people who are overweight. Stereotype researchers have found the distinction between general and specific social categories to be important to understanding the categorization process.

**Basic Social Categories.** If you are a *Saturday Night Live* fan, you might remember the popular recurring sketch about Pat, a character played by Julia Sweeney. Pat's gender was purposefully ambiguous; in fact, the skits involving Pat centered around others trying to trick her/him into revealing his/her gender. These skits worked because gender is a **basic social category**, or a category for which a wealth of information is available in memory (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Race and age also are basic social categories. When people know a person's basic category membership, such as gender, they use that information to draw conclusions about the person's traits, social roles, and physical characteristics (Deaux & Lewis, 1984). When basic category membership cannot be easily determined, people feel off balance; they do not know what assumptions to make or how to begin or continue an interaction. Because information about gender is so tightly woven into the social fabric, the writers of the "Pat" skits had to be extremely creative. Sustaining even a five-minute interaction without revealing the gender of the protagonist is quite a challenge.

All basic categories have "privileged" status: information about them is readily available to perceivers. Category membership usually is easily observable, and the categories have important cultural meanings (Fiske et al., 1999). Recall from Chapter 1 that, at the societal level, there is generally consensus about the content of stereotypic beliefs. This is especially true for basic social categories. In the absence of a clear motivation to do otherwise, people tend to treat all members of basic social categories similarly, based on the stereotypic knowledge of that social group.

**Other Social Categories.** Of course, people make decisions about how to interact with others based on other social categories or other types of information as well. Abundant evidence suggests, for example, that physically attractive people are treated differently than physically unattractive people (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991). People also are categorized based on their sexual orientation (Simon, 1998), their religion, or specific aspects of their physical appearance, such as weight (Crandall, 1994), disability status (Soder, 1990), or skin tone (Maddox & Gray, 2002). And, of course, people have stereotypes about nationalities (Terracciano et al., 2005). Common stereotypes Americans hold

about Germans, for example, include the beliefs that they are always on time, drink in beer gardens, eat bratwurst, and are unfriendly. Germans, in contrast, believe Americans live without restrictions, eat fast food, drive big cars (and drive them fast), and spend most of their time watching television (Below, Molau, & Suchi, 1995).

More generally, people attend to others' demeanor, making snap judgments based on nonverbal cues such as facial expressions, posture, and gait (Zebrowitz, 1996). Judgments also can be based on something as simple as color; in classic Westerns, the "good guys" wear white and the "bad guys" wear black, implicitly reflecting their moral virtue. Research supports the rationale behind this judgment: athletes wearing black uniforms see themselves, and are seen by others, as more aggressive than athletes wearing uniforms of other colors (Frank & Gilovich, 1988). As is true for basic social categories, classification into many of these other categories is based on physical appearance cues (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991, for a review).

**Level of Specificity.** Evidence suggests that people notice basic category information first. However, in judging others, people tend to give more weight to some social categories than to others. For example, people find knowing another's sex to be more informative than knowing another's race (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992). Yet this same research also demonstrated that people recognize that a person can simultaneously be a member of more than one category. That is, when people know both the race and sex of another, they tend to use a single category, such as Black woman, that represents both basic categories simultaneously. This combined category is labeled a **subtype**. Subtypes can be formed by a combination of two or more basic category memberships or by combining basic category memberships with role or trait information. People rely on those more specific categories when they need a detailed understanding of another person's underlying characteristics.

All basic categories can have subtypes, but the majority of research on this topic has examined gender and age subtypes. Gender researchers, for example, have identified a set of commonly used subtypes of women and men, such as career woman and businessman, sexy woman and macho man (Deaux, Winton, Crowley, & Lewis, 1985; Vonk & Ashmore, 2003). Similarly, stereotypes of older adult are both positive, such as golden ager, and negative, such as severely impaired (Hummert, 1990). Subtypes of gay men include closeted, flamboyant, feminine, and activist (Clausell & Fiske, 2005). These subtypes do not negate the broader concepts represented by basic social categories; they do, however, provide additional information, often about the social roles the group member occupies. Knowing that a woman has a career or that an older person is relatively impaired provides clues about the behaviors they are likely to exhibit. When the occasion calls for it, perceivers use this information to make more fine-grained judgments. When older people are described at the subtype level, for example, people's evaluations are more likely to be based on this additional information than on age alone. People are more likely to believe that hearing and memory loss has occurred for members of the Severely Impaired (negative) subtype than

for members of the Golden Ager (positive) subtype (Hummert, Garstka, & Shaner, 1995). If perceivers were relying on information about age alone, members of both subtypes would be judged similarly.

### Ingroups and Outgroups

The Montagues versus the Capulets. The Yankees versus the Red Sox. The British versus the French. Labor versus management. Some rivalries are centuries old, others are more recent. Bets are won and lost based on such rivalries, and often, the emotional loss is more difficult to swallow than the financial loss. One thing is clear: People thrive on dividing themselves into groups. It is a rare college that does not have rivals, in sports or otherwise. And it is indeed a rare “us” that does not have a “them.” Social psychologists label “us” the ingroup and “them” the outgroup. When it comes to stereotyping and prejudice, there is no more basic cognitive distinction than the one made between ingroups and outgroups.

Just how easily ingroups and outgroups can be created may surprise you. Imagine, for a moment, you are a participant in a research study. You are alone in a dark room and are estimating the number of dots on a screen. After you have completed the task, the experimenter explains that some people consistently underestimate the number of dots, whereas others consistently overestimate those numbers. You then find out that you are an underestimator. Now, the experimenter asks you to make judgments about others, both those who are like you (the underestimators) or those who are different from you (the overestimators). You never see or meet members of either group. Do you really feel like part of a unique group? And, if so, will you treat members of your group differently from members of the outgroup?

Few people would guess that the answer to both questions is a resounding yes. The original experiments demonstrating this phenomenon were conducted by Henri Tajfel (1969). Tajfel set out to establish the minimum conditions necessary for a person to distinguish between an ingroup and an outgroup. As Tajfel (1978) described his quest, “we attempted to eliminate from the experimental situations all the variables that normally lead to ingroup favoritism and discrimination against the outgroup. The variables were: face-to-face interaction; conflicts of interest; any possibility of previous hostility between the groups; any ‘utilitarian’ or instrumental link between the subjects’ responses and their self-interest” (p. 77). So as we have described, participants were alone, and the groups were created based on an unimportant variable rather than on an existing social group about which people had beliefs and feelings. In fact, placement into the “overestimator” or “underestimator” group was done at random, rather than on the participants’ actual responses, to ensure that the obtained differences in how the groups were perceived could not possibly have been due to real group differences. This procedure is known as the **minimal group paradigm** because it shows that ingroups and outgroups can be created from the most minimal conditions.

One way Tajfel (1978) explored the differential treatment of ingroup and outgroup members was by asking participants to award payment to two other people. All that the assigners knew about the other individuals was that they

had either over- or underestimated the number of dots. The results were strikingly clear: Participants awarded more money to ingroup members than to outgroup members. This happened even though the participants were not allowed to award themselves money, and so did not benefit personally from favoring their group (the self-interest part of Tajfel's design). Based on no information other than knowledge of group membership, participants used the categories "my group" and "other" and, in the process, decided their group was more deserving. This finding, known generally as ingroup favoritism, has been replicated many times, in many countries, and is the foundation of a great deal of theory and research (Brewer, 2003). We discuss the role group membership plays in prejudice and discrimination in more detail in Chapter 9.

## ORIGINS OF STEREOTYPES

Imagine again that you are participating in a research study using the minimal group paradigm. What if the researcher asked you to describe the content of your stereotype about the outgroup (i.e., the overestimators)? Would you have anything to list? Tajfel (1978) did not ask his research participants this question; if he had, chances are they would have had only very sketchy ideas about the outgroup members' characteristics. The minimal group paradigm demonstrates how quickly people can create two groups, us and them, but does not address how people learn the characteristics they associate with ingroups and outgroups. Where do these stereotypes come from? As we saw in Chapter 1, people learn stereotypes from parents, peers, the media, and from their own observations of the world. Psychologists also have looked deeper, exploring the processes by which these stereotypic beliefs become part of people's schemas about social groups. We discuss next three explanations about the process of acquiring these beliefs: the outgroup homogeneity effect, social role theory, and illusory correlations.

### The Outgroup Homogeneity Effect

As we noted, the minimal group paradigm can be used to easily create an ingroup and an outgroup, but people probably do not have well-developed stereotypic beliefs about such groups. That does not mean, of course, that they have not developed stereotypes of naturally occurring groups. Research shows that not only do people have such stereotypes, they actually see ingroups and outgroups quite differently. People tend to see members of their own group as very different from each other and, at the same time, tend to underestimate the differences among members of other groups (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990). This differential perception is known as the **outgroup homogeneity effect**. To a perceiver, members of the outgroup really can "all look alike." Studies of cross-racial identification, for example, show that people have more difficulty recognizing members of a race other than their own

(Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997). Moreover, the outgroup homogeneity effect goes beyond physical appearance. People believe outgroup members have similar traits and occupy similar social roles. One consequence of this differential perception is that evaluations of outgroup members tend to be more polarized and extreme than evaluations of ingroup members (Linville & Jones, 1980). We next consider explanations for this cognitive bias.

**Reasons for the Outgroup Homogeneity Effect.** There are a number of reasons why outgroup members all appear similar, but ingroup members do not (Wilder, 1986). These explanations are not mutually exclusive; that is, more than one of them may play a role in perceptions of a particular outgroup. These reasons include:

1. *People simply interact more with members of their own group and, therefore, have more information about them and their unique qualities.* People can readily identify differences between and among members of their own social group. Blacks, for example, are likely to recognize that some Blacks are good at accounting, others at sports, and still others at writing poetry. People's willingness or ability to see these differences comes, in part, from the fact that they have more information about people from their own social group. Whites, for example, are much more likely to spend time with other Whites than they are to spend time with Blacks, and during that time, come to recognize their own group members' individuality. Would spending more time with outgroup members lessen the tendency to see them as all the same? Possibly. For example, the outgroup homogeneity effect emerges less consistently for gender (Brown & Smith, 1989) and age (Harwood, Giles, & Ryan, 1995). Perhaps this is because people know a lot about the other sex, even if they are not a member of that group; many of people's closest relationships, for example, are with a member of the other sex. Similarly, most people have older grandparents, aunts, uncles, or neighbors with whom they regularly interact. As we will see in Chapter 14, however, contact in and of itself does not always reduce stereotyping and prejudice.
2. *Interactions with ingroup members provide more information about their unique characteristics.* Because people see ingroup members so frequently, they have more opportunities to notice others' individuality. This is particularly true because this extra time people spend with their own group members gives them a chance to see ingroup members in multiple roles and situations. Students who live in a sorority or a fraternity house, for example, see their Greek brothers and sisters studying, socializing, eating, and relaxing. However, they might see members of other student organizations only in formal settings, when their behavior seems more uniform because of the social norms operating in that situation. As we will see, ingroup biases are related to people's tendency to underestimate the extent to which situational factors affect another's behavior.
3. *People are motivated to see themselves as unique and, therefore, look for ways to distinguish themselves from their group to maintain their individuality.* No one

wants to be seen as a complete conformist, with no individual thoughts or actions. Indeed, people are motivated to see themselves as unique individuals and pay attention to the ways in which they are different from the other members of their own group (Brewer & Pickett, 1999). This level of scrutiny is not necessary for outgroups—people already believe outgroups differ from them on important dimensions.

4. *Ingroup versus outgroup comparisons are typically made at the group level.* When people make ingroup and outgroup comparisons, they focus on how the groups differ (for example, the Sharks versus the Jets from *West Side Story*), thereby minimizing within group differences. In contrast, when people look within their own group (How I am doing compared to my classmates?), the focus changes to differences between individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Republicans, for example, usually are not called on to consider whether individual Democrats might differ in their opinion about a political issue. More typically, political controversies are framed along party lines. For example, a Republican senator hoping to find out whether her party can maintain a filibuster (which can be used to delay a vote on an issue, but requires 60 votes to stop) will consider how individuals within the party might vote, carefully monitoring the differences among ingroup members. In contrast, she may assume that all Democrats will vote in the same way.

**The Ultimate Attribution Error.** All of the reasons just discussed explain the same result: Members of other social groups are treated stereotypically. As a consequence of seeing people as members of groups rather than as individuals, perceivers often make biased judgments about an outgroup members' actions. One bias, known as the **ultimate attribution error**, occurs when people assume that their own group's negative behavior can be explained by situational factors, but similar negative actions by members of other groups are due to their internal stable characteristics (Pettigrew, 1979). This effect was demonstrated by Birt Duncan (1976), who asked White research participants to watch a video of one man shoving another. When the video depicted a White man shoving another person, participants concluded the actor was "horsing around." The picture changed dramatically, however, when the action involved a Black man shoving someone. In this case, the cause of the shove was more likely to be deemed "violent behavior" (see Figure 3.1). As the results of this study demonstrate, negative behaviors displayed by an outgroup member are attributed to personal causes—in this case, violent tendencies—whereas negative behaviors by an ingroup member are attributed to situational factors (for example, horsing around). Such assumptions lead to stereotypic beliefs about the outgroups (for example, all Blacks are aggressive). The ultimate attribution error is most likely to emerge when the ingroup and outgroup have a history of intense conflict or when the ingroup holds negative stereotypes of the outgroup (Hewstone, 1990).

If this pattern emerged for positive behaviors or desirable outcomes, the outgroup would actually benefit from the attribution; Whites, for example, would view the academic success of Blacks as due to their inherent intellectual abilities.




**FIGURE 3.1** Classifications of Harm Doers and Victims for Cross-race Pairings

Participants who saw a Black person shoving a White person saw the act as violent, rather than playing around. When the actor was a White person (shoving another White person), the action was seen as playing around, rather than violent.

SOURCE: Adapted from Duncan, B. L. (1976). Differential social perception and the attribution of intergroup violence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 590–598.

Interestingly, the ultimate attribution error does not take this form (Pettigrew, 1979). Instead, positive behaviors by an outgroup are likely to be dismissed as due to special advantages (for example, their having benefited from affirmative action), luck, or unusual characteristics of the situation. These same behaviors by an ingroup, in contrast, are attributed to stable personality traits; Whites see their own success as due to their ability, for example. The result, then, is that the favored ingroup benefits from biased thinking whereas the outgroup is negatively labeled. In short, when it comes to pleasing members of another social group, outgroup members cannot win for losing. Evidence suggests the ultimate attribution error can occur in everyday life, such as in sporting events (see Box 3.2). The effect of this bias may be particularly strong, however, when the groups involved have histories of intense conflict (for example, Hindus versus Muslims or Chinese versus Malaysians), when the evaluators are highly prejudiced individuals, or when emotions run high (see Hewstone, 1990, for a review).

The behavior of a single minority group member also may significantly influence how members of the entire social group are viewed. Whites who witnessed a Black person responding in a rude manner to a White person were later more likely to avoid sitting next to another Black person, compared with Whites who had witnessed the Black person behaving in a positive way (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996, Study One). Such an instance of negative behavior also can affect Whites' overall feelings about Blacks. Research participants who overheard a staged phone conversation about an assault by a Black assailant later rated Blacks as generally more antagonistic than did participants who heard the same



### **B o x 3.2    Stereotyping and Prejudice in Sports?**

People are fascinated with sports. Discussions of local high school athletics, college, and professional sports are the subject of entire television channels, newspaper coverage, and conversations at the water cooler. But does this relate to stereotyping and prejudice? Evidence suggests that many of the ideas presented in this chapter can be found on the playing field—or at least in people's response to what happens on the playing field. People, for example, show ingroup favoritism by wearing school colors the day following a win (Cialdini et al., 1976) and by being more likely to use “we” language after a successful athletic event (Cialdini & De Nicholas, 1989).

Sports fans also differ in their explanations for the outcomes of sporting events. Joachim Winkler and Shelley Taylor (1979) asked fans to offer explanations for their favorite team's actions in the 1976 Super Bowl. Consistent with research on the ultimate attribution error, results showed that the fans offered more credit to their side for their favorable plays than they did to the other side for similarly positive plays. Participants also predicted what would happen if the play were to be hypothetically repeated. When their team had made a good play, they believed it was more likely to be repeated, compared to when the opposing team had made a good play. Perceptions of the same sporting event are clearly in the eye of the beholder, with the same play being viewed through different lenses depending on where one's loyalties lie.

One only needed to have witnessed the fight that emerged during the 2004 Indiana Pacers–Detroit Pistons men's basketball game to be assured that emotions run high at sporting events. In anger over Pacer Ron Artest's foul against Piston player Ben Wallace, Detroit fans threw beer, ice, and popcorn at the Pacers. This led to fans and players exchanging punches in the stands and, ultimately, to one of the worst brawls in NBA history (*Motown melee*, 2004). Women are getting in the action, too. In 2008,

a disagreement between Plenette Pierson of the Detroit Shock and Candace Parker of the Los Angeles Sparks led to punches and pushes. As Mike Lopresti (2008) noted, “[m]aybe this is all part of the WNBA maturation process ... The league has seen dunks by Parker...Now it's had a brawl” (B1). Or maybe it is something about the location since the action occurred in the same Detroit arena as the men's altercation described above. Whatever the reason, emotions flared. Nyla Branscombe and Daniel Wann (1991) investigated such emotional response in study of reactions to an alleged world heavyweight championship match between an American and a Russian. Those individuals who had previously strongly identified with the United States had more extreme physiological arousal in response to the match than did individuals who did not show strong pride in the United States. According to the authors, this arousal stems from the threat highly identified participants experienced when faced with possibility that a representative of their country might lose. Moreover, this threat led highly identified viewers to derogate the Russian boxer, and Russians in general, more than those low in identification. Strongly identifying with an ingroup produced measurable aggression.

Are sports harmful, then? Probably not. Although one can find evidence of stereotyping and prejudice in sports, the outcomes are mostly all in good fun. One important difference between sports-related prejudice and prejudice against other groups is that people choose the teams they support and can change this decision at any time. Obviously, one's race and gender are less mutable. Even so, results such as these demonstrate the generalizability of the processes we describe in this chapter and they do indicate some troubling sports-related aggression. Studying groups such as sports teams is beneficial, too, because it offers the chance to explore research questions without some of the social desirability concerns raised in Chapter 2.

conversation about a White assailant. Moreover, those who believed the assailant was Black were more likely to express the belief that Whites have too little power relative to Blacks, in society (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996, Study Three). That is, observing a single instance of a negative behavior involving a member of an outgroup led people to evaluate all members of that group negatively. It also led to protective beliefs about the ingroup—in this case, that Whites were less powerful than they should be.

## Social Role Theory

Most humans are people watchers. Observing others is a source of endless fascination, as evidenced by the international obsession with reality TV. It certainly seems logical, then, that beliefs about social groups would stem from watching the world around us. **Social role theory**, developed by Alice Eagly (1987), proposes just that. According to this theory, when people observe others they pay attention to the social roles others occupy, such as their occupations. In doing so, they come to associate the characteristics of the role with the individuals who occupy it. To understand how this works, consider first a basic principle of social perception, called the *correspondence bias* (Ross, 1977). This bias stems from the tendency to misjudge the demands of the situation: All things being equal, people give relatively little weight to how situational factors influence behavior; instead, they believe someone's actions reflect the person's personality traits. People who observe a woman nurse comforting a patient, for example, are more likely to conclude that she is a caring person than they are to conclude that situational factors (such as her job as a caregiver) led to the nurturing act.

Social role theory proposes that this bias leads to the development of stereotypic beliefs. Consider, for example, the widely held stereotypes that women are naturally kind and concerned about others and that men are naturally self-confident and assertive. According to social role theory, these beliefs developed from observations about women and men in the social roles they occupy. Women are traditionally in the homemaker role or in a lower status employee role and men are traditionally in the breadwinner role or a higher status employee role. As such, women are disproportionately represented in roles requiring the very traits people associate with women, such as kindness and concern for others, and men are disproportionately represented in roles requiring the very traits people associate with men, such as self-confidence and assertiveness. Because the situational influences on behavior (in this case, social roles) are not given sufficient weight, gender stereotypic beliefs develop. Perceivers conclude that all women are kind and warm and all men are assertive and self-confident.

Eagly's research has focused mainly on the development of gender stereotypes, although the theory also has been used to examine age stereotypes, beliefs about nationalities, and perceptions of leadership ability (see Eagly, Wood, & Diekmann, 2000, for a review). Yet studying how social roles might help create these widely held stereotypes presents a problem because even young children have stereotypes firmly in place. Curt Hoffman and Nancy Hurst (1990) creatively skirted this problem by asking people to evaluate members of two fictional alien groups, the "Orinthians" and the "Ackminians." These aliens were described as either predominantly city workers or as predominantly child raisers. Because their planet had no female or male sex, the association between human gender stereotypes and these categories was eliminated. Moreover, on their imaginary planet there were no differences between the traits describing city workers and child raisers. Results showed that the correspondence bias influenced responses: City workers were described by characteristics usually associated with that role (such as active and logical) and child raisers were described by

characteristics usually associated with that role (such as helpful and patient). That is, people's judgments were based on the role the aliens occupied rather than on their actual traits.

### Illusory Correlations

One way to think about stereotypic beliefs is to recognize that they represent a perceived relationship between a group and a characteristic (for example, women are warm, Asians are good at math, college professors are absent-minded). For these perceived relationships to be accurate, however, information about the group and the characteristics must first be encoded, or perceived, correctly (Hamilton, 1981). Unfortunately, accurate encoding can be easily derailed. One way this happens stems from people's tendency to overestimate the relationship between two categories when the information is distinctive, or stands out within the context of the judgment (Chapman, 1967). In doing so, people develop **illusory correlations**—beliefs that incorrectly link two characteristics, such as race and a personality trait. Such beliefs are as firmly held as accurate associations, but nevertheless are based on inaccurate information processing.

In a series of clever experiments, David Hamilton and Robert Gifford (1976) demonstrated how these inaccurate associations can lead to stereotypic beliefs about minority groups. These researchers began with the assumption that majority groups members have infrequent interactions with minority group members. Hence, when such interactions do occur they are distinctive. The researchers further reasoned that undesirable behaviors also are relatively unique. What happens, then, when a majority group member observes a minority group member engaging in an undesirable behavior? The co-occurrence between these two distinctive events is given undue weight, leading to the conclusion that minority group members are likely to behave in undesirable ways.

To test their hypothesis, Hamilton and Gifford (1976) asked research participants to read a series of 39 sentences, each of which was associated with either Group A or Group B. The researchers used abstract groups to ensure that prior stereotypic beliefs would not influence their results. Group A represented the majority group; 26 of the 39 sentences were associated with that group. Group B represented the minority group; the remaining 13 sentences were associated with that group. Most of the sentences (27) described positive behaviors; the remaining 12 described negative behaviors. As you can see from Table 3.1, each group performed the same proportion of desirable and undesirable behaviors. So, if people's perceptions were accurate, they should have perceived no relationship between group membership and behavior. Results of the study showed that when the behaviors were desirable, and therefore not distinctive, people were in fact reasonably accurate in their associations. However, when the behaviors were undesirable (and therefore distinctive), people overestimated the extent to which the minority group exhibited those behaviors.

The illusory correlation operates in everyday settings as well. Rupert Brown and Amanda Smith (1989) found that the academic staff of a British university overestimated the number of female, and underestimated the number of male,

**TABLE 3.1** Distribution of Desirable and Undesirable Sentences Used to Create an Illusory Correlation

|             | Group A (Majority) | Group B (Minority) |       |
|-------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------|
| Behaviors   |                    |                    | Total |
| Desirable   | 18 (69%)           | 9 (69%)            | 27    |
| Undesirable | 8 (30%)            | 4 (30%)            | 12    |
| Total       | 26                 | 13                 | 39    |

senior staff on their campus. In other words, respondents inaccurately perceived the relationship between gender and seniority. This bias occurred because female senior staff were few and, therefore, were distinctive. Interestingly, in this case the observance of negative behaviors was not necessary for the creation of the illusory correlation. Observing a single, unusual behavior from a distinctive group member also may be sufficient to produce an illusory correlation. Jane Risen and her colleagues (Risen, Gilovich, & Dunning, 2007) asked research participants to read sentences about uncommon behaviors, such as having a pet sloth, or common behaviors, such as using ketchup. Results showed that when the sentence described an uncommon behavior performed by a member of a distinctive group, people took longer to process the information (Study 1), were more likely to report that they thought about the connection between group membership and the behavior (Study 2), and were particularly likely to remember that behavior (Study 3) compared to when a member of a common group performed that same distinctive behavior or when anybody performed a common behavior. These *one-shot illusory correlations* suggest that a single instance of distinctiveness is sufficient to create a stereotypic association between uncommon group membership and unusual behavior.

What are the implications of this information processing bias? One obvious implication is that many beliefs about minority groups are derived from inaccurate associations (see Box 3.3). These errors are magnified when one group is proportionately smaller than the other (Mullen & Johnson, 1995); the actions of a minority group appear to be under greater scrutiny than similar actions in a majority group. After these erroneous associations are made, they may be very difficult to change and may set the stage for how additional information is processed (Hamilton & Rose, 1980). Once an expectation is in place, cognitive processing generally works to maintain biases, rather than correct them. Later in this chapter we will consider in more detail how stereotypes are maintained.

## TRANSMISSION OF STEREOTYPIC BELIEFS

As we discussed in Chapter 1, stereotypes exist at the individual level—the pictures in our heads—but there is also an important shared component to stereotype content (Schneider, 2004). Recall that much of the research defining the content of people's

### **Box 3.3 Are Illusory Correlations Perpetuated by the Media?**

"If it bleeds, it leads" the saying goes. Newspapers and television news broadcasts compete for viewers' attention, often by presenting stories about local and national criminals. And why not? After all, crime stories are distinctive and draw in viewers (Klein & Naccarato, 2003). But what if these presentations misrepresent which racial groups are likely to be victims and perpetrators of crime? Travis Dixon and Daniel Linz (2000) examined this question with a content analysis of television news in Los Angeles and Orange counties in California. These researchers found that Whites were more likely to be shown as crime victims than were Blacks. Lawbreakers seen on television news, in contrast, were more likely to be Black than White. When compared with actual crime reports, the portrayals of victims overrepresented Whites; conversely, Blacks were overrepresented as perpetrators. Interestingly, Latinos were largely absent from television news reports, which means they were underrepresented as both crime victims and perpetrators. Studies of the news markets in Chicago and Philadelphia have shown similar results (Klein & Naccarato, 2003). More generally, Roger Klein and Stacy Naccarato (2003) found that 80 percent of references to Blacks in Pittsburgh's television newscasts were negative, whereas for Whites, fewer than two-thirds were negative.

The stereotypic belief that Blacks are more likely to commit violent crime also appears to have affected media coverage of Hurricane Katrina. Interestingly, in this case, the result was an inaccurate reporting of such crimes in the aftermath of that disaster. As Samuel

Sommers and his colleagues note (Sommers, Apfelbaum, Dukes, Toosi, & Wang, 2006), media reports "described sniper fire aimed at rescuers, rampant homicide, and roving gangs of youths committing rapes against teenage victims and even babies" (p. 44). As it turned out, many of these events simply never occurred or were wildly exaggerated. Media reports, for example, indicated that 40 murder victims were found in a freezer, but only one such victim was documented (Rosenblatt & Rainey, 2005, cited in Sommers et al. 2006).

From an illusory correlation perspective, these findings suggest that the news media is promoting an inaccurate association between Blacks and lawbreaking. Because Blacks are distinctive relative to Whites and because crime is a negative behavior, people may incorrectly assume that more Blacks are criminals than Whites. (Recall from Chapter 1 that the "Driving While Black" statistics support this assumption.) People see the world presented on television as similar to the real world; studies show that the vast majority of people of all ages, from adolescents to older adults, agree that "Local TV news shows me the way the world really is" (cited in Klein & Naccarato, 2003). It is also interesting that the largest ethnic group in Los Angeles and Orange counties, Latinos, also are being inaccurately represented in that market, but in this case, it is an error of omission. How do you think this fits with the illusory correlation model? What conclusions do you think people draw about Latinos as crime victims or perpetrators?

stereotypes focuses on identifying these shared characteristics. But how is this information shared? We next discuss how stereotypes are transmitted in society, beginning with important sources of stereotypic beliefs: parents, peers, and the media.

### **Sources of Stereotypic Beliefs**

Do you live in a diverse neighborhood or do most of the people you live near share your ethnicity, ability status, or sexual orientation? Are you likely to seek out movies or books that feature diverse characters or do you prefer stories with protagonists who are similar to you? Do you watch a lot of television or spend a lot of time surfing the Internet? As we discuss next, research suggests that these decisions are likely to have influenced the content of your stereotypes.

**Parents and peers.** As we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 8, it is probably safe to assume that many children learn stereotypic beliefs from their primary

caregivers. When children are young, those individuals have a great deal to say about who their children interact with and what they see on television or at the movies. This, in turn, influences what is learned about social groups. Interestingly, parents often teach stereotypes both directly and indirectly but appear to impart racial stereotypes primarily through indirect means (P. Katz, 2003). That is, parents might tell young children that “trucks are for boys,” a direct statement about stereotypes, or they might take away a truck from their daughter, an indirect message about appropriate behavior for her gender. Parents of a White child may not allow her to choose a Black doll at the toy store, indirectly suggesting this doll is inferior because of its color, but they are unlikely to state directly that they believe Blacks are inferior.

As children grow, their peers provide additional information about social groups. In fact, as people get older, parental influence likely lessens and is, instead, replaced by peer influence (P. Katz, 1987). Peers generally have a significant influence on attitudes and behaviors (see Fishbein, 2002, for a review), a process that continues into adulthood. Evidence suggests that interacting with peers who are low in prejudice can make highly prejudiced adolescents more accepting of others (for example Aboud & Fenwick, 1999). One way these influences affect stereotype development is captured by **social learning theory** (Bandura, 1986). According to this perspective, people learn about social behavior either directly (for example, by being rewarded or punished for their actions) or vicariously (for example, by observing the consequences of others’ behavior). They retain those beliefs and behaviors for which they are rewarded (or for which they see others being rewarded) and discontinue those beliefs that result in theirs or others’ punishment. Children, then, who were encouraged to read books about positive characters from diverse backgrounds would be more likely to develop positive racial stereotypes than children who were discouraged from reading those books. And, of course, adults also are influenced by peers and their stereotype use is similarly affected either directly or indirectly by rewards and punishments.

**The Media.** The media, including film, the comics, television, and advertising, are saturated with stereotypes. A recent examination of more than 900 Hollywood films, for example, revealed that Arabs are consistently portrayed as heartless, brutal, uncivilized, and religious fanatics (Shaheen, 2003). These films also conveyed the incorrect message that all Arabs are Muslims and all Muslims are Arabs. Hollywood films also are replete with examples of gender and racial stereotypes (Escholz, Buffkin, & Long, 2002). Hollywood is not the only source of stereotypic presentations in the media. Major news magazines most often use pictures of Blacks to represent the poor, leading people to the incorrect conclusion that most poor people are Black (Gilens, 1996). Even when the media depict someone in a nontraditional role (for example, women police officers) the message can still be stereotypic. Media descriptions of female athletes, for example, tend to focus on their attractiveness, whereas descriptions of male athletes usually focus on their ability (Messner, 1988).

Television, too, relies heavily on stereotypic characterizations (Newman, 2007). Television shows such as *The OC* and *The Gilmore Girls* focus on

stereotypic depictions of the wealthy. Middle class families are prevalent but working class families are largely invisible. When the working class do appear on the small screen, they are usually shown in unflattering roles. Homer Simpson, for example, is the quintessential working class buffoon as are classic characters such as Archie Bunker from *All in the Family*. Reality shows project a narrow slice of life as well/ *The Apprentice*, for example, depicts wealthy lifestyles whereas *Extreme Makeover: Home Edition*, draw viewers into the lives of “desperately needy families being ‘saved’ with a new house” (Newman, 2007, p. 101).

Advertisements often portray people in stereotypic roles as well. In television commercials, Whites are shown more frequently than any other ethnic group and they also are portrayed more prominently and are more often seen exercising authority. This pattern holds even on Black Entertainment Television, although Blacks are significantly more likely to appear in advertisements on that network (29.3 percent) than on general networks (14 percent; Messineo, 2008). Other research shows that Whites are more likely to be portrayed in the parent role or spousal role in advertising, whereas Asian Americans are more likely to be shown as children. African American men are more likely to be seen in aggressive roles than Whites. African American women are less likely to be portrayed as sex objects than are White women. Latinos, in contrast, are virtually invisible from commercials, raising the question of whether it is better to be portrayed in a negative light than not portrayed at all (Coltrane & Messineo, 2000).

Sex-role stereotyping in advertising also is pervasive. Adrian Furnham and Twigg Mak (1999) reviewed 14 studies of television commercials that aired in 11 countries over a 25-year period. Their analysis revealed that men were more likely than women to be depicted as authorities; men most often did the voice-overs of commercials (that is, they were the narrators who are heard but not seen), which is portrayed as the literal voice of authority. Men also were more likely to be seen in professional roles whereas women were more likely to be seen in the home, engaged in behaviors that conveyed their dependence. Studies of women in print advertisements tell a similar story (Linder, 2004). Gender stereotypic representations are common; women are particularly likely to be objectified (i.e., her primary purpose is to be looked at), shown as subordinate to men, or depicted as mentally withdrawn from the “action.” Moreover, current day depictions have not changed much from those of the 1950s. Other research has shown that older women simply appear less frequently in advertisements than do younger women and, when they are featured, it is likely to be in ads for pharmaceuticals, suggesting they are in poor health (Bailey, Harrell, & Anderson, 1993).

It is easy to believe that these stereotypic portrayals do not affect us. Research evidence suggests the contrary, however. The more television children watch, the more they hold gender and racial stereotypes, suggesting that children learn what they live (Reid, 1979). Children, for example, are well aware that most cartoon characters are boys and they recognize that the actions of these boys are gender stereotypic: For both boys and girls, this recognition correlates with the expectation that they will hold a gender stereotypic job in the future (Thompson & Zerbino, 1997). Adults’ perceptions also are related to how much

media they are exposed to. The more news media people watched during the U.S.-Iraq war, for example, the more likely they were to exhibit implicit prejudice toward Muslims (Martin, Grande, & Crabb, 2004). Similarly, heavy news viewers expressed more concern about a news report depicting a dark-skinned black perpetrator, compared to a White perpetrator, but infrequent news viewers made no such distinction (Dixon & Maddox, 2005). Watching more television also is related to holding negative stereotypes of older adults. These negative stereotypes may develop because older people who appear on television are portrayed mainly in negative roles: Often older adults are depicted as crime victims, as being betrayed by family members, or in situations in which they are ridiculed (Gerbner, 1997).

It should be noted, however, that these results are correlational and need to be interpreted with caution (see Chapter 2). An experimental demonstration of the effects of media depictions on stereotypic beliefs shows a similar pattern, however. Lindy Geis and her colleagues (Geis, Brown, Jennings (Walstedt), & Porter, 1984) had undergraduates view commercials depicting women and men in traditional or nontraditional roles. The participants then wrote an essay imagining their lives and concerns ten years in the future. These essays were examined for career achievement versus homemaking themes. Women's essays were highly influenced by the commercials: Those who saw traditional commercials were much more likely to describe their future in terms of the homemaker role than the career role (see Figure 3.2). In contrast, men's essays were not influenced by the type of commercial. The researchers believe these results are due to the ambivalent achievement messages that women, but not




**FIGURE 3.2** Future Life Themes by Sex of Participant and Type of Commercial

Regardless of whether they viewed traditional or nontraditional commercials, men's descriptions of their future life were similar and career oriented. Women's descriptions of their future life were less career oriented when they saw traditional commercials and more career oriented when they saw nontraditional commercials.

SOURCE: Adapted from Geis, F. L., Brown, V., Jennings (Walstedt), J., & Porter, N. (1984). TV commercials as achievement scripts for women. *Sex Roles*, 7/8, 513-525.



men, receive while growing up. Taken together, the research results described in this section suggest that stereotypes from the mass media influence both adults and children.

### Interpersonal Communication and Social Inference

Another way stereotypes are shared is through language itself, both from person to person and from generation to generation. As Anne Maass and Luciano Arcuri (1996) explain, stereotypes are transmitted through vocabulary. For example, there are about ten times more expressions describing women's promiscuity than men's, which feeds into acceptance of the sexual double standard (that is, men having many sexual partners is more socially acceptable than women doing so). Speakers also tend to qualify descriptions of people when they occupy nontraditional roles. Think about how often you hear phrases such as "Lady Boilermakers" to describe women's basketball teams. Yet you rarely hear the men's team referred to as the "Gentleman Huskies." Similarly, we talk about "Black" lawyers and "woman" doctors, but do not use qualifiers for the White men who have traditionally occupied these roles. Using qualifiers for the nontraditional groups "marks" them or makes their category membership stand out. Doing so increases the chances that they will be categorized on that basis (see Ng, 2007, for a review).

Most people also assume that in the United States there is a standard language that is "correct"—the language spoken by the White, middle class. This language also is viewed as accent-free, although in reality no language is without an accent. According to Rosina Lippi-Green (2004), people who hold such beliefs are likely to devalue those who speak with a different accent and to expect them to change their way of speaking to conform to the assumed standard. Interestingly, some accents, such as Swedish and Irish, are acceptable to most U.S. citizens, but others, such as Asian accents are not. Moreover, as Sik Hung Ng (2007) points out, foreigners are often denied jobs due to their language skills. Yet because language competence is highly correlated with national origin, doing so creates "stowaway discrimination"—an indirect way to legally discriminate against ethnic aliens.

Although speakers rarely consider it, many common expressions also convey stereotypes about ethnic groups or nationalities such as "Jew down a price" or "Indian giver" (Bolinger, 1990). North Americans, for example, often use so-called mock Spanish, especially in creating derogatory terms such as "el stupido" to refer to dumb people, inadvertently creating the perception that Spanish-speaking people are not intelligent. And, when the Terminator says "Hasta la vista, baby" right before killing someone, a link between Spanish speakers and violence is suggested. Interestingly, many mock Spanish terms are not actually in the Spanish lexicon. Yet a negative message about Latin Americans (especially Mexicans) is conveyed through their use at the one-on-one level and through mass communication (Hill, 1995). Differential use of foreign accents in movies also can convey negative stereotypes, as we explain in Box 3.4.

Some modes of communication, such as e-mail, are free of paralinguistic cues such as accent that might bias perceptions. When such cues are absent, are

### Box 3.4 Language-Based Stereotypes in Disney Films

The Walt Disney company is famous for its heart-warming stories and lovable characters. Audiences cheered when Beauty tamed her Beast, Snow White awoke to the handsome prince, and Simba became the Lion King. Of course, gender stereotypes are pervasive in these films. But are there other, less apparent, stereotypes lurking under the surface? Yes, according to Rosina Lippi-Green (1997). Lippi-Green examined 371 characters in 24 Disney films, ranging from Snow White to the Lion King. Confirming the gender stereotypic portrayals, Lippi-Green found that the vast majority of the female characters are never shown outside the home or have traditionally female jobs, such as nurses or waitresses. The male characters, in contrast, are depicted in traditionally male jobs such as doctors, advisors to kings, detectives, and pilots. What is perhaps more interesting, however, is the results of her analysis of the characters' accents. Lippi-Green

categorized characters by whether they spoke U.S. English, British English, or foreign-accented English (for example, Stromboli in Pinocchio, speaks in a contrived Italian dialect). She further divided characters by their motivations and actions (good, bad, or mixed). Those who spoke U.S. English were mostly likely to have positive (73.5%) rather than mixed (26.5%) motivations and actions. Similarly, those who spoke British English were most likely to have only positive (57.6%) rather than negative or mixed (42.4%) motivations and actions. In contrast, those who spoke foreign-accented English were most likely to have negative or mixed (62.7%) rather than only positive (37%) motivations and actions. One reason we might not notice this pattern is that the characters in Disney films are often animals. Even so, the message to viewers is clear: people who speak standard English are the good guys and people who speak with a foreign accent are the bad guys.

people less likely to stereotype others? The answer to this question appears to be no. Nicholas Epley and Justin Kruger (2005, Study One) asked male undergraduates to interview a partner, either by phone or e-mail, carefully controlling the nature of the communication and, in particular, ensuring that the word-for-word content of the conversation was the same across the two mediums. Results showed when the interviewer expected the partner to be intelligent, for example, post-interview impressions of the partner were more likely to match the stereotype when the communication took place by e-mail rather than by phone. Results of a follow-up study (Study Three) showed that this effect was due to the ambiguous nature of e-mail; even though the content of the communication was the same, perceivers still found the e-mail message harder to interpret. When this difference was taken into account, impressions of the interviewees were similar across the two modes of communication.

Are some stereotypes more likely to be shared through language than others? Research suggests that the answer is yes; some stereotypes are more likely to be the subject of conversation than others and, accordingly, are more readily communicated than stereotypes that are less likely to be discussed. In looking at this possibility, Mark Schaller and his colleagues (Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002) examined whether the traits that are most often part of everyday conversation are also the ones most likely to persist over time. They began with a list of stereotypes commonly associated with ethnic groups, derived from the classic Daniel Katz and Kenneth Braly (1933) checklist we discussed in Chapter 1 and from more recent research. Results of one study showed that people were more likely to talk about some traits than others—that is, that some traits were more communicable. Moreover, people reported that they found discussions of those

highly communicable traits more interesting than discussions of less communicable traits. A second study showed that highly communicable traits were more likely to become part of the stereotype of an ethnic group, at least if that group was often the subject of conversation. Results of a third study looked at the persistence of the African American stereotype, based on the five studies that have examined this stereotype over time (see Devine & Elliot, 1995). Results showed that highly communicable traits were more likely to be retained in the African American stereotype. These results are correlational and, therefore, are subject to the limitations of correlational research discussed in Chapter 2; that is, researchers cannot firmly conclude that the communicability of traits causes the obtained effects. Even so, these results suggest that everyday conversations influence how people think about social groups. The power of language in maintaining stereotypes is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

## STEREOTYPE ACCURACY

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You do not have to see many movies to recognize the accuracy of this reflection. There are exceptions, of course. Queen Latifah, a larger Black woman, is the clear heroine in *Bringing Down the House* (Hoberman, Amritraj, & Lieberman, 2003), for example, and *Hairspray* (Zadan & Meron, 2007) celebrated the size of its heroines, including John Travolta in drag and a fat suit. But it is certainly much easier to think of instances that fit Piercy's description. On the whole, then, Marge Piercy's analysis seems more accurate than not, at least in describing movie land. Can we conclude, then, that the stereotypes portrayed in this poem reflect reality, at least to some extent?

In everyday life, perceivers are often faced with the question of whether their stereotypes are accurate. A woman walking alone at night must decide whether the man walking nearby is a threat to her safety or is simply another night owl out for a stroll. An employer who is interviewing job candidates wants to know whether his belief that liberal arts majors have good critical thinking skills is accurate. An African American student wonders whether her Caucasian American professor will evaluate her based on her actual performance or her skin color. From a social science perspective, however, the question of whether stereotypic beliefs are accurate is a tricky one. As Gordon

Allport (1954) put it: “The distinction between a well-founded generalization and an erroneous generalization is very hard to draw, particularly by the individual who himself harbors the generalization” (p. 20). How, then, to resolve the question of whether members of a social group actually possess the characteristics that are associated with them?

### Defining Accuracy

Recall from Chapter 1 that, historically, some researchers have viewed stereotypes as bad and as stemming from biased and faulty information processing. More recent theorists, especially those taking the perspectives discussed in this chapter, have moved toward seeing stereotyping as a natural outgrowth of human information processing that, at least to some extent, reflects a kernel of truth—beliefs are not totally unfounded, but have a basis in social reality. How then, does a researcher assess the size of this kernel? This most basic question—“what constitutes accuracy?”—is a slippery one indeed. Surely we can agree that if a belief describes only a few members of a group, it is off the mark. Similarly, we do not expect a trait to describe all group members before it is deemed “true.” The middle ground, however, is harder to find. Would a stereotype that describes 30 percent of social group members be accurate? How about 50 percent or 75 percent?

To better understand how psychologists have looked at this issue, let us first consider how accuracy is usually measured: by percentage estimates or by measures of dispersion. Percentage estimates are based on whether social group members typically do possess the stereotypic characteristic associated with them. In an early use of this measure (McCauley & Stitt, 1978), research participants from various backgrounds estimated the percentage of Black Americans, and Americans in general, who exhibited behaviors stereotypically attributed to Blacks (for example, were illegitimate or on welfare). For each participant, a diagnostic ratio was computed by dividing the estimated percentage of Blacks who displayed the behavior by the percentage of all Americans who displayed the behavior. These ratios were compared to similar calculations, based on actual U.S. Census figures for these two groups. Overall, participants’ ratings mirrored the census data reasonably well. People were more accurate than not at estimating how many Blacks were on welfare, for example. However, as we will discuss below, this conclusion does not provide unquestionable proof that such beliefs are accurate.

Psychologists also estimate stereotype accuracy by considering the perceived dispersion, or diversity of group members (Judd & Park, 2005). If perceivers believe that most Asians are good at math, for example, they would estimate there was low variability on this trait. But if they believe this ability differs across the Asian population, there would be high variability on this trait. A stereotype might be considered more accurate if it reflects the actual diversity of a characteristic within a group. Accuracy can also be assessed by ranking. For example, Michael Ashton and Victoria Esses (1999) asked undergraduates to estimate the average course grade of Canadian high school students from nine ethnic groups, including aboriginal/Native American, British, Canadian-born, Black, and Chinese. They then compared how the participants ranked these groups’ academic ability to the

actual ranked performance of the groups. These two estimates were highly correlated, suggesting the high school students were generally very accurate in their assessments.

Regardless of whether percentage estimates or measures of dispersion are employed, the question is whether people over- or underestimate the group's actual characteristics. To make this judgment, researchers must assume there is an objective way to assess the characteristic of interest, which as we discuss below, is often difficult. Further complicating the picture, these two measures of stereotype accuracy can operate independently. Research participants might be fairly accurate, for example, in their estimates of what percentage of Asians are mathematical, but they might be inaccurate in their estimate of the variability of this characteristic. If perceivers are accurate on one measure, but not the other, does their belief have a kernel of truth? This question is difficult to answer.

### **The Risks of Assuming Accuracy**

To fully understand the complexities of assessing stereotype accuracy, researchers must appreciate the risk of concluding that stereotypes do represent reality. Recall, again from Chapter 1, that stereotypes have been used as justification for maintaining the social status quo. Whites justified their subjugation of racial minority groups, for example, using the belief that minorities were naturally inferior to Whites and that such treatment was therefore appropriate (Duckitt, 1994). It may seem hard to believe now, but that perception was deemed accurate at the time. To cite a more recent example, 58 percent of Palestinians approve of suicide bombings inside Israel, presumably because they stereotypically view the Israelis as deserving of such violence (Wolin, 2003). When stereotypes are influenced by societal norms or historical events, the proposition that they might be "accurate" becomes more difficult to support.

Even if less harmful stereotypes are deemed accurate, thus descriptively capturing the group as it is today, should these descriptions be used as road maps for the characteristics that individual members of social groups should have (that is, should we use them as prescriptions)? Recall from Box 1.3 that the data suggest that Blacks do not swim as well as other ethnic groups. As we discussed, these data do not mean Blacks should not or cannot swim. Consider also the belief that all good basketball players are tall. In general, this belief is on the mark. The average height of the 2008–2009 Los Angeles Lakers was 6'7" (National Basketball Association, 2008). Does this mean a middle or high school coach should discourage shorter players? Of course not. Short players can reach the NBA; Earl Boykins of the Charlotte Bobcats is 5'5" tall. And, obviously, a person can enjoy playing basketball without making it to the professional ranks. There is another side to prescriptive stereotypes, too. Many tall adolescents can tell you how frustrating it is to have people immediately assume that playing basketball is their dream. Perhaps without meaning to, Americans do seem to want to prescribe that all tall boys (and more recently girls) play basketball. At the group level, then, stereotypes may have a kernel of truth, but relying on them at the individual level may lead to serious judgment errors.

Researchers who have grappled with the accuracy issue also recognize that methodological problems stand in their way. Even when they agree, for example, that percentage estimates or measures of group variability are good indicators of stereotype accuracy, other issues arise (see Ryan, 2002, for a discussion). For example, how do psychologists assess actual attributes? The first challenge is to find an acceptable operational definition of the characteristic of interest (see Chapter 2). Objective statistics are available for some things, such as employment rates, income, or physical characteristics, but these data provide only part of the picture; the vast majority of stereotypes are not based on verifiable demographics but on abstract attributes such as kind or lazy (Stangor, 1995). Another important question is whether it is acceptable to use self-report to assess the match between perceived and actual group characteristics (such as by asking members of stereotyped groups to report their own traits). This procedure has the advantage of letting group members speak for themselves, but, as we saw in Chapter 2, self-report can be inaccurate.

A second methodological concern might be framed “which comparison group?” Imagine researchers are exploring the accuracy of the stereotypic belief that Blacks are more athletic than Whites. Even if researchers agreed on the operational definition of athletic ability, they would still need to determine whose ability to measure. In all probability, this stereotype refers to male athletes. But making this assumption immediately adds another layer of complexity: Is that belief accurate or does a similar stereotypic group difference exist for female athletes? Assuming for the moment that it is most appropriate to focus on men, the researchers still need to find the right sample. Would that be only those men who indicate an interest in athletics or all men? Does it need to be a representative national sample of Blacks and Whites, or can researchers simply ask college students, the respondents in the majority of psychological research? Could the accuracy of this stereotype depend on factors such as the respondents’ socioeconomic status or culture? If you are having difficulty answering these questions, you are not alone. Psychologists who have grappled with the issues find them equally perplexing (see Ashmore & Longo, 1995, for a discussion).

### Shifting Standards

The issue of stereotype accuracy is further complicated because perceivers have motivations that affect their responses. If a group feels threatened, for example, its members are probably less able to draw accurate conclusions about the characteristics of the threatening group: They will be biased toward forming negative opinions about the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Accuracy also can be influenced by the context in which people make judgments. Monica Biernat and her colleagues (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) offer the **shifting standards model**, which proposes that judgments often are influenced by relative comparisons—that is, by the particular yardstick perceivers choose for making judgments in a given situation.

According to the shifting standards model, the language of evaluation and judgment is subjective and perceivers impose their own meaning depending on

the group being rated. These meanings are based on within-group reference points: People draw conclusions about an individual based on their beliefs about the group in general (for example, women are compared to women). Assume, for example, that a shove is considered, on average, to be a moderately aggressive act. Note also that people generally believe that men are more aggressive than women. According to the shifting standards model, in deciding whether a woman who shoves another person is aggressive, the perceiver considers the woman's aggression relative to the perceiver's beliefs about the average level of aggression displayed by women. In this example, then, the woman shover would likely be perceived as aggressive. If instead, the judgment was being made about a man who shoved another man, the shover's action would be perceived as average in aggressiveness. This is because the comparison has shifted and the perceiver is now comparing men to men. Moreover, if the man's and woman's aggression are directly compared, the woman's actions would be viewed as more aggressive than the man's.

How do these findings relate to stereotype accuracy? Recall that to determine whether a stereotype is accurate, researchers compare peoples' perceptions of the group to the actual characteristics of the members of that group. In doing so, researchers generally assume that the participants' assessments are stable. But research based on the shifting standards model shows that, instead, assessments are unstable and depend on the reference point the participants adopt when making their evaluations (Biernat & Manas, 2007). Rating scales, then, are more subjective than researchers sometimes realize and thus may be inappropriate as estimates of stereotype accuracy. For example, the estimate of men's perceived aggressiveness would differ depending on whether the judgment was made relative to other men or relative to women and it would be impossible to determine which assessment was more "accurate."

Overall, the challenges associated with assessing accuracy are daunting; our asking more questions than we have answered reflects the status of the literature (Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995). Psychologists are divided as to whether stereotype accuracy even should be a focus of research. On the one hand, researchers note that science is best served by empirical research and theory development. Without the ability to assess accuracy, some argue, we will never know if stereotypes do, indeed, have a "kernel of truth" and we will be unable to truly understand the cognitive processes underlying stereotype development and use (Jussim, Clark, & Lee, 1995). On the other hand, it may be impossible to measure stereotype accuracy, particularly because of the difficulties in doing so objectively, as we have discussed (Stangor, 1995). As research continues, researchers are better able to estimate stereotype accuracy and, at the same time, have a better understanding of the limitations of the estimates. It is unlikely that these limitations can be completely overcome, however; it may simply be impossible to know whether a stereotype is "true." For individual social justice researchers, the question may come down to this: how can my research best contribute to understanding and eradicating prejudice? For some, the answer will be by trying to assess stereotype accuracy. For others, attention will be directed to different questions, including changing negative attitudes toward outgroups, rather than

the content of people's stereotypes (Judd & Park, 2005). Certainly, this debate will continue, as will research by those who do believe the problems can be adequately addressed.

## **FUNCTIONS OF STEREOTYPES**

In most cases prejudice seems to have some  
“functional significance” for the bearer. Yet this is not  
always the case. Much prejudice is a matter of blind  
conformity with prevailing folkways.

—Gordon Allport (1954, p.12)

Most human behavior is driven by motivations and desires, and holding stereotypic beliefs and prejudicial attitudes is no exception. Evidence suggests that these motivations and desires differ among people. Two individuals might have racist attitudes, for example, and might hold those attitudes with equal fervor. But the underlying reason for those beliefs, and the purpose they fulfill, might be very different. The idea that beliefs and evaluations might serve different functions for different people was developed in the 1950s by two researchers, M. Brewster Smith and Daniel Katz, working independently but arriving at similar ideas (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for a review). No set list of functions was ever agreed on, but there are many similarities in the functions that have been studied. We examine three functions stereotypes might serve: the cognitive function, the ego-defensive function, and the social adjustment function (Snyder & Miene, 1994).

### **Cognitive Function**

As we have discussed, one important reason people categorize others is because their cognitive resources are limited and schemas provide useful shortcuts in making decisions about others. Researchers also consider this process to be one of the functions stereotypes might serve for an individual. This cognitive function was labeled a knowledge function by Daniel Katz (1960), who theorized that its use stems from the need to maintain a meaningful, stable, and organized view of the world. Although this basic function is critical, and also ubiquitous, it does not capture more complex motives for holding stereotypic beliefs, nor does it address the basic needs that might be served by stereotyping and prejudice. The other remaining two functions better capture these complexities.

### **Ego-Defensive Function**

Beliefs about others can serve an ego-defensive function as well. Such beliefs serve to protect an individual's self-concept against both internal and external



threats (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As we will see in Chapter 6, people sometimes derogate outgroups as a way to feel better about themselves. One theoretical perspective holds that such derogation can occur because people project their own negative feelings onto members of other groups. Some researchers of anti-gay prejudice take this perspective, assuming, for example, that the possibility of receiving unwanted sexual advances is anxiety provoking and can result in the defense mechanism of reaction formation. That is, heterosexual men may substitute feelings of anger and resentment toward gay men for the anxiety associated with unwanted sexual advances, perhaps even resorting to violence against gay men as a means of responding to their discomfort (see, for example, Franklin, 1998). Similarly, the results of some research suggest that homophobic men show greater physical arousal to consensual male homosexual activity than do nonhomophobic men, although the self-reported arousal of these individuals does not vary (Adams, Wright, & Lohr, 1996). This difference may occur because homophobic men are repressing their attraction to other men; from a psychodynamic perspective, these repressed feelings could be expressed in the form of a negative stereotype about and prejudice toward gay men (see, for example, Young-Bruehl, 1996).

### **Social Adjustment Function**

Humans are social beings and one of the most fundamental goals they have is fitting in with their social groups. All social groups have norms and expectations and sometimes these expectations provide direction about how to think and feel about others. Expressing beliefs that are counter to these group norms can be risky and may even result in ostracization from the group (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Individuals do not have to accept these beliefs to express them, but they nonetheless have a powerful influence over behavior. It is easy to underestimate the power the group has over behavior—the blind conformity Allport referred to. But think about the last time you heard a racist joke that you disapproved of. How did you respond? Did you remain silent and, perhaps, even laugh along with the group? Many people do; they go along to get along because the goal of relationship maintenance can so easily supersede other goals (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

An important way that relationships are maintained is through following norms—the rules or customs that groups follow. These norms may be personal, like the more individualized rules or customs that family and friends follow, or they may have the weight of the society behind them. In his influential book on the Holocaust, Daniel Goldhagen (1996) addresses how the power of German society affected the lives of everyday Germans, leading them to participate in perhaps the most inexplicable action of the 20th century, the annihilation of 6 million Jews. Writing about the perpetrators of this event, Goldhagen notes, “[t]hese people were overwhelmingly and most importantly Germans.... They were Germans acting in the name of Germany and its highly popular leader, Adolf Hitler. Some were ‘Nazis’ ... some were not. The perpetrators killed and made their other genocidal contributions under the auspices of many institutions

other than the SS. Their chief common denominator was that they were all Germans pursuing German national political goals—in this case, the genocidal killing of Jews” (pp. 6–7). A major thesis of Goldhagen’s book is that killing of this magnitude simply could not have taken place without the consent and participation of vast numbers of people. This consent, he argues, was rooted in the virulent antisemitism that was part and parcel of German culture at that time. As Goldhagen puts it, “eliminationist antisemitism, with its hurricane force potential, resided ultimately in the heart of German political culture, in German society itself” (p. 428).

Christopher Browning (1992) also points to societal pressures in his study of why members of Reserve Police Battalion 101 willingly participated in the murder of Jews in the Polish town of Józefów in 1942. The commander of this group, Major Wilhelm Trapp, offered the men the opportunity to excuse themselves from participating in the impending mass murder. Yet only a dozen men out of nearly 500 chose to do so. Browning argues that the pressure to conform, which is especially acute for a group of men in uniform, kept the men from bowing out. The evidence he examined suggests that the men strongly believed doing so was a sign of weakness or cowardliness. That anyone would willingly support the goal of eliminating all Jews from Europe remains incomprehensible to most people. Yet at least part of the key undoubtedly lies in understanding the pull of fitting in with the social structure of the day.

## **STEREOTYPE MAINTENANCE**

As Gordon Allport (1954) put it, “[p]rejudgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge” (p. 9). In this chapter, we have examined how the human need for efficient information processing produces stereotypes. Yet, as we will see in the next chapter, human cognition does not always run on autopilot. When people have fewer cognitive resources available, for example, they are less likely to stereotype (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Unfortunately, much of the research we have reviewed in this chapter can also give testimony to people’s resistance to stereotype change. We describe next factors that work to maintain stereotypic beliefs, including perception and recall of social information, behavioral confirmation, and linguistic biases. As you read the next section, keep in mind that, as we just explained, understanding the functions stereotypes serve can facilitate change, as can an understanding of the processes we will discuss in upcoming chapters. We close this chapter by considering models of stereotype change.

### **Perception and Recall of Social Information**

Fidelma O’Leary made national news because she was planning a five-day pilgrimage to Mecca, which all Muslims are expected to do (Mangan, 2003). Why are these, and similar stories, news? The answer stems, at least in part,

from people's interest in unique information. People like to learn about exceptions to the rules. In the case of O'Leary, people are interested in why the daughter of an Irish Roman Catholic would convert to Islam. Research documents that observers attend to things that are unique and attract their attention. Certain contextual cues are particularly likely to capture people's attention. Individuals who are moving, are brightly lit, or are wearing colored clothing grab attention, for example (see Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1981 for a review). Intense or novel events also are likely to be noticed, especially those that are negative, such as crime (see Fiske, 1980).

Intuitively, this attention to the unique might seem to impede stereotyping by highlighting the things that make people different rather than the things they have in common. Research suggests that, instead, the consequence of this attention is that people who stand out physically also stand out psychologically. Thus, a solo Black person in a group of Whites is noticed more and is seen in more exaggerated stereotypic terms than the same person in a group of other Blacks (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991 for a review). When this happens, it works to maintain perceivers' stereotypic beliefs. And, as we will see in Chapter 11, there can be long-term negative effects of always standing out in a crowd, for example by being a Black on a predominantly White university campus.

**Recall of social information.** In general, stereotype-inconsistent information surprises people; perhaps because they want to account for this information, they attend to it. Indeed, evidence suggests that people more readily attend to stereotype-inconsistent information than to stereotype-consistent information (Hastie, 1984). But does the perceptual tendency to notice the unique affect what people remember? To answer this question, researchers study whether people are better at remembering stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-consistent information. As we will see, what people recall depends upon their expectations, the information sources, and their lay theories about others' personalities.

In a now classic study, Claudia Cohen (1981) studied how people's expectations influenced what they remembered about another person. Research participants watched a video of a woman who they believed to be either a waitress or a librarian. In the video, she described her day at work to her husband. While doing so, the woman talked about events or behaved in ways consistent with both the librarian stereotype (for example, she wore glasses and said she liked classical music) or the waitress stereotype (for example, she talked about bowling and said she liked pop music). As expected, participants recalled information that was consistent with their stereotypic expectations much better than the information that was inconsistent with their expectations. Those who believed she was a waitress remembered the things that were consistent with the waitress stereotype and those who believed she was a librarian remembered the things that were consistent with the librarian stereotype. Results of a second study showed that stereotypic expectations affect both what people remember about someone and how they use that remembered information in later judgments. Participants who, in the second study, did not learn about the woman's occupation until after they viewed the tape still had better recall for the stereotype-consistent information.

That is, when people later discovered that the woman was a librarian or a waitress, they used this knowledge to make sense of what they had already stored in memory about her. Other research supports this result (see, for example, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996; Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979).

As people process information about social interactions, their memory can be influenced by a process known as *source confusion*; this occurs when an onlooker incorrectly remembers a behavior performed by Person A as having been performed by Person B because the behavior is more consistent with the stereotype of B's group (Sherman, Groom, Ehrenberg, & Klauer, 2003). Another effect of stereotypes on memory involves *assimilation*: People remember a behavior initially presented to them in general terms as stereotype consistent; so, the behavior is assimilated to the stereotype (Dunning & Sherman, 1997). That is, given a general statement about a person's behavior, people may incorrectly remember it as a more specific stereotype-consistent behavior. For example, David Dunning and David Sherman (1997) found that given the statement "Some felt that A's statements were untrue," people remembered Person A as having lied if he was portrayed as a politician and as having been mistaken if he was portrayed as a physicist.

**Lay Theories of Personality.** Research suggests that people may make different assumptions about the nature of personality and that these assumptions influence how they process and interpret stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information (Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001). Some people are *entity theorists*; that is, they implicitly believe that personality is fixed and that, for example, regardless of situational factors, an individual's overall moral character is the same. These individuals are particularly likely to endorse stereotypes and to explain such endorsements by the belief that personality has a strong biological basis (Bastian & Haslam, 2005). Other people are *incremental theorists*; that is, they believe that personality is malleable and that, for example, an individual's moral behavior is influenced by the situation.

When confronted with new information, entity theorists prefer to focus on stereotype-consistent information whereas incremental theorists pay attention to both stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information and, if they do show a preference, it is for stereotype-inconsistent information (Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2001). These individual differences have implications for stereotype maintenance. That is, because entity theorists decline to consider stereotype-inconsistent information, they also are unlikely to consider changing their stereotypic beliefs about a social group. If they believe priests are always moral, for example, entity theorists would continue to hold that belief, even if an individual priest committed an immoral act. Incremental theorists, in contrast, are likely to consider stereotype-inconsistent information and revise their beliefs accordingly. Even if they initially believe priests are always moral, for example, incremental theorists would still weigh information suggesting otherwise. One way they might do so is by evaluating the circumstances under which a priest might behave immorally and developing a more fine-grained theory about priests' moral behavior that takes these situational factors into account.

On balance, people appear to recall information better when it violates their expectations, as shown by a review of 54 studies on this topic (Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Yet, consistent with the research we have presented, this review also suggests that a number of factors affect this relationship. People remember information that is expected better when they have strong expectancies (as in the waitress/librarian example described above); when they are engaged in a complex judgment, such as deciding who to hire for a job; when they are asked to recall traits rather than behaviors; and when their goal is to remember specific information, rather than form an overall impression. These factors have an extremely important influence on how people perceive others, as we will see in the next chapter.

### Linguistic Biases

Earlier in this chapter, we discussed the role of language in stereotype transmission. We now consider how language influences what information is passed along to others and how that information is processed. We first discuss what kinds of information people choose to share with others in everyday conversation. We then examine what happens when groups, rather than individuals, communicate about other social groups. We conclude this section with a discussion of how language facilitates stereotype maintenance through the word choices people make when describing the social behaviors of ingroups and outgroups.

**Stereotype Communication.** Evidence suggests that people are more likely to share stereotype-consistent information than stereotype-inconsistent information about a group. To demonstrate this, Anthony Lyons and Yoshihisa Kashima (2001) asked Australian university students to read a story about an Australian Rules Football player. Some of his actions were stereotype consistent, others were stereotype inconsistent. The experiment was similar to the telephone game that children play in that the researchers were examining what information was remembered and then shared with others. So, the first group of participants read the story and then recalled it. These participants' reconstruction of the original story was then given to a new group of research participants, a process that was repeated four times. As the story was repeated, more and more stereotype-consistent information was reproduced and more and more stereotype-inconsistent information was lost. These results demonstrate that the tendency to recall information that fits people's beliefs also affects the transmission of stereotypes. Inconsistent information tends to get lost in the retelling.

Stereotype-inconsistent information also tends to get lost when groups discuss their stereotypic beliefs. It is not uncommon for people to discuss stereotyped groups, such as ethnic groups, political groups, or other social groups with others (Thompson, Judd, & Park, 2000). Moreover, research suggests that, as a result of such group discussions, people's beliefs about other social groups become more stereotypic than they were initially (Brauer, Judd, & Jacquelin, 2001). This polarization happens even when most individual group

members know that the members of the social group being discussed sometimes behave counterstereotypically. Interestingly, however, if these counterstereotypic behaviors are known to only one member of the discussion group, the effect on group consensus differs. In this case, discussion does not lead to polarized views of the targeted social group. Apparently, when all group members come to the discussion with knowledge of counterstereotypic information, they give that information relatively little weight and it is discussed very little, if at all. When only one group member has counterstereotypic information, however, it is more likely to become part of the group discussion. When that happens, it results in less polarized attitudes toward the social group (see also Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977). Unless there is no voice of dissent about a social group's characteristics, then people's conversations with others tend to lead them to more stereotypic perceptions.

**Linguistic Intergroup Bias.** Earlier in this chapter, we discussed the role of language in stereotype transmission. We now consider how language facilitates stereotype maintenance through the degree of abstraction speakers use to describe social behaviors. Anne Maass and her colleagues (Maass, Salvi, Acuri, & Semin, 1989) have proposed that people's descriptions of ingroup and outgroup behaviors vary in their level of abstraction. Abstract terms are general and describe enduring psychological states (for example, Person A is honest, Person B is impulsive) whereas concrete terms are descriptive and observable (for example, Person A visits a friend; Person B kissed a lover). Maass and her colleagues' model of stereotype maintenance, labeled the **linguistic intergroup bias**, proposes that positive descriptions of ingroups and negative descriptions of outgroups tend to be made in abstract terms; in contrast, negative ingroup and positive outgroup actions tend to be described in concrete terms.

In a study testing this possibility, participants were drawn from rival sides of an Italian city during the time of a highly competitive annual horse race (Maass et al., 1989). Competitors in this race represent specific areas of the city and people highly identify with their own neighborhoods, creating natural ingroups and outgroups. Participants saw cartoons depicting either positive behaviors or negative behaviors. Half of the behaviors of each type were supposedly performed by the ingroup and half by the outgroup. The dependent variable was the response participants chose to represent the action. The results were consistent with the linguistic intergroup bias hypothesis: people described their own groups' positive behavior and the other groups' negative behavior in abstract terms (for example, the outgroup is violent) but the other groups' positive behaviors and their own negative behavior in concrete terms (for example, the ingroup member hurt another; see Figure 3.3). Support for this bias has emerged with a wide variety of ingroups and outgroups, including competing schools, nations, women and men, and political interest groups (see Maass & Acuri, 1996, for a review).

The linguistic intergroup bias helps maintain stereotypes: statements made at a high level of abstraction are more resistant to change than concrete statements because abstract descriptions are difficult to confirm or disconfirm. Seeing Blacks respond to one or two situations in a nonaggressive way, for example, might not




**FIGURE 3.3** Language Abstraction as a Function of Ingroup/Outgroup Membership and the Social Desirability of the Behavior

People describe the socially desirable behaviors of their own group and the socially undesirable behaviors of an outgroup using abstract language, but the other groups' positive behaviors and their own negative behaviors using concrete language.

SOURCE: Adapted from Maass, A., Salvi, D., Arcuri, L., & Semin, G. R. (1989). Language use in intergroup contexts: The linguistic intergroup bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 981–993.

convince people who hold the stereotype that the abstract description “Blacks are aggressive” is incorrect. Concrete descriptions, however, can be more easily discounted. A person can more easily see if the description “the Black man shoved the White man” was correct because it is specific and disconfirmable. It is an advantage, then, to describe your own groups' negative behaviors in ways that can be easily proven wrong. People also gain an advantage if they describe their groups' positive behaviors in abstract terms that are hard to disprove. Doing the reverse when describing an outgroups' behavior creates a disadvantage for its members because it works to maintain negative stereotypes.

### Self-fulfilling Prophecies

If [people] describe situations as real, they are real  
in their consequences.

—William and Dorothy Thomas (1928, p. 572)

Research shows that people's stereotypes lead them to see what they expect and that these expectations influence behavior in actual social interactions. When people meet someone for the first time, for example, they direct their conversation toward topics that they believe will be relevant. Individuals instructed to learn more about someone whom they believe is an introvert, for example, will ask questions that confirm this introversion such as, “What things do you

dislike about loud parties?” (Snyder & Swann, 1978). If the person is, instead, an extrovert, such questions limit her or his ability to demonstrate that trait. After all, extroverts as well as introverts probably dislike some things about loud parties.

When our initial behavior towards others leads them to behave in a way that meets our stereotypic expectations and behave in a stereotype-consistent manner, a **self-fulfilling prophecy** has occurred (Klein & Snyder, 2003). Consider the hypothetical example illustrated in Figure 3.4, in which a White personnel




**FIGURE 3.4** The Self-fulfilling Prophecy

In a self-fulfilling prophecy, a perceiver's stereotypes lead to expectations about another person's characteristics. These expectations lead the perceiver to act in ways that elicit behaviors from the other person that confirm the perceiver's expectations.



officer interviews a minority applicant for a managerial job. In this example, the interviewer holds negative stereotypes about members of the applicant's group, such as their being hostile toward White people and generally lacking the skills required for the job. These stereotypes lead to expectancies about how the applicant will perform during the job interview. For example, the hostility stereotype leads to an expectancy that the applicant will be unfriendly and the ability stereotype leads to an expectancy that the applicant will have few job-related skills.

The interviewer's expectancies lead to two types of behaviors that then elicit stereotype-confirming behaviors from the applicant. First, the interviewer's expectancy of interacting with an unfriendly applicant leads the interviewer to act in a reserved manner, such as making little eye contact, maintaining a greater than normal physical distance, talking in a cold tone of voice, and so forth. Generally, people show *behavioral reciprocation* in their interactions with others, responding in the same way as they are treated (Klein & Snyder, 2003). Therefore, the applicant is likely to respond to the interviewer's behavior in much the same way and to answer questions cautiously and volunteer little information. The second type of interviewer behavior that elicits stereotype-confirming behavior is the interviewer's information-gathering behavior. If the interviewer expects the applicant to have few job-related skills, the interviewer's questions may focus primarily on eliciting information about weaknesses rather than strengths. The applicant answers the interviewer's questions, thereby providing information that confirms the interviewer's stereotypes (Trobe & Thompson, 1997). The applicant's behavior is filtered through the perceiver's perceptual processes, bringing factors such as biased interpretation into play, so that any ambiguous responses the applicant makes are interpreted as confirming the interviewer's expectancies. As an end result of the self-fulfilling prophecy process, the interviewer concludes, *on the basis of the applicant's behavior*, that the applicant is not qualified for the job, and can bolster that conclusion with stereotype-biased memories.

The classic demonstration of a self-fulfilling prophecy in intergroup interaction was provided in a pair of studies conducted by Carl Word, Mark Zanna, and Joel Cooper (1974). In the first study, White undergraduate research participants interviewed both a Black and a White candidate for a position as a member of a decision-making team. Using a set of questions provided by the researchers, the research assistants who acted as applicants were trained to provide answers that showed they were qualified for the job and to behave in similar ways during the interview. The researchers found that the interviewers sat farther away from the Black applicant than the White applicant, made more speech errors (a sign of nervousness) when talking with the Black applicant, and held shorter interviews with the Black applicant. This behavior was not simply a sign of the times in which the research was conducted: Today's White college students respond in similar ways when interacting with African Americans (see, for example, Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; McConnell & Leibold, 2001).

In their second study, Word and his colleagues (1974) examined how people respond to the ways in which the participants in their first study acted toward White people (which we will call *warm* behavior) versus Black people (which

we will call *cool* behavior). White research assistants trained to behave in these ways interviewed White research participants; White participants were used so that interracial factors could not affect the results. Compared to participants who were treated warmly, those treated coolly rated the interviewer as less friendly and reciprocated the interviewer's behavior by sitting farther away and making more speech errors. The interviewees were videotaped during the interview and judges who did not know the hypothesis of the study rated their behavior. The judges rated the interviewees in the cool treatment condition as more nervous and as having performed more poorly in the interview than those in the warm treatment condition. Taken together, the results of these two studies show that people treat members of stereotyped and nonstereotyped groups differently and that this difference in treatment results in stereotype-confirming behavior on the part of members of the stereotyped groups.

The self-fulfilling prophecy has been found to operate for a variety of stereotypes in addition to race, including those related to gender (Ridge & Reber, 2002), obesity (Snyder & Haugen, 1994), mental illness (Sibicky & Dovidio, 1986), and physical attractiveness (Snyder, Tanke, & Berschied, 1977). However, self-fulfilling prophecy effects are not inevitable. For example, people who are more prejudiced produce stronger effects (Dovidio, 2001), and effects tend to be stronger when the perceiver also is engaged in other cognitive tasks (Biesanz, Neuberg, Smith, Asher, & Judice, 2001). Effects are weaker when the perceiver is motivated to form an accurate impression (Biesanz et al., 2001).

As Oliver Klein and Mark Snyder (2003) point out, the self-fulfilling prophecy requires a kind of cooperation, as it were, from members of stereotyped groups: In response to the perceiver's expectancy-related behavior, the target must perform behaviors that either confirm the stereotype or that are sufficiently ambiguous that perceivers can interpret them as confirming the stereotype. Strong social norms, such as the expectation that people answer questions that are asked of them, facilitate such expectancy confirmation. Even so, Klein and Snyder point out that people are sometimes motivated to behave in ways that disconfirm, rather than confirm, the group stereotype. For example, people who are especially sensitive to their groups' being stereotyped often try to act in ways that contradict the stereotype, and people who want to make a good impression may act in a warm and friendly manner even if faced with cool and unfriendly behavior on the part of the other person. Such stereotype-disconfirming behavior can disrupt the self-fulfilling prophecy process and can lead the perceiver to view the person as an individual rather than in stereotypic terms.

### **Stereotype Change**

Since the publication of Allport's (1954) classic book on prejudice, researchers have reflected on people's reluctance to change their beliefs. Such change does not come easily. As Allport wrote: "We have fashioned our generalizations as we have because they have worked fairly well. Why change them to accommodate every new bit of evidence? If we are accustomed to one make of automobile and are satisfied, why admit the merits of another make? To do so would only

disturb our satisfactory set of habits” (p. 23). At the same time, there are reasons why fixing incorrect beliefs is a good idea. If you think about it, basing decisions on an incorrect belief goes against the very reason beliefs exist in the first place: efficient information processing (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). People cannot be efficient if they are heading down the wrong path. When faced with firm evidence that the available information about a group member contradicts stereotypic beliefs, people have two choices: change the belief or find a way to recategorize the person or persons who do not fit the stereotypic model.

What does it take to make people change stereotypic beliefs? Three answers to this question have been proposed (see Weber & Crocker, 1983). The *book-keeping model* suggests that change occurs slowly as people add and subtract information from their schema ledger. In this model, both small and large pieces of disconfirming evidence are taken into account, and, over time, the stereotype is adjusted. The *conversion model*, in contrast, is based on the notion that people “see the light” based on undeniably contradictory evidence. In this model, dramatic information has an effect, but less obvious instances of disconfirmation go unnoticed.

The *subtyping model* has received the most empirical support in the psychological literature, perhaps because it is the easiest to test experimentally; for that reason we discuss this model in some detail. The subtyping model proposes that people rely on a cognitive sleight of hand that allows their beliefs about a group, in general, to remain intact, yet accommodate the discrepant case: that is, they create a special category for the exceptions to the rule. This process, described as *re-fencing* by Allport (1954), occurs when people treat those who do not fit their stereotype as exceptions (Richards & Hewstone, 2001). For example, when people learn that an older man has an excellent memory, which is inconsistent with the stereotype that older people have poor memories, they form a subtype “competent older man.” The older person with the good memory is placed in this category, allowing people to retain their stereotypic beliefs about old age and memory.

What process underlies subtype creation? To understand the answer to this question, think about the social group, women. Bring to mind, also, that women are stereotypically considered to be unathletic, so that meeting an athletic woman would disconfirm this stereotype. Now imagine you meet a very athletic woman, but she is one of the few you have ever met, so she seems to be an exception to the rule. Subtyping researchers label this case *concentrated disconfirmation* (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992) because you know only one athletic woman, all the information that disconfirms the female stereotype is concentrated in this one, seemingly rare example. When disconfirmers are concentrated, perceivers re-fence, or create a new category to account for this unusual person (Weber & Crocker, 1983). What happens, however, if you start to notice that more and more of the women you meet are athletic? Subtyping researchers label this an example of *dispersed disconfirmation* (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992). Here, many women disconfirm the group stereotype. When this happens, it becomes hard to isolate this perception by creating a subtype of exceptions: What might have been seen as an exception is now becoming part of the rule. Therefore, the group stereotype is likely to be changed.

Lucy Johnston and Miles Hewstone (1992) demonstrated this process by asking participants to read about physics students or drama students who either had traits consistent or inconsistent with the stereotype of their group. They also varied whether the inconsistent information was concentrated (applied to two of the eight group members) or dispersed (was spread across six of the eight group members). In each condition, six pieces of inconsistent information were presented. Thus, both groups were given the same amount of disconfirming information but the percentage of people to whom the information applied differed by condition: 25 percent of the people in the concentrated condition and 75 percent in the dispersed condition. Greater stereotype change occurred in the dispersed condition—that is, when a greater percentage of the group members exhibited the disconfirming traits. Results also suggested that, in the concentrated condition, the two people who disconfirmed the stereotype were set apart from the group, leaving the stereotype intact. In short, subtypes were created.

Research by Ziva Kunda and Kathryn Oleson (1995, Study One) suggests that people resist changing their group stereotype, preferring to create a subtype if they can justify doing so. In their research, participants learned that a particular lawyer was introverted, which is inconsistent with the commonly held stereotype that lawyers are extroverted. In response to this information, people did change their stereotype about the group in general, deciding that lawyers were less extroverted than they had previously believed. However, when they also learned that the lawyer worked for a large or small law firm, they instead created a subtype for the introverted lawyer and did not change their perceptions of lawyers as a group. This outcome emerged even though the additional information (size of firm) is not stereotypically associated with lawyers, suggesting that people readily look for reasons not to challenge their stereotypic beliefs.

### **Changing Stereotypic Beliefs**

Subtyping might be viewed as more of a process for stereotype maintenance, or stereotype revision, than stereotype change (Richards & Hewstone, 2001). Even so, the research described above clearly shows that change in the content of people's schemas can occur. Another possibility for change comes from the research on stereotype functions that we described earlier in this chapter. Functional theorists propose that understanding the purpose being fulfilled by holding stereotypic beliefs is the key to stereotype change. Sometimes this purpose is heavily influenced by situational factors, other times by the personality of the beholder. Evidence suggests that once the function of the belief has been identified, successful strategies can be targeted to change it (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for a review). Gregory Herek (1986) offers the example of two people who are opposed to a neighborhood treatment facility for the mentally ill. Ms. Wagner opposes the facility because she stereotypically believes the inmates threaten her personal safety, a cognitive function. Mr. Adams opposes the facility because his friends and neighbors oppose it, a social adjustment function. Changing Ms. Wagner's attitude might be accomplished most effectively by convincing her that only a small minority of mentally ill people are violent. Mr. Adams,

on the other hand, is likely to change his attitude only if he believes other neighbors or friends actually support the facility. Stereotype change is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor but, by carefully considering the functions the stereotypes are serving, progress can occur. We will discuss changing prejudicial beliefs in more detail in Chapter 14.

## SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the ways in which cognitive processing influences stereotyping. Research on this topic mushroomed in the late 1970s and 1980s, exploring the idea that humans are inherently efficient information processors, and remains an important focus of study today. In reviewing the costs and benefits of processing efficiency, we described the categorization process and its influence on schemas about social groups. When approaching a social interaction, people's first level of analysis relies on basic social categories, such as age, race, and gender. However, perceivers also use more fine-grained social categories and readily recognize that others can belong to more than one basic category at a time. As we saw, one of the most natural cognitive tendencies is to divide the world into two groups—us versus them. The minimal group paradigm demonstrates how little it takes to start this division. As a result, people perceive a world in which they see their own group as both diverse and deserving (ingroup favoritism) and other groups as all alike and less worthy (the outgroup homogeneity effect).

Stereotypes originate from many sources, including parents, peers, and the media. We reviewed these sources and also described theories that outline the process by which these stereotypes form. Social role theory recognizes that people form perceptions from observing the world around them, but acknowledges that their tendency to give too little weight to situational factors tips the balance in these observations. Illusory correlations emerge when people notice that distinctive events are co-occurring with minority status, even if that correlation is erroneously perceived. Messages conveyed through language also influence stereotype formation. Some discourse appears to be more interesting and more communicable. Stereotypes that fit this mold may be more likely to persist.

The seemingly simple question of whether stereotypes are accurate has been perplexingly difficult to answer. Researchers have developed ways to assess accuracy and agree that this assessment should include both measures of central tendency and measures of variability. But the quest for the kernel of truth also has led to considerable discussion of the methodological problems associated with this measurement and even the wisdom of trying to do so. The shifting standards model demonstrates that judgments are subjective and can change with a switch in point of view.

We reviewed research showing that stereotypes are not all things to all people. In fact, the same stereotype might serve a cognitive, ego-defensive, or social adjustment function to different people. Understanding these differences leads to a better chance for stereotype change. We then turned to a discussion of how cognitive processing influences what people attend to and what they remember. Research suggests that people readily notice stereotype-inconsistent information.

What people notice, in turn, influences what they perceive. The issue of whether people recall stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent information is difficult to answer. In short, it depends on processing goals or other situational factors. Cognitive processes, more often than not, seem to support stereotype maintenance. One such process is the linguistic intergroup bias which influences the vocabulary people use to describe ingroups and outgroups. Another is the self-fulfilling prophecy where Person A's stereotype of Person B's group leads Person A to act in ways that elicit stereotype-consistent behavior from Person B. As a result, Person B confirms Person A's stereotypic perceptions.

We close the chapter by discussing models of stereotype change, explaining in detail the model that has received the most empirical support in the literature: the subtyping model. In response to disconfirming evidence, particularly evidence displayed by only a few members of a group, perceivers adjust their schemas by creating subtypes. Subtypes do not replace the group level stereotype, but instead offer a way for perceivers to acknowledge that some individuals do not fit the group stereotype. Limitations of the experimental method make demonstrations of other models of stereotype change, such as the bookkeeping model, difficult. Fortunately, this does not mean such changes do not occur.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Social Categorization

Hamilton, D. L. (Ed.) (1981). *Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

This classic work includes chapters by prominent researchers whose work became the cornerstones of the modern cognitive approach to stereotyping. The chapters are perhaps more accessible than some more recent explorations and they convey the excitement of this new way of thinking about the topic.

Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking categorically about others. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51, 93–120.

Provides an excellent overview of the research on categorization, focusing on (1) when social categories are activated by perceivers, (2) the consequences of this activation, and (3) whether and how perceivers can control this activation.

Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 25 (4), 79–97.

This highly influential paper anticipated much of the current work on the cognitive processes involved in stereotyping and prejudice as well as social identity theory, which is discussed in Chapter 9.

### Origins of Stereotypes

Blaine, B. E. (2007). *Understanding the psychology of diversity*. London: Sage.

Chapter 9 reviews how members of diverse social groups are portrayed on television and how those depictions influence people's stereotypic beliefs.

Eagly, A. H., Wood, W., & Diekmann, A. B. (2000). Social role theory of sex differences and similarities: A current appraisal. In T. Eckes (Ed.), *The developmental social psychology of gender* (pp. 123–174). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Provides an up-to-date overview of social role theory that has been supported by numerous studies by Eagly and others.

Hamilton, D. L., & Gifford, R. K. (1976). Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 12, 392–407.

Describes Hamilton and Gifford's original study of illusory correlations.

### Stereotype Accuracy

Biernat, M., & Manis, M. (2007). Stereotypes and shifting standards: Assimilation and contrast in social judgment. In D. A. Stapel & J. Suls (Eds.), *Assimilation and contrast in social psychology* (pp. 75–97). New York: Psychology Press.

Provides a comprehensive overview of the research supporting the shifting standards model.

Lee, Y.-T., Jussim, L. J., & McCauley, C. R. (Eds.) (1995). *Stereotype accuracy: Toward appreciating group differences*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

This volume includes a number of highly readable chapters that tackle the complexities of assessing stereotype accuracy. Particularly interesting are the concluding two chapters, one by Charles Stangor, the other by the editors, which provide opposing viewpoints about the benefits and risks of research in this area.

### Functions of Stereotypes

Herek, G. M. (1986a). The instrumentality of attitudes: Toward a neofunctional theory. *Journal of Social Issues*, 42(2), 99–114.

Gregory Herek can be credited with reviving interest in functional attitude theory, including developing ways to measure attitude function.

Snyder, M., & Miene, P. (1994). On the functions of stereotypes and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson (Eds.), *The psychology of prejudice* (pp. 33–54). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Mark Snyder's highly engaging writing style makes this an accessible introduction to the various functions people's stereotypes might serve.

### Stereotype Maintenance

Cohen, C. E. (1981). Person categories and social perception: Testing some boundaries of the processing effects of prior knowledge. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 40, 441–452.

The studies reported in this article remain widely cited and provide a good overview of how experimental design can be used to demonstrate cognitive processes.

Maass, A., Salvi, D., Arcuri, L., & Semin, G. R. (1989). Language use in intergroup contexts: The linguistic intergroup bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 981–993.

Provides a good introduction to the linguistic intergroup bias. Maass's work is nice because her ingroups and outgroups are not ones traditionally seen in the literature.

Weber, R., & Crocker, J. (1983). Cognitive processes in the revision of stereotypic beliefs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45, 961–977.

This work remains the classic overview of models of stereotype change.

### Encyclopedia Entries

Worell, J. (Ed.). (2001). *Encyclopedia of women and gender: Sex similarities and differences and the impact of society on gender*. San Francisco: Academic Press.

Contains excellent summaries of social role theory, expectancy confirmation and self-fulfilling prophecies, and stereotype development. The chapter on gender stereotypes addresses the structure of stereotypes, subtypes, stereotype accuracy, and the shifting standards model.

### KEY TERMS

|                            |                          |                      |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| basic social category      | outgroup homogeneity     | subtypes             |
| categorization             | effect                   | ultimate attribution |
| illusory correlation       | self-fulfilling prophecy | error                |
| linguistic intergroup bias | shifting standards model |                      |
| minimal group              | social learning theory   |                      |
| paradigm                   | social role theory       |                      |

### QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Explain why people categorize.
2. Think of the social categories you use most frequently. Are they at the basic category or the subtype level?
3. Sometimes it is difficult to determine a person's gender by their physical appearance. Based on what you know about categorization, what do you think people do in this situation?
4. Describe the minimal group paradigm.
5. List and describe sources of stereotypic beliefs. Which do you believe are more important?
6. Do you think people today are more likely to hold stereotypes than those who lived before television and movies? Why or why not?
7. Describe the development of stereotypes about Blacks and Whites using the tenets of social role theory.



8. What are illusory correlations? Specifically, how are they formed and why do they lead to stereotyping?
9. Give an example of a one-shot illusory correlation.
10. How does language influence the development of stereotyping?
11. Should your college or university allow faculty who have heavy foreign accents to teach? Why or why not?
12. Think of some of your favorite songs. Do they contain racial or gender stereotypes? If so, how common do you think this is and what effect does it have on your perceptions of other groups?
13. What is the outgroup homogeneity effect and what are the reasons this effect emerges?
14. Describe the ultimate attribution error.
15. Distinguish between two of the measures of stereotype accuracy we described: percentage estimates and perceived dispersion.
16. Do you believe researchers should explore whether stereotypes are accurate? Why or why not?
17. If researchers demonstrate that some stereotypes are accurate, do you think this information could be exploited, for example by members of hate groups? If so, in what way?
18. How accurate is the stereotype that women are better caregivers than men? Base your answer on the shifting standards model.
19. Describe three functions stereotypes might serve.
20. How might you change a stereotype that serves an ego-defensive function?
21. Why would people attend to novel, unique events, but recall stereotype-consistent information about social groups?
22. Describe the ways in which stereotypes can bias memory.
23. Describe some ways in which biased interpretation of behavior and biased memory could influence real-life situations in which interpretations and memory are important, such as eyewitness testimony, teachers' grading of students, and supervisors' annual performance ratings of their employees.
24. Explain the difference between abstract and concrete language use. How does this lead to the intergroup linguistic bias?
25. Explain how a self-fulfilling prophecy operates.
26. Describe the three models of stereotype change.
27. Distinguish between dispersed and concentrated disconfirmation.
28. Do you believe subtyping is a model of stereotype change or stereotype maintenance? Explain your answer.
29. Do you think the most popular videos, posted on websites such as YouTube, are likely to portray stereotypic images? If so, how might that work to maintain stereotypic beliefs?

## Chapter 4

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# Stereotype Activation and Application

It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring “a course at charm school.” Nor ... does it require expertise in psychology to know that if an employee’s flawed “interpersonal skills” can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.

—UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., WRITING FOR THE MAJORITY IN *PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS* (1989, P. 256)

### Chapter Outline

#### **Categorization**

*Prototypicality*  
*Situational Influences*  
*Prejudice*

#### **Stereotype Activation**

*Automatic Activation*  
*Motivated Activation*

#### **The Activated Stereotype**

#### **Stereotype Application**

*Motivation to Inhibit Stereotyping*

*Ability to Inhibit Stereotyping*

#### **Consequences of Stereotype Use**

*Biased Interpretation of Behavior*  
*Biased Evaluation*

#### **Summary**

#### **Suggested Readings**

#### **Key Terms**

#### **Questions for Review and Discussion**

**A**nn Hopkins, a senior executive at the well-known accounting firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers, was being considered for promotion to partnership status, a very prestigious and important position in the company. The only woman among the 88 candidates for promotion that year, Ms. Hopkins' job performance was outstanding. She had generated more business for the company than had any of the other candidates and she was popular with her clients. Despite these achievements (and others), she was not promoted; the reason given by decision makers was that she lacked the necessary interpersonal skills, being described as too "macho" and "needing a course in charm school." That is, despite her accomplishments as a member of the firm, Ms. Hopkins was denied promotion because she did not fit the traditional female stereotype. She sued the company for sex discrimination, with the case ultimately being decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. They found in her favor, resulting in the decision by Justice Brennan quoted above.

How do stereotypes lead to outcomes such as Ann Hopkins being denied a partnership? Several factors are involved. One is stereotype knowledge, the extent to which a person is familiar with the content of a stereotype. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 3, stereotype knowledge is widespread in a society, and both prejudiced and unprejudiced people know the content of stereotypes. Thus, for example, both prejudiced and unprejudiced White Americans can describe the American stereotype of African Americans (Devine & Elliot, 1995), both prejudiced and unprejudiced White Britons can describe the British stereotype of West Indians (Lepore & Brown, 1997), and both prejudiced and unprejudiced White Australians can describe the Australian stereotype of Australian Aborigines (Augoustinos, Innes, & Ahrens, 1994). **Stereotype endorsement**, in contrast, is the extent to which a person actually agrees with the social stereotype of a group. As we saw in Chapter 1, stereotype endorsement is one component of prejudice.

Before a stereotype can have an effect, it must be activated. **Stereotype activation** is "the extent to which a stereotype is accessible in one's mind" (Kunda & Spencer, 2003, p. 522). Because a stereotype only applies to a given group, it has no function except in relation to its group and so usually lies dormant until activated, such as through an encounter with a member of a stereotyped group. However, stereotypes are not always activated. As we discussed in Chapter 3, a precondition for stereotype activation is **categorization**: Based on a person's observable characteristics (such as skin tone, facial features, behavior, and so forth), an onlooker must classify that person as a member of stereotyped group.

Finally, the activated stereotype must be applied to the person. **Stereotype application** is "the extent to which one uses a stereotype to judge a member of the stereotyped group" (Kunda & Spencer, 2003, p. 522). The progression from categorization through stereotype activation to stereotype application is rapid and automatic, with people only rarely being aware that it is happening (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman, 1999). However, the automatic nature of the process does not mean that its completion is inevitable: Because group membership is not always clear-cut, a number of factors can influence how an onlooker categorizes a person. Similarly, knowledge of a stereotype does not always lead to its activation and activation of a stereotype does not always lead to its application.

This chapter deals with four topics. We first look at the factors that influence how onlookers categorize others. We then consider some of the factors that facilitate and inhibit the activation of stereotypes, following a model developed by Ziva Kunda and Steven Spencer (2003). The third section of the chapter examines the circumstances under which stereotypes are applied, following a model presented by Russell Fazio and Tamara Towles-Schwen (1999). The last section presents some of the effects of stereotype application. Although we discuss categorization, stereotype activation, and stereotype application as discrete processes, in practice each step follows the other so quickly that they can be difficult to separate. While examining the role stereotypes play in how people perceive and interact with others, it is important to bear two factors in mind. First, stereotypes are most likely to be activated and applied to strangers and others whom people do not know very well; the better people know other people, the more likely they are to view those others in terms of their unique characteristics rather than in terms of the stereotypes associated with the social groups they represent (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Second, as we will see throughout the chapter, when people interact with others, their behavior is driven by goals to be achieved and needs to be fulfilled (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). Some of these motivational factors inhibit the effects of stereotypes and lead people to see others in individualized, rather than stereotypical, terms. However, stereotypes can be very important because they may be the only information people have about others when they first encounter them. Those stereotypes can also shape first impressions of and behavior toward strangers.

## CATEGORIZATION

The first step in the stereotype application processes is categorization. Before a stereotype can be activated, an onlooker must categorize a person as a member of a stereotyped group. As we saw in Chapter 3, people tend to classify others into the three basic social categories of gender, race, and age: Simply seeing a person calls attention to his or her group membership in terms of those categories. However, any one person, such as a middle-aged Black woman, falls into all of these categories. Because a person can be placed into more than one category, several processes operate to determine which category gets the most attention and, therefore, which stereotype is available for activation.

When one person first encounters another, the first category to be noticed is race, quickly followed by gender (Ito & Urland, 2003). Because this process of allocating attention to categories takes only a fraction of a second, no one category necessarily has precedence when the process is complete: As we discussed in Chapter 3, unless other processes intervene, onlookers make use of all three categories to classify a person. This process results in subcategories, such as young Black woman, that combine salient social categories (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992) and it is the subcategory stereotype that is available for activation.

### Prototypicality

One factor that affects the speed and ease of categorization is the **prototypicality** of the person being categorized. A person is prototypical of a social category to the extent that he or she fits the observer's concept of the essential features characteristic of that category. For example, the prototypical African has dark brown skin, dark eyes, tightly curled black hair, a relatively broad nose, and relatively full lips; in contrast, the prototypical European has light-colored skin, light or dark eyes, straight or loosely curled hair that can be either light or dark in color, a relatively narrow nose, and relatively thin lips (Livingston & Brewer, 2002). The more prototypical of a category a person is, the more quickly and easily the person is categorized, a process known as the *racial phenotypical bias* (Maddox, 2004).

For example, Robert Livingston and Marilynn Brewer (2002) showed people pictures of White Americans and African Americans who had been previously rated as high or low in prototypicality for their respective racial groups and measured how quickly people could correctly categorize the pictures as being of White or Black people. Their research participants categorized the high prototypical pictures about 10 percent faster than the low prototypical pictures. Similarly, Irene Blair and her colleagues (Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002) found positive correlations between the prototypicality of pictures of both White and Black people and how quickly they were categorized as White or Black. In addition, using pictures of Black people who varied in skin tone from dark to light, Keith Maddox and Stephanie Gray (2002) found that prototypicality facilitated racial categorization for both Black and White research participants. Research shows that although people are often aware that they make judgments based on another's category membership, such as another's race or gender, they are not aware that they also use information about prototypicality in their evaluations. Thus, as we will see, people are able to control stereotyping based on category membership under certain conditions, but appear to be unable to control their use of another's prototypical features even when given explicit instructions about how to avoid doing so (Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004).

Researchers generally define prototypicality by the physical features associated with a category. However, a person's likability also appears to affect group members' perceived fit with their category and, therefore, influences the speed with which they are categorized. White perceivers more quickly categorize admired than disliked members of their own race. In contrast, Blacks who were disliked were categorized more quickly than those who were admired (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005b). These effects presumably emerged because disliked Whites and admired Blacks are seen as less prototypical of their racial group than are disliked Blacks and admired Whites.

### Situational Influences

Although categorization is often automatic, situational factors can intervene in the categorization process to emphasize one category over another. Thus, although people spontaneously subcategorize using basic social categories, they may need to be motivated to subcategorize on the basis of other characteristics,

such as occupation. For instance, when someone encounters a businesswoman, the salient category will be woman because it, and not businesswoman, is the basic social category. In the absence of a reason to do otherwise, people use basic categories rather than subcategories (Brewer & Feinstein, 1999; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). For example, Louise Pendry and Neil Macrae (1996) had research participants watch a brief videotape of a woman in an office performing a variety of work-related tasks, such as removing documents from a briefcase and reading reports. Before watching the tape, participants were given one of three goals: to form an accurate impression of the woman, to estimate the woman's height, or to check the clarity of the tape. Pendry and Macrae hypothesized that the participants who were motivated to form an accurate impression would be most likely to use the subcategory businesswoman because, for them, this category would provide more information for forming an accurate impression than would the general category of woman. Results supported the hypothesis: Participants asked to form an accurate impression were more likely to categorize the woman in the videotape as a businesswoman and the participants in the other two conditions were more likely to categorize her simply as a woman.

The context in which a perceiver encounters another person can also influence categorization. For example, when a person in a group differs in some way from the other group members, onlookers pay the most attention to the category in which the person differs from the others (Nelson & Miller, 1995). Thus, Jason Mitchell, Brian Nosek, and Mahzarin Banaji (2003) found that people thought of a Black woman in terms of her gender when she was shown in an otherwise all-male context and in terms of her race when she was shown in an otherwise all-White context. A person's behavior may also draw onlookers' attention to one category over another. Neil Macrae, Galen Bodenhausen, and Alan Milne (1995) found that people thought of an Asian woman in terms of her gender when they saw her putting on makeup but in terms of her race when they saw her eating with chopsticks. In situations such as these, onlookers pay attention to and use the basic social category, such as race or gender, to which the situation draws their attention; other categories are inhibited, which prevents categorization in terms of subcategories (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). As a result, it is the stereotype of the basic category—race or gender depending on the situational cues—that becomes available for activation.

### Prejudice

Racially prejudiced people tend to pay more attention to race than other characteristics, such as gender, when they see people and this attention affects categorization (Fazio & Dunton, 1997). For example, Charles Stangor and his colleagues (1992) had White research participants watch videotapes of an eight-member discussion group consisting of two Black women, two White women, two Black men, and two White men. Stangor and his colleagues found that participants high on racial prejudice were more likely to categorize discussion participants by race than were low prejudice participants, but that racial prejudice was unrelated to categorization by gender.

Prejudiced people also are biased in the categorizations they make. For example, Michael Quanta, John Keats, and Stephen Harkins (1975) showed research participants who were high or low in anti-Semitism (anti-Jewish prejudice) pictures of people, some of whom were Jewish and some of whom were not. The participants classified the people in the pictures as Jewish or not Jewish. People who were prejudiced against Jews tended to overclassify the people in the pictures as Jewish; that is, they tended to err on the side of classifying Gentiles as Jews rather than err by classifying Jews as Gentiles. More recently, Emanuele Castano and colleagues (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002) found a similar effect for high versus low ethnocentric Europeans: highly ethnocentric people tended to overclassify others as members of the outgroup whereas low ethnocentric people did not. Jacques-Philippe Leyens and Vincent Yzerbyt (1992) have called this phenomenon *ingroup overexclusion*: prejudiced people want to avoid treating outgroup members as though they were part of the ingroup. It is therefore “safer” for them to misclassify ingroup members as outgroup members (even though it means excluding ingroup members) than to misclassify outgroup members as part of the ingroup (and thus extend ingroup privileges to the “wrong” people). As David Taylor and Fathali Moghaddam (1994) put it, “If we take the case of the prejudiced white person, when grouping black and white others, such a person would identify with the white group, and any racial mixing that took place would, from that person’s perspective, negatively affect his or her status. Such a person would try to make sure not to mistakenly place any blacks in the white group” (pp. 68–69).

Exclusion of outgroup members can also be accomplished by accurately classifying people as members of the ingroup or outgroup. Accurate classification can sometimes be difficult, especially when confronted with a person with racially ambiguous characteristics, such as a light-skinned African American or a dark-skinned European American. In such cases, racially prejudiced people may be especially motivated to accurately classify people as Black or White. Therefore, it is not surprising that Jim Blascovich and his colleagues (Blascovich, Wyer, Swart, & Kibler, 1997) found that racially prejudiced White people took longer to categorize racially ambiguous faces as Black or White than did nonprejudiced White people, presumably using the additional time to be more accurate in their classifications. In contrast, prejudiced and nonprejudiced people did not differ on the amount of time they took to classify unambiguous (that is, prototypical) faces.

Prejudiced people may also use group stereotypes to help reduce the ambiguity they face when encountering a person who does not clearly fit into any one category. For example, Kurt Hugenberg and Galen Bodenhausen (2003) created a set of pictures of male faces that combined prototypically White and Black features, half of which had happy expressions and half of which had angry expressions. They showed these pictures to White research participants and found that nonprejudiced participants were equally likely to classify a particular face as White or Black regardless of the emotion it showed. However, prejudiced participants were more likely to classify the angry face as Black, presumably using the stereotype of African American men as hostile as a cue to deciding the race of the person in the picture.

Text not available due to copyright restrictions

A final factor motivating categorization may be America's historical emphasis on race as an important social category. As Jordan Lite (2001), a young woman of multiracial background recounts in Box 4.1, Americans seem to find it necessary to put her into the "correct" racial category before beginning a closer relationship.

## STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION

Once a person has been categorized as a member of a stereotyped group, the stage is set for stereotype activation. In **stereotype activation**, a dormant stereotype becomes active, ready for use, and capable of influencing a person's thoughts about and behavior toward a member of the stereotyped group. As shown in Figure 4.1, following categorization, two types of stereotype activation processes begin that operate simultaneously and can affect one another. The first type, automatic processing, is triggered simply by observing stimuli associated with the stereotyped group; the second type, motivated processing, is rooted in people's goals and needs, activating stereotypes when the stereotypes can help fulfill those goals and needs. These motives can arise from either individual difference factors, such as personality, or from situational factors. In addition, activation occurs for motivated stereotypes only if some aspect of the stereotype is relevant to the situations in which people find themselves. For example, if the person must select someone for a job, stereotypes that include work-related traits such as lazy or hard working






**FIGURE 4.1** Stereotype Activation

Stereotype activation begins when a person's attention is drawn to a member of a stereotyped group. At that point, two types of processes begin that operate simultaneously and can affect one another. Automatic processing is triggered by stimuli associated with the stereotyped group. Motivated processing is rooted in people's goals, needs, and motivations, and activates stereotypes when the stereotypes can help fulfill those goals, needs, and motivation. These motives can arise from either individual difference factors, such as personality, or from situational factors. In addition, activation occurs for motivated stereotypes only if some aspect of the stereotype is relevant to the situation in which the person finds him- or herself.

SOURCE: Adapted from Kunda & Spencer, 2003.

would be activated but stereotypes that do not include work-related traits would not be activated. This section describes the stereotype activation process, looking first at automatic activation processes and then at motivated activation processes. It concludes with a discussion of some characteristics of the activated stereotype.

### Automatic Activation

Categorization paves the way for stereotype activation—the process of making the stereotype accessible in the mind and ready for use. Like categorization, stereotype activation is automatic; that is, it occurs without effort or conscious thought once a person has been categorized as a member of a stereotyped group. The automatic nature of stereotype activation is shown by the fact that even

subliminal cues—those presented too quickly to be consciously noted—can activate stereotypes (Bargh, 1999). For example, Steven Spencer and his colleagues (Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998) had research participants watch a computer screen on which either a Black or White face was shown for less than one-tenth of a second; the participants then completed word stems such as hos\_, wel\_, ste\_, and stu\_. Participants who saw Black faces were more likely to complete the stems with words consistent with the Black stereotype, such as hostile, welfare, steal, and stupid, whereas those who saw White faces were more likely to complete the stems with nonstereotypic terms, such as hospital, welcome, step, and student. Researchers have used *functional magnetic resonance imaging* (fMRI) to examine the neural activity that occurs when stereotypes are activated by showing research participants pictures of Black or White faces. They have found that when stimuli are presented only briefly (30 milliseconds) greater activation is present in the amygdala, a brain area associated with emotion, when Black rather than White faces are presented (Cunningham et al., 2004). However, if stimuli are presented for a longer duration (525 milliseconds), the difference in amygdala response to Black and White faces is significantly reduced. In this longer exposure condition, activation of regions of the frontal cortex, a brain area associated with control and regulation, were greater for Black than for White faces, suggesting that participants were trying to control their biased responding. Similarly, when people are specifically asked to think about each face as unique, amygdala response is different than when people are asked to categorize faces, suggesting that automatic processing is not inevitable (Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). Thinking creatively may also prevent stereotype activation, as explained in Box 4.2.

#### **Box 4.2    Thinking Outside the Box**

The expression “think outside the box” has become a cliché, but the advantages of doing so remain. Creative thinkers look at problems in new ways and take unconventional routes to problem solving. Although explicitly encouraging people to think creatively may sometimes promote stereotype activation, research suggests that when people are unconsciously primed to think creatively, automatic stereotype activation is inhibited. Kai Sassenberg and Gordon Moskowitz (2005) demonstrated this effect by first asking research participants to provide examples of times when they approached a problem by thinking creatively (such as making art) or thoughtfully (such as making an important decision). Participants believed this portion of the study was unrelated to the task that followed, so there was no clear connection between this “mindset manipulation” and the stereotype activation measures used in the next part of the study. Results showed automatic activation of the African American stereotype in the thoughtful mindset condition, but not in the

creative mindset condition. This finding was replicated with a task that measured associations between primed words (such as sugar) with a category (such as sweet); categories were activated more quickly in the thoughtful condition than in the creative condition, suggesting that automatic activation can be inhibited by creative thinking.

Sassenberg and Moskowitz suggest that thinking creatively is a proactive strategy that can prevent stereotypes from coming to mind. They also note that the strategy can be applied to all stereotypes and that it does not require people to set specific goals to avoid stereotyping, nor does it require extensive training. Their “think different” strategy involves the simple mental task of recalling past success at being creative. The rub, unfortunately, is that it is not clear whether people can consciously use this technique and see the same benefits. Perhaps future research can find ways to help people apply this technique, allowing them to reduce their reliance on stereotypic processing.

When automatic processing does occur, researchers believe it stems from people's cultural environments that establish strong links between a category, such as Black, and stereotypes associated with the category, such as lazy, musical, athletic, and hostile. Because these category-stereotype links are both strong and pervasive in the culture, people learn the links so thoroughly that the stereotype becomes a conditioned, unthinking mental response to the category (Fazio, 2001; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). A wealth of evidence has supported the principle that when a category label is presented, people are unable to prevent making the association between the category label and the information they have stored about it (see Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000, for a review). The strength of such associations is often measured by how quickly people respond to stereotypic words after a category is primed. White research participants presented with the racial category "Black," for example, respond more quickly to traits stereotypically associated with Blacks and to negative traits in general. However, when a White prime is presented, responses are fastest for traits stereotypically associated with Whites and for positive traits. Whites, then, see a stronger connection between White and positive and Black and negative than the reverse, demonstrating that people not only access a category (Black or White) faster when they are primed, they also access the evaluations they associate with that category (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1984).

Until recently, most researchers accepted the inevitability of category activation leading to stereotyping (Lepore & Brown, 1997). Testing the alternative—that category activation does not lead to stereotyping—presents a bit of a puzzle because, without a doubt, the relationship between category activation and stereotyping is strong and easily activated. Unlinking them, or separating them experimentally to see if they are independent processes, is difficult. However, although stereotype activation is usually automatic, several factors have been identified that can disrupt the activation process or influence the particular aspect of a stereotype that is activated. These factors include the prototypicality of the stereotyped person, the context in which the person is encountered, the degree of prejudice of the individual encountering the stereotyped person, and the extent to which that individual is cognitively busy.

*Prototypicality* Just as the prototypicality of a stimulus person can facilitate the categorization of that person, prototypicality can facilitate activation of stereotypes. For example, White research participants rate a Black person who has more prototypically African facial features as more likely to have behaved in a negative stereotypic way (such as acting aggressively) than a less prototypically appearing Black person (Blair et al., 2002). Furthermore, on an implicit cognition measure (see Chapter 2), White research participants associate more negative traits with a more prototypically appearing Black person than with a less prototypically appearing Black person (Livingston & Brewer, 2002). Thus, Black people who are more prototypically African are seen in more stereotypic terms than Black people who are less prototypically African. In addition to demonstrating the role of prototypicality in stereotype activation, the results of these studies suggest that categorization may not always be necessary for stereotype activation; see Box 4.3 for more information.

### **Box 4.3 Is Categorization Necessary for Stereotype Activation?**

Theorists and researchers have generally assumed that stereotype activation is a three-step process:

1. An observer notices characteristics of a target person (such as skin tone, facial features, and so forth) that indicate the target person's membership in a social category (such as Black person).
2. The observer categorizes the target person on the basis of those characteristics.
3. Placing the target person into a category activates the stereotype associated with that category.

However, several groups of researchers (Blair et al., 2002; Livingston & Brewer, 2002; Maddox, 2004) have recently challenged this assumption, proposing that a target person's characteristics can activate a stereotype independent of categorization. They pointed out that within the category of African American, individuals' experiences of prejudice and discrimination vary as function of the prototypicality of their features. For example, compared to more prototypically appearing African Americans their less prototypically appearing peers have better jobs and higher incomes, even given the same level of education and experience (Hill, 2002) and report having had experienced less discrimination (Klonoff & Landrine, 2000). Consistent with the prototypicality hypothesis, these researchers have shown that more prototypically African Black people are negatively stereotyped to a greater degree (Blair et al., 2002; Maddox et al., 2002) and arouse more negative emotion (Livingston & Brewer, 2002). In addition, Blair and her colleagues (2002) showed that prototypicality increased stereotype activation over and above the effects of categorization. Thus, even if the target persons in these studies had not been categorized as Black, negative stereotypes and negative emotions would have been activated.

Why do prototypical features activate stereotypes? Researchers have proposed three possible reasons. First, as Blair and her colleagues (2002) note, prototypical characteristics define group membership

and are the main bases for categorization. To some extent, the prototype and the category are the same thing: "An African American [the category] is a person with dark skin, coarse hair, and a wide nose [the prototype], and a person with those features is an African American, regardless of actual ancestry" (Blair et al., 2002, p. 6).

Second, Blair and her colleagues (2002) and Livingston and Brewer (2002) suggest that people are conditioned through cultural experiences to associate prototypically African features with negative traits. For example, in the media, highly prototypically appearing Black people are likely to be portrayed in negative ways, whereas less prototypically appearing Black people are likely to be portrayed in positive ways (Russell, Wilson, & Hall, 1992). As a result, "dark skin [the prototype] signals not only that a target is African American but also that he or she is likely to be lazy and musical [the stereotype]" (Blair et al., 2002, p. 6). This kind of cultural conditioning may be the reason why, as noted in the text, Maddox and Gray (2002) found that both Black and White research participants associated more stereotypical characteristics with darker-skinned Black people.

Finally, Livingston and Brewer (2002) note that unfamiliarity leads to anxiety and other negative emotions. Because light-colored skin and European facial features are more familiar to White Americans than dark-colored skin and African features, unfamiliarity may lead White Americans to experience negative emotions in response to prototypically African features. The results of these studies indicate that "when a perceiver makes a judgment on the basis of physical appearance, the target's race-related features may influence that judgment in two ways. First, those features provide the basis for racial categorization, which results in the activation of related stereotypes. Second, those features may directly activate the stereotypic traits.... The two processes occur independently and ... either one is sufficient to result in the attribution of stereotypic traits" (Blair et al., 2002, p. 22).

**Context.** When people encounter others, that encounter takes place within some type of context; for example, a person may see someone on the street, in a classroom, or in church. The context in which a person sees someone can affect the interpretation of what that person is like. Consider the case of stereotypes. Stereotypes can be complex, consisting of both positive and negative components (Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995) and both positive and

negative subtypes (Devine & Baker, 1991). Therefore, when a stereotype is activated, either the positive or negative component, or both, could be activated. One factor that can influence which aspects of a stereotype become active is the context in which an observer encounters a member of a stereotyped group. For example, you might draw one kind of conclusion about a person lurking up a dark alley but another kind of conclusion if you see the same person praying in church.

Bernd Wittenbrink, Charles Judd, and Bernadette Park (2001) tested the effect of context on stereotype activation by having White research participants watch videotapes or view photographs of Black men in either positive contexts (at a family barbecue or in church) or negative contexts (at a gang meeting or in an urban street scene with graffiti-covered walls). Using an implicit cognition measure, they found more positive associations to the Black men depicted in positive contexts and more negative association to the Black men depicted in negative contexts. Why? Stangor and his colleagues (1992) found that categorization (and therefore stereotype activation) generally occurs at the subtype level (for example, Black athlete) rather than the more general category level (such as Black person). In the studies Wittenbrink and his colleagues conducted, the different contexts probably led to categorization in terms of different subtypes: family man and churchgoer versus gang member and ghetto Black (see Devine & Baker, 1991, for examples of White Americans' subtypes of African Americans). Context can therefore influence which aspect of a stereotype becomes activated.

**Prejudice.** Just as prejudice can facilitate the categorization process, it can facilitate stereotype activation. For example, several groups of researchers have found positive correlations between level of prejudice and a tendency to attribute stereotypic traits to people of African descent (Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). The generality of this tendency is shown by the fact that each of these research groups worked in a different country: Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, respectively. Lorella Lepore and Rupert Brown (1997) also found that compared to people high in prejudice, those low in prejudice were more likely to associate counterstereotypic traits with Black people.

Why does this relationship between level of prejudice and stereotype activation exist? Recall that automatic stereotype activation is believed to occur because of well-learned associations between a category and the stereotypes associated with that category (Fazio, 2001). Kawakami and her colleagues (1998) have suggested that, compared to less prejudiced people, more prejudiced people develop stronger associations between stereotypes and categories. They note that “[b]ecause high prejudiced people use stereotypes more consistently, engage in repeated activation of stereotypes, and attribute stereotypes more extremely to category members, they may develop associations that are highly accessible [that is, easy to activate] and of sufficient strength to produce automatic activation.... Because low prejudiced people engage in less stereotyping in general and attribute stereotypes less extremely to group members, they may develop weaker associations that are less accessible, or even develop [counterstereotypic] associations.... These

individuals are therefore less likely to activate cultural stereotypes automatically” (p. 414). As Lepore and Brown (1997) put it, “Faced with a member of the stereotyped group ... people seem to react automatically *according to the representation they have in mind*” (p. 285; emphasis in original). If that representation is negative, negative traits and emotions are activated; if that representation is positive, positive traits and emotions are activated.

**Cognitive Busyness.** Because stereotypes consist of people’s mental representations of groups, before they can be used they must be retrieved from long-term memory (where they are stored when not in use) and brought into working memory. One implication of this process is that if working memory is in use, stereotype activation can be disrupted because little space is left in working memory for stereotypic information (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Spencer et al., 1998).

In a classic study of this effect, Daniel Gilbert and Gregory Hixon (1991) had White research participants watch a videotape in which either an Asian or White research assistant showed them a card containing a word with one letter omitted. The participants had 15 seconds to generate as many words as possible based on each word fragment. Five of the word fragments could be completed either as words that stereotypically describe Asians or as nonstereotypic words. For example, RI\_E could be completed as either the stereotypic rice or the nonstereotypic *ripe*. Gilbert and Hixon hypothesized that if participants’ working memories were not in use, seeing the Asian assistant would activate the Asian stereotype and lead to more stereotypic word completions; however, if working memory was in use, the stereotype would not be activated. Therefore, half the participants who saw each research assistant had their working memory capacity reduced by mentally rehearsing an eight-digit number while watching the videotape (a situation known as cognitive busyness: people are busy with one mental task while trying to do another). The researchers found that, of the participants who saw the Asian research assistant, those who were cognitively busy completed fewer words in a stereotypic manner than those who were not. Participants who saw the White research assistant made the same number of stereotypic word completions in both the busy and nonbusy conditions. Thus, seeing the Asian research assistant activated the Asian stereotype for people who were not cognitively busy but not for those who were cognitively busy.

The role of working memory in this process was shown by experiments conducted by Christian Wheeler, Blair Jarvis, and Richard Petty (2001), who found that stereotype activation could disrupt problem solving. They had White research participants write an essay about a day in the life of a college student named either Tyrone (a stereotypically Black name) or Erik (a stereotypically White name). The researchers assessed stereotype activation in terms of whether the essays contained stereotypes of African Americans; 64 percent of the essays by participants who wrote about Tyrone contained stereotypic content, indicating that the Black stereotype had been activated for them, compared to 11 percent of the essays written about Erik. After writing their essays, participants took a difficult math test, a task that requires effective use of working memory. Participants for whom the Black stereotype had been activated solved

fewer problems than either those who wrote about Tyrone without having the stereotype activated or those who wrote about Erik. These findings show that stereotype activation uses up working memory capacity; therefore, when working memory is already in use, as in Gilbert and Hixon's (1991) and Spencer and colleagues' (1998) studies, little capacity is left for stereotypes, resulting in a disruption of stereotype activation.

### Motivated Activation

Evidence shows that people's motivations and goals can facilitate or inhibit stereotype activation (Blair, 2002; Kunda & Spencer, 2003). That is, people have goals they want to achieve in various social settings and "when stereotype application can help satisfy such goals, stereotypes are activated for that purpose. But when stereotype application can disrupt goal satisfaction, stereotype activation is inhibited to prevent such application" (Kunda & Spencer, 2003, p. 524). Although a number of motives have the potential to affect stereotype activation (Fiske, 2003), we focus on four broad categories (Blair, 2002; Kunda & Spencer, 2003): comprehension goals, self-enhancement goals, social adjustment goals, and motivation to control prejudiced responses. These goals can stem from individual differences, situational factors, or both. For example, individual differences in self-enhancement motivation can be seen when one person feels a continuing need to see him- or herself as better than others while another person does not. As an example of situational influences on self-enhancement motivation, people tend to feel a need to enhance their self-images after experiencing failure (Fein & Spencer, 1997). It is important to bear in mind that more than one goal may be operating in any situation. As a result, two goals can reinforce each other if both motivate either stereotype activation or inhibition, but can offset each other if one goal motivates stereotype activation while the other motivates stereotype inhibition.

**Comprehension.** Comprehension goals stem from people's needs to form clear impressions of what others are like and to understand why events happen. Clear understanding of people and events makes the world more predictable, which, in turn, contributes to a feeling of security (Kunda, 1999): If one understands how other people will react to events and understands the causes of events, then one can determine how to act effectively to avoid problems and achieve desired ends. Stereotypes contribute to these goals by providing a framework for accomplishing them. For example, in a study conducted by Etsuko Hoshino-Browne and Ziva Kunda (described in Kunda, Davies, Hoshino-Browne, & Jordan, 2003), an Asian confederate asked White participants a series of questions unrelated to race. Half of the participants formed an impression of the interviewer's personality and likely career choice; this task set up a comprehension goal—understanding what the other person was like. The other participants focused on the topics the interviewer had asked about, a task without comprehension goals about the interviewer. The researchers found that the Asian stereotype was more strongly activated for the participants who had been

motivated to understand what the interviewer was like, probably because stereotypic information would help them form an impression of the interviewer.

Another type of comprehension goal is understanding why people behave the way they do. For example, Ziva Kunda and her colleagues (Kunda, Davies, Adams, & Spencer, 2002) had White research participants take part in a simulated jury study in which they decided whether a criminal defendant was guilty or not guilty. They then watched a videotape of a Black student who had supposedly previously taken part in the same study. During the first part of the videotape, the student was interviewed about his impressions of the university where the research took place; the student then gave his opinion of the case, which either agreed or disagreed with that of the participant watching the tape. The participants next completed an implicit cognition test of stereotyping. The researchers found that the Black stereotype was more strongly activated for the participants who saw a Black person who disagreed, rather than agreed, with them. Kunda and her colleagues explained that this outcome occurred because people want to understand why others disagree with them. People often assume that members of other groups hold opinions that differ from their own (Miller & Prentice, 1999), so seeing the Black student in terms of his racial group rather than as an individual would help explain the disagreement.

**Self-enhancement.** Self-enhancement goals stem from people's need to see themselves in a positive light. Stereotypes, especially negative stereotypes, can help people achieve this goal because seeing others in a negative light can make oneself look better by comparison (Fein, Hoshino-Browne, Davies, & Spencer, 2003). For example, Lisa Sinclair and Ziva Kunda (1999) had White research participants take what was portrayed as a measure of interpersonal skills; they then received either positive or negative feedback on the test results from either a Black man or a White man. Negative stereotypes about the Black interviewer were activated when he provided negative feedback but not when he provided positive feedback. Moreover, people better about themselves after receiving negative feedback from the Black evaluator than they did after receiving negative feedback from the White evaluator, suggesting that self-enhancement accounted for the results. Being able to call to mind a stereotype that would make the evaluator look less competent (that is, the negative Black stereotype) seemed to lessen the effect of the negative feedback and so helped the participants maintain a positive self-image. Similar effects have been found for stereotypes of Asians (Spencer et al., 1998), gay men (Fein et al., 2003), and women (Sinclair & Kunda, 2000).

If stereotyping can help people maintain a positive self-image, it should not only activate negative stereotypes, but also should inhibit positive stereotypes. Conversely, positive feedback should activate positive stereotypes and inhibit negative stereotypes. Sinclair and Kunda (1999) tested these hypotheses in a study in which participants received either positive or negative feedback from a Black physician. Results showed that when the physician provided negative feedback, the negative Black stereotype was activated and the positive physician stereotype was inhibited; that is, participants tended to think of their evaluator as



Black rather than as a physician. However, when the feedback was positive, the physician stereotype was activated and the Black stereotype was inhibited; that is, participants tended to think of their evaluator as a physician rather than as a Black man. Sinclair and Kunda reasoned that thinking of the evaluator in terms of the negative Black stereotype undercut the value of the praise, whereas thinking of the evaluator in terms of the positive physician stereotype enhanced the value of the praise.

When a person is confronted with negative information about themselves, they generally find this information threatening and are motivated to reduce this threat. Gordon Allport (1954) suggested that people do so by attributing the negative trait to another who is stereotypically viewed in those terms. Hence, to avoid thinking of themselves as lazy, people may focus on Mexicans, who are stereotypically perceived as lazy, but not on Asians, to whom this stereotype does not apply. Olesya Govorun, Kathleen Fuegen, and Keith Payne (2006) tested Allport's hypothesis by asking college students to write about either a success or a failure at either an intellectual task or a leadership task. A pretest had shown that lack of intelligence and lack of leadership were stereotypically associated with sorority women. The researchers reasoned that writing about failure should threaten people's self-concept, but writing about success should not and, in the failure condition, people should be more likely to stereotype as a way to reduce this threat. They measured the accessibility of respondents' stereotypes by counting the number of stereotype-relevant traits listed during the writing task and by giving greater weight to those listed first; they assumed that these were more accessible than the traits listed later. Results supported their hypothesis about the effects of failure on stereotype activation. Traits related to sorority women's lack of leadership were more accessible when participants wrote about failing at leadership rather than failing at an intellectual task or about a success at either task. Similarly, the lack of intelligence stereotype was most accessible when participants wrote about failure on an intellectual task.

**Social Adjustment.** Social adjustment motives reflect people's desire to adjust their behavior to fit into situations and adhere to the norms or rules of behavior for that setting (Blair, 2002). As a general example, people may behave and speak one way when discussing a topic with their friends but act very differently when discussing the topic with their parents. In the context of prejudice, social adjustment motives can explain the finding that White people are less likely to express prejudiced attitudes to a Black interviewer than to a White interviewer (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997): Because social rules say that one should try to avoid offending others, White people generally moderate their expressed racial attitudes when talking with Black people. The motivation to do so affects stereotype activation; White research participants show less stereotype activation on a measure of implicit cognition when the experimenter is Black rather than White, for example, indicating that the social norm of not offending others is so strong that it can inhibit stereotype activation (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001).

Another type of social adjustment motive is the desire to fit in with one's peers. Fein and his colleagues (2003) showed research participants a videotape

of an actual campus panel discussion on gay rights that was edited to give either the impression that most students supported gay rights or that most opposed gay rights. Scores on an implicit cognition measure of stereotype activation indicated that exposure to anti-gay-rights norms activated the gay stereotype, whereas exposure to pro-gay-rights norms inhibited the stereotype.

**Motivation to Control Prejudice.** As we discuss in greater detail in Chapter 5, prejudice is generally considered to be a negative trait; as a result, people want to avoid acting in a prejudiced manner. This desire is stronger in some people than in others and can arise either because prejudice is contrary to their personal values or because they do not want other people to think of them as prejudiced (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998). A motivation to control prejudiced responses, especially one that is based on personal standards rather than external pressure, can therefore help inhibit stereotype activation. For example, Gordon Moskowitz and his colleagues (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000) postulated that some people hold strong, long-term beliefs in equality, which they call *chronic egalitarian goals*. Moskowitz and his colleagues reasoned that these goals are constantly, although not always consciously, operating for people who hold them. They further reasoned that because stereotyping others would violate these strong egalitarian standards, people with chronic egalitarian goals should exhibit less stereotype activation than people without such goals. This outcome is precisely what they found using stereotypes of women and of African Americans. Similarly, Patricia Devine and her colleagues (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002) found that people who had a motivation to control prejudice that was based on strong internal standards showed less stereotype activation than other people.

**Stereotype Relevance.** Although stereotypes can help people fulfill needs such as comprehension and self-enhancement, they can do so only if the content of the stereotype is relevant to the particular goal at hand. That is, even if a need is present while a person is interacting with a member of a stereotyped group, if the nature of the stereotype does not help to fulfill the need it may not influence stereotype activation or inhibition. For example, people may activate and use the stereotype of Asian Americans as interested in science to predict an Asian student's major because an interest in science is relevant to that goal but are unlikely to use the stereotype of fat people when making the same prediction for a fat student because the stereotype of fat people does not include academic interests (see Kunda & Spencer, 2003).

## THE ACTIVATED STEREOTYPE

Although we have discussed automatic and motivated activation of stereotypes separately, the two processes operate simultaneously and so jointly affect the degree to which a stereotype is activated or inhibited (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). For example, we saw how cognitive busyness can inhibit stereotype

activation. However, if a motive is strong enough, it can overcome this automatic inhibition process. Thus, Spencer and his colleagues (1998) found that a self-image threat could activate both the Asian and Black stereotype even when research participants were cognitively busy. Similarly, we saw that prejudice facilitates stereotype activation. However, Sinclair and Kunda (1999) found that an experience that enhanced participants' self-image—praise from a Black physician—inhibited the activation of the Black stereotype even in prejudiced people. Thus, in any situation, multiple motives might be in play whose effects can either reinforce or offset one another (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). One consequence of these multiple simultaneous processes is that in practice it might be very difficult to predict whether a stereotype, or which stereotype, might be activated in any given situation.

One factor that might affect the activated stereotype is the mood a person is in when the stereotype is activated. For example, Victoria Esses and Mark Zanna (1995) found that, compared to people in positive or neutral moods, those in negative moods saw negative stereotypic characteristics as more negative. For example, *aggressive*, when associated with Arabs, was seen as a more negative trait by people in a negative mood than by people in a positive mood. Esses and Zanna concluded that mood affects how people interpret characteristics ascribed to negatively stereotyped groups. "For example, when someone who is in a negative mood says that members of one of these groups are 'religious,' the person might conjure up images of religious wars and fanaticism rather than images of members of the group at prayer" (Esses & Zanna, 1995, p. 1065). We discuss the effects of mood on stereotyping and prejudice in Chapter 5.

A question that researchers have just begun to ask is, once a stereotype is activated, how long does it stay active? Ziva Kunda and her colleagues (Kunda et al., 2002) found the answer to this question: not very long. The stereotypes they activated dissipated within 12 minutes of activation. They suggest that this decay occurs because during an interaction with a member of a stereotyped group, "as time unfolds, one's attention shifts from the person's category membership to individuating information [which leads one to see other people as individuals rather than in stereotypic terms] or to the demands of the tasks at hand" (Kunda et al., 2002, p. 528). However, Kunda and her colleagues also found that a dissipated stereotype could be reactivated quite easily, such as by a minor disagreement with the other person. Therefore, even though stereotypes can fade over time, incidents might occur during an interaction that reactivate the stereotype.

## STEREOTYPE APPLICATION

Once a stereotype has been activated, it is available for use; the more strongly a stereotype has been activated, the more likely it is that it will be used as a lens through which to view members of the stereotyped group (Fein et al., 2003; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). However, stereotype application is not inevitable; given the right circumstances, people can, consciously or unconsciously, inhibit

the application of a stereotype. As shown in Figure 4.2, inhibition of an activated stereotype is a two-step process (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). The person must first be motivated to inhibit the stereotype. If the person is not motivated to inhibit the a stereotype, it will be applied. However, even if a person is so motivated, she or he might not be able to avoid stereotyping. For example, some behaviors, such as verbal behaviors, are easy to control whereas others, such as nonverbal behaviors, are difficult to control. Therefore, a person might be motivated to control the application of a stereotype and successfully do so with verbal behavior, such as by speaking politely to a member of a negatively stereotyped group, but not be able to control nonverbal indicators of dislike, such as avoiding eye contact with the other person (see Dovidio, 2001). Therefore, a person is likely to inhibit the application of a stereotype only if he or she is both motivated and able to do so. Another way of looking at stereotype application is that it is the default option: Unless the person can and wants to inhibit a stereotype, stereotype application will likely occur (Bodenhausen et al., 1999). Bear in mind, however, that, as shown at the top of Figure 4.2, a stereotype that has not been activated cannot be applied.




**FIGURE 4.2** Stereotype Application

Stereotype application is likely to occur automatically after stereotype activation unless both of two conditions apply: The person must be motivated to inhibit the stereotype, and the person must be able to inhibit the stereotype. If either of these conditions is absent, the activated stereotype will be applied.

SOURCE: Adapted from Fazio & Towles-Schwen's, 1999, model of the attitude-behavior relationship.

## Motivation to Inhibit Stereotyping

A number of factors can either motivate or undermine people's motivation to inhibit the application of stereotypes. Some of these factors, such as motivation to control prejudiced responses, comprehension goals, and self-enhancement goals are similar to those that influence stereotype activation. Others, such as cognitive style and social power, may be more specific to stereotype application.

**Motivation to Control Prejudice.** As we noted while discussing stereotype activation, most people are motivated to avoid acting in a prejudiced manner. This motivation includes a desire not to view or respond to other people on the basis of stereotypes (Darley & Gross, 1983; Yzerbyt, Schadon, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994). Consequently, people try to avoid using stereotypes and experience negative feelings about themselves when they view others in stereotypic terms (Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Monteith & Voils, 1998). The more motivated people are to control prejudiced responses, the less they use stereotypes. For example, Ashby Plant and Patricia Devine (1998) measured White research participants' personal commitment to control prejudice and assessed the extent to which they viewed African Americans in stereotypic terms. They found that personally committed participants were less likely to apply stereotypes not only when they had to respond publicly and so could be exhibiting a social desirability response bias (see Chapter 2) but also when they responded anonymously and so were more likely to be giving their true opinions (see also Plant, Devine, & Brazy, 2003). Not surprisingly, more highly prejudiced people are less motivated to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998) and so are more likely to apply stereotypes in their dealings with others (Brown, Croizet, Bohnet, Fournet, & Payne, 2003; Kawakami et al., 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997). Most people are probably motivated to control prejudice to some degree, if for no other reason than to avoid the negative feedback from others that prejudiced behavior is likely to entail (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998). However, some prejudices (such as those concerning fat people) and their associated stereotypes are more socially acceptable than others (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002); motivation to control prejudice is less likely to inhibit stereotyping in those cases.

Controlling one's stereotypes requires substantial mental work. For example, during interactions with members of stereotyped groups, people may try to intentionally force stereotypic thoughts from their minds, to seek out more information about the person that goes beyond the content of the stereotype, or to replace a prejudiced response with a nonprejudiced one (Devine & Monteith, 1999). Because of the effort required to control stereotype application, people's attempts to avoid stereotyping can be either helped or hindered by other goals and motives (Kunda & Spencer, 2003).

**Comprehension Goals.** The goals people have when they interact with others also influence stereotype activation. For example, during interactions people are generally motivated to form what they believe to be accurate impressions of those other people. This desire for accuracy exists because having a correct picture of what others are like allows people to interact effectively with them (Kunda, 1999):

Without having any idea what the other person was like, people would always be uncertain about how to interact with him or her and might, for example, be constantly concerned that something they do or say would offend the other person. However, if people are confident that they know what the other person is like, they can avoid problematic behaviors.

Because of this desire to be accurate, generally people prefer to use **individuating information** when judging others, that is, information that is specific to the person, regardless of whether it is stereotypic to the person's group. For example, "perceivers may expect Tom to be more assertive than Nancy if they know only their names, that is, they apply gender stereotypes to these individuals. However, if they know that Tom and Nancy performed an assertive behavior such as interrupting someone, perceivers view them as equally assertive; they no longer apply the gender stereotypes, basing their judgments instead entirely on the individuals' behavior" (Kunda & Spencer, 2003, p. 538). Ziva Kunda and Paul Thagard (1996) calculated that individuating information carries about four times the weight of stereotypes when people make judgments about others. This preference for individuating information may be one reason why stereotype activation dissipates over the course of an interaction (Kunda et al., 2002): the interaction provides individuating information about the other person that replaces stereotypic information.

However, people do not always seek out individuating information about others. People tend to be, in Shelley Taylor's term, cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). That is, unless motivated to do otherwise, people conserve their mental resources and do not exert the cognitive effort required to seek out individuating information. The more relevant the other person is to the perceiver's life, however, the more the perceiver is motivated to individuate the person (Brewer & Feinstein, 1999; Fiske et al., 1999). Thus, people develop very detailed, individualized impressions of people who are close to them, such as family members, close friends, and romantic partners. These individualized impressions allow people to anticipate how another person will act and how he or she will respond to their actions. People also tend to individuate those who control desired rewards because an accurate, individualized impression allows them to act in ways that will please the power holder and so induce him or her to reward them. Thus, as we will discuss in more detail shortly, subordinates tend to develop individualized impressions of their supervisors. Supervisors, however, do not find it necessary to appease their subordinates and so do not develop individualized impressions of them (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Stevens & Fiske, 2000).

Individuating information does not totally do away with the influence of stereotypes; people still rely on them to some degree (Nelson, Acker, & Manis, 1996). To illustrate this, Galen Bodenhausen and Robert Wyer (1985) had research participants read about a crime that was either stereotypic or nonstereotypic of the offender's ethnic group. The case description also included information about the offender's background that could explain his behavior. When participants rated the likelihood of the offender's committing the same offense again, they rated the stereotypic offense to be more likely to be repeated than the nonstereotypic offense. Thus, stereotypes influenced participants' behavior

despite the fact that they received information about the offender that bore on his specific likelihood of reoffending.

Stereotypes may continue to function in the face of individuating information for at least two reasons. First, people tend to avoid seeking out new information about members of stereotyped groups and the information they do seek out tends to support the stereotype. For example, Yaacov Trope and Erik Thompson (1997) examined the amount and type of information research participants would seek from an American Jew or a feminist about their views on U.S. support for Israel or support for passage of a constitutional amendment guaranteeing equal rights for women (the ERA). Pretesting showed that support for Israel was stereotypically associated with American Jews (and not feminists) whereas support for the ERA was stereotypically associated with feminists (and not Jews). Participants wrote up to five questions that would help them determine someone's attitude toward one of these political issues. The questions were directed to an American Jew and to a feminist. Trope and Thompson found that participants asked fewer questions of the person who was stereotypically associated with the political issue. Apparently, the participants assumed they already knew that person's position and so had no need to ask for more information. Trope and Thompson also found that the questions that were directed to stereotyped group members were stereotype confirming. That is, they were more likely to ask an American Jew a question such as "Do you believe there should be an independent Jewish state?" and more likely to ask a feminist a question such as "Do you think that current laws sufficiently protect women's rights?"

A second reason stereotypes may continue to function despite individuating information is because they can affect how people interpret individuating information. For example, Ziva Kunda and Bonnie Sherman-Williams (1993) gave research participants information about either a construction worker (a group stereotypically high on aggression) or a housewife (a group stereotypically low on aggression). Participants read that the person engaged in either an ambiguously aggressive behavior (hitting someone who had annoyed him or her), an unambiguously high aggressive behavior (violently hitting someone who had taunted him or her), or an unambiguously low aggressive behavior (spanking his or her misbehaving child but then regretting it and comforting the child). Kunda and Sherman-Williams found that, in the high aggression condition, participants rated both the construction worker and the housewife as being more aggressive and that, in the low aggression condition, participants rated both the construction worker and the housewife as being less aggressive; that is, the individuating information overrode the stereotype. However, in the ambiguous aggression condition, people relied on their stereotypic belief that construction workers are more aggressive than housewives and, therefore, rated the construction worker as more aggressive than the housewife. Stereotypes, then, can affect how perceivers interpret ambiguous information, leading them to see such unclear behaviors as stereotype consistent (see also Dunning & Sherman, 1997; Kunda, Sinclair, & Griffin, 1997).

People may need external motivation to ignore stereotypes; accuracy and accountability are two such motives. Simply telling people to make an accurate

judgment reduces reliance on stereotypes (Neuberg, 1989). This reduced reliance on stereotypes occurs because accuracy motivation leads people to seek out individuating information about the other person. Another means of motivating people to make accurate judgments is to hold them accountable for their decisions. For example, Gifford Weary and her colleagues (Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001) had student research participants judge a case of academic dishonesty in which the accused was either a member or not a member of a group stereotypically associated with cheating (athletes). Participants who thought they were not accountable for their decisions judged the athlete more harshly than the nonathlete, but that accountable participants were not influenced by the accused's group membership. Holding people accountable for their decisions probably motivates a desire for accuracy because people like to see themselves as accurate judges of what others are like and because making mistakes would lead others to see them as incompetent (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In fact, the effect of accountability in inhibiting stereotype use is strong enough to overcome the effects of other factors that facilitate stereotype use (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994). It is important to bear in mind that in many everyday settings, people are accountable for the decisions they make about others, so accountability motivation may attenuate the influence of stereotypes in many situations.

**Cognitive Style.** Individual differences in people's motivation to acquire and use information are called cognitive styles. These individual differences can affect stereotype use. For example, people high on the trait of need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) generally like to think about things carefully and consider all options when making a decision even when there is no particular reason to do so. People low on the trait carefully think about things only if they have a reason to do so; otherwise, they prefer to make judgments based on simple rules. Because of this preference for simple rules, people low in need for cognition tend to depend more on stereotypes in making judgments than do people high in need for cognition (Crawford & Skowronski, 1998; Florack, Scarabis, & Bless, 2001); stereotypes present simple ways of judging people without having to exert the mental effort of looking for and thinking about individuating information. In contrast, people high on need for cognition like exerting that kind of effort and do so.

Another cognitive style variable is causal uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994). The concept of causal uncertainty is based on people's need to accurately understand how the world and other people operate. People low in causal uncertainty feel sure that they have an accurate understanding of the world and other people and so feel little need to look for more information. People high in causal uncertainty have no such feeling of sureness and so are always on the lookout for more information. When dealing with people, this desire for more information leads to a search for individuating information; as a result, people high on causal uncertainty use stereotypes less than do people low on the trait (Weary et al., 2001). Although need for cognition and causal uncertainty both reflect people's orientation toward information (Edwards, Weary, & Reich, 1996), they represent different stages in the information utilization process: Causal uncertainty



affects people's search for information whereas need for cognition affects how people use information.

A final type of cognitive style is need for closure, also called need for structure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). People high in need for closure prefer simple, definite answers to questions and dislike ambiguity and uncertainty. Because stereotypes represent simple, definite answers to the question of what people are like, people high on need for closure make more use of stereotypes than do people low on the trait (Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996; Neuberg & Newsome, 1993). Like need for cognition and causal uncertainty, need for closure reflects an orientation toward information, but it is unrelated to the other two (Edwards et al., 1998; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Whereas causal uncertainty affects people's search for information and need for cognition affects how people use information, need for closure affects how much information people look for: People high on need for closure stop looking for information when they feel they have an answer to a question (even though it might not be the best answer) and are reluctant to consider new information once they have decided on an answer (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Because need for cognition, causal uncertainty, and need for closure have little relation to one another, they operate independently. For example, at the same time that high need for cognition and causal uncertainty are motivating a person to avoid stereotype use, high need for closure could be motivating the same person toward stereotype use. Various combinations of different levels of the traits could therefore either reinforce or offset each other's influence on stereotype use.

**Self-Enhancement Goals.** Just as threats to self-esteem can facilitate the activation of stereotypes (Spencer et al., 1998), they can facilitate the application of stereotypes. For example, Lisa Sinclair and Ziva Kunda (2000) examined college students' reactions to having received a high or low grade from a male or female instructor. Because female college professors are stereotyped as less competent than male instructors (Basow, 1995), Sinclair and Kunda expected students who received a low grade from a female instructor to give more negative (that is, more stereotypical) instructor evaluations than students who received a low grade from a male instructor. The researchers surveyed students about the courses they had taken the previous semester, asking them to report the grade they received in the course and to evaluate the instructor on a scale ranging from 0 (very poor) to 100 (excellent). Not surprisingly, students who received lower grades gave lower instructor evaluations; however, the difference was larger for female instructors. Experimental research has found similar increased stereotyping following negative feedback from women (Sinclair & Kunda, 2000) and gay men (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Furthermore, when participants receive negative feedback from a member of a stereotyped group, the amount of stereotyping is correlated with increases in self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997). These results indicate that stereotyping functions to maintain self-esteem, probably because seeing an evaluator in negatively stereotyped terms helps one to dismiss the negative evaluation as unimportant: If the evaluator is seen as incompetent, then the evaluation is meaningless and so can be ignored.

If self-image threats facilitate stereotype application, what happens if positive aspects of the self-image are reinforced? Fein and Spencer (1997) examined this question by having some research participants write about a value, such as maintaining good interpersonal relations or pursuit of knowledge, that was important to them personally; other participants wrote about why the value might be important to other people. Fein and Spencer hypothesized that writing about a value that was personally important would reinforce those participants' positive self-images and so reduce their likelihood of using stereotypes. After writing about the value, participants evaluated a job candidate from a group with a strong negative stereotype. Results showed that the participants who had had a positive aspect of their self-images reinforced viewed the candidate in less stereotypic terms than did the participants whose positive self-images were not reinforced. Thus, although attacking a person's self-image can facilitate stereotyping, reinforcing a positive self-image can inhibit stereotyping.

**Social Power.** Susan Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin & Fiske, 1996; Goodwin et al., 2000) have postulated that having power over others, especially the power to control the rewards and punishments that others receive, facilitates stereotyping of the people subject to that power. For example, Stephanie Goodwin and her colleagues (2000) randomly assigned college student research participants to a high or low power role in evaluating a Hispanic high school student applying for a summer program. The researchers found that, compared to the low power participants, those with high power were more likely to view the applicant in stereotypic terms. Other studies have confirmed this power-leads-to-stereotype-use effect in a number of contexts (Goodwin et al., 2000) and for implicit as well as explicit stereotypes (Richeson & Ambady, 2003).

Goodwin and Fiske (1996) have suggested that several factors influence the use of stereotypes by powerful people. First, because of their positions in social hierarchies such as formal organizations, powerful people are entitled to judge others and are often required to. This feeling of entitlement to judge leads to overconfidence in the accuracy of simple belief systems such as stereotypes, and belief in their accuracy leads to their use. Second, powerful people are motivated to maintain the power difference between themselves and those under them because higher power provides benefits such as higher pay and status. Stereotypes of subordinate groups, especially negative stereotypes, help power holders justify their positions in the social structure by portraying subordinates as being suited only for low power positions because they are incapable of doing higher-level work. Finally, people in power may stereotype subordinates because they have no motivation to individuate them. Recall that one factor that motivates individuation is depending on the other person for rewards. However, power holders are in the opposite position: others depend on them for rewards. As a result, power holders do not look for individuating information about subordinates and stereotype them by default, having no motivation to do otherwise. Not surprisingly, then, because low power people depend on high power people for rewards, low power people tend to individuate, rather than stereotype, the people who have power over them (Stevens & Fiske, 2000). As Laura Stevens and Susan

Fiske (2000) note, forming individualized (that is, nonstereotypic) impressions of powerful people allows low power people to indirectly control the rewards they get by accurately anticipating what the powerful people want and helping them get it.

Because of either individual differences or situational influences, some power holders are weakness oriented whereas others are strength oriented and this orientation affects stereotype use. Weakness-oriented power holders are motivated to avoid failure and so view subordinates in stereotypic terms when stereotypes indicate that the subordinates might not have the capabilities to do a task. The stereotype is then used as a justification for not allowing the subordinate to attempt the task. In contrast, strength-oriented power holders are motivated to achieve success and so view subordinates in stereotypic terms when stereotypes indicate that the subordinates *do* have the capabilities to do a task. Theresa Vescio, Mark Zanna, and David Butz (2003) compared these two types of power holders in a mock interview. Research participants selected questions to be used in interviewing female applicants for a stereotypically masculine job. As the researchers had theorized, compared to strength-oriented participants, those with a weakness orientation chose more questions designed to elicit weakness on the task, such as “Tell me about a time you struggled to complete a task involving spatial skills” and fewer questions designed to elicit strengths, such as “Tell me about a time when you completed a challenging mental problem and felt proud of your logic and reasoning skills.” Thus, power holders are more likely to rely on stereotypes of subordinates when those stereotypes are consistent with the power holders’ general approach to problem solving.

Power holders can inhibit stereotype use when they are motivated to do so, however. For example, Vescio and her colleagues (2003) found that power holders’ stereotype use disappeared when receiving a reward depended on their subordinates’ task performance. Because receiving the reward now depended on accurately assessing subordinate characteristics, power holders focused on individuating information about subordinates. Power holders also individuate subordinates when they feel responsible for their subordinates’ outcomes (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996) or want to help subordinates with their problems (Overbeck & Park, 2001). Therefore, by appropriately motivating people who are in positions of power, organizations can reduce power holders’ stereotype use (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996).

### Ability to Inhibit Stereotyping

The studies we have examined so far in this section show that motivated people can inhibit stereotype application. However, there are times when this is not possible. A number of factors—including lack of cognitive resources, emotional states, and the low controllability of some behaviors—can interfere with people’s opportunity to inhibit stereotype application. We consider these factors next.

**Cognitive Resources.** Earlier, we described how cognitive busyness could prevent the activation of stereotypes by, essentially, filling up working memory so that

there was no room for the stereotype. Once a stereotype has been activated and is in working memory, however, cognitive busyness can use up mental resources that could otherwise be used to search for individuating information, thereby preventing stereotype inhibition and facilitating stereotype application. For example, as in their stereotype activation study, Daniel Gilbert and Gregory Hixon (1991) had White research participants watch a videotape of either a White or Asian research assistant showing cards that contained partial words that could be completed either stereotypically or nonstereotypically. In their second study, participants were not cognitively busy at this point, so the Asian stereotype was activated for the participants who saw the Asian research assistant. The participants then listened to an audiotape of the research assistant describing a day in her life that contained no stereotypic information and formed an impression of her. Half the participants were cognitively busy while listening to the tape; they watched a computer screen on which letters were flashed and had to indicate each time the letter U followed the letter T. The participants then rated their impression of the research assistant on a set of traits that included Asian-stereotypic terms such as timid and intelligent. Gilbert and Hixon found that cognitively busy participants gave more stereotypic ratings to the Asian research assistant than did the nonbusy participants; the ratings of the White research assistant did not differ by busyness condition, indicating that cognitive busyness affected only perceptions of a member of a stereotyped group, not perceptions of people in general.

Figure 4.3 illustrates the results of Gilbert and Hixon's (1991) two studies on cognitive busyness. Although the results of those studies might at first glance appear to be contradictory, the contradiction is resolved if you remember that




**FIGURE 4.3** Cognitive Load, Stereotype Activation, and Stereotype Application.

When a person encounters a member of a stereotyped group, high cognitive load inhibits activation of the stereotype; there is no stereotype application because an unactivated stereotype cannot be applied. If the person is under a low cognitive load, the stereotype is activated and ready for application because working memory is available for the stereotype. If the person's cognitive load continues to be low, the stereotype is inhibited because the person has the cognitive resources available to prevent stereotype application. However, if the person comes under a high cognitive load after the stereotype has been activated, the stereotype is applied because the person does not have the cognitive resources available to prevent application.

cognitive busyness has opposite effects depending on whether a stereotype is being activated or applied. Cognitive busyness inhibits stereotype activation but, once a stereotype has been activated, cognitive busyness facilitates stereotype application. Although the distinction between stereotype activation and application may seem to be somewhat artificial, Gilbert and Hixon give an example of how the two processes can be separated in everyday life: “A faithful churchgoer who meets a newly arrived Hispanic minister may not experience activation of his or her beliefs about Hispanics because the social demands of the formal encounter may usurp resources that are necessary for the activation of those concepts.... If stereotypes are activated prior to a resource consuming social interaction (‘Let me take you over and introduce you to Father Gonzales’), then the interactants may be especially likely to view each other in stereotypic terms” (p. 515).

Gilbert and Hixon’s (1991) research focused on the effect of externally imposed cognitive busyness, but sometimes real world tasks can generate busyness and therefore can undermine stereotype inhibition. For example, working on a complex task—one that required extensive cognitive resources to complete—leads to greater stereotype use in making judgments related to the task than does working on a simpler version of the task (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). Making decisions under time pressure also leads to greater stereotype use (de Dreu, 2003; de Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).

Reduced cognitive capacity can result not only from task demands, but also from natural variations in cognitive capacity over the course of a day. Drawing on research that shows that there are morning people who are more effective thinkers early in the day and evening people who are more effective thinkers later in the day, Galen Bodenhausen (1990) hypothesized that people would be more likely to use stereotypes during their “off” periods—early in the day for evening people and late in the day for morning people. Classifying students as morning or evening people based on a standard assessment instrument, Bodenhausen asked them to take part in his research at either 9 A.M., 3 P.M., or 8 P.M. As shown in Figure 4.4, as he had expected, Bodenhausen found more stereotype use by evening people at 9 A.M. and more stereotype use by morning people at 3 P.M. and 8 P.M.

The research that we have considered so far indicates that putting people under cognitive load reduces the ability to inhibit stereotype use. Mark Muraven and Roy Baumeister (2000) have suggested that the ability to inhibit undesired responses is, itself, a mental resource that can be depleted through use. Olesya Govorun and Keith Payne (2006) drew on Muraven and Baumeister’s theory to predict that if people carried out a demanding mental task before making judgments about stereotyped group members, those people’s mental resources would be depleted and they would be unable to inhibit stereotyped judgments. Govorun and Payne had research participants go through a large number of repetitions of a cognitively demanding task, called the Stroop procedure, that required them to inhibit a well-learned response—reading the word red shown on a computer screen—and to replace it with a different response—naming the color the word is shown in. Because reading a word is an automatic response (try not reading a word when you see one), people’s immediate tendency is to read the word. However, if the word red is shown in a green font,




**FIGURE 4.4** Circadian Variations in Stereotype Application

Because of circadian variations in cognitive efficiency, morning people are more likely to use stereotypes later in the day and evening people are more likely to use stereotypes earlier in the day.

SOURCE: Data from Bodenhausen, 1990, Table 1, p. 321.

red is the incorrect response to the color-naming task; green, the color of the font, is the correct response. Therefore, people must inhibit the automatic response of red and replace it with the thoughtful response of green. Govorun and Payne found that, compared to research participants who had undergone relatively few repetitions of the task, those who had undergone many repetitions were more likely to use stereotypes when judging a Black person. These findings indicate that engaging in a mentally demanding task before evaluating members of a stereotyped group can facilitate stereotype use.

Cognitive load also can undermine an existing motivation to inhibit stereotype use. Recall from our discussion of social power as a motivating factor that depending on another person reduces stereotype use and increases the use of individuating information. Manipulating both dependency and cognitive busyness, Louise Pendry and Neil Macrae (1994) found that cognitively busy research participants made stereotypic judgments regardless of whether they depended on the other person. In contrast, although nonbusy participants made stereotypic judgments when they did not depend on the other person, they made individuated (that is, nonstereotypic) judgments when they did depend on the other person. Pendry and Macrae's study is a good illustration of a point we made earlier: Motivation is not sufficient to inhibit stereotype use; people must also have the ability to exert control over use of the stereotype.

Why does cognitive load facilitate stereotype use? One possibility is that once a stereotype is activated, people pay more attention to stereotypic information as opposed to individuating information when cognitive load is high and

show the opposite pattern when cognitive load is low. This difference may occur because stereotype-consistent information is easier to integrate with existing (that is, stereotypic) information when working memory is limited (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993). People then use the available information to judge others: stereotypic information when cognitive load is high and individuating information when cognitive load is low.

One factor that is well known to reduce people's cognitive resources is alcohol intoxication. Surprisingly, researchers have only just begun to examine its effects on stereotyping. Not surprisingly, however, the results of such research shows that intoxication leads to stereotype use. For example, Bruce Bartholow, Cheryl Decker, and Marc Sestir (2006) conducted an experiment in which, relative to their body weights, White research participants consumed a high or moderate dose of alcohol or a placebo drink they thought contained alcohol. The researchers found that the more alcohol participants had consumed, the more they stereotyped African Americans. Other measures indicated that the increased stereotyping occurred because the participants who had consumed alcohol had more difficulty inhibiting their stereotypic responses, although they had no problem with nonstereotypic responses. Bartholow and his colleagues were also able to show that although alcohol consumption affects stereotype application, it has no effect on stereotype activation.

## **CONSEQUENCES OF STEREOTYPE USE**

When a stereotype is applied, it influences the person's perceptions of and interactions with members of the stereotyped group. As Bodenhausen and his colleagues (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 2002) note, "activated stereotypic concepts serve to simplify and structure the process of social perception by providing a readymade framework for conceptualizing [members of stereotyped groups]" (p. 331). In Chapter 3, we examined how these processes work to reinforce stereotypes in people's minds and make them more difficult to change and how they can create self-fulfilling prophecies, leading people to see what they expect to see. In this section, we examine three additional effects of activated stereotypes: biased interpretation of behavior, biased evaluation of individuals and cultural artifacts, and biased memory.

### **Biased Interpretation of Behavior**

Stereotypes can act as filters that influence how onlookers interpret the behavior of members of stereotyped groups. In general, ambiguous behaviors—those that can be interpreted in more than one way—are assimilated to the stereotype. That is, onlookers interpret ambiguous behaviors as being stereotype consistent. The classic illustration of the way in which stereotypes can guide the evaluation of individuals' behavior is Birt Duncan's (1976) study, described in Chapter 3, in which White research participants observed a Black or White person giving a slight shove to another person. The onlookers interpreted the behavior as being

more aggressive when performed by a Black person than when performed by a White person, consistent with the stereotype of African Americans as more aggressive than White Americans.

Andrew Sagar and Janet Schofield (1980) conducted a study to see whether such biases affect children as well as adults. They showed Black and White 6th graders attending a racially integrated school illustrations of ambiguously aggressive behaviors they had observed in the school, along with a verbal description of the behavior. For example, an illustration showing a boy poking the boy seated in front of him with the eraser end of a pencil was accompanied by the description, "Mark was sitting at his desk, working on his social studies assignment, when David started poking him in the back with the eraser end of his pencil. Mark just kept on working. David kept poking him for a while, and then he finally stopped" (Sagar & Schofield, 1980, p. 593). The perpetrator in each case was either Black or White, as was the victim. An experimenter of their own race tested children individually and asked them to rate how mean and threatening the perpetrator was. Consistent with Duncan's (1976) results, Sagar and Schofield found that both Black and White research participants rated the behavior as more mean and threatening when performed by a Black child, indicating that Black children as well as White children hold the stereotype of African Americans as more aggressive.

Not only racial or ethnic stereotypes affect interpretations; perceptions can be influenced by perceived social class. For example, John Darley and Paget Gross (1983) found that perceptions of a fourth grader named Hannah were influenced by the setting in which she was depicted: either a depressed urban setting or an affluent suburban setting. Participants watched Hannah complete an oral achievement test. Even though her answers were a balanced mixture of correct and incorrect responses, those who believed that Hannah had upper class roots judged her ability as above grade level, and, when recalling what they saw, inflated the number of questions she answered correctly. Those who believed she came from a lower class background reported that Hannah's ability was below grade level and underestimated the number of questions she actually answered correctly. How did the participants in the different conditions come to different evaluations of Hannah based on the same behavior? Darley and Gross (1983) found that the participants thought the test was more difficult when they saw the high SES (socioeconomic status) Hannah than when they saw the low SES Hannah, a perception that would justify giving the high SES Hannah a higher performance rating. In addition, the participants gave the high SES Hannah higher ratings on work habits, motivation, and cognitive skills. What happened, then, is that the participants interpreted Hannah's behaviors in ways that were consistent with their stereotypes about social class.

Stereotypes also can influence the interpretation of even relatively subtle behaviors. For example, Kurt Hugenberg and Galen Bodenhausen (2004) found that people who implicitly endorsed the traditional African American stereotype were more likely to interpret an ambiguous facial expression as indicating anger when the expression was shown on a Black face than when it was shown on a White face. In addition, stereotypes can influence interpretation of physical



characteristics: When shown pictures of men and women who were equally tall, people estimate that the man is taller than the woman, consistent with the stereotype (accurate in this case) that men are, on the average, taller than women (Nelson, Biernat, & Manis, 1990). For a harrowing real-life example of the effects of stereotypes on interpretations of behavior, see Box 4.4.

#### **Box 4.4 Can Stereotyping Be a Matter of Life or Death?**

Imagine yourself in this situation: You are a police officer searching along a poorly lit street for a suspect you believe to be armed. As you pass a doorway, you see a man resembling the suspect, who begins to lift an object he is holding. Is the object a gun or something harmless? Should you shoot the man to prevent him from shooting you? You have less than a second to make both decisions. A situation similar to this one faced four New York City police officers in February 1999. They thought the man held a gun and shot him. They were mistaken; he was holding his wallet. The man was Amadou Diallo, an immigrant from the African country of Guinea. Were the White police officers predisposed to misperceive the wallet as a gun and to shoot more quickly because Diallo was Black rather than White? Researchers have addressed this question in two ways. The first is by testing the effects of the race of a stimulus person on the perception of objects (Judd, Blair, & Chapleau, 2004; Payne, 2001; Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002). The second is by having people participate in computerized simulations of situations in which they are shown a person who may or may not be holding a weapon; they must “shoot” at armed stimuli by pressing a button or indicate that they would not shoot at unarmed stimuli by pressing a different button (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Greenwald, Oaks, & Hoffman, 2003).

These studies have produced three interesting sets of findings. First, participants were more likely to misperceive a harmless object, such as a pair of pliers, as a gun if they were primed with a picture of a Black person (Judd et al., 2004; Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2002) or if they saw a Black person holding the object (Greenwald et al., 2003). This misperception occurred even when the Black person was dressed as a police officer (Greenwald et al., 2003). Participants were also more likely to correctly identify an object as a gun if the object was held by a Black person (Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2002). Taken together, the results of these studies show that the “he has a gun” response is more likely to occur when the stimulus person is a Black man, regardless of whether that response is correct or

incorrect. Not surprisingly, these kinds of errors increase as time pressure to make a decision increases. Decreasing time to respond by 0.5 seconds leads to about a twenty percent increase in identification errors (Payne et al., 2002).

The second set of findings suggest that this response is automatic: People make it without thinking about it (Judd et al., 2004; Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2002) and neuroscience evidence shows that people differentiate between targets at the earliest stage of information processing and is nearly instantaneous (Correll, Urland, & Ito, 2006). Moreover, this automatic processing takes place even when participants are explicitly told “try not to let the race of the [person] influence your decisions” (Payne et al., 2002, p. 388).

The third set of findings deals with how people react once they have identified an object as a weapon. When faced with an unarmed stimulus person (that is, when participants had incorrectly identified the object as a weapon), participants make the decision to shoot more quickly if the person is Black (Correll et al., 2002; Greenwald et al., 2003). However, research also shows that participants are more likely not to shoot an armed White person. For example, Joshua Correll and his colleagues (2002) found that participants in their simulation shot at 16 percent of the unarmed Black people they saw compared to 12 percent of the unarmed White people they saw, and failed to shoot at 12 percent of the armed White people they saw compared to 7 percent of the armed Black people they saw. That is, participants were more likely to endanger unarmed Black people by mistakenly shooting at them, but were more likely to endanger themselves by not shooting at an armed White person. As with identification errors, shooting errors increased under time pressure. Correll and his colleagues found a similar “shooter bias” in a sample of adults recruited at shopping malls and other public places; they also found that Black and White participants showed an equal degree of shooter bias.

How do stereotypes fit into this problem? Correll and his colleagues (2002, 2006) found that the magnitude of shooter bias was correlated with participants’

knowledge of the cultural stereotype of Blacks as violent and dangerous and evidence for this relationship Box . (Continued)

emerged when examining neural activity during a weapon identification task. They interpreted their findings as showing that "ethnicity influences the shoot/don't shoot decisions primarily because traits associated with African Americans, namely 'violent' or 'dangerous,' can act as a schema to influence perceptions of an ambiguously threatening target" (Correll et al., 2002, p. 1325). They gave two reasons for their conclusion. The first was the correlation they found between shooter bias and knowledge of stereotypes. The second reason was "the ... finding that African Americans and Whites, alike, display this bias.... It is unlikely that participants in our African American sample held strong prejudice against their own ethnic group ..., but as members of U.S. society, they are, presumably, aware of the cultural stereotype that African Americans are violent" (Correll et al., 2002, p. 1325). Interestingly, people's personal racial attitudes are not related to either weapon misperception or shooter bias (Correll et al., 2002; Payne, 2001).

What can be done about this problem? As Payne (2006) noted, there are two possibilities for reducing or eliminating weapon bias. One is to change the automatic impulse, the other is to encourage people to intentionally control their bias. Changing automatic responses is extremely difficult, even by experience. Police officers, for example, show clear evidence of a weapon bias at the automatic processing stage (Correll et al., 2007), even though they have experience in confronting people with guns. However, expertise and practice do help people control their weapon bias. Compared to a less experienced community sample, police officers are more sensitive to the presence of a weapon and are less "trigger happy" about the decision to shoot. Unfortunately, speed is of the essence when facing an armed suspect, so asking police officers to stop and think about the situation more carefully before shooting is impractical at best. As Payne and his colleagues (2002) note, "Speed is obviously important in this situation, and the time pressure immense" (p. 394). Even so, Michelle Peruche and Ashby Plant Peruche & Plant (2006) found training was effective in eliminating the weapon bias for police officers who also reported that they had positive interactions with Blacks in their personal lives. In the long run, then,

### Biased Evaluation

People frequently make evaluations of others, liking them or disliking them, judging their qualifications for employment or political office, deciding on rewards and punishments, and so forth. When a group stereotype is relevant to an evaluation, such as when a particular group is stereotyped as talented in a particular area (as Blacks are in sports) or stereotyped as untalented (as Whites are in sports), the group stereotype can affect the evaluation of a member of the stereotyped group. In addition, group stereotypes can influence the evaluation of cultural artifacts such as music, art, and literature, with artifacts associated with negatively stereotyped groups' being seen in a more negative light.

**Individuals.** Many of the studies discussed in the section on the factors that influence the application of stereotypes also dealt with the effect of stereotypes on evaluation. For example, Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) had research participants read about a case of employee misbehavior on the part of a blue-collar worker. The offense was related to either an aspect of the Arab stereotype—laziness—or an aspect of the American stereotype—lack of cooperation with management (these stereotypes had been elicited from an earlier group of research participants). Each participant read one of four versions of the case; in two versions, the American or Arab employee committed the laziness offense and in the other two versions, the American or Arab employee committed the

uncooperativeness offense. The participants then recommended a punishment for the offense. Bodenhausen and Wyer found that the more stereotypic offense led to greater recommended punishments. Participants recommended more severe punishment for the American who committed the uncooperativeness offense and the Arab who committed the laziness offense. Other studies also have found that factors that motivate stereotype use also lead to more negative evaluations of members of stereotyped groups in terms of such factors as liking for the person (Fein & Spencer, 1997) and competence ratings (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Sinclair & Kunda, 2000).

Positive stereotypes also can lead to differential evaluation. For example, Jennifer Steele and Nalini Ambady (2004) had research participants interview an Asian woman for a job as a computer technician, a job for which the Asian stereotype is positive but the female stereotype is negative. Information provided prior to the interview either emphasized the interviewee's Asian identity over her female identity, emphasized her female identity over her Asian identity, or put an equal emphasis on both identities. Participants rated the interviewee as better qualified and recommended a higher starting salary when her Asian identity was salient than when her female identity was salient.

Although the role that stereotypes play in evaluation can be straightforward, it also can take complex forms, especially when the evaluation results in the allocation of rewards. In Chapter 3, we noted that one factor that complicates the question of stereotype accuracy is that the standard for accuracy on a particular trait can differ from one social group to another. This **shifting standards model** of stereotyping (Biernat & Manis, 2007; Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) also has implications for the effect stereotypes have on evaluations. In this case, the effect depends on the kind of judgment being made. The basic principle of the model is that if some groups (such as African Americans or women) are seen as less competent than other groups (such as White men), then the standards used to evaluate a person shift depending on the type of decision to be made. When the issue is one of the allocation of a limited resource, such as when only one of many applicants for a job can be hired, then members of the group that are stereotyped as more competent will get the resource even if members of the other group are equally well qualified. However, if a resource is not limited, such as praise for good performance, given equal performance by members of positively and negatively stereotyped groups, members of the negatively stereotyped group will get more of the resource. Why? Because the stereotype leads decision makers to have lower expectations for members of the negatively stereotyped group, so the same level of performance seems better relative to the lower standard.

To illustrate these ideas, Monica Biernat and Theresa Vescio (2002) had research participants role-play being the manager of a coed softball team. The participants were given photographs of nine men and nine women; the photographs had been pretested to ensure that the men and women appeared to have equal levels of athletic ability. The participants had to choose 13 people for their team and, of those, choose 10 to be starting players; note that team and starting lineup membership were limited resources because not everyone could get those

positions. Participants were more likely to choose men than women for their teams, a difference that was especially large for players who were seen as having moderate (versus low or high) ability, with three men being chosen for every two women. Men also were more likely to be chosen for the starting lineup, again especially among players of moderate ability, where the ratio was three to one. Thus, even though the men and women were matched on ability, members of the group stereotyped as more athletic (men) were more likely to receive the limited resources.

Biernat and Vescio (2002) also investigated the allocation of an unlimited resource, praise for good performance. Their participants indicated, by checking a list of behaviors, how enthusiastically they would respond to each of their players' hitting a single. In this case, female players received more of the resource even though their performance was the same as the men's. That is, members of the group stereotyped as less athletic got more praise because good performance was unexpected. Although giving more praise for performance may sound positive, it is also patronizing (Biernat, 2003): Members of the group stereotyped as less competent get praised for what is seen as routine performance by others, sending the message that the person giving the praise sees the stereotyped group as less competent.

**Cultural Artifacts.** Stereotypes can affect not only evaluations of members of a stereotyped group but also evaluations of aspects of the group's culture. For example, recall from Chapter 1 that Carrie Fried (1996, 1999) examined racial stereotypes as a factor in negative reactions to rap music, a genre associated with urban African American culture. She hypothesized that although rap music is frequently condemned for its content, part of the condemnation on the part of people who are not African American comes from its association with Black American culture. Fried tested this hypothesis by showing people at a shopping mall lyrics taken from a song performed in the early 1960s by an all-White group. The lyrics depicted the protagonist in the story told by the song as being unrepentant over having shot and killed a police officer. The participants were told that the lyrics were from either a rap song or a country and western song. They then rated the lyrics on dimensions such as offensiveness and the extent to which songs like it were dangerous and a threat to society. Fried found that the lyrics were evaluated more negatively when they were presented as rap lyrics than when they were presented as country and western lyrics. That is, the lyrics were seen as more negative when associated with an aspect of Black culture than with an aspect of White culture.

To further test the role of race in evaluation of the lyrics, Fried (1996) showed the lyrics to another group of research participants without mentioning the type of music they represented. She also showed them a picture of the supposed performer of the song, who was either a young Black man or a young White man. The participants then rated the lyrics on the dimensions used in the first study. Fried found that participants rated the lyrics more negatively when the performer was portrayed as Black than when he was portrayed as White. Thus, negative stereotypes affect not only members of the stereotyped group but also evaluations of the group's culture.

## SUMMARY

Group stereotypes are problematic. Applying them to a member of a stereotyped group can bias interpretation of and memory for the group member's behavior and judgments made about the group member. However, knowledge of the content of stereotypes does not make stereotype application inevitable. Before an onlooker applies a stereotype to a person, three processes must occur. The onlooker must categorize the person as a member of a stereotyped group, the group stereotype must be activated, and the group stereotype must be applied to the person. If categorization does not occur, activation cannot occur; and if activation does not occur, application cannot occur.

People spontaneously categorize others based on the three basic social categories of race, gender, and age, with race categorized first, followed quickly by gender. Categorization frequently occurs in terms of subcategories, such as young Black woman. Although categorization is automatic, several factors influence the categorization process. People tend to be categorized on the basis of characteristics that make them stand out from their surroundings, and category-related behavior (such as a woman applying makeup) can draw attention to that category. Individuals whose characteristics are more typical of characteristics that define the group are categorized more quickly. Finally, prejudiced people tend to focus on the categories they are prejudiced against, to overclassify people as members of outgroups, to take more time to categorize people who appear to be ambiguous in terms of category membership, and to use stereotypes as cues for categorization.

Stereotype activation occurs spontaneously after categorization because associations between categories and stereotypes are well learned and therefore strong. Nonetheless, a number of factors can influence the activation process. The context in which activation occurs may favor one stereotypic subcategory over another. More prejudiced people show stronger stereotype activation for groups they are prejudiced against, probably because the category-stereotype link is stronger for them. Finally, cognitive busyness can disrupt stereotype activation by using up the working memory capacity needed by the activated stereotype.

People's motives, needs, and goals also can influence stereotype activation. Stereotypes can aid comprehension by appearing to provide needed information about others and by providing explanations for others' behavior. Negative stereotypes can aid self-enhancement by providing an excuse for ignoring others' criticism of oneself. Stereotypes can aid social adjustment and fitting in with the ingroup by indicating that one shares others' views of outgroups. Finally, most people are motivated to control prejudiced responses, and a strong personal motivation not to be prejudiced can inhibit stereotype activation. Although stereotypes can help fulfill motives, needs, and goals, they are activated for that purpose only if their content is relevant to the goal at hand.

Automatic and motivated processes jointly influence the activated stereotype. If they operate in the same direction (say, toward activation), they can reinforce each other; if they operate in different directions, one toward activation and the other toward inhibition, they can offset one another. Once a stereotype is activated, it may not stay active very long; however, events can occur during

an interaction with a member of a stereotyped group that can reactivate a dissipated stereotype. An activated stereotype will be applied unless the person is both motivated and able to inhibit stereotyping. One motivational factor that acts to inhibit stereotyping is motivation to avoid prejudice. Another factor is comprehension goals: People are generally motivated to form accurate impressions of others and so generally seek out individuating information about them. However, stereotypes may be relied on even when some individuating information is present, and stereotypes can affect how people interpret individuating information. People are especially likely to seek out individuating information when they have an incentive to be accurate. Individual differences in cognitive style also influence stereotype application: People high in need for cognition and causal uncertainty tend to use stereotypes less, whereas people high in need for structure tend to use stereotypes more. Self-enhancement goals may lead people to view others in terms of negative stereotypes when those others threaten their self-images. In contrast, reinforcing people's positive self-images reduces their use of stereotypes. Finally, people who hold power over others tend to stereotype their subordinates because they are generally not motivated to individuate subordinates and as a means of justifying power differentials in hierarchical organizations. However, stereotyping by power holders is not inevitable. They tend to use stereotypes the most when the stereotypes are relevant to the decisions they have to make and tend to inhibit the use of stereotypes when other motives, such as responsibility for subordinates, are salient.

Even when people are motivated to inhibit stereotypes, they may not be able to do so. One factor that facilitates stereotyping is a lack of cognitive resources that could be used to inhibit stereotyping. This lack of resources could arise from cognitive busyness, working on a complex task, time pressure, fatigue, or the effort to control stereotyping itself. In addition, alcohol consumption inhibits people's ability to control their thought processes and therefore to control stereotyping. Once a stereotype has been applied, it can have a number of consequences. Stereotypes affect how onlookers interpret others' behavior: Ambiguous behaviors are interpreted to be consistent with group stereotypes. Stereotypes can bias the evaluations people make of members of stereotyped groups and their cultures, with negative stereotypes leading to negative evaluations. Stereotypes also can create shifting standards for evaluation, such that members of stereotyped groups must work harder to be seen as deserving of limited resources but are patronized for good performance, such as by being praised for behavior that would be seen as routine from members of nonstereotyped groups.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Stereotype Activation

Bargh, J. A. (1999). The cognitive monster: The case against the controllability of automatic stereotype effects. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), *Dual-process theories in social psychology* (pp. 361–382). New York: Guilford.

Blair, I. V. (2002). The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6, 242–262.

Kunda, Z., & Spencer, S. J. (2003). When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they color judgment? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation and application. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129, 522–544.

There is some controversy among researchers over the extent to which stereotype activation is automatic and inevitable versus the extent to which stereotype activation can be influenced by other processes. Bargh presents the case for inevitability; Blair and Kunda and Spencer present evidence for the malleability of automatic stereotypes.

**Stereotype Application**

Gilbert, D. T., & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: Activation and application of stereotypic beliefs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60, 509–517.

Kunda, Z., & Thagard, P. (1996). Forming impressions from stereotypes, traits, and behaviors: A parallel-constraint-satisfaction model. *Psychological Review*, 103, 284–308.

Kunda and Thagard review the research literature on factors that influence the application of stereotypes and present a theory of how those factors operate. Eloquent in its simplicity, Gilbert and Hixon’s article provides a highly readable example of how social cognition researchers explore the processes underlying stereotyping and prejudice.

**Consequences of Stereotype Use**

Bodenhausen, G. & Wyer, R. S., Jr. (1985). Effects of stereotypes on decision making and information processing strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48, 267–282.

Darley, J. M. & Gross, P. H. (1983). A hypothesis-confirming bias in labeling effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 44, 20–33.

Both of these classic papers provide accessible examples of how of how researchers gain insight into people’s biases (Darley and Gross) and the effects of those biases on judgments of others (Bodenhausen & Wyer).

**KEY TERMS**

|                              |                          |                        |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| categorization               | prototypicality          | stereotype application |
| cultural                     | shifting standards model | stereotype endorsement |
| individuating<br>information | stereotype activation    |                        |

**QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION**

1. Draw a diagram of the stereotyping process from categorization through stereotype activation to stereotype application. At each stage, include the factors that affect the process at that point.

2. What happens during the categorization process? Describe the factors that influence how an onlooker categorizes another person.
3. Reread Box 4.1. Do you agree or disagree with Jordan Lite's belief that American society places an undue emphasis on racial categorization as a factor in interpersonal relations? Explain the reasons underlying your answer. If American society does place an undue emphasis on racial categorization, what social and historical factors do you think created that emphasis and operate to maintain it?
4. Why might it be important to try to avoid viewing other people in terms of their social categories, especially in "real world" interactions? Do you think that it is possible to avoid categorization? Why or why not?
5. Stereotype activation is said to be an automatic process. What does that mean? What is it about social categories and stereotypes that makes the activation process automatic?
6. Describe the factors that influence the degree to which stereotypes are activated.
7. What does it mean to say that motives, needs, and goals play a role in stereotype activation? Under what conditions is motivation most likely to affect stereotype activation?
8. Explain how each of the following motives affects stereotype activation: comprehension, self-enhancement, social adjustment, and motivation to control prejudice.
9. Explain how the various motives can interact to affect stereotype activation.
10. How do moods affect the activated stereotype?
11. How long does a stereotype stay activated? If stereotypes can dissipate relatively quickly, how is it that they can have an influence during a relatively lengthy interaction?
12. Explain why both motivation and ability are necessary to inhibit the application of an activated stereotype.
13. What does the term individuating information mean? What role does it play in stereotyping? Why can stereotypes still have an influence in the face of individuating information?
14. What motivates people to seek out individuating information about others?
15. What cognitive style variables are related to stereotype application? What kind of effect does each have?
16. Explain why power holders are likely to stereotype their subordinates. Assume that you are an upper-level manager in an organization. What could you do to reduce stereotyping by power holders? Explain why your solutions would be effective.
17. Describe the various cognitive factors that reduce the opportunity to inhibit stereotyping.



18. Describe how individual differences in levels of prejudice affect each stage of the process and explain why prejudice has the effect it does at that stage.
19. A factor involved in both stereotype activation and application is the availability or unavailability of cognitive resources. Describe the role of cognitive resources in these processes and explain why cognitive resources have the effects they do.
20. Describe the role of self-enhancement in stereotype activation and application and explain why it has the effect it does.
21. Describe how stereotypes can influence the interpretation of behaviors performed by members of stereotyped groups.
22. Describe how stereotypes can influence judgments made about members of stereotyped groups and of the cultures of those groups.
23. Explain how stereotypes result in shifting standards for evaluation of members of stereotyped and nonstereotyped groups. What effects do these shifting standards have? Create an example of shifting standards different from the one given in this chapter.
24. What kinds of things can you personally do to prevent stereotypes from affecting the judgments you make about other people?

# Chapter 5

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## Emotions and Motivation

Black people used to scare me. 'Cause I didn't know anything about 'em. It's just like anything else, if you don't understand it, you're suspicious and you're off it. (P. 140)

Most white people feel that any minority is a threat. I think they see people on welfare as the scum of the earth, and I think that they think that most black people ... are on welfare. (P. 151)

I dislike them .... I don't say I hate every black person, but the majority. (P. 160)

—ANONYMOUS WHITE INTERVIEWEES (FEAGIN & VERA, 1995)

Especially when inner conflict is present, people put the brakes on their prejudices. They do not act them out—or they act them out only up to a certain point. Something stops the logical progression somewhere.

—GORDON ALLPORT (1954, P. 332)

### Chapter Outline

#### Emotions and Stereotyping

#### Emotions and Prejudice

*Intergroup Emotions*

*Intergroup Anxiety*

*Empathy*

#### Motivation to Control Prejudice

*Types of Motivation*

*Social Norms*

*The Development of Motivation  
to Control Prejudice*

#### Summary

#### Suggested Readings

#### Key Terms

#### Questions for Review and Discussion

Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the cognitive component of prejudice—stereotypic beliefs about outgroups and outgroup members and what happens when those stereotypes are activated. That research can sometimes make it seem as though reactions are entirely void of emotion. However, as the first three quotations at the beginning of this chapter illustrate, negative emotions such as fear, contempt, dislike, and hate are important components of people's responses to outgroups. This chapter focuses on three roles that affect or emotions play in stereotyping and prejudice. The first role is to facilitate or inhibit stereotype activation and application. The focus in this research is on what are called *incidental emotions*, emotions that are not associated with a given social group but which the person brings to the intergroup situation (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 2002). For example, a person might be angry because of an argument with a coworker and then go to a meeting with a member of an outgroup. That anger can influence the activation of outgroup stereotypes. The first part of this chapter discusses the effects of such incidental emotions.

The second role emotions play is as responses to the stereotypes that are activated when people think about outgroups or interact with outgroup members. (Although this chapter focuses on emotions engendered by outgroups, the emotions one experiences relative to one's ingroup can also be important; see, for example, Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Emotions and stereotypes are linked because beliefs carry emotions along with them (Zajonc, 1998). Beliefs (including stereotypic beliefs) describe the characteristics one associates with a person, group, object, or concept; emotion represents one's reaction to whether one considers a characteristic to be good or bad in terms of the implications the characteristic has for oneself. For example, if a person associates the characteristic *dangerous* with an outgroup, that characteristic would be considered bad because it implies a threat to oneself or one's ingroup, and so the person would experience negative emotions such as fear and anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The second part of this chapter discusses how these emotional processes can lead to prejudice and discrimination.

The third role that emotions play in prejudice is to motivate people to control their prejudicial reactions. As the quotation from Gordon Allport at the beginning of the chapter indicates, people do not always express the prejudices they hold. As we will see in Chapter 6, theories of contemporary prejudice posit that although people absorb the prejudices that have historically held sway in American society, it is no longer socially acceptable to act in a prejudiced manner. As a result, people who find themselves acting in a prejudiced manner or thinking prejudiced thoughts feel guilty about violating the norm of nonprejudice. This guilt then motivates them to control or suppress any prejudicial impulses they feel (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007). The third part of this chapter describes how this motivation operates.

## EMOTIONS AND STEREOTYPING

One question that has intrigued prejudice researchers is whether people's emotional states affect stereotyping. That is, does being in a good or bad mood affect the extent to which stereotypes are activated and applied when the person




**FIGURE 5.1** Affect and Stereotyping

People induced to experience a happy mood use stereotypes to a greater extent than those in a neutral or sad mood. People induced to feel anger also use stereotypes to a greater extent than those in a neutral or sad mood and use stereotypes to about the same degree as people in a happy mood.

SOURCE: Data from Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süsser (1994) and Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994).

encounters a member of a stereotyped group? As mentioned earlier, this type of emotion is labeled **incidental emotion** because it is not associated with a social group, but rather comes from the context in which an intergroup interaction takes place. Researchers have investigated this question with experiments in which a manipulation induces a given mood (such as happiness or sadness) in one group of research participants and a different or neutral mood in another group of participants. The two groups are then compared on the degree of stereotyping they exhibit.

One might think that people's tendency to stereotype would reflect their mood states, so that, for example, happy people would see others in a positive light and so be less likely to stereotype than would sad people. However, a very consistent finding is that, as shown in the first three bars of Figure 5.1, happy people stereotype to a greater extent than people in neutral or sad moods. This outcome has been found for both explicit and implicit stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Chartand, van Baaren, & Bargh, 2006). Why does this happen? Bodenhausen and his colleagues (2002) suggest that being in a happy mood promotes simplistic thinking by "signaling that 'Everything is fine,' and thus there is little need for careful analysis of the environment. Consequently, happy people may generally prefer to conserve their mental resources [by using stereotypes] rather than engaging in effortful, systematic thinking" such as by seeking out individuating information about others that would disconfirm the stereotype. "Sad moods, in contrast, suggest to [people] that

their environment is problematic and may promote more detail-oriented, careful thinking” (p. 334).

One result of happy people’s avoidance of careful thought is that, compared to people in sad and neutral mood states, they are more likely to erroneously attribute stereotypic characteristics to others (Park & Banaji, 2000). However, it is important to note that this happy mood effect is not absolute. For example, when happy people are motivated to make accurate judgments, they seek out individuating information (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) and when given clearly counterstereotypic information about others, they rely on that information, not stereotypes, in making judgments (Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000).

Other emotions, such as anger (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdic, 2004), anxiety (Wilder & Shapiro, 1989), and disgust (Tiedens & Linton, 2001) are also associated with stereotyping. For example, as shown in the last bar in Figure 5.1, angry people stereotype to about the same degree as happy people. These findings have led to the hypothesis that “hot” or physiologically arousing emotions facilitate stereotyping by leading people to focus their attention on their emotional state. This internal focus of attention then promotes stereotyping by distracting people from environmental factors, such as individuating information about others, that would otherwise inhibit stereotyping (Wilder & Simon, 2001). This hypothesis is supported by research that shows that any kind of physiological arousal, such as that induced by physical exercise, facilitates stereotype use (Paulhus, Martin, & Murphy, 1992).

However, not all arousing emotions promote stereotyping. For example, Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süsser (1994) found that both arousing and nonarousing happiness inductions led to the same amount of stereotyping, and Larissa Tiedens and Susan Linton (2001) found that although disgust promoted stereotyping, fear did not. Therefore, although it is clear that some arousing emotions can facilitate stereotyping, it is not clear why they do so although other arousing emotions do not. One possible explanation is provided by Paul Rozin and his colleagues (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). They point out that some emotions, including anger and disgust, are responses to perceived violations of important cultural values. In the United States, examples of such values include working hard and controlling self-indulgent impulses (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996). Because outgroups are often seen as violating important ingroup values (Biernat et al., 1996), experiencing a value-related emotion might facilitate the categorization of a person as a member of an outgroup and so enhance the perceiver’s propensity to stereotype the person. In addition, as we will see later in this chapter, specific emotions can be associated with the stereotypes of specific groups (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Therefore, an emotion might best facilitate stereotyping of groups whose stereotypes elicit that particular emotion. For example, disgust seems to facilitate stereotyping of gay men whereas anger seems to facilitate stereotyping of African Americans (Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, & Wickens, 2007). However, the role of affect in stereotyping, especially affects other than happiness and sadness, has not been well explored, so any explanations of how those factors influence stereotyping remain tentative (Bodenhausen et al., 2002; Wilder & Simon, 2001).

### Box 5.1 Emotion and the Cross-Racial Identification Bias

Research on the cross-racial identification bias suggests that, in general, people of other races and ethnic groups “all look alike” to most perceivers. One explanation for this bias is that people use their limited cognitive resources for processing information about ingroup members, perhaps because their interactions with them are more frequent and, to some extent, more important to their interaction goals than are interactions with outgroup members (see Maner et al., 2003). This tendency may not hold, however, when processing angry faces. Consistent with past research on the cross-racial identification bias, Joshua Ackerman and his colleagues (2006) found that White research participants accurately recognized both angry and neutral White faces and were also relatively inaccurate at recognizing neutral Black faces. However, contrary to previous research on the cross-racial identification bias, Whites showed the greatest accuracy when identifying angry Black faces. Whites stereotypically view Blacks as dangerous and an angry face warns people about the potential for harm. In the face of this perceived risk,

Whites may be motivated to accurately process angry Black faces.

People’s own emotional state may also reduce the cross-racial identification bias. Kareem Johnson and Barbara Fredrickson (2005) asked White research participants to watch a stand-up comedian, a clip from a horror movie, or an instructional video about wood-working, inducing a joyous, a fearful, or a neutral mood, respectively. Participants then engaged in a facial recognition task. Those who were in a joyful mood were better at discriminating Black faces than were those in a fearful or a neutral mood. Interestingly, however, a positive mood did not improve Whites’ ability to recognize members of their own race. Explanations for this result await further research; one possibility is that people process ingroup faces holistically and, when happy, use this same strategy to process outgroup members faces. Overall, results of a great deal of research has supported the existence of a cross-racial identification bias. Results of these two studies, however, point to the power of emotion in reducing or eliminating this bias.

Emotions can also affect other aspects of intergroup relations. Box 5.1, for example, describes the effects of emotion on one’s ability to recognize members of other racial or ethnic groups.

## EMOTIONS AND PREJUDICE

Emotions have several characteristics that are important to understanding prejudice (Zajonc, 1998). First, emotions are aroused automatically without conscious control; that is, when one experiences an emotion, it just pops up by itself, whether the person wants it to or not. Because of this automatic character of emotional response, a person might not be aware of the cause of a felt emotion. For example, a person may feel vaguely uncomfortable when interacting with a member of an outgroup, but may not know that the cause, in this case, is the automatic arousal of emotions associated with negative stereotypes of the group. This arousal can occur even for people who consciously reject a stereotype; as we noted in Chapter 4, stereotypes, and therefore their associated emotions, can be automatically activated even in people who are not consciously prejudiced.

Second, emotions motivate behavior. For example, fear motivates people to flee the fear-arousing situation, anger motivates people to attack the person who provoked the anger, and pity motivates people to help the person pitied (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). However, such behavioral responses

are not inevitable. As we will see in Chapter 10, many factors can inhibit the expression of a behavior; for example, social norms prohibit the expression of aggression except in very limited circumstances. Nonetheless, as Chapter 10 also shows, strong emotions can overcome these inhibitions, leading to behaviors that can range from snubs to violent attacks.

Finally, different people can experience different emotions in response to the same person or group. This difference arises from three sources. First, different people develop different beliefs about a group; the factors discussed in Chapter 3 lead some people to develop negative beliefs about a certain group whereas other people develop positive beliefs about the group. Their differing beliefs lead to differing emotional responses. Another source of differences in emotional response is that different people may evaluate the same belief differently. For example, some people might evaluate a group (and its members) that challenges traditional gender roles in a positive light because they agree with that challenge, whereas other people might evaluate the group negatively because they disagree with the group's goal. A final source of differences in emotional response to a group is that there are individual differences in the degree of intensity with which people experience emotions, both in general (Larsen & Diener, 1987) and in response to specific emotions (e.g., Hodson & Costello, 2007; Tapias et al., 2007). Therefore, one person might feel a given emotion strongly where another person experiences it weakly, leading to different behavioral responses.

In discussing the role of emotions in prejudice, we address three categories of emotions. *Intergroup emotions* arise from a person's stereotypes of an outgroup (Smith & Mackie, 2005). As noted earlier, people who perceive an outgroup as dangerous are likely to feel fear and anger in response to the group. *Intergroup anxiety* refers to the low-level feelings of discomfort many people, even unprejudiced people, experience when interacting with, or anticipating an interaction with, members of an outgroup (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). We will conclude our discussion of emotions with *empathy*, the degree to which a person feels sympathy with another's situation and feel compassion for others who are in need.

### Intergroup Emotions

**Intergroup emotions** are the feelings aroused when people think about or interact with members of social groups; these groups include one's ingroups (Smith et al., 2007), but we will focus on emotional responses to outgroups. The research we discuss will also focus on the emotions majority group members experience in response to minority groups. There has been very little research on minority group members' emotional responses to majority groups; we will discuss some aspects of that research in this chapter's section on intergroup anxiety and in Chapter 11.

Two teams of researchers have developed models of how intergroup emotions arise and affect behavior (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Cuddy et al., 2007). Both models propose that the stereotypic beliefs that people hold about outgroups lead them to feel emotions that are based on evaluations of those beliefs: Positive beliefs lead to positive emotions and negative beliefs lead to negative

emotions. Both models also discuss how emotions affect behavior, with positive emotions leading to positive behaviors directed toward the group and negative emotions leading to negative behaviors. The difference between the models lies in their levels of specificity: One considers stereotypes in terms of general categories of beliefs whereas the other focuses on specific beliefs. We will first look at the link between beliefs and emotions, and then at the link between emotions and behavior. This section will conclude with a consideration of the nature of hate and a brief look at individual differences in how people experience emotions and how those differences relate to prejudice.

**From Stereotypes to Emotions.** The model of intergroup emotions developed by Amy Cuddy and her colleagues (2007) is an outgrowth of a theory of stereotyping called the **stereotype content model** (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Most theories of stereotyping deal with the ways in which specific stereotypic beliefs develop and influence cognition and behavior. In contrast, the stereotype content model classifies group stereotypes along two broad dimensions. The first dimension is *warmth*; groups can be stereotyped as warm and friendly or as cold and unfriendly. Perceptions of an outgroup as warm and friendly derive from the belief that the outgroup has the potential to provide benefits to the ingroup, such as by cooperating with the ingroup in achieving the ingroup's goals. Perceptions of an outgroup as cold and unfriendly derive from the belief that the outgroup has the potential to harm the ingroup, such as by competing with the ingroup for a societal resource (such as jobs) and so potentially frustrating the ingroup in accomplishing its goals. The second dimension is *competence*; groups can be stereotyped as competent and successful in dealing with the world or as incompetent and unsuccessful. Perceptions of an outgroup as competent derive from the belief that an outgroup can be effective in either helping or frustrating the accomplishments of the ingroup's goals. Perceptions of an outgroup as incompetent derive from the belief that the outgroup can neither help nor frustrate the ingroup in accomplishing its goals.

As shown in Table 5.1, the various combinations of stereotypic warmth and competence lead to different emotional responses. Groups that are perceived as warm and friendly evoke positive emotions, although type of emotion differs depending on the perceived competence and success of the group. Thus, as shown in the first line of Table 5.1, groups such as White and middle class (the ingroups of Cuddy and colleagues' research participants) are seen as both warm and competent, and so evoke admiration. However, as shown in the second line of Table 5.1, retarded and disabled people are seen as warm but not competent (that is, unable to take care of themselves through no fault of their own) and so evoke pity. In contrast to the effects of perceived warmth, groups that are seen as cold and unfriendly call forth negative emotions, but, as with warmth, the type of emotion depends on the perceived competence of the group. As shown in the third line of Table 5.1, groups seen as successful competitors with the (in this case, White middle class) ingroup, such as Jews and Asian Americans, evoke envy and anger because they are seen as taking resources away from the ingroup. (We discuss this aspect of intergroup relations in Chapter 9.) Finally, unsuccessful



**TABLE 5.1 Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick's (2007) Model of the Relation of Stereotype Content to Intergroup Emotions and Behavior**

| Stereotype Content            | Example Groups                      | Emotion     | Behaviors                                   |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------|
| High Warmth + High Competence | Middle-class and White people       | Admiration  | Active facilitation<br>Passive facilitation |
| High Warmth + Low Competence  | Retarded and disabled people        | Pity        | Active facilitation<br>Passive harm         |
| Low Warmth + High Competence  | Jews, Asians                        | Envy, Anger | Active harm<br>Passive facilitation         |
| Low Warmth + Low Competence   | Welfare recipients, homeless people | Contempt    | Active harm<br>Passive harm                 |

SOURCE: Based on data from Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2007) and Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002).

groups, such as welfare recipients and homeless people, are viewed with contempt because their lack of success is assumed to stem from their not trying to succeed. (We discuss how perceptions of the causes of a group's situation affect attitudes toward the group in Chapter 7.)

Catherine Cottrell and Steven Neuberg (2005) take the same theme of stereotypes' causing emotions, but consider the roles of specific beliefs about outgroups, especially beliefs about how an outgroup might threaten the welfare of the ingroup. Table 5.2 provides some examples of the links between beliefs and emotions that Cottrell and Neuberg propose. Groups that are seen as posing an economic threat to the (again, White middle class) ingroup, such as Asian Americans and Mexican Americans, arouse emotions such as anger, fear, and disgust. Groups that are perceived to threaten the ingroup's values, such as gay men and feminists, evoke emotions such as disgust, fear, and anger. Groups that are seen as threatening the ingroup's safety, such as African Americans and Mexican Americans, evoke emotions such as fear and anger. Finally, groups that are seen as unsuccessful, such as Native Americans and African Americans, lead to feelings of pity and anger. Note that although different groups arouse different primary emotions, such as disgust for gay men and fear for African Americans, anger is a common theme across all groups. This theme is important when we discuss the link between emotions and behavior because anger motivates aggression.

These models of the link between stereotypes and emotions have two important implications for understanding prejudice. First, although people may express the same degree of prejudice toward various groups, the emotional bases of those prejudices might differ. For example, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) found that their White middle-class research participants expressed similar levels of prejudice against Asian Americans and Native Americans. However, the primary emotions they felt toward Asian Americans were anger and resentment whereas

**TABLE 5.2 Examples from Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) Model of the Relation of Stereotypes to Intergroup Emotions and Behavior**

| Belief about Group | Example Groups                       | Emotions                     | Behavior   |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------|
| Economic threat    | Asian Americans, Mexican Americans   | <b>Anger</b> , fear, disgust | Aggression |
| Values threat      | Gay men, active feminists            | <b>Disgust</b> , fear, anger | Avoidance  |
| Safety threat      | African Americans, Mexican Americans | <b>Fear</b> , anger          | Escape     |
| Unsuccessful       | Mexican Americans, African Americans | <b>Pity</b> , anger          | Help       |

NOTE: The emotion shown in boldface is the primary emotion associated with the stereotype; the other emotions listed may also be felt in response to the stereotype. The behavior listed is the one associated with the primary emotion.

SOURCE: Based on Cottrell and Neuberg (2005).

the primary emotion they felt toward Native Americans was pity. The second point these models make about prejudice is that the same group can evoke inconsistent, emotional responses. For example, Cottrell and Neuberg found that although African Americans were stereotyped as dangerous and therefore evoked fear as an emotion, they were also seen as unsuccessful, evoking feelings of pity. (We discuss these kinds of ambivalent intergroup emotions in more detail in Chapter 6.)

**From Emotions to Behavior.** As shown in the last columns of Tables 5.1 and 5.2, both models propose that emotions dispose people to act in certain ways. That is, emotion is a motivator (or engine) for behavior. Cuddy and colleagues (2007) point out that behaviors directed at groups can be described in terms of two dimensions. One dimension describes the degree to which a behavior is helpful (or facilitative, in Cuddy et al.'s terminology) or harmful to a group; the other dimension describes the degree to which a behavior is active or passive. Combining these dimensions leads to four categories of behaviors:

- *Active facilitation* consists of doing things that help a group or its members get ahead in society, such as by working to get benefits for the group. An example would be lobbying a company to hire more members of minority groups.
- *Passive facilitation* consists of not hindering a group or its members from getting ahead. An example would be not opposing programs such as affirmative action that can benefit members of minority groups. Note, however, that a person's not opposing a program or action does not mean actively promoting the program or action; it's a matter of letting the program or action proceed without trying to stop it.
- *Active harm* consists of doing things that harm a group or its members. Such behaviors include actions such as name calling, sexual harassment, bullying, and destruction of property.
- *Passive harm* consists of harming a group or its members either by not doing things that would be helpful or of not engaging in behaviors that could generally be categorized as polite. Examples of the latter include avoiding

contact with members of a group, excluding them from participating in day-to-day activities such as lunch groups at work, and ignoring them when exclusion is not possible.

As noted in Chapter 1, although these behaviors consist of what might seem individually as small slights, they can accumulate to create strong feelings of psychological hurt in the people who experience them (see, for example, Sue et al., 2007).

Cuddy and colleagues' (2007) Study 3 illustrates the link between emotion and behavior. Research participants read a description of a fictitious immigrant group that was described as either being admired, envied, held in contempt, or pitied by people familiar with the group. As Table 5.1 shows, these emotions derive from different combinations of stereotypic warmth and competence. The participants then rated whether they would be likely to engage in various behaviors toward the group. These behaviors, such as *help*, *cooperate with*, *attack*, and *ignore*, represented active and passive facilitation and harm. As predicted by their model, Cuddy and colleagues found that admiration and pity (associated with high-warmth stereotypes) led to more active facilitation and that contempt and envy (associated with low-warmth stereotypes) led to more active facilitation compared to admiration and pity. Similarly, they found that admiration and envy (associated with high-competence stereotypes) led to more passive facilitation and that contempt and pity (associated with low-competence stereotypes) led to more passive harm compared to admiration and envy. Thus, as Cuddy and colleagues (2007) and Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) have proposed, a stereotype elicits emotions that are specifically associated with that stereotype and those emotions motivate behaviors that are specific to the emotions. Prejudice results when negative stereotypes elicit negative emotions and discrimination results when negative emotions motivate negative behaviors.

How do intergroup emotions lead to intergroup behavior? A sequence of processes is involved. Researchers who study emotions in general propose that people experience emotions when their environments change. One type of environmental change occurs when a person meets a member of another group, which can arouse emotion associated with stereotypes of the group. For example, an encounter with a member of a group that is stereotyped as dangerous could arouse fear. The situation itself could enhance the emotion, as might happen if the person encountering the group member interpreted the group member's behavior as threatening. In addition, negative emotions are aversive, motivating people to do something to reduce them. The emotion—in this case, fear—then motivates the behavior associated with the emotion—in this case, escape from the threatening encounter. If the behavior is successful in restoring the environment to one in which the person feels comfortable, the emotion is reduced.

A set of studies conducted by Angela Maitner, Diane Mackie, and Eliot Smith (2006) illustrates this process. In their Study 1, they aroused intergroup anger in research participants by having them imagine a terrorist attack on their country. Later, the participants rated their emotions, again including anger. The participants then rated the emotions, including anger, that they would feel if their own country responded by bombing the country from which the terrorists

had come. Maitner and her colleagues found that participants' anger was significantly reduced after thinking about retaliation. That is, when anger was followed by its associate behavior, in this case aggression (see Table 5.2), then the emotion was reduced. In a second study, Maitner and colleagues found that only a effective behavioral response—one that reduced the threat—reduced emotion; an ineffective response—one that failed to change the outgroup's threatening behavior—increased the emotion and therefore increased the likelihood of a stronger response in the future.

**Hate.** The two models of emotion and prejudice that we have examined so far have generally dealt with single emotions. What happens when emotions combine? Robert Sternberg (2003) postulates that ordinary emotions can combine to result in the much stronger and potentially destructive emotion of hate. Sternberg views hate as being composed of high levels of three of the emotions we have discussed:

- Feelings of *disgust* for an outgroup motivate people to avoid and distance themselves from the outgroup. This separation can be physical, such as by restricting the outgroup to living in ghettos or limiting the occupations they can follow, or it can be psychological, such as by placing an emphasis on intergroup differences rather than similarities when thinking about or discussing the outgroup. In more extreme cases, the psychological distancing includes portraying the outgroup as being less than human. For example, Sternberg notes that Nazi propaganda in the 1930s and early 1940s described Jews as germs, rats, insects, and other vermin that are sources of disease. In contrast, the ingroup is portrayed as the embodiment of all that is beautiful and good, emphasizing the distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup.
- Feelings of *fear of and anger toward* an outgroup arise from seeing the outgroup as a threat to the ingroup. Recall that Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) proposed that fear and anger often occur together as responses to outgroups that are stereotyped as threats to the ingroup's economic well-being, values, and safety (see Tables 5.2). Propaganda that emphasizes these themes can be used to arouse fear and anger, as the Nazi propagandists did to create feelings of hate toward Jews (Sternberg, 2003).
- Feelings of *contempt* for an outgroup motivate people to look down on the outgroup. Contempt often involves viewing members of the outgroup as less than human by denying that they possess traits such as intelligence and self-control that are presumed to characterize true human beings. One implication of viewing a group as less than human (as a result of disgust, contempt, or a combination of the two) is that they fall outside the protection of the rules that normally govern behavior in society, implying that it is not wrong to harm them (Opatow, 2005).

Sternberg proposes that each component of hate can be expressed individually or in combination with one another, resulting in various types and degrees

of hate. The strongest and most dangerous and destructive form of hate, which Sternberg calls *burning hate*, combines all three components.

Sternberg points out that hate is aroused and maintained by the stories members of an ingroup tell about an outgroup. These stories may have some basis in fact or they may be totally fabricated by propagandists; in either case, they are structured in ways that emphasize the evilness of the outgroup and the goodness and innocence of the ingroup. Two main story themes support burning hate:

- *Outgroups are barbarians* who are out to destroy the sophisticated superior culture of the ingroup and replace it with outgroup's degenerate inferior culture. If the outgroup succeeds, the ingroup will be dragged down into barbarism, losing all that is good and barely eking out an existence in a state of brutishness. To protect the ingroup's culture for future generations, it is imperative to stop the outgroup's cultural incursions, even if it means destroying the outgroup.
- *Outgroups are evil victimizers* who, because of their moral bankruptcy and animal nature, want to torture, murder, and rape members of the ingroup for their own perverse pleasure. To protect the ingroup, it becomes necessary to punish past wrong doing on the part of the outgroup and to prevent future depredations, even if it means destroying the outgroup.

Themes such as these often arise as a result of conflict between groups, especially armed conflict, and serve to create, maintain, and reinforce the stereotypes that engender the emotions that comprise hate, fanning the flames of hate. The stories embodying these themes can be passed from generation to generation, keeping hate alive for centuries. Such enduring hatreds are often cited as a cause of genocide (Moshman, 2005; Sternberg, 2003); Box 5.2 briefly examines the relationship between hatred and genocide.

**Individual Differences in Emotions.** Although everyone experiences emotions, not everyone experiences them to the same degree: Given the same emotional stimulus, some people experience the emotion very intensely, others less so (Larsen & Diener, 1987). Although emotion researchers have studied this difference for some time, it has only recently been studied in the context of the relation of intergroup emotions and prejudice. Two groups of researchers have recently tested the hypothesis that people who are more sensitive to negative intergroup emotions are more likely to express negative attitudes toward outgroups. The research participants in the studies were White middle-class Canadian (Hodson & Costello, 2007) and U.S. (Tapias et al., 2007) college students. These researchers found that people who scored higher on a measure of sensitivity to disgust (an emotion associated with threats to ingroup values; see Table 5.1) reported more negative attitudes toward immigrants, Muslims, and gay men (groups stereotyped as threats to traditional middle-class values). Differences in disgust sensitivity were not related to attitudes toward White people or African Americans, indicating that people high in disgust sensitivity disliked only groups they saw as threatening ingroup values, not people in general. Tapias and colleagues also found that negative attitudes toward African Americans (a group

## Box 5.2 Emotions and Genocide

**Genocide** is the attempt by members of one social or cultural group to exterminate the members of another group. Hatred of an outgroup is usually given as the primary cause of genocide and other hate crimes (see Chapter 12); after all, what cause other than extreme negative emotion could lead to behavior aimed at annihilating an entire culture? However, some scholars who have studied genocide have suggested that hatred is not the only, or even the most important, motivator of genocidal behavior.

When discussing individual behavior that contributes to genocide, these researchers generally consider three categories of people. *Perpetrators* carry out the murders of outgroup members that, in total, result in the destruction or attempted destruction of the outgroup. *Bystanders* are members of the ingroup who do not participate in the murders, but who, through their failure to act, allow the murders to be carried out and thereby give their implied approval to the genocide and the perpetrators. *Instigators* arouse the emotions that motivate perpetrators to carry out their murders and that motivate bystanders to take no action to prevent them.

Perpetrators can be motivated by several factors, including negative emotions, including those such as disgust, anger, and contempt that constitute hate in Sternberg's (2003) theory (Baumeister, 2002; Moshman, 2005). However, motives can also include factors that, in other contexts, would be considered positive:

- *Idealism* is commitment to cause and to achieving the cause's goals, even if doing so involves distasteful policies and actions (Baumeister, 2002). Thus, patriotism is an ideal that motivates people to protect their homelands. As Roy Baumeister (2002) points out, "The Nazis had an overarching vision of an ideal society in which good people would live together in peace and harmony.... The Nazis set about erecting their ideal society by first getting rid of all the people whom they regarded as unsuited for membership." When other ways of removing "unsuitable" people proved unworkable, "killing emerged as seemingly the only practical way to get rid of the unwanted unfortunates" (pp. 245, 246).
- *Conscientiousness* is the desire to do a job well. When combined with contempt for an outgroup

that leads to dehumanization, it can result in a desire to do an effective job of mass murder. For example, Yitzhak Arad (1987) describes Franz Stangl, commander of the Nazis' Treblinka concentration camp, this way: "Stangl regarded his job as commander of a death camp the way he would have viewed any other job. He wanted to succeed at the task and mission that had been assigned to him, that is, to eliminate the people who had been sent to the camp ... and to make certain that this be carried out quickly and efficiently. To Stangl, the people he murdered were not human, they were cargo" (pp. 184, 186).

Bystanders generally take no action to prevent genocidal murder because of their contempt for the outgroup, which makes them indifferent to the fate of the outgroup and its members. Conversely, this passivity in the face of injustice leads bystanders to develop even greater contempt toward and indifference to the outgroup as a way of justifying to themselves their failure to act to stop the murders.

Instigators may be the group most directly and strongly influenced by hate. For example, in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler (1925/1943) expressed his extreme disgust, anger, and contempt toward Jews. He aroused similar emotions in others by portraying Jews as, dirty, disease-ridden, and threats to Germany's social and economic well-being (Mandel, 2002). His propagandists cemented these negative images of Jews through stories, such as those discussed by Sternberg (2003), depicting them as barbarians and criminals. These emotional manipulations created the indifference toward and dehumanization of Jews that motivated perpetrators to murder and bystanders to inaction.

If hate plays only a minor role in genocide, why is it given such prominence in discussions of annihilative murder? David Moshman (2005) suggests that the motivation is defense of our own self-images: "We overemphasize the role of genocidal hatred because we are motivated to see the perpetrators of genocide as people and governments very different from us and ours.... In the study of genocide, what we want is different from what we need. What we want is a theory of how perpetrators of genocide differ from us. What we need is a theory that explains how people like us, with motivations like ours, can come to commit genocide" (p. 207).

stereotyped as dangerous) was related to sensitivity to anger (an emotional response to danger) but not to sensitivity to disgust; they found the opposite pattern for attitudes toward gay men.

**Summary.** This section has described how stereotypes can evoke the emotional component of prejudice. People can differ in how intensely they experience emotions, creating individual differences in prejudice. Those emotions can motivate behaviors that can be either positive or negative, active or passive, leading to intergroup discrimination. However, it is important to bear in mind that emotions only set the stage for behavior; they do not guarantee it. Chapter 12 discusses the circumstances under which prejudice does and does not lead to discriminatory behavior.

### Intergroup Anxiety

**Intergroup anxiety** is a term devised by Walter and Cookie Stephan (1985) to describe the feelings of discomfort many people experience when interacting with, or anticipating an interaction with, members of other groups. Anxiety differs somewhat from the emotions we have just discussed. Those emotions, such as anger, disgust, and pity, are experienced as relatively distinct states, whereas anxiety is relatively amorphous—that is, we experience an unpleasant state, but cannot pinpoint an exact emotion or cause of the feeling, we just have a generalized sense of foreboding that something bad could happen. Intergroup anxiety is caused by expectations that interactions with members of another group will have negative consequences; these expectations, in turn, derive from concerns the person has over a number of issues, such as

- the (perhaps implicit) belief that outgroup members are dangerous and potentially harmful;
- the possibility that outgroup members might reject or ridicule the person;
- the possibility that ingroup members might reject or ridicule the person for associating with outgroup members;
- the possibility that the person will embarrass him- or herself by committing a social blunder by not knowing the appropriate norms that apply or behaviors to use when interacting with outgroup members; and
- the possibility that outgroup members will perceive the person as being prejudiced against their group (Klein & Snyder, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 2001).

The theory postulates that these negative expectations exist for one of two reasons. In some cases the person has had little contact with the outgroup and so sees the outgroup in terms of stereotypes that are often negative. In other cases, the person has had negative experiences with members of the outgroup in the past and bases expectations for future interactions on those experiences. Regardless of the reason, intergroup anxiety can lead to avoidance of outgroup members and hostility toward the outgroup. As noted earlier, people find

negative emotions to be aversive; as a result, they try to avoid situations that might arouse those emotions. The theory of intergroup anxiety is less clear about anxiety's links to intergroup hostility, but people usually dislike stimuli that arouse negative emotions (Deckers, 2009).

Research conducted to test intergroup anxiety theory has provided strong support for intergroup anxiety's relationship with prejudice, with correlations between measures of intergroup anxiety and prejudice averaging  $r = .46$  (Reik, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). In regard to its antecedents, research has found intergroup anxiety to be correlated with low levels of intergroup contact (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000), negative intergroup contact (Plant & Devine, 2003; Stephan et al., 2002), and negative stereotypes of outgroup members (Stephan et al., 2002). In addition, Ashby Plant and Patricia Devine (2003) demonstrated that the relationship between negative intergroup contact and intergroup anxiety stems from the expectation that future contact will have negative consequences, which in turn leads to intergroup anxiety. Figure 5.2 summarizes the theory of intergroup anxiety in graphic form.

The relationship of intergroup anxiety to prejudice and negative intergroup attitudes is very robust. The relationship has been found not only for attitudes of White Americans toward minority groups in the United States (for example, Plant & Devine, 2003; Stephan et al., 2002), but also for majority group attitudes toward minority groups in other countries, including Bangladesh (Islam & Hewstone, 1993), Israel (Bizman & Yinon, 2001), Italy (Voci & Hewstone, 2003), and Spain (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998). Intergroup anxiety is also related to nationality group members' ratings of one another, such as Americans' and Mexicans' ratings of each other (W. G. Stephan et al., 2000), with




**FIGURE 5.2** Intergroup Anxiety

Intergroup anxiety results from negative expectations about the outcomes of interactions with members of outgroups. These negative expectations derive from negative prior contact with the outgroup, little prior contact, and stereotypes of the outgroup that are activated when the interactant is categorized as a member of an outgroup. Intergroup anxiety leads to avoidance of intergroup contact and prejudice against the outgroup.



higher intergroup anxiety being associated with more negative ratings. Finally, higher intergroup anxiety among women is related to more negative attitudes toward men (Stephan, Stephan, Demitrakis, Yamada, & Clason, 2000).

A particular strength of the intergroup anxiety concept is that, unlike many other theories of prejudice, it relates to minority group members' attitudes toward the majority group as well as majority group members' attitudes toward minority groups. For example, intergroup anxiety has been found to be related to African Americans', Asian Americans', and Hispanic Americans' attitudes toward White Americans (Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 1989) and ratings of the Muslim majority by members of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh (Islam & Hewstone, 1993).

Finally, an important implication of the theory of intergroup anxiety is that the relationship between anxiety and prejudice is self-reinforcing. Intergroup anxiety motivates avoidance of outgroup members. However, avoidance of outgroup members lessens the likelihood of having the positive intergroup contacts that can undermine negative expectations and stereotypes (see Chapter 14). That is, intergroup anxiety promotes behavior that keeps the processes that create the anxiety in operation. People who are higher in prejudice experience greater intergroup anxiety than people lower in prejudice (Reik et al., 2006) and so are particularly motivated to avoid the very contact that might reduce their prejudice.

## Empathy

**Empathy** is “an other-oriented emotional response congruent with another’s perceived welfare; if the other is oppressed or in need, empathic feelings include sympathy, compassion, tenderness, and the like” (Batson et al., 1997, p. 105). There is a good deal of evidence that the capacity for empathy, like sensitivity to experiencing emotions, is an individual difference variable. That is, some people are more capable of feeling empathy than are other people (Davis, 1994). Mark Davis (1994) has identified four components of empathy: *Perspective taking* is the “tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others in everyday life,” *empathic concern* is “the tendency to experience feelings of sympathy and compassion for unfortunate others,” *personal distress* is “the tendency to experience distress and discomfort in response to extreme distress in others,” and *fantasy* is “the tendency to imaginatively transpose oneself into fictional situations” (p. 57). Table 5.3 shows some of the questionnaire items that are used to assess empathy.

Although empathy has not played a large role in research on prejudice, several studies have found that more empathic people exhibit less prejudice. For example, empathy has been found to be negatively correlated with a combined measure of several forms of prejudice (Backstrom & Bjorklund, 2007), with prejudice against African Americans (Whitley & Wilkinson, 2002), with prejudice against lesbians and gay men (Johnson, Brems, & Alford-Keating, 1997), and with prejudice against Australian Aborigines (Pedersen, Beven, Walker, & Griffiths, 2004). Daniel Batson and his colleagues (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002) have suggested that empathy affects prejudice through a three-step process: “(a) adopting the perspective

**TABLE 5.3 Sample Questionnaire Items Used to Assess Empathy****Perspective Taking**

I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.

When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.

**Empathic Concern**

I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.

I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.

**Personal Distress**

Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.

I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.

**Fantasy**

When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me.

After seeing a play or a movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.

SOURCE: Davis, 1994, pp. 56–57.

of ... a member of a stigmatized group (i.e., imagining how the individual is affected by his or her situation) leads to increased empathic feelings for this individual; (b) these empathic feelings lead to a perception of increased valuing of this individual's welfare ...; and (c) assuming that this individual's group membership is a salient component of his or her plight, the increased valuing generalizes to the group as a whole and is reflected in more positive attitudes toward the group" (p. 1657).

Of course, correlational research cannot determine causality, but researchers have found that they can manipulate the amount of empathy people feel for another person by having them take that person's perspective on events. For example, John Dovidio and his colleagues (2004, Study 1) conducted a study in which White college students were pretested on their attitudes toward African Americans. Several weeks later they watched a documentary from a U.S. television newsmagazine show that followed a White man and a Black man while they separately shopped, inquired about advertised jobs, and looked at apartments that were for rent. The documentary showed the ways in which the two were treated differently, and it was clear that the Black man was subject to discrimination because of his race. Before they watched the documentary, research participants had been assigned to one of three experimental conditions. The first condition was designed to arouse feelings of empathy for the Black man; participants were instructed to "try to imagine how Glen, the African American in the documentary, feels about what is happening and how it affects his life" (p. 1540). The second condition was designed to inhibit empathy by having participants take the role of impartial observer; their instructions were to "try to take an objective perspective toward what is described" (p. 1540). In the third condition, a control condition, participants received no instructions. After watching the documentary, participants completed a questionnaire that assessed their levels of prejudice and feelings of empathy for

the African American man whose experiences were depicted in it. The researchers found that participants in the empathy condition, but not the other conditions, showed both more empathy for Glen (the African American man) and a reduction in their prejudice scores. In addition, for all participants, the more they empathized with Glen, the more their prejudice scores went down. Thus, inducing feelings of empathy reduced participants' racial prejudice.

Studies employing manipulations such as the one Dovidio and colleagues (2004) used have found similar results for attitudes toward drug addicts (Batson et al., 2002); AIDS victims, homeless people, and murderers (Batson et al., 1997); and older adults (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Taken together, these results indicate that empathy can operate as a buffer against prejudice. Being able to see the world from the viewpoint of minority groups leads people to see an affinity between themselves and members of those groups that inhibits the development of prejudice (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000).

## MOTIVATION TO CONTROL PREJUDICE

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, theories of contemporary prejudice (to be discussed in Chapter 6) postulate that all people are prejudiced to some degree, even if they are not consciously aware of it. A corollary to these theories is that, because of the prejudice that affects them, people will sometimes feel an impulse to behave in a prejudiced or discriminatory manner but will restrain that behavior because the egalitarian aspect of their value systems motivates them to act in an unprejudiced manner (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). For example, a White person might find himself about to say something along the lines of, "Well, that's a typical X for you," with X being a derogatory term for an ethnic group. However, realizing what he was about to say, he restrains himself and says nothing. This section will consider some factors that motivate people to control prejudiced reactions. Two pairs of researchers, Bridget Dunton and Russell Fazio (1997) and Ashby Plant and Patricia Devine (1998), have studied the factors that motivate control of prejudiced responses. These pairs of researchers worked on this issue separately; as a result, they developed somewhat different, yet compatible, approaches to understanding this concept of **motivation to control prejudice**.

### Types of Motivation

Plant and Devine (1998) proposed that people experience what they refer to as *motivation to respond without prejudice*. Working from the perspective that a norm exists in the United States that discourages expressions of prejudice, Plant and Devine postulated that motivation to comply with that norm can come from two sources. The first source is internal, stemming from a personal belief system that holds that prejudice is wrong; this type of motivation is reflected in statements such as those shown in the first section of Table 5.4. The other source of motivation to comply with the nonprejudiced norm is external, a result of social pressure. This type of motivation is reflected in statements such as those shown

**TABLE 5.4**    **Statements Illustrating Different Types of Motivation to Control Prejudice**

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**Internal Motivation (Plant & Devine, 1998, p. 630)**

"Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong."

"Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept."

**External Motivation (Plant & Devine, 1998, p. 630)**

"I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others."

"If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me."

**Restraint to Avoid Dispute (Dunton & Fazio, 1997, p. 319)**

(Agreement with these items indicates low restraint)

"I always express my thoughts and feelings, regardless of how controversial they might be."

"I think that it is important to speak one's mind rather than to worry about offending someone."

---

in the second section of Table 5.4. In essence, internally motivated people act in a nonprejudiced way because it is personally important to them to do so; externally motivated people act in a nonprejudiced way to avoid negative reactions from other people. Plant and Devine conceptualize internal and external motivation as separate dimensions, so that a person can experience one type of motivation but not the other, experience both types of motivation simultaneously, or experience neither type of motivation. As a result, researchers can determine the factors that are specifically associated with each source of motivation. For example, people high in internal motivation judge their intergroup behavior by their personal standards; if they act in a prejudiced way, they feel guilty and criticize themselves because they have violated personal values that are important to them. In contrast, people high in external motivation who act in a prejudiced manner feel threatened because they anticipate a negative response from other people.

As might be expected, people who are high in internal motivation to control prejudice exhibit less explicit prejudice than people low in internal motivation. In addition, people high in internal motivation who are also low in external motivation (remember, it is possible to be high on both) score lower on physiological and implicit cognition measures of prejudice (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). Devine and her colleagues interpret these results to mean that people high in internal motivation to control prejudice, especially those who are also low on external motivation, have so thoroughly integrated their nonprejudiced standards into their personal belief systems that they automatically control even implicit and physiological indicators of prejudice. Furthermore, people who are both high in internal motivation and low in external motivation show low levels of implicit prejudice when distracted, suggesting that they control their negative attitudes

automatically, without conscious effort (Devine et al., 2002). Not surprisingly, people who exhibit no motivation to control prejudice exhibit the highest degree of prejudice (Legault, Green-Demes, Grant, & Chung, 2007).

An interesting finding that has emerged from the research of Plant and her colleagues is that although high internal motivation to control prejudice is associated with *low* scores on measures of explicit prejudice (average  $r = -.65$ ), external motivation is associated with *high* scores on those measures (average  $r = .28$ ) (Amodio et al., 2003; Devine et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 1998; Plant, Devine, & Brazy, 2003). Why would external motivation to *control* prejudice be associated with *more* prejudice? Plant and Devine (1998) hypothesize that people high in external motivation, especially those who are also low in internal motivation, probably try to avoid situations where they have to interact with members of minority groups so as to avoid pressure from others to control their prejudices in that situation. When put in settings where they cannot avoid intergroup contact and must control public expression of prejudice (such as classrooms and the workplace), they try to do so (Plant & Devine, 1998; Plant et al., 2003) and are generally able to do so (Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998), but feel frustrated by the process. They also report generally feeling more pressure to act in a “politically correct” manner than do other people (Plant & Devine, 2001).

Plant and Devine (2001) believe that these negative feelings cause an anti-minority backlash in people high in external motivation to control prejudice. This backlash against pressure from others is reflected in higher levels of explicit prejudice. In addition, when put under pressure to favor a Black person over a White person or to support a policy that benefits Blacks over Whites, people high in external motivation to control prejudice will do so. However, those who are also low in internal motivation to control prejudice feel more angry and resentful about the pressure than other people and are less favorable toward African Americans and pro-Black policies after the pressure has been released (Plant & Devine, 2001). Consequently, putting pressure on other people to change negative intergroup attitudes they hold could backfire, reinforcing rather than reducing their prejudice.

Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) approach to motivation to control prejudice also has two components. The first, which they call *concern with acting prejudiced*, is a combination of internal and external motivation (Plant & Devine, 1998). Their second component, called *restraint to avoid dispute*, involves the awareness that saying and doing some kinds of things (such as telling racial jokes) would cause trouble, combined with a willingness to not say or do those things as a way of avoiding arguments. This characteristic is reflected in statements such as those shown in the last section of Table 5.4. Thus, people avoid doing some things so they will not appear to be prejudiced to themselves and other people, to avoid arguments, or both.

The importance of restraint to avoid dispute lies in its relationship to intergroup interaction. Tamara Towles-Schwen and Russell Fazio (2003) found that people who are low on restraint to avoid dispute express a willingness to interact with African Americans regardless of whether their implicit racial attitudes are positive or negative. People who are low on restraint also have more experience interacting with African Americans, so presumably they have learned how to

carry on interracial interactions without letting any negative attitudes they may hold get in the way. However, people with negative implicit attitudes who are low on concern with appearing prejudiced but high on restraint to avoid dispute prefer to avoid interracial interactions, perhaps as a way of avoiding the trouble that expressing their negative attitudes might cause. In this regard, people high on restraint to avoid dispute are similar to people high on external motivation to avoid prejudice—both types of people prefer to avoid interracial interactions. However, their underlying motivations differ. People high on external motivation are concerned with appearing to conform to the social norm of nonprejudice, whereas people high on restraint want to avoid any arguments that their prejudiced attitudes might generate.

### Social Norms

An important aspect of external motivation to control prejudice that deserves a little more discussion is motivation to comply with social norms. **Social norms** are informal rules that groups develop that describe how to be a good group member (Forsyth, 2006). These rules govern both behavior—how a group member is supposed to act—and attitudes—the types of beliefs a group member is supposed to hold. For example, members of the Democratic Party expect one another to vote for Democratic candidates and to hold relatively liberal political attitudes whereas members of the Republican Party expect one another to vote for Republican candidates and to hold relatively conservative political attitudes. Attitude norms sometimes include prejudices; group norms will promote some prejudices, such as “Students at our college are better than students at the college that is our biggest rival,” and forbid others, such as racial prejudice. Because being a good group member means adhering to group norms, “to be a good group member, one must adopt the prejudices that the group holds and abstain from those prejudices that the group frowns upon” (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002, p. 360). The extent to which social norms permit discrimination against a group is a function of the normativeness of prejudice against that group. In a study of these hypotheses, Crandall and his colleagues (2002) had college students rate the acceptability of prejudice and discrimination against a number of social groups. They found an average correlation of  $r = .82$  between the acceptability of prejudice against a group and the acceptability of discrimination against the group. Thus, people will feel comfortable expressing normative prejudices and discriminating against targets of those prejudices because they believe that other people will approve; similarly, they are reluctant to express nonnormative prejudices and to discriminate against members of normatively protected groups because they believe that others will disapprove.

Researchers have typically investigated the effects of people’s perceptions of social norms on discriminatory behavior by providing research participants made-up information about a group norm and then assessing the attitudes they express. For example, Fletcher Blanchard, Terri Lilly, and Leigh Ann Vaughn (1991) conducted an on-campus survey of responses to racist behavior. When the person conducting the survey approached a student to participate, one or

two student confederates of the researchers joined the participant and interviewer. The interviewer told the students that all of them could answer the questions. The confederates always answered first, responding with either the most pro-racist answer to each question, the most anti-racist answer to each question, or with a neutral (middle of the response scale) answer. These different responses created the three conditions of the experiment. Blanchard and his colleagues found that students provided with a racist norm responded in a more racist manner than those provided with a neutral norm and those provided with an anti-racist norm responded in a more anti-racist manner. Other researchers have obtained similar results (for example, Zitek & Hebl, 2007), although the effect is more consistent for anti-racist norms than for pro-racist norms.

Social norms will have greater influence on some people than on others. For example, David Trafimow and Krystina Finlay (1999) compared the extent to which people's performance of 30 behaviors was influenced by personal attitudes versus social norms. They found that normative influence was more important than personal attitudes for 21 percent of the participants in their research. In addition, social identity theory (see Chapter 9) predicts that group norm effects will be stronger for people who identify more strongly with the group (Hogg & Mullin, 1999). This prediction was borne out in a study conducted by Charles Stangor, Gretchen Sechrist, and John Jost (2001), who provided college students with information that indicated that their racial stereotypes were less positive than those of students at either their own college (their ingroup) or another college (an outgroup). A week later, in what was supposedly a different experiment, Stangor and his colleagues found that students who were given information about their ingroup norm expressed more positive racial attitudes than those given information about the outgroup norm.

### **The Development of Motivation to Control Prejudice**

Where does motivation to control prejudice come from? Two sets of researchers have taken somewhat different, but nonetheless compatible, approaches to answering this question. Working with the concepts used in Dunton and Fazio's (1997) model, Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2001) looked for the childhood correlates of concern with appearing prejudiced and restraint to avoid dispute by asking college students about their childhood experiences. They found that high concern with appearing prejudiced was associated with parental emphasis on egalitarian values and positive contact with Black people during childhood (although the absolute number of contacts was not important). "These children learned that they should not act prejudiced from their parents while still very young and these values were reinforced by positive interactions early in childhood" (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2001, p. 173). People high in restraint to avoid dispute reported having grown up with prejudiced parents, having had little contact with Black people during childhood, and that their primary exposure to Black people was through media portrayals. In addition, they remembered the few contacts they did have with Black people as being negative. Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2001) concluded that "restraint promotes control because the individuals' backgrounds are such that their

inexperience with Blacks and/or their prejudiced home environment provide cause for their believing that their actions might provoke dispute” (pp. 173–174).

Crandall and his colleagues (2002) view the development of internal and external motivation to control prejudice as a matter of accommodation to group norms, a perspective similar to that of Plant and Devine (see, for example, Devine et al., 2002). As shown in Figure 5.3, this model begins with people being embedded in a normative context, such as that of their childhood, for




**FIGURE 5.3** The Normative Context and Motivation to Control Prejudice

When people are fully embedded in a normative context they experience no motivation to control prejudice because they automatically comply with the relevant norms. When they move to a new normative environment, they first experience external motivation as people in the new environment apply pressure to comply with their norms. As the new arrival comes to identify with the new group, they develop an internal motivation to control prejudice. As the new norm becomes part of their value system, external motivation declines. Finally, when compliance with the new norm becomes fully automatic, internal motivation is no longer needed.

SOURCE: Based on Crandall, Eshleman, and O'Brien (2002).



which they have learned the governing norms without being aware of having done so. These norms, including those dealing with the expression and control of prejudice, comprise the “natural” rules of behavior for people raised as part of that social group. These individuals have no need for specific sources of motivation to control prejudice; they know what behaviors the group will and will not accept and “naturally” comply with the group’s norms. When people move to a new normative environment, such as by leaving home to go to college, some of the expressions of prejudice that were permissible in their previous environment may no longer be acceptable. People in the new environment will provide external motivation to control prejudice by putting pressure on the new arrivals to comply with the new group’s norms concerning prejudice, although at this point the new arrivals may have little internal motivation to do so. One possible response to this pressure would be to leave the new group to escape the pressure.

However, if the people are attracted to the new group, they will try to fit in by complying with the group’s norms. To the extent that people begin to identify with the new group, that is, as membership in the group becomes important to their self-concepts, they will develop an internal motivation to control prejudice based on their desire to fit in with the group. At this point they experience external motivation as well as internal because they are still dependent on the group for information about what the norm entails. As people internalize the new norm and make it part of their value system, internal motivation remains, but external motivation declines. When people become fully adapted to the group norm, internal motivation declines because they no longer need to monitor their behavior; behaving in accord with the norm has become automatic.

## SUMMARY

Emotions play several roles in prejudice. Incidental emotions—those that are aroused by the situations in which people find themselves—can affect stereotype use. Some emotions, such as happiness, anger, anxiety, and disgust, facilitate stereotype use, but others, such as sadness and fear, have no effect on stereotyping. Researchers have proposed that happiness has its seemingly paradoxical effect on stereotyping by motivating people to avoid the mental effort needed to individuate others and that physiologically arousing emotions distract people from attending to individuating characteristics.

Intergroup emotions arise from the stereotypes that people hold of outgroups. Two theoretical models link stereotypes to emotions. The model developed by Cuddy and her colleagues (2007) links two general characteristics of stereotypes—the degree to which a group is seen as warm and friendly versus cold and unfriendly and the degree to which a group is seen as competent versus incompetent—to emotions. Perceptions of warmth lead to positive emotions: admiration when combined with perceptions of competence and pity when combined with perceptions of incompetence. Perceptions of coldness lead to

negative emotions: envy when combined with perceptions of competence and contempt when combined with perceptions of incompetence. Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) model links specific threats that outgroups stereotypically pose to specific emotions; for example, economic threat elicits anger, threat to values elicits disgust, and threats to safety elicit fear. Both theories also propose that emotions motivate behavior, with positive emotions leading to positive behavior toward the stereotyped group and negative emotions leading to negative behaviors. However, people differ in the extent to which they experience emotions, so that a given stereotype is likely to have stronger emotional and behavioral effects on some people than on others.

Hate consists of high levels of disgust, fear, and contempt directed at an outgroup. Intergroup hate is aroused and maintained by the stories members of an ingroup tell about an outgroup. These stories may have some basis in fact or they may be totally fabricated; in either case, they are structured in ways that emphasize the evilness of the outgroup and the goodness and innocence of the ingroup. Two main story themes support extreme hate. One is the portrayal of outgroups as barbarians who are out to destroy the ingroup's culture and replace it with the outgroup's inferior culture. The other is the portrayal of outgroups as evil victimizers who want to torture, murder, and rape members of the ingroup. Themes such as these often arise as a result of conflict between groups, especially armed conflict. The stories embodying these themes can be passed from generation to generation, keeping hate alive for centuries. Such enduring hatreds are often cited as a cause of genocide.

Intergroup anxiety refers to the feelings of discomfort many people experience when interacting with members of other groups; this anxiety drives from the expectation that intergroup interactions will have unpleasant outcomes. People with high levels of intergroup anxiety tend to be prejudiced against the groups that arouse their anxiety. A particular strength of the intergroup anxiety concept is that it encompasses minority group members' attitudes toward the majority group as well as majority group members' attitudes toward minority groups. That is, intergroup anxiety is related to intergroup attitudes for members of both majority and minority groups. The relationship between intergroup anxiety and prejudice is self-reinforcing: The anxiety motivates avoidance of outgroup members, but avoidance of outgroup members lessens the likelihood of having the positive intergroup contacts that can undermine negative expectations and stereotypes.

Empathy is the ability to feel the emotions that others experience; this ability arises from being able to see the world from the other person's point of view. Although empathy has been much less studied in relation to prejudice than have other variables, researchers have consistently found that people who are high on empathy are low on prejudice. In addition, experimentally manipulating empathy can reduce prejudice.

Because of the egalitarian norm that exists in modern society, most people are motivated to control any prejudice they feel. There are two theories of motivation to control prejudice. Plant and Devine (1998) postulate two types of motivation. Internal motivation stems from a personal belief that prejudice is

wrong; external motivation stems from a desire to avoid pressure from other people to comply with the norm of nonprejudice. Dunton and Fazio (1997) postulate a third type of motivation: Restraint to avoid dispute involves the awareness that acting in a prejudiced manner could cause trouble coupled with a willingness not to act in a prejudiced manner as a way of avoiding arguments. Social norms—informal rules that define how a good group member thinks and behaves—are an important part of both theories. Group norms define what prejudices and forms of discrimination are acceptable and unacceptable, and people are motivated to behave in ways that are consistent with what they believe the norm to be.

The two theories take somewhat different, but compatible, approaches to the development of motivation to control prejudice. Dunton and Fazio's (1997) theory focuses on childhood correlates of motivation. Concern with appearing prejudiced (a combination of internal and external motivation) is associated with parental emphasis on egalitarian values and positive contact with Black people. Restraint to avoid dispute is correlated with having prejudiced parents, having little childhood contact with Black people, and experiencing the contacts they did have as negative. Plant and Devine's (1998) theory views the development of internal and external motivation as a matter of accommodating to group norms. People start out in a given normative context. If they move to a new context, they then experience external motivation to control prejudices that were acceptable in the old context but are not acceptable in the new context. To the extent that people try to abide by the new norms, they develop an internal motivation and external motivation fades.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Emotions and Stereotyping

Bodenhausen, G. V., Mussweiler, T., Gabriel, S., & Moreno, K. N. (2002). Affective influences on stereotyping and intergroup relations. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), *Handbook of affect and social cognition* (pp. 319–343). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Bodenhausen and his colleagues conducted some of the most influential research on the effects of emotions on stereotyping. This chapter reviews and integrates that research.

### Emotions and Prejudice

Cottrell, C. A., & Neuberg, S. L. (2005). Different emotional reactions to different groups: A sociofunctional threat-based approach to "prejudice." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88, 770–789.

Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: Behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 92, 631–648. These articles present the researchers' models of the links from stereotypes to emotions to behavior.

## Hate and Genocide

Newman, L. S., & Erber, R. (Eds.) (2002). *Understanding genocide: The social psychology of the Holocaust*. New York: Oxford University Press.

This book contains chapters by psychologist who try to explain the psychological underpinnings of genocide.

Sternberg, R. J. (2003). A duplex theory of hate: Development and application to terrorism, massacres, and genocide. *Review of General Psychology*, 7, 299–328.

Sternberg, R. J. (2005). Understanding and combating hate. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *The psychology of hate* (pp. 37–49). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

These readings present Sternberg's theory of how emotions combine to form hate. The book chapter is more succinct but the article includes a multitude of examples and application to world events.

## Intergroup Anxiety

Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (2003). The antecedents and implications of interracial anxiety. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29, 790–801.

Plant and Devine briefly review theories of intergroup anxiety and propose and test a model of its origins and relationship to prejudice.

## Empathy

Stephan, W. G., & Finlay, K. (1999). The role of empathy in improving intergroup relations. *Journal of Social Issues*, 55, 729–743.

Stephan and Finlay provide an overview of the role empathy plays in prejudice and discrimination.

## Motivation to Control Prejudice

Dunton, B. C., & Fazio, R. H. (1997). An individual difference measure of motivation to control prejudiced reactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, 316–326.

Legault, L., Green-Demers, I., Grant, P., & Chung, J. (2007). On the self-regulation of implicit and explicit prejudice: A self-determination theory perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33, 732–749.

Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75, 811–832.

The Dunton and Fazio and Plant and Devine articles present the two major models of motivation to control prejudice. Plant and Devine comment on the similarities and differences of the models. Legault and her colleagues present an expanded model of motivation to control prejudice. Their model differs from the other two in that it directly addresses the issue of lack of motivation.

## KEY TERMS

|                     |                                 |                          |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| empathy             | intergroup emotions             | stereotype content model |
| genocide            | motivation to control prejudice |                          |
| incidental emotions | prejudice                       |                          |
| intergroup anxiety  | social norms                    |                          |

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What is incidental emotion? Which moods and emotions affect stereotype use? Describe the theories that have been proposed to explain these effects.
2. What are intergroup emotions? Describe the models of intergroup emotions proposed by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) and by Cuddy and her colleagues (2007). In what ways are these models similar and in what ways are they different? Which model do you think is more accurate? Explain your reasons for your choice.
3. What implications do the theories of intergroup emotions have for understanding prejudice?
4. How are intergroup emotions related to behavior?
5. Describe Sternberg's theory of hate. What are the components of hate? How is hate aroused and maintained? How can hate be controlled?
6. What is genocide? What role do emotions play in motivating genocidal murder?
7. How do individual differences affect intergroup emotions?
8. What is intergroup anxiety? What causes it? Explain the process by which intergroup anxiety leads to prejudice.
9. Debate the following proposition: The consequences of intergroup anxiety should not be considered to be prejudice because it is normal for people to feel anxious when they are in new situations, such as interacting with members of a group they are not familiar with.
10. What is empathy? Describe how it is related to prejudice.
11. Describe the types of motivation to control prejudice proposed by Dunton and Fazio (1997) and Plant and Devine (1998). In what ways are these models similar and in what ways are they different? Which model do you think is more accurate? Explain your reasons for the choice.
12. Plant and her colleagues have found that people with high scores on external motivation to control prejudice express more prejudice than people with low scores. How do they explain this apparent contradiction?
13. What are social norms? How are they related to prejudice? What experiences have you had with social norms and the expression of prejudice?
14. Describe the two models of the development of motivation to control prejudice.

## Chapter 6

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# Old-Fashioned and Contemporary Forms of Prejudice

You start out in 1954 by saying “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff. [By 1981] you’re getting so abstract [that] you’re talking about cutting taxes and all these ... totally economic things and a by-product of them is that blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it.... Obviously sitting around and saying, “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing *and* a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.” [emphasis in original]

—ANONYMOUS MEMBER OF RONALD REAGAN’S WHITE HOUSE  
STAFF DISCUSSING RACIAL POLITICS IN AN INTERVIEW WITH  
ALEXANDER LAMIS (1984, P. 26N)

### Chapter Outline

#### The Transformation of Prejudice

*Prejudice Continues ...*

*... But Only Bad People Are  
Prejudiced ...*

*... So “They” Should Stop  
Complaining*

*Theories of Contemporary  
Prejudice*

#### Modern-Symbolic Prejudice

*Characteristics of  
Modern-Symbolic  
Prejudice*

|                                                             |                                                |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Psychological Bases of<br/>Modern-Symbolic Prejudice</i> | <i>Aversive Prejudice and<br/>Behavior</i>     |
| <i>Historical Roots of Modern-<br/>Symbolic Prejudice</i>   | <b>Ambivalent Prejudice</b>                    |
| <i>Modern-Symbolic Prejudice and<br/>Behavior</i>           | <i>Ambivalent Attitudes</i>                    |
| <i>Concluding Comments</i>                                  | <i>Psychological Conflict</i>                  |
|                                                             | <i>Response Amplification</i>                  |
| <b>Aversive Prejudice</b>                                   | <b>Putting the Theories Together</b>           |
| <i>Characteristics of Aversive<br/>Prejudice</i>            | <b>Benevolent Prejudice</b>                    |
| <i>Psychological Bases of Aversive<br/>Prejudice</i>        | <b>Summary</b>                                 |
| <i>Research on Aversive<br/>Prejudice</i>                   | <b>Suggested Readings</b>                      |
|                                                             | <b>Key Terms</b>                               |
|                                                             | <b>Questions for Review and<br/>Discussion</b> |

If you asked White Americans today if they thought that prejudice is less of a problem now than it was in the past, most would probably agree. For example, 74 percent of White respondents to a 2008 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll said discrimination against Black people was not a problem in their communities (PollingReport.com, 2008). The results of other research seem to support this perception that prejudice has decreased. For example, Patricia Devine and Andrew Elliot (1995) compared the results of several studies of White college students' stereotypes of African Americans that had been conducted between 1933 and 1995. As shown in Figure 6.1, the stereotypes became less negative over time, changing from very negative to somewhat positive (see also Madon et al., 2001). Survey researchers have found similar changes over time in the general population; for example, 68 percent of Whites supported racially segregated schools in 1942 compared to 4 percent in 1995 (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Jean Twenge (1997b) found that beliefs about women's social roles had become less stereotyped between 1970 and 1995, and Alan Yang (1997) found that attitudes toward lesbians and gay men had become less negative between 1973 and 1996.

But is America truly becoming less prejudiced? Or, as the quotation opening this chapter suggests, has there been less change than appears to be the case, with prejudice becoming less direct and more subtle in recent years compared to the overt and blatant prejudice of the past? This chapter addresses that question. First, we briefly look at some evidence suggesting that prejudice continues to operate despite its apparent decline. We then examine some theories that have been developed to explain this contemporary form of prejudice. We conclude by considering whether prejudice can take the form of positive beliefs; that is, whether positive stereotypes as well as negative stereotypes can reflect a prejudiced mind-set.

Before doing so, however, we would like to make three points. The first is that most of the theories of contemporary prejudice that we discuss were specifically developed to explain anti-Black prejudice on the part of White people. Although




**FIGURE 6.1** Change in Stereotypes of African Americans over Time

The valence (positivity versus negativity) of U.S. college students' personal stereotypes of African Americans has become less negative over time.

SOURCE: Adapted from Devine and Elliot (1995, Table 2, p. 1145).

a few of the theories have been extended beyond racial or ethnic prejudice, as far as we have been able to determine few have been applied to prejudices exhibited by members of minority groups. The second point is related to the first. From time to time in this chapter, we use the word *people* to refer to White people. This may make it seem as though this chapter were written for White people about White people. That is not our intention. The occasional use of the terms White and people interchangeably in this chapter reflects the focus of the theories and a desire to avoid what would otherwise be awkwardly worded sentences. Because some of the concepts in this chapter are difficult, we want to make it as readable as possible.

The third point concerns an assumption underlying the theories. The theories assume that, because of the historical legacy of racism in American society, all or almost all White people are prejudiced to some degree. This assumption is clearly pessimistic concerning the possibility of eliminating prejudice. However, as Stephen Phillips and Robert Ziller (1997) have noted, theorists and researchers have historically focused on the nature of prejudice and prejudiced people rather than on the nature of unprejudiced people. As a result, prejudice may appear to be more common than it actually is. As we will see later in this chapter, Phillips and Ziller (1997) and others (for example, Livingston & Drwecki, 2007) have conducted research that indicates that not all White Americans are prejudiced. Also, Chapter 14 will discuss a number of interventions that are effective in reducing prejudice. The bottom line is, despite whatever the situation may appear to be from the perspective of



theories of contemporary prejudice, there are people who are accepting of diversity and those who work to be less biased can indeed change their attitudes.

## THE TRANSFORMATION OF PREJUDICE

Several lines of evidence suggest that prejudice continues to be alive and well in United States, only in a subtle rather than overt form. In this section, we will review some of that evidence and then consider why prejudice has, so to speak, gone underground.

### Prejudice Continues ...

One source of evidence of continuing prejudice comes from the results of research using a technique called the bogus pipeline (Roese & Jamieson, 1993). In **bogus pipeline research**, participants answer questions while their physiological responses are measured by what they believe to be an effective lie detector. The researchers then compare these responses to the participants' earlier responses to the same questions. The theory underlying the technique is that people do not want to be caught lying and so reveal their true attitudes rather than attitudes that are contaminated by social desirability response bias (see Chapter 2). The technique is called the bogus pipeline because, although it is designed to provide a pipeline to participants' true attitudes, the lie detector is bogus: it provides no information at all. Research has consistently found that people express more prejudice under bogus pipeline conditions than when they believe that the truthfulness of their responses cannot be checked (Roese & Jamieson, 1993).

Other evidence comes from physiological and implicit cognition measures of prejudice. As we saw in Chapter 2, some White people whose self-report data indicate low levels of prejudice nonetheless exhibit physiological responses indicative of negative emotions when they interact with African Americans or see pictures of African Americans (see, for example, Guglielmi, 1999). Similarly, some people categorized as low on prejudice by self-report measures unconsciously associate members of minority groups with negative concepts (see, for example, Fazio & Olson, 2003).

Assessments of behavior also indicate that prejudice continues. For example, Ute Gabriel and Ranier Banse (2006) had research assistants make telephone calls to randomly selected people, telling the person who answered the phone that they urgently needed to contact their boyfriend or girlfriend and apologizing for calling the wrong number. The callers said they were at a public telephone and had used the last of their phone cad minutes to make the call. They then asked the person to call their friend and give him or her that number. Both the male and female research assistants asked the person they reached to call either their boyfriend or girlfriend. Thus, half the people called thought they were talking to a lesbian or gay man and half thought they were talking to a heterosexual man or woman. Gabriel and Banse found that 84 percent of the people who thought the call came from a heterosexual person passed on the message compared with 67 percent of those who thought the call came from a lesbian or gay man.

Self-reports of behavior indicate that it is close contact with members of minority groups that White people most want to avoid. Donal Muir (1991) surveyed White students at a predominantly White college about their racial attitudes and willingness to interact with Black students. Most of the students said they were willing to interact with Black students in public settings. For example, 92 percent said they would sit next to a Black student in class and 84 percent said that they would eat at the same table as a Black student. The responses for interactions in more intimate settings were different: only 42 percent of the White students said they would be willing to have a Black roommate and only 12 percent said they would be willing to date a Black student. At the same time, these students reported holding positive attitudes toward African Americans: only 15 percent endorsed negative stereotypes of Blacks, 93 percent said Blacks and Whites should be treated equally, and 86 percent said there should not be legal restrictions to keep Blacks and Whites from mixing socially.

Finally, evidence for the continuation of prejudice comes from the day-to-day experience of women and members of minority groups. For example, in the CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll in which 74 percent of White respondents said that discrimination against Black people was not a problem, only 39 percent of Black people agreed. These results suggest that White people do not perceive the discrimination that members of minority groups believe exists. In other research, Janet Swim and her colleagues (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003) had female and Black college students keep records of the sexist and racist behaviors they experienced or directly observed during a two-week period. Overall, 78 percent of the women and 65 percent of the Black students reported at least one incident, with the women reporting an average of about two incidents per week and the Black students reporting an average of about one incident every other week. As shown in Table 6.1, the incidents reported by women included gender-role stereotyping, demeaning comments, and sexual objectification; Black students reported

**TABLE 6.1 Percentage of Women and African Americans Reporting Having Observed Sexist or Racist Behavior during Two-Week Periods**

| Type of Behavior                    | Examples                                            | Percent Reporting |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Sexist Behaviors<sup>a</sup></b> |                                                     |                   |
| Gender-role stereotyping            | Expressions of a double standard for men and women  | 36                |
| Demeaning comments                  | Referring to a woman as "bitch" or "chick"          | 31                |
| Sexual objectification              | Staring at breasts, unwanted touches                | 25                |
| <b>Racist Behaviors<sup>b</sup></b> |                                                     |                   |
| Nonverbal behavior                  | Hostile stares, being watched closely in stores     | 36                |
| Verbal expressions                  | Racial slurs, prejudiced jokes                      | 24                |
| Bad service                         | Whites who arrived later seated first in restaurant | 18                |
| Interpersonal offense               | Rude behavior, avoiding contact                     | 15                |

<sup>a</sup>Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson (2001).

<sup>b</sup>Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma (2003).

hostile nonverbal behaviors, verbal expression of prejudice, receiving poor service in stores and restaurants, and various negative interpersonal behaviors, such as rudeness and White people trying to avoid them.

### ... But Only Bad People Are Prejudiced ...

Why does this apparent contradiction between people's nonprejudiced responses to questions about race, gender, and sexual orientation and their sometimes prejudiced everyday behavior exist? Two social processes seem to be at work. One is the change in American racial attitudes that has occurred since World War II (Schuman et al., 1997; Takaki, 1993). Prior to the war, prejudice by the White majority against members of other groups was the social norm. In the domain of race, the prejudice of this era is often referred to as **Jim Crow racism** and had three major components (Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000). One was Whites' acceptance as absolute truth the belief that Whites were inherently superior to other races (and that men were inherently superior to women and that Christians were morally superior to adherents of other religions). A second component was a firm belief in the rightness of keeping minorities at a distance through racial segregation; "blacks were supposed to 'stay in their place,' separate and subordinate to whites" (Sears et al., 2000, p. 9). The third component was the use of laws and the power of government to establish racially segregated school systems and other forms of discrimination, such as curtailment of voting rights. White people who were not prejudiced were looked on as somewhat strange; to call someone a "nigger lover" was intended as an insult. See Box 6.1 for more about Jim Crow racism.

World War II brought with it the beginnings of a change in those norms, especially in regard to race. As part of its domestic propaganda effort to rally support for the war against Nazi Germany, the U.S. government portrayed the Nazi racist ideology as dangerous and un-American, and the concept of racism as un-American came to be applied to the United States itself. For example, Republican presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie said, "It is becoming increasingly apparent to thoughtful Americans that we cannot fight the forces of imperialism abroad and maintain a form of imperialism at home.... Our very proclamations of what we are fighting for have rendered our own inequities self-evident. When we talk of freedom of opportunity for all nations, the mocking paradoxes in our own society become so clear that they can no longer be ignored" (quoted in Takaki, 1993, p. 374).

In the first two decades following the war, a number of events occurred that carried the message that racial prejudice was no longer an acceptable American value. In the immediate postwar years, President Harry Truman ordered the desegregation of the armed forces and proposed legislation (that was not enacted) to ensure voting rights and equal employment opportunity for members of minority groups (Schuman et al., 1997). The anticommunist Cold War raised the same issue as Wilkie did during World War II: How could the United States criticize communist governments for violating the civil liberties of their citizens while not granting full equality to all U.S. citizens? For America to be able to influence other nations, its behavior had to be more consistent with its espoused values (Schuman, 2000). Racial equality was formally established as an American

## Box 6.1 Who Was Jim Crow?

Jim Crow was a Black character created by the White minstrel show performer Thomas Rice in 1828. Wearing makeup that parodied African facial features, Rice portrayed the stereotypic Black man of the time: a lazy, somewhat stupid, shiftless but happy-go-lucky person who spoke in an odd dialect and enjoyed singing and dancing (Wormser, 2003). To “protect” White people from such “degenerate” Black people, states passed laws that restricted the freedom of Blacks and other minority groups. Because of the fame of Rice’s “Jim Crow” character, Jim Crow became a symbol of the ultra-stereotypic Black person. The laws passed to control and demean Black people then became known as *Jim Crow laws*, which were prevalent in the United States until the 1960s. The racism represented by those laws and the White attitudes underlying them came to be known as *Jim Crow racism*.

What were these laws like? The first Jim Crow laws were enacted in the North prior to the Civil War:

Blacks ... were prohibited from voting in all but five New England states. Schools and public accommodations were segregated. Illinois and Oregon barred blacks from entering the state. Blacks in every Northern city were restricted to ghettos in the most unsanitary and run-down areas and forced to take menial jobs that white men rejected. White supremacy was as much a part of ... the North as it was [of] the South. (Wormser, 2003, p. xi)

Although Southern states had laws restricting the freedoms of free Black people prior to the Civil War,

the most severe laws were enacted after the end of the Reconstruction period when the pre-Civil War White upper class regained political power:

As punitive and prejudicial as JimCrow laws were in the North, they never reached the intensity of oppression... that they did in the South. A black person could not swim in the same pool, sit in the same public park, bowl, play pool or, in some states, checkers, drink from the same water fountain or use the same bathroom, marry, be treated in the same hospital, use the same schoolbooks, play baseball with, ride in the same taxicab, sit in the same section of a bus or train, be admitted to any private or public institution, teach in the same school, read in the same library, attend the same theater, or sit in the same area with a white person. Blacks had to address white people as Mr. [or] Mrs.... while they, in turn, were called by their first names, or by terms used to indicate social inferiority [such as] “boy”.... Black people, if allowed in a store patronized by whites, had to wait until all the white customers were served first. If they attended a movie, they had to sit in the balcony.... They had to give way to whites on a sidewalk, remove their hats as a sign of respect when encountering whites, and enter a white person’s house by the back door.... And while the degree of these restrictions often varied from state to state and county to county, white supremacy was the law of the South, and the slightest transgression could be punished by death. (Wormser, 2003, pp. xi–xii)

norm by the 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* that made segregated schools illegal and by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

As these new norms diffused through society and especially as children grew up in a culture that promoted those norms, racism changed from being normal to being bad and racists began to be seen as bad people. Most White Americans came to see themselves as unprejudiced and to define prejudice and racism in terms of extreme behavior such as that associated with the Ku Klux Klan and to view racists as ignorant, crude, hostile, and generally undesirable (Sommers & Norton, 2006).

## ... So “They” Should Stop Complaining

Although a norm of equality has been developing in the United States, it is difficult, if not impossible, to extinguish a cultural legacy of 400 years of racism in only a few

decades (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981). This situation provides the basis for the second social process that contributes to the contradiction between people's nonprejudiced responses to survey questions and their sometimes prejudiced everyday behaviors: learning prejudiced beliefs through socialization. As we saw in Chapter 3, negative racial stereotypes still exist in American culture and Americans still absorb the negative emotions associated with those stereotypes. These negative emotions form part of what are called **implicit prejudices**, prejudices that can be assessed through implicit cognition and some behavioral measures (see Chapter 2), but which people are not aware of having. Despite this lack of conscious awareness, these prejudices affect White people's emotional responses to and behavior toward minority groups (for example, Hofman, Gawroski, Gschwinder, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007). In contrast to old-fashioned prejudice that is reflected in beliefs such as the biological superiority of Whites, support for racial segregation, and opposition to interracial marriage, this new form of prejudice is reflected in beliefs such as that discrimination no longer exists because laws have dealt with the problem and that members of minority groups should stop complaining and just get on with life; if they cannot achieve as much as Whites, that is their problem, not Whites' (McConahay et al., 1981).

As the political advisor quoted at the beginning of the chapter noted, the nature of prejudice has changed from being, in the words of Thomas Pettigrew and Roel Meertens (1995), "hot, close and direct" to being more "cool, distant and indirect" (p. 57). The next section describes some theories that address the nature of this new form of prejudice.

### Theories of Contemporary Prejudice

Although, as we will see, there are several theories of this new form of prejudice, they share three propositions. One is that there has been a genuine change in America's social norms since World War II in the direction of belief in the principle of equality for all people. A second proposition is that not everyone has accepted this norm to the same degree. For example, the norm seems to have taken root first among more highly educated and more politically liberal people and to be gradually dispersing through society (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997). In addition, it seems to be more influential in younger generations than older generations (Schuman et al., 1997). The third proposition is that even those people who have not yet fully accepted the norm are motivated to act in nonprejudiced ways. This motivation exists because these people do accept the norm to some degree and so do not want to think of themselves as being prejudiced and because they know that other people would disapprove of prejudiced behavior on their part (for example, Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998).

As a result, White people who hold contemporary prejudices express those prejudices in ways that can be justified on unprejudiced grounds. In the domain of race, such prejudice could be expressed in such ways as explaining a vote against a Black political candidate not on the grounds that she is Black, but because she is too liberal, and explaining opposition to programs that benefit

members of minority groups (such as affirmative action) not as a way to keep minorities down but because such programs violate the American principle of equal treatment for all people. These types of attitudes and behaviors are not necessarily conscious attempts at making oneself look good to others while secretly opposing equality. Rather, they may represent a genuine acceptance of the principle of equality and rejection of traditional prejudice coupled with residual effects of old-fashioned prejudices that have been learned while growing up in an essentially prejudiced society (for example, Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Sears & Henry, 2005).

In the following sections, we describe three theories of contemporary prejudice: the theories of modern-symbolic prejudice, aversive prejudice, and racial ambivalence. Although most of these theories are labeled as theories of racism (such as *symbolic racism*), for the most part we will use the term *prejudice* to describe them because many of their principles also apply to other forms of prejudice, such as prejudice based on gender (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995) and sexual orientation (Morrison & Morrison, 2002). However, most of our examples deal with racial prejudice because the theories were originally developed to address that issue and most of the research inspired by these theories has focused on race.

## MODERN-SYMBOLIC PREJUDICE

In the early 1970s, public opinion researchers noticed what appeared to be a contradiction between White Americans' endorsement of racial equality and their support for government interventions that would enforce equality. For example, as shown in Figure 6.2, White Americans expressed high levels of support for the principles of school integration, equal employment opportunity, and open housing. However, fewer than half the people surveyed supported government programs designed to put those principles into practice. Findings such as these led David Sears and John McConahay to independently develop the concept originally called symbolic racism (Sears & McConahay, 1973).

**Symbolic racism** is a set of beliefs about Black people as an abstract group (as in the anonymous "they" in "if they would only ...") rather than as specific individuals. These beliefs portray Black people as morally inferior to White people because Black people supposedly violate traditional (White) American values such as hard work and self-reliance. These beliefs are expressed behaviorally as "acts (voting against black candidates, opposing affirmative action programs, opposing desegregation in housing and education) that are justified (or rationalized) on a nonracial basis but that operate to maintain the racial status quo with its attendant discrimination" (McConahay & Hough, 1976, p. 24). Symbolic racism stands in contrast to **old-fashioned racism**, which is based on belief in the biological inferiority of Black people and the attendant stereotypes of low intelligence, laziness, and so forth; informal discrimination in the form of exclusion from certain jobs and segregated housing and social clubs; and legalized, formal discrimination in the form of racially separate schools and denial of voting rights. Symbolic racism theorists believe that social change has led most White




**FIGURE 6.2** Inconsistency of White Opinion on Racial Issues in the Early 1970s

Although Whites generally supported various aspects of racial equality as general principles, they also generally opposed government intervention to enforce those principles.

SOURCE: Adapted from Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan (1997).

Americans to reject most aspects of old-fashioned racism. However, because symbolic racism is not linked directly to race, but (as we will see) is linked indirectly to race through political and social issues, most White Americans do not see symbolic racist beliefs as prejudice (McConahay et al., 1981).

Although the concept was originally named symbolic racism, McConahay changed the name to **modern racism** “to emphasize the contemporary, post-civil-rights-movement nature of the tenets constituting the new ideology or belief system. The change also reflected the realization that both the new racism and the old-fashioned racism are symbolic in the sense that both are group-level abstractions rooted in early racial socialization and not in personal experience” (McConahay, 1986, p. 96). Other researchers also have taken the concept of symbolic or modern racism and given it different names, such as racial resentment and laissez-faire racism. Despite these differences, all are measured in much the same way and so represent essentially the same concept (Kinder & Mendelberg, 2000); Box 6.2 discusses some of the reasons behind this multiplicity of names. We will use the term *modern-symbolic prejudice* to emphasize that these concepts are essentially identical.

## Box 6.2 What's in a Name?

We noted in the text that the terms *symbolic racism*, *modern racism*, *racial resentment*, and *laissez-faire racism* all represent essentially the same concept. Why, then, does that concept have so many names? In a workshop he presented as part of the 2003 meeting of the American Psychological Association, statistician Bruce Thompson only half-jokingly remarked that statisticians give the same statistical concept different names to make students think statistics is more difficult than it really is. Although one might be tempted to believe that the same principle is at work among theorists, those who work with the modern racism concept have used different terms because each has wanted to emphasize a different aspect of it.

David Sears and John McConahay (1973) originally chose the term *symbolic racism* to indicate that it was rooted in abstractions, such as cultural stereotypes of Blacks and cultural values, rather than in White people's direct experiences with Black people. As Sears and P. J. Henry (2003) wrote, "the term *symbolic* highlights both symbolic racism's targeting Blacks as an abstract collectivity rather than specific Black individuals and its presumed roots in abstract moral values rather than concrete

self-interest or personal experience" (p. 260).

McConahay renamed the concept *modern racism* "to emphasize the contemporary, post-civil rights movement nature of the beliefs and issues. Modern racism is indeed symbolic, but old-fashioned racism had its symbolic aspects as well—for example, beliefs and stereotypes rooted in socialization and not in personal experience" (McConahay et al., 1981, p. 565n).

Because some people misinterpreted symbolic racism as simply a cover for old-fashioned racism rather than a new form of prejudice, Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders (1996) chose the term *racial resentment* to emphasize that contemporary racial attitudes are rooted in genuinely felt resentment over Black people's perceived violation of traditional values. Most recently, Lawrence Bobo, James Kluegel, and Ryan Smith (1997) coined the term *laissez-faire racism* to emphasize that modern racism's opposition to government programs designed to increase equality has the effect of keeping race relations essentially the way they were under old-fashioned racism, with Whites as the dominant group. (*Laissez-faire* is a French term that essentially means "let people do what they want" or "let events take their own course.")

## Characteristics of Modern-Symbolic Prejudice

The belief system of modern-symbolic prejudice is characterized by five themes that justify opposition to social policies designed to promote intergroup equality while still endorsing equality as an abstract principle (Sears & Henry, 2005):

- *Racial prejudice and discrimination no longer exist*, or are so rare as to no longer be major barriers to the success and prosperity of African Americans. For example, people with modern-symbolic prejudice hold that civil rights legislation has eliminated discrimination. They view their own opposition to racially related policy issues such as affirmative action as being based on nonracial grounds such as fairness and therefore as not being a form of prejudice.
- *Any remaining Black-White differences in economic outcomes result from Black people's lack of motivation to work hard*. Modern-symbolic prejudice is indicated by agreement with survey items such as "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors" (Sears & Henry, 2003, p. 275). Thus, inequality is attributed to characteristics of its victims rather than continued prejudice and discrimination.



- *Because Black people are unwilling to work to get what they want, their continuing anger over inequality is unjustified.* This theme derives from the first two: If discrimination no longer hinders African Americans and if they do not want to work to get ahead, they should stop complaining about inequality.
- *Rather than working to get ahead, Black people seek special favors from the government and corporations and are demanding too much from them.* Modern-symbolic prejudice portrays policies designed to guarantee equality, such as open housing laws, and policies designed to remedy past discrimination, such as affirmative action, as special favors that minorities could do without if they would only work hard enough.
- *Relative to White people, Black people have been getting more than they deserve economically* because government and private agencies have given in to demands for special favors. Modern-symbolic prejudice portrays life as a game in which the gains of minority groups must come at the expense of White people; win-win situations are seen as impossible. Thus, modern-symbolic prejudice views White people as being unfairly deprived of jobs, admission to selective colleges, and so forth, so that those resources can be given to members of minority groups who did not earn them.

For an example of how these themes emerge in White people's analyses of their own racial attitudes and how they are absent from Black people's self-analyses of their racial attitudes, see Box 6.3.

### Psychological Bases of Modern-Symbolic Prejudice

The theory underlying modern-symbolic prejudice proposes that the themes described above reflect a particular set of interrelated emotions and beliefs (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears & Henry, 2005). The first of these factors is mild to moderate anti-Black emotions. Although people with modern-symbolic prejudice genuinely support the principle of racial equality, they nonetheless feel some degree of negative emotion toward African Americans. These emotions are not the strong feelings of hostility experienced by old-fashioned racists, but less intense emotions such as anxiety, dislike, and resentment. Furthermore, unlike the explicit emotions expressed by old-fashioned racists, these emotions are often implicit, so that people may not be consciously aware of them.

People acquire these negative emotions and associated negative stereotypes through socialization. **Socialization** is the process of learning one's culture in childhood by being directly taught what things are important and by observing and imitating adults' behaviors and attitudes. Much of this process usually occurs without conscious awareness, thus facilitating the development of implicit attitudes (for example, Katz, 2003). As David Sears and his colleagues (Sears, van Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman, 1997) noted, "For several centuries white Americans have grown up in a socializing culture marked by widespread negative attitudes toward African Americans, a socializing culture that seems unlikely to have been abruptly overturned within the relatively few years since the end of Jim Crow" (p. 18). The effect of this type of socialization is shown by the results of survey

**Box 6.3 Modern-Symbolic Prejudice in People's Own Words**

Modern-symbolic prejudice may seem like a rather abstract concept, but it is one that people put into practice on a regular basis. Margo Monteith and Vincent Spicer (2000) asked White and Black college students to write essays about their attitudes toward the other race. As one would expect from the theory of modern-symbolic prejudice, the White students who expressed negative attitudes toward Blacks tended to write about Black people as a group in abstract, symbolic terms, rather than in terms of personal experience, as in this combination of two examples:

I have generally negative attitudes toward Blacks because I feel they follow the "give an inch, take a mile" cliché. Whites have attempted to integrate our society since the Civil War. [a] Although it has been a slow progress, it is to a point now where the civil rights are not really an issue. [b] The problem is, black people are not satisfied with this. They want 50% of everything from corporate positions to baseball coaches. [c] Our society does not work that way, however. People attain jobs or positions because of qualifications and not race now. I believe if you go to school and study, and have goals, you can achieve anything. If [unemployed Black people] wanted a job, they could get one, without blaming their failures on other races. Secondly, I feel that blacks are very guilty of "reverse discrimination." "Black" fraternities, and the "Black" Entertainment Television channel, and the "Black" student union are examples. If that is not segregation and discrimination, I don't know what is.... [a] I just think that blacks hold a tremendous

chip on their shoulder for no reason. Slavery is over, and civil rights give them every right and freedom [d] (often more opportunities) than Whites. For example, minority scholarships. (pp. 139–140)

Notice how the essay includes some of the defining elements of modern-symbolic prejudice, such as (a) denial of discrimination, (b) Blacks' making unreasonable demands, (c) appeal to traditional American values, and (d) Black people's gains coming at the expense of Whites.

In contrast, Black students who held negative attitudes toward Whites tended to write in concrete terms based on personal experience, as in this example:

I have generally negative attitudes toward Whites because of my experiences with them as a whole. When I was 10 years old my family moved from ... an African American neighborhood to a mixed one. The Black kids and White kids would play together, but at school they segregated themselves. I was placed in a high level English class with all the White children. My English teacher, who was White, would give me this stupid grin whenever the subject of race would come up.... I heard many comments from my classmates of how stupid, ugly, or inhuman we appeared to them. Any White friend I made would quickly turn against me because their friends or parents didn't approve of me. In high school my best friend was White until I heard her use the "N" word when she described her Black math teacher. I will never fully trust them. (p. 141)

research. For example, in 1994, there was virtually no difference in opinion between people born prior to 1936 (and so fully socialized in the culture of old-fashioned racism) and those born after 1962 (and so having grown up in a culture that rejected old-fashioned racism and promoted racial equality) on the extent to which lack of Black success was due to low motivation and not to discrimination (Schuman et al., 1997). Thus, despite an increasing acceptance of racial equality, some racist beliefs persist.

Two lines of research support the role of anti-Black affect in modern-symbolic prejudice. The first is that scores on measures of modern-symbolic prejudice are correlated with scores on measures of anti-Black affect, indicating that anti-Black affect is involved in modern-symbolic prejudice. The second line of research is the analysis of historical trends in survey data that shows that although White people's attitudes toward the abstract principle of racial equality have

become more positive since World War II (as shown by increased support for equal opportunity in housing, education, and employment), their feelings toward Black people have remained essentially unchanged (Schuman et al., 1997). For example, on a 100-point scale, on which higher scores indicate more positive emotion, Whites' feelings toward Blacks averaged 60 in 1964 and 63 in 1996.

A second factor underlying modern-symbolic prejudice is *belief in traditional values*. People with modern-symbolic prejudice also strongly endorse traditional (White) American values such as hard work, individualism, self-reliance, self-restraint, and so forth. However, in modern-symbolic prejudice, these values have become, to use David Sears and P. J. Henry's (2003) term, *racialized*. That is, it is not simple agreement with the abstract values that is implicated in modern-symbolic prejudice. Rather, it is the perception that Black people fail to act in accordance with these values, such as by accepting public assistance, seeking government favors, and acting impulsively, that drive modern-symbolic prejudice. The fact that White people also accept public assistance, seek government favors, and act impulsively is not relevant to people with modern-symbolic prejudice; it is their perception (usually in stereotypic terms) of Black people's behavior they focus on. As Sears and Henry noted, "a White man high in symbolic racism might have only a moderate work ethic himself but might feel that Blacks have reprehensively poor work ethics, which are responsible for many of their problems" (p. 261).

A third factor involved in modern-symbolic prejudice is low *outcome-based egalitarianism*. **Egalitarianism** is a value system that reflects the belief that all people are equal and should be treated identically. An apparent paradox of modern-symbolic prejudice is that people with modern-symbolic prejudice endorse racial equality in principle but oppose policies, such as affirmative action, that could bring it about. Sears, Henry, and Kosterman (2000) suggested that this apparent paradox arises because the term *equality* has two somewhat different meanings. One meaning is *equality of opportunity*, the principle that everyone should have an equal, fair chance at success in life and that one function of government is ensuring such equality. People with modern-symbolic prejudice endorse this type of equality.

A second meaning of equality is *equality of outcome*, the belief that government should ensure that everyone, regardless of their personal resources, should receive an equal, or at least a reasonable, share of society's resources. This belief is reflected in support for programs such as government-subsidized health care, housing, child care, and so forth for people who cannot afford them. It is this meaning of equality that people with modern-symbolic prejudice reject. They believe that given equal opportunity, success should depend on individuals' talents and effort; people whose talents and effort are equal will have equal outcomes. Therefore, government should not intervene to ensure equality of outcome despite differences in talent and effort; such intervention would be a violation of traditional values and a violation of equality of opportunity. Thus, as was shown in Figure 6.2, people can simultaneously endorse equality of opportunity and reject government intervention to bring about equality of outcome.

A fourth factor implicated in modern-symbolic prejudice is *group self-interest*. The concept of group self-interest reflects the idea that people try to promote the interests of the social groups that are important to them and respond negatively to perceived threats to group welfare. This idea is similar to the concept of relative

deprivation that we will discuss in Chapter 9. In the context of modern-symbolic prejudice, group self-interest is shown in the belief that social programs designed to benefit minority groups will unfairly deprive White people as a group of opportunities for jobs, for advancement at work, for education, and so forth. John McConahay and Joseph Hough (1976) noted that “symbolic racism is very much a reaction to the civil rights movement, especially the Northern phase of that movement” (p. 237) that saw the introduction of affirmative action programs.

Finally, people with modern-symbolic prejudice have *little personal knowledge of Black people*. Although racial segregation has decreased in the United States, most White people still live in all-White or predominantly White neighborhoods and most interracial contact occurs in relatively structured settings such as work or school (for example, Bonilla-Silva, 2003). Consequently, most White people have little opportunity to get to know Black people as individuals, so the stereotypes that support modern-symbolic prejudice continue to endure.

### Historical Roots of Modern-Symbolic Prejudice

Lawrence Bobo, James Kluegel, and Ryan Smith (1997) add a historical perspective to the origins of modern-symbolic prejudice, tracing its roots to the end of the Civil War. They note that old-fashioned or Jim Crow racism functioned to keep Black people, especially those living in the southern United States, in a state of social and economic oppression not substantially different from that which existed when they had been slaves. However, as cultural trends turned away from old-fashioned racism and the social power of Black Americans increased, Jim Crow racism was replaced by what Bobo and colleagues call *laissez-faire racism* (see Box 6.2).

In Bobo and colleagues’ analysis, *laissez-faire racism* frames the cause of Black-White differences in economic success in terms of differences in culture and values rather than in old-fashioned racism’s terms of innate, biologically based differences in ability. Yet, *laissez-faire racism* (or modern-symbolic prejudice) serves the same sociological purpose as old-fashioned prejudice: Modern-symbolic prejudice “legitimizes persistent black oppression in the United States, but now in a manner more appropriate to a modern, nationwide, postindustrial free labor economy and [political system]. In effect, a significant segment of white America effectively condones as much black disadvantage and segregation as ... modern-day free-market forces and informal social mechanisms can reproduce or even exacerbate” (Bobo et al., 1997, pp. 21–22). In this view, modern-symbolic prejudice is motivated by a desire (although not necessarily a conscious one) on the part of many White Americans to retain and justify their traditional privileged position in society and the attendant access to the lion’s share of societal resources (such as jobs, educational opportunities, and political power) that they see as threatened by Black economic gain. In Chapter 7, we will examine a more general approach to this attitude called *social dominance orientation*.

### Modern-Symbolic Prejudice and Behavior

When it comes to dealing with Black people, White people who experience modern-symbolic prejudice are in a bind. On the one hand, their anti-Black

emotions, their resentment over Black peoples' perceived violation of traditional values and the principle that outcomes should result from merit, and their desire to protect White privilege should lead them to behave in ways detrimental to Blacks. On the other hand, people with modern-symbolic prejudice genuinely endorse equality as an abstract principle and so are motivated not to act in ways that could be called prejudiced. In doing so, they hope both to maintain their self-images as unprejudiced people and to appear unprejudiced to others. The solution to this dilemma is to act in ways that are detrimental to Black people only in situations in which the behavior can be attributed to nonracial causes (McConahay, 1983). Thus, White people with modern-symbolic prejudice say they oppose affirmative action programs not because they oppose racial equality but because such programs violate the principle of equal opportunity and give an unfair advantage to members of minority groups (for example, Sears, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000).

White people with modern-symbolic prejudice also tend to discriminate against Black people when the discrimination can be justified on nonracial grounds. For example, Arthur Brief and his colleagues (Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000) had college students who had completed a measure of modern-symbolic prejudice earlier in the semester evaluate the résumés of 10 job applicants and recommend three for interviews. Of the 10 applicants, three were qualified Blacks, two were qualified Whites, and five were unqualified Whites. The students were also given a copy of a memorandum from the president of the company. For half the students, the memorandum made no mention of race; in the other version of the memorandum, the president wrote that "I feel that it is important that you do not hire anyone who is a member of a minority group" because the person hired would be dealing with coworkers and customers who were White (Brief et al., 2000, p. 80). When no justification had been given for not hiring a Black candidate, students high and low in modern-symbolic prejudice recommended Black candidates at the same rate, 61 percent. However, when discrimination was justified by a business reason given by the company president, 37 percent of the students low in modern-symbolic prejudice recommended a Black applicant compared to 18 percent of the students high in modern-symbolic prejudice. (Note, however, that even students low in modern-symbolic prejudice gave in to pressure from the president, although not to the degree shown by those high in modern-symbolic prejudice.) If Brief and colleagues' research seems too artificial, see Box 6.4 for a real-life example of this process.

### Concluding Comments

By now the theory of modern-symbolic prejudice might seem overwhelming, so Figure 6.3 provides a diagram that ties the pieces together. Modern-symbolic prejudice is rooted in the tension between the genuine belief in racial equality in terms of equal opportunity that has become the American norm since World War II and other emotional and cognitive factors that include implicit anti-Black affect, racialized traditional values, low belief in equality of outcome without equality of effort and ability, group self-interest, and little personal knowledge (as opposed to stereotypic beliefs) about Black people. Modern-symbolic prejudice is reflected in denial of continuing discrimination, the belief that Black people

### Box 6.4 Modern-Symbolic Prejudice at Work

Modern-symbolic prejudice tends to operate in subtle ways and be superficially justifiable, as in the story recounted by a business executive:

I was interviewing a bunch of people for a certain position [at our workplace]. We had a black guy come in who was a supervisor of a division of our type. I ended up hiring an Asian American. Basically, I was weighing in my mind, this [black] guy was really well qualified. But I was also weighing in my mind, well, how would he interact with the people within the group. He was going to be in somewhat of a supervisory role. I was weighing in my mind how people would react to him because he was black. The dilemma was

solved for me because I was sitting at home trying to think who would I really like for this position. I said I'd like somebody like this Asian American fellow. (Feagin & Vera, 1995, p. 157).

Notice two characteristics of modern-symbolic prejudice that come out in this story. One is a justification for not hiring the Black applicant that is unrelated to the executive's own racial attitudes: The applicant would not make a good supervisor for this group because, presumably, the people working for him would not accept him. Another is that the executive can maintain his own (and his company's) image as nonprejudiced: After all, he did hire a member of a minority group.

should work harder to achieve success, and the beliefs that claims of continued inequality are unjustified and that Blacks are demanding special favors and receiving undeserved outcomes. Modern-symbolic prejudice is manifested in opposition to equality-enhancing social programs such as affirmative action and individual discrimination when discrimination can be explained in nonracial terms. Although the theory does not address institutional discrimination, the expression of modern-symbolic prejudice by individuals in organizations, as illustrated by the story related in Box 6.4, probably results in institutional discrimination as well. The net result is continuing racial inequality.

## AVERSIVE PREJUDICE

Psychoanalyst Joel Kovel (1970) coined the term **aversive racism (or prejudice)** to describe the attitudes of a person who “tries to ignore the existence of black people, tries to avoid contact with them, and at most to be polite, correct, and cold in whatever dealings are necessary between the races” (p. 54). In the 1980s, John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner (2004) began to systematically explore the nature and effects of aversive prejudice.

### Characteristics of Aversive Prejudice

Aversive prejudice is similar to modern-symbolic prejudice in that people who experience it truly believe in equality but nonetheless retain implicit negative feelings toward minority groups. As in modern-symbolic prejudice, these negative feelings are usually low key, involving such emotions as discomfort and uneasiness rather than hostility or hatred. As does the theory of modern-symbolic prejudice, the theory of aversive prejudice postulates that White people absorb implicit negative attitudes toward minority groups while they are growing up;




**FIGURE 6.3** Model of Modern-Symbolic Prejudice

Modern-symbolic prejudice is rooted in the tension between belief in equal opportunity and other emotional and cognitive factors that include implicit anti-Black affect, racialized traditional values, low belief in equality of outcome without equality of effort and ability, group self-interest, and little personalized knowledge of Black people. Modern-symbolic prejudice is reflected in denial of continuing discrimination, the belief that Blacks should work harder, and beliefs that claims of continued inequality are unjustified, that Blacks are demanding special favors and receiving undeserved outcomes. Modern-symbolic prejudice is manifested in opposition to equality-enhancing social programs and individual and institutional discrimination when discrimination can be explained in nonracial terms. The net result is continuing racial inequality.

indeed, Dovidio and Gaertner (1991) believe that acquiring some degree of racial bias is unavoidable for White children growing up in American culture.

However, aversive prejudice differs from modern-symbolic prejudice in a number of ways (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). First, people who experience aversive prejudice generally reject the racialized traditional beliefs that support modern-symbolic prejudice and support equality-enhancing social programs such as affirmative action. Second, people who experience aversive prejudice are more strongly motivated to see themselves as unprejudiced and lack of prejudice is an important aspect of their self-concepts. Finally, despite their strong support for equality and strong motivation to avoid appearing prejudiced, White people experiencing aversive prejudice prefer to avoid most interracial contact because it arouses the negative affect they associate with minority groups.

Aversive prejudice is also reflected in behavior:

- “When interracial interaction is unavoidable, aversive racists experience anxiety and discomfort, and consequently they try to disengage from the interaction as quickly as possible” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, p. 7).
- However, because of their motivation to avoid appearing prejudiced, White people who experience aversive prejudice “strictly adhere to established rules and codes of behavior in the interracial situations they cannot avoid” (Dovidio &

Gaertner, 1998, p. 7). “Indeed, they may over-compensate ... by responding more favorably to blacks than to whites” (Gaertner et al., 1997, p. 169).

- Finally, the negative feelings experienced by White people with aversive prejudice “will get expressed, but in subtle, rationalizable ways that may ultimately disadvantage minorities or unfairly benefit the majority group” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, p. 7). In general, aversive prejudice theory tends to place more emphasis on the pro-White aspect of prejudice, a component that has been largely overlooked until recently in research and theory on prejudice (Gaertner et al., 1997).

### Psychological Bases of Aversive Prejudice

Dovidio and Gaertner (1998) propose three psychological underpinnings for aversive prejudice. The first is the human predisposition to cognitive categorization that we discussed in Chapter 3. This predisposition leads people to categorize people into discrete social groups and to contrast the groups to which they belong with other groups. This categorization, in turn, fosters bias because, as we discussed in Chapter 3, people tend to believe that their own groups are better than other groups. A second factor is motivational: People have a need to control their environments to ensure positive outcomes for themselves and their groups. “In a world of limited resources, one of the ways that people maintain their control or power is by resisting the progress of competing groups” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, p. 6). This motivation is much like the group self-interest factor in modern-symbolic prejudice, but it plays a less direct role in influencing behavior in the theory of aversive prejudice.

The most important psychological component in the theory of aversive prejudice is the socialization of two sets of incompatible values. On the one hand, the theory holds, every White person has been socialized to some extent in the racist traditions that have characterized American history. This socialization process results in implicit prejudice in the form of negative stereotypes and emotions being associated with minority groups. On the other hand, people who experience aversive prejudice have also been socialized to genuinely believe in the American ideals of racial fairness, justice, and equality. The conflict between these inconsistent values leads to conflicting feelings about racial issues and members of minority groups and to inconsistent behavior toward members of those groups: Sometimes people experiencing aversive prejudice will discriminate (reflecting their implicit negative feelings), sometimes not (reflecting their egalitarian beliefs).

It is the characteristics of the situation that determine which behavior aversive prejudice will produce. People experiencing aversive prejudice “will not discriminate in situations in which they recognize that discrimination would be obvious to others and themselves.... When people are presented with a situation in which [an egalitarian, nonprejudiced] response is clear, in which right and wrong is clearly defined, aversive racists will not discriminate.... [However,] discrimination will occur when appropriate (and thus inappropriate) behavior is not obvious or when an aversive racist can justify or rationalize a negative response on the basis of some factor other than race. Under these circumstances, aversive racists may



discriminate, but in a way that insulates them from ever having to believe that their behavior was racially motivated” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, p. 7).

### Research on Aversive Prejudice

This focus on the role of situational factors has led researchers who study aversive prejudice to take an approach to research different from that used by researchers working with other theories of prejudice. Most theories of prejudice attempt to identify the prejudiced person by measuring prejudice as a trait and to study prejudice by correlating scores on the prejudice measure with scores on measures of presumed causes of prejudice (such as racialized traditional values in the case of modern-symbolic prejudice) and with discriminatory behaviors. In contrast, Dovidio and Gaertner (1991) note that “the focus of our research has not been on who is biased—we assume that most people, because they are normal, have developed some racial biases.... Instead, our focus is on systematically identifying the situational conditions that will prime the egalitarian portion of an aversive racist’s attitude and reveal the contexts in which the negative feelings will be manifested” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991, p. 131).

One result of this approach to research is that the study of aversive prejudice focuses on interracial interaction, either actual or simulated, and so more on concrete situations in contrast to modern-symbolic prejudice’s focus on people’s responses to racial groups as abstract collectivities. That is, to a large extent, research on aversive prejudice takes a more personal approach to prejudice, examining, for example, a White person’s response to a specific Black person rather than to Black people in general. Another result is that because the theory emphasizes situational factors, there is no measure of aversive prejudice. Instead, the effects of aversive prejudice are inferred from the ways in which people respond to situations that are designed to arouse it.

### Aversive Prejudice and Behavior

The theory of aversive prejudice makes a number of rather specific predictions about behavior. The predicted behaviors include avoidance of intergroup contact, overly positive intergroup behavior when situational norms call for polite behavior, a pro-White bias in ambiguous situations, discrimination when the behavior can be justified as unprejudiced, and derogation of members of minority groups who hold higher status positions.

**Avoidance of Intergroup Contact.** One characteristic behavior of people experiencing aversive prejudice is avoiding contact with members of minority groups; this is especially true for close, personal contact. Recall the results of Muir’s (1991) study of White college students discussed earlier in this chapter. He found that while the vast majority of the students felt comfortable with distant interpersonal contact, such as sitting next to a Black student in a classroom or eating at the same table in the cafeteria, they were less certain about more personal contact. For example, fewer than half said they would be willing to have a Black

roommate and only about 10 percent said they would be willing to date a Black student. Results of national surveys lead to the same conclusion about close contact (Schuman et al., 1997): Although 90 percent of White Americans support open housing laws, 43 percent prefer to live in all- or predominantly White neighborhoods; although 87 percent oppose laws forbidding interracial marriage, only 50 percent say they approve of interracial marriage. Sometimes even relatively indirect contact can motivate avoidance; Box 6.5 describes some of the tactics Black home-owners have to use when selling to prevent potential White buyers from avoiding their homes.

The theory of aversive prejudice holds that this kind of avoidance is motivated by feelings of anxiety and discomfort. Several lines of research support this part of the theory. First, using physiological measures, Wendy Mendes and her colleagues (Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002) found that when interacting with a Black man, White research participants showed cardiovascular responses associated with feelings of threat that were absent when they interacted with a White man. However, the participants' self-reports indicated that they liked the Black man better than the White man. Taking a different approach, Tamara Towles-Schwen and Russell Fazio (2003) asked White college students to imagine themselves in situations of varying degrees of intimacy with either a Black person or someone whose race was not specified. Low-intimacy situations included those such as sitting at a library table with the other person; high-intimacy situations included those such as sharing a small dorm room with the other person. Towles-Schwen and Fazio found that their research participants were more willing to interact with a Black person in low intimacy situations than in high intimacy situations; they also found that the students said they

### **Box 6.5    The Effect of Aversive Prejudice on African Americans: "The Box"**

Aversive prejudice is characterized by a desire to avoid contact with members of other races. This example illustrates not only that even very remote contact can be aversive, but that the aversion also affects the lives of Black people in demeaning ways:

Some people simply call it "the box." It's usually a large cardboard box found hidden away in a walk-in closet or down in the basement next to the washing machine. It contains diplomas, artwork, books, music, and especially all the family photos—anything that can identify the family as black. If a black family living in a predominantly white neighborhood wants to sell their house, they are often advised by friends or their real estate agent to put everything identifiably black—any vestige of who they are—in the box. Otherwise, white people may not buy the house....

It happened to a Wall Street Journal editor, who, after his house was appraised significantly below market value, decided not only to replace all the family photos with those of his white secretary but asked her and her blond son to be in the house when a new appraiser came by. The strategy worked. Black families are also advised to clear out when prospective white buyers want to see the house. Too many times a white family will drive up to a house, see the black home owner working in the garden or garage, and quickly drive away.

The box is a very small part of the daily commerce between blacks and whites.... But as a metaphor for race relations it looms very large, because it shows the lengths to which whites will go to avoid intimate contact with anything black. (Steinhorn & Diggs-Brown, 1999, pp. 29–30)

would feel more comfortable with a Black person in a low intimacy situation. Finally, John Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami, and Samuel Gaertner (2002) found behavioral evidence of discomfort in a study in which White college students discussed a race-neutral topic with a Black partner. During the interaction, the White students gave off nonverbal cues, such as avoiding eye contact, that indicate anxiety and discomfort.

Where does this discomfort come from? Walter and Cookie Stephan's (2000) theory of intergroup anxiety (discussed in Chapter 5) proposes several sources: Negative stereotypes and prior negative experiences with members of the other group cause anxiety by leading people to anticipate a negative response from the person with whom they are interacting, and lack of knowledge about the other group makes people uncertain about how to behave in interracial situations. Another motive for avoidance and anxiety might be concern over stigma by association. Michelle Hebl and Laura Mannix (2003) found that a man sitting next to an overweight woman was rated more negatively than a man seated next to an average-weight woman. If people believe that others will think less of them for associating with a member of a negatively viewed group, they may try to avoid such associations and feel anxiety when anticipating and during interactions with a member of such a group.

In their study of White college students' comfort with interracial interactions, Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2003) also found that participants expressed a preference for interracial interactions in highly scripted situations. In highly scripted situations, the rules for interaction are clear and accepted by all participants; such situations reduce the likelihood of one person's making a social blunder and inadvertently offending the other person. It is in these kinds of situations that aversive prejudice motivates White people to adhere to social norms and to act in an unprejudiced manner during interactions with members of minority groups. For example, Dovidio (2001) conducted a study in which White research participants were divided into three groups: traditional prejudice (those who scored high on measures of both explicit and implicit prejudice; see Chapter 2), aversive prejudice (those who scored on low explicit prejudice but on high implicit prejudice), and unprejudiced (those who scored low on both measures). The participants then worked on a problem-solving task with a Black partner. As shown by the lighter bars in Figure 6.4, the participants in the unprejudiced and aversive prejudice groups tried to abide by the norm of the work situation and treat their partners in a friendly (that is, unprejudiced) manner; as would be expected, the participants in the traditional prejudice group made less effort to be friendly. However, as shown by the darker bars, the participants' Black partners perceived those exhibiting both aversive and traditional prejudice to be relatively unfriendly. Even though the aversive prejudice participants were trying to be friendly, their Black partners picked up on their nonverbal expressions of anxiety and interpreted them as indicating unfriendliness, perhaps because those cues contradicted the participants' nonverbal behavior. In contrast, the Black partners of the unprejudiced participants perceived them as friendly because their nonverbal behavior matched their verbal behavior.

**Overly Positive Intergroup Behavior.** The theory of aversive prejudice also holds that the desire to appear unprejudiced will lead people to overdo their




**FIGURE 6.4** Interracial Discomfort in Aversive Prejudice

White research participants who exhibited aversive prejudice (low explicit prejudice but high implicit prejudice) tried to act in a friendly manner, but were perceived to be less friendly because they gave off nonverbal cues indicative of nervousness. In contrast, participants who exhibited traditional prejudice (high on both explicit and implicit prejudice) did not try to act in a friendly manner and were perceived as less friendly and unprejudiced participants (low on both forms of prejudice) tried to act in a friendly manner and were perceived as friendly.

SOURCE: Adapted from Dovidio (2001, Table 1, p. 845).

efforts to appear unprejudiced and be unduly positive in their interactions with members of minority groups. An example of this effect appears in a study conducted by Kent Harber (1998). Harber had White students provide written feedback on a poorly written essay that they thought was composed by either a Black or White student. The participants were told that the writer would see the feedback, which, according to the theory of aversive prejudice, should cause the participants to try to be fair in their evaluations because they do not want to appear prejudiced to themselves, the person to whom they are giving feedback, or the experimenter. Because all participants read the same essay, a truly unbiased evaluation would result in the Black and White writers getting the same feedback. However, the Black writer got more positive feedback; their evaluators overcompensated for their aversive prejudice in trying to evaluate the essay fairly. Similarly, Jennifer Crosby and Benoît Monin (2007) found that White college students being trained as peer counselors were less willing to tell a Black student than a White student that a proposed course load was too difficult. In a follow-up study, they found that students placed in a similar situation were concerned

that they would appear prejudiced by implying that a Black student was not capable of handling a heavy academic workload.

**Pro-White Bias.** Although people experiencing aversive prejudice try to be unprejudiced when the situation presents a clearly unprejudiced response to choose, the theory also holds that they will show a pro-White bias in ambiguous situations, when the unprejudiced response is not clearly defined. For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) conducted a study in which White college students were asked to evaluate a candidate for a peer counselor job on the basis of a résumé and the transcript of an interview. The candidate was presented as being either Black or White; in some cases he was well qualified, in some cases he was poorly qualified, and in some cases the qualifications were ambiguous, with the person being well qualified in some ways but poorly qualified in other ways. As shown in Figure 6.5, when the candidate's qualifications were either clearly strong or clearly weak, the participants recommended the Black and White




**FIGURE 6.5** Pro-White Bias in Aversive Prejudice

When the candidate's qualifications were either clearly strong or clearly weak, Black and White applicants were recommended for hire at about the same rate. However, when the candidate's qualifications were ambiguous, the Black candidate was recommended for hire at about the rate that would be expected for an unbiased judgment, but the White candidate was recommended for hire more often than would be expected for an unbiased judgment.

SOURCE: Adapted from Dovidio and Gaertner (2000, Table 1, p. 317).

candidates at about the same rate. However, when the ambiguously qualified candidate was presented as White, he was recommended much more often than when he was presented as Black. The pro-White bias in these decisions is shown by the fact that when other research participants evaluated the candidates without being given any information about race, the candidate with ambiguous qualifications was recommended about 50 percent of the time. When race was included (Figure 6.5), the Black candidate was recommended 45 percent of the time, indicating an unbiased decision; however, the White candidate was recommended 76 percent of the time, which is much more frequently than would be expected in an unbiased decision. The results of a study conducted by Gordon Hodson, John Dovidio, and Samuel Gaertner (2002) indicated that this difference came about because, when making their decisions, evaluators gave more weight to negative than to positive information about Black applicants. In essence, the White candidate was getting a “benefit of the doubt” that was denied the Black candidate.

**Anti-Minority Discrimination.** The theory of aversive prejudice also holds that people experiencing aversive prejudice will discriminate against members of other groups when the behavior can be justified as unprejudiced. For example, Donald Saucier, Carol Miller, and Nicole Doucet (2005) reviewed that research that had been conducted on whether the race of a person needing help (Black or White) influenced White research participants’ likelihood of giving help. They found that, overall, Black and White people received help at essentially the same rate. However, in situations in which not helping could be attributed to factors other than the race of the person needing help—factors such as the amount of time the helper had to give up to provide the help, the amount of inconvenience helping would entail, the degree of risk to the helper that helping would cause—Black people were helped less often than White people. Thus, in situations in which racial prejudice was the only apparent reason for not helping a Black person, White people helped a Black person as often as they helped a White person. However, when not helping could be attributed to some factor other than race, such as “I didn’t have enough time to help him with his homework,” then White people helped a Black person less often than they helped a White person.

**Derogation of Higher Status Minority Group Members.** A final implication of the theory of aversive prejudice is that because one of the implicit attitudes that White people acquire through socialization is a belief in White superiority, the discomfort associated with aversive prejudice should be greater when Black people are in higher status positions. For example, Jennifer Knight and her colleagues (Knight, Hebl, Foster, & Mannix, 2002) had White college students rate the performance of an employee based on a summary of information about the person. The person was either White or Black and in either a supervisory or subordinate job. The research participants gave higher ratings to the White supervisor than the Black supervisor, but rated the Black subordinate higher than the White subordinate. In an earlier study on the effect of status, Dovidio and Gaertner (1981)

assigned White research participants to work with either a Black or White partner who was appointed to be either the participant's superior or subordinate and was described as being high or low in ability. During the task the two were working on together, the partner "accidentally" dropped some pencils. Dovidio and Gaertner wanted to see how often the participant helped his partner. They found that the higher-status Black partner was helped less often (58 percent) than the lower-status Black partner (83 percent), but that the higher-status White partner was helped slightly more often (54 percent) than the lower-status White partner (41 percent). The researchers also found that the participants thought that the high-ability White partner was somewhat more intelligent than themselves, but rated the high-ability Black partner as significantly less intelligent than themselves. In a later review of this and similar research, Dovidio and Gaertner (1991) concluded that "although whites may accept that a black person is intelligent on an absolute dimension, [they] are reluctant to accept ... that a black person is high or equal in intelligence compared to themselves" (p. 140).

## AMBIVALENT PREJUDICE

The theories of contemporary prejudice that we have examined thus far have postulated that although contemporary White Americans have, for the most part, adopted the principle of racial equality, which leads them see themselves as unprejudiced. However, some anti-Black emotions and beliefs remain. People therefore try to maintain the unprejudiced self-images by suppressing their negative emotions and beliefs. Nonetheless, these emotions and beliefs can find expression in the form of prejudice or discrimination if those biases can be justified on some basis other than prejudice. For example, someone who voted against a Black political candidate might explain his vote as "I voted against him because he's too liberal, not because he's Black."

Like those theories, the theory of **ambivalent prejudice** developed by Irwin Katz and his colleagues (Katz, 1981; Katz & Hass, 1988; Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986) holds that White Americans genuinely accept the principle of racial equality. However, it also postulates that many White Americans have developed genuinely positive attitudes toward Black people that exist along with the lingering negative attitudes. Because these White people see Black people as having both positive and negative characteristics, their attitudes are ambivalent and so is their behavior: sometimes it is positive, sometimes negative. Note that although all three theories of contemporary prejudice postulate that people experience psychological conflict, the source of the conflict is different in the case of ambivalent prejudice. Whereas the theories of modern-symbolic and aversive prejudice postulate a conflict between an unprejudiced self-image and residual negative emotions and beliefs, the theory of ambivalent prejudice postulates a conflict between two sets of beliefs, positive and negative, about a stigmatized group. The theory, diagrammed in Figure 6.6, is designed to explain the circumstances that lead to positive or negative behavior.




**FIGURE 6.6** Ambivalent Prejudice

People who simultaneously hold contradictory values and beliefs about minority group members experience conflict when they become aware of the contradiction. This conflict generates negative emotional responses that they are motivated to reduce. The discomfort can be reduced by emphasizing one aspect of the attitude over the other; the aspect that is emphasized depends on situational cues. Negative cues lead to overly negative behavior and positive cues lead to overly positive behavior.

### Ambivalent Attitudes

Two groups of theorists have suggested different, but complementary, sources of ambivalent racial attitudes. Irwin Katz and Glen Hass (1988) postulated that two sets of American values are important to ambivalent prejudice. One set of values centers on individualism, emphasizing personal responsibility, hard work as the



means to success, self-reliance, and trying to improve one's lot in life. These values are similar to the racialized traditional values of modern-symbolic prejudice, but they are not directly connected to race in the theory of ambivalent prejudice. Katz and Hass (1988) emphasize the value-of-work aspect of the concept, measuring it with items such as "Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding" and "A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character" (p. 905). The other set of values centers on egalitarianism and humanitarianism, the beliefs that all people should be treated equally and that people have a responsibility to help others who are disadvantaged. (To keep the terminology simple, we will use the term egalitarianism to represent this concept.) This value position is indicated by agreement with items such as "Those who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others" and "Prosperous nations have a moral obligation to share some of their wealth with poor nations" (Katz & Hass, 1988, p. 905). Note that Katz and Hass's concept of egalitarianism seems to focus on the equality of outcome aspect that people with modern-symbolic prejudice reject.

Two sets of White people's beliefs about Black people also are important to the theory. First, because of Black Americans' history of being the targets of discrimination and exclusion from the mainstream of society, White people perceive Black people as being both deviant and disadvantaged. The deviance aspect comes from a perception that Black Americans' beliefs, customs, and culture lead them to behave in ways that make it difficult for them to fit into "proper" (that is, White) American society. The disadvantaged aspect reflects the reality that Black Americans are, on the average, less well-off economically and socially than White Americans. The theory of ambivalent prejudice holds that these beliefs intersect with people's value orientations. An individualistic orientation leads people to focus on the perception that Black people are deviant and leads to negative feelings, such as aversion; an egalitarian orientation leads people to focus on Black people's state of disadvantage and leads to positive feelings, such as sympathy for Black people and admiration for their ability to cope with and often overcome disadvantage. People who hold both individualistic and egalitarian values therefore experience ambivalence—mixed feelings—toward Black people. As Katz and Hass (1988) note, "Blacks [can be] perceived as deserving help, yet as not doing enough to help themselves; and both attitudes may exist side by side within an individual.... Having sympathy for Blacks as innocent targets of discrimination does not necessarily determine how one thinks about what Blacks can and should be doing to help themselves and how well they are doing it" (p. 894). Katz and Hass also note that the belief that innocent victims have a responsibility to help themselves is not limited to racial issues but is also found in other contexts, such as illness.

Tara MacDonald and Mark Zanna (1998) suggest that stereotypes provide another source of ambivalence. MacDonald and Zanna drew on research that shows that two basic evaluations that people make of one another center on the concepts of liking and respect. People tend to like others they perceive to be warm and friendly and to dislike those they perceive to be cold and distant; people tend to respect those who demonstrate intellectual and other achievements and not respect those they perceive as failures. However, feelings of liking and

respect are independent of one another: A person can like someone for whom he or she has little respect (the genial klutz) and dislike someone for whom he or she has great respect (the arrogant genius). Similarly, people can have feelings of liking or disliking and respect or disrespect for social groups, based on their beliefs and stereotypes of what members of those groups are like. Thus, people who hold both positive and negative beliefs about a social group can experience conflicting feelings about the group: liking but little respect (for example, that Black people are friendly but lazy) or respect but little liking (e.g., Black people are athletically talented but hostile toward White people). These conflicting feelings are expressed as ambivalent prejudice.

It is important to bear in mind that not all White people are ambivalent toward minority groups. If individualistic values and negative stereotypes are stronger than egalitarian values and positive stereotypes, attitudes and behavior will be consistently negative. Conversely, if egalitarian values and positive stereotypes are stronger than individualistic values and negative stereotypes, attitudes and behavior will be consistently positive. It is only people who simultaneously hold individualistic and egalitarian values or positive and negative stereotypes who experience ambivalence. But can people simultaneously hold apparently conflicting values and stereotypes? It appears that they can. For example, Katz and Hass (1988) found scores on their measures of individualism and egalitarianism to be essentially uncorrelated and other researchers have found that White college students' stereotypes of Blacks contained both strong positive and strong negative elements (Czopp & Monteith, 2006; Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995).

### **Psychological Conflict**

The theory of ambivalent prejudice holds that people's ambivalent attitudes affect their behavior only when they become aware that they have inconsistent feelings toward minority groups. Katz (1981) suggested that interacting with a member of a minority group is sufficient to arouse feelings of ambivalence in White people. Depending on the situation, people might find themselves either feeling sympathy for someone who is down-and-out but doing nothing to help her- or himself, or having negative feelings about someone who is less fortunate. These responses are problematic because the first conflicts with the individualistic value system (one should not have positive feelings toward people who should be helping themselves) whereas the second response conflicts with the egalitarian value system (one should help the less fortunate). Katz believes that such conflicts threaten the person's self-image because, regardless of what the person feels, it implies that the person is not living up to one side or the other of his or her value system. These feelings of threat cause negative emotions that the person is motivated to reduce. Katz postulates that people reduce the feelings of conflict and threat, and along with them the negative emotions, by behaving in a way that, at least temporarily, makes one value seem to be more important than the other. If one is more important than the other, then the more important value takes precedence and the conflict is resolved.

The theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999) provides another, and somewhat simpler, way of looking at attitude ambivalence. Cognitive dissonance theory holds that people prefer that all their attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, and so forth adhere to simple, consistent patterns. Any inconsistencies or contradictions lead to a state of unpleasant emotion called cognitive dissonance, which people are motivated to reduce. Threats to self-image are not necessary; the awareness of inconsistency is enough to cause psychological discomfort. Consistent with both theories, the results of research show that attitude ambivalence is associated with negative self-directed emotions. For example, Margo Monteith (1996) found that White people who scored higher on a measure of ambivalent prejudice reported greater feelings of discomfort and higher levels of negative self-focused moods such as guilt, embarrassment, and disappointment with the self compared to people with lower ambivalence scores. Taking a different approach, Hass and his colleagues (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992) found that making White people aware of their ambivalent racial attitudes by having them listen to audiotapes of people making both pro- and anti-Black statements led to increased ratings of negative moods such as tenseness, nervousness, and frustration.

### Response Amplification

Both the theories of ambivalent prejudice and cognitive dissonance propose that one way to reduce feelings of conflict and the associated negative emotions is to emphasize the importance of one set of values or beliefs over the other. Ambivalence and cognitive dissonance exist only because the two sets of values or beliefs are equally important; if one set is perceived as more important, the conflict between the sets is resolved and the negative emotions dissipate. When situational factors no longer force people to confront their conflicting values or beliefs, their importance equalizes again until a new situation arises to bring attention to the inconsistency.

Behaviorally, emphasis on egalitarian values appears in the form of unduly positive behavior directed toward minority group members. Emphasis on individualistic values appears in the form of unduly negative behavior. This pattern of behavior is called **response amplification**, “a behavior toward the stigmatized person that [is] more extreme than behavior toward a nonstigmatized but similar person in the same type of situation” (Katz, 1981, p. 25). Situational cues determine the direction of response amplification. If the situation calls for positive behavior (such as when the other person does something good), the person experiencing ambivalent prejudice acts more positively toward a member of a minority group than toward a White person; if the situation calls for negative behavior (such as when the other person does something bad), the person experiencing ambivalent prejudice acts more negatively toward a member of a minority group.

For example, Glen Hass and his colleagues (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Eisenstadt, 1991) had White students work with either a White or Black student whose behavior caused the pair to either succeed or fail at a task. Asked to evaluate their partners' performance, the research participants rated the Black student more

positively than the White student in the success condition but more negatively than the White student in the failure condition. The researchers also found that the degree of response amplification was correlated with the extent to which participants held ambivalent racial attitudes. Note that although the theory of aversive prejudice also postulates that White people can show a pro-minority bias, the basis for that bias differs in the two theories. The theory of aversive prejudice holds that the bias is an attempt to maintain an unprejudiced self-image; the theory of ambivalent prejudice holds that it is an amplification of genuinely-held positive beliefs.

A key aspect of the theory of ambivalent prejudice is that response amplification results from a motivation to reduce negative emotions caused by being made aware of one's ambivalent attitudes. Although this tension reduction explanation has not been directly tested, Bell and Esses (2002) showed that response amplification occurs only when people see ambivalence as being negative. Canadian college students with ambivalent attitudes toward Native Canadians were told that ambivalence was either positive because there are advantages to seeing both sides of an issue or that it was negative because there are disadvantages to seeing both sides of an issue. They then received either a positive or negative prime after which their attitudes toward Native people were assessed. Participants who were motivated to see ambivalence as bad exhibited response amplification, whereas those motivated to see ambivalence as good did not. Leading people to see ambivalence as positive presumably removed the negative emotions associated with it and so removed the motive for response amplification.

In contrast to theorists who see response amplification as being unconsciously motivated, Bridget Dunton and Russell Fazio (1997) suggest that positive amplification, at least, is a conscious response. Drawing on a general theory of how people make judgments about others, Dunton and Fazio postulated that people know their attitudes might lead them to respond negatively to members of minority groups. In an attempt to avoid acting in such a way, these people intentionally overcompensate as a way of ensuring that their negative attitudes do not have an adverse impact. Of course, Dunton and Fazio's explanation does not rule out unconscious motivation; positive response amplification could have both conscious and unconscious roots.

One question that might arise at this point is why is it a problem to overcompensate for possible discriminatory behavior? Is it possible to be too helpful or accepting? Possibly. If the overcompensation takes the form of overly positive feedback on performance at a task (such as writing an essay), for example, the people receiving the feedback get an incorrect perception of their true level of performance and receive no information on how to perform better in the future. This incorrect perception, which leads them to believe that they are more skillful than they actually are, can set them up for failure the next time they perform the task (Crosby & Monin, 2007). For example, students who fall behind in math because teachers do not give accurate feedback have difficulty catching up in later grades. In addition, if members of minority groups come to see feedback from Whites as consistently overly positive, they may come to see White people as patronizing and develop a distrust of any feedback they provide (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991).

An important aspect of the theory of ambivalent prejudice is that, unlike the other theories we have discussed, it was designed to be a general theory of prejudice, dealing not just with race but with all forms of difference. Thus, response amplification has been found not only in the racial context but also for nondisabled people interacting with people with disabilities (Katz, Hass, & Bailey, 1988), for men's and women's rating of members of the other sex (Kenyon & Hewitt, 1989), and for ratings of women described as feminists (MacDonald & Zanna, 1998).

## **PUTTING THE THEORIES TOGETHER**

We have looked at a number of theories of contemporary prejudice, each of which proposes a different source of prejudice. How do they all fit together? Gerard Kleinpenning and Louk Hagendoorn (1993) postulated that the different types of prejudice could be arranged along a continuum of severity as shown in Table 6.2, with old-fashioned prejudice at the most severe end and lack of prejudice at the least severe end. Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn did not include ambivalent prejudice in their system, so we placed it in the continuum as suggested by Melinda Jones (2002). Table 6.2 also summarizes some of the key characteristics of each type of prejudice.

Old-fashioned prejudice is characterized by lack of acceptance of group equality and endorsement of traditional racist beliefs such as the innate superiority of the White race. People with old-fashioned prejudice experience strong negative emotions toward members of minority groups and try to exclude them from society or, failing that, dominate and control them. Modern-symbolic prejudice is characterized by high acceptance of equality of opportunity for minority groups but rejection of equality of outcome. People with this kind of prejudice reject most traditional racist beliefs but retain some, such as negative stereotypes. They strongly endorse the traditional beliefs of their culture, which are interpreted in terms of race. People with modern-symbolic prejudice tend to deny that minority groups still experience discrimination, believe that minority groups demand and receive special favors, and believe that Whites are treated unfairly. They also tend to have mild to moderate negative emotional responses to members of minority groups and tend to oppose social policies that benefit minority groups and show anti-minority bias if the behavior can be justified as unprejudiced.

Aversive prejudice is characterized by acceptance of both aspects of equality. Although people with aversive prejudice see themselves as unprejudiced, they tend to have mildly negative emotional responses toward members of minority groups and experience anxiety during intergroup contact. They try to avoid intergroup contact but are polite during unavoidable interactions. They often show a pro-minority bias to avoid appearing prejudiced, a pro-White bias in ambiguous situations, and an anti-minority bias if it can be justified as unprejudiced. Ambivalent prejudice is also characterized by acceptance of both aspects of equality, but people with ambivalent prejudice also experience conflict between traditional and egalitarian beliefs or between positive and negative stereotypes of

**TABLE 6.2 Types of Contemporary Prejudice**

| Type of Prejudice | Acceptance of Equality                | Rejection of Traditional Racist Beliefs | Other Beliefs                                                                                                                                    | Emotional Response                                                                                          | Behavioral Response                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Old-fashioned     | Low                                   | Low                                     | Innate superiority of White race                                                                                                                 | Strong negative, e.g., fear, hatred                                                                         | Tries to exclude or dominate and control minority groups                                                                                                                                                                |
| Modern-symbolic   | High for opportunity; low for outcome | Moderate                                | Denial of discrimination; racialized traditional values; minorities demand and receive special favors; Whites treated unfairly                   | Mild to moderate negative, e.g., dislike, resentment, anxiety                                               | Opposes social policies benefiting minorities; anti-minority bias if justifiable as unprejudiced                                                                                                                        |
| Aversive          | High                                  | High                                    | Sees self as unprejudiced                                                                                                                        | Mild negative; e.g., discomfort; anxiety concerning intergroup contact                                      | Avoids intergroup interaction; polite during unavoidable interactions; pro-minority bias to avoid appearing prejudiced; pro-White bias in ambiguous situations and/or anti-minority bias if justifiable as unprejudiced |
| Ambivalent        | High                                  | High                                    | Conflict between traditional and egalitarian beliefs, and between positive and negative stereotypes                                              | Both positive (e.g., sympathy) and negative (e.g., aversion); discomfort when aware of ambivalent responses | Response amplification                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Lack of prejudice | High                                  | High                                    | Complex social identity; broad scope of moral inclusion; focus on similarities among people rather than differences; positive implicit attitudes | Responds to individual, not group                                                                           | Responds to individual, not group                                                                                                                                                                                       |

minority groups. They tend to have both positive and negative emotional responses to minority groups and to experience discomfort when they become aware of the inconsistency. To reduce the discomfort, they exhibit response amplification, overdoing positive responses when those are called for and negative responses when they are called for.

Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993) showed that people who hold a more severe type of prejudice endorse beliefs held by people who hold a less severe type, but people who hold a less severe type of prejudice reject the beliefs held by people who hold a more severe type. For example, people holding old-fashioned prejudiced beliefs also agree with beliefs held by people with modern-symbolic prejudice, such as that members of minority groups receive undeserved benefits, and exhibit characteristics associated with aversive prejudice, such as discomfort when interacting with members of minority groups. However, people holding modern prejudice beliefs do not agree with old-fashioned prejudice beliefs, such as the inherent superiority of the majority group.

Although the various forms of prejudice are relatively distinct, their nested nature implies that people can simultaneously exhibit characteristics of more than one type. For example, the results of the response amplification studies (described in the discussion of ambivalent prejudice) may seem to contradict the results of Harber's (1998) study (described in the discussion of aversive prejudice) that White students gave more positive feedback to a poor-performing Black student than to a poor-performing White student. One important difference between the studies, however, is that the participants in Harber's research thought that the person who wrote the essay would see their feedback, whereas in most of the response amplification studies, participants did not expect the person they rated to be informed of the ratings. Knowing that a member of a minority group will see the ratings probably arouses a motive to appear unprejudiced, thereby leading to a more favorable evaluation. This process may explain why, in general, response amplification appears to be stronger for positive responses than for negative responses (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996). Therefore, the processes involved in contemporary forms of prejudice are not necessarily independent and may work together in complex ways to affect behavior.

What about people who are not prejudiced? Interestingly, little research has been conducted on the characteristics of unprejudiced people. They are usually not often studied as a specific group, but rather defined, in contrast to prejudiced people, as being low on characteristics on which prejudiced people are high (Phillips & Ziller, 1997). However, some characteristics of nonprejudiced people can be identified. They are, almost by definition, high on acceptance of both forms of equality. Unprejudiced people also tend to have complex social identities (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). That is, they see themselves as members of many different social groups rather than as members of a single group; we discuss the concept of social identity in more detail in Chapter 9. In addition, unprejudiced people tend to focus on similarities among people rather than differences (Phillips & Ziller, 1997) and see differences among people as enriching and interesting rather than disconcerting (for example, Thomas, 1996). Unprejudiced people also exhibit a broad scope of moral inclusion, seeing everyone as members of a single group for

whose welfare they have a moral responsibility (Opotow, 1995). Finally, nonprejudiced people might simply be more resistant than other people to acquiring prejudices. We saw in Chapter 5 that one way in which people acquire prejudices is by forming associations that link negative characteristics and emotions to outgroups. However, Robert Livingston and Brian Drwecki (2007) have found that nonprejudiced people are less likely than others to form negative associations with neutral stimuli and more likely to form positive associations. Thus, nonprejudiced people may be predisposed to seeing others in a positive light. Too little is known about the nature of nonprejudice; more research is needed on the characteristics of nonprejudiced people and how those characteristics are acquired.

Finally, although this section has focused on contemporary forms of prejudice, it is important to remember that old-fashioned prejudice is not dead. Based on a review of survey results, Dovidio and Gaertner (1998) estimated that 10 percent to 15 percent of White Americans still show old-fashioned prejudice, and Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993) and Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) found similar results in European countries. In addition, the existence and activities of hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and the continuing problem of hate crimes show that old-fashioned prejudice still has profound effects on behavior. We discuss hate crimes in Chapter 9.

## BENEVOLENT PREJUDICE

Historically, the study of prejudice has focused on negative beliefs about and negative emotional responses to targets of prejudice. However, in Chapter 1 we saw that stereotypes can be both positive and negative. This duality of stereotypes suggests that there also can be two aspects of prejudice, one involving negative beliefs about the group and the other involving ostensibly positive beliefs. These two types of prejudice have been variously labeled paternalistic and competitive (van den Berghe, 1967), benign and malevolent (Wilson, 1996b), and hostile and benevolent (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Because the last two terms are becoming the ones most often used in psychology, we will also adopt them. **Hostile prejudice**, as the name implies, refers to the traditional form of prejudice, expressed in terms of negative beliefs about and emotional responses to targets of prejudice. **Benevolent prejudice**, in contrast, is expressed in terms of apparently positive beliefs and emotional responses to targets of prejudice. Table 6.3 lists some examples of hostile and benevolent beliefs that are stereotypically held about several groups. Although its tone is superficially positive, benevolent prejudice has the same net effect of hostile prejudice of keeping targets of prejudice in subordinate positions in society.

The idea that groups, on the one hand, can be looked down on but, on the other hand, can be seen as in some ways good is not new. Rudyard Kipling (1899), for example, expressed these sentiments in his poem “White Man’s Burden” when he referred to the subjects of English colonialism as “Your sullen, new-caught peoples,/ Half devil and half child” (p. 290) who needed to be reformed from their devilish heathen ways (an expression of hostile prejudice) and protected in their



childlike ignorance and naiveté (an expression of benevolent prejudice). Pierre van den Berghe (1967) described the benevolent side of this colonial attitude as viewing the colonized people as “childish, immature, irresponsible, exuberant, improvident, fun-loving, good humored, and happy-go-lucky; in short, as inferior but lovable as long as they stay in ‘their place’” (p. 27). Note the overlap with current benevolent stereotypes of African Americans shown in Table 6.3.

The negative side of this apparent benevolence is seen in its use as a justification of the most brutal forms of European colonialism (Hochschild, 1998) and

**TABLE 6.3 Hostile and Benevolent Prejudice**

| Hostile Beliefs                                                                                 | Benevolent Beliefs                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>African Americans (held by White Americans)</b><br>(Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995) |                                                                |
| Hostile                                                                                         | Athletic                                                       |
| Cliquish                                                                                        | Musical                                                        |
| Irresponsible                                                                                   | Religious                                                      |
| Loud                                                                                            | Strong family ties                                             |
| <b>White Americans (held by Black Americans)</b><br>(Judd et al., 1995)                         |                                                                |
| Self-centered                                                                                   | Intelligent                                                    |
| Greedy                                                                                          | Financially well-off                                           |
| Stuffy/uptight                                                                                  | Independent                                                    |
| Sheltered from the real world                                                                   | Organized                                                      |
| <b>Jews</b><br>(Wilson, 1996b)                                                                  |                                                                |
| Greedy                                                                                          | Intelligent                                                    |
| Dishonest                                                                                       | Hardworking                                                    |
| Uncouth                                                                                         | Ambitious                                                      |
| Loud                                                                                            | Loyal to family                                                |
| <b>Women</b><br>(Glick & Fiske, 1996)                                                           |                                                                |
| When women lose fairly, they claim discrimination                                               | Women should be cherished and protected by men                 |
| Women seek power by gaining control over men                                                    | Men are incomplete without women                               |
| Once a man commits, she puts him on a tight leash                                               | Women have a quality of purity few men possess                 |
| Women fail to appreciate all men do for them                                                    | Men should sacrifice to provide for women                      |
| <b>Men</b><br>(Glick & Fiske, 1999)                                                             |                                                                |
| Men will always fight for greater control in society                                            | Woman should take care of man at home, or else he'd fall apart |
| Even sensitive men want traditional relationships                                               | Women are incomplete without men                               |
| Most men are really like children                                                               | Men are less likely to fall apart in emergencies               |
| Men have no morals in what they will do to get sex                                              | Men are more willing to risk self to protect others            |

American slavery (Jackman, 1994). For example, one apologist for slavery wrote in 1860 that “slavery ... is a blessing to this race of people.... Our slaves all have homes, are bountifully provided for in health, cared for and kindly nursed in childhood, sickness, and old age; multiply faster, live longer, are free from the corroding ills of poverty and anxious care, labor moderately, enjoy the blessings of the gospel, and let alone by wicked men, are contented and happy” (quoted by Jackman, 1994, p. 174).

The most thorough recent analysis of the distinction between hostile and benevolent prejudice lies in Peter Glick and Susan Fiske’s (1996, 2001a,b) theory of ambivalent sexism. Glick and Fiske note that two forms of sexism exist. Hostile sexism views women and men as opponents in the so-called battle of the sexes in which women try to control men through marriage, sexual wiles, and demands for attention and material goods, or, more recently, feminist ideology, forcing men to struggle for their independence and maintain their virility. Benevolent sexism, in contrast views women as “pure creatures who ought to be protected, supported, and adored” (Glick & Fiske, 2001a, p. 109), who nurture their children through childhood and their men through adversity and who represent all that is good and pure in humanity. However, benevolent sexism also consigns women to traditional gender roles, portraying them as weak, best suited for the homemaker role, and fit for only a few low status occupational roles outside the home.

But can positive beliefs really be a form of prejudice? Evidence that this is, in fact, the case lies in research results that show positive correlations between measures of hostile and benevolent prejudices. For example, there are correlations between benevolent sexism and hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and between benevolent sexism and negative implicit attitudes toward women (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). In the domain of race, agreement with positive stereotypes of African Americans is correlated with both agreement with negative stereotypes and with modern-symbolic prejudice (Whitley, 1999). Thus, people who hold benevolent prejudices toward women and African Americans also tend to express negative attitudes toward those groups.

Benevolent prejudices represent an especially insidious form of bias for at least three reasons. First, they provide the prejudiced person with what Benoît Monin and Dale Miller (2001) call *moral credentials*. People can express the opinion that women are weak and incompetent or that African Americans do not work hard enough, but can defend against charges of prejudice by pointing to their positive beliefs: Women are more moral than men and mold the characters of their children; African Americans are more family oriented than Whites and more musically and athletically talented. At the same time, the prescriptive aspects of stereotypes (see Chapter 3) imply that women and African Americans are suited only for these roles and not for roles that have greater power and social status.

The second insidious impact of benevolent prejudices is that the targets of the prejudices might buy into them. For example, in discussing benevolent sexism, Glick and Fiske (2001a) noted that “women may find its sweet allure difficult to resist. Benevolent sexism, after all, has its rewards; chivalrous men are willing to sacrifice their own well-being to provide for and to protect women” (pp. 114–115). At the same time, “women who reject conventional gender roles

or attempt to usurp male power are rejected and punished with hostile sexism” (p. 113). Thus, hostile and benevolent sexism work together to reinforce and maintain the gender-role status quo.

Finally, benevolent prejudices may be difficult to change; as Glick and Fiske (2001a) note, “it does not feel like prejudice to ... perpetrators (because it is not experienced as antipathy)” (p. 114). That is, because benevolent prejudices are superficially positive, there seems to be nothing to feel guilty about so there may not be much motivation to change.

What determines the type of prejudice that will be directed toward a group? One answer to this question is provided by Susan Fiske and her colleagues’ (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) stereotype content model, which we described in Chapter 5. Recall that Fiske and colleagues proposed that stereotypes can be described in terms of two sets of characteristics, warm and likeable versus cold and not likeable and competent versus incompetent. Their model also proposes that these two sets of perceptions combine to create different forms of prejudice. High perceived warmth and competence generally characterize attitudes toward one’s ingroups, resulting in admiration and a *positive prejudice* based on respect, admiration, and affection for fellow group members. This attitude is the basis for ingroup biases, such as the pro-White bias we discussed as part of aversive prejudice. High perceived warmth coupled with low perceived competence result in *paternalistic (benevolent) prejudice*. These perceptions result in positive emotions, but positive emotions such as pity and patronizing affection that are based in a lack of respect for and a feeling of superiority to the group. These attitudes lead the person experiencing benevolent prejudice to feel an obligation to help the groups but at the same time relegate them to low-status social roles and to limit their power and influence in society. Targets of benevolent prejudice include disabled people, housewives, and the elderly. Glick and Fiske (2001a) suggest that the positive attitudes that are part of ambivalent prejudice arise because “some liberal Whites may have paternalistic attitudes toward African Americans, characterized by pity and an implicit belief that African Americans are incapable of helping themselves” (p. 116).

Fiske and colleagues (2002) divide hostile prejudice into two forms. *Envious prejudice* results when a group is perceived as competent but not warm and so represents a potential threat to the ingroup’s hold on political and economic power. These perceptions of threat result in feelings of envy, fear, resentment, and hostility toward the targets of prejudice, combined with feelings of respect and admiration for their competence and achievements. Targets of envious prejudice include Jews, Asians, and successful Black people. These attitudes result in a desire to avoid members of the group and to segregate them into roles that limit their social power. It might also motivate denial of the group’s competence, as is found in modern-symbolic prejudice, which attributes minority groups’ successes to “special favors” such as affirmative action. The second form of hostile prejudice, *contemptuous prejudice*, results when a group is perceived as neither competent nor warm and so is also seen as eminently dislikable. Targets of contemptuous prejudice include poor Whites, poor Blacks, and welfare recipients. This is prejudice as it has traditionally been viewed—characterized by a lack of

positive emotions, feelings of contempt, disrespect, resentment, and hostility toward the group, and a desire to avoid the group, exclude it from social power and relegate it to low status social roles.

In closing this section, let us make two points. The first is that the groups given as examples of the targets of the different forms of prejudice are based on the average perceptions of warmth and competence across groups of research participants (Fiske et al., 2002). Because there are individual differences in people's attributions of warmth and competence to different groups, one person might respond with admiration to a group to which another person responds with contempt. Furthermore, the truly unprejudiced person will experience admiration for all groups, making the other categories or prejudice irrelevant to that person. The second point is that Fiske and colleagues' model is still relatively new and requires more research to test its validity. Nonetheless, it offers an excellent framework for viewing the several forms that prejudice can take.

## SUMMARY

Although overt expressions of prejudice have declined in the United States since the mid-1940s, covert measures of prejudice and some self-report studies of behavior indicate that prejudice continues to exist. In addition, women and members of minority groups continue to experience discrimination. Two factors seem to have contributed to this apparent contradiction. On the one hand, a social norm has developed in the United States that condemns racial prejudice. On the other hand, White Americans, at least, grow up in a culture that still has remnants of prejudice left over from America's history of racism and absorb some of that prejudice through socialization processes. As a result, many White Americans experience a conflict between a genuine belief in equality as a desirable social goal and feelings, often ones that are difficult to articulate, of dislike for and discomfort around members of minority groups. It is this conflict that provides the basis for theories of contemporary prejudice.

Old-fashioned prejudice is characterized by lack of acceptance of group equality, endorsement of traditional racist beliefs such as the innate superiority of the White race, and strong negative emotions toward members of minority groups. Modern-symbolic prejudice is characterized by high acceptance of equality of opportunity for minority groups but rejection of equality of outcome. People with this kind of prejudice reject most traditional racist beliefs but retain some, such as negative stereotypes. They strongly endorse the traditional beliefs of their culture, which are interpreted in terms of race, deny that minority groups still experience discrimination, believe that minority groups demand and receive special favors, and believe that Whites are treated unfairly. They also tend to have mild to moderate negative emotional responses to members of minority groups and tend to oppose social policies that benefit minority groups and show anti-minority bias if the behavior can be justified as unprejudiced.

Aversive prejudice is characterized by acceptance of both equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. Although people with aversive prejudice see themselves as unprejudiced, they tend to have mildly negative emotional responses toward members of minority groups and experience anxiety during intergroup contact and so try to avoid intergroup contact. They often show a pro-minority bias to avoid appearing prejudiced, a pro-White bias in ambiguous situations, and an anti-minority bias if it can be justified as unprejudiced. Ambivalent prejudice is also characterized by acceptance of both aspects of equality, but people with ambivalent prejudice also experience conflict between traditional and egalitarian beliefs or between positive and negative stereotypes of minority groups. They tend to have both positive and negative emotional responses to minority groups and to experience discomfort when they become aware of the inconsistency. To reduce the discomfort, they exhibit response amplification, overdoing both positive responses when those are called for and negative responses when they are called for. People who hold a more severe type of prejudice endorse beliefs held by people who hold a less severe type, but people who hold a less severe type of prejudice reject the beliefs held by people who hold a more severe type.

Finally, we considered the possibility that positive beliefs about other groups can reflect prejudice. Although such benevolent prejudice is superficially positive, it has an effect similar to that of hostile prejudice of putting groups in a subordinate position and restricting the social roles group members can hold. Generally, benevolent prejudices are held toward groups that are perceived as likable but incompetent, such as people with disabilities. The envious form of hostile prejudice is held toward groups that are perceived as dislikable but competent, such as Jews, and the contemptuous form of hostile prejudice is held toward groups that are perceived as dislikable and incompetent, such as people on welfare.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Theories of Contemporary Prejudice

Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2004). Aversive racism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 36, 1–52.

Katz, I. (1981). *Stigma: A social psychological analysis*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Sears, D. O., & Henry, P. J. (2005). Over thirty years later: A contemporary look at symbolic racism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 37, 95–150.

Sears and Henry's chapter summarizes the origins and nature of the theory of modern-symbolic prejudice and addresses some of the criticisms of the theory. Dovidio and Gaertner's chapter provides an excellent summary of their theory of aversive prejudice. Although older, Katz's short book still provides an excellent overview of ambivalent prejudice.

### Benevolent Prejudice

Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and benevolent sexism as complementary justifications for gender inequality. *American Psychologist*, 56, 109–118.

Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). Ambivalent stereotypes as legitimizing ideologies: Differentiating paternalistic and envious prejudice. In J. T. Jost & B. Major (Eds.), *The psychology of legitimacy* (pp. 278–306). New York: Cambridge University Press.

The *American Psychologist* article gives a nontechnical presentation of Glick and Fiske's theory of hostile and benevolent sexism. The chapter outlines Fiske's model of four types of prejudice.

### KEY TERMS

|                                   |                                 |                        |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| ambivalent prejudice              | implicit prejudices             | old-fashioned racism   |
| aversive racism<br>(or prejudice) | Jim Crow racism                 | response amplification |
| benevolent prejudice              | modern racism<br>(or prejudice) | socialization          |
| bogus pipeline research           | modern-symbolic<br>prejudice    | symbolic racism        |
| egalitarianism                    |                                 |                        |
| hostile prejudice                 |                                 |                        |

### QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. The results of research show that, in some ways, White Americans are less prejudiced than they were prior to World War II, but that in other ways prejudice and discrimination continue. What causes have been proposed for this apparent contradiction?
2. Theories of contemporary prejudice are based on the assumptions that most White Americans truly believe in the principle of racial equality but that they have been socialized into being prejudiced to at least some degree by a culture that has historically been racist (and prejudiced in other ways as well). Do you agree or disagree with these assumptions? What are your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing?
3. What is modern-symbolic prejudice? How does it differ from old-fashioned prejudice? In what ways is it similar to old-fashioned prejudice?
4. Describe the five themes that characterize modern-symbolic prejudice.
5. Describe the psychological bases of modern-symbolic prejudice.
6. Explain the two meanings that the term *equality* can have.
7. Describe the behavioral effects of modern-symbolic prejudice.
8. Several criticisms have been made of the concept of modern-symbolic prejudice. These include the following: (a) Modern-symbolic prejudice is not a new form of prejudice; it is just old-fashioned prejudice under a new name. (b) People who express modern-symbolic prejudice do not really believe in equality; they are just hiding their old-fashioned prejudice behind “politically correct” justifications. (c) Many of the themes of modern-symbolic

prejudice reflect conservative political values, so calling those beliefs a form of prejudice is just a way for political liberals to discredit conservatives. Do you agree or disagree with these criticisms? What are your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing?

9. What is aversive prejudice? Describe its characteristics. What are its psychological bases?
10. Describe the effects that aversive prejudice can have on behavior. Under what circumstances do people with aversive prejudice exhibit positive behavior toward members of minority groups and under what circumstances do they exhibit negative behavior?
11. Some people say that because it is natural to feel uncomfortable in an unfamiliar situation, such as when a White person interacts with a member of a minority group, that discomfort does not really indicate prejudice. Do you agree or disagree with this point? What are your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing?
12. Bridget Dunton and Russell Fazio (1997) have suggested that some people avoid interracial contact to avoid conflicts that their racial attitudes might cause. Ashby Plant and Patricia Devine (1998) suggest that some people avoid interracial contact to avoid pressure from other people to control their prejudice. Are these types of behavior examples of aversive prejudice? Why or why not?
13. Explain the concept of ambivalent prejudice. What causes ambivalence? What psychological effects does ambivalence have?
14. What does the term *response amplification* mean? Under what circumstances does positive amplification occur and under what circumstances does negative amplification occur? How are these circumstances similar to and different from the circumstances that influence the behavior of people with aversive prejudice?
15. Some researchers think that response amplification is a conscious choice whereas others think it arises from unconscious processes. Which do you think is true? What are your reasons for taking that position?
16. Describe Gerard Kleinpenning and Louk Hagendoorn's (1993) continuum of prejudices.
17. What are the characteristics of *unprejudiced* people? Why do you think that so little research has been conducted on nonprejudice compared to the vast amount of research on prejudice? Similarly, why do think that so little research has been conducted on prejudice among members of minority groups?
18. The section on contemporary forms of prejudice provided a number of examples of these prejudices. What other examples can you think of? Which forms of prejudice do your examples represent? Explain how they fit the definition of those forms of prejudice.

19. What is benevolent prejudice? Glick and Fiske (2001a) propose that benevolent prejudice has the same net effect of hostile prejudice of restraining its targets' freedom. Do you agree or disagree? What are your reasons?
20. Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (2001a) have suggested that the positive beliefs that people with ambivalent prejudice hold about members of minority groups and the positive emotions they feel toward them might actually represent benevolent prejudice. Do you agree or disagree with their suggestion? What are your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing?
21. Have you observed or experienced instances of benevolent prejudice? If so, describe them.
22. Describe the two forms of hostile prejudice that Fiske and her colleagues (2002) have proposed. What factors do they say lead to the different types of prejudice postulated by their model?



## Chapter 7

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# Individual Differences and Prejudice

[Some people] are so hostile toward so many minorities,  
they seem to be equal opportunity bigots.

—BOB ALTEMEYER (1998, P. 52)

### Chapter Outline

#### Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation

*Authoritarianism*

*Social Dominance Orientation*

#### Self-Esteem

*Self-Enhancement*

*Self-Protection*

#### Personal Values

*Value Orientations*

*Perceived Value Differences*

#### Social Ideologies

*Religion*

*Political Orientation*

#### Summary

#### Suggested Reading

#### Key Terms

#### Questions for Review and Discussion

Are there people who dislike all outgroups equally and so are, in Bob Altemeyer's (1998) words quoted above, "equal opportunity bigots" (p. 52)? That is, are there people who are, as a result of their personalities, belief systems, or other personal characteristics, especially likely to become prejudiced, and become prejudiced toward not just one group, but toward everyone they see as different from themselves? Individual difference researchers address these questions by studying the ways in which people differ from one another and the ways in which these

personal characteristics are related to other variables such as prejudice. Individual differences began to become important to the study of prejudice after World War II, when researchers concluded that factors such as realistic intergroup conflict and competition (see Chapter 9) could not explain Nazi anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. “Explanations were therefore sought in the disturbed personality, for it was hardly conceivable that these actions could be the actions of normal men” (Milner, 1981, p. 106). This search led to the development of one of the first individual difference theories of prejudice, the theory of the authoritarian personality, which we discuss shortly. A second reason why researchers believe that individual differences play a role in prejudice is that researchers have found that people who score high on prejudice against one group also tend to score high on prejudice against other groups (for example, Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004). This similarity of response to different groups suggests that some characteristic of the person may be a common underlying cause of all the prejudices.

This chapter examines the relationships of selected individual difference variables to prejudice. Choosing the variables to discuss was not easy. Researchers have studied more than 25 individual difference variables in relation to prejudice (McFarland, 2001); however, in a set of four studies, Sam McFarland (2001) found that two of those variables—authoritarianism and social dominance orientation—were consistently related to prejudice. This chapter begins, therefore, with those two variables. The second section of this chapter focuses on the role of the self in prejudice, both because of its historical importance and because of some recent theories that connect some self-related variables with prejudice. The third section examines the role of value systems in prejudice, and the last section focuses on two important social ideologies related to prejudice—religion and political orientation.

While reading this chapter, it is important to bear two cautions in mind. First, research on individual differences is, by its nature, correlational. As we discussed in Chapter 2, although correlational research can show that two variables are related to each other, it cannot show that one of those variables causes the other. Second, the relationships between individual difference variables and prejudice are far from perfect, so a high score on an individual difference variable that is related to prejudice does not necessarily mean that the person is prejudiced; other factors can offset the effect of any particular variable. Conversely, not all people who score low on an individual difference variable related to prejudice are unprejudiced; other factors can lead the person to be prejudiced.

## **AUTHORITARIANISM AND SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION**

Authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are two individual difference variables closely associated with prejudice (McFarland, 2001). Although authoritarianism was originally conceptualized as a personality trait and social dominance orientation is frequently referred to as one, John Duckitt (2001) has pointed out that they more closely resemble **ideologies**, sets of attitudes and beliefs that

predispose people to view the world in certain ways and to respond in ways consistent with those viewpoints. For example, from an authoritarian perspective, the world is a dangerous place, so people high in authoritarianism seek security by trying to make the world conform to their political and social values. In a similar vein, people high in social dominance orientation see the world as a competitive jungle and respond by trying to prevent people and groups they see as competitors from gaining on them (Duckitt, 2001).

### Authoritarianism

Theodor Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) developed the concept of the **authoritarian personality** as a means of explaining the rise of fascism during the 1930s. Fascism is a political philosophy that holds, among other tenets, that those who hold power in a society know what is best for the society, so people should simply do what their government tells them to do. Fascism was quite popular in Europe and the United States during the 1930s; fascist governments were established in Germany, Italy, and Spain, and fascist movements existed in the United States and Great Britain. It was the German fascist (or Nazi) government that directed the systematic annihilation of ethnic and racial minority groups and the mentally and physically handicapped that is known as the Holocaust. As noted earlier, Adorno and his colleagues, along with other researchers, began to look for an explanation for why large numbers of people could become complicit in government-led genocide. They believed that the scope of the Holocaust meant that it could not be explained in terms of intergroup conflict, so the answer must lie within the human mind. They therefore postulated the existence of what they called the authoritarian personality, a personality type that is especially susceptible to unthinking obedience to authority.

**The Authoritarian Personality.** Adorno and his colleagues (1950) proposed that the authoritarian personality was composed of nine characteristic patterns of thought, five of which are related to prejudice:

1. *Conventionalism.* Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.
2. *Authoritarian submission.* Submissive uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities....
3. *Authoritarian aggression.* Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values....
4. *Stereotypy.* The ... disposition to think in rigid categories....
5. *Projectivity.* The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses. (p. 228)

Adorno and his colleagues believed that the propensity for rigid adherence to conventional thinking leads people with authoritarian personalities to view the world in stereotypical terms; conventionalism and authoritarian submission

combined with authoritarian aggression leads them to be prejudiced against people who violate conventional norms or who are condemned by authority figures; and projectivity leads them to see their own faults in the targets of their prejudice.

Adorno and colleagues (1950) used interviews and questionnaires to examine the relationship of the authoritarian personality to prejudice. One of the questionnaires, the F-Scale, has become a standard measure of authoritarianism (Meloan, 1993). Adorno and his colleagues found high correlations between authoritarianism and prejudice against a variety of ethnic groups. Later research using the F-Scale also found support for a relationship between authoritarianism and ethnic and racial prejudice (Duckitt, 1994), and scores on the F-Scale also correlate strongly with attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (Whitley & Lee, 2000). Thus, there is good evidence that the authoritarian personality, at least as assessed by the F-Scale, is associated with prejudice.

Despite its early popularity and success, interest in the authoritarian personality began to decline in the 1960s and 1970s. There were several reasons for this change. One was a growing disenchantment among psychologists with psychoanalytic theory on which Adorno and his colleagues (1950) based their theory and a simultaneous growth in interest in the cognitive underpinnings of prejudice (Duckitt, 1994). In addition, a number of flaws were found in the F-Scale, which led to some loss of faith in the original research results; however, subsequent revisions of the F-Scale have corrected those shortcomings (Christie, 1991). A final criticism was that although Adorno and his colleagues conceptualized the authoritarian personality as a characteristic of the political far right-wing, people on the far left could also show some characteristics of the authoritarian personality, such as uncritical acceptance of statements made by authority figures and aggression toward people who do not share their beliefs (Stone & Smith, 1993). This criticism led to attempts to develop measures of generalized authoritarianism that would capture both its right- and left-wing aspects, such as Milton Rokeach's (1960) Dogmatism Scale. However, such attempts have not been very successful; for example, although the Dogmatism Scale was designed to be politically neutral, scores on it correlate fairly highly with scores on measures of right-wing authoritarianism, suggesting that the measures assess similar traits (Altemeyer, 1996). Because of problems such as these, recent research has focused on the relationship between what is now called *right-wing authoritarianism* and prejudice.

**Right-wing Authoritarianism.** After languishing during the 1970s, research on authoritarianism was revived by Bob Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996), who replaced the concept of the authoritarian personality with that of **right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)**. RWA differs somewhat from the original concept of the authoritarian personality; particularly important is that RWA is defined as a set of attitudes rather than as a personality type. Altemeyer defined RWA in terms of three clusters of attitudes that are similar to three of the characteristics Adorno and his colleagues (1950) used to describe the authoritarian personality: "authoritarian submission—a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives;

authoritarian aggression—a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, that is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities; conventionalism—a high degree of adherence to the social conventions that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities” (Altemeyer, 1994, p. 133; see Table 7.1 for sample questionnaire items used to assess RWA). If one thinks of prejudice as a form of nonphysical, symbolic aggression, these attitudes lead people high in RWA to be prejudiced against groups that authority figures condemn and that are perceived to violate traditional values.

People high in RWA tend to be prejudiced against a wide variety of groups, including feminists (Duncan, Peterson, & Winter, 1997), lesbians and gay men (Whitley & Lee, 2000), Native Americans (Altemeyer, 1998), Muslims (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielman, 2005), immigrants (Quinton, Cowan, & Watson, 1996), and fat people (Crandall, 1994). However, whereas some research shows that people high in RWA are prejudiced against African Americans (for example, Altemeyer, 1998; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), other research does not (for example, Whitley, 1999). RWA has also been found to be related to prejudice not only in the United States and Canada, but in other parts of the world as well, including Australia and New Zealand (Duckitt, 2001; Heaven & St. Quintin, 2003), Western Europe (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002), Russia (McFarland, Ageyev, & Djintcharadze, 1996), and South Africa (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002).

Several personal characteristics of people high in RWA may predispose them to prejudice. First, people high in RWA tend to be mentally inflexible. They see the world in simple terms, want definite answers to questions, and have a high need for closure, especially when dealing with issues that are important to them

**TABLE 7.1 Sample Questionnaire Items Used to Assess Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)**

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**Authoritarian Submission**

It is always better to trust the judgments of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.

Once our government leaders give us the “go ahead,” it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.

**Authoritarian Aggression**

What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to the true path.

The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and get us back to our true path.

**Conventionalism**

The “old-fashioned way” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.

Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.<sup>a</sup>

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<sup>a</sup>Agreement with this item indicates low RWA.

SOURCE: Altemeyer (1998, pp. 49–51).

(Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). As we saw in Chapter 4, this type of mental inflexibility is associated with a propensity for stereotyping. Perhaps as a reflection of this inflexibility, people high in RWA are uninterested in political issues (Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 2002) and experiencing new things (Heaven & Bucci, 2001), and so are unlikely to be exposed to views that differ from their own. People high in RWA also tend to see the world as a dangerous and threatening place, leading them to place a high value on security. They submit to authority and conform to group norms as a way of finding security in the protection of the group under the guidance of its authority figures (Duckitt, 2001).

In addition, people high in RWA tend to organize their worldviews in terms of ingroups and outgroups (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998). As we discuss in Chapter 9, strong identification with an ingroup promotes prejudice against outgroups, in part by leading people to exaggerate the differences between the ingroup and outgroups. These perceived differences can lead to the belief that outgroups threaten the traditional values embraced by people high in RWA (see the discussion of perceived value differences later in this chapter). By derogating outgroups, people can dismiss them as unimportant and therefore as constituting no real threat to ingroup values. Altemeyer (1981, 1998) also noted that people high in RWA tend to be self-righteous, seeing themselves as more moral than other people and therefore as justified in looking down on anyone authority figures define as less moral than themselves. They may feel especially free to express prejudice against members of outgroups, such as lesbians and gay men, who authority figures condemn as immoral threats to traditional values.

An important aspect of RWA as a theory of prejudice is the role authority figures play. People high in RWA accept as legitimate prejudice against groups authority figures condemn, but not necessarily other forms of prejudice. For example, some studies have found that people high in RWA have negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men but not toward African Americans (for example, Whitley, 1999). This difference in attitudes is explainable in terms of authority: some religious and political authority figures condemn lesbians and gay men for violating traditional values. However, most religious and political authority figures do not condemn African Americans; instead, they actively oppose racial prejudice. Because people high in RWA also tend to hold traditional religious beliefs (for example, Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2003), they are especially responsive to the directions religious authorities set.

The importance of authority was demonstrated in a study conducted of university students in what had been West Germany before reunification (Petersen & Dietz, 2000). The research consisted of a personnel selection simulation in which the participants had to choose three candidates for a managerial position; half the candidates were from the former West Germany and half were from the former East Germany, a group that was often the target of prejudice by former West Germans. The participants were categorized as high or low in RWA and assigned to one of two experimental conditions. In one condition a memo from the company president indicated that he did not think that hiring a former East German would be a good idea; in the other condition, the memo did not mention the candidates' regional background. Results showed that in making their selections,

participants low in RWA did not discriminate on the basis of regional background, nor did participants high in RWA whose memo did not mention regional background. However, participants high in RWA who thought the company president did not want to hire a former East German recommended fewer former East German candidates than did the other participants.

In summary, people high in RWA tend to be prejudiced against a wide variety of groups, especially those that they perceive to violate traditional values and groups that authority figures condemn. A number of psychological characteristics may predispose people high in RWA to prejudice, including mental inflexibility, a disinterest in experiencing new things, a perception of the world as a dangerous place, and a tendency to organize their worldviews in terms of ingroups and outgroups.

### Social Dominance Orientation

**Social dominance orientation (SDO)** is an individual difference variable that reflects “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups” (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742). It is comprised of two closely related components, group-based dominance and opposition to equality (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Group-based dominance reflects the belief that one’s group ought to be at the top of the societal ladder and that other groups ought to be on the bottom; opposition to equality reflects the belief that the groups on the bottom ought to stay there. People high in SDO believe that the groups they identify with, such as racial or ethnic groups, socioeconomic status groups, and so forth, should have a superior position in society and control over society’s resources and that other groups should “stay in their place” and not ask for more than they have. Thus, people high in SDO prefer a society in which social groups are unequal and their group holds the superior position (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). See Table 7.2 for sample questionnaire items used to assess SDO.

Not surprisingly, members of groups that hold more power in society exhibit higher levels of social dominance orientation. For example, in the United States, Whites score higher than members of minority groups, men score higher

**TABLE 7.2 Sample Questionnaire Items Used to Assess Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)**

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#### Group-Based Dominance (GBD)

It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

Inferior groups should stay in their place.

#### Opposition to Equality (OEQ)

We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.<sup>a</sup>

Increased social equality would be a good thing.<sup>a</sup>

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<sup>a</sup>Agreement with these items indicates low OEQ and low SDO.

NOTE: Items are from Sidanius and Pratto (1999, p. 67); classification of items as GBD and OEQ is from Jost and Thompson (2000, p. 216).

than women, heterosexuals score higher than lesbians and gay men, and the wealthy score higher than the less wealthy; similar patterns have been found in other countries (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2007; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In addition, the longer people are members of a higher-power social group, the higher they score on SDO. For example, Serge Guimond and his colleagues (Guimond, Dambrum, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003) measured SDO in first-year and upper-year students in a high-social-power profession—law—and in a low-social-power profession—psychology. They found that law students' SDO scores increased with years in college whereas psychology students' SDO scores decreased with years in college. In addition, people high in SDO tend to be attracted to high-power professions (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The link between social status and SDO has been further demonstrated in experiments in which research participants have been randomly assigned to high- or low-power roles. Participants assigned to high-power roles score higher on SDO than do participants assigned to low-power roles (Guimond et al., 2003). Therefore, social power is not simply correlated with SDO; social power causes people to develop social dominance attitudes. Thus, SDO is related to social power in two ways: People high in SDO are attracted to high-power professions and socialization into the profession increases SDO (Guimond et al., 2003).

**Social Dominance Orientation and Prejudice.** Given SDO's roots in the desire to maintain social inequality, it is not surprising that people high in SDO are prejudiced against members of groups that challenge the legitimacy of social inequality, including racial or ethnic groups such as African Americans, Asian Americans (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), Native Americans (Altemeyer, 1998), Muslims (Cohrs et al., 2005), and Australian Aborigines (Heaven & St. Quintin, 2003); immigrants (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998); lesbians and gay men (Whitley & Lee, 2000); and feminists (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). SDO has been found to be related to prejudice not only in the United States, but also in many other parts of the world, including Australia and New Zealand (Duckitt, 2001; Heaven & St. Quintin, 2003), Western Europe (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002), Asia (Pratto et al., 2000), Israel (Levin & Sidanius, 1999), and South Africa (Duckitt et al., 2002). Thus, like RWA, SDO is related to multiple forms of prejudice in multiple cultural contexts.

Like people high in RWA, those high in SDO have a number of personal characteristics that may predispose them to prejudice. For example, people high in SDO tend to see the world as what John Duckitt (2001) describes as a "competitive jungle characterized by a ruthless and amoral Darwinian struggle for survival, ... in which might is right, and winning is everything" (p. 51). In addition, people high in SDO tend to see resources as being in limited supply, so that if someone else gets something, they lose out on it; they have trouble believing that there could be enough for everyone (Esses et al., 1998). Taken together, these characteristics motivate people high in SDO to try to deny resources to members of outgroups and to try to keep outgroups from gaining any power that might force the sharing of resources. People high in SDO are also tough-minded (Duckitt, 2001) and low in empathy (McFarland, 2001); as



we saw in Chapter 5, being able to empathize with members of other groups tends to reduce prejudice.

An important aspect of the social dominance theory is the concept of legitimizing myths. **Legitimizing myths** are sets of attitudes and beliefs that people high in SDO can use to justify their dominant position in society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In the context of prejudice, group stereotypes are legitimizing myths that can be used to justify denying equality to other groups despite the fact that prejudice is socially disapproved. For example, the beliefs that members of another group are lazy and of low intelligence could be used to justify denying equal educational opportunity and powerful positions in society to members of the stereotyped group: The logic of social dominance asks, why should society expend precious resources to provide people with opportunities they are inherently unfit to take advantage of? Consequently, being high in SDO leads people to endorse stereotypes of outgroups, especially negative stereotypes, and these negative beliefs then lead to prejudice. For example, Bernard Whitley (1999) found that SDO was positively correlated with endorsement of both positive and negative stereotypes of African Americans. How would positive stereotypes contribute to the goal of keeping other groups down? Recall from Chapter 6 that positive stereotypes can contribute to that goal if they place people in low power roles, such as by stereotyping African Americans as athletes and entertainers rather than as business executives or government leaders. Whitley also found that when endorsement of stereotypes of African Americans and of lesbians and gay men was controlled, the relationship between SDO and other indicators of prejudice was greatly reduced. That is, among people high in SDO, those who endorse legitimizing myths to a greater degree are more prejudiced. These results suggest that legitimizing myths, in the form of stereotypes, are necessary for people high in SDO to justify their other prejudiced responses.

Recall from Chapter 4 that Stephanie Goodwin and her colleagues (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000) found that people high in social power tend to use stereotypes to a greater extent than do people low in social power. They attributed this greater stereotype use to people high in power not being motivated to individuate others. In a similar vein, Guimond and his colleagues (2003) have found that power correlates with prejudice: People high in power express more prejudice against a variety of outgroups. Guimond and colleagues explain this finding in terms of SDO: People higher in social power are higher in SDO, which leads to higher levels of prejudice. Social power, then, may potentiate both SDO and stereotyping, with people high in SDO using those stereotypes to justify their prejudices. SDO may also have motivational effects; see, for example, Box 7.1.

**Social Dominance Orientation and Authoritarianism.** In some ways SDO and authoritarianism sound very similar, both being ideological variables that predispose people to prejudice, but they are, in fact, different. The most fundamental difference is that authoritarianism focuses on submission to ingroup authority figures regardless of whether they advocate dominance over other groups, whereas SDO focuses on dominance over outgroups regardless of

### **Box 7.1 The Motivational Effect of Social Dominance Orientation**

The relationship between social dominance orientation (SDO) and prejudice can take a number of forms. Although we have focused on SDO as a potential cause of prejudice, Henry Danso and Victoria Esses (2001) took a different perspective, viewing SDO as a motive that can be aroused given the right circumstances. They reasoned that if SDO is based on a need to maintain dominance over other groups, people high in SDO should be motivated to prove their group's dominance, even if they are unaware of that motivation.

In their study, Danso and Esses had either a Black or White research assistant individually administer a standardized test of arithmetic ability to White college students. The researchers reasoned that students high in SDO would be motivated to show that Whites are intellectually superior to Blacks and so would do better on the test when it was administered by a Black research assistant; students tested by a White assistant and low SDO students tested by a Black assistant should not differ from one another. Danso and Esses

found that the high SDO students who were tested by a Black research assistant had an average score of about 80 percent on the test, whereas the other groups averaged only about 50 percent. Although SDO is correlated with prejudice, Danso and Esses reported that in a previous study there was no relationship between level of racial prejudice and performance when tested by a Black or White research assistant. Therefore, the motivational effects found in their study occurred as a result of SDO, not prejudice.

The authors concluded that their findings "may have practical implications for relations between groups for whom there has previously been an unequal distribution of power and resources (e.g., between men and women in managerial positions or between Blacks and Whites in the United States). In such situations, perceived shifts in power balance may represent a threat to the dominance of one group and, as a result, motivate the dominant group members to work to maintain their group dominance, especially if they desire an unequal distribution of resources" (pp. 163–164).

the views of ingroup authority figures. That is, authoritarianism focuses on relations within groups (submission to ingroup authority) whereas SDO focuses on relations between groups (dominance of the ingroup over outgroups). The relationship between SDO and prejudice is higher for people who identify more strongly with their groups, supporting the intergroup nature of SDO (Wilson & Liu, 2003). Stronger group identity motivates people to make stronger distinctions between their group and other groups, to stereotype members of other groups, and to view other groups less positively than one's own group (see Chapter 9). The importance of ingroup authority in authoritarianism was shown in Petersen and Dietz's (2000) study, described earlier, in which participants high in RWA acted in accordance with an authority figure's hint to discriminate against members of an outgroup whereas participants low in RWA did not.

This difference in the nature of the two constructs is reflected in the low correlations that are often found between scores on measures of SDO and RWA. For example, Michele Roccato and Luca Ricalfi (2005) reported that the average correlation between SDO and RWA was only  $r = .20$  for studies conducted in the United States and Canada. However, they also found that the average correlation was much higher for people in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. They attributed the geographic differences in correlations to differences in political systems. The countries with the higher correlations tend to make stronger distinctions between the policies of the political left and those of the political right (see also Duckitt, 2001). However, the correlation between SDO and authoritarianism is not very high in any group.

There are also differences in how SDO and authoritarianism relate to different forms of prejudice. For example, SDO is linked to both racial and antigay prejudice, whereas RWA is linked to antigay prejudice but not to racial prejudice (Whitley, 1999). In addition, SDO is linked to hostile sexism but not to benevolent sexism, whereas RWA is related to benevolent sexism but not to hostile sexism (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). This pattern reflects differences in the nature of authoritarianism and SDO (Duckitt, 2001). Authoritarianism focuses on perceived threats and obedience to authority figures' rules as a means of avoiding those threats. Because lesbians and gay men are portrayed by some authority figures as threats to important social values whereas African Americans are not, people high in RWA respond to the purported threat with negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men but not toward African Americans. In contrast, benevolent sexism represents endorsement of traditional gender roles and values, resulting in a positive correlation between it and RWA. Turning to SDO, recall that it has two components, opposition to equality and group based dominance. Because lesbians and gay men are distributed across the socioeconomic spectrum, they do not present a challenge to inequality in the distribution of society's resources—they already have economic parity with heterosexuals. African Americans, in contrast, do challenge inequality. Hence, the opposition to inequality component of SDO is not related to negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, but it is related to negative attitudes toward African Americans (Whitley, 1999). Group-based dominance is related to negative attitudes toward both lesbians and gay men and African Americans because many heterosexuals classify lesbians and gay men as an outgroup and many White Americans classify African Americans as an outgroup. Hostile sexism portrays women, a traditionally subordinated group, as competing with men for social status, thus evoking both the opposition to equality and group-based dominance aspects of SDO.

In conclusion, then, authoritarianism and SDO represent two separate ideologically based roots of prejudice (Duckitt, 2001). Authoritarianism focuses on seeking security against perceived threats from other groups by conformity to group norms and obedience to authority. SDO focuses on quashing competition for resources from other groups and maintaining the ingroup's dominance in society.

## SELF-ESTEEM

The *self* represents our awareness of ourselves as living beings who interact with the world and the people in it. This awareness includes our beliefs about what we are like, our characteristic behaviors, our abilities and shortcomings, and so forth. *Self-esteem* refers to people's evaluations of their personal characteristics and behavioral patterns. People who evaluate themselves positively are said to have high or positive self-esteem; people who evaluate themselves negatively are said to have low or negative self-esteem. Researchers and theorists have proposed two ways in which self-esteem might be related to prejudice, both of which can operate at the same time (Crocker, Blaine, & Luhtanen, 1993). One role proposed

for self-esteem is **self-enhancement**: looking down on others might make one feel better about oneself. The other role is **self-protection**: if one's self-esteem is threatened, looking down on others might again make one feel better about oneself, especially if doing so can directly counteract the threat. For example, if threat comes in the form of criticism from a member of a negatively stereotyped group, viewing that group and its members as incompetent to make a valid criticism can blunt its effect on self-esteem: If criticism comes from someone who is incompetent to judge, it is meaningless and so is no reflection on oneself.

### Self-Enhancement

Although the self-enhancement role of self-esteem seems to be quite straightforward—one bolsters one's self-image by looking down on others—research on the process is complicated by the fact that the self-enhancement hypothesis can be interpreted in two ways (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000). The traditional interpretation, based on general theories of self-esteem, is that people with low self-esteem should be more prejudiced than people with high self-esteem. It holds that “low self-esteem individuals need to make up for poor self-concept, and therefore they may pick on others to raise deficient self-esteem, whereas high self-esteem individuals do not need to bolster self-esteem” (Aberson et al., 2000, p. 158). This interpretation postulates a negative correlation between self-esteem and prejudice: People with low self-esteem should be more prejudiced than people with high self-esteem. The alternate interpretation is just the opposite: People with high self-esteem should be more prejudiced than people with low self-esteem because prejudice is one source of self-esteem. As Christopher Aberson, Michael Healy, and Victoria Romero (2000) put it, “bias allows high self-esteem individuals to create, bolster, and maintain positive ... identities. Low self-esteem individuals have low self-esteem because they do not regularly engage in ... bias” (p. 158).

Researchers have used two approaches to investigate the self-enhancement hypothesis. In one approach, they create artificial groups in laboratory settings. As we saw in Chapter 3, even arbitrarily assigning people to artificial groups elicits group loyalty that leads them to see their own group in more favorable terms than other groups. Researchers then can use this method to look at the degree to which group members' personal self-esteem is correlated with their ingroup bias. The second approach uses survey research to assess the correlation between people's level of self-esteem and prejudice against minority groups in society. Aberson and his colleagues (2000) reviewed the research using the first approach and found an average correlation of  $r = .20$  between self-esteem and intergroup bias. That is, people with high self-esteem showed more bias than people with low self-esteem, but only to a small degree. Survey research has produced inconsistent results: Some studies have found small positive correlations between self-esteem and prejudice (for example, Utsey, McCarthy, Eubanks, & Adrian, 2002) but others have found negative correlations (for example, Little, Murry, & Wimbusch, 1998; Valentine, 1998).

What causes these contradictory results? There has been too little research to know for certain, but there are several possibilities. One is that both high- and

low-self-esteem people are prejudiced, but that they express their prejudices in different ways (Aberson et al., 2000; Crocker et al., 1993). For example, high-self-esteem people may express their prejudice directly, such as by saying negative things about outgroups. Their high self-esteem buffers them against any criticism they may receive from expressing prejudice directly. In contrast, low-self-esteem people already have low opinions of themselves and so want to avoid such criticism. They therefore express their prejudice indirectly, such as by giving undeserved low ratings to products created by members of outgroups or by avoiding interaction with them. Because most research has used direct measures of bias, researchers may have overlooked these indirect indicators of prejudice and so may have erroneously concluded that high self-esteem people are more biased.

A second possibility is that self-esteem is related to prejudice, but that the relationship is indirect rather than direct. That is, self-esteem might work through some other variable to influence prejudice. For example, Jane Simoni (1996) found only a small correlation between self-esteem and attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, but larger correlations between both self-esteem and contact with lesbians and gay men and between contact and attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. She showed that higher self-esteem could lead to more contact with lesbians and gay men and that more contact could lead to more positive attitudes (see Chapter 14 for more discussion of intergroup contact and prejudice). Thus, low self-esteem may make people reluctant to engage in the intergroup contact that could lead to more favorable attitudes.

A final possibility is that there are two kinds of high self-esteem, with one being related to prejudice and the other not. Christian Jordan, Steven Spencer, and Mark Zanna (2005) have distinguished between what they call secure high self-esteem and defensive high self-esteem. People with secure high self-esteem truly have positive opinions of themselves whereas people with defensive high self-esteem act as though they see themselves positively as a way to hide the fact that they really doubt their self-worth. However, both types of people get high scores on traditional measures of self-esteem. Using a measurement strategy that distinguished between the two types of self-esteem, Jordan and his colleagues found that people with defensive high self-esteem expressed more intergroup bias than people with secure high self-esteem. These findings are quite consistent with the self-enhancement role of self-esteem in prejudice: People who are secure in their high self-esteem have no need to be biased, but those who doubt their self-worth use bias as a means of bolstering their self-images.

### Self-Protection

If prejudice is used to protect self-esteem, then a threat to self-esteem should lead to increases in prejudice. Exhibiting prejudice would reduce the effects of the threat and return self-esteem to its prethreat level. Unlike the results of research on self-enhancement, those for self-protection have been strongly supportive. We saw some examples of the self-protective role of prejudice in Chapter 4, in which we discussed research on how threats to self-esteem affected stereotype activation and application (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998).

Steven Fein and Steven Spencer (1997) also demonstrated the role of prejudice in self-esteem maintenance. Participants in their study took a bogus intelligence test, after which some were told that they had done poorly (the self-esteem threat condition) and others were told that they had done well (the no threat condition). All participants then completed a self-esteem measure. Then, in what was ostensibly another experiment, they evaluated either an Italian or Jewish job candidate (pretesting had shown that there was a fair amount of anti-Jewish prejudice on the campus where the research was conducted, but not much anti-Italian prejudice). The participants in the self-esteem threat condition made more negative ratings of the Jewish candidate than of the Italian candidate; participants in the no threat condition rated both candidates equally highly. Similarly, Steven Fein and colleagues (Fein, Hoshino-Browne, Davies, & Spencer, 2003) found that male research participants whose self-esteem had been threatened sat farther away from a man they thought was gay than a man they thought was straight; there was no difference in seating distance for participants in a no threat condition. Note that in both of these studies the threat to self-esteem came from the researcher, not from a Jewish person in the first study or a gay man in the second; thus, a threat from any source, not just the target of prejudice, can arouse prejudice.

The results of Fein and Spencer's (1997) research also demonstrated the buffering role of prejudice. They found that participants who rated the Jewish job candidate and whose self-esteem had been threatened showed an increase in self-esteem after making their ratings whereas the self-esteem of the other participants did not change. Putting all their data together, then, Fein and Spencer first showed that the threat to self-esteem caused lower ratings of the Jewish candidate and then showed that those lower ratings were associated with increased self-esteem. That is, expressing prejudice warded off the threat to self-esteem. Examining this issue from a different perspective, Fein and his colleagues (2003) reinforced the self-esteem of some research participants before giving them an opportunity to express their opinions about students attending their college and students attending a rival college. The participants whose self-esteem was not reinforced showed the typical ingroup bias, rating students at their college as better than students at the rival college; however, the students whose self-esteem had been reinforced showed no such bias. Thus, reinforcing self-esteem seems to inoculate participants against normal intergroup bias and prevents prejudice.

Finally, it appears that prejudice can have self-protective effects in children as well as adults. Jayne Stake (2003) studied high school students attending a science enrichment program. Focusing on male students, she assessed their self-confidence in their science abilities and their attitudes toward women in science at the beginning of the program and at its end four weeks later. Students were exposed to positive information about women in science and to women scientists as role models throughout the program. At the beginning of the program, Stake found that boys with lower science self-confidence tended to have negative attitudes toward women in science. However, boys whose science self-confidence increased over the course of the program had more positive attitudes toward women in science at the end of the program than at the beginning. Apparently, the initial negative attitudes toward women in science functioned to

protect the boys' self-esteem as science students. As that self-esteem increased over time, the protection that prejudice provided was no longer needed and their attitudes became more positive.

## PERSONAL VALUES

Values are the enduring beliefs people hold concerning the relative importance of the goals they aspire to achieve in life and the types of outcomes they should try to avoid (Rokeach, 1973). For example, people who place a higher value on security than on freedom will do all they can to protect themselves and their families from harm, even if it means giving up some freedom. In contrast, people who place a higher value on freedom than on security will do all they can to ensure that others have minimal control over them, even if it means taking risks and therefore giving up some security. In addition to defining goals, values also serve as standards for making evaluative judgments: People and things one perceives to be consistent with one's values are judged to be good and those perceived to be inconsistent with one's values are judged to be bad (Schwartz, 1996).

Psychologists have related values to prejudice in several ways. Some theories, such as Irwin Katz and Glen Hass's (1988) theory of ambivalent prejudice, hold that values are directly related to prejudice: Some values facilitate prejudice whereas other values inhibit prejudice. Other theories, such as Milton Rokeach's (1972) value dissimilarity model and the theory of modern-symbolic prejudice (McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2005), hold that prejudice arises because people believe that outgroup members hold values that are incompatible with or threaten those of the ingroup. Finally, the theory of aversive prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004) holds that egalitarian values, or beliefs in equality, lead White people to suppress overt prejudice against other groups and to redirect it into more subtle forms, such as avoidance of intergroup contact (see Chapter 6 for discussion of these forms of prejudice). In this section, we first examine the direct relation of values to prejudice and then look at some theories based on perceived value dissimilarity.

### Value Orientations

Several theories postulate that two general categories of values are related to prejudice, although different theories give different names to the values (Sampson, 1999). One category, generally referred to as *individualism*, relates to values emphasizing the importance of self-reliance; the other category, generally referred to as *egalitarianism*, emphasizes the importance of all people being treated equally and fairly (Katz & Hass, 1988).

**Individualism.** Historically, **individualism** is a value that has long been important in North America (Kinder & Mendelberg, 2000). North Americans place a strong emphasis on self-reliance and independence from others (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996). Donald Kinder and Tali Mendelberg (2000) explain

that during the 19th century, individualism came to be associated with hard work as the route to success in life because the wealth obtained through hard work allowed one to be independent of others and to do whatever one chose. At the same time, idleness came to be seen as a vice. As a result, “in America today, idleness is ... a moral defect; hard work, in and of itself, a moral virtue; dependence on others, a disreputable condition” (Kinder & Mendelberg, 2000, p. 47). Because of this link between individualism and hard work, most research on individualism defines the concept in terms of what is called the *Protestant ethic* or *Protestant work ethic*, which emphasizes the importance of hard work and perseverance as the way to success in life (Furnham, 1990). Although there are many measures of the Protestant ethic, the scale devised by Katz and Hass (1988) is one of the most commonly used; the first section of Table 7.3 contains some sample items from the scale.

Group stereotypes provide the link between individualism and prejudice: Groups that are stereotyped as behaving in ways that violate the principles of individualism are viewed negatively by those who adhere to these principles (Biernat et al., 1996). Thus, Monica Biernat and her colleagues (1996) found that people who score high on the Protestant ethic hold negative attitudes toward African Americans and fat people, two groups that are stereotyped as lazy, although the correlation is stronger for African Americans as the target group (see Katz & Hass, 1988, and Sears & Henry, 2005, for other examples of racial attitudes and Crandall, 1994, for anti-fat attitudes). Interestingly, Biernat and her colleagues also found a correlation between work ethic scores and negative attitudes toward gay men. This correlation was of about the same magnitude as that for attitudes toward African Americans even though gay men are not stereotyped as lazy. This may be because the Protestant ethic includes values such as self-restraint and avoidance of pleasure seeking and gay men are often stereotyped

**TABLE 7.3 Sample Questionnaire Items Used to Assess Values**

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**Individualism/Protestant Ethic**

*Respondents rate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each item:*

Most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy.  
 Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.  
 If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for themselves.  
 A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character.

**Egalitarianism**

*Respondents rate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each item:*

There should be equality for everyone—because we are all human beings.  
 Those who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others.  
 Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things.  
 Prosperous nations have a moral obligation to share some of their wealth with poor nations.

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SOURCE: Katz and Hass (1988, p. 905).



as hedonistic (Biernat et al., 1996). Not all research supports a link between individualism and prejudice. For example, Margo Monteith and Gina Walters (1998) found essentially no correlation between endorsement of individualism and anti-Black prejudice in a sample of White college students, and Gloria Cowan, Livier Martinez, and Stephanie Mendiola (1997) found that individualism did not correlate with non-Latino college students' attitudes toward illegal Latino immigrants. Thus, the actual link between individualism and prejudice may not be as strong as some theories have proposed.

**Egalitarianism.** As a value position, **egalitarianism** reflects a strong emphasis on the principles of equal opportunity, equal treatment for all people, and concern for others' well-being (Biernat et al., 1996). The second section of Table 7.3 contains some sample items from the scale most commonly used to assess endorsement of egalitarian values (Katz & Hass, 1988). In contrast to individualism, which is held to facilitate prejudice, theorists propose that egalitarianism inhibits prejudice. As Biernat and her colleagues (1996) expressed it, White Americans who endorse egalitarian values "either experience feelings of sympathy for Black Americans [as proposed by the theory of ambivalent prejudice] or they work to avoid the threat to self-concept that negative behavior toward Blacks would produce [as proposed by the theory of aversive prejudice]. In either case, egalitarian values work as brakes on racist reactions" (p. 154). In addition, whereas individualism is proposed to affect prejudice only when the group stereotype includes characteristics that are contrary to individualistic values, theorists propose that egalitarianism works to counteract all forms of prejudice: "It represents a form of antiprejudice that is not specific to any particular group or underlying cause of negative affect toward outgroups; it is a 'prejudice antidote'" (Biernat et al., 1996, p. 155).

What, then, is the relationship between egalitarianism and prejudice? Biernat and her colleagues (1996) included egalitarianism as well as individualism in their study of attitudes toward African Americans, lesbians and gay men, and fat people. Endorsement of egalitarian values was negatively correlated with prejudice against each group; that is, greater endorsement of egalitarian values was associated with less prejudice (for other examples, see Cowan et al., 1997; Katz & Hass, 1988; Monteith & Walters, 1998). Biernat and her colleagues also found that egalitarianism was more strongly related to prejudice than was individualism. In addition, using a different measure of values, Lilach Sagiv and Shalom Schwartz (1995) found that endorsement of egalitarian values was positively correlated with Israeli Jews' willingness to interact with Israeli Arabs. Thus, as Biernat and her colleagues (1996) proposed, egalitarianism does appear to be a general antidote to prejudice.

How does egalitarianism have its effects? Recall from Chapter 4 that stereotypes, which in their negative form constitute one aspect of prejudice, must be activated before they can have an effect on people's thoughts about and behavior toward outgroups. For examples, Gordon Moskowitz, Amanda Salomon, and Constance Taylor (2000) have found that stimuli associated with outgroups are less likely to activate stereotypes for people who strongly endorse egalitarian values than for people who are less egalitarian. Thus, egalitarianism may inhibit prejudice by preventing the activation of negative stereotypes.

### Perceived Value Differences

Rokeach (1972) proposed that prejudice is, in part, based on the perception that outgroups' value systems differ from one's own. Because values guide judgments of what is good or bad, holding different values implies a lack of goodness in the outgroups. In a sense, this **value difference hypothesis** represents the mirror image of the well-established psychological principle that people like others who are similar to them, especially if they are similar in terms of abstract characteristics such as attitudes and value positions (Berscheid & Reis, 1998). This principle also applies to members of outgroups. For example, several studies have found that people who learn that a gay man holds attitudes similar to their own like him better than people who learn that his attitudes differ from theirs. This finding holds even for people high in prejudice against gay men (for example, Pilkington & Lydon, 1997). Bear in mind, however, that liking one person more than another does not necessarily mean liking that person a lot. These studies also found that expressed liking for a similar gay man was at about the level of that expressed for a dissimilar heterosexual man, and both were liked less than a similar heterosexual man. In this section, we first look at research on the relation of perceived value differences to prejudice. We then present two theoretical explanations for the relation of value differences to prejudice—terror management theory and the attribution-value model.

**Value Dissimilarity.** The value dissimilarity hypothesis holds that one source of prejudice is the belief that members of outgroups do not share the values of one's ingroup. In fact, most people assume that outgroup members' values differ from their own. For example, White Americans believe that Black Americans are less likely to share their important values and less likely to live their lives according to those values than are other White Americans (Biernat et al., 1996); heterosexuals hold similar beliefs about lesbians and gay men (Biernat et al., 1996). Perceptions of group differences in values have also been called **symbolic beliefs** (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) and **symbolic threats** (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). However, the last term may be misleading in some cases; although Whites and heterosexuals believe that Blacks and lesbians and gay men do not share their values, they do not always believe that members of those groups violate or disrespect their values (Biernat et al., 1996).

Nonetheless, a perception of a lack of common values seems to be sufficient for prejudice. Perceptions of value differences are correlated with majority group prejudice against minority groups in a number of contexts, including prejudice against African Americans (Stephan et al., 2002); Cuban, Mexican, and Asian immigrants to the United States (Stephan et al., 1999); lesbians and gay men (Biernat et al., 1996); Native Canadians (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001); French and Pakistani Canadians (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993); Russian immigrants to Israel (Bizman & Yinon, 2001); and fat people (Biernat et al., 1996). Perception of value differences is a two-way street: It should be related to minority group members' attitudes toward the majority group as well as for majority group attitudes toward minority groups. This pattern has been found for ratings of White Americans by African Americans (Stephan et al., 2002), of White Canadians by Native Canadians (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001), and of men by women (C. W. Stephan et al., 2000).

Most of the research cited above has measured value differences in general terms, examining the extent to which outgroup attitudes are perceived to be different from one's own. The value dissimilarity hypothesis also holds that because specific groups are sometimes stereotyped as violating specific values, prejudice against those groups should be higher among people who endorse those values. Supporting this idea, Biernat and her colleagues (1996) found that the extent to which people gave beauty a high rating as a value was correlated with prejudice against fat people. Perhaps the best known example of a values-prejudice relationship is that of using family values as a justification for discrimination against lesbians and gay men; see Box 7.2.

### **Box 7.2    Family Values and Prejudice**

Since the 1992 presidential election, the concept of family values has played a major role in political debates in the United States, especially in debates about the civil rights of lesbians and gay men (for example, Cloud, 1998). Although the concept of family values is poorly defined (Cloud, 1998), lesbians and gay men are stereotyped as violating those values, being perceived as incapable of maintaining stable relationships, being bad parents, corrupting children, and violating traditional gender roles that some people view as fundamental to family life (Vescio & Biernat, 2003). Because of this perceived conflict between the gay/lesbian stereotype and the stereotype of the traditional family (for example, McLeod & Crawford, 1988), one would expect that endorsement of the traditional family would be related to attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.

Surprisingly little research has been conducted on this topic, but what research there is supports the hypothesis. For example, Gregory Herek (1988) found negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men to be correlated with scores on a measure of traditional family ideology that focused primarily on parents as the authority in the family and traditional husband-wife and other gender roles. More recently, Theresa Vescio and Monica Biernat (2003) examined college students' evaluations of a gay or heterosexual man who was portrayed as either a good father or a bad father. Participants who rated family security as an important value evaluated the heterosexual father more favorably than the gay father; participants who rated the value as less important evaluated the two fathers equally. Interestingly, whether the men's parenting behavior was consistent or inconsistent with traditional family values had little effect on the ratings. That is, even when the gay father's behavior demonstrated support

for one aspect of traditional family values, effective parenting, participants who said they valued the family highly gave him a lower rating than a heterosexual father who behaved in the same way.

Family values are also associated with attitudes toward homosexuality in some non-Western cultures. For example, Ming-Hui Hsu and Judith Waters (2001) assessed the relationship between filial piety and attitudes toward lesbians and gay men among Chinese college students. Filial piety refers to "the highest virtue within Confucian doctrine, ... the production of male offspring to maintain the family name [and] offer sacrifices after death" (Hsu & Waters, 2001, p. 3). Hsu and Waters found that greater endorsement of filial piety was associated with more negative attitudes toward both lesbians and gay men for both male and female students. Thus, as the value dissimilarity model would predict, people who strongly endorse a variety of beliefs that can be categorized as family values hold negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, a group stereotyped as violating those values.

Finally, Dana Cloud (1998) reports an interesting sidelight on the family values issue. She notes that its first political use was in the context of race, not sexual orientation. It occurred when, in May 1992, then Vice President Dan Quayle said that racial unrest then taking place "is directly related to the breakdown of family structure" (quoted in Cloud, 1998, p. 395). In fact, Cloud found that in political discourse from December 1992 to July 1996, family values were mentioned almost three times more often in a racial context than in a sexual orientation context. Despite this difference in use, there appears to be no research on the relationship between endorsement of family values and racial attitudes.

**Terror Management Theory.** Jeff Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon, and Tom Pyszczynski (1997; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003) developed **terror management theory** to explain (among other issues) how people's desire to promote and defend their belief and value systems results in prejudice. Their explanation is rooted in two human characteristics—the instinct for self-preservation and the contrasting knowledge that one's death is inevitable. Greenberg and his colleagues propose that the coexistence of the self-preservation instinct and the knowledge of one's vulnerability to death leads to terror because the self-preservation instinct motivates people to try to avoid the unavoidable, death. As a species, one way in which humanity has dealt with this terror is by developing cultural institutions and worldviews that promise immortality. The promised immortality can take two forms. It can be literal, in the form of religious beliefs in an immortal soul that lives on after physical death. Immortality can also be symbolic, in the form of identification with time- and death-transcending social institutions such as the family and the nation and of tangible reminders of continuity such as children and culturally valued achievements that carry on one's reputation after death.

Because culture and its values provide a buffer against the terror created by death, people are motivated to defend their culture against perceived challenges to its validity, such as those posed by different cultural worldviews. If such challenges were to succeed, they would undermine the protective cultural worldview and leave people open to the terror created by the knowledge of death. The theory therefore proposes that if people are made aware of the inevitability of their own deaths they will experience a need to reinforce their faith in their culture. One form this reinforcement takes is the rejection of people who challenge the culture's beliefs and values or who represent other cultures: "The mere existence of alternative [worldviews] will be psychologically unsettling, because granting their validity either explicitly or implicitly undermines absolute faith in one's own worldview.... The most common response is to simply derogate either the alternative worldview or the people who hold that view. By dismissing other worldviews as inaccurate, or the people who hold such views as ignorant savages who would share our perspectives if they were sufficiently intelligent or properly educated, the threat to one's own point of view is minimized" (Greenberg et al., 1997, p. 70).

Researchers test the effects of awareness of one's future death with an experimental manipulation that induces what is called *mortality salience*. In response to a supposed projective personality test, participants in the mortality salience condition write a brief paragraph about what they think will happen to them when they die and the emotions they feel while thinking about their own deaths. Participants in the control condition typically write about a negative experience that does not imply death, such as dental pain. Although this manipulation may sound somewhat minimal, there is a substantial body of research attesting to its effectiveness (Greenberg et al., 1997). After participants write their paragraphs, researchers administer other manipulations and measure the dependent variables, such as by having participants evaluate a person who either does or does not challenge their worldviews.

Most research on terror management theory has focused on responses to people who directly challenge participants' worldviews and cultural values, such

as someone who has written an essay challenging some aspect of traditional American values (Greenberg et al., 1997); much less research has focused on reactions to ethnic groups or other targets of societal prejudice. In one study that did so (Greenberg et al., 1990), research participants who identified themselves as Christians underwent a mortality salience manipulation, after which they read what they were told were self-descriptions written by two other students at their university, one of whom was depicted as a Christian and the other as Jewish. Participants in the mortality salience condition rated the Christian student more positively than the Jewish student; the religion of the students being rated did not affect the evaluations of the participants in the control condition. Taking a different approach to the assessment of prejudice, Lori Nelson and her colleagues (Nelson, Moore, Olivetti, & Scott, 1997) manipulated mortality salience and then had research participants read the case of a man who had been seriously injured when his car crashed. The victim was suing the car's manufacturer, alleging that a manufacturing defect caused the accident; the car manufacturer was described as being either American or as Japanese. Participants in the mortality salience condition assigned more blame to the Japanese manufacturer than to the American manufacturer; there was no difference in the control condition.

Finally, Jeff Schimel and his colleagues (1999) examined the effects of mortality salience on stereotyping. They hypothesized that because outgroup stereotypes are components of cultural worldviews, participants experiencing mortality salience would respond favorably to an outgroup member who acted consistently with the group stereotype (because such behavior would be consistent with their worldview) and would respond unfavorably to an outgroup member who acted inconsistently with the group stereotype (because such behavior would contradict with their worldview). After undergoing a mortality salience manipulation, White research participants read one of three essays purportedly written by a Black student about his summer activities. In the stereotype-consistent condition, the student reported engaging in such activities as "splitting to L.A., serious hoop, slammin' night life, cruisin' for honeys, clubbing, getting stupid, a few run-ins, drinking forties" (Schimel et al., 1999, p. 914). In the stereotype-inconsistent condition, the writer used formal language and told about taking summer engineering classes, working for a software company, and reading two novels about World War II. A stereotype-neutral essay told about the student's traveling to San Francisco for sightseeing, to Ohio to visit family, and to New Orleans for a friend's wedding; he could afford the trips because his mother worked for an airline. As shown in Figure 7.1, in the mortality salience condition, liking for the Black student decreased as his behavior became less stereotype consistent; the opposite pattern was found in the control condition. Another way of looking at these results is that for control participants, liking increased with apparent value similarity, which is consistent with the belief similarity effect discussed earlier; however, for mortality salient participants, liking decreased with apparent value similarity because that similarity contradicted the participants' worldviews.

Taken together, the results of these studies indicate that mortality salience leads to increased prejudice. What psychological mechanism underlies this effect? From a terror management theory perspective, prejudice and stereotyping of




**FIGURE 7.1** Mortality Salience and Stereotyping

Under mortality salience conditions, White research participants liked a Black student more as his behavior became more stereotypical. Under control conditions, White research participants liked a Black student less as his behavior became more stereotypical.

SOURCE: Adapted from Schimel et al. (1999, Table 3, p. 914).

outgroup members reinforces people's cultural worldviews. It does so by emphasizing the negative characteristics of the outgroup that is challenging their worldview. The presence of these negative characteristics implies that any challenge the group makes is defective and therefore no real threat to the worldview. Mortality salience also increases people's feelings of identification with their ingroup (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002); as we discuss in Chapter 9, strong ingroup identification tends to lead to prejudice. This increased identification with the ingroup can result in a kind of "My group, right or wrong!" mentality, leading people to tolerate negative behaviors by ingroup members they would otherwise condemn. See Box 7.3 for an example.

**The Attribution-Value Model.** The **attribution-value model** (Crandall et al., 2001) proposes that prejudice begins with the perception that members of minority groups have characteristics that are contrary to majority group values. Thus, fat people are seen as lazy and unable to exercise restraint in eating, and lesbians and gay men are seen as violating family values. Coupled to that perception is the belief that members of those groups are responsible for their undesirable characteristics. Because people who are seen as responsible for their negative

### **Box 7.3 Mortality Salience and Tolerance for Racism**

Two of the effects of mortality salience are a motivation to defend one's cultural worldview by derogating other groups (Greenberg et al., 1997) and increased identification with the ingroup (Castano et al., 2002). As two studies have shown, the combination of these factors can lead people to tolerate acts of racism that they would otherwise condemn. Jeff Greenberg and his colleagues (Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 2001) had White research participants undergo a mortality salience manipulation after which they read an employment discrimination case in which the plaintiff alleged that he was repeatedly passed over for promotion because of his race. In one version of the case, the employee was Black and the manager who had allegedly blocked his promotion was White; in the other version, these roles were reversed. Participants rated the extent to which they thought the manager was guilty of discrimination. Participants in the mortality salience condition rated the White manager as less guilty of discrimination and the Black manager as more guilty of discrimination compared to participants in the control condition. Thus, mortality salience functioned to lessen the perceived guilt of an ingroup member who harmed an outgroup member and to increase the perceived

guilt of an outgroup member who harmed an ingroup member.

Joel Lieberman and his colleagues (Lieberman, Arndt, Personius, & Cook, 2001) examined a more extreme situation, that of hate crimes. Following a mortality salience manipulation, research participants read a summary of a crime in which two young men attacked a man who had just left what was described as a "Jewish Pride rally," a "Gay Pride rally," or just "a rally." The first two versions of the crime were clearly hate crimes because witnesses reported that the attackers shouted aggressive anti-Jewish or antigay insults as they beat their victim; in the control condition, nonspecific insults were used. The victim had to be hospitalized because of the injuries he received. After reading the case, participants recommended the amount of bail that one of the alleged perpetrators should be required to post. Participants in the control condition recommended higher bail amounts for the hate crimes than for the other assault; in the mortality salience condition, lower bail was recommended for the alleged hate crime perpetrator. As in the job discrimination study, mortality salience lessened the perceived guilt of an ingroup member who harmed an outgroup member.

characteristics arouse negative emotions in others (Weiner, 1995), prejudice results when groups are perceived to be responsible for their negative stereotypic characteristics. Thus, studies conducted in a number of countries have found that dislike of fat people is correlated with the belief that fatness is a matter of choice: If fat people would only choose not to eat so much, they would not be fat (Crandall et al., 2001). Similarly, researchers have found that less negative attitudes toward homosexuality are held by people who believe that homosexuality is a matter of biology rather than choice (for example, Jayaratne et al., 2006) or, more generally, that homosexuality is not something that is changeable or under a person's control (for example, Haslam & Levy, 2006).

The research just cited was correlational and so could not show that attributions of responsibility cause prejudice. However, some experimental research has been conducted to examine whether manipulating people's perceptions of the cause of a negative characteristic results in differing evaluations of people with that characteristic. For example, William DeJong (1980) had research participants give their impressions of a young woman who was portrayed, through photographs and information in a fact sheet, as overweight. The fact sheet told some participants that the woman's overweight was due to a medical condition; the fact sheet read by other participants provided no cause for the overweight,

implying that it was due to overeating. A third group of participants rated an average weight woman. The woman who was overweight due to a medical condition was rated more favorably than the overweight woman without a medical condition and equally favorably as the average-weight woman. Therefore, leading people to believe that a negative characteristic was caused by something not under the person's control led to more favorable ratings of the person. Similar results have been found for ratings of a person whose offensive body odor was attributed either to a medical condition or to not bathing (Levine & McBurney, 1977) and for attitudes toward lesbians and gay men after participants read about homosexuality being either a matter of biology or an undetermined cause (Piskur & Degelman, 1992).

Although strong evidence shows that the attributions for the cause of obesity and homosexuality are related to attitudes toward those groups, the attribution-value model might not apply equally well to all forms of prejudice. For example, Nick Haslam, Louis Rothschild, and Donald Ernst (2002) found that beliefs about whether a group's characteristics are changeable were related to attitudes toward gay men but not to racial or gender attitudes. This difference may exist because of two dimensions people use to classify social groups (Haslam et al., 2000). One dimension is *naturalness*, the extent to which group membership is seen as biologically based. If a group is seen as highly natural, group members cannot leave their group for another; for example, a woman cannot change into a man. However, members of low-naturalness groups can change their membership; for example, a Republican could become a Democrat. The other dimension is *entitativity*, the extent to which group members are seen as being similar to each other, to which knowing that a person is a member of the group provides useful information about the person, and to which group membership is exclusive (the person either clearly belongs to the group or not; there is no in-between state). For example, all members of a political party are assumed to hold the same political views, people assume that knowing a person's party affiliation provides information about those views, and a person is either a Republican or Democrat, not both at the same time.

Some groups, such as racial and gender groups, are seen as being high on both dimensions. Femeness, for example, is seen as both natural in a biological sense and as entitative: all women are perceived to share certain characteristics, knowing that a person is a woman rather than a man supposedly provides useful information about her, and (most people believe) a person must be either a man or a woman: there is nothing in between. Other groups, such as lesbians and gay men, are seen as high on entitativity but low on naturalness. That is, they are seen as coherent social groups, but not as natural or biological in nature, and so people can change from one group to another (for example, from homosexual to heterosexual). Therefore, being gay or lesbian is seen as a matter of choice, just as one can choose to be a Republican or Democrat (political groups are also seen as low on naturalness but high on entitativity). Haslam and his colleagues (2002) therefore suggest that attributional models of prejudice apply only to groups that are seen as high on entitativity and low on naturalness: "Categories that are represented as unambiguous natural kinds—such as races and genders—cannot be understood in terms



of personal control and choice. Their members cannot be held responsible for belonging to them if membership is a matter of immutable biology.... By this account, prejudice towards [lesbians and] gay men is more strongly associated with [entitativity] than are sexism and racism because the culture's prevailing belief that homosexuality is not a natural kind allows a particular form of stigmatizing" based on attributions of responsibility for violating cultural values (pp. 96–97).

## **SOCIAL IDEOLOGIES**

Ideologies are sets of attitudes and beliefs that predispose people to view the world in certain ways and to respond in ways consistent with those viewpoints. As John Jost and colleagues (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) explain, ideologies are psychologically important for two reasons. First, "people adopt ideological belief systems ... to satisfy their psychological needs and motives" (p. 341). For example, authoritarianism appeals to people with strong needs for structure and certainty; authority figures can provide both (for example, Altemeyer, 1996). Second, "people embrace ideological belief systems at least in part because they inspire conviction and purpose" (p. 351); that is, they give people goals to strive for. Two important social ideologies that have been studied in relation to prejudice are religion and political orientation.

### **Religion**

More than half a century ago, Gordon Allport (1954) wrote that "the role of religion [in prejudice] is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice.... The sublimity of religious ideals is offset by the horrors of persecution in the name of these same ideals" (p. 444). The situation has not changed much since then: as we will see, some forms of religiosity (ways of being religious) are positively correlated with prejudice and other forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with prejudice. We first examine the relationship of degree of religious involvement to prejudice, continue with the concept of religious orientation, take a bit of a detour to look at the concepts of proscribed and permitted prejudices, and conclude with religious fundamentalism.

As you read this section, there are two cautions to bear in mind. First, almost all the research on the relationship between religion and prejudice has been conducted in North America and most of the participants in the research have been White, middle-class Christians (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993). Therefore, little is known about the relationship of religious faith to prejudice among believers in other religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism, to name only a few of the world's other large religions. Second, because most of the focus has been on the degree or nature of research participants' religiosity, nonreligious people have rarely been included in the research (Batson & Burris, 1994). Consequently, we know relatively little about the ways in which nonreligious people differ from religious people and how those differences relate to prejudice.

**Religious Involvement.** Because almost all religions teach intergroup tolerance, one would expect that people who are more involved in their religions, and so presumably believe their religion's teachings more strongly, would show less prejudice. However, based on a review of 38 studies conducted from 1940 to 1990, Daniel Batson and his colleagues (1993) found that religious involvement was consistently correlated with a variety of forms of prejudice. Research conducted since 1990, which has focused largely on attitudes toward homosexuality, has found a similar pattern of results (Whitley, in press). Thus, it appears that, as Batson and his colleagues (1993) wrote, "religion is not associated with increased love and acceptance but with increased intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry" (p. 302).

**Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientation.** These findings were not received well by religious leaders and researchers interested in the psychology of religion, who had expected that there would be a negative correlation between religious involvement and prejudice (Batson et al., 1993). As a result, the focus of research shifted from the degree to which people are religious to the way in which they are religious, that is, from quantity of religious involvement to quality of religious involvement. This shift is consistent with a distinction Allport (1954) had made some years earlier: "belonging to a church because it is a safe, powerful, superior in-group is likely to be the mark of an authoritarian character and to be linked with prejudice. Belonging to a church because its basic creed of brotherhood expresses the ideals one sincerely believes in, is associated with tolerance" (pp. 452–453). These ideas evolved into the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967).

People with an **intrinsic religious orientation** truly believe in their religions' teachings and try to live their lives according to them. They "find their master motive in religion.... Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that he *lives* his religion" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434, emphasis in original). People with a strong internal orientation should be unprejudiced to the extent that their religions teach intergroup tolerance. In contrast, people with an **extrinsic religious orientation** use religion as a way to achieve nonreligious goals, "to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit [nonreligious] needs" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434). People high in extrinsic orientation are hypothesized to pay little attention to religious teachings and so to accept and express their societies' prejudices even when those prejudices run counter to their religions' teachings (Duck & Hunsberger, 1999). The first two sections of Table 7.4 present some sample questionnaire items used to assess intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation. Research findings have generally supported the hypothesis that an extrinsic orientation is positively related to prejudice, although the correlations are often small. The results for intrinsic religiosity are less clear, but studies have generally found either a small negative or no correlation for racial prejudice (Batson et al., 1993) but a positive correlation for anti-gay prejudice (Whitley, in press).

The findings that sincere religious belief, defined in terms of an intrinsic religious orientation, was negatively correlated with prejudice were more satisfying

**TABLE 7.4 Sample Questionnaire Items Used to Assess Religious Orientations**

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**Intrinsic<sup>a</sup>**

It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thoughts and meditation.

I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.

Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Divine Being.

Religion is especially important to me because it answers questions about the meaning of life.

**Extrinsic<sup>a</sup>**

Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in life.

The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships.

I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray.

Occasionally, I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to protect my social and economic well-being.

**Quest<sup>b</sup>**

As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change.

It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.

I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning and purpose of my life.

Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.

**Fundamentalism<sup>c</sup>**

God has given mankind a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.

The long-established traditions in religion show the best way to honor and serve God, and should never be compromised.

Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science must be wrong.

To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, true religion.

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<sup>a</sup>Allport and Ross (1967), reproduced in Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993, p. 162).

<sup>b</sup>Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993, p. 170).

<sup>c</sup>Altemeyer (1996, pp. 158–159).

to researchers than the finding that religious involvement was positively correlated with prejudice. However, Batson and colleagues became concerned that intrinsically religious people might not really be low in prejudice, but instead were simply motivated not to appear prejudiced (Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, & Pynch, 1986). That is, because their religions tell them they should be unprejudiced, intrinsically religious people give socially desirable—that is, unprejudiced—responses on self-report measures. As Daniel Batson and Christopher Burris (1994) put it, “every major [religious] denomination is on record opposing racial prejudice and discrimination. Yet we are given pause when we see a headline that reads, ‘Sunday morning at 11 remains most segregated hour of the week’ (*Atlanta Constitution*, August 9, 1987, p. 11-A). We suspect that in many cases the intrinsic believer,

attending to the practice of the religious community as well as the preaching, is [learning] a very different, more pharisaical norm: The truly religious can't look racist" (p. 167).

Batson and his colleagues (1986) tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which White research participants were led to believe that they and another student would watch and evaluate a short movie in one of two two-person "theaters." When participants arrived at the theaters, they found a Black student waiting in one and a White student waiting in the other. There were two experimental conditions. In the overt prejudice condition, the same movie was being shown in each theater, so choosing to sit with the White confederate might make participants appear to be prejudiced, because the race of the other person was the only factor that differentiated the two theaters. In the covert prejudice condition, different movies were being shown in each theater, so choosing to sit with the White confederate could be attributed to a factor other than prejudice—the movie. Batson and his colleagues reasoned that if social desirability influenced the racial attitudes of internally religious people, they would choose to sit with the Black person in the overt prejudice condition as a way of demonstrating their lack of prejudice, but would choose to sit with the White person when that choice could be attributed to movie preference rather than prejudice. A lack of prejudice would be indicated if an equal number of participants chose to sit with the Black student and the White student. The researchers' results partially supported their expectation: In the overt prejudice condition, 75 percent of the intrinsically religious participants chose to sit with the Black student compared to 46 percent of the intrinsically religious participants in the covert prejudice condition. Note that although the intrinsically religious participants exhibited a social desirability response bias by favoring the Black student over the White student, they made unprejudiced choices in the covert condition, sitting with the Black and White students at about the same rate. Thus, although intrinsically religious people do appear to be influenced by social desirability concerns, they also appear to be unprejudiced, at least in regard to race. Contrary to the theory underlying the concept of religious orientation, extrinsic religiosity was unrelated to prejudice in either study.

**Quest Orientation.** Based on his study of theology and the results of his psychological research, Batson (1976) proposed a third type of religious orientation, which he named **quest**. Quest reflects a view of religiosity as a search, or quest, for answers to questions about the meaning of life. "An individual who approaches religion in this way recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably never will know, the final truth about such matters. Still, the questions are deemed important and, however tentative and subject to change, answers are sought" (Batson & Burris, 1994, p. 157). The third section of Table 7.4 shows some sample questionnaire items used to assess quest orientation. Quest orientation is only minimally correlated with intrinsic and extrinsic orientation (for example, Wilkinson, 2004) and so constitutes a third dimension of religious orientation that Batson (1976) described as a "more ... flexible type of religiosity than the other two" (p. 207).

Because quest orientation reflects an open-mindedness and willingness to change that would include tolerance for members of other social groups, researchers have hypothesized that it would be negatively correlated with prejudice (Spilka et al., 2003). With few exceptions, research has supported that hypothesis (Whitley, in press). In addition, the relationship between quest and low prejudice seems to be unaffected by social desirability concerns. For example, in Batson and colleagues' (1986) "movie theater" study described earlier, about half of research participants high on quest orientation chose to sit with the Black student in both the overt (44 percent) and covert (54 percent) prejudice conditions, indicating a lack of prejudice. Thus, quest initially appeared to be the source of "universal love and compassion" sought by psychology of religion researchers (Batson, Floyd, Meyer, & Winner, 1999).

**Proscribed versus Permitted Prejudices.** Theorists have pointed out that although most religions teach tolerance toward outgroups, some outgroups may be tolerated more than others (Duck & Hunsberger, 1999). That is, although some religions proscribe (that is, forbid) some forms of prejudice, such as racism, they may at the same time permit prejudice against people, such as lesbians and gay men, who are perceived to violate the religion's values. Because intrinsically religious people believe strongly in their religions' teachings (for example, Wilkinson, 2004), researchers hypothesized that they would follow their religions' teachings regarding proscribed and permitted prejudices. That is, researchers expected that intrinsic religiosity would be negatively correlated with proscribed prejudices and positively correlated with permitted prejudices. In contrast, researchers hypothesized that quest orientation would be negatively correlated with both types of prejudice because of the generalized tolerance it engenders (Batson et al., 1993). Extrinsic religiosity has not received much attention in this research because extrinsically religious people are hypothesized to be more influenced by societal norms than by religious norms (Herek, 1987). Because societal norms may or may not coincide with religious norms, it is not possible to formulate clear hypotheses about the influence of religious norms on extrinsically religious people.

One approach has been to examine the correlations of religious orientations to proscribed and permitted prejudices, using racism as the proscribed prejudice and anti-gay attitudes as the permitted prejudice. The correlations that have been found for the relationship of intrinsic and quest orientations with both forms of prejudice have been small. Nonetheless, as hypothesized, researchers have found intrinsic religiosity to be negatively correlated with racism and positively correlated with anti-gay attitudes and quest to be negatively correlated with both forms of prejudice (Whitley, in press).

Another approach to testing the hypotheses is experimental, studying people's reactions to individuals who are presented to them as violating or not violating their values. For example Batson and his colleagues (1999) gave college student research participants who were high on intrinsic religiosity the opportunity to help another student earn some money. The other student was portrayed as either heterosexual and needing the money to visit his or her grandparents, as gay and needing the money to visit his or her grandparents, or as gay and needing the

money to attend a gay rights rally. Although levels of helping were high in all three conditions, participants were more likely to help the student portrayed as heterosexual than the student portrayed as gay, regardless of why the student needed help. Thus, intrinsically religious students were reluctant to help someone who violated their religious values even when the help would promote a value-consistent behavior (visiting grandparents) rather than value-violating behavior (attending a gay rights rally).

In contrast to these results for intrinsic religiosity, Batson and his colleagues (1999) found that participants high on quest religiosity were equally willing to help the other student regardless of experimental condition. Thus, students high on quest were willing to help someone who violated their religious values even when the help would promote a value-violating behavior. However, Batson and colleagues (Batson et al., 1999; Batson, Eidelman, Higley & Russell, 2001) noted that people high on quest might value the openness and tolerance that characterizes their approach to religion more than any particular religious doctrine, such as the prohibition against homosexuality. People high on quest, therefore might be tolerant of people who violate religious principles but might dislike prejudiced people. To test this possibility, Batson and his colleagues (2001) conducted an experiment similar to the one just described, except that the student the participants could help was either tolerant of homosexuality and needed money to visit his or her grandparents, intolerant of homosexuality and needed money to visit his or her grandparents, or intolerant of homosexuality and needed money to attend an anti-gay-rights rally. The researchers found that although participants high on quest were equally willing to help both the tolerant and intolerant student visit grandparents, almost none of them were willing to help the intolerant student to attend the anti-gay-rights rally. That is, people high on quest were tolerant of someone whose religious beliefs were different than their own, but would not support behavior that was contrary to their beliefs.

Although these findings shed a positive light on people high on quest, Jerry Goldfried and Maureen Miner (2002) proposed that this tolerance may be limited. They suggested that whereas people high on quest may be tolerant of attitudes that differed from their own, they may not be tolerant of a religious style that ran contrary to theirs, such as fundamentalism. Using a research design similar to Batson and colleagues (2001), Goldfried and Miner found that people high on quest were unwilling to help a person who expressed a fundamentalist religious orientation even when the help would not promote fundamentalist religious goals. Thus, people high on quest appear to be tolerant of prejudiced people (Batson et al., 2001), but not of intolerant behavior or people whose religious style is inconsistent with their own open-minded orientation. Thus, there appears to be no universally tolerant religious orientation: Intrinsic and quest orientation are each related to some form of prejudice.

**Religious Fundamentalism.** **Religious fundamentalism** is “the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contain the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously

fought; [and] that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past” (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 118). Religious fundamentalists also are committed to using their belief system as a guide for understanding and interacting with the secular world (Kirkpatrick, Hood, & Hartz, 1991). Fundamentalist movements sharing these characteristics are found among Christians, Jews, and Muslims (Armstrong, 2000). The last section of Table 7.4 shows some sample questionnaire items used to assess religious fundamentalism. Not surprisingly, given its nature, fundamentalism is highly correlated with an intrinsic religious orientation and somewhat negatively correlated with quest orientation (for example, Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). These correlations reflect fundamentalists’ adherence to religion and to living their religion in their everyday lives on the one hand and, on the other, the contrast between questers’ search for answers to theological question and fundamentalists’ confidence that their religion already provides those answers.

Research has found religious fundamentalism to be consistently associated with prejudice (Spilka et al., 2003). For example, in a review of studies published between 1989 and 2006, Whitley (in press) found that fundamentalism had an average correlation of  $r = .44$  with negative attitudes toward homosexuality and an average correlation of  $r = .18$  with negative racial attitudes. Note that, as with intrinsic religious orientation, the correlation is stronger for a permitted prejudice (against homosexuality) than for a proscribed prejudice (racism). However, whereas intrinsic orientation has a negative correlation with proscribed prejudice, fundamentalism has a positive, albeit small, correlation. In addition, Aubyn Fulton, Richard Gorsuch, and Elizabeth Maynard (1999) concluded that “the homosexual antipathy of fundamentalism is in excess of what is required by their [sic] religious ideology” (p. 20). They came to this conclusion based on two of their research findings. First, although fundamentalists’ religious values require them to reject homosexuality on moral grounds, they did so on nonmoral grounds as well, thereby going beyond the requirements of their religion. Second, Fulton and colleagues (1999) found that fundamentalists expressed prejudice against celibate as well as sexually active gay men, even though the former group “are not in violation of the perceived biblical injunctions [against homosexual behavior]” (p. 20).

**Conclusions.** Given the complexity of the relationship between religion and prejudice, what can we conclude? Three factors stand out. First, almost all religions teach acceptance and tolerance of all people, including people belonging to different racial and ethnic groups. Second, in practice, this acceptance and tolerance can be limited to those who are perceived to share one’s religious values; prejudice may be permitted against those who are perceived to violate those values. Note, however, that permitting a prejudice is not the same as requiring it. That is, people are allowed to adhere to permitted prejudices, but are not required to do so; as a result, people may or may not exhibit a permitted prejudice based on other factors that influence their beliefs. Finally, it is essential to bear in mind that all the data relating religiosity to prejudice are correlational, so one should not come to the conclusion that religion causes prejudice. Although that might be

true in some cases, in other cases people might be using religious doctrine as a justification for their preexisting prejudices. As Allport (1954) noted more than 50 years ago, “Piety may ... be a convenient mask for prejudices which ... have nothing to do with religion” (p. 447).

### Political Orientation

Political orientation is one of the most controversial topics addressed by those who study the psychology of prejudice. The controversy arises from research that has consistently found a correlation between endorsement of conservative political beliefs and prejudice (for example, Jones, 2002). As a result, some writers have objected that conservatives have become what might be called the “designated villains” of prejudice. For example, Paul Sniderman and Philip Tetlock (1986) have suggested that the typical portrayal is that “Racists ... are by definition conservatives; and conservatives, again by definition, are racists” (p. 181). The symbolic prejudice approach (see Chapter 6) has been particularly singled out for criticism in this regard because it defines prejudice partly in terms of some of the traditional American values that conservatives endorse (see, for example, Tetlock, 1994; for a reply, see Sears, 1994).

In this section, we examine some of the recent research on the relation of political orientation to prejudice, looking first at prejudice itself and then at attitudes toward social policies, such as affirmative action, that are intended to relieve some of the effects of prejudice and discrimination. While reading this section, it is important to bear in mind that there has been little consensus on how to define *liberal* and *conservative*, the two key terms of political orientation, either conceptually or operationally (Knight, 1999). As a result, direct comparison of the results of different studies can be difficult.

**Conservatism and Prejudice.** As was the case for older research, more recent studies have found a relationship between endorsement of conservative beliefs and prejudice (for example, Federico & Sidanius, 2002). However, as Duckitt (1994) noted, the more important question is not whether a relationship exists between conservatism and prejudice, but why it exists. Two principal explanations have been proposed, both rooted in concepts we discussed earlier in this chapter. One explanation draws on the concepts of *social dominance orientation* (SDO) and *right-wing authoritarianism* (RWA). Endorsement of conservative beliefs is correlated with both SDO (for example, Whitley & Lee, 2000), which are themselves related to prejudice. Together, RWA and SDO account for a large proportion of variance in conservatism (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002) and when SDO and RWA are controlled, the correlation between conservatism and prejudice is greatly reduced (for example, Federico & Sidanius, 2002). From the perspective of social dominance theory, these results suggest that prejudice is really caused by SDO and RWA rather than a conservative belief system: The correlation between conservatism and prejudice arises because conservative beliefs constitute one form of legitimizing myths that people high in SDO can use to justify their prejudice. That is, conservatism does not cause prejudice;



rather, some prejudiced people use the conservative belief system as a means of justifying their prejudices.

Another explanation for the relationship between conservatism and prejudice draws on the attribution-value model of prejudice. Researchers have found that, compared to liberals, conservatives are more likely to see people as being responsible for negative outcomes they experience, such as poverty and unemployment (for a review, see Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Therefore, when one group experiences a negative outcome, such as unemployment, to a greater degree than another group, conservatives are likely to attribute the outcome to a factor under group members' control, such as laziness (especially if laziness is part of the group stereotype). In contrast, liberals are more likely to attribute the outcome to factors beyond individuals' control, such as poor economic conditions. These different perceptions make conservatives more likely to be prejudiced because, in terms of the attribution-value model, they are more likely to perceive others as violating an important social value (hard work in our example) and dislike them for it.

This principle is illustrated by research conducted by Alan Lambert and Alison Chasteen (1997), who examined prejudice against African Americans and older adults. Lambert and Chasteen chose these groups because, although both are perceived to be economically disadvantaged, African Americans are stereotypically blamed for their economic situation because they are seen as violating the work ethic, but older people are not blamed for their situation because they are seen as victims of circumstance. The researchers hypothesized that liberalism would be correlated with positive attitudes toward both groups because liberals tend to attribute disadvantage to situational factors regardless of value issues. In contrast, they hypothesized that conservatism would be correlated with negative attitudes toward African Americans because they are perceived as value violators, but with positive attitudes toward older people because they are not. Lambert and Chasteen's research is unusual in that they assessed liberalism and conservatism separately, so each research participant received a score on each ideological dimension. That is, rather than assuming that people are either liberal or conservative, they assumed that people can have a mixture of liberal and conservative beliefs. This approach allowed them to examine individual differences in both liberalism and conservatism. Lambert and Chasteen's results supported their hypotheses: liberalism was correlated with positive attitudes toward both African Americans and older adults, whereas conservatism was correlated with negative attitudes toward African Americans but with positive attitudes toward older people.

If at least some of the relation between conservatism and prejudice comes from attributional differences between liberals and conservatives, where do these differences come from? Linda Skitka and her colleagues (2002) found that the answer lies in liberalism rather than conservatism. Using an approach that classified people as either liberal or conservative, they found that both liberals and conservatives initially attributed responsibility for negative outcomes to the person experiencing the outcome. They had expected this finding because personal responsibility is an American value that both liberals and conservatives have

internalized. However, liberals were more likely than conservatives to change their attribution to a situational one (that is, one that fit their value system) when given an opportunity to elaborate on their responses. Because an attribution of personal responsibility is consistent with conservative values, conservatives have no need to change their attribution. Therefore, what is typically viewed as the conservative reaction—attributions of personal responsibility for value-violating outcomes that lead to blame that in turn lead to prejudice—is the “default option” for both liberals and conservatives.

**Liberalism and Prejudice.** John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner (1998) have suggested that both liberals and conservatives can be prejudiced, but that prejudice takes different forms in the two groups. Conservatives, they proposed, exhibit modern-symbolic prejudice whereas liberals exhibit aversive prejudice (see Chapter 6). Paul Nail, Helen Harton, and Brian Decker (2003) tested this possibility by having White research participants who had classified themselves as liberal, moderate, or conservative read a summary of a legal case in which a police officer had assaulted a motorist. In one experimental condition the police officer was White and the motorist was Black; in the other condition, the police officer was Black and the motorist was White. In both conditions, the officer was acquitted of assault charges in state court despite strong evidence against him (for example, the assault had been videotaped by a witness) but later was found guilty of violating the motorist’s civil rights in federal court. After reading the case, the participants rated the extent to which they thought the police officer was being exposed to double jeopardy; that is, being tried twice for the same offense.

Nail and his colleagues (2003) hypothesized that if modern-symbolic prejudice is associated with conservatism, then conservatives would rate double jeopardy exposure as being lower for the Black police officer because doing so would allow them to express their prejudice subtly, in that the double-jeopardy rating does not directly criticize the Black officer. In contrast, they hypothesized that if liberalism is associated with aversive prejudice, liberals would rate double jeopardy as higher for the Black police officer because they would feel guilty over their residual negative racial feelings and overcompensate for their guilt by being more sympathetic to the Black officer. The researchers proposed no hypotheses concerning moderates because neither theory of prejudice addresses that situation. Figure 7.2 illustrates the results of the research. As predicted, liberals favored the Black police officer and conservatives favored the White police officer; that is, both liberals and conservatives were prejudiced but in different ways. In contrast, moderates, who had no political ideology that might bias their responses, treated both police officers equally.

**Social Policy Attitudes.** Generally, people with conservative political beliefs hold more negative attitudes toward social policies intended to increase intergroup equality than do people with liberal political beliefs (for example, Sidanius, Singh, Hetts, & Federico, 2000). Perhaps the best known and most controversial of these programs is affirmative action. Three explanations can be offered to explain why conservatives are more opposed to affirmative action than are liberals. One is that




**FIGURE 7.2** Pro-Black Bias in Aversive Prejudice

Politically liberal participants (presumably experiencing aversive prejudice) rated the Black police officer to be experiencing double jeopardy to a greater extent than the White police officer, politically conservative participants (presumably experiencing modern-symbolic prejudice) showed the opposite pattern of response, while politically moderate participants made similar ratings for Black and White officers.

SOURCE: Adapted from Nail, Harton, and Decker (2003, Figures 1, 2, and 3, pp. 758, 760, and 761).

because conservatism is correlated with prejudice, conservatives oppose such programs because they are prejudiced. The second explanation parallels the first, holding that because conservatism is correlated with SDO, conservatives oppose the programs because they are anti-egalitarian. The third explanation has been variously labeled principled conservatism (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996), principled objections (Federico & Sidanius, 2002), and principled politics (Sidanius et al., 2000). This hypothesis proposes that conservatives oppose affirmative action because they sincerely believe in certain principles—such as fairness, individual merit, and minimal government—that they see as being inherently inconsistent with programs that favor one group over another, especially when these programs are mandated or carried out by the government. While reading our summary of the research evidence bearing on these hypotheses, keep in mind that interpretation of the research is complicated by the facts that the term *affirmative action* can have many meanings and that people's attitudes toward affirmative action vary as a function of the meaning they apply to it (see Chapter 14). For example, although most people think affirmative action means giving preferential treatment to

women and members of minority groups, such an approach is only legal if an organization is making up for past discrimination. In its most accurate sense, affirmative action means establishing policies and procedures that ensure equal opportunity for women and members of minority groups (Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & Downing, 2003).

The prejudice explanation of conservative opposition to affirmative action implies that if levels of prejudice are controlled, there should no longer be a relationship between conservatism and opposition. In this context *controlling* means using statistical procedures that show what a relationship between two variables, such as political orientation and opposition to affirmative action, would look like if everyone had similar scores on a third variable that is correlated with the other two, such as prejudice. In this case, controlling for prejudice means asking what the correlation between political orientation and opposition to affirmative action would look like if both liberals and conservatives had similar scores on a measure of prejudice. The results of such research show that when prejudice is controlled, there is only a small reduction in the relationship between conservatism and opposition to affirmative action (for example, Federico & Sidanius, 2002). These results indicate that there is more to the relationship between conservatism and opposition to affirmative action than prejudice.

The anti-egalitarianism explanation of conservative opposition to affirmative action implies that if SDO is controlled, there should no longer be a relationship between conservatism and opposition. However, as with prejudice, controlling for SDO reduces the conservatism-opposition relationship only slightly (for example, Federico & Sidanius, 2002). Therefore, conservative opposition to affirmation action cannot be explained entirely in terms of anti-egalitarianism.

The principled objections explanation is more difficult to evaluate than the other two because a number of principles are at issue and no research has systematically investigated all of them. We focus on one of those principles, fairness. One conservative objection to affirmative action is that it is inherently unfair because it favors one group over another. One implication of this position is that conservatives should be less opposed to affirmative action programs that do not violate the principle of fairness or merit (such as by offering the same professional development programs to members of both majority and minority groups) than to those that do. Research shows that people who believe in the principle that rewards should be based on qualifications (the merit principle) also support such equal treatment programs but do not support programs that give members of one group preference over members of other groups (Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998). People who support the merit principle are also less likely to oppose preferential treatment programs that are instituted as a remedy for discrimination (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002). Because discrimination is itself an unfair impediment to application of the merit principle, in such a case affirmative action would promote fairness.

One complication to fairness as a principled objection to affirmative action is that perceptions of fairness are themselves related to prejudice and SDO: Prejudiced people and those high in SDO are more likely to endorse unfairness as an objection to affirmative action than are less prejudiced people and those

low in SDO (Federico & Sidanius, 2002), perhaps as a means of justifying their prejudice. A second complication is that the fairness objection should apply equally to all groups, but conservatives are more opposed to affirmative action for African Americans than for women (for example, Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2005). Christine Reyna and her colleagues (2005) found that this difference was related to an aspect of fairness—deservingness. Women are seen as more deserving of the help provided by affirmative action, perhaps because of the laziness component of the Black stereotype. Reyna and her colleagues found that when attributions of deservingness were controlled, there was no difference in approval of race- and gender-based affirmative action programs. These results also suggest that fairness as a principled objection is somewhat contaminated by prejudice.

**Conclusions.** What can we conclude about the relationship of political orientation to prejudice? First, the research does indicate a moderate correlation between conservatism and prejudice, but the research also indicates that SDO and RWA can account for the relationship. That is, some conservatives are prejudiced and some are not, and those who are prejudiced tend to be high on SDO or RWA. Second, liberals as well as conservatives can be prejudiced, but it appears that liberals are more likely to exhibit aversive prejudice and that conservatives are more likely to exhibit modern-symbolic prejudice. Finally, some evidence shows that the objections many conservatives make to programs such as affirmative action are based on principle rather than prejudice. However, prejudiced people may use those principles to justify objections that actually stem from prejudice.

## SUMMARY

Individual difference researchers study the ways in which people's personal characteristics relate to other variables such as prejudice. Two individual difference variables that have been consistently linked with prejudice are *right-wing authoritarianism* (RWA) and *social dominance orientation* (SDO). The study of authoritarianism as a factor in prejudice began after World War II. The research initially focused on what was called the *authoritarian personality*, a personality type that was postulated to be especially susceptible to unthinking obedience to authority and to prejudice. Recent research has focused on RWA, a refined version of the original concept. People high in RWA are prejudiced against a wide variety of groups, especially groups that are perceived to violate traditional values and groups that authority figures condemn. A number of psychological characteristics may predispose people high in RWA to prejudice, including mental inflexibility, a disinterest in experiencing new things, a perception of the world as a dangerous place, and a tendency to organize their worldviews in terms of ingroups and outgroups.

SDO is a belief system that leads people to want their ingroup to dominate in society and be superior to outgroups. It is composed of group-based dominance, the belief that one's ingroup should dominate in society, and opposition to

equality, the belief that societies should be structured so that one group dominates others. Generally, members of groups that hold more power in a society exhibit higher levels of SDO. People high in SDO are prejudiced against a variety of groups, especially those that challenge the legitimacy of social inequality. Psychological characteristics that might predispose people high in SDO to prejudice include seeing the world in competitive terms, belief that other groups' successes necessarily come at their ingroup's expense, and low empathy. People high in SDO justify their prejudices with legitimizing myths, or belief systems, such as group stereotypes that portray outgroups as inferior to the ingroup. Although SDO may appear to be similar to RWA, the two concepts differ in a number of ways. For example, SDO emphasizes relations between ingroups and outgroups whereas RWA emphasizes obedience to ingroup authority; scores on measures of SDO and RWA are only slightly correlated; and the two constructs have different patterns of relationships to some forms of prejudice.

The self represents our awareness of ourselves as living beings who interact with the world and the people in it; self-esteem refers to a person's self-evaluation as positive or negative. Theorists have proposed that prejudice can both enhance and protect self-esteem. Prejudice enhances self-esteem by providing people with groups they can feel superior to. Although one might expect that it would be people low in self-esteem who are more prejudiced, research has found a small positive correlation between self-esteem and prejudice. Three explanations have been proposed for why it has been high rather than low self-esteem that has been linked to prejudice. One is that people both low and high in self-esteem are prejudiced, but in different ways; however, because researchers have not focused on the ways in which low self-esteem people express prejudice, it looks like people high in self-esteem are the more prejudiced. The second explanation that has been offered is that the relationship between low self-esteem and prejudice is indirect; that is, that low self-esteem results in behaviors, such as avoidance of intergroup contact, that can lead to prejudice. The third explanation is that there are two kinds of high self-esteem, secure and defensive; people with defensive high self-esteem do not really value themselves and so bolster their self-images by looking down on others. Prejudice protects self-esteem by deflecting criticism: If the person making the criticism is a member of a devalued group, the criticism can be shrugged off as meaningless because members of that group are not qualified to make valid judgments. Thus, researchers have found that being the recipient of criticism increases prejudice. Conversely, if a person's self-esteem is reinforced, the person will exhibit less prejudice.

Values are beliefs people hold concerning the relative importance of the goals they aspire to achieve in life and the types of outcomes they should try to avoid. Two value orientations have been related to prejudice. Individualism emphasizes the importance of self-reliance, and egalitarianism emphasizes the importance of all people being treated equally and fairly. The link between individualism and prejudice is group stereotypes: Groups that are stereotyped as behaving in ways that violate the principles of individualism are viewed negatively. In contrast, egalitarianism appears to be negatively correlated with all forms of prejudice. Egalitarianism may have its effects by suppressing stereotype activation.

Although some value orientations appear to be directly related to prejudice, prejudice is also related to the perception that outgroups' value systems differ from one's own: Because values guide judgments of what is good or bad, holding different values implies a lack of goodness in the outgroups. Research has shown that people generally believe that members of outgroups hold values that differ from their own, and research has also shown that perceptions of value difference are related to prejudice. One explanation for the values-prejudice relationship comes from terror management theory, which holds that awareness of one's mortality increases one's adherence to the ingroup's cultural values; people who are aware of their mortality express prejudice against groups they see as challenging those views as a way of deflecting that challenge. The attribution-value model holds that groups that are seen as violating values are disliked because they are seen as choosing to violate those values, and so are responsible for their negative (that is, value-violating) behavior. In general, people who are seen as responsible for their negative behaviors and outcomes are liked less than people who are seen as not responsible, their behaviors and outcomes being due to factors they cannot control, such as biology or economic circumstances.

Social ideologies are sets of attitudes and beliefs that predispose people to view the world in certain ways and to respond in ways consistent with those viewpoints. Two important social ideologies that have been studied in relation to prejudice are religion and political orientation. Early research on the relationship between religion and prejudice focused on religious involvement and found that involvement was positively correlated with prejudice. Researchers then examined ways of being religious, and found that intrinsic religious orientation, which views faith as an end in itself, had a small negative correlation with prejudice whereas extrinsic orientation, which views religion as a means for achieving other goals, had a small positive correlation with prejudice. However, other research suggested that some of intrinsic orientation's negative relation to prejudice might have resulted from people's desire to appear unprejudiced rather than from a true lack of prejudice. A third orientation, quest, views religion as a process of seeking answers to life's important questions, and is negatively correlated with prejudice.

A more recent approach to studying the religion-prejudice relationship has focused on the contrast between prejudices that religions proscribe, such as racial prejudice, and prejudices that some religions permit, such as anti-gay prejudice. Generally, intrinsic religiosity has been found to have positive correlations with permitted prejudices and small negative correlations with proscribed prejudices. In contrast, quest has been found to have negative correlations with both types of prejudice. However, people high on quest do appear to be prejudiced against people, such as religious fundamentalists, whose style of religious belief runs counter to their own. The results for extrinsic orientation have not been as clear: Although researchers have found it to have a positive correlation with racial prejudice, it has had no correlation with anti-gay attitudes.

Religious fundamentalism has been found to be positively correlated with both anti-gay prejudice and racial prejudice, although the latter correlation is much smaller. As a psychological trait, fundamentalism is related to both RWA

and a strong adherence to orthodox religious beliefs. Thus, religious orthodoxy triggers hostility toward targets of permitted prejudice that is supplemented by hostility arising from compliance with religious authority figures' condemnation of those groups.

Researchers have generally found a positive correlation between endorsement of a conservative political orientation and prejudice. One reason for this relationship may lie in the positive correlation between conservatism and SDO: With SDO controlled, the conservatism-prejudice correlation is greatly reduced. From this perspective, conservative beliefs constitute one form of legitimizing myths that people high in SDO can use to justify their prejudice. That is, conservatism does not cause prejudice; rather, some prejudiced people use the conservative belief system as a means of justifying their prejudices. A second explanation for the relationship lies in the attribution-value model of prejudice. Compared to liberals, conservatives are more likely to see people as being responsible for negative outcomes they experience, such as poverty and unemployment. Therefore, when one group experiences a negative outcome to a greater degree than another group, conservatives are likely to attribute the outcome to a factor under group members' control. In contrast, liberals are more likely to attribute the outcome to factors beyond individuals' control. These different perceptions make conservatives more likely to be prejudiced because they are more likely to perceive others as violating an important social value and dislike them for it. However, the correlation between conservatism and prejudice does not mean that liberals are necessarily unprejudiced. Some research suggests that whereas conservatives experience modern-symbolic prejudice, liberals experience aversive prejudice.

People with conservative political beliefs tend to hold more negative attitudes toward social policies intended to increase intergroup equality, such as affirmative action, than do people with liberal political beliefs. Three explanations have been offered for this difference. Two of those explanations, that the relationship is due to conservatives' being more prejudiced and that it is due to conservatives' being high on SDO, have not found much research support. The third explanation, that conservative opposition is rooted in race-neutral political principles, has found some support. However, there is also evidence that support for at least some of these principles is correlated with prejudice. It is therefore possible that those principles are used by prejudiced people to justify objections that stem from prejudice rather than principle.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Authoritarianism

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Altemeyer, B. (1996). *The authoritarian specter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stone, W. F., Lederer, G., & Christie, R. (Eds.). (1993). *Strength and weakness: The authoritarian personality today*. New York: Springer-Verlag.



*The authoritarian personality* by Adorno and his colleagues is the classic original exposition of the theory of authoritarianism. The chapters in Stone and colleagues' book summarize much of the research that has been conducted on the theory. Altemeyer's book summarizes his revision of the original theory and presents some of his research on his theory.

### Social Dominance Orientation

- Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other "authoritarian personality." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 30, 47–92.
- Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., & Levin, S. (2006). Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 17, 271–320.
- Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sidanius and Pratto's book presents the theory underlying the concept of *social dominance orientation* (SDO) and much of the research that has been conducted on it. Pratto and colleagues' article provides an update on the theory. Altemeyer's chapter compares SDO and right-wing authoritarianism.

### Self-Esteem

- Crocker, J., Blaine, B., & Luhtanen, R. (1993). Prejudice, intergroup behaviour and self-esteem: Enhancement and protection motives. In M. A. Hogg & D. Abrams (Eds.), *Group motivation: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 52–67). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Crocker and her colleagues provide an overview of theories that relate self-esteem to prejudice.

### Personal Values

- Biernat, M., Vescio, T. K., Theno, S. A., & Crandall, C. S. (1996). Values and prejudice: Toward understanding the impact of American values on outgroup attitudes. In C. Seligman, J. M. Olson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *The psychology of values* (pp. 153–189). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- This chapter provides an overview of the relationship of values to prejudice, including the roles values play in theories of contemporary prejudice.

### Terror Management Theory

- Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. (1997). Terror management theory of self-esteem and cultural worldviews: Empirical assessments and conceptual refinements. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 29, 61–139.
- Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2003). *In the wake of 9/11: The psychology of terror*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2000). Pride and prejudice: Fear of death and social behavior. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 9, 200–204.

The chapter by Greenberg and colleagues provides a detailed explanation of terror management theory. The article by Solomon and colleagues presents a succinct overview of the theory focusing on prejudice, and the book by Pyszczynski and colleagues interprets the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States in light of their theory.

### Attribution-Value Model

Crandall, C. S., D'Anello, S., Sakalli, N., Lazarus, E., Wieczorkowska, G., & Feather, N. T. (2001). An attribution-value model of prejudice: Anti-fat attitudes in six nations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27, 30–37.

Weiner, B. (1995). *Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct*. New York: Guilford.

The article by Crandall and his colleagues outlines the attribution-value model. Weiner's book presents the theory on which the model is based.

### Religion

Batson, C. D., Schoenrade, P., & Ventis, W. L. (1993). *Religion and the individual: A social-psychological perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Spilka, B., Hood, R. W., Jr., Hunsberger, B., & Gorsuch, R. (2003). *The psychology of religion: An empirical approach* (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford.

Batson and colleagues' Chapter 9 provides an overview of research and theory on the relations of religion to prejudice, which Spilka and colleagues update in their Chapter 14.

### Political Orientation

Nail, P. R., Harton, H. C., & Decker, B. P. (2003). Political orientation and modern versus aversive racism: Tests of Dovidio and Gaertner's (1998) integrated model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 754–770.

Sidanius, J., Singh, P., Hetts, J. J., & Federico, C. (2000). It's not affirmative action, it's the Blacks: The continuing relevance of race in American politics. In D. O. Sears, J. Sidanius, & L. Bobo (Eds.), *Racialized politics: The debate about racism in America* (pp. 191–235). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sniderman, P. M., Crosby, G. C., & Howell, W. G. (2000). The politics of race. In D. O. Sears, J. Sidanius, & L. Bobo (Eds.), *Racialized politics: The debate about racism in America* (pp. 236–279). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nail and his colleagues present evidence that both liberals and conservatives are prejudiced, but in different ways. Sidanius and his colleagues and Sniderman and his colleagues present different sides of the principled objections debate.

**KEY TERMS**

|                                 |                                   |                                    |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| attribution-value model         | legitimizing myths                | social dominance orientation (SDO) |
| authoritarian personality       | quest orientation                 | symbolic beliefs                   |
| egalitarianism                  | religious fundamentalism          | symbolic threats                   |
| extrinsic religious orientation | right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) | terror management theory           |
| ideologies                      | self-enhancement                  | value difference hypothesis        |
| individualism                   | self-protection                   |                                    |
| intrinsic religious orientation |                                   |                                    |

**QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION**

1. Explain authoritarianism as conceptualized by Adorno and his colleagues (1950) and by Altemeyer (1981). In what ways are those conceptualizations similar and in what ways do they differ?
2. Describe the characteristics of people high in *right-wing authoritarianism* (RWA) that may predispose them to prejudice. How are these characteristics related to the ones described in Chapter 4 that are associated with a propensity for stereotyping?
3. Explain the role authority figures play in shaping the prejudices of people high in RWA.
4. What is *social dominance orientation* (SDO)? In what ways is it similar to RWA and in what ways does it differ from RWA?
5. Describe the characteristics of people high in SDO that may predispose them to prejudice. How are these characteristics related to the ones described in Chapter 4 that are associated with a propensity for stereotyping?
6. Explain the concept of legitimizing myths as it is used in social dominance theory.
7. Think back to Chapter 6. Do any of the theories of contemporary prejudice postulate that people use what social dominance theory calls legitimizing myths to justify their prejudices? If so, what are those myths?
8. Explain the distinction between self-esteem enhancement and self-esteem protection as motives for prejudice. How are these motives related to the ones described in Chapter 4 that are associated with a propensity for stereotyping?
9. What are the two hypotheses that can be derived from the self-enhancement view of the role self-esteem plays in prejudice? What has research on these

hypotheses found? What explanations have been offered to account for these findings?

10. What has research on the relationship between self-esteem protection motives and prejudice found?
11. What are values? Describe the value orientations that have been studied in relation to prejudice. How is each related to prejudice? What processes have linked each value orientation to prejudice?
12. Explain how the perception of value dissimilarity can lead to prejudice. What individual difference variables are related to this process?
13. Describe the terror management theory explanation for the role played by perceived value dissimilarity in prejudice.
14. Describe the attribution-value explanation for the role played by perceived value dissimilarity in prejudice. How are perceptions of a group's naturalness and entitativity related to this process?
15. What are social ideologies? In what ways do religion and political orientation fit the definition of an ideology? In what ways do they not fit that definition?
16. Allport (1954) wrote that religion "makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice" (p. 444). What did he mean by that? What light has subsequent research shed on his statement?
17. Describe the relationship of religious involvement to prejudice. Why were religious leaders and psychology of religion researchers displeased by these findings? What new approach did researchers take?
18. Explain the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation. In theory, how should each be related to prejudice? What has research shown about how each is related to prejudice?
19. Debate the following proposition: Intrinsically religious people are no less prejudiced than anyone else; they are just more motivated to give socially desirable responses to questions about prejudice.
20. Explain the concept of quest as a religious orientation. How is it related to prejudice?
21. What is meant by proscribed and permitted prejudices? We used racial prejudice as an example of a proscribed prejudice and anti-gay attitudes as an example of a permitted prejudice. What other examples can you think of for each category? Is the concept of proscribed versus permitted prejudices unique to the religious context or does it apply to society in general?
22. Describe how each of the three religious orientations is related to proscribed and permitted prejudices.
23. Define religious fundamentalism. How is it related to prejudice? What seem to be its major psychological components? How might each of these components contribute to fundamentalism's relationship to prejudice?

24. Allport (1954) wrote that “piety may ... be a convenient mask for prejudices which ... have nothing to do with religion” (p. 447). What did he mean?
25. Researchers generally find a positive correlation between political conservatism and prejudice. What explanations have been offered to account for that relationship?
26. Describe the relationship between political liberalism and prejudice.
27. Researchers generally find a positive correlation between political conservatism and attitudes toward social policies, such as affirmative action, that are intended to increase intergroup equality. What explanations have been offered to account for that relationship? Which explanation do you think is best supported by the research evidence? Explain the reasons for your answer.
28. Debate the following proposition: Political conservatism may be a convenient mask for prejudices that have nothing to do with politics.

## Chapter 8

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# The Development of Prejudice in Children

We lived in a neighborhood that was, I guess, about a mile and a half from a black neighborhood. So I can remember early on, during my youth, we had a black park...I used to enjoy [going] there, and the idea was that it was somehow dangerous now to go there. We had a swimming lake there, and I was ten or eleven, and blacks were allowed then to go to that park. It was just overnight that, "Well son, you're not allowed to go there because there are black people swimming there now." Basically we had to go twenty miles out to a different lake to go swimming. They just said, "You don't want to go there because it's dangerous. Black people are there. You never can tell what they might do to you."

—ANONYMOUS WHITE RESEARCH PARTICIPANT QUOTED BY JOE FEAGIN  
AND HERNÁN VERA (1995, P. 158)

### Chapter Outline

#### **Awareness of Social Categories**

*Implicit Awareness of Social Categories*

*Explicit Awareness of Social Categories*

#### **The Development of Prejudice**

*The Development of Racial Prejudice*

*The Development of Gender-Based Prejudice*

#### **Theories of Prejudice Development**

*Social Learning Theory*

*Inner State Theories*

*Cognitive Developmental Theory*

*Developmental Intergroup Theory*

*So Where Does Prejudice Come From?*

#### **Reducing Children's Prejudice**

*School Desegregation*

*Cooperative Learning*

*Multicultural and Anti-Bias Education*

#### **Summary**

#### **Suggested Readings**

#### **Key Terms**

#### **Questions for Review and Discussion**

The opening quotation describes the childhood experience of one White American adult. If you read the quote again, you will notice that this person's notion of Black people's being dangerous was not based on his personal experiences with Black people, but rather it was based on other people's stereotypes. In fact, as a boy, he probably never had the opportunity to get to know many Black people personally because he was segregated from them. Thus, he learned about members of other races indirectly, from parents, teachers, friends, and the media. Most people can probably come up with at least one similar experience that they had as children—either being taught prejudice like the person in the opening quotation, being warned about others' prejudice, or being the target of prejudice. Of course, not all childhood exposure to prejudice and discrimination is based on race; it also can be based on gender, religion, age, or a multitude of other social categories.

The ease with which prejudice can be fostered in children was demonstrated in a classroom exercise developed by elementary school teacher Jane Elliott following Dr. Martin Luther King's assassination. She wanted her students to experience firsthand what it felt like to be targets of discrimination, so she divided her class into groups based on eye color. On the first day, blue-eyed children were designated the "superior" group and brown-eyed students were designated the "inferior" group. The brown-eyed children wore collars so that they would easily be identified as the low-status group. Elliott gave her blue-eyed students special privileges such as having extra time at recess and being permitted to go back for seconds in the cafeteria at lunch. Furthermore, she encouraged the blue-eyed children to discriminate against their brown-eyed classmates by convincing the blue-eyed children that they were smarter, better, cleaner, and more civilized. On the next day, Elliott reversed the children's roles.

The results of this exercise were astounding (Peters, 1970). According to Elliott, the "superior" group (whether brown-eyed or blue-eyed) became mean and nasty while the "inferior" group felt isolated and hopeless. Elliott even noted changes in academic performance based on group membership. When the students were the "inferior" group, their school performance suffered; when they were the "superior" group, their performance was enhanced. At the end of the day, the "inferior" students were allowed to remove their collars and throw them away. One boy in the class tried to rip his cloth collar before throwing it away because he did not like how it made him feel and how others treated him when he wore the collar. One girl started to cry because she was happy to be back with all of her friends again. Other students seemed relieved and eager to remove the collars, so that they were no longer marked as the low status group. (For more information on Elliott's brown eyes/blue eyes exercise, see Box 8.1.)

Although Elliott's lesson on discrimination was not an empirical study, it was a bold attempt to illustrate the devastating effects of prejudice and discrimination in a classroom setting. This chapter describes theory and research on the development of prejudice in children. The first section covers children's awareness of social categories. It is important to note that categorical distinctions based on race, gender, and other characteristics do not necessarily lead to prejudice in children; however, they provide the foundation for preferences, attitudes, and behaviors toward members

**Box 8.1 More on Jane Elliott's Brown Eyes/Blue Eyes Exercise**

A documentary film entitled *Eye of the Storm* (Peters, 1970) about Jane Elliott's lesson on prejudice and discrimination was produced in 1970. In the movie, Elliott was filmed while she conducted the exercise with 3rd graders in Riceville, Iowa. The results were truly shocking. Elliott watched what she called "marvelous, cooperative, wonderful, thoughtful children turn into nasty, vicious, discriminating, little third graders" (Peters, 1970). The initial impact that the exercise had on her students was even more amazing. One student said, "Yeah, I felt like I was—like a king, like I ruled them brown-eyes, like I was better than them, happy."

In 1985, a second documentary on Elliott's exercise was made, entitled *A Class Divided* (Peters & Cobb, 1985). The second film combined original footage from *Eye of the Storm* with a reunion of the 3rd graders from the original film, who were now young adults. *A Class Divided* showed these individuals as they discussed the impact that Elliott's lesson had on them. One man who had participated in the exercise as a child said, "It made everything a lot different than what it was.... It was hard on you; when you have your best friend one day and then he's your enemy the next,

it brings it out real quick in you." Everyone agreed that Elliott's exercise opened their eyes to how awful prejudice and discrimination can feel, especially when you are the target. Some of the students also acknowledged that they felt powerful when they were the "superior" group. Clearly, Elliott's exercise had a long-lasting impact on these individuals. Many of the people at the reunion mentioned talking with their children about the important lessons that Elliott's exercise taught them, and most agreed that similar exercises should be implemented in other elementary schools.

*A Class Divided* also showed Elliott using a modified version of the brown eyes/blue eyes lesson with adult employees in Iowa's prison system. Interestingly, the adults' reactions to the exercise were quite similar to those of children. One man who was assigned to the lower status group said, "I think I learned from the experience a feeling like I was in a glass cage and I was powerless, there was a sense of hopelessness, I was angry, I wanted to speak up and yet I—at times I knew if I spoke up, I'd be back in a powerless situation, I'd be attacked, a sense of hopelessness. Depression." Hence, this exercise appears to have a powerful impact on adults as well as children.

of other social groups. The second section highlights research on the development of prejudice in children and is organized in terms of the two social dimensions that have been studied most often, race and gender. The third section ties these topics together by presenting three types of theories of prejudice: social learning theories, inner state theories, and cognitive developmental theories. The final section discusses the prevention and reduction of prejudice in children.

## AWARENESS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES

As we saw in Chapter 3, adults use categories to help them organize, simplify, and make sense of the world around them. Some categories and their underlying concepts refer to particular social groups (such as conservatives, athletes, and Jews), whereas other categories are nonsocial in nature (such as tables, flowers, and snakes). Adults classify people, objects, and events based on shared characteristics, and children form categories on the same basis and for the same reasons that adults do, such as simplifying a complex world. However, children have an even greater need to simplify their worlds through categorization because of their more limited mental abilities (Friedman, Putnam, Hamberger, & Berman, 1992). Categorization allows children to free up some of their mental resources so that they can use those



resources for other tasks. It would be difficult to imagine exactly what life would be like if we did not form categories. At a minimum, the environment would be quite complicated, unorganized, and chaotic if we did not group people, objects, and events together. To illustrate, suppose that children did not possess the concept “woman.” Each time children saw an adult female, they would think to themselves, “What is that?” Clearly, this process would be counterproductive and inefficient in terms of functioning adaptively in the world. Thus, categorization is helpful in simplifying the complexities of our physical and social environment.

Categorization also helps children develop an accurate picture of their social world. People differ—whether in hair, eye, or skin color, in size, or in gender—and it is appropriate for children to notice these differences. By doing so, children are forming a more accurate perception of what the world around them is like. If they did not notice these real differences, then their views of reality would be distorted or inaccurate. Some children who demonstrate awareness of social categories will be prejudiced, whereas others will not. Prejudiced children will respond negatively to the distinctions they note; nonprejudiced children will not (Bigler & Liben, 2006). The last section of this chapter discusses some of the factors that theorists have proposed as being important to the development of prejudice in children.

When researchers study children’s awareness of social categories, they divide awareness into two types: implicit and explicit awareness. Explicit awareness of social categories is conscious awareness of particular social groups. For example, a child who points at a picture of a woman in a magazine advertisement and says, “She’s tall!” has demonstrated explicit awareness of a social category based on height. However, children may be aware of certain social categories before they begin using language to place labels on those groups. In other words, it is possible that preverbal children have an implicit awareness of social categories.

This section reviews some of the research on the awareness of social categories in infants and children. We cover implicit awareness first because it emerges earlier in development, during infancy, before children have acquired language. Then, we discuss explicit awareness of social categories in verbal children.

### **Implicit Awareness of Social Categories**

Even before children begin to produce words such as “boy,” “pretty,” and “old,” evidence shows that they have an awareness of basic social categories such as gender, attractiveness, and age. That is, children implicitly recognize differences between or among basic social categories without being able to verbalize those differences explicitly. Even infants display this ability. For example, Joseph Fagan and Lynn Singer (1979) used what is known as an habituation paradigm with 5- to 6-month-old infants to investigate whether babies could discriminate pictures on the basis of gender, age, and race. In an habituation paradigm, an infant is presented with a photograph of a person repeatedly until she has gotten used to the picture. Then, the original photo and a new photo are presented simultaneously, and an observer measures the amount of time the baby spends looking at each photo. Looking time is commonly used as an index of infants’ awareness of difference, novelty, or change. The logic is that if the baby looks reliably longer at the new picture, then she has

discriminated between the two photographs and prefers the new one over the old one because it represents something new in her environment.

Fagan and Singer's (1979) experiment had two conditions. In one condition, the babies first saw a picture of a person who was a member of a particular basic social category, such as sex, age, or race, and then they saw a picture of another person who fell into the same category. For example, if the first picture was of a boy, then so was the second picture. In the other condition, the second picture was a different subcategory of the same social category. Thus, if the first picture was of a boy, then the second picture was of a girl. Fagan and Singer matched the photographs on a number of facial features such as thickness of lips, hair length and texture, and separation of the eyes; this procedure was used so that the infants would not simply respond to surface physical differences between the people in the photos but to deeper conceptual differences. The researchers found that infants spent significantly more time looking at a new photograph when it was of a different gender or age than when it was of the same gender or age as the old photo. This finding suggests that gender and age were meaningful categories for the infants. However, these infants did not differentiate between pictures of a White woman and a Black woman, suggesting that race was not a meaningful category for them. However, more recently, using a similar research procedure, David Kelly and his colleagues (2005) found that awareness of racial groups may also develop at an early age. In their study, newborn White children (ages 16 to 120 hours) showed no preference for looking at pictures of adults from various racial groups. However, White 3-month-old children preferred White adult faces over those of Black, Middle-Eastern, and Asian adults.

Infants also differentiate between people based on physical attractiveness, preferring attractive faces over unattractive ones long before socialization from parents, peers, and the media could affect these preferences. Judith Langlois and her colleagues (1987) examined this possibility with two groups of infants: a younger group (2- to 3-month-olds) and an older group (6- to 8-month-olds). Infants were shown color slides of White women's faces; half of the faces were rated as attractive by adult judges and half were rated as unattractive. When an attractive and an unattractive face were presented side by side, both groups of infants spent significantly longer looking at the attractive faces than the unattractive ones, suggesting that the infants preferred the attractive faces. In a subsequent set of experiments, Langlois and her colleagues (Langlois, Ritter, Roggman, & Vaughn, 1991) extended the original research by varying the gender, race, and age of the individuals in the photographs. Again, infants (6-month-olds in this experiment) looked longer at photos of attractive people regardless of whether they were of men or women, Blacks or Whites, or adults or infants.

More recently, researchers have suggested an attractiveness bias in infants as young as 2 months of age (Game, Carchon, & Vital-Durand, 2003) and perhaps in newborns under 1 week of age (Slater et al., 1998). This early preference for attractive faces could exist either because infants have a built-in mechanism that responds to faces or because infants learn about faces relatively soon after birth. It is possible that this early preference for attractive faces underlies the "beauty is good" stereotype, which is the perception that people who are physically

attractive also have positive psychological characteristics, such as intelligence or kindness (Langlois et al., 2000; see Chapter 13).

Taken together, the results from these studies indicate that infants are implicitly aware of social categories based on race, gender, age, and physical attractiveness by a very early age. Infants' early awareness of their social environment suggests that their ability to form social categories is not something that is influenced by adults, but rather reflects an innate propensity to organize their social world in meaningful ways.

### **Explicit Awareness of Social Categories**

When do children first demonstrate explicit or conscious awareness of social categories? A colleague related a humorous conversation she had with her then 2½-year-old son Max that illustrates explicit awareness of social categories. The dialogue went something like this:

MOM: "Are you a girl or a boy?"

MAX: "I'm a boy, silly!"

MOM: "Are mommies women or men?"

MAX: "Mommies are women... they're girls."

MOM: "Is daddy a man or a woman?"

MAX: "He's a man."

MOM: "Is Elliot [Max's 6-month-old baby brother] a boy or a girl?"

MAX: "He's not a boy or a girl. He's a baby."

This conversation demonstrates that Max had accurate and explicit knowledge of some social categories such as "boy," "woman," and "man." However, he seemed to think that his little brother was neither a boy nor a girl, but a baby. Eventually Max came to realize that his little brother was both a baby and a boy, and that the two categories are not mutually exclusive.

When researchers examine explicit awareness of social categories, they generally require the child to apply a label correctly or to identify which person goes with a particular label by presenting the child with pictures or dolls. For example, in one study of children's awareness of gender as a social category, Spencer Thompson (1975) showed young children photographs of people and asked them to classify the photos as being pictures of males or females. He found that 75 percent of the 2-year-olds in his study could correctly identify males and females, and that by 3 years of age 90 percent displayed this ability. Findings from other studies confirm that by 2½ or 3 years of age, children are using gender labels appropriately (Yee & Brown, 1994).

Other researchers have used more open-ended tasks to examine children's early awareness of gender and racial categories. In one such task, children are given a set of photographs and are asked to group the ones that "look alike" or "belong together." Sometimes children are allowed to use only a preset number of categories; other times they are free to create as many categories as they would like. The photographs usually vary on several dimensions such as age, sex, and ethnicity. In

one study that used this procedure, 7- to 10-year-old White children primarily used the dimension of ethnicity to sort the photos and seldom used gender (Davey, 1983). However, when given more specific instructions, such as to match two pairs of photographs to play together, the results were different. Children used gender as the category of choice; for example, children were more likely to match a Black boy and a White boy together than a boy and a girl of the same race. Thus, the context in which children sorted the photographs influenced the way in which children categorized them. When children were asked to simply sort the photos, they focused on ethnicity; however, when the task was extended to the broader cultural context (in this case, playmate choice), then they did not focus on race. Such results suggest intergroup attitudes and intergroup behaviors may develop along multiple pathways.

Kenneth and Mamie Clark (1947) pioneered the study of children's racial category awareness, and their **doll technique** is still used today (see Box 8.2). In this paradigm, the child is presented with two (or more) dolls. In the simplest scenario using only two dolls, one of the dolls is White with blond hair, and the other doll is Black with black hair. Then the child is asked, "Which looks like a White (or Black) child?" When the doll technique is used with 3-year-olds,

### Box 8.2 Kenneth and Mamie Clark's Doll Studies

The husband and wife team of Kenneth and Mamie Phipps Clark were the first and second African Americans to receive Ph.D. degrees in psychology from Columbia University (in 1940 and 1943, respectively; Jones & Pettigrew, 2005). Growing up in the racially segregated United States of the early 20th century, in which Jim Crow laws (see Chapter 6) strictly limited Black Americans' rights and opportunities, they developed strong interests in the effects of racism on Black children and in ways of alleviating those effects. These interests were the focus of their lives' work in psychology.

Mamie Clark first developed the doll technique, in which children were shown Black (actually with brown skin color) and White dolls and asked a series of questions, as part of her master's thesis. She and Kenneth Clark then used the technique and others (such as having children color in outlines of people) in a series of studies examining Black children's color preferences (summarized in Clark, 1963). The questions included:

- "Give me the doll you like best."
- "Give the doll that is the nice doll."
- "Give me the doll that looks bad."
- "Give me the doll that is a nice color." (Clark, 1963, p. 23)

The Clarks found that 60 percent of the children preferred the White doll in response to positive questions (such as "looks best") whereas 25 percent preferred the Black doll (the remaining 15 percent gave ambiguous responses).

The Clarks also explored children's reasons for their color preference. Reasons for rejecting the Black doll included:

- "looks bad all over"
- "cause him black"
- "cause it looks like a Negro"

Reasons for choosing the White doll included

- "cause he's not colored like these—they are the best looking cause they're white"
- "cause it's white—it's pretty"
- "case that the good one" (Clark & Clark, 1950, p. 348).

The Clarks concluded that the results of their research indicated that many Black children would prefer to be White and that this preference "reflects their knowledge that society prefers white people" (Clark, 1963, p. 24). As we note in the text, the doll technique continues to be used to study children's racial preferences, making it a continuing reminder of the Clarks' pioneering research.

fewer than 25 percent of them can point to the correct doll (or, in some research, picture of a doll) when provided with the labels Black and White. However, by 4 or 5 years of age, accuracy increases to 75 percent or higher regardless of their own ethnicity (see, for example, Williams & Morland, 1976). Thus, it appears that the preschool years are critical in the development of awareness of social groups based on race.

Interestingly, children's differentiation of Native Americans, Chinese, and Latinos comes at a later age, perhaps because the features that differentiate these groups are less perceptually obvious than the features that distinguish Whites and Blacks. David Fox and Valerie Jordan (1973) found that between 5 and 7 years of age, White and Chinese American children are able to identify Chinese people as a separate category. Similarly, identifying Latinos proved to be more of a challenge for both White and Latino children, but their accuracy improved between 4 and 9 years (Rice, Ruiz, & Padilla, 1974; Weiland & Coughlin, 1979). Along the same lines, researchers have discovered that White and Native American children's identification of Native Americans is fairly well developed by 6 years of age but continues to improve until age 9 (George & Hoppe, 1979; Hunsberger, 1978).

It thus appears that explicit awareness of social categories develops by approximately 3 years of age for gender-based categories, by 4 or 5 years of age for the racial categories Black and White, and between 5 and 9 years for other racial groups such as Native Americans, Chinese, and Latinos. It is clear, then, that children can make many social-group-based categorical distinctions during the preschool years. But does making these sorts of distinctions lead to prejudice? Not always. Some children will go on to become prejudiced, whereas others will not. The next section describes the course of development of prejudice in children.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF PREJUDICE

Just because children demonstrate awareness of various social categories does not necessarily mean that they value some categories more than others. The literature on how children add values to social categories has been described using several terms, including category preference, prejudice, and discrimination. The term **category preference** means that children select or prefer one group over another; however it does not necessarily imply a derogation of the nonselected group or groups. For example, suppose a child prefers playing with Asian children on the playground at recess. This does not necessarily mean that the child has negative attitudes about children who are not Asian; although it could mean that, the child's choice could have other meanings, as we will discuss shortly.

As we saw in Chapter 1, the term *prejudice* refers to an evaluative response toward the members of some group, based solely on their membership in that group. Although prejudicial reactions can be positive, negative, or mixed, most research on prejudice focuses on the negative attitudes toward particular social groups. As also noted in Chapter 1, the term *discrimination* refers to behaviors

directed toward social groups who are the object of prejudice. Again, the emphasis is usually on negative behaviors, but it can also refer to positive behaviors. Although children might engage in what appears to be discrimination by excluding other children from activities based on their social group membership, it is difficult to determine whether negative attitudes underlie exclusionary behavior in children, especially in young children with limited verbal abilities. Even when children, especially younger children, verbally express prejudice, they may not truly understand what they are saying or the effect that it has on others (Nesdale, 2001). Therefore, we discuss the development of prejudice as encompassing the various age-related changes that occur as children add value judgments to social categories, including preferences, attitudes, and behaviors. Although it may appear that we are mixing apples and oranges in taking this approach, researchers often have used very similar operational definitions for what they have variously referred to as preference, prejudice, and discrimination (see, for example, Fishbein, 2002). On that basis, then, this section examines what we know about the development of racial and gender prejudice in children.

### The Development of Racial Prejudice

Because it is challenging to find ways to tap into children's racial attitudes, this section discusses some of the methodological issues faced by researchers who study the development of racial attitudes. After an overview of the methods used, we summarize the research literature on racial attitudes in children, with the primary focus on Black and White children because that has been the major emphasis in the research literature.

**Methodological Issues.** John Williams and J. Kenneth Morland (1976) created the method most commonly used to examine children's attitudes about race, the Preschool Racial Attitude Measure (PRAM). The PRAM assesses the development of racial prejudice using a **forced choice method**, in which the participant must choose one of two options presented. In the PRAM, children are presented with photographs of two very similar drawings of humans; the only difference is that one of the individuals in the drawing has pinkish-tan skin and the other has medium-brown skin. Then, children hear short stories about the two people and are asked a question. For example, the children are told: "Here are two little boys. One of them is a naughty little boy. People do not like to play with him. Which is the naughty little boy?" Again, half the stories contain positive adjectives and half contain negative ones. If a child reliably associates one color with the positive adjectives and the other color with negative adjectives, then racial bias is presumed to exist.

A problem with this method is that, as we noted earlier, although consistently choosing a picture of a White child over a picture of a Black child indicates a preference, it does not automatically mean a rejection of Black children. For example, consider a situation in which a child is presented with pictures of two children, one of a child who is overweight and the other of a child of

average weight. The child indicates her preference about who she would rather have as a friend by pointing to a picture. What we do not know is the child's attitudes about the two individuals in the photos. Perhaps the child favored one photo over the other for some other reason that has nothing to do with the body types of the children pictured. For example, if a participant says, "I chose that child because he has friendlier eyes than the other child," then this does not give us any information about the child's attitudes based on body type. Furthermore, choosing one child over another does not necessarily mean that the participant disliked the unchosen child; rather, it tells us that the participant liked the chosen child more than the unchosen child. In fact, the participant might actually have positive feelings toward both children, with one set of feelings being more positive than the other. If that is the case, then the participant is not prejudiced against either child. Conversely, if a participant says, "I wouldn't want that child as my friend because he's pudgy," then that gives us information about the participant's prejudices about children who are overweight.

Using a **continuous measure** of prejudice can help overcome this problem. One example of a continuous measure is the social distance scale, which can be used with older children to assess complex attitudinal judgments. In this scale participants answer questions such as "Would you feel comfortable living next door to a Black family?" There are five options for a response, ranging from *Yes, definitely* to *No, definitely*. Thus, continuous measures of prejudice do not force research participants to choose one child over another. These types of measures also allow researchers to make finer-grained assessments of attitudes, sorting them into five (or more) categories rather than the two provided by a forced choice. For example, Frances Aboud and Frank Mitchell (1977) asked 6- and 8-year-old White children to indicate how much they liked (or disliked) their own ethnic group and other ethnic groups on a continuous scale. Overall, the White children liked their own ethnic group the best; however, they liked their own ethnic group only slightly more than their next preferred group, and they gave the least liked group a neutral rating. Therefore, having positive attitudes about their own ethnic group does not necessarily mean that children have negative attitudes about other ethnic groups.

Other measures are based on the assumption that children do not interact with those they dislike. In one method, researchers observe the extent to which children interact with children of their own and different races on the playground, in the classroom, or in the school cafeteria at lunch. Another way to assess peer interactions is to use **sociometric ratings**. There are two types of sociometric procedures: the *best friends procedure* and the *roster and rating procedure*. In the best friends procedure, children are provided with the names of all their classmates and asked to identify their best friends. The researcher then notes the race and gender of those listed as friends. One problem with the best friends technique is that not being named as a "best friend" is not the same as being disliked. The roster and rating procedure does not have this limitation because children are given all of their classmates' names and are asked to use a continuous scale to rate how much they like to interact (play or work) with each student. These sociometric measures are, in a sense, indirect observations of children's

behavior: Instead of watching and recording those with whom children interact, researchers ask children about their interactions. The validity of this approach depends, of course, on the accuracy of what the children report. Finally, researchers can ask children about their interactions with others. For example, children might report how frequently they socialize with members of different ethnic groups or members of the other sex.

In sum, forced choice methods, such as the PRAM, have some methodological shortcomings, although some of these difficulties can be overcome by using continuous measures of prejudice. Nonetheless, it is important to note that different methods sometimes yield different results. Typically, self-reports and behavioral observations yield similar results, whereas the results from the two sociometric procedures, best friends and roster and rating, have tended to be similar to one another, but different from the result of self-reports and behavioral observations. Thus, if the results of two studies are inconsistent, it is difficult to interpret their outcomes if attitudes were assessed in different ways.

Bearing in mind the strengths and limitations of the methodologies used to study the development of racial prejudice in children, we can now look at some of the findings these methods have produced. One important distinction to be aware of when reading about racial attitudes is that children's attitudes toward their own ethnic group are not always measured independently of their outgroup attitudes. As we noted earlier, if a child expresses a preference for his own group, it may not be possible to tell whether his attitudes toward the other group are positive, negative, or neutral. However, some researchers have developed ways in which they can partially separate ingroup favoritism from outgroup dislike (see, for example, Aboud, 2003). Because the development of racial attitudes depends, in part, on the child's own ethnic group membership, we review the research findings in this area separately by ethnic group.

**White Children's Attitudes.** White children begin to develop racial attitudes, both positive and negative, between ages 3 and 4 (see, for example, Aboud & Amato, 2001; Banaji, Baron, Durham, & Olson, 2008; Fishbein, 2002). For example, Frances Aboud (2003) used a measure that partially separated ingroup favoritism from outgroup prejudice. Using this measure with two samples of 4- to 7-year-old White children, Aboud found that ingroup favoritism emerged first and reached significant levels at 5 years of age. Outgroup prejudice also emerged at age 5, but was comparatively weaker than ingroup favoritism across age. Aboud concluded that ingroup and outgroup attitudes were distinct sets of attitudes. Her findings have important implications for the way in which researchers measure children's intergroup attitudes, suggesting that when measures do not allow a separation of children's ingroup and outgroup attitudes, positive attitudes toward the ingroup may be mistaken for outgroup prejudice, given that ingroup favoritism appears earlier in development and is stronger.

Racial prejudice reaches its highest levels around 5 to 7 years of age (Aboud & Amato, 2001; Banaji et al., 2008; Fishbein, 2002). For example, Rebecca Bigler and Lynn Liben (1993) had 4- to 9-year-old White children complete a measure



of racial stereotyping, in which they assigned positive and negative traits (such as, clean, smart, ugly, and sick) to “only Black people,” to “only White people,” or to “both Black and White people.” Participants’ responses were classified into one of three types: stereotypical responses (assigning positive traits to “only White people” and negative traits to “only Black people”), counterstereotypical responses (assigning positive traits to “only Black people” and negative traits to “only White people”), and nonstereotypical responses (traits assigned to “both White and Black people”). The younger children, 4- and 5-year-olds, gave the largest number of stereotypical responses and the fewest counterstereotypical and nonstereotyped responses, suggesting that they had the highest degrees of racial stereotyping. The older children, 8- and 9-year-olds, had the lowest degrees of racial stereotyping, indicating that prejudice declined between 4 and 9 years of age.

In line with Bigler and Liben’s (1993) findings, Anna Beth Doyle and Frances Aboud (1995) found that by the age of 7, more than half of White children show a substantial decline in racial prejudice. Doyle and Aboud examined longitudinal changes in White children’s prejudice toward ethnic minorities in kindergarten and again in 3rd grade, and they found that prejudice declined as children got older. For example, 85 percent of kindergartners were biased against Black people, whereas only about half of 3rd graders held this bias. On a measure that distinguished between ingroup bias and outgroup prejudice, kindergartners held more positive attitudes toward White people and more negative attitudes toward Black people and Native Americans. By 3rd grade, however, the children’s positive and negative evaluations did not differ among the three races. Thus, a decline in racial prejudice occurs sometime between 6 and 9 years of age and continues until age 12 and perhaps beyond Aboud & Amato, 2001; Banaji et al., 2008; Fishbein, 2002).

**Black Children’s Attitudes.** Black children, like White children, begin to develop racial attitudes at 3 or 4 years of age (Aboud & Amato, 2001). For example, Phyllis Katz and Jennifer Kofkin (1997) tested Black children and their families longitudinally during the first 5 years of the children’s lives, and found that 3-year-old Black children’s attitudes were initially either pro-Black or unbiased. However, in contrast to White children, no typical ethnic attitudinal patterns have been found for 5- to 7-year-old Black children. In a comprehensive review of 36 studies on Black children’s attitudes toward their own and other ethnic groups, Frances Aboud (1988) found that some Black children in those studies held pro-Black attitudes, some held pro-White attitudes, and some were unbiased. For example, Margaret Spencer (1982) found that Black preschoolers and kindergartners scored at the midpoint on the PRAM, indicating that children assigned negative and positive qualities to Black targets and White targets equally. Other studies find pro-Black attitudes between 5 and 7 years of age. For example, Lisa O’Connor, Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, and Julia Graber (2000) interviewed 8- and 9-year-old Black girls and found that 56 percent expressed a preference for a same-race friend.

Some studies have found the opposite—a pro-White bias. For example, Mary Newman, Marsha Liss, and Felicia Sherman (1983) studied Black kindergartners’ attitudes about Whites, Blacks, and Latinos by showing the children drawings of

children their own age from the three ethnic groups in pairs and asking them to select which one they would like as a friend. They found that Black children preferred Whites and Latinos over Blacks. When a Black child was shown paired with a child of another race, the research participants chose the Black child less than half the time.

However, between 7 and 10 years of age, pro-White bias disappears, and Black children typically either express more pro-Black attitudes or do not exhibit any bias (Aboud & Amato, 2001). When researchers have examined Black children's attitudes toward Blacks and their attitudes toward Whites independently of one another, they have found that a preference for Blacks does not necessarily mean a rejection of Whites. In fact, it appears that Black children become neutral, rather than negative toward Whites (for example, Aboud, 1980; Davey, 1983). The attitudes of Black children ages 7 to 10 years generally show a pro-Black shift. Those who had been pro-White become racially neutral, those who were neutral become pro-Black, and those who were already pro-Black become more pro-Black. For instance, when Aboud and Doyle (1995) examined differences in Black children's racial attitudes in kindergarten and 3rd grade, they found that 3rd graders were more pro-Black than kindergartners. They also found that pro-Black attitudes were stronger in children with higher Black self-identification.

Thus, Black children show more variability than White children in their racial preference patterns (Aboud & Amato, 2001). One explanation for these mixed results is that Black children, being members of a nondominant group, simply have a more complicated developmental pattern in terms of their attitudes. For example, Clark McKown (2004) interviewed children between the ages of 6 and 10 to assess their understanding of the nature of racism. As shown in Figure 8.1, children's understanding of racism became more complex as they grew older. They show increases in both the number of statements they make about racism and refer to more aspects of racism such as stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict. In addition, at all age levels, minority children, and especially Black children, have more complex views of racism than White children. These differences may develop because minority parents are more likely to discuss prejudice and discrimination with their children (Aboud, 2005) and because of differences in experiences with prejudice and discrimination.

**Attitudes of Children from Other Groups.** Most research on racial attitudes has focused on Black and White children. However, the research literature extends beyond these groups to include other ethnic groups as well. This research indicates that the preference patterns for children of other races are less consistent than they are for White children. Thus, Mexican American, Asian American, and Native American children show attitudinal patterns similar to those displayed by Black children, characterized by heterogeneity in attitudes between 5 and 7 years. That is, some studies find a pro-White bias, some find a pro-ingroup bias, and some find neutral attitudes (for example, Bernal, Knight, Ocampo, Garza, & Cota, 1993; Corenblum & Annis, 1993; Morland & Hwang, 1981). Between 7 and 10 years, any pro-White bias tends to disappear, and children either express a pro-ingroup bias or no bias at all (Bernal et al., 1993; Boulton &




**FIGURE 8.1** Change in Children's Understanding of Racism as a Function of Age and Ethnic Group Membership

As children become older, their understanding of the nature of racism becomes more complex in terms of the number of statements they make about racism and in terms of the different aspects of racism they refer to.

SOURCE: Adapted from McKown (2004, Table 5, p. 610).

Smith, 1996). Again, this pattern is similar to that found for Black children. For example, Michael Boulton and Peter Smith (1996) examined racial preferences in 8- to 10-year-old White and Asian children and found that all children, regardless of race, preferred classmates who were of their own race over classmates of a different race.

Finally, it is interesting to consider the ethnic attitudes for biracial children—children whose parents are of different races. Given the findings noted earlier on Black and White children's preferences, one might expect that biracial children would have racial attitudes that fall somewhere in between those of Black and White children because they are members of and presumably identify with both racial groups. In a study that tested this idea with Black-White biracial preschoolers, Deborah Johnson (1992) found that biracial children did not differ significantly from either Black children or White children in their racial attitudes, although Black children and White children differed significantly from one another. That is, because biracial children identify with both ethnic groups, their ethnic attitudes also seemed to reflect both of their ethnicities.

In conclusion, all children appear to acquire racial preferences and attitudes between 3 and 5 years of age. It is during this time that some children begin to express negative attitudes toward certain ethnic group members. When prejudice develops, the target of the prejudice depends in part on the child's own ethnicity. White children are consistently prejudiced against members of other racial groups. Black, Latino, and Asian children are more heterogeneous in their attitudes, with some children initially showing negativity toward members of their own ethnic group.

Let us note that prejudice is not a phenomenon found only in the United States; it can be found almost anywhere. For example, the Arab-Israeli conflict has generated a great deal of prejudice on both sides. A group of researchers at Tel Aviv University in Israel have been investigating the development of prejudice against Arabs in Israeli Jewish children (Bar-Tal, 1996). See Box 8.3 for a summary of this research.

**Intergroup Behavior.** If you have spent time with young children, you are probably aware that it is sometimes difficult to get specific information from them verbally. Perhaps they are distracted by someone or something more interesting than you, they just do not want to answer your questions at that particular moment, they would prefer to answer questions about something else, or they do not yet have the language skills to respond in an appropriate manner. Given these difficulties, some researchers have opted to observe children's behavior rather than assess their attitudes directly.

Sometimes children's attitudes and their behaviors seem inconsistent with one another. For example, Harold Fishbein and Satomi Imai (1993) observed

### Box 8.3 The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Children

Ethnicity is an important point of distinction for people living in Israel, including children. For Israeli Jews, Arabs are probably the most significant outgroup. Daniel Bar-Tal (1996) notes that Israeli children begin to use the word "Arab" between 2 and 2½ years of age. Between 2½ and 3 years, Jewish children can identify Arabs and tell you something about them, which suggests that they have acquired the concept of Arabs. Children in this age range understand that Arabs are people who are different from Jews, and they can draw a picture of an Arab man. The traits Jewish children use to describe Jews and Arabs indicate that older children (5½ to 6½ year-olds) evaluate "the Arab" more negatively than younger children (2½ to 3½ year-olds). Moreover, both groups evaluate "the Arab" more negatively than "the Jew." Between 10 and 12 years of age, the concept of "Arab" becomes more multifaceted, and children mention both positive and negative attributes.

The general pattern of Bar-Tal's findings are similar to what you might expect to find if you conducted the same research project in the United States with White children as participants, and you presented them with the same sorts of items about Black and White people. However, some differences between the political and social situations in Israel and the United States may account for any differences between the two groups. For example, Jews and Arabs live in close proximity to one another in the midst of continuing tension between the two groups. Therefore, it is essential for both Jewish and Arab children to learn the differences between these groups very early and perhaps to develop attitudes about the groups at an earlier age than might be found in the United States. However, acknowledging individual differences in Israeli children and children in the United States should by no means overshadow the commonalities that emphasize the universality of the development of prejudice.

Black, White, and Asian preschoolers during free play. They found that girls of all three races preferred to play with girls of their own race, but boys of all three races preferred to play with White boys. That is, girls showed a same-race preference but boys showed a pro-White preference. Note that these results are inconsistent with what we saw previously about the development of racial attitudes in children. Recall that most preschoolers, regardless of their gender, typically say that they prefer to play with a White child. However, the preschool-aged girls in Fishbein and Imai's study played with girls of their own race at recess. How might this inconsistency be explained? One simple explanation is that perhaps there is not a one-to-one correspondence between children's attitudes and their behavior. If you consider your own attitudes and behaviors, you will see that they do not always correspond with one another. For example, you might disagree with something your college professor says in class, but, when she asks if anyone disagrees, you do not raise your hand or speak up. The same might hold true for children, especially because it is socially adaptable for people to not always show how they feel.

When using sociometric methods, roster and rating measures typically indicate much less prejudice than best friends measures. For example, Olga Jarrett and Lorene Quay (1984) used both roster and rating and best friends techniques to examine kindergartners' and 1st graders' playmate preferences. The best friends methods yielded no same-race preferences for kindergartners, but showed that 1st graders displayed same-race preferences. However, the roster and rating method indicated that both White and Black kindergartners and 1st graders preferred White peers and rejected Black peers. The researchers found no significant correlation between children's responses on the two measures. However, it is clear that, starting in 1st grade, both Black and White children designate best friends on the basis of race.

Between kindergarten and 8th grade, observations conducted in nonclassroom settings indicate that children prefer interacting with same-race peers (Finkelstein & Haskins, 1983; Schofield & Francis, 1982). However, when observed in classroom settings, the results are different, with girls interacting with same-race peers and boys showing little or no racial segregation (Schofield & Francis, 1982). Racial segregation increases between 6 and 8 years of age (Singleton & Asher, 1977), then levels off or declines until the age of 12 (Schofield & Francis, 1982).

It seems that racial segregation, in terms of best friend choice, is at its peak in 6th to 8th grades, with few students naming peers of another race in these three grades (Shrum & Cheek, 1987). Moreover, from 6th grade on, Black children are more likely to list other-race best friends than are White children (Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007). When roster and rating procedures are used, a somewhat different developmental story unfolds. In kindergarten and 1st grade, both Black and White children preferred White children (Jarrett & Quay, 1984), but in 3rd through 8th grades there was some same-race preference (Singleton & Asher, 1979).

There has been less research on intergroup interactions in high school (Fishbein, 2002). To fill this gap, Martin Patchen (1982) used interviews and questionnaires to examine high school students' racial attitudes. Both Black and White students reported that they avoid sitting or walking near, talking to, or

standing with students of other races. There were no race differences in terms of interracial avoidance: Black students avoided White students as much as White students avoided Black students. Although the majority of students reported that there were friendly cross-racial contacts at school (such as greeting, walking with, and talking with), only half the students reported friendly cross-racial contacts off campus (such as interracial dating and visiting the home of cross-racial peers). There were large racial differences in reports of unfriendly cross-racial interactions. Significantly more White students than Black students reported being called names, being threatened, and being physically blocked from passing. However, these differences were much smaller in other categories, such as interracial arguments, pushing, and fighting. Beverly Daniel Tatum (1997) has written an interesting book on the topic of racial segregation in children and adolescents, in which she explains why all the Black students sit together in the cafeteria at lunch. See Box 8.4 for more information on this book.

In sum, children's intergroup behavior, like adults', is not always consistent with their attitudes. During preschool, there appears to be either an own-race or a pro-White bias. However, by 1st grade both Black and White children show an own-race bias that increases with age. In high school, it seems that the majority of students reported having positive cross-race interactions at school, but less than half of students reported having positive cross-race experiences outside of school.

### The Development of Gender-Based Prejudice

If you think back to your own childhood, you might remember holding negative attitudes toward members of the other sex. You might recall hearing little girls saying that they had "boy germs" because a boy had touched them on the playground or little boys talking about getting "cooties" from girls. How do these negative attitudes toward members of the other sex develop?

**The Origins.** We begin in toddlerhood, where the roots of gender-based prejudice emerge. Ironically, toddlers begin to form gender stereotypes before they can even say the words "boy" and "girl." Some evidence shows that even infants younger than 2 years of age have visual preferences for and knowledge of gender-stereotyped toys. For example, Lisa Serbin and her colleagues (Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colburne, Sen, & Eichstedt, 2001) tested 12-, 18-, and 24-month-old infants' preferences for photos of vehicles or dolls. They found that by 18 months, infants showed preferences for gender-stereotyped toys, with the girls preferring the dolls and the boys preferring the vehicles. Serbin and her colleagues also wanted to determine whether infants would associate gender-stereotyped toys with the faces and voices of male and female children. By 18 months of age, girls "matched" the gender-stereotyped toys with girls' and boys' faces, although boys did not do so until 24 months.

By around 2½ or 3 years of age, children know something about their own gender and the gender of others ("I'm a girl and he's a boy."). However, this awareness does not necessarily mean that they have a complete understanding

### **Box 8.4 "Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?"**

If you walk into the cafeteria at a racially mixed high school, you will most likely see Black students all seated together in the cafeteria. Beverly Tatum (1997), a clinical psychologist who is now president of Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia, posed the question: "Why are all the Black kids sitting together in the cafeteria?" Tatum begins by pointing out that in racially diverse elementary schools it is quite common to see children of different ethnicities working, playing, and eating together. However, by the time these children are in 6th or 7th grade, this racial segregation has begun. Why? Tatum believes that when children enter adolescence, they begin to search for a personal identity.

An especially important aspect of personal identity for Black teens is racial identity. Why is race so important to Black adolescents? Probably because everyone else thinks of them in racial terms. Resisting Black stereotypes, such as that Blacks are not as smart as Whites or that all Black people love to dance, and defining themselves in other ways is a major task for Black teens. So perhaps it is Black children's experiences with racism that lead them to self-segregate in the cafeteria. Associating only with other Black teens would protect them from the racism that they may experience in other contexts. Moreover, Black teens turn to other Blacks for social support because other Black students are more likely to understand how they feel than are White teens. To make matters worse, White teens are generally not very supportive when Black teens want to talk to them about racism.

Sometimes Black adolescents develop an oppositional identity in which they want everyone to be aware of their Blackness. When a group of Black teens are together, this oppositional group may be

perceived as threatening. Unfortunately, getting good grades in school is not considered part of most Black teens' identities. In fact, if a Black adolescent achieves academically, then some of her peers might say that she is trying to act White (Kao, 2000). Black teens avoid situations that will distinguish them from their peers, such as participating in a gifted program. But how do Black students who do well in school find acceptance among White students? It seems that Blacks downplay or deemphasize their racial identity, but they do not reject it.

Getting back to the original question: Why are all the Black kids sitting together in the cafeteria? According to Tatum, sitting at the Black table is a way to express their identity. The results from two studies of college students suggest another reason for self-segregation by both Blacks and Whites. Nicole Shelton and Jennifer Richeson (2005) found that both Black and White students were interested in becoming better acquainted with members of the other race, but both also thought that any overtures they might make would be rejected. Thus, both Black and White students were reluctant to initiate interracial contact because of a misperception of disinterest on the part of the other group.

What about the Black children who choose not to sit at the Black table in the cafeteria? Lawrence Graham (1995) was one of those Black children who did not even consider sitting at the Black table in the cafeteria. He recalls that he avoided the Black table because he was afraid that by sitting at that table he would lose his White friends. To Graham, sitting at the Black table would make a racist or anti-White statement.

of gender identity. For example, although over 90 percent of 2- to 5-year-old children know their own gender (Slaby & Frey, 1975), they seem unclear on some other aspects of gender such as *gender constancy*: the understanding that gender is permanent despite superficial changes in hairstyle, clothing, behavior, or age. That is, young children have some basic knowledge about their own gender and the gender of others, but their gender identity is not fully developed. Moreover, there is a relationship between children's level of gender constancy and their preference for attending to (that is, looking at) same-sex adults. For example, Ronald Slaby and Karin Frey (1975) found that children who had a more advanced level of gender constancy attended more to the individuals of their own sex who were shown in brief video clips.

Similarly, young children do not use gender-role stereotypes as readily as adults do, but rather are more likely to base judgments strictly on biological sex. That is, they are not as adept at distinguishing biological differences between the sexes from differences based on socially derived gender roles. For example, boys described as having feminine interests, such as playing with dolls or playing dress-up, are still thought to prefer boys' activities by other children (Martin, 1990). By around age 9, children begin to associate gender roles, rather than biological sex, with activities and interests. Yet even young children are well aware of gender-associated expectations and make judgments based on those assumptions. Thus, children as young as 2 years can readily identify which toys are appropriate for their sex (Blakemore, LaRue, & Olejnik, 1979), and they know which activities are stereotypically associated with women and men (Levy & Fivush, 1993). Children assume that if they like a gender-neutral toy, then other members of their sex will also like it but that children of the other sex will not. Moreover, children say they like very attractive toys less if they learn these toys are designed for the other sex and assume their peers will hold the same belief (Martin, Eisenbud, & Rose, 1995).

Within most Western cultures, children first exhibit same-sex preferences around 3 or 4 years of age (LaFreniere, Strayer, & Gauthier, 1984; Jacklin & Maccoby, 1978). However, same-sex preferences emerge either earlier or later in cultures with different family and social structures. For example, in a rural Kenyan community, same-sex preference does not develop until 6 to 9 years of age (Harkness & Super, 1985). This later emergence of preference compared with children from Western cultures might be due to the increased interactions that Kenyan children have in mixed-sex groups. Given the significant family and economic responsibilities involving mixed-sex groups, such as helping with child care and supervising cattle, it makes sense that Kenyan children might not exhibit the same-sex preference as early as children in other cultures because they have more experience with members of the other sex. These findings highlight the importance of the environment on gender preferences. In cultures where mixed-sex groups are more common, **homosociality**, or the tendency to interact socially only with members of one's own sex, occurs later in development.

Gender-based prejudice emerges by age 3 and is quite strong by 4 years of age (Bussey & Bandura, 1992; Martin, 1989). Researchers have consistently found that, overall, boys like boys and men better than girls and women, whereas for girls the opposite is true. Therefore, prejudice on the basis of gender is initially symmetrical and bidirectional, with boys holding negative attitudes about girls and girls holding equally negative attitudes about boys.

**Older Children's Attitudes.** An interesting shift occurs in children's gender-based attitudes between 4 and 8 years, in which the process becomes more lopsided. For example, Carol Martin (1989) showed 4½- and 8½-year-old children pictures of boys and girls and also read descriptions of the target children's interests and friends. The descriptions of gender characteristics presented consisted of gender neutral characteristics, same-sex stereotyped interests, other-sex stereotyped



interests, a boy labeled as a sissy, and a girl labeled as a tomboy. When asked how much they liked the target children, 4½-year-old children disliked tomboys more than all of the other groups, whereas 8½-year-old children disliked sissies the most. The age-related shift from disliking tomboys to disliking sissies might be a result of older children's valuing male characteristics more than female characteristics in both sexes (Smetana, 1986); thus, older children would have the most negative attitudes toward children thought to be sissies because they devalue feminine characteristics. It is important to note that Martin (1989) found no significant differences for the other three groups: gender neutral, gender-stereotyped, or counterstereotyped interests. Taken together, these findings suggest that labels were more important than behaviors for these children's preferences.

During preadolescence, both boys and girls like gender-role traditional girls the most. For example, Thalma Lobel and her colleagues (Lobel, Bempechat, Gewirtz, Shoken-Topaz, & Bashe, 1993) showed 10- and 12-year old Israeli children one of four videotapes. In these videotapes, a target child was shown playing a gender-appropriate game (soccer for boys and jump rope for girls) with members of the same sex or a gender-inappropriate game (jump rope for boys and soccer for girls) with members of the other sex. After watching the videotape, participants rated the target child on several dimensions. Both the boy target and the girl target who played soccer were rated as more masculine than feminine. Conversely, the boy and girl targets who jumped rope were rated as more feminine than masculine. In terms of perceived popularity with their peers, the least liked child was the boy who played jump rope with girls, while the likability of all other targets was the same. In terms of how much participants personally liked the target child, traditionally sex-typed girls were liked the most. In other words, both boys and girls personally most liked girls who played with other girls. In terms of willingness to engage in activities with the target, boys preferred to engage in other activities with the girl who played soccer with the boys, whereas girls preferred to engage in other activities with the boys who played soccer with other boys. Again, this finding suggests that both boys and girls highly value masculine characteristics.

When considering Lobel and her colleagues' (1993) findings, it is important to note that the research was conducted with Israeli preteens—not American preteens; consequently, their findings may or may not generalize to American children. For example, in both Lobel and her colleagues' and Martin's (1989) studies, children disliked sissies the most. However, all children in Lobel and her colleagues' study liked girls who played with other girls the most, whereas in Martin's study boys liked boys who played with other boys, and girls liked girls who played with other girls.

It appears, then, that other-sex prejudice emerges by age 3 and is in full force by age 4. This early prejudice is bidirectional, with girls having negative attitudes about boys and vice versa. Between 4 and 8 years of age an asymmetry emerges, with both boys and girls rejecting "sissies." After 8 years of age, other-sex prejudice declines slightly, perhaps due to heterosexual interest. In other words, perhaps prejudice toward the other sex becomes less prevalent as children become romantically interested in one another.

**Intergroup Behavior.** Holding a negative attitude about someone based on social group membership does not always result in discriminatory behavior against that person. As with race, even if children's behavior indicates segregation based on gender group, we cannot be sure that this behavior is arising from prejudice. For example, if a girl chooses to play four-square with other girls on the playground at recess, does this necessarily mean that she holds negative attitudes about boys and is discriminating against them? Perhaps it simply means that she likes playing four-square and so do several other girls in her class.

To examine whether younger children discriminate against members of the other sex, researchers generally use behavioral observations. In one such study, Peter LaFreniere, Floyd Strayer, and Roger Gauthier (1984) observed 15 groups of 1- to 6-year-olds over a 3-year period to determine how frequently they displayed positive behaviors toward same- and other-sex peers. The 1-year-olds did not exhibit any sex-based preferences. By 2 years of age, girls showed same-sex preferences but boys did not. At 3 years, both boys and girls held same-sex preferences, directing twice as many positive social initiatives to same-sex peers. By 5 years of age, girls were still directing twice as many initiatives toward other girls, but that ratio had increased to 3-to-1 for boys. In another observational study of young children, Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin (1987) studied 4½- and 6½-year-olds. The younger group was in preschool and the older group was in kindergarten. The researchers found that younger children were 2½ times more likely to be playing with a same-sex peer than an other-sex peer; the older children were 11 times more likely to be playing with a same-sex friend. It is evident that there is a dramatic increase in other-sex discrimination between preschool and kindergarten. Thus, the development of attitudes and behaviors based on gender are consistent with one another. Same-sex attitudinal and behavioral preferences can be seen by 2½ years of age and are stable until 4½ years. At this time, both attitudes and behaviors become stronger and more prevalent. By 6½ years, other-sex discrimination is in full swing.

To study other-sex discrimination in older children, researchers typically use a form of the roster and rating method. For example, Laura Hayden-Thomson, Kenneth Rubin, and Shelley Hymel (1987) gave children a photo of every child in their class and asked them to sort the photos into three groups: "like a lot," "sort of like," and "don't like." Children of all ages rated same-sex peers higher in likeability than opposite-sex peers. From kindergarten through 3rd grade, children had a negative bias toward other-sex classmates, and this other-sex negativity increased with age. From 3rd grade through 6th grade, no particular trends were noted. Therefore, other-sex discrimination increased from kindergarten to 3rd grade, then remained stable from 3rd grade to 6th grade.

Wesley Shrum and Neil Cheek (1987) studied 3rd through 12th graders in a racially integrated school located in the South. Participants were asked, "Who from school are your best friends?" To understand how gender, race, and age influenced social networks in the schools, they examined the composition of social groups, which they defined as sets of three or more people who were friends. They found that from 3rd to 6th grade only 17 percent of groups were composed of both boys and girls, compared with 66 percent of groups at 7th and

8th grades, and 100 percent at 12th grade. Thus, the gender segregation that is seen in early elementary school changes during junior high school. This change might be due to an increased romantic interest in members of the other sex for the majority of junior high school students.

In related research, Shrum, Cheek, and Sandra Hunter (1988) analyzed friendship patterns to determine the relative frequency of same-sex and cross-sex friendships. They found that cross-sex friendships were very infrequent from 3rd to 12th grade, although frequency increased a little during junior high through high school. For boys, same-sex preferences peaked at grades 3 and 6. Same-sex preferences were highest for girls at 7th grade. Students in all grades reported that they had, on average, at least five times as many same-sex friends as other-sex friends. Thus, it appears that children exhibit same-sex friendship patterns quite early in development, which can be seen in children's self-segregating behavior. This self-segregation seems to continue during elementary school, middle school, and high school, with reductions in other-sex prejudice being associated with heterosexual interest.

**Sexual Orientation.** As heterosexual interest emerges, it also seems to affect adolescents' attitudes toward gay and lesbian individuals. Negative attitudes toward homosexuality seem to arise around the time of puberty (Baker & Fishbein, 1998; Horn, 2008). In a series of studies, a team of researchers led by Stacey Horn (2008) found that although heterosexual students tend to maintain the belief that homosexuality is wrong through young adulthood (up to age 24), other beliefs change as they get older. For example, compared to 14- to 16-year-olds, older adolescents and young adults tend to be more tolerant of gay and lesbian peers (such as by coming to view social exclusion or teasing on the basis of sexual orientation as wrong), to be less likely to endorse stereotypes about homosexuality, and to express less discomfort when interacting with gay or lesbian peers. Older adolescents are also more likely to view prejudice against sexual minorities as wrong. However, these attitudes can be very context-dependent. For example, Horn (2008) notes that reported discomfort with interacting with gay and lesbian peers increases as the intimacy of the situation increases. Thus, heterosexual adolescents report little discomfort with working with gay or lesbian peers on school committees, but much more discomfort with possibility of having to share a room with a gay or lesbian peer on a school trip. Horn (2008) has also found that many of the psychological and demographic correlates of antigay attitudes that are found in adults (see Chapter 10), such as being male, highly religious, and holding traditional sex-role attitudes are also found in adolescents.

## THEORIES OF PREJUDICE DEVELOPMENT

Now that we have reviewed the research findings on the development of racial and gender prejudice in children, let us look at some of the ways in which theorists have attempted to explain how prejudice develops. Some theories of

prejudice emphasize the role of the environment, whereas others postulate that prejudice comes from within. This section discusses four theories of how prejudice develops in children: social learning theory, inner state theories, cognitive developmental theory, and developmental intergroup theory.

### Social Learning Theory

**Social learning theory** (Bandura, 1977, 1986) provides a comprehensive explanation for many aspects of social development, including the development of prejudice, in terms of three learning processes: direct teaching, observational learning, and vicarious learning. Direct teaching occurs when an individual is rewarded for behaving in a certain way. For example, a White child might receive a smile from a parent for avoiding children of color on the playground. Bandura's theory also holds that children can be taught indirectly through observational learning. Observational learning sometimes involves imitating the attitudes or behavior of a live model, such as a parent or peer, but observational learning can also occur through symbolic modeling, such as imitating the behavior of a character in a book or television show. Vicarious learning occurs when the child observes someone else being reinforced for a particular attitude or behavior. For example, if one boy sees another boy being applauded by his same-sex peers for calling a girl a mean name, then the first child might learn vicariously, or indirectly, that it is a good idea to call girls mean names. As we saw in Chapter 3, some researchers believe that stereotypes are learned through observational or vicarious learning.

**Direct Teaching.** Direct teaching of prejudice is probably not very common; in fact, White parents, at least, rarely discuss prejudice with their children. One group of researchers, for example, found that only 26 percent of their sample of White parents had discussed racism with their children (Katkin, Katz, & Downey, 1995, as reported in Aboud & Amato, 2001). Similarly, parents rarely teach gender stereotypes directly (Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004).

Nonetheless, direct teaching does occur in some situations. For example, children whose parents are members of hate groups are likely to be exposed to direct teaching of prejudice. Based on interviews with women active in organized racist groups, Kathleen Blee (2002) discovered that children of group members are explicitly taught religious and racial hatred at a very early age. Sentiments from parents such as "stay away from nigger children," "Jews are inhuman," and "nonwhites should be called 'mud people'" were not uncommon. The explicit teaching of prejudice happens not only in the home, but also by the racist organizations. The Ku Klux Klan has a special group for children called the "Klan Kid Korp" to prepare children to become racists (Blee, 2002). Children dressed in miniature Klan robes hold imitation torches and guns as they run or dance around burning crosses with adults. Blee noted that schooling is another method of direct transmission of prejudice to the children of hate group members, with some children attending "Aryan-only" schools and others being homeschooled to prevent

their being “corrupted” by exposure to minority children and egalitarian beliefs. In addition, children are encouraged to have pen pals in other racist groups to strengthen their racist attitudes.

**Indirect Teaching.** Although direct teaching of prejudice has been known to occur in extremely racist families, Phyllis Katz (2003) suggests that most teaching of racial prejudice is indirect, occurring through processes such as modeling, imitation, and vicarious learning. Sources of indirect learning include parents, peers, cultural background, media, and school programs. For example, Joe Feagin and Hernan Vera (1995) interviewed a White woman in her 20s who described an incident from her childhood illustrating the indirect role that other people play in the development of prejudice. The woman recalled:

I’m playing with my black paper dolls, having a good time. Then somebody comes to visit my parents, and they saw these dolls. And they say, “Oh, you let her play with nigger paper dolls? You let her do that?” Later, when this person leaves, my parents come over, and it’s “She bought nigger paper dolls! What’s with her?” And they took my paper dolls away. To this day there’s this little something in me that, I want those paper dolls back. Because that just wasn’t where my head was at, I wasn’t about being black or white, I just wanted those paper dolls. (p. 159)

By taking her paper dolls away, this child’s parents were giving her an indirect message that Black paper dolls were not appropriate for her to play with. Presumably, her parents’ message also implied that it was not appropriate for her to play with Black children either.

**Social Learning and Prejudice.** The most straightforward way to show that parents influence the acquisition of prejudice is to examine the correlation of children’s attitudes with those their parents hold. However, researchers have generally found little or no correlation between parents’ intergroup attitudes and those of their children (Aboud & Amato, 2001; Fishbein, 2002). One reason for a low parent-child correlation for prejudice is that the effect of parental prejudice may operate through other factors. For example, Christopher Agnew, Vaida Thompson, and Stanley Gaines (2000) found no direct link between family factors and prejudice in college students, but did find that family factors were related to direct predictors of prejudice, such as level of tolerance and political beliefs. Thus, parents may influence their children’s level of prejudice indirectly through the values they teach their children rather than by directly teaching them to be prejudiced. Other factors may also be important. For example, Megan O’Bryan, and Neal Ritchey (2004) found that mothers influenced their children’s attitudes on race and fatness whereas fathers influenced their children’s sex-role attitudes and attitudes toward homosexuality. In addition, Stacey Sinclair, Elizabeth Dunn, and Brian Lowery (2005) found greater parent-child similarity in both explicit and implicit prejudice among children who were more highly identified with their parents than among children who felt little identification with their parents.

Peers also can influence the development of prejudice. For example, Frances Aboud and Anna Beth Doyle (1996) examined how children's racial attitudes were influenced by talking about their attitudes with a peer whose level of prejudice differed from their own. White 3rd and 4th graders were classified as being either high or low on prejudice based on their scores on a measure of racial attitudes. Next, Aboud and Doyle paired high-prejudice children with low-prejudice children in dyads, and the children discussed one positive item and one negative item from the racial attitudes measure administered earlier. Children were instructed to talk about how the children in the items, who were of three different racial groups (White, Black, and Chinese), should be evaluated and to provide a rationale for their evaluation. Following the discussions, each child was retested on the same racial attitudes measure they had completed at the beginning of the study. The researchers found that high-prejudice children subsequently adopted less prejudiced attitudes, and the changes were the greatest when the low-prejudice partner made more comments about the similarities among people of different races coupled with more positive Black evaluations and negative White evaluations. However, low-prejudice children did not become more prejudiced.

Although Aboud and Doyle (1996) found that children *can* influence each other's racial attitudes, researchers have generally found no correlation between children's intergroup attitudes and those of their peers (Aboud & Amato, 2001; Fishbein, 2002). Neal Ritchey and Harold Fishbein (2001) have suggested that this lack of similarity in peers' attitudes may exist because children and adolescents (or at least White children and adolescents) assume that their friends hold attitudes similar to their own and so rarely discuss prejudice and discrimination.

Symbolic models of prejudice include images and words that children see or hear about in the media. As we saw in Chapter 3, children can indirectly learn about stereotypes through what they read in books, magazines, and newspapers, and what they watch on television, video, or in a movie theater. For example, to examine gender and racial minority roles in daily newspaper comics, Jack Glascock and Catherine Preston-Schreck (2004) sampled 50 comic strips from four daily newspapers during a month-long period. Overall, male characters (69 percent) appeared more frequently than female characters (31 percent) and characters were gender stereotyped in a number of ways. For example, women characters were more likely than men characters to be married and have children and not as likely to have a job outside the home. When women characters did work outside the home, they had a lower job status than did male characters. In terms of activities and behaviors, female characters did more domestic work, such as household chores and child care, and male characters participated in more yard work. Female characters were portrayed as exhibiting more verbal aggression, whereas male characters displayed more physical aggression. Ninety-six percent of the characters in the comics were White, indicating that racial minorities are underrepresented.

Finally, the absence of certain social groups from the media can give children an indirect message about the relative value of that social group. Many social groups rarely appear in the media, and when they are seen they are depicted in

a negative light (Klein & Naccarato, 2003). Similarly, a child whose book collection is dominated by White characters learns indirectly that people of color and their cultures are not valued.

### Inner State Theories

**Inner state theories** are essentially theories of individual differences, such as those discussed in Chapter 7. Aboud (1988) labeled them inner state theories because the theories propose that prejudice is caused by something inside the person, such as personality. Although most of the theories we examined in Chapter 7 do not address developmental issues, one of the earliest theories—authoritarianism—does, and various theorists have considered its development in terms of personality, and social learning. The development of social dominance orientation has also been addressed.

**Personality.** As you will recall from Chapter 7, Theodor Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) developed the concept of the authoritarian personality to explain the popularity of fascism during the 1930s. They proposed that a certain type of person—one with an authoritarian personality—was especially susceptible to the appeal of authoritarian political parties. In addition to describing the characteristics of the authoritarian personality, Adorno and his colleagues drew on psychoanalytic theory to propose a model of how that personality developed.

As with other psychoanalytic theorists, Adorno and his colleagues (1950) placed the origin of authoritarianism in early childhood experience—specifically in child-rearing practices. According to this theory, an adult who is high in authoritarianism had parents who set strict rules and used punishment to enforce those rules, especially rules dealing with obedience. As a result of these punitive experiences, the child experienced psychological conflict. On the one hand, the child felt resentment and hostility toward the parents stemming from the punishments the parents inflicted; on the other hand, the child had to repress all desires and impulses toward expressing that resentment because it would have been futile to attack the more powerful parents and because the child learned (through punishment) to obey the parents' authority. Unless these feelings of conflict are resolved, they generalize to all authority figures and continue on into adulthood.

This conflict gives rise to the authoritarian personality. As we saw in Chapter 7, this personality type includes characteristics such as rigid adherence to conventional values, a submissive attitude toward authority, a tendency toward aggression against people who violate conventional values, a tendency toward using rigid cognitive categories, and a tendency to project one's emotional impulses onto others. This personality type is linked to prejudice through stereotypic thinking, prejudice against people who violate conventional norms (that is, people who are different from oneself) or who are condemned by authority figures, and a tendency to see one's own faults in the targets of prejudice. (See Forbes, 1985, for a more

detailed description of the psychoanalytic underpinnings of the authoritarian personality.)

Unfortunately, there has not been much research on the relationship of child-rearing practices to either authoritarianism or prejudice, and what research exists has provided inconsistent results (Hopf, 1993). On the one hand, research using paper-and-pencil measures of authoritarianism and people's memories of how their parents treated them as children has generally found little support for a relationship. Bob Altemeyer (1981), for example, examined the correlation between several measures of punitive child-rearing practices and found that the measures were not highly correlated. On the other hand, Christel Hopf (1993) noted that studies using qualitative techniques, such as personal interviews, have tended to find such a relationship.

Does the disparity in these results simply reflect differences in research methods? Perhaps not. John Duckitt (2001) has suggested that child-rearing practices do play a role in the development of authoritarianism, but that other factors intervene, obscuring their role. As shown in the left half of Table 8.1, Duckitt proposes that punitive child-rearing practices lead to a conforming personality (because nonconformity is punished), and this experience with punishment causes the child to see the world as a threatening and dangerous place. These perceived threats motivate the child (and later, the adult) to seek security and to seek control over the environment as a means of minimizing those threats. Because authoritarian political and social ideologies advocate controlling the environment, the person embraces those kinds of ideologies and the prejudices that accompany them. In contrast, tolerant child-rearing practices lead to an independent personality that perceives the world as safe and secure. This perception causes the person to be motivated by personal freedom and to adopt social and political ideologies that also emphasize personal freedom.

As shown in the right half of Table 8.1, Duckitt (2001) has proposed a similar model for the development of social dominance orientation. In this model,

**TABLE 8.1 Duckitt's Model of the Development of Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation**

|                      | Adult Outcomes              |                  |                              |                    |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|
|                      | Authoritarianism            |                  | Social Dominance Orientation |                    |
|                      | High                        | Low              | High                         | Low                |
| Childhood experience | Punitive                    | Tolerant         | Unaffectionate               | Affectionate       |
| Personality          | Conforming                  | Independent      | Tough-minded                 | Tender-minded      |
| Worldview            | Threatening and dangerous   | Safe and secure  | Competitive                  | Cooperative        |
| Motivation           | Social control and security | Personal freedom | Superiority                  | Concern for others |
| Social ideology      | Authoritarianism            | Freedom          | Social dominance             | Equality           |

NOTE: The order of development is from top to bottom.

SOURCE: Adapted from John Duckitt (2001, Table 4, p. 53).



cold, unaffectionate child-rearing practices lead to a tough-minded personality (because that is how the parents behave), and tough-mindedness causes the child to see the world as a competitive jungle in which each person must look out for him- or herself first. This worldview leads the child (and later, the adult) to want to attain superiority over others and thus promotes a social dominance orientation. In contrast, warm, affectionate child-rearing practices lead to a tender-minded personality that sees the world as cooperative. This worldview promotes concern for others and an orientation toward social equality rather than social dominance. Duckitt has found support for his models in studies conducted in the United States, New Zealand, and South Africa (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). Both Adorno and colleagues' (1950) and Duckitt's (2001) models hold that authoritarianism (and, for Duckitt, social dominance orientation) are based in personality characteristics that are formed by child-rearing practices. However, note that the models differ in their views of how child-rearing practices affect personality. For Adorno and his colleagues, improper child-rearing instigates intrapsychic conflict that is not properly resolved; for Duckitt, parental behavior teaches the child to view the world in certain ways.

**Social Learning.** Bob Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) rejects the role of early childhood experience as a source of authoritarianism and its associated prejudices. Instead, he proposes a social learning model that holds that authoritarian beliefs are acquired through socialization. Altemeyer believes that this learning begins in adolescence because it is only at that stage of cognitive development that children reach a point at which they can understand the kinds of social and political issues on which authoritarianism is based. Although Altemeyer does not address social dominance orientation in his books, the idea that the same process is at work there is consistent with his perspective.

Altemeyer (1988, 1996) proposes two main sources of social learning. The first, not surprisingly, is parents. Altemeyer points out that one of the first things parents teach their children is obedience to themselves; later, parents also teach obedience to authority figures outside the home, such as teachers, police officers, and so forth. Other adults with whom children interact, such as day-care staff, grandparents, and teachers also teach obedience. In addition, to some extent, children pick up their parents' attitudes; Altemeyer has found a positive correlation between the authoritarianism scores of college students and their parents. The second source of authoritarian attitudes is personal experience. Altemeyer had people complete a questionnaire about personal experiences related to authoritarian attitudes; for example, one item on the questionnaire read, "The people I have known who are unpatriotic and disrespectful toward authority have seemed to me to be ignorant troublemakers" (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 76). Altemeyer found a strong positive correlation between personal experience and authoritarianism, making it the strongest of the predictors he studied. Altemeyer also points out that the kinds of experiences that affect authoritarian attitudes continue throughout life, not just in childhood. Thus, Altemeyer found that students' average authoritarianism scores decreased while they were at college and continued to decrease after graduation.

### Cognitive Developmental Theories

**Cognitive developmental theories** of prejudice hold that children's intergroup attitudes reflect their abilities to think about and understand the nature of social groups and intergroup relations. Because children's cognitive abilities increase with age, their intergroup attitudes also change. Hence, prejudice differs qualitatively across stages of development as a result of the changes in underlying cognitive structures that occur as children grow older. This process involves an ongoing interplay between children's mental development and their environments, so that social-cognitive processes such as prejudice reflect both nature (natural developmental changes) and nurture (experience). The cognitive developmental stages that children pass through imply that although prejudice may be unavoidable at certain stages of development, it is probably not permanent and may decrease or disappear entirely as the child advances cognitively.

**Piaget's Theory.** The study of the relationship between cognitive development and prejudice began with a pioneer in the field of developmental psychology, Jean Piaget (Piaget & Weil, 1951). Piaget (1932) proposed that children move through four stages of cognitive development. In the sensorimotor stage (birth to age 2) infants cannot internally represent people and objects in the world, so they cannot hold attitudes (either positive or negative) about them and prejudice does not exist. During the preoperational stage (2 to 7 years) children's thinking focuses on the self as the center of everything and children are unable to take the perspective of another person. Children at this stage also tend to focus on a single piece of information when multiple pieces of information are relevant. For example, when deciding who to play with, a 4-year-old child might focus on skin color or gender because those are perceptually obvious characteristics even though other factors, such as having similar interests, should come into play when choosing playmates. At around 7 years of age, children's thinking becomes concrete operational, which means that thought is now logical and systematic, but it is limited to concrete, as opposed to abstract, objects and events. The ability to think abstractly comes at the formal operational stage which begins at about age 11 or 12 and lasts through adulthood.

Piaget proposed that prejudice develops in three stages that roughly parallel the stages of cognitive development. The egocentric stage runs from 4 to 7 years of age. At this stage children do not notice differences in people because they assume that everyone experiences the world the way they do. Piaget considered social group preferences displayed before 7 years to be random and to differ from child to child. From 7 to 10 years of age, thought is sociocentric. Children no longer focus only on themselves, but on their own social group. Focusing on one's own social group (for example, people of the same religion, race, or gender) makes it difficult to understand the perspectives of other social groups, so children conceptualize other groups in terms of how they differ from the children's own group. For example, a White, Christian child might consider other White, Christian people as the "template" for comparison. Thus, she compares all other social groups to her own social group. Preferences will change

accordingly, with children having positive attitudes about their own social group and negative attitudes about other groups. Between 10 and 15 years of age, children's tendency to focus on themselves continues to decline, which allows them to distinguish among other social groups. In addition, they begin to apply the principle of reciprocity to those groups: they tend to believe that outgroup members' beliefs about them reflect their beliefs about the outgroup. Piaget did not clearly describe this last stage, so whether he would predict that prejudice would remain high or diminish between 10 and 15 years is uncertain.

You may have noticed that Piaget's theory of prejudice, which he developed before much research was conducted on prejudice in children, is not entirely consistent with the finding of that research. For example, researchers have found that prejudice begins to develop between 3 and 4 years of age. However, Piaget claimed that during the preoperational stage (2 to 7 years), children's thought is self-focused, which prevents them from having systematic intergroup attitudes. Also, Piaget's theory suggests that prejudice should reach its highest levels during the concrete operational period (7 to 12 years). However, researchers have found that racial prejudice reaches its highest levels at around 5 years and declines by 7 years and that gender-based prejudice increases until 8 years then declines. Thus, contrary to Piaget's theory, prejudice is already beginning to decline by 7 or 8 years of age. Finally, based on Piaget's theory, it is not clear what happens to prejudice during the formal operational stage (12 years and older). Prejudice might decline or it might stay at the same levels as it was during the concrete operational stage. As we saw earlier, researchers have found a decline in prejudice before the age of 12.

**About's Theory.** Problems such as these led later theorists to modify Piaget's theory to better fit the empirical data. For example, Frances Aboud (1988) describes the development of prejudice in terms of three broad stages that do not have age boundaries; different children can proceed through a given stage at different ages based on individual differences in the rate of cognitive development.

At the earliest stage of development, children's prejudice is based on emotional responses to others and a focus on the self. For example, infants 9 to 12 months of age display what is known as *stranger distress*, a fear of strangers. This fear applies to anyone who looks different than people the child knows well. Thus, infants whose parents have blond hair and blue eyes sometimes get more upset when they see a stranger with dark hair and dark eyes than when they see a stranger who looks more like their parents. Wariness of strangers continues into toddlerhood but changes occur. During toddlerhood, children may only fear those strangers whose behavior is unpredictable. For example, they may only fear the stranger who approaches them too quickly then immediately picks them up. At this stage of development children are also egocentric, paying the most attention to their own preferences and perceptions. Children under the age of 7 assume that everyone sees the world the same way they do. For example, you might receive a doll from your 5-year-old niece for your birthday. Assuming that you are like most adults, this gift probably was not one of the items on your birthday wish list. However, this particular niece would love a doll for her

birthday, so she assumes that you would like one as well. Because of this focus on emotion and the self, prejudice at the early stage of development differs from prejudice displayed by older children. It “usually does not take the form of anger, hostility, and verbal taunts. Rather, it is experienced as fear, sadness, and disapproval, and expressed as avoidance, social exclusion, and negative evaluations” (Aboud, 2005, p. 314). Because of their egocentric focus, children at this age also cannot understand why others do not share their feelings.

In the second stage of the developmental process, perceptions of other people develop relative to oneself, with children noting physical similarities and dissimilarities between themselves and others. Children overemphasize obvious perceptual differences, such as differences in skin color, hair texture, and language, and they underemphasize or perhaps entirely ignore the deeper, underlying similarities between people. Based on these perceptions, children form the foundation for categorization and begin to categorize people according to social group membership. Children note the difference between their own social group and other social groups. At first, children exaggerate the contrast between their own and other social groups to aid in their understanding of the groups. This exaggeration may lead to prejudiced attitudes—an “us versus them” mentality. Eventually children become aware of the similarities as well as the differences between their own and other groups, indicating that they are becoming more cognitively flexible. Thus, declines seen in prejudice might be a result of this increased cognitive flexibility.

In the third stage of development, conceptual understanding develops. Categorization is no longer just based on perceptual similarities and differences, but now involves looking at people’s internal qualities as well. Now children categorize people based on both social group membership and their individual qualities. It is at this level that children realize that ethnicity is a permanent characteristic. Because children at this stage attend to people as individuals, they judge others in terms of personal qualities rather than the qualities of their ethnic group. This is not to say that all individuals will be judged positively, but the criterion for making judgments about others will not be based on ethnic group membership. As a result of this focus on individual differences, ethnic prejudice begins to decline and this is the time when children would be most responsive to interventions to reduce prejudice.

Cognitive developmental theories are important because they explain how the nature of prejudice changes as mental processes and capabilities change from infancy through childhood and adolescence into adulthood. However, as Rebecca Bigler and Lynn Liben (2007) note, these theories do not explain why children develop prejudices based on some characteristics of people (such as race and gender) and not on others (such as handedness). Developmental intergroup theory (Bigler & Liben, 2006, 2007) addresses this issue.

### **Developmental Intergroup Theory**

The basic premise of developmental intergroup theory (Bigler & Liben, 2006, 2007) is that the development of prejudice is a byproduct of the normal process

of cognitive development through which children come to understand the world they live in and the rules by which that world operates. Just as children must work out which foods their cultures classify as edible and inedible based on their observations of others' behavior and the feedback they receive for their own behavior, so they must determine which categories of people are important to their cultures. Just as they learn that foods classified as edible are good and those classified as inedible are disgusting, so they associate positive emotions with groups that their cultures classify as good and negative emotions with groups their cultures classify as bad.

**Prejudice Development.** As shown in Table 8.2, the theory proposes that the development of prejudice proceeds in three stages. In the first stage, children develop rules for categorizing people into social groups. Four factors support the process of delineating categories. For young children, categories tend to be based on perceptually obvious characteristics of people, such as skin color, gender, age, and physical attractiveness. Young children focus on the physical characteristics of others because they cannot understand abstract characteristics such as nationality or religion. For example, Adam Rutland (1999) found that children aged 6 to 10 showed little ingroup favoritism or outgroup bias on the basis of nationality. However, as children grow older and their cognitive faculties improve, prejudices based on abstract categories can develop. Thus, Rutland (1999) found both nationality-based ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias among 12- to 16-year olds. A second factor that supports the development of categories is group size. Smaller groups, such as minority groups, are more distinctive to children because they see members of those groups less frequently than members of the majority group.

The third supporting factor is explicit categorization by adults. Children notice the categories that adults use to classify people and take adult behavior as cues for establishing their own categories. For example, Rebecca Bigler, Christia Brown,

**TABLE 8.2 Developmental Intergroup Theory**

| Stage of Development                      | Supporting Factors                                                                                                                |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Development of Category Rules             | Presence of perceptually obvious characteristics<br>Group size<br>Explicit categorization by adults<br>Societal use of categories |
| Categorization                            | Categorization/classification skill                                                                                               |
| Development of Stereotypes and Prejudices | Essentialism<br>Ingroup favoritism<br>Explicit teaching<br>Implicit teaching                                                      |

SOURCE: Adapted from Rebecca Bigler and Lynn Liben. (2006, Figure 1, p. 54).

and Marc Markell (2001) conducted a study in which children in a school were randomly assigned to wear either red or blue shirts. They found that when adults used the color groups to label children (such as by referring to “the red children”) and to organize classroom activities, the child showed a greater tendency to categorize each other by color group than when adults did not make use of color groups. Finally, children notice and make use of the ways in which society groups people. “They note perceptual similarities among those who live, work and socialize together. They then infer that individuals operate within segregated environments because they differ in important and non-obvious ways” (Bigler & Liben, 2006, p. 67). For example, in one experiment Bigler (2004, described in Bigler & Liben, 2006) randomly assigned some children in a summer program to segregated red or blue classrooms based on the color of shirts they were given to wear or to an integrated red and blue classroom. She found that children who were enrolled in the program but were not involved in the red-blue experiment were more likely to see the red- and blue-clothed students as members of different categories if the children who were part of the experiment had been assigned to segregated classrooms.

These factors not only operate separately, but also reinforce each others’ effects. Bigler and Liben (2006) illustrate this process with factors influencing the development of gender categories: “‘Male’ and ‘female’ are social categories that are characterized by (a) perceptual [differences] (often exaggerated by various kinds of marking such as differential dress and hair styles), (b) explicit labeling (different words, forms of words, pronouns, names) and sorting (e.g., in bathrooms, basketball teams), and (c) implicit use or segregation by sex (e.g., the pervasiveness of same-sex friendships, segregation by sex in many occupational settings” (p. 74).

Once children have created categories, they can then classify people into those categories. This process begins as children attain the concept of **category constancy**, an understanding that a person’s membership in a social category, such as gender or race, does not change across time or as a matter of superficial changes in appearance (Hirschfeld, 2008). For example, young children may assume that people can change their sex by changing clothing or hair style. Similarly, young children may believe that people can change from one race to another (Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001). Only when children attain the concept of constancy at about age 5 to 9 years (Ocampo, Bernal, & Knight, 1993) can they reliably classify others.

The complexity of the categories children form also changes over time. For example, preschool children tend to have very simplistic classification systems with either/or categories. For example, young children may simply categorize people as “good guys” or “bad guys” because they cannot yet understand that people can have both good and bad qualities simultaneously. They also tend to focus on a single classification dimension, such as sex or race. As children get older, they develop the capacity to see people in terms of multiple categories such as young Black woman. As we saw in Chapter 4, viewing people in terms of multiple roles tends to undermine stereotyping. In addition to using simplistic categories, young children tend to believe that people who are physically similar

are also similar on unseen characteristics. For example, children may believe that because Black and White people differ in physical appearance, they also have different blood types (Gelman, 2003). This belief that physical differences imply abstract differences provides the basis for the development of stereotypes.

Categorization sets the stage for the development of stereotypes and prejudices. Four factors contribute to this process. One is **essentialism**, the belief that members of a category all have similar psychological characteristics and that these characteristics are unchanging. (If this characteristic persists into adulthood, it is called *entitativity*, which we discussed in Chapter 7.) For example, researchers have found that children who believe that personal characteristics cannot change tend to develop more extreme attitudes toward groups (more positive for groups that were portrayed positively, more negative for groups that were portrayed negatively) and stronger same-race peer preferences than their peers who believe that such characteristics are changeable (G. Levy, 2000; S. Levy & Dweck, 1999). A second factor, which is also found in adults, is ingroup favoritism: As we saw earlier, children tend to attribute positive traits to their own groups, although they do not necessarily derogate outgroups. The third factor is explicit teaching; however, as we noted in our discussion of social learning theory, direct teaching of prejudice is probably rare. The final contributing factor is implicit teaching. For example, children may notice that most elementary school teachers are female. In conjunction with children's tendency to establish simplistic categories, this observation could lead to the stereotype that only women can or should be elementary school teachers. That is, children, like adults, can form stereotypes based on the process of illusory correlation, which we discussed in Chapter 3 (Johnston & Jacobs, 2003). Children also notice the ways in which adults respond to members of social groups. For example, if a child sees that her parents appear to be anxious around or try to avoid contact with members of minority groups, she may develop the belief that there is something wrong or bad about members of those groups.

**The Drop-Off in Prejudice.** Although Bigler and Liben (2006) do not address the issue directly, the last stage in their theory can explain the drop-off of expressed prejudice around age 7 or 8. Several mechanisms may be involved, either individually or in combination. First, real change might be taking place. As Bigler and Liben (2006) note, as children get older, their ability to view people in terms of multiple categories increases, which is associated with reduced prejudice. However, not all researchers agree that the observed drop-off in prejudice represents real change. For example, Scott Baron and Mahzarin Banaji (2006) and Adam Rutland and his colleagues (Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005) have found that even as children's levels of explicit prejudice drop off, their levels of implicit prejudice remain unchanged.

An alternative explanation for the drop-off in prejudice is that as children get older they begin to pick up on societal cues that prejudice is bad and so develop the motivation to control prejudice that we discussed in Chapter 5. For example, Rutland and colleagues (2005) found that even children younger than age 10 could control the expression of prejudice if they were externally motivated to do so. Older children showed an internal motivation to control

prejudice. In addition, Tamara Towles-Schwen and Russell Fazio (2001) found that college students' perceptions of their parents' degree of prejudice were positively correlated with restraint to avoid dispute, the tendency to control prejudiced responses to avoid negative reactions from other people. That is, the children of prejudiced parents may learn from observing their parents that there are situations in which expressing prejudices is taboo.

### **So Where Does Prejudice Come From?**

Does prejudice originate in social learning, inner states, or cognitive development? The answer probably is, to some extent, all of the above. Each person develops, to a greater or lesser degree, the personality factors, or inner states, that are related to prejudice. Social learning teaches children which social categories are important, the characteristics stereotypically associated with those categories, and whether those characteristics are good or bad. In addition, information does not simply take root in a child's mind, but is influenced by stages of cognitive development. For example, prejudice in the adult sense may not begin to emerge until children grasp the concepts of ingroups and outgroups during preschool and might not be fully formed until late elementary school when they begin to understand the potential impact their attitudes have on other people and the abstract, social meanings of those attitudes. During the latter part of the developmental sequence, children also begin to learn that prejudice is bad and to control its expression.

The bottom line is, we do not yet have a good understanding of how children turn into either prejudiced or nonprejudiced adults (Aboud & Amato, 2001). One reason for this lack of understanding is that, traditionally, the study of prejudice has been the domain of social psychologists and the study of cognitive and social development has been the domain of developmental psychologists, and the two groups have rarely collaborated to study the development of prejudice (S. Levy, 2004). That situation is changing, so the future should bring a better understanding of how prejudice develops.

## **REDUCING CHILDREN'S PREJUDICE**

Having looked at how prejudice develops in children, we now turn to interventions psychologists and educators have developed to reduce or prevent the development of prejudice in children. This section examines two commonly used school-based interventions, cooperative learning and multicultural and anti-bias education. First, though, we look at school desegregation, a social policy that many hoped would improve intergroup relations among children by fostering intergroup contact.

### **School Desegregation**

In deciding the landmark 1954 case *Brown v. Board of Education*, the United States Supreme Court ruled that segregated public education violated minority group



children's right to equal protection of the law and ordered that public schools be desegregated. The Court's focus was on providing equality of education for all children, but a group of 32 social scientists had written an *amicus curiae* (friend of the court) brief expressing their opinion that desegregation would have a variety of positive educational, social, and psychological effects (Effects of segregation, 1953). One of the effects listed in what became known as the Social Science Statement was the potential for improved intergroup relations. According to the Social Science Statement, this potential was based on the belief that desegregated schools would provide the opportunity for positive intergroup contact. A principle known as the contact hypothesis (which we discuss in detail in Chapter 14) holds that positive intergroup contact undermines stereotypes and so helps to reduce prejudice. In effect, the drafters of the Social Science Statement saw school desegregation as an opportunity to implement the principles of the contact hypothesis on a national scale.

The eventual implementation of school desegregation led to a flurry of research on its effectiveness in improving the outcomes discussed in the Social Science Statement (see Schofield, 2001b, for a summary of the results of this research). In terms of intergroup relations, the research findings indicated that desegregation had inconsistent effects. Harold Fishbein (2002) examined the results of 26 studies of the effect of school desegregation on intergroup attitudes, 16 of which assessed Black students' attitudes and 22 of which assessed White students' attitudes. He found that the most common outcome was an increase, rather than a decrease in prejudice: 44 percent of the studies of Black students' attitudes and 45 percent of the studies of White students' attitudes found more prejudice among students in desegregated schools than among students in schools that were still racially segregated. Fishbein did note that 38 percent of the studies of Black students' attitudes found less prejudice among students attending desegregated schools, but only 23 percent of the studies of White students' attitudes did so. These findings led Schneider (2004) to conclude that "desegregation is no poster child for the contact hypothesis" (p. 391). However, two issues need to be considered in evaluating these findings: the distinction between desegregation and integration and the distinction between short-term effects and long-term effects.

**Desegregation Versus Integration.** In 1969, Thomas Pettigrew made a famous distinction between desegregation and integration. As he later phrased it, "Mere desegregation involves only a mixture of groups no longer formally separated. It does not refer to the quality of the intergroup interaction. Desegregated campus life can range from positive intergroup contact to a living hell of intergroup strife.... Genuine integration refers to positive intergroup contact that meets [the necessary] conditions for prejudice-reducing contact.... Integration goes beyond present-day U.S. society by providing the conditions for removing the racial and ethnic threats and stereotypes that divide Americans" (Pettigrew, 1998b, p. 272). The necessary conditions that Pettigrew referred to are four factors that must be met for intergroup contact to be effective in reducing prejudice (Brewer & Brown, 1998): Ingroup and outgroup members must have equal

status in the school, the groups must work with each other to achieve common goals, the students from the different groups must be able to get to know each other as individuals, and school authorities (such as teachers and principals) must clearly support the effort to improve intergroup relations (see Chapter 14 for a complete discussion of these criteria). Although the Social Science Statement had said that, in Pettigrew's terms, integration, not mere desegregation, was necessary for contact to improve intergroup attitudes, researchers have noted from the outset that, in most cases, schools desegregated but did not integrate (Schofield, 2001b). That is, most school desegregation programs did not implement the conditions necessary for successful intergroup contact.

Janet Schofield (2001a; Schofield & Eurich-Fulcer, 2001) has pointed out that many schools that are officially desegregated are actually segregated internally. One way in which this internal resegregation occurs is through the use of ability grouping or academic tracking, in which students who score high on standardized achievement tests are grouped together in accelerated classes while those with average or below average scores are grouped together in standard or remedial classes. For example, Schofield (1989) found that in one desegregated school more than 80 percent of the accelerated track students were White whereas more than 80 percent of the standard track students were Black (see also, Oakes, 1996). One ironic aspect of Schofield's finding was that the school she studied had been specifically established to be a model of integrated, not just desegregated, education. In addition to academic tracking, some bilingual education programs segregate students less fluent in English from other students for most of the school day (Khmelkov & Hallinan, 1999; Schofield, 2001a).

Finally, as we noted earlier, students often voluntarily segregate themselves by race. For example, in a school with a student body that was almost exactly 50 percent Black and 50 percent White, Janet Schofield and Andrew Sagar (1977) found that on a typical day 95 percent of the students sat next to a student of the same race at lunch. In-school segregation extends to extracurricular activities, with White students predominating in some activities and minority students in other (Kao, 2000; Khmelkov & Hallinan, 1999). Grace Kao (2000) found that this extracurricular segregation is often self-imposed, with students joining activities they perceive as appropriate to the stereotypes of their racial or ethnic group: Asians are good at math and so join (and are the majority in) the math club, Blacks are athletic and so join (and are the majority on) track and field, and Whites are good at swimming and so join (and are the majority on) the swim team.

This internal resegregation has negative effects on two of the conditions necessary for intergroup contact to result in improved intergroup relations. First, it clearly reduces opportunities for students from different groups to get to know each other (Khmelkov & Hallinan, 1999; Schofield, 2001a): Students who rarely meet one another cannot get to know each other. For example, interracial friendships are more common at schools with more diverse student bodies (Quillian & Campbell, 2003) and in schools in which extracurricular activities are integrated (Moody, 2001). Second, and perhaps less obviously, resegregation undermines the equal status of majority and minority students. For example, academic tracking produces a status hierarchy among students, with, as we noted

earlier, the higher status accelerated track being populated primarily by White students and the lower status standard track being populated primarily by Black students. “This means that students are not only resegregated but resegregated in a way that can reinforce traditional stereotypes and engender hostility” (Schofield, 2001a, p. 638).

In addition to the effect academic tracking has on acquaintance potential and equal status, other school policies can also undermine the conditions needed for successful intergroup contact. For example, administrative decisions, such as which students are chosen to represent a school at public events, can influence students’ perceptions of relative group status. Schofield (2001a) relates an incident in which a Black student refused to watch a televised quiz show in which a team from his school competed. “He explained that he did not want to see the program because the team from his school, which had a student body that was just over half Black, consisted entirely of White children. He said bitterly, ‘They shouldn’t call this school Wexler [a pseudonym]; they should call it White School’ ” (p. 639; brackets in original). In addition, school and teacher policies that emphasize competition rather than cooperation between students reduce the potential for creating situations in which members of different racial and ethnic groups cooperate to achieve common goals (Schofield, 2001a). Finally, institutional support, especially in the form of the commitment of school principals to integration is essential for success. If that commitment is absent, nothing will change (Khmelkov & Hallinan, 1999; Schofield, 2001a), as Box 8.5 illustrates.

In contrast, when the conditions for successful intergroup contact are present, school integration can have positive effects on intergroup relations. For example, based on a review of school desegregation studies, Linda Tropp and Mary Prenovost (2008) found that the average correlation between intergroup contact and prejudice was  $r = -.37$  when the conditions for successful contact were met versus  $r = -.21$  when they were not. Thus, although any contact had some positive effect, the effect was much stronger when the conditions for success were met. In a study that included four schools, Ludwin Molina and

### **Box 8.5    The Importance of Institutional Support**

Social Psychologist David Schneider worked as a consultant for high schools implementing desegregation plans during the 1960s and 1970s. He relates this example of the effects of institutional support on the outcome of intergroup contact:

My observation was that desegregation did “work” in some schools.... And in each school where it did work, it was because the school board and especially the principal moved the faculty and the students beyond the “this is being shoved down our throats” mentality. I spent time in one school that seemed to be well integrated

behaviorally (in terms of clearly friendly relationships among at least some black and white students, and no overt hostility). I questioned some teachers about this, since the atmosphere contrasted so vividly with other schools I had visited. They all pointed to the principal, who had made it clear that desegregation was an opportunity rather than a constraint, and that they were going to make it work. He also had moved quickly to set up in-house teacher workshops to prepare the teachers for the increased demands he was placing on them. (Schneider, 2004, p. 432)

Michele Wittig (2006) found that the two most important conditions were opportunities to get acquainted with members of other groups and working together to achieve a common goal. Molina, Wittig, and Michael Giang (2004) also found that one reason that these conditions promote prejudice reduction is that they motivate students to want to learn about and work with members of other groups. Learning about other groups' languages and cultures can also be helpful. Stephen Wright and Linda Tropp (2005) found that White children who were in a bilingual instruction class with Hispanic children gave higher evaluations of Hispanics as a group and made more Hispanic friendship choices than students in classes in which English was the only language used, even when the English-only classes included significant numbers of Hispanic students.

**Long-Term versus Short-Term Effects.** Schofield (2001b) has noted that one of the shortcomings of most research on school desegregation is that it focused primarily on short-term effects, ignoring any long-term benefits desegregation may have. Researchers generally assessed the effects of desegregation after only a brief period of implementation, usually a year or less, and paid little attention to later life outcomes (Schofield, 1991). However, Schofield (2001b) has pointed out that the research that has been conducted on the long-term effects of school desegregation has uncovered some positive effects. For example, as adults, Blacks who attended desegregated schools are more likely to live in integrated neighborhoods, are more likely to have White friends, and are more likely to work in desegregated settings (which often provide more in salary and benefits than predominantly Black work settings). Although there has been less research on long-term outcomes for Whites, as adults those who attended desegregated schools say they are more willing to live in integrated neighborhoods, are more likely to have Black friends, and are more likely to work in desegregated settings. In addition, White adults who attended desegregated schools exhibit less prejudice than those who attended segregated schools. Thus, despite the pessimistic results of research on the short-term effects of school segregation on intergroup relations, the research on its longer-term effects provides a basis for optimism.

### Cooperative Learning

A number of educational techniques, collectively referred to as **cooperative learning**, have been devised to create group learning environments which implement the necessary contact conditions as part of the day-to-day educational process. One example of these techniques is the jigsaw classroom developed by Elliot Aronson and his colleagues (Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978; Aronson & Patnoe, 1997). In the jigsaw classroom:

- Students are divided into teams of six members, balanced in terms of gender, ethnicity, and academic ability.
- Each lesson is divided into six parts, with each team member responsible for becoming an "expert" on one part. For example, in a geography class

focusing on a particular country, one team member becomes an expert on the country's history, another on its economics, another on its culture, and so forth.

- The students study their topics and then discuss them with the experts on their topics from the other teams.
- The students then meet as teams and each member teaches the others his or her area of expertise. This is where the term jigsaw classroom comes from: Each lesson is like a jigsaw puzzle, divided into pieces; the students then put their pieces together to form the "big picture" (Aronson et al., 1978).
- Finally, students take a quiz on the material with their individual scores being combined into a single team score.

As Iain Walker and Mary Crogan (1998) note, the cooperative learning process creates conditions necessary for successful intergroup contact: "Students have equal status contact (each has a unique and necessary piece of information), they work interdependently (each depends on the others to be able to achieve their desired goals), and they work in pursuit of a common goal (good grades, learning, teacher praise), all with the sanction of authorities (teachers)" (p. 382). In addition, interacting across teams with fellow experts and within teams with other team members provides opportunities to get to know each other.

How effective is cooperative learning in reducing prejudice? David Johnson and Robert Johnson (2000) examined the results of 61 studies that compared the effects of cooperative learning versus individual study on intergroup relations. Sixty-one percent of the studies found that cooperative learning reduced prejudice and discrimination toward outgroup members who were teammates. However, Fishbein (2002) has noted that studies of cooperative learning have provided little evidence that its effects generalize to attitudes toward teammates' outgroups as a whole. More optimistically, Robert Slavin (2001) has noted that cooperative learning frequently results in the development of cross-ethnic group friendships. As we discuss in more detail in Chapter 14, such friendships can play an important role in the generalization of prejudice reduction from individual outgroup members to the group as a whole.

### Multicultural and Anti-Bias Education

Whereas cooperative learning reduces prejudice by providing experiences that allow students to get to know members of other groups and see them in a positive light, multicultural and anti-bias education take a more didactic approach using traditional teaching techniques (Stephan & Stephan, 2001). Although multicultural and anti-bias education overlap to some extent, they have somewhat different goals (Aboud & Levy, 2000), so we will discuss them separately.

**Multicultural Education.** Multicultural education is an umbrella term that covers a variety of programs designed to teach students about the ethnic, racial, religious, and other groups in society. Multicultural education has five components (Banks, 2001):

- The integration of information on the history and culture of the groups and their contributions to society as a whole into the curriculum.
- Educating students on the ways in which cultural assumptions and perspectives influence the interpretation of events. For example, James Banks (2001) suggests that a history teacher could have students discuss how a Lakota Sioux historian might describe the westward expansion of the United States.
- Helping students develop positive attitudes toward social groups other than their own.
- Using teaching strategies that accommodate different learning styles.
- Creating a school culture that promotes equality.

The multicultural education approach is based on the belief that ignorance is a major cause of prejudice, with a lack of accurate information about other groups leading to intergroup anxiety and the use of stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 2001). Therefore, these programs try to “provide students with the knowledge and attitudes necessary to understand, respect, and interact harmoniously as equals with members of different ethnic groups” (Aboud & Levy, 2000, pp. 277–278).

There is disagreement about just how effective multicultural education is in reducing prejudice. Walter Stephan and Cookie Stephan (2001) take an optimistic view based on their review of 41 studies of the effectiveness of multicultural education. They classified 88 percent of the studies as showing that the programs evaluated had some positive effects and no negative effects on prejudice, and classified only 5 percent of the studies as having found predominantly negative effects. Stephan and Stephan concluded that, despite some weaknesses, multicultural education is an effective tool for reducing prejudice. In contrast, Rebecca Bigler (1999) has taken a more pessimistic view, pointing out a number of weaknesses in the research (some of which Stephan and Stephan also noted). For example, Bigler called attention to the fact that although the results of published studies tend to support the effectiveness of multicultural education, many unpublished studies (such as doctoral dissertations) show no effect. Bigler also noted that within studies the effects of multicultural education are not consistent across dependent variables, with positive effects being found with some measures but not with others. There is also little evidence for long-term effects. Based on her review of the literature, Bigler concluded that multicultural education has been relatively ineffective in reducing prejudice in children. However, she also noted that such programs are potentially beneficial but need a stronger grounding in current understanding of the nature of children’s racial attitudes and how education influences (and does not influence) those attitudes.

**Anti-Bias Education.** **Anti-bias education** “aims to provide students with a heightened awareness of institutional racism [and other forms of institutional bias] and with the skills to reduce it within their sphere of influence” (Aboud & Levy, 2000, p. 278). Anti-bias education programs instruct students about the nature of bias, its history, and its current forms and effects. The programs use lectures, media presentations, role-playing (such as the blue eyes/brown eyes exercise

described in Box 8.1), and class discussion as teaching tools. Anti-bias education can either be part of a multicultural education program or can be a separate program.

Josette McGregor (1993) reviewed the results of 26 studies of the outcomes of anti-bias education programs and concluded that they were generally effective in reducing prejudice. She did note, however, that they tended to produce more change in younger students than in older students and that about 12 percent of the studies found more prejudice after the program than before. In addition, as with multicultural education, there is little research evaluating the long-term effects of anti-bias education. Overall, then, it would seem that multicultural education and anti-bias education are promising programs, but require more research on what makes them work so that they can be implemented more effectively (Bigler, 1999; McGregor, 1993).

## SUMMARY

There is a natural human tendency to organize and simplify the world around us. One way that we do this is to form categories. There is some evidence that even infants have implicit awareness of some social categories. However, because infants cannot talk, we cannot explicitly ask them to tell us about the sorts of categorical distinctions they make. Explicit awareness of racial categories such as Black and White emerges at 4 or 5 years of age, but awareness of other racial categories such as Native Americans, Asians, and Latinos arises a few years later. Explicit awareness of social categories based on gender is present slightly earlier in development, by 3 years of age. It is important to remember that children's awareness of differences between social groups does not mean that they prefer or value one group over another.

When value judgments are added to children's distinctions between social groups, then positive and negative attitudes (in other words, prejudices) are formed. The research methods used to examine the development of prejudice have included observations of behavioral interactions, self-reports (using both forced-choice and continuous measures), and sociometric ratings to examine children's intergroup attitudes.

Both Black and White children first exhibit prejudice toward other ethnic groups by 3 or 4 years of age. For White children, racial prejudice reaches its highest levels at about 5 years, and by 7 years a decline in prejudice is seen. However, the pattern for Black children is not as straightforward. For Black children, there is no typical racial attitudinal pattern. Some Black children hold pro-Black attitudes, some hold pro-White attitudes, and still others hold neutral attitudes between 5 and 7 years. Between 7 and 10 years, any pro-White bias has disappeared and Black children tend to express either pro-Black attitudes or unbiased attitudes. The pattern of development of racial attitudes for Latino and Asian children is similar to the patterns seen in Black children. Biracial children's attitudes fall between the two races of which they are members, suggesting that biracial children identify with both races.

When researchers look at children's intergroup behavior (for example, observations, self-report, or sociometric methods) to assess their racial attitudes, they sometimes find that children's attitudes and behavior seem inconsistent with one another. This finding is not unusual, given that adults' behaviors and attitudes do not always match up either. During preschool, behavior suggests an own-race or pro-White bias. However, by 1st grade both Black and White children show an own-race bias that increases with age, peaking at around the 7th grade. During high school, students report having positive cross-race interactions at school, but had few positive cross-race interactions outside of school.

The foundation for gender-based prejudice appears during toddlerhood, as children start to show preferences for gender-stereotyped toys. By age 3, children know their own gender and the gender of other people, but their gender identity is not fully developed. Within most Western cultures, gender-based prejudice first emerges during preschool and increases until about 8 years of age. Between 8 and 10 years, gender-based prejudice declines slightly, possibly due to romantic interest in the opposite sex. When researchers look at children's intergroup behavior, they find that by 3 years of age both boys and girls display more positive behaviors toward members of their own sex than toward members of the other sex. In terms of segregation on the basis of gender, both preschoolers and kindergartners exhibit this behavior, but it is even more common in kindergartners than in preschoolers. When peer nominations are used with kindergartners through 3rd graders, other-sex negativity increases with age. From 3rd to 6th grade, very few friendship groups are composed of both boys and girls. However, by 7th grade more than half of groups are composed of children of both sexes, and by 12th grade all groups are mixed in terms of gender composition.

Four types of theories have been used to explain the development of prejudice in children. Social learning theories explain prejudice in terms of direct reinforcement, modeling and imitation, and vicarious learning. Direct teaching of prejudice is not very common; indirect teaching of prejudice from live models (for example, family members, peers, and teachers) and symbolic models in the media are primarily responsible for the learning of prejudiced attitudes. Inner state theories focus on the development of prejudice in terms of age-related changes in personality and other individual-difference variables.

Developmental intergroup theory posits that prejudice arises as a byproduct of normal cognitive developmental processes. Children are motivated to understand how the world works. Sorting elements of their environments into categories is a basic mechanism that helps in understanding the world. Children initially derive categories based on the physical characteristics of people, such as skin color. As they develop cognitively, however, they can also create and use abstract categories such as religion. Once children have established categories, they can sort people into them. They also begin to associate positive and negative characteristics (stereotypes) and emotions (prejudice) with members of those categories.

Because prejudice begins to arise in childhood, psychologists and educators have developed a number of school-based interventions aimed at reducing or preventing the development of prejudice in children. Although school



desegregation was not motivated by a desire to reduce prejudice, social scientists hoped that the resulting intergroup contact would do so. However, research on the outcomes of school desegregation generally found that desegregation led to an increase rather than a decrease in prejudice. One reason for this outcome is that, for the most part, desegregation programs did not put into practice the conditions necessary for successful intergroup contact. Nonetheless, the limited research that has been conducted on the long-term effects of desegregation show more positive results.

Cooperative learning interventions are designed to implement the conditions necessary for successful intergroup contact within the everyday classroom context: Students have equal status contact, they work cooperatively to achieve common goals, they interact closely and so get to know each other, and the process is supported by authority in the form of the teachers. Research on the effectiveness of cooperative learning has found that it reduces prejudice and discrimination toward outgroup members who are learning partners; however, there is little evidence that its effects generalize to attitudes toward teammates' outgroups as a whole.

Multicultural and anti-bias education programs attempt to provide students with knowledge about cultural groups, to instill respect for other groups, and to help children develop the attitudes and skills needed to interact effectively with members of other groups. Researchers disagree on how effective such programs are. On the optimistic side, most of these programs have been found to have generally positive effects. On the pessimistic side, the research showing positive effects has often found them on some measures of change but not others, and there has been little research on the long-term effects of these kinds of programs.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### The Development of Prejudice

Bigler, R. S., & Liben, L. S. (2006). A developmental intergroup theory of social stereotypes and prejudice. *Advances in Child Development and Behavior*, 34, 39–89.

Bigler, R. S., & Liben, L. S. (2007). Developmental intergroup theory: Explaining and reducing children's stereotyping and prejudice. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 16, 162–166.

Bigler and Liben's 2006 article lays out their theory in detail. The 2007 article summarizes the theory and is a good non-technical introduction to it.

Fishbein, H. D. (2002). *Peer prejudice and discrimination: The origins of prejudice* (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

This recent book has chapters on the development of racial and opposite-sex prejudice, but it also covers prejudice and discrimination toward persons who are deaf and mentally retarded.

Horn, S. S. (2008). The multifaceted nature of sexual prejudice: How adolescents reason about sexual orientation and sexual prejudice. In S. R. Levy & M. Killen (Eds.), *Intergroup attitudes and relations in childhood through adulthood* (pp. 173–188). New York: Oxford University Press.

Horn's chapter summarizes the results of her research program on the development of antigay prejudice.

Killen, M., Sinno, S., & Margie, N. G. (2007). Children's experiences and judgments about group exclusion and inclusion. *Advances in Child Development and Behavior*, 3, 173–218.

This chapter presents the results of a number of studies on as well as an integrative theory of children's moral reasoning about exclusion on the basis of gender and race.

Williams, J. E., & Morland, J. K. (1976). *Race, color, and the young child*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

A classic on the development of racial prejudice.

### Reducing Children's Prejudice

Bigler, R. S. (1999). The use of multicultural curricula and materials to counter racism in children. *Journal of Social Issues*, 55, 687–705.

Schofield, J. W., & Eurich-Fulcer, R. (2001). When and how school desegregation improves intergroup relations. In R. Brown & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes* (pp. 475–494). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2001). *Improving intergroup relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Schofield and Eurich-Fulcer present a summary of the research on the effects of school desegregation on intergroup relations. Stephan and Stephan provide a concise description of cooperative learning interventions in their Chapter 7, and an optimistic review of multicultural education in their Chapter 3. Bigler presents a more pessimistic view of the effects of multicultural education.

### KEY TERMS

|                        |                      |                         |
|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| anti-bias education    | cooperative learning | homosociality           |
| category constancy     | developmental        | inner state theories    |
| category preference    | intergroup theory    | multicultural education |
| cognitive              | doll technique       | social learning theory  |
| developmental theories | essentialism         | sociometric ratings     |
| continuous measure     | forced choice method |                         |

### QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. The chapter opens with an excerpt from an interview with a White research participant. In what ways were your own childhood experiences with prejudice similar to or different from this person's experiences?
2. Jane Elliott's brown eyes/blue eyes exercise was first conducted in the late 1960s. Do you think that this exercise would have the same impact on children today? Explain why or why not.

3. Explain why it is useful for children to categorize people, objects, and events in their environments.
4. Based on the research literature, provide evidence that infants have implicit awareness of certain social categories.
5. Explain how the doll technique is used to study children's explicit awareness of social categories. What have researchers found out about children's category awareness using this technique?
6. Describe the differences between implicit and explicit awareness of social categories. Do you think the two are related? Explain why or why not.
7. Explain the distinction between social categorization and prejudice.
8. Do you think that there is a distinction between preference and prejudice? Explain why or why not.
9. Describe the methodological difference between forced choice and continuous measures of prejudice and provide an example of each.
10. What is sociometrics? Discuss the two types of sociometric techniques used to study racial prejudice in children.
11. Describe the patterns of racial attitudes for White and Black children. Are they the same or different? Are Black children's racial attitudes similar to those of other racial minority groups? If so, in what ways?
12. Describe the difference between ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice. Why is it important for researchers to be able to separate these attitudes from one another?
13. What is the relationship between children's intergroup attitudes and their intergroup behavior?
14. Describe the origins of gender-based prejudice during toddlerhood.
15. Explain how gender constancy relates to developing a gender identity. How do you think gender constancy relates to the development of other-sex prejudice?
16. What roles do experience, environment, and culture play in the development of gender preferences?
17. According to social learning theories of prejudice, children can be taught prejudice directly and indirectly. Give one example of direct teaching of prejudice and one example of indirect teaching of prejudice. Which type of teaching do you think is more influential in the development of prejudice? Explain the reasons for your answer.
18. Explain how the development of personality influences the development of prejudice.
19. Use Duckitt's (2001) model to explain how child-rearing practices affect personality and prejudice.
20. Do you think that authoritarian beliefs can be learned? Explain why or why not.

21. Explain the ways in which the cognitive developmental, social learning, inner state, and developmental intergroup theories of prejudice are similar and differ from one another.
22. Based on your own experiences, which theory of the development of prejudice makes the most sense to you? Why?
23. In discussing explicit awareness of social categories, we noted that children develop an understanding of the categories “White” and “Black” earlier than other categories. What processes would developmental intergroup theory use to explain this age difference in the development of social categories?
24. Figure 8.1 shows that within each age group minority children, and especially black children, show a more complex understanding of racism. How would each of the four theories of prejudice development explain this finding? Which explanation do find most convincing? Why?
25. How would developmental intergroup theory explain the development of gender prejudice?
26. What possible explanations are there for the reduction of prejudice found around age 7 or 8? Which explanation do you prefer? Why?
27. What was the basis for expecting that school desegregation would reduce prejudice? What factors contributed to its short-term success or failure? What long-term effects has it had?
28. Did you attend a desegregated elementary, middle, or high school? If so, how well did the school environment embody the conditions for effective intergroup contact? What effect did these factors have on intergroup relations in the school? What additional factors seemed to affect intergroup relations?
29. What is cooperative learning? Explain why cooperative learning programs should reduce prejudice. How well do they work? What limitations do they have?
30. Have you ever been involved in a cooperative learning situation? If so, how well did the situation embody the conditions for effective intergroup contact? What effect did these factors have on your attitudes? What is your personal evaluation of the experience?
31. What are multicultural and anti-bias education? What are their goals? How effective are they at reducing prejudice?
32. How could the principles of the four theories of the development of prejudice be used to design programs to reduce prejudice in children?

## Chapter 9

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# The Social Context of Prejudice

Human relationships always occur in an organized social environment—in a family, in a group, in a community, in a nation—that has developed techniques, categories, rules and values that are relevant to human interaction. Hence the understanding of the psychological events that occur in human interactions requires comprehension of the interplay of these events with the social context in which they occur.... The social psychologist must be able to characterize the relevant features of the social environment in order to understand or predict human interaction.

—MORTON DEUTSCH AND ROBERT KRAUSS (1965, PP. 2–3)

### Chapter Outline

#### **Realistic Conflict Theory**

*The Work of Muzafer Sherif*

*John Duckitt's Extension of*

*Realistic Conflict Theory*

#### **Social Identity Theory**

*Social Identity and Intergroup Bias*

*Factors that Influence Social  
Identity*

*Issues in Social Identity Theory*

*Looking Back at Social Identity  
Theory*

#### **Relative Deprivation Theory**

*Relative Deprivation,  
Dissatisfaction, and Resentment*  
*Relative Deprivation and  
Prejudice*

*Relative Gratification*

*Scapegoating*

#### **Integrated Threat Theory**

#### **Hate Group Membership**

*Why People Join Hate Groups*

*Recruiting Hate Group Members*

*Group Socialization*

*Leaving the Group*

#### **Summary**

#### **Suggested Readings**

#### **Key Terms**

#### **Questions for Review and Discussion**

The theories and research presented prior to this chapter have generally focused on people as individuals in isolation from any social context. This chapter takes a different perspective. Rather than considering people in isolation from others, it focuses on the social context of prejudice and the influence other people have on individuals' attitudes and beliefs. As Deutsch and Krause (1965) pointed out in the quotation that opened this chapter, people do not operate in a vacuum; rather, they operate in an environment—a social context—made up of other people and other social groups.

The first four sections of this chapter describe theories that deal with the ways in which relationships between groups—intergroup processes—can contribute to prejudice. The intergroup process perspective focuses on what happens when people think of themselves and others in terms of the social groups to which they belong rather than as individuals. For example, the first theory we discuss, realistic conflict theory, holds that people come to dislike members of other groups because they see those groups as competing with their own group for needed resources. From this perspective, it is not the individual group members' stereotypes and ideologies that influence their attitudes, but the nature of the relationship—competitive or cooperative—between the groups: People dislike members of competing groups and like members of cooperating groups. The second theory we discuss, social identity theory, examines how people's identities are tied to group membership and how this relationship can lead to intergroup bias. Relative deprivation theory is discussed next; this theory proposes that when people compare their situation to others in similar circumstances, they sometimes conclude they are not getting what they deserve. The fourth theory we present is integrated threat theory, a perspective that explains how the three other theories are related to each other. In the final section of the chapter, we take a look at hate groups, groups whose very existence is predicated on prejudice, and the kinds of people who are attracted to those groups.

## REALISTIC CONFLICT THEORY

Realistic conflict theory (Bobo, 1988; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966) is the earliest intergroup theory of prejudice, tracing its roots back to the beginning of the 20th century. In 1906 William Sumner wrote that “the insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder. . . . [Attitudes] are produced to correspond. Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without—all grow together, common products of the same situation” (p. 12). In contemporary terms, realistic conflict theory proposes that people dislike members of outgroups because their ingroup is competing with the outgroup for resources, resulting in Sumner's “war and plunder.”

Realistic conflict theory proposes that people are motivated by a desire to maximize the rewards they receive in life, even if that means taking those rewards

away from other people (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Thus, people join groups because cooperating with ingroup members makes it easier to get rewards. However, because different groups are frequently in pursuit of those same resources, they end up competing with one another for those rewards. According to realistic conflict theory, this competition leads to conflict between groups; one result of this conflict is a disliking for, or prejudice against, members of competing groups.

### The Work of Muzafer Sherif

The research of Muzafer Sherif (1966) provides what is perhaps the most famous demonstration of the principles of realistic conflict theory. From 1949 through 1954, Sherif conducted a series of studies on intergroup conflict, the best known of which is the “Robbers Cave” study carried out at Robbers Cave State Park in southeastern Oklahoma. (Robbers Cave got its name because Jesse James and other outlaws had supposedly used it as a hideout.) The participants in these studies were 11- and 12-year-old boys who thought they were simply attending a summer camp; the researchers were part of the camp staff so they could observe the boys without arousing their suspicions. The boys were strangers to each other before they arrived at the camp and were carefully selected so that they had similar socioeconomic backgrounds and showed no evidence of mental or emotional problems. They were assigned to two groups that were similar in terms of average physical strength, athletic skills, and other characteristics of the members. Sherif wanted to be sure that none of the research results could be attributed to systematic differences among the boys or between the groups.

Group members were given time to get to know one another and to permit the emergence of natural leaders within the groups. During this period, the groups devised names for themselves (the Eagles and the Rattlers) and group members worked together on tasks designed to build group cohesion, but the two groups did not yet interact. The researchers then brought the groups together and introduced an element of competition by setting up a series of games—such as baseball, football, and a treasure hunt—in which prizes were awarded to the members of the winning group. Box 9.1 provides Sherif’s description of the outcome: derogation of and aggression toward the outgroup (Sherif ended each of the studies with activities that restored good relations between the groups.). Sherif (1966) concluded that “the *sufficient condition* for the rise of hostile and aggressive deeds and for... derogatory images of the outgroup [is] the existence of two groups competing for goals that only one of the groups could attain” (p. 85; italics in original).

Although Sherif’s (1966) research was conducted more than 50 years ago and used a very restricted participant sample (White, middle-class, Protestant boys), his findings have stood the test of time. Rupert Brown (1995), for example, noted that evidence supporting realistic conflict theory has been found in both laboratory and field research in Europe, Australia, Israel, and Africa as well as the United States. Recent research suggests that competition has carry-over

**Box 9.1 Groups in Competition: The Robbers Cave Study**

The tournament started in a spirit of good sportsmanship, but as it progressed good feeling began to evaporate. The "good sportsmanship" cheer customarily given after a game, "2-4-6-8-who do we appreciate," followed by the name of the other group, turned into "2-4-6-8-who do we appreci-hate." [Italics in original.] Soon, members of each group began to call their rivals "stinkers," "sneaks," and "cheats." ... The rival groups made threatening posters and planned raids, collecting secret hoards of green apples as ammunition.

The Eagles, after defeat in a game, burned a banner left behind by the Rattlers. The next morning the Rattlers seized the Eagles' flag when they arrived on the athletic field. From that time on, name-calling, scuffling, and raids were the rule of the day. A large

proportion of the boys in each group gave negative ratings to the character of all boys in the other. When the tournament was over, they refused to have anything more to do with members of the other group....

Near the end of this stage [of the study], the members of each group found the other group and its members so distasteful that they expressed strong preferences to have no further contact with them at all. In fact, they were subsequently reluctant even to be in pleasant situations (eating, movies, entertainments), if they knew that the other group would be in the vicinity.

Sherif (1966, pp. 82–83).

potential. That is, when ingroups are involved in a competitive situation, the result can be prejudiced responses against an outgroup even if the outgroup is not involved in the competition. German college students, for example, showed more prejudice toward Muslims after participating in a competitive versus a non-competitive knowledge test, even though Muslims were not their competitors and did not otherwise participate in the experiment (Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Jacoby, & Hansen, 2007).

### John Duckitt's Extension of Realistic Conflict Theory

Realistic conflict theory is a relatively straightforward approach to prejudice: competition leads to conflict that leads to prejudice. However, John Duckitt (1994) has pointed out that most tests of realistic conflict theory have been limited to one type of competition, competition between groups of equal status and power. He went on to note that conflict often arises between groups of unequal power and status, such as when a majority group in a society dominates one or more minority groups. Also, in some of these cases, although the majority group denies the minority groups the full benefit of the society's material and social rewards, open conflict often fails to materialize. To account for these situations, Duckitt developed a typology of types of realistic conflicts and the resulting patterns of prejudice. Table 9.1 shows a portion of his typology.

Two types of conflict in Duckitt's (1994) scheme are based on direct inter-group competition: Realistic conflict theory addresses the first type, *competition with an equal group*, in which the ingroup sees the outgroup as a threat to the ingroup's ability to acquire some resource. This perceived threat leads the ingroup members to feel hostility toward the outgroup. These feelings of hostility



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provide the motivation for the group to engage in a conflict with the outgroup as a way to acquire the resource. But what happens if one group wins the conflict? In that case, *domination of the outgroup by the ingroup* occurs and the result often is that the winning group dominates and exploits the losing group. Such an outcome is evident in the domination and exploitation that have historically characterized the relationships of the White majority in the United States to minority groups (see Chapter 1) and to the relationships of colonial powers to the people whose lands they colonized, such as when Great Britain ruled India between 1858 and 1947. In such cases, members of the dominant group generally see members of the subordinate group as inferior and derogate them by stereotyping them in negative ways or in positive ways that connote low power and status. This positive stereotyping reflects the “benevolent” form of prejudice discussed in Chapter 6. The dominant group then uses these stereotypes as legitimizing myths (in the language of social dominance theory; see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Chapter 7) to justify their dominance and oppression. These myths typically include the assertion that the “negative” qualities of the subordinated group must be controlled for the protection of both groups and that members of the subordinated group must not be given too much responsibility or power because they are incapable of handling it.

How does a subordinated group respond to the dominating group? Duckitt (1994) proposes that either of two processes can occur. In *stable oppression* (see

Table 9.1), the subordinated group accepts the dominating group's view that it is superior to them and submits to that group to avoid conflict. Members of the subordinated group may also take on the dominating group's value system, rejecting their own group's values in the process. This acceptance of the dominant group's values is sometimes referred to as **false consciousness**, "the holding of false or inaccurate beliefs that are contrary to one's own social interest and which thereby contribute to [maintaining] the disadvantaged position of... the group" (Jost, 1995, p. 400). False consciousness leads "members of a subordinate group to believe that they are inferior, deserving of their plight, or incapable of taking action against the causes of their subordination" (Jost, 1995, p. 400), which makes them unwilling to challenge the dominant group's position. In the second process, *unstable oppression*, the subordinated group rejects the subordinating stereotypes and lower status assigned to it by the dominating group and sees the dominating group as oppressive. The realization that they are oppressed leads subordinated group members to develop hostility toward the dominating group. These feelings of hostility motivate subordinated group members to challenge the other group's dominance and oppression.

Duckitt's (1994) final question is "How does the dominating group respond to the subordinated group's challenge?" (see Table 9.1) If their response is to see the *challenge as unjustified*, the dominating group concludes that the subordinated group is both threatening and inferior. The dominating group members then respond with hostility to the perceived threat and with increased derogation to reinforce their view that the subordinated group is inferior. These attitudes are used to justify whatever actions the dominating group members believe are necessary to maintain the status quo. If the response is to see the *challenge as justified*, however, the subordinated group is seen as legitimate and they are given the power to demand change. For example, Duckitt (1994) noted that the U.S. civil rights movement gained ground in the 1960s because of "the perception by many whites that the black struggle is one that cannot legitimately be denied on the basis of important social values such as democracy and equality of opportunity" (p. 107). Another positive outcome is that the dominating group begins to treat the subordinated group with true tolerance. Unfortunately, however, in many cases there is only the superficial appearance of tolerance. For example, as was discussed in Chapter 6, overt prejudice in the United States has been supplanted by more subtle forms of prejudice that have been described as modern, symbolic, or aversive. Whether this tolerance is real or superficial, it provides a means of avoiding overt intergroup conflict.

Realistic conflict theory holds that prejudice and discrimination arise as a result of real competition between groups for resources that both groups want. These resources may be either material, such as money, goods, or land, or social, such as status or power. One implication of realistic conflict theory, then, is that if groups are not in competition, there should be no prejudice or discrimination. However, the next theory to be considered, social identity theory, holds that intergroup competition is not a necessary prerequisite for prejudice and discrimination; rather, the mere existence of social groups is sufficient.

## SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

Following Sherif's (1966) work on intergroup conflict and prejudice, research on intergroup behavior virtually disappeared in the United States (Turner, 1996), replaced by an emphasis on individual-level cognitive processes, such as those described in Chapters 3 and 4 (E. E. Jones, 1998). Social identity theory was developed by European psychologists who believed that North American psychologists were putting too much emphasis on the individual and not paying sufficient attention to the role social group membership plays in influencing attitudes and behavior (Turner, 1996). Foremost among these theorists was Henri Tajfel who noted that realistic conflict theory was correct in holding that competition for resources leads to intergroup conflict. He wondered, however, if such competition was *necessary* for conflict and proposed that group membership "can, *on its own*, determine... intergroup behavior" (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flamant, 1971, p. 153; emphasis in original).

Social identity theory is based on the concept of **social identity**, the part of a person's self-concept that derives from membership in groups that are important to the person. Such groups can include one's family, college, nation, and so forth. When identifying with a group, the person feels that what happens to the group is happening to him or her as well (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). For example, if someone praises your college, you feel good about it; if someone disparages your college, you feel upset. Why do you, as the saying goes, "take it personally?" Because your college is part of your social identity, so how people see your college *does* reflect on you personally; your college is, to some extent, part of you, a part that links you to similar people, such as other students who attend your college, and differentiates you from other people, such as students at other colleges. People have multiple social identities (Deaux, 1996), such as being a male New Yorker who is a student at the University of Alabama; the particular identity or identities that are active or salient at any one time depends on a number of factors that we discuss shortly. Social identity theory also holds that people are motivated to develop and maintain social identities that are positive but that clearly set their groups apart from other groups. That is, people want to see their groups as distinct from, but also better than, other groups: They want their group to be number one.

### Social Identity and Intergroup Bias

Tajfel and his colleagues (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel et al., 1971) proposed that when people identify with an ingroup and view other people as members of an outgroup, they perceive members of the ingroup in more positive terms than members of the outgroup. Tajfel and his colleagues demonstrated this phenomenon in a series of experiments using the *minimal group paradigm* discussed in Chapter 3. Recall that, in this paradigm, research participants are assigned to groups based on very minimal, even trivial, criteria. Yet even when group members never interact, people show an **ingroup bias** in favor of members of their own group. Although the amount of

ingroup bias found in this kind of research is often small, the effect is consistent, having been repeatedly replicated in the decades since Tajfel's original research (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Social identity theorists have proposed two hypotheses to explain the ingroup bias effect. These hypotheses are the categorization-competition hypothesis and self-esteem hypothesis, and the processes they describe can operate either separately or in tandem.

**The Categorization-competition Hypothesis.** The categorization-competition hypothesis holds that categorizing oneself and others into an ingroup and an outgroup is sufficient to generate intergroup competition. Recall from Chapter 3 that when a particular social identity is activated, an *outgroup homogeneity effect* occurs: People perceive members of the outgroup as more similar to each other than they actually are, while seeing members of the ingroup as distinct individuals (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990). As a result, people believe differences between the ingroup and the outgroup to be greater than they really are. For example, many Americans who are not of Latin American descent tend to see "Latinos" or "Hispanics" as a single cultural group, all of whose members share similar values, customs, food preferences, and so forth. In contrast, Cuban Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and people whose ancestors came from other Latin American countries, see themselves as distinct groups and can point to significant cultural and language differences that set them apart from one another (Huddy & Virtanen, 1995). When a social identity is activated, then, people place themselves and others into sharply distinct and contrasting categories.

This categorization process results in people taking an "us versus them" perspective on the ingroup and outgroup (Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995). North American culture (among others) teaches that relations between groups are naturally competitive and that other groups cannot be trusted because they are out to get the resources "our" group needs (Insko & Schopler, 1987). Categorizing people into ingroups and outgroups therefore arouses feelings of competition and a desire to win. These competitive feelings then lead to an *ingroup favoritism effect*: People favor their own group to protect their group's interest against the competition (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). On a larger scale, perceived competition can lead people to think that outgroups cause society's problems and that intergroup contact should be avoided (Jackson, 2002). One implication of this competition arousal hypothesis is that intergroup bias should be strongest when people see their group in relation to just one other group. Intergroup bias should decrease as the number of other groups increases, because people's feelings of competition are diluted across more outgroups. Thus, the ingroup bias is found in research when participants are divided into two groups, which arouses the competitive motive, but not when people are divided into three groups, which dilutes that motive (Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995; Spielman, 2000).

**The Self-esteem Hypothesis.** Although the categorization-competition hypothesis provides one explanation for intergroup bias, perhaps the most studied

explanation has been the self-esteem hypothesis (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Social identity theory proposes that people are motivated to achieve and maintain positive social identities. Because people's social identities interact with their personal identities, having a positive social identity leads to positive self-esteem: When a group people identify with does well, its members feel good about themselves. For example, people who identify with their colleges often enhance their self-esteem by basking in the reflected glory of successful athletic teams, enthusing about how "*we won*" and "*we're number one*" (Cialdini et al., 1976).

Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams (1990) proposed that self-esteem plays three roles in intergroup bias. First, intergroup bias results in an increase in positive social identity by demonstrating that the ingroup is better than the outgroup; this increase in positive social identity is reflected in an increase in self-esteem. Second, because engaging in intergroup bias can raise self-esteem, people with low self-esteem will engage in intergroup bias to raise their self-esteem. Third, when an event threatens people's self-esteem, especially an event linked to an important social identity, they can defend their self-esteem through intergroup bias.

As we saw in Chapter 7, considerable research has been conducted on the self-esteem hypothesis. Although the results of the studies have not always been consistent with one another, research using the minimal group paradigm has generally supported Hogg and Abrams' (1990) three propositions (Aberson et al., 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Thus, in line with the first proposition, researchers have found small but consistent positive correlations between self-esteem and intergroup bias, with higher self-esteem being associated with more bias. Although this finding might seem to contradict the second proposition, that low self-esteem leads to bias, Christopher Aberson and his colleagues (2000) noted that people with low self-esteem do engage in intergroup bias but use different tactics than people with high self-esteem. People with high self-esteem are more likely to engage in direct bias, such as by overrewarding members of their groups, whereas people with low self-esteem tend to show bias indirectly, such as by expressing a desire for greater separation from the outgroup. Finally, the results of research on the effects of self-esteem threat have generally supported the third proposition, that threats to self-esteem motivate intergroup bias. This is particularly true for individuals who strongly identify with their ingroup, perhaps because strong identification with the ingroup increases commitment to the group (Branscombe, Elmers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999).

### Factors that Influence Social Identity

People have multiple potential social identities—such as student, friend, sorority member, woman, child-care worker—each of which is available for activation at any one time. What factors, then, affect which social identity or identities are activated and what determines the strength of people's social identities? Four factors appear to be important: self-categorization, a need for optimal distinctiveness, chronic social identities, and individual differences.

**Self-categorization.** Researchers using the minimal group paradigm randomly assign people to artificial groups; as we have discussed, this categorization is sufficient to create an ingroup bias. However, as we also noted, people are more likely to accept a social identity—and that identity is likely to be stronger—if they *self-categorize*, or determine for themselves which group or groups they belong to (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). Self-categorization theory (Turner & Oakes, 1989), proposes that categorizing oneself as a group member becomes more likely as the perceived difference between the ingroup and an outgroup increases. One way of looking at this process is in terms of *distinctiveness*, the extent to which a person feels that he or she differs along some dimension from other people in a situation (Sampson, 1999). The greater the perceived difference, the more likely a person is to self-categorize on the differentiating dimension and take on the social identity associated with that dimension. For example, an Asian woman is more likely to identify herself by her ethnicity when most of the people around her are White (McGuire & McGuire, 1988). Likewise, men are more likely to think of themselves as male when in a group of women but are less likely to do so when in a group of men; similarly, women are more likely to describe themselves as female when in a group of men rather than a group of women (Swan & Wyer, 1997).

The particular identity self-categorization activates depends on factors that change from situation to situation; as a result, social identity can change from situation to situation. For example, social identity as a sorority member might be low for Miranda when she attends a meeting of her sorority. In this setting, she sees herself and her sorority sisters as individuals with unique personalities and there are no women from other sororities present to create a perception of difference from other groups. However, at a meeting of the Panhellenic Council, Miranda may be the only member of her sorority present, so the contrast between herself as member of her sorority and the other women present (who are members of other sororities) becomes more salient, leading Miranda to feel greater social identification with her own sorority. If Miranda goes to another meeting at which she is the only woman, her social identity as a sorority member may fade into the background and her social identity as a woman may become more salient; now the contrast is based on gender rather than sorority membership. Box 9.2 provides a real-life example of how feelings of distinctiveness can lead to prejudice.

One result of self-categorization is that as social identity increases and personal identity decreases, group identity, group goals, and the influence of other group members become more important than personal identity, personal goals, and personal motives in guiding beliefs and behavior (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Self-categorization theory calls this process **self-stereotyping**: group members view themselves in terms of the (usually positive) stereotypes they have of their group so that the self becomes one with the group and the positive view of the group is reflected in a positive view of the self.

Differentiation from outgroups, then, is one factor that motivates self-categorization. A second factor is a need for certainty or correctness. Psychological research consistently shows that people have a strong need to believe that


**Box 9.2 Residential Integration and White Prejudice**

Social identity theory holds that increased feelings of social identity lead to prejudice because of perceptions of intergroup competition and as a way of maintaining self-esteem. One factor that increases social identity is an increase in distinctiveness, which can be brought about by the presence of members of other groups. Consequently, as members of other groups become more salient to people, their feelings of prejudice should increase.

This process is illustrated by the results of a study conducted by Marylee Taylor (1998). She used national survey data to examine the relationship between the proportion of Black residents in neighborhoods and anti-Black prejudice among White residents of those neighborhoods. As the figure below shows, the distinctiveness-prejudice hypothesis was partially

supported: White prejudice increased as the percentage of Black residents increased to around 20 percent. Taylor also found, as would be predicted by social identity theory, that White residents' feelings of competition with Blacks, indicated by feelings of economic and political threat, were correlated with both the percentage of Black residents in their neighborhoods and their degree of prejudice.

Note that prejudice peaked when the proportion of Black residents was about 20 percent and then decreased as the Black population increased. This finding reflects the principle that, under certain conditions, intergroup contact can reduce prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998). The role of intergroup contact in reducing prejudice is discussed in Chapter 14.



White Prejudice as a Function of Percentage of Black Residents in Their Neighborhoods

As the percentage of Black residents increases from 0 to 20 percent, prejudice increases and then begins to decrease. Scores are standardized, which means that 0 represents the average prejudice score of all the White respondents; negative numbers indicate less than average prejudice and positive numbers indicate greater than average prejudice.

SOURCE: Adapted from Taylor (1998, Figure 1, p. 526).

their attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions are correct (Hogg & Mullen, 1999). Uncertainty about what to believe or how to act is unpleasant because it implies that one has little control over one's life; consequently, people are motivated to reduce uncertainty by verifying the correctness of their beliefs. However, the problem with determining whether one's beliefs are correct is that there is no concrete standard for judging abstract beliefs. People therefore seek verification of their beliefs by comparing what they believe with what other, similar people believe. If the beliefs match, this consensus is taken as evidence of correctness: The more people who agree, the more correct the beliefs are assumed to be.

Hogg and Mullen (1999) proposed that one way to achieve this kind of validation is by identifying with a group that provides clear norms for structuring beliefs and guiding behavior. Because the self-stereotyping effect leads people to substitute the group identity for their personal identities, group beliefs on which everyone agrees replace less certain personal beliefs. This reduces uncertainty and removes an aversive state, so people experience the process as a pleasant one. This, in turn, reinforces self-categorization and group identification. Moreover, when people feel uncertain about the norms in a particular situation, they are more likely to identify with groups that provide information and that reduce feelings of uncertainty (Grieve & Hogg, 1999).

Self-categorization theory assumes that seeing oneself as different from others and the need for certainty are unconscious processes that lead people to categorize themselves in terms of group identity. Researchers also have studied conscious processes as precursors of self-categorization; one of those processes is making a choice to identify with a group. Not surprisingly, people who choose to join a group have a stronger social identity for that group than people who are assigned to a group (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). There are at least two reasons why this happens. First, people tend to join groups composed of others who have attitudes and values similar to their own (Forsyth, 2006), so a strong basis for mutual identification already exists. Second, once people make a choice, they tend to be committed to that choice and to see it in positive terms. To do otherwise would be admitting to a mistake, which most people are reluctant to do (Markus & Zajonc, 1985).

**Optimal Distinctiveness.** Self-categorization theory holds that people are motivated to identify with groups that provide them with distinct positive social identities and that fulfill their needs for certainty. As we discussed, one result of this process is self-stereotyping, in which people replace their personal identities with the group identity. However, one shortcoming of the self-stereotyping hypothesis is that people have a countervailing need to experience themselves as unique individuals who are different from other people (Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Pickett, 1999). Marilyn Brewer (1991) therefore proposed a modification to self-categorization theory, which she calls *optimal distinctiveness theory*. Optimal distinctiveness theory holds that people are most likely to identify with groups that provide the most satisfying balance between personal identity and group identity. Consider the earlier example of Miranda, the young woman who represented her sorority at the Panhellenic Council meeting. As we saw, self-categorization theory proposes that she will



identify with her sorority because of the contrast she sees between her sorority and the other sororities represented at the meeting. Optimal distinctiveness theory agrees that that kind of contrast motivates group identification, but adds that Miranda also wants to feel that, while being a member of the sorority, she can still be her own person. If the sorority tried to force Miranda to completely replace her personal identity and values with those of the sorority, her level of group identification would be reduced.

**Threat to the Group.** Events that threaten the well-being of the group generate stronger identification with the group. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States most certainly threatened the well-being of its citizens. To examine the result of this threat on group identity, Sophia Moskalkenko, Clark McCauley, and Paul Rozin (2006) asked U.S. college students to respond to the question “How important to you is your country?” They found that importance ratings increased following the September 11 attack compared to ratings made 6 months earlier. Eighteen months later, ratings had decreased to the pre-attack level. However, reminding U.S. citizens of the attack can cause ingroup identification to increase once more. College students who were asked to think back to the events of September 11, 2001, increased their favorability ratings of President George W. Bush (an indicator of ingroup identification) compared to students in a control condition (Landau et al., 2004). Interestingly, these approval ratings increased for both politically liberal and politically conservative students.

**Chronic Social Identities.** Although social identity theory emphasizes that social identities that can change from situation to situation, depending on the context, people also have **chronic identities** that influence their behavior (Sherman, Hamilton, & Lewis, 1999). Chronic identities are ones that are always with us, regardless of how much the situation changes. As Stephen Sherman and his colleagues (1999) note, “A ballplayer on the playing field will obviously self-categorize in terms of that athletic category, but may also think of himself as ‘a black ballplayer.’ A physician will self-categorize as a member of the medical profession, but if female, may often think of herself as ‘the woman doctor’” (p. 92). Chronic identities may be especially important for those people whose minority status makes them distinctive in any intergroup situation regardless of any other identities that situational factors activate.

**Individual Differences.** Just as chronic identities can influence social identity, so can other chronic personal characteristics, such as personality and ideology. Although, as we saw in Chapter 7, researchers have studied the relationships between individual difference variables and prejudice for a long time, social identity theory researchers have just begun to look for links between these variables and social identity. For example, Stéphane Perreault and Richard Bourhis (1999) studied the relationship of ethnocentrism, the tendency to favor one’s own ethnic and nationality groups over other such groups, to social identification. Using the minimal group paradigm, they found that people high in ethnocentrism were more likely to identify with their assigned groups than were people low in

ethnocentrism. Thus, some people may have a predisposition to identify more strongly with the groups to which they belong independent of any situational factors that might be operating.

### Issues in Social Identity Theory

Although social identity theory has proven to be a useful framework for studying prejudice, a few issues require more research. These issues include whether social identity processes can lead to outgroup derogation as well as ingroup favoritism, the factors that determine whether ingroup members will respond to aggression against a fellow group member, and the relation between social identity and intergroup tolerance.

**Ingroup Favoritism versus Outgroup Derogation.** Generally, research on social identity theory has found that although people show favoritism toward members of their ingroups, they do not necessarily penalize outgroup members (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). According to Charles Stangor and Scott Learly (2006) people are motivated by two important social goals: protecting and enhancing the self and the ingroup and affiliation and social harmony. Consistent with the research we have discussed so far, people receive psychological benefit from being part of a group and ingroup favoritism is usually the primary goal. However, people also are part of a larger community that includes outgroups, and, in general, they approach those interactions with respect. That is, “[i]n general, people view other people positively, act positively toward them in most cases, help them if they can, and expect others to react positively to them in a similar fashion (Stangor & Leary, 2006, p. 250). For example, Christine Theimer, Melanie Killen, and Charles Stangor (2001) studied pre-schoolers’ willingness to exclude another child from an activity that was stereotypically incongruent, such as a boy joining a group of girls who were playing with dolls. They found that the majority of both ingroup members (girls) and outgroup members (boys) judged that it was wrong to exclude the child from the activity. Moreover, the children’s reasoning reflected an attention to social harmony, including concerns about fairness and being nice. Adults also consider fairness in their evaluations of outgroup members. White college students who evaluated job applicants showed a preference for hiring a member of the ingroup (White applicants) over the outgroup (Black applicants) even though, objectively, they were equally qualified. However, they did recommend hiring the Black applicant 45 percent of the time (compared to 75 percent of the time for the White applicant); based on the applicants’ objective qualifications, each should have been recommended for hiring 50 percent of the time. This suggests that the evaluators were at least somewhat fair in their assessments of the Black candidate. That is, preference for the ingroup did not translate into rejection of the outgroup (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).

**Vicarious Retribution.** Despite these research findings, by looking at the world around us, it is easy to see that ingroup favoritism is often accompanied

by harmful discrimination and hostile attitudes toward outgroups, including aggression against the outgroup. Under some conditions, ingroup members will aggress against outgroup members even when they themselves have not been directly harmed, an act Brian Lickel and his colleagues (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006) term **vicarious retribution**. Lickel and colleagues offer the example of violence in Northern Ireland, perpetrated by two opposing groups, the Irish Republican Army, whose members wanted Northern Ireland to reunite with the predominantly Catholic Irish Republic, and the Protestant militia, whose members wanted Northern Ireland to continue under British rule. Prior to the truce between these warring factions, members of both groups participated in retributive killings. These killings occurred even when the retaliators did not themselves experience violence, but a member of their religious group had been harmed by the opposing group.

How do ingroup members decide whether to engage in vicarious retribution? Lickel and colleagues (2006) propose that ingroup members first appraise the action in question and decide whether it was directed toward their group and, if so, whether harm was intended (see Figure 9.1). Ingroup members also consider whether the act was intentional. Hence, if a Catholic was murdered in Belfast, Northern Ireland, members of the Protestant militia would have considered

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whether the murder was related to the Protestant/Catholic conflict or had another cause, such as a domestic argument or a botched robbery attempt.

If the ingroup members decide the aggressive act was due to conflict between the ingroup and the outgroup, the likelihood of vicarious retribution would then depend on how motivated the ingroup is to respond (Lickel et al., 2006). Factors related to group identity, such as group pride, group-member empathy, and normative influences come into play here. If the group's status is threatened, if they feel empathy for the person who experienced the harm, or if cultural norms suggest that retaliation is appropriate, motivation to respond will be high and vicarious retribution is more likely. Yet even if one or more of these factors is operating, ingroup members may not retaliate. This is especially true if the person responsible for the original violent action is unavailable for retribution, but instead another outgroup member will be the target of the retaliation. In making this decision, ingroups consider whether the outgroup is seen as a unified and coherent whole and so is seen as collectively responsible for the action. If so, ingroup members are more likely to act against an outgroup member, even if that person did not commit the original act.

Even if these conditions are met, ingroup provocation may not result in vicarious retribution. Lickel and colleagues (2006) describe additional factors that affect whether an ingroup will respond to an aggressive act. One is the power and status of the ingroup relative to the outgroup: High-power ingroups are more likely to engage in retribution. Another is whether the provocation was publicly known; if so, the ingroup's pride was more likely threatened and their motivation to respond will be enhanced. If their retaliation will likely also become public, they are similarly more likely to act. Finally, if the initial aggressive act was promoted by one of the outgroups' leaders or was directed toward a leader of the ingroup, vicarious retribution will be more likely.

This model can also explain why people fail to respond to genocide or mass violence in other countries. For example, although the violence in Darfur has resulted in the loss of over 400,000 lives and the displacement of over 2,500,000 people, international response has been slow and ineffective. According to the vicarious retribution model, members of other countries have failed to curb the violence because, although morally reprehensible, it is not directly relevant to them. Hence, although the Bush administration called for action to stop the genocide (*President Bush discusses genocide*, 2007), the international community did not do so, perhaps because, as stated in the *International Herald Tribune*, it believed that "[r]esponsibility for the Darfur horrors lies squarely with the government of the Sudan" (*The genocide continues*, 2008).

**Social Identity and Intergroup Tolerance.** Although social identity theory has focused on the negative intergroup effects of social identity, researchers and theorists have begun to address how social identity relates to intergroup tolerance. One approach to this issue focuses on conditions for tolerance and another on the complexity of social identity.

Amélie Mummendey and Michael Wenzel (1999) have suggested that, under some conditions, ingroup identification can lead to tolerance rather than hostility.

If the ingroup either does not believe that it and the outgroup share a common set of values, for example, or does not see their own values as more valid than those of the outgroup, then there will be no hostility (see also Stangor & Leary, 2006). They illustrate their point with the case of Germans' attitudes toward Turks: "Many Germans, although on the one hand generally having negative attitudes towards Turks living in Germany, on the other hand love to spend their holidays in Turkey. Because during their holidays they are on Turkish territory and in the Turkish culture, they may to a lesser extent represent Turks and themselves as [being governed by the same set of values] and thus experience strange habits and customs as less of a norm violation or deviance" (p. 169).

Noting that people have many potential social identities, Sonia Roccas and Marilynn Brewer (2002; see also Brewer & Pierce, 2005) have proposed that the more complex a person's social identity is, the more tolerant of other groups that person will be. A person with a complex social identity is aware of having multiple identities and sees people who share any of those identities as part of his or her ingroup. In contrast, a person with a simple social identity focuses on only one identity and sees only people who share that one identity as part of the ingroup. Consider, for example, a woman who is Black and a lawyer. If she has a complex social identity, she will view all women, all Black people, and all lawyers as members of her ingroup; if she has a simple social identity that focuses on her profession, she will view all lawyers as members of her ingroup, but exclude anyone who is not a lawyer, even women and Black people who are not lawyers. Roccas and Brewer (2002) postulate that a complex social identity leads people to be more tolerant of group differences because a complex identity reduces the motivation to self-categorize as a member of any one group. For example, having multiple concurrent social identities reduces feelings of distinctiveness—the person sees him- or herself as fitting in with many groups—and low distinctiveness leads to a lower likelihood of self-categorization. In addition, Roccas and Brewer suggest that a complex social identity protects people from threats to social identity that can lead to ingroup bias: If people have more than one social identity, a threat to one identity can be offset by focusing on a more positive identity until the threat has passed.

### Looking Back at Social Identity Theory

We have spent a lot of time discussing social identity theory because it is one of the most important theories of intergroup relations and so has developed in a complex and multifaceted way. Therefore, let us take a moment to put it all together. Figure 9.2 summarizes social identity theory in diagrammatic form. At the center of the theory, of course, is social identity: the part of one's self-concept that comes from membership in groups. Social identity derives from both temporary, situational factors such as self-categorization and the need for optimal distinctiveness, and from long-term factors such as chronic identities and individual difference variables. Self-categorization, in turn, derives from feelings of distinctiveness, need for certainty, and choosing one's identities. Taking on a social identity leads to




**FIGURE 9.2** Social Identity Theory

Social identity derives from both situational factors such as self-categorization and the need for optimal distinctiveness and from long-term factors such as chronic identities and individual difference variables. Self-categorization derives from feelings of distinctiveness, need for certainty, and choosing one's identities. Taking on a social identity leads to feelings of competition with outgroups and a motivation to maintain a positive social identity. These factors lead to ingroup bias, which promotes a positive social identity and self-esteem, thereby reinforcing the social identity.

feelings of competition with contrasting outgroups and a motivation to maintain a positive social identity. These factors lead to ingroup bias, which promotes a positive social identity and self-esteem, thereby reinforcing the social identity.

## RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY

Relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976; Davis, 1959; Runciman, 1966) addresses the questions of how people become dissatisfied with some aspect of their lives and how they react to that dissatisfaction. The theory holds that people become dissatisfied if they either compare their current situation to similar

situations they had experienced in the past or compare themselves to other people currently in their situation and as a result decide that they lack some resource that they deserve to have. They are not necessarily deprived in absolute terms; in fact, their objective situation might be quite good (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Rather, they *feel* deprived *relative* to what they had in the past or *relative* to people who have the resource they believe they deserve, giving rise to the term **relative deprivation**. Relative deprivation's relation to prejudice comes in how people respond to feelings of deprivation: If people blame another group for causing the deprivation, they come to dislike that group and its members.

The concept of relative deprivation originated in research conducted with American soldiers during World War II. One aspect of that research dealt with soldiers' levels of satisfaction (or perhaps more accurately, dissatisfaction) with army life. There were a number of unexpected findings, among which was that soldiers in the air corps expressed more dissatisfaction than soldiers in the military police. This finding was unexpected because promotions and the consequent raises in pay and other benefits came much faster in the air corps than in the military police (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). The researchers explained these findings in terms of relative deprivation: Because airmen saw many fellow soldiers promoted quickly, they felt deprived when they were not promoted; in contrast, because military policemen saw few people being promoted quickly, they did not feel deprived relative to their colleagues and as a result felt more satisfied with the promotion system.

Since World War II there has been a vast amount of research conducted on relative deprivation theory in a wide variety of contexts (see Walker & Smith, 2002, for a history of this research). Here, of course, we focus on its relationship to prejudice and intergroup relations. After describing how the theory proposes that dissatisfaction arises and how people respond to dissatisfaction, this section looks at research on the relation of relative deprivation to prejudice and at the related concepts of relative gratification and scapegoating.

### Relative Deprivation, Dissatisfaction, and Resentment

Relative deprivation theory holds that people become dissatisfied when they compare their current outcomes with some standard. If they see that they are getting less than the standard, they then feel deprived. As shown in Figure 9.3, the standard can be based either on personal experience or from comparing one's own situation to another person's situation (social comparison). James Davies (1969) proposed that personal experience can cause feelings of relative deprivation when reality fails to meet people's expectations. Davies noted that people's expectations for future outcomes tend to increase over time as their actual outcomes get better. For example, in the United States the overall standard of living increased from World War II until the 1980s; people got used to this steady increase and expected it to continue, and children came to expect to do better economically than their parents did. According to Davies's model, people are satisfied as long as their outcomes are a good match for their expectations. However, if outcomes begin to decline, as when the United States began to




**FIGURE 9.3** Relative Deprivation as a Source of Dissatisfaction and Resentment

People compare the outcomes they receive to what they expect and believe that they deserve to receive. This expectation is based on what they received in the past and on what other people are receiving. If they see their outcomes as being less than they deserve, feelings of relative deprivation and low distributive justice (unfairness) ensue. These emotions lead to feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment, which are intensified if people believe that the outcomes are distributed using unfair procedures (low procedural justice) as well as being too low. Resentment of deprivation leads to hostility toward the perceived cause of the deprivation.

lose jobs because of increasing competition from other parts of the world, an increasingly large gap forms between expectations and outcomes. When the size of the gap becomes too large, people feel deprived relative to their past experience.

This process is illustrated by Michael Kimmel's (2002) description of men who join White supremacist groups:

They are the sons of skilled workers in industries like textiles and tobacco, the sons of owners of small farms, shops, and grocery stores. Buffeted by global political and economic forces, the sons have inherited little of their fathers' legacies. The family farms have been lost to foreclosure, the small shops squeezed out by Wal-Marts and malls. These young men face a spiral of downward mobility and economic



uncertainty. They complain that they are squeezed between the omnivorous jaws of global capital concentration and a federal bureaucracy that is at best indifferent to their plight and at worst complicit in their demise (p. B11).

That is, these people feel deprived relative to what they had come to expect to receive based on their parents' successes. The second source of feelings of relative deprivation is social comparison: People see that others have something and want it; not having it leads them to feel deprived relative to the comparison other. This was the process that was operating among the air corps soldiers during World War II (Stouffer et al., 1949).

Thus, feelings of relative deprivation are similar to feelings of unfairness, or what is known as low **distributive justice** (Greenberg, 1996): the perception that outcomes are not being distributed on the expected basis that people who deserve more get more, but on some other, unfair basis, such as ingroup favoritism. As shown in Figure 9.3, this perception of relative deprivation or unfairness leads to feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment. Robert Folger (1987) points out that the negative feelings are exacerbated if people believe that **procedural justice**—the fairness of the process by which rewards are distributed (Greenberg, 1996)—is also low. For example, a student might feel deprived and upset if she sees that someone got an A on a test on which she got a C; she'd feel even more upset if she thought the other person got the A unfairly, such as by cheating. Conversely, John Jost (1995) has proposed that convincing people that procedural justice is high when distributive justice is low can reduce feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment. Thus, Brenda Major (1994) has suggested that one reason many women are willing to accept less pay than men is that they believe that they do not deserve more money. That is, these women may believe that their outcomes are unfair (low distributive justice), but also believe that the difference in salaries between women and men is appropriate, so dissatisfaction is low (high procedural justice). When feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment are aroused, they can lead to hostility toward the group perceived to be benefiting at one's expense. One way these feelings of hostility can be expressed is in the form of prejudice (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 2002; Taylor, 2002).

### Relative Deprivation and Prejudice

Relative deprivation researchers make a distinction between personal and group relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966). **Personal (or egoistic) relative deprivation** refers to the degree to which a person feels deprived as an individual. In contrast, **group (or fraternal) relative deprivation** refers to the degree to which a person feels that a group he or she identifies with has been deprived of some benefit, independent of the amount of relative deprivation experienced. This distinction is important because, generally, group relative deprivation has been found to be related to prejudice whereas personal relative deprivation has not.

The classic study of the relationship of relative deprivation to prejudice was conducted by Reeve Vanneman and Thomas Pettigrew (1972). Using survey data

of White respondents from four northern cities, Vanneman and Pettigrew classified respondents as personally deprived if they saw their economic gains over the prior 5 years as being less than those of other White people and as experiencing group deprivation if they saw their gains as being less than those of Black people. Vanneman and Pettigrew were therefore able to construct four groups of respondents: (1) those high in both personal and group relative deprivation, (2) those low in both, (3) those high in personal relative deprivation but low in group relative deprivation, and (4) those high in group deprivation but low in personal relative deprivation. They found a modest relationship between group relative deprivation and prejudice: 54 percent of the White people high in group relative deprivation expressed negative attitudes toward Black people compared to 42 percent of Whites who were low in group relative deprivation. In contrast, personal relative deprivation was unrelated to prejudice, with 48 percent of the members of both the high and low groups expressing negative attitudes. Note the importance of the relativity of the feelings of deprivation: Although the White respondents in these surveys were *objectively* better off than their African American contemporaries, 42 percent of them thought they were losing out *relative* to African Americans, and it was they who expressed the most prejudice.

Ursula Dibble (1981) found similar results in data from a survey of African Americans that was conducted at about the same time as Vanneman and Pettigrew's (1972) survey. Dibble studied relative deprivation in terms of job discrimination: People who had themselves experienced job discrimination were classified as *personally deprived* and those who had not experienced it as *not deprived*. Group relative deprivation was assessed in terms of how much job discrimination Blacks in general experienced. Dibble used a measure of hostility as her dependent variable: advocating violence as a means of gaining civil rights. Her results paralleled those of Vanneman and Pettigrew's study of Whites: 28 percent of those high in group relative deprivation advocated violence compared to 13 percent of those low in group relative deprivation. In addition, those high in both forms of relative deprivation were the most likely to express hostility. In Dibble's study, personal relative deprivation may have resulted in additional hostility because it was defined in very personal terms—direct experience of job discrimination—whereas Vanneman and Pettigrew defined it more broadly in terms of general economic gains.

In the years since Dibble (1981) and Vanneman and Pettigrew (1972) conducted their studies, research has continued to show a relationship between group relative deprivation and factors such as prejudice and hostility toward outgroups, both in the United States and in other countries (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Although most of this research has been correlational in nature, experiments in which participants' feelings of group relative deprivation are manipulated indicate that relative deprivation causes feelings of prejudice and hostility and that it is these negative emotions that lead to prejudiced reactions (Grant & Brown, 1995). Furthermore, relative deprivation can lead to prejudice and hostility toward a minority group even when that group did not cause the deprivation (Guimond & Dambrun, 2002). Clearly, then, feelings of relative deprivation and the associated resentment play a role in intergroup prejudice.

Also, it is one of the few theories of prejudice that can explain why some objectively well-off people explain their prejudices as arising from their victimization by less well-off groups (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

### Relative Gratification

In contrast to the feeling that people are not getting all they deserve, people also experience **relative gratification**, or the feeling that things are getting better (see Guimond & Dambrun, 2002). Bernard Grofman and Edward Muller (1973) have proposed that both of these feelings can lead to prejudice. Using survey data, they divided respondents into three groups: those who thought their economic situation would be worse in the future than in the past (relative deprivation), those who thought their economic situation would be better in the future than in the past (relative gratification), and those who thought things would stay the same. Grofman and Muller assessed resentment and discontent in terms of endorsement of political violence as a way to bring about change. They found that both people who thought things would get better and those who thought things would get worse were more willing to endorse political violence than those who saw no change ahead for themselves. More recently, Guimond and Dambrun (2002) replicated Grofman and Muller's (1973) results experimentally, using a measure of ethnic prejudice as their dependent variable. They found that both people who had experienced relative gratification and those who had experienced relative deprivation expressed more prejudice than members of a control group. Research in a natural setting, based on responses from a representative sample of South Africans, also showed that perceptions of relative deprivation and relative gratification lead to prejudice against immigrants, a prime target for discrimination in that country (Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush, & Méot, 2006).

Why do both deprivation and gratification lead to prejudice? Guimond and Dambrun (2002) suggest that it is because people define their self-interest differently in the two situations. People who are relatively deprived focus on their perceived losses and experience resentment and hostility toward those whom they blame for those losses. In contrast, people who are relatively gratified focus on their group's superior position relative to outgroups. As proposed by social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see Chapter 7), they hold negative beliefs about outgroups as a means of justifying their relatively advantaged position. People who see themselves as neither deprived nor gratified relative to outgroups—that is, people who perceive their ingroups and outgroups as having equivalent outcomes—have neither the need to ascribe blame for loss nor the need to justify their greater outcomes as motives for prejudice.

### Scapegoating

One aspect of Guimond and Dambrun's (2002) findings that you may have noticed is that people sometimes express prejudice against others who played no role in their relative deprivation. This process of blaming (and sometimes

punishing) an innocent outgroup for the misfortunes of one's ingroup is called **scapegoating**. Perhaps the most infamous example of scapegoating was the Nazis' blaming the Jewish people for all the economic and social problems that beset Germany following World War I. The Nazis then used the Jews' supposed guilt as a justification for murdering six million Jews.

Blaming an outgroup for the ingroup's problems is not a new phenomenon. For example, Gordon Allport (1954) quoted the 3rd century Roman writer Tertullian as having observed that "[the Roman people] take the Christians to be the cause of every disaster to the state, of every misfortune to the people. If the Tiber reaches the wall, if the Nile does not reach the fields, if the sky does not move or if the earth does, if there is a famine, or if there is a plague, the cry is at once, 'The Christians to the lions'" (p. 243). In essence, then, scapegoating provides what might be called a "designated villain" to explain the deprivation and frustration caused by social and economic problems. Two theories have been proposed to explain scapegoating, frustration-aggression-displacement theory and Glick's (2002; 2005) ideological theory. Both theories view scapegoating as a response to frustration; however, they differ in their explanations of the psychological processes that lead from perceived deprivation to intergroup hostility.

**Frustration-aggression-displacement Theory.** Frustration-aggression-displacement theory was one of the first theories proposed to explain scapegoating (Allport, 1954). This theory is based on the frustration theory of aggression, which John Dollard and his colleagues derived from the psychoanalytic theory of aggression (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; see Berkowitz, 1993, for a more recent account of the theory). The frustration theory of aggression holds that frustration causes aggression. The preferred target of that aggression is the cause of the frustration, but if it is not possible to be aggressive toward that source, aggression will be displaced onto a more readily available target. For example, a person who is treated unfairly by her boss might feel like taking aggressive action either physically or verbally, but may do nothing out of concern for losing her job. However, she vents her frustration when she gets home by yelling at her dog; that is, she displaces her aggression from her boss to her dog. This displacement can occur at the societal level as well. For example, post-World War I Germany faced a host of social and economic problems, including hyperinflation of the currency, high crime rates, and political riots. Because there were no clear causes for these problems, the Nazis exploited the situation by blaming the problems on a Jewish conspiracy to undermine Germany.

Although the frustration-aggression-displacement theory of scapegoating has been around for a long time, it has a number of shortcomings. One of the biggest is that more than 60 years of research have failed to provide strong support for it (Duckitt, 1994; Glick, 2002; 2005). Even the study most commonly cited in support of the theory, Carl Hovland and Robert Sears' (1940) study of the relation between deteriorating economic conditions and racial lynchings in the United States, has been shown to be problematic. Hovland and Sears postulated that White Americans would scapegoat African Americans during economic downturns and provided historical data that appeared to show a correlation between negative

economic indicators and lynchings. However, using more modern statistical tools, Donald Green and his colleagues (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998) showed that the correlation did not really exist. In addition, they were not able to find correlations between economic downturns and hate crimes directed at other minority groups.

Another problem is that frustration-aggression theory is, at heart, a theory of individual, not group, behavior: The theory cannot explain why individual frustration should result in scapegoating of groups (Glick, 2002; 2005). Even at the individual level, support for the theory is weak. For example, compared to nonprejudiced people, prejudiced people who are frustrated show more aggression toward members of groups against whom they hold prejudices. However, prejudiced individuals also show more aggression toward people against whom they are *not* prejudiced. Thus, prejudiced people seem to be aggressive against everyone, not just the targets of their prejudices as the theory would predict (Duckitt, 1994). Finally, the frustration-aggression-displacement theory cannot explain why some outgroups are chosen as scapegoats while others are not (Duckitt, 1994), a problem Allport noted in 1954. However, a more recent theory of scapegoating, Peter Glick's (2002; 2005) ideological theory, does explain how scapegoats are chosen.

**Ideological Theory.** Figure 9.4 shows Glick's (2002; 2005) ideological theory of scapegoating. The theory starts with a perception of group relative deprivation. If there is no clear cause for the deprivation, people search for one. If an ideology (such as Nazism) exists that provides a scapegoat to explain their predicament, people take up that ideology because it fulfills their need to understand the cause of their deprivation. The ideology can also fulfill other needs, such as having a positive social identity, by providing a common outgroup for people to contrast themselves with, and by showing that the predicament is the outgroup's fault, so ingroup members should not feel bad about themselves.

Several factors increase a group's vulnerability to becoming a scapegoat (Duckitt, 1994; Glick, 2002; 2005). Scapegoats usually have little power so that they cannot effectively resist or retaliate for any actions taken against them. They are typically outgroups that are visible enough in society to be salient to the ingroup. Visibility can take a number of forms, including physical characteristics such as skin color or well-publicized deviance from social norms as in the case of a political group. They usually are disliked and already stereotyped in ways that make them believable as the cause of the group's deprivation. For example, in describing the German Nazis' scapegoating of Jews, Ervin Staub (2002) noted that "there had been a long history of anti-Semitism, with periods of intense mistreatment of Jews.... In addition to early Christian anti-Semitism..., the intense anti-Semitism of Luther..., who described Jews in language similar to that later used by Hitler, was an important influence. Centuries of discrimination and persecution further enhanced anti-Semitism and made it part of German culture" (p. 15). Finally, the scapegoated group tends to be seen as a threat to the ingroup, a theme that is usually strongly emphasized in ideological propaganda.

Commitment to the ideology leads to hostile action against the scapegoated group. Because people need to feel justified in taking such action, the action both reinforces and enhances the negative stereotypes of the scapegoat: People




**FIGURE 9.4** Peter Glick's (2002) Ideological Model of Scapegoating

Group relative deprivation without a clear causal agent leads to a search for a cause of the deprivation. If an ideology (such as Nazism) exists that provides a causal scapegoat, people adhere to the ideology because it fulfills their need to understand the cause of their deprivation. The ideology can also fulfill other needs, such as social identity and collective self-esteem. Outgroups are chosen as scapegoats if they have little power, are visible, are disliked, are stereotyped in ways that make them appropriate as the cause of the deprivation, and are seen as a threat to the ingroup. Commitment to the ideology leads to action against the scapegoated group. The action both reinforces the stereotypes and commitment to the ideology. The reinforced stereotypes lend additional apparent validity to the ideology and help justify the actions taken against the scapegoated group.

SOURCE: Adapted from Peter Glick. (2002). "Sacrificial Lambs dressed in wolves' clothing: Envious prejudice, ideology, and the scapegoating of Jews," Figure 5.2, p. 126. In *Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust*, ed. by Newman and Erber. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.

reason that the outgroup must in fact be bad to deserve what the ingroup did to them. Taking action in support of the ideology also tends to increase commitment to the ideology. The reinforced stereotypes lend additional verisimilitude to the ideology. Glick's (2002; 2005) ideological theory is very new and as yet has not been tested with research. However, it does an excellent job of explaining the process of scapegoating and so holds great promise.

## INTEGRATED THREAT THEORY

Although we have discussed realistic conflict theory, social identity theory, and relative deprivation theory separately, they are, in fact, closely linked. Walter and Cookie Stephan's (Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) integrated threat theory of prejudice, illustrated in Figure 9.5, provides one way of showing how the theories relate to one another. Stephan and Stephan propose that prejudice derives from three types of perceived threat to one's ingroup: intergroup anxiety, perceptions of realistic threats, and perceptions of symbolic threats.

Intergroup anxiety, discussed in Chapter 5, consists of factors that make people feel anxious or nervous in the presence of members of other groups. These

factors include such things as fear of being embarrassed by saying or doing the wrong thing, aversive prejudices, and so forth.

Perceptions of realistic threat derive from intergroup conflict and competition, and from feelings of group relative deprivation. As noted earlier, sometimes groups really are in competition for resources and so constitute threats to each other and, as research using the minimal group paradigm has found, simply putting people into groups can create ingroup favoritism which, in turn, can stimulate competition. Feelings of relative deprivation may or may not stem from real deprivation, but, as we saw earlier, in either case blaming another group for the deprivation creates hostility toward that group. In addition, feelings of group relative deprivation can lead to feelings of competitiveness with the outgroup (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999).

Symbolic threats come from perceptions that the outgroup differs from the ingroup in terms of values, attitudes, beliefs, moral standards, and other symbolic, as opposed to material, factors. Perceptions of such differences are often associated with the belief that the outgroup is trying to undermine those factors, especially values, and destroy the ingroup by destroying its cultural underpinnings (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996).




**FIGURE 9.5** Walter and Cookie Stephan's (2000) Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice

Greater identification with the ingroup leads to more perceived realistic and symbolic threats and more intergroup anxiety. Higher levels of these factors lead to more prejudice. Adapted from Walter G. Stephan and Cookie W. Stephan. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice.

SOURCE: Adapted from Walter G. Stephan and Cookie W. Stephan, 2000. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination*, Figure 2.4, p. 37. Reprinted by permission of Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Identification with the ingroup is associated with all three types of threat. As shown earlier in Figure 9.2, increases in ingroup identification lead to increases in feelings of competitiveness with the outgroup, and increased social identity has been found to be associated with perceptions of greater group relative deprivation in both correlational research (Mummendey et al., 1999; Tropp & Wright, 1999) and experimental research (Grant & Brown, 1995). Furthermore, stronger identification with the ingroup reflects stronger investment in group values, moral standards, and so forth. Therefore, people strongly identified with the ingroup are more sensitive to seeing ingroup-outgroup differences in values as threatening (Stephan et al., 2002). Blake Riek and his colleagues (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006) reviewed almost 100 tests of integrated threat theory and found that, as predicted by the model shown in Figure 9.5, identification with the ingroup was related to realistic threat, symbolic threat, and intergroup anxiety. These, in turn, each had unique influences on attitudes toward the outgroup. However, the relationship between both realistic threat and intergroup anxiety was stronger for low- rather than high-status outgroups. Overall, then, integrated threat theory provides a useful model for tying intergroup conflict and competition, relative deprivation, and other factors into a package of perceptions that potentiates prejudice.

## HATE GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Hate groups represent an extreme form of social identity. A **hate group** is an organization whose central principles include hostility toward racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups. Most hate groups also espouse White racial supremacy and advocate the segregation or deportation of minority groups, or, in a few cases, the annihilation of those groups. Some hate groups, such as the one called Christian Identity, claim to be religions or churches; others, such as the Ku Klux Klan do not claim religious status but do assert that Christianity is one of their guiding principles. A number of hate groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, are fairly well organized with a national structure, whereas others, such as racist skinheads, are loose coalitions of local groups.

Hate groups engage in a variety of activities, including holding membership meetings, rallies, and bring-the-family social events; engaging in protests and demonstrations; distributing pamphlets; producing television shows for public access cable channels; running World Wide Web sites; and producing and distributing recordings of racist music. Interestingly, despite the violent rhetoric hate group leaders often use in their speeches and literature, with a few exceptions (such as racist skinheads) the groups rarely initiate violent activities and often disown members who engage in violence (Levin & McDevitt, 2002). A study of extremist internet sites found that only 16.6 percent had content that specifically urged violence and that it was common for sites to contain language specifically condemning violence (Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003). The groups operate this way because they want to project an image of normalcy, an image of people who prefer to disagree peacefully with government racial policy, but who are also willing to engage in armed defense of what they see as their rights (Blee, 2002, 2007; Ezekiel, 1995).



The purpose of this section is to examine the psychological factors that predispose people to join hate groups, the way in which hate groups recruit new members, how the groups socialize recruits into becoming “good” group members, and factors that motivate people to leave the groups. Space does not permit a discussion of the historical, political, and sociological factors that have led to the rise and continuation of hate groups in the United States. Betty Dobratz and Stephanie Shanks-Meile (2000), among others, have done an excellent job of covering this complex topic.

Most of the information about hate group members comes from ethnographic studies of current and former members, especially those conducted by James Aho (1988, 1990), Tore Bjørgo (1998), Kathleen Blee (2002), and Raphael Ezekiel (1995, 2002). As Blee (2002) notes, one must be careful when evaluating people’s reports of their motivations because autobiographical memory is constructive; that is, people, usually unconsciously, select and interpret past events in terms of their current belief systems to help them justify those beliefs. Nonetheless, the consistencies in the findings of the research conducted by Aho, Blee, Ezekiel (who worked in different parts of the United States at different times), and Bjørgo (who worked in Europe) provide support for the generality of the motivational themes and group processes they identified.

### Why People Join Hate Groups

There is no one reason why people join hate groups. Rather, there seem to be a set of factors that, in various combinations, lead people to see joining a hate group as something reasonable to do. Among these factors are the person’s racial attitudes, being in search of solutions to problems and questions that have arisen in the person’s life, youthful rebellion, the allure of violence, and being male.

**Racial Attitudes.** Clearly, racial attitudes play a role in hate group membership: No one who holds nonracist attitudes is likely to join such a group. However, although rabid racism might characterize a few people at the time they join hate groups, most new recruits do not hold extreme racist attitudes (Aho, 1990; Bjørgo, 1998; Blee, 2002, 2007). Perhaps because of this, about one fifth of the Web sites include explicit statements that the group is not racist (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003). Instead of explicit racism, hate groups are often characterized by what Philomena Essed (1991) called **everyday racism** or what James Jones (1997) called **cultural racism**. Everyday racism and cultural racism reflect the assumption inherent in much of North American culture that the only correct social and cultural values are European Christian values. This assumption, in turn, promotes negative, stereotyped views of people, such as members of minority groups, whose values are presumed to differ from the European Christian norm (Biernat et al., 1996). Everyday racism is the process that, for example, lets people laugh at racist jokes and leads them to feel uncomfortable in the presence of minority group members, even though they see themselves as unprejudiced and would not intentionally act in a racist manner.

Everyday racism does not by itself lead people into hate groups, but it does provide a foundation on which hate group recruiters can build when trying to

persuade people to join their groups. As we will see, once people are recruited into hate groups the process of organizational socialization converts everyday racism into extreme racism, or in Blee's (2002) term, **extraordinary racism**. Aho (1988), for example, noted that "It is not uncommon to meet presently dedicated neo-Nazis who, when they first read or heard its doctrines were either shocked by them, morally revolted, or simply amused by what they took to be its patent absurdities" (p. 161).

**A Search for Solutions.** Stephen Worchel (1999) has suggested that throughout their lives people are on a search for solutions to the philosophical and practical problems that inevitably confront them. They are trying to decide what things are important in life. When bad things happen, people want to understand the causes so they can put things right. People want the sense of comradeship and community that comes from associating with like-minded people. People want to make the world a better place for themselves and their children. Hate groups can appeal to some people because the groups seem to provide the answers to their questions and solutions to their problems.

As Worchel (1999) noted, people want their lives to have meaning and purpose, they want to know that they are having an impact on the world and on other people, and they want to have sense of pride and self-value. Membership in hate groups can help fulfill such needs. Based on his interviews with young members of racist groups, Ezekiel (1995) concluded that participating in the groups "brings a sense of meaning—at least for a while.... To struggle in a cause that transcends the individual lends meaning to a life, no matter how ill-founded or narrowing the cause. For young men in the neo-Nazi group that I had studied in Detroit, membership was an alternative to atomization and drift; within the group they worked for a cause and took direct risks in the company of comrades" (p. 32). Pride and self-image may also play a role in the appeal of hate groups. Bjørge (1998) concluded that pride "perhaps is the most important factor involved when youths join racist groups.... Individuals who have failed to establish a positive identity and status in relation to school, work, sports, or other social activities sometimes try to win respect by joining groups with a dangerous and intimidating image" (pp. 235–236). Other people, especially young people, may simply be drifting, looking for something to give purpose and direction to their lives (Bjørge, 1998). For example, Aho (1990) reported that while observing a paramilitary training exercise being conducted by a hate group, "I spoke to a young man garbed in jungle fatigues carrying an automatic rifle.... Behind the mosquito face-net I discovered a bored... high school student who became animated only when conversation shifted to his 'real' interests in art, drama, and wrestling" (p. 32). Thus, one neo-Nazi recruiting manual urges members to "recruit ... disaffected white kids who feel 'left out,' isolated, unpopular, or on the fringe or margins of things at school (outsiders, loners).... Working with Nazi skinheads will give them a sense of accomplishment, success, and belonging. In recruiting, proceed from such 'outsiders' inwards toward the mainstream, conventional, average students" (quoted in Blazak, 2001, p. 988).

One propaganda tool that hate groups use to attract high school and college students who are searching for direction and meaning in their lives is racist rock

music (Blee, 2002; Löw, 1998). Racist rock bands write and perform songs that disparage and dehumanize members of racial and religious minority groups while extolling the superiority of the White race. Blee (2002) quotes one neo-Nazi leader as saying that “music has the potential to get through to the kids like nothing else. The great thing about music is, if a kid likes it, he will dub copies for his friends, and they will dub copies for their friends, and so on. This has the potential to become a grassroots, underground type movement” (p. 161). This approach can be effective. Blee (2002) goes on to describe one young woman who told her: “How I really started believing, thinking in that white separatist sense and then got all white separatist, it was really through the music. There’s a whole other genre of music out there that no one ever hears about, and it’s real powerful, especially at that awkward stage where no one knows exactly who they are. It gives you an identity, it says you’re special, you know, because you’re white” (p. 162). Multimedia, such as video downloads and games, which appeal to young people, are also common (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003).

Many members of hate groups have grievances and want to set them right. For example, they may believe that the government and other powerful groups whose actions they cannot control, such as employers, are treating them unfairly. In some cases, this sense of grievance might be a reaction to the loss of White privilege brought about by civil rights legislation. No longer, for example, does a White job applicant get automatic preference over minority applicants (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). Exploiting the principle of group relative deprivation, hate group recruiters frame this situation as one of minority group members unfairly taking jobs away from more deserving White applicants. In other cases, personal grievances might lead to feelings of deprivation. Ezekiel (1995), for example, suggested that a sense of grievance might be especially characteristic of poor Whites who feel their plight is being ignored because news media reports and government officials’ speeches focus on minority group poverty. This attention paid to minority group poverty may also lead poor Whites to feel shortchanged on social services (Björge, 1998). Similar processes might also be at work among the middle class (Kimmel, 2002). Thus, one hate group recruiter told sociologist Randy Blazak (2001), “The easiest place to recruit is around some big layoff.... You wait for things to get bad and you go to the kids, not the parents and say, ‘You know why your dad got laid off? It’s because the money hungry Jews sent his job to China. They care more about the... Chinese than they do about White workers’” (p. 992).

In addition, Ezekiel noted that the poor White hate group members he interviewed “were people who at a deep level felt terror that they were about to be extinguished. They felt that their lives might disappear at any moment. They felt that they might be blown away by the next wind” (p. 156). Their fear came from being born in poverty and from a lack of hope that things would get better. Hate groups try to recruit new members by claiming to provide a means for White people to unite and fight for what the groups present as rightfully theirs.

People also need to feel a sense of community. Björge (1998) and Ezekiel (1995) reported that the young hate group members they interviewed usually had few strong social ties outside the group. The groups therefore provided friendship and support networks not otherwise available to their members. In

addition, most of the members had few close family ties and often did not have a father figure in the home. For these young men, older group members served as father figures and role models, providing advice and guidance.

Finally, in his study of hate group members, Aho (1990) noted that one important motivation was to make the world a better place. Most of Aho's interviewees were Christian religious fundamentalists who saw a strong conflict between their religious standards and the corruption and immorality rife in the United States and the world at large. For these people, the hate groups provided a set of scapegoats to blame for the perceived corruption and immorality—religious and racial minority groups—and a solution—wresting control of the country from those groups and putting it in the hands of right-minded White Christians. See Box 9.3 for more on religion and hate groups.

### **Box 9.3 Religion and Racism**

Although it may seem like a contradiction, some hate groups claim to be religions. Betty Dobratz (2001) and Jonathan White (2001) identify three principal racist religions: Christian Identity, Creatorism, and Odinism (The World Church of the Creator). Christian Identity has three central beliefs (Barkun, 1997): that European Whites, not Jews, are the chosen people of God, and as such should have dominance over all other peoples; that Jews are the children of the devil, born from the liaison between Satan and Eve; and that "Aryans" must battle a Jewish conspiracy to prevent the Second Coming of Christ. Creatorism is a form of racist deism that holds that the Creator set the universe in motion and established laws of nature to govern it; people must work things out on their own within the strictures of these natural laws. According to Creatorism, racial primacy and purity are essential to human survival because "nature does not approve of miscegenation or mongrelization of the races" (Dobratz, 2001, p. 290). Creatorism claims no scriptural base for its racism, but holds that "Our religion is our race" (quoted in White, 2001, p. 940). Finally, Odinism is a resurrection of ancient Norse mythology in the service of racism. It claims that Northern European "Aryans" are a separate race that is superior to all other races and so must be kept racially pure. The best way to ensure purity is through the separation of the races (Dobratz, 2001).

Although racist religions, especially those that claim a Christian basis, focus their recruiting efforts on people whom White (2001) refers to as mainstream fundamentalists (Dobratz, 2001), there

are important differences between mainstream Christian fundamentalism and racist religion (White, 2001). Although we present those differences in terms of end points of a continuum, any one person's beliefs could fall somewhere between those points:

Although both mainstream fundamentalism and racist religion favor a literal interpretation of the Bible, mainstream fundamentalists embrace its call for universal love. In contrast, racist religion "accepts the idea of love [only] for one's own kind [and] is defined by hate. One does not simply love, one loves in conjunction with hate. For example, one loves Christians because one hates everyone who is not a Christian. One loves Whites because one hates everyone who is not White" (White, 2001, p. 945).

Racist religion claims that the Bible can be interpreted to support racism; mainstream fundamentalists reject such claims.

In the United States, mainstream fundamentalist belief is not linked to one's race or ethnicity, whereas race is a central feature of racist religion, which claims that God favors the White race and God's love (and by extension, believers' love) applies only to Whites.

Mainstream fundamentalists believe that they must prepare for the Second Coming of Christ, which will take place in accordance with Biblical prophecies yet to be fulfilled, through religious observance. Racist religions believe that the prophecies have already been fulfilled and that they must fight to create conditions conducive to the Second Coming. They

*(continued)*

### B o x 9.3 Religion and Racism—Continued

believe that they must “give history a push” (Lacquer, B o x . (Continued) 1996, p. 32).

Both mainstream fundamentalism and racist religion view evil as an active, important force on the world that must be countered. However, mainstream fundamentalists attribute evil to the work of Satan, which must be countered through religious adherence, whereas racist religion attributes evil to secular conspiracies, especially Jewish conspiracies, which must be physically destroyed.

Racist groups present themselves as religions because religion can unify people who might actually hold disparate racial beliefs, provide a justification for those beliefs, and, as noted earlier, be a recruiting tool

(Dobratz, 2001; White, 2001). For example, Dobratz (2001) quotes one group leader as saying, “Christianity provides us with the moral framework of our groups, as well as, the spiritual outlet” (p. 293). In addition, different religious visions—such as Christianity, deism, and paganism—permit appeals to different kinds of people (Dobratz, 2001). For example, someone who rejects Christianity might be attracted to a deist or pagan version of racism. Dobratz also notes, however, that religion can create tensions between groups whose religious visions are fundamentally opposed. In addition, some racists groups, such as White Aryan Resistance, reject religion entirely. As a result, many hate groups downplay religion, considering it to be a personal matter that is irrelevant to the group’s goals.

**Youthful Rebellion.** Some young people may join hate groups as a way of expressing rebellion against established authority, especially when they feel disenchanting with and alienated from the political process. Bjørge (1998) noted that youthful rebellion moves counter to whatever the current establishment’s political doctrine is. Young rebels turned to leftist politics in the 1960s because the political establishment was then conservative; a more liberal political establishment pushes rebellion toward the political right. For example, Bjørge (1998) quoted one former member of a European hate group as saying, “If you really want to provoke society these days, you have to become either a National Socialist [Nazi] or a Satanist” (p. 235). Similarly, Ezekiel (1995) found that the young hate group members he interviewed in Detroit “feel strongly the urge to be shocking and to scandalize the Establishment, and nothing serves the purpose easier [sic] than the swastika” (p. 157).

**The Allure of Violence.** Some people, especially young men, find hate groups attractive because of the violent images the groups project (Bjørge, 1998). Because most groups rarely engage in violent activities but do indulge in violent rhetoric, membership provides a feeling of machismo, excitement, and danger without much real risk. Many groups also provide paramilitary training, so that members can feel empowered by the use of weapons but do not have to undergo the rigors and discipline of military training.

**Gender.** Most hate group members are men (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995), perhaps because the groups’ violent images repel women while attracting men. In addition, most hate groups promote traditional gender roles and male leadership and dominance in all activities. For the most part, male hate group members’ attitudes toward White women are benevolently sexist: women’s proper roles are raising children and housework while men provide women with the protection

they need to carry out their roles (Blee, 2002). In contrast, hate group members tend to be hostilely sexist toward minority group women, portraying them as sources of moral corruption. Despite these sexist organizational attitudes, many hate groups have a significant number of female members, and the groups target women for recruitment, perhaps in an effort to soften their images (Blee, 2002).

**Myths Concerning Hate Group Members.** Although there is a stereotype that portrays hate group members as being poor and uneducated (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002), that is not always the case. Although Ezekiel (1995) focused his research on hate group members in poor White neighborhoods, most of the people Aho (1990) and Blee (2002) interviewed were middle class and reasonably well educated. In fact, as described in Box 9.4, Blee was particularly struck by the ordinariness of the women she interviewed. Of the 278 hate group members Aho interviewed, 50 percent had completed college or had had some post-high-school education and 39 percent had completed high school or had obtained a General Educational Development (GED) certificate; only 11 percent were high school dropouts. Currently, many hate groups are focusing their recruiting efforts on the better-educated segment of the population, especially those in high school and college (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002).

**The Psychological Functions of Group Membership.** People can be attracted to hate groups because they are searching for answers and solutions to life's questions and problems, because they feel a need to rebel, because they find the violent images of the hate groups appealing, or from a combination of these factors. Especially for people searching for answers, their everyday racist attitudes can provide a source of answers: Being faced with the contrast of living in poverty when others have more leads to a search for someone to blame; racism's answer

#### **Box 9.4 The Ordinariness of Extraordinary Racists**

Kathleen Blee (2002) described the women she interviewed as being extraordinary in terms of their degree of racism. Nonetheless, she noted that almost all lived rather ordinary lives and would not stand out in a crowd of everyday working- and middle-class people. Consider two of the women she talked with, who could be almost anyone's mother or grandmother:

Among the women I interviewed there was no single racist type. The media depict unkempt, surly women in faded T-shirts, but the reality is different. One of my first interviews was with Mary, a vivacious [Ku Klux] Klanswoman who met me at her door with a big smile and ushered me into her large, inviting kitchen. Her blond hair was pulled back into a long

ponytail and tied with a large green bow. She wore dangling gold hoop earrings, blue jeans, a modest flowered blouse, and no visible tattoos or other racist insignia. Her only other jewelry was a simple gold-colored necklace. Perhaps sensing my surprise at her unremarkable appearance, she joked that her suburban appearance was her "undercover uniform."

Trudy, an elderly Nazi activist I interviewed somewhat later, lived in a one-story, almost shabby ranch house on a lower-middle-class street in a small town in the Midwest. Her house was furnished plainly. Moving cautiously with the aid of a walker, she brought out tea and cookies prepared for my visit (pp. 7–8).

is that there is a minority group conspiracy to keep you down (Ezekiel, 1995). When faced with a conflict between one's religious principles and a degenerate secular world in which one must live, racism's answer is to remove the corrupting influence by removing religious and racial minority groups (Aho, 1990). When faced with a decline in traditional White dominance, racism's answer is to restore White entitlement (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002).

As Ezekiel (1995) wrote of the people he interviewed, "Most were members in this extreme racist group because the membership served a function, not because they had to enact their racism. Given another format in which they could have relieved their fears, given an alternative group that offered comradeship, reassuring activities, glamour, and excitement, they could easily have switched their allegiances. They would have remained racist—like their neighbors who hadn't joined a group—but they would not have needed to carry out racist actions in a group setting" (p. 159).

### Recruiting Hate Group Members

Why is it that some people who are psychologically predisposed to join hate groups do so while others do not? Having a psychological predisposition to joining a hate group is not sufficient. Potential new members must be recruited into the group; those who are not recruited are likely to find more constructive ways of resolving their personal searches for answers, such as through church work, neighborhood associations, or traditional political activities (Aho, 1990).

Most people who join hate groups do not seek the groups out; instead, current group members recruit them into the groups (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002). The recruiting is usually done by someone the recruit knows; as Blee (2002) noted, "It is a mistake to assume that the process of recruitment into racist groups differs markedly from that through which individuals enter churches, neighborhood associations, or bowling leagues—they join because of contacts with current members and, in some cases, a particular receptivity to the group's ideas" (p. 188). Thus, Aho found that 55 percent of the hate group members he interviewed had been recruited by friends or family members, 17 percent by other personal acquaintances such as coworkers, and 18 percent by people encountered at political meetings. Only 10 percent sought membership after reading literature produced by a group. As one of Aho's (1990) interviewees explained, "It was my friends that started to convince me that blacks weren't my equal" (p. 188).

The recruiter is someone the recruit trusts and respects, either because the recruiter is a family member or friend, or because the recruiter has gained the recruit's trust and respect by acting as mentor and role model in an activity important in the recruit's life. For example, Aho (1990) told of a group of young railroad employees who developed strong feelings of respect for an older work group leader who was also a racist: "His [personality] first attracts the younger men to him, not his beliefs. Only after strong bonds are established does he open to them his prolific library of radical literature" (p. 189).

As this example shows, recruitment into a hate group is usually a gradual process (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002). After gaining the trust of potential recruits, the recruiter

guides conversations toward political issues of general interest, such as crime, unemployment, education, and government policies. While doing so, the recruiter feels out the potential new group members for receptivity to the group's ideology. A recruiter might, for example, interpret crime statistics in racial terms by blaming members of minority groups to see how potential recruits react. If they appear to be receptive to the group's ideology, the recruiter can guide them to draw on their everyday racism to make such interpretations for themselves, encouraging their commitment to the group's belief system. Finally, the recruiter will invite recruits to a group function to meet other people who think the same way.

Many group functions are rather innocuous events, such as bring-the-family picnics, giving the group an appearance of normalcy. For example, "A flyer advertising a neo-Nazi event promises a day of fellowship and racist learning, along with a social time of music and meals at a local banquet hall" (Blee, 2002, p. 131). This normalcy reassures the recruits that these people, at least, do not meet the stereotype of rabid racist maniacs, but are "just plain folk" who, like the recruits, are trying to raise their families in a difficult world. Blee (2002), for example, reported that "a neo-Nazi recalled being surprised to find that a racist event was 'kind of like a big powwow or something. There was no cross burnings or screaming'" (pp. 130–131). Thus, one step at a time, recruits are drawn into full group membership.

### Group Socialization

Socialization is the process by which new members learn a group's values and learn how to be good group members. This section discusses the process of socialization in hate groups and some of the social and psychological outcomes of that socialization process.

**The Socialization Process.** Like other groups and organizations, hate groups socialize new members by means of formal and informal education and through participation in rituals. In addition, hate groups try to reinforce the socialization process by isolating members from opposing viewpoints.

Formal education of both new and old group members uses lectures and speeches by leaders, books and pamphlets about the group's ideology, and video and audio recordings of speeches of propaganda disguised as documentary presentations. However, Blee (2002) suggested that these efforts may not be very effective because members tend to "tune out" the speeches and the printed, audio, and video materials are usually poorly written and produced, and boring. For example, she reported that "[a]t a neo-Nazi gathering I attended, most people paid only sporadic attention to long, boring speeches [on the topic of Jews and African Americans as racial enemies] by the group's self-proclaimed leaders. Even a livelier (at least to me) presentation by two younger members ... had no more success in sustaining the interest of the audience, many of whom left early or spent time conspicuously reading the newspaper" (Blee, 2002, p. 76).

In contrast, Blee (2002) found that "much more animated discussions of racial enemies occurred in informal conversations held in the food line, in the queue for bathrooms, or in small groups clustered at the outskirts of the tent where speeches



were given” (p. 77). That is, discussions with peers and other people in the group whom members respect personally is a much stronger source of information than formal presentations. Such face-to-face indoctrination is especially effective because the discussions can address issues of special concern to the person being socialized and the indoctrinator can exploit this concern to lead the person into more extreme beliefs and greater commitment to the group’s ideology.

Participation in rituals is an important part of the socialization process for hate groups. These rituals include group singing of racist songs, parades and marches, dressing in ritual clothing such as Ku Klux Klan robes and neo-Nazi uniforms, and ceremonies such as formal initiation into group membership and cross-burnings (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002). These rituals serve two purposes. First, they promote group unity and cohesiveness. Doing things together and dressing alike increase members’ identification with the group and their feelings of oneness with other members. Second, rituals serve to increase members’ commitment to the group. Taking action on behalf of a group, especially public action, increases one’s psychological investment in the group (see, for example, Forsyth, 2006). Putting effort and psychological energy into the group’s activities means that a person has more to lose by leaving the group: The act of leaving essentially says that the time and effort given to the group were wasted resources that cannot be recovered.

As new members become more committed to the group, they spend more time with other group members and less time with family, friends, and acquaintances who are not members of the group. This change in the new members’ social networks has two effects (Aho, 1990; Bjørge, 1998; Blee, 2002). First, by associating with people who share their beliefs, group members receive support for those beliefs and reassurance that the beliefs they hold are correct. Second, increased association with group members isolates people from information that contradicts the group’s ideology and provides the group with the opportunity to rebut any contradictory information members might encounter. As one of Bjørge’s (1998) interviewees noted, “In the past, when I had an opinion, I could discuss it with people who disagreed with me. Now I can only discuss with people who already agree with me completely. What if I am wrong?” (p. 240). To maximize isolation from information that contradicts the group’s ideology and to increase dependence on the group for social support, many hate groups encourage new members to sever ties with nonracist family members and friends and to replace them with the “family” of the group (Bjørge, 1998; Blee, 2002).

**The Outcomes of Socialization.** Blee (2002) noted that “[r]acist groups change people. Most of the women I interviewed were changed profoundly by being in a racist group.... They went from holding racist attitudes to being racial activists, from racial apathy to racial zeal” (p. 188). These changes involve members’ social networks, their self-concepts, and the way they think about the world.

Hate group members tend to let their social relationships with nonmembers wither away and create new relationships with other group members. As noted earlier, the groups encourage this change to isolate members from information that contradicts the group’s ideology. However, the members often find the new relationships rewarding (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002). Aho (1990), for example, noted that

“while they rarely mention this as a motive for joining [the racist] movement, most [members] appear to have benefited personally from their affiliations by sustaining rewarding relationships with their recruiting agents” (p. 76). This restructuring of social networks is accelerated and made easier when, as often happens, the new members’ families and friends shun them for joining a hate group (Aho, 1988; Blee, 2002). As a result, the group becomes the center of members’ social lives.

Because the group members live in a social environment that emphasizes race and supposed racial differences, being White becomes more central to members’ social identities, intensifying the effects of social identity described in our discussion of social identity theory. For example, one woman member of the Ku Klux Klan told Blee (2002), “It is not so much that I am in the Klan, it is the fact that the Klan is in me. By the Klan being in me I have no choice other than to remain, I can’t walk away from myself” (p. 32).

In groups that advocate violence, the social environment makes violence seem to be acceptable and proper, and members become more tolerant of violence toward minority groups and of taking part in such violence. For example, one member of a violent hate group explained her experience this way: “It is remarkable how fast I have shifted my boundaries regarding violence. I used to be against violence, but now it does not cost me a penny to beat and take out all my aggression against someone who represents what I hate.... From being stunned and scared by seeing and experiencing violence, I have come to enjoy it” (quoted by Bjørge, 1998, p. 239).

Hand in hand with changes in the self-concept come changes in how members think about the world. Because of the groups’ emphasis on race, members begin to interpret events, especially negative events, in racial terms (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995). When bad things happen, people want to understand why. The ideology of hate groups provides the answer for their members: It is because religious and ethnic minority groups have conspired to make them happen. Similarly, group members come to redefine their self-interest in racial terms, believing that keeping members of minority groups from improving their lives will make life better for the hate group members and their families. Finally, racial attitudes become more extreme and more solidified, with everyday racism being transformed into extraordinary racism, so that “being prejudiced against Jews [becomes] believing that there is a Jewish conspiracy that determines the fate of individual Aryans [the term used by racist groups for people of Northern European descent], or... thinking that African Americans are inferior to whites [becomes] seeing African Americans as an imminent threat to the white race” (Blee, 2002, pp. 75–76).

### Leaving the Group

Although most hate groups have a core of dedicated members, for the most part, hate group membership is very unstable: People continuously come and go between various groups and move into and out of the racist movement as a whole. “In the words of one [Ku Klux] Klan chief, the movement is a revolving door” (Ezekiel, 1995, p. xxii). Why do people leave racist groups? Two factors seem to

be the most important: disenchantment with the group's ideology or tactics (such as violence) and the pull of social relationships outside the group.

**Disenchantment With the Group.** Disenchantment with the group can stem from a number of sources (Bjørge, 1998). These sources include negative effects on members' lives, loss of faith in the group's ideology, and concern over group extremism.

As noted earlier, joining a hate group can generate disapproval from the member's family and friends, sometimes resulting in ostracism. If these social relationships are important to the person, he or she may give up the group to preserve those relationships. In addition, group membership can affect members' work and careers. Being very active in the movement can take time away from a job, resulting in poorer job performance and the risk of being fired. In addition, because having hate group members working for them may adversely affect the reputations of their businesses, employers may fire employees who are known to be members of hate groups and refuse to hire known members. Finally, for members who take an active part in demonstrations and engage in violent activities, there is the possibility of arrest and prosecution and the resulting adverse publicity.

Many people join hate groups because the groups and their ideology appeal to members' real need for meaning in their lives and answers to their problems. However, as Ezekiel (1995) has noted, very often the main thing the groups provide is "a particular kind of theater. The movement lives on demonstrations, rallies, and counterrallies; on marches and countermarches; on rabid speeches at twilight; on cross-burnings with Gothic ritual by moonlight. By their nature those actions guarantee failure [because they] bear little relation to the issues of [the members'] lives" (p. 32). Even when groups have an ideology that provides answers, if those answers prove unsatisfactory, or if people come to see the answers as incorrect, they will be motivated to leave the group (Aho, 1988, 1990; Blee, 2002).

Although many hate groups advocate, and some engage in, violence against their "enemies," very often they prefer to downplay the violent aspects of their ideologies to make themselves more appealing to potential new members. Bjørge (1998) suggested that people who are attracted to racist ideology but reject violence as a means of achieving racist goals will leave groups when the violent aspect of their ideology becomes apparent. However, Ezekiel (1995) noted that concern over violence may also result from fear for personal safety: Groups "lose the greater part of their followers as dangerous confrontations multiply; the less intense followers decide after a few such experiences that there are better ways to spend time" (p. 102).

**Relationships Outside the Group.** Because hate group members often sever their ties with family members and friends who are not group members, they become dependent on the group for meeting their needs for affiliation, status, and respect. Consequently, even when people become disenchanted with a group's ideology they may not leave if they cannot satisfy their social needs outside the group. Therefore, establishing or renewing a rewarding relationship with a person

who is not a group member is the key to defection from the group (Aho, 1988, 1990; Bjørge, 1998; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995). A person is most likely to leave a hate group if he or she does not find group membership to be rewarding but does have a rewarding relationship outside the group. For example, "Getting a girlfriend who is not involved with the [racist] movement is probably the most common circumstance that motivates boys to leave and remain outside.... However, if the relationship breaks up, chances are high that they will return to the group" (Bjørge, 1998, p. 317). The more extensive and rewarding a social network a defector from a hate group has, the less likely the person is to return to the hate group movement if one relationship ends.

Therefore, rather than shunning a family member or friend who joins a hate group, one should maintain contact as a way of encouraging the person to leave the group. This encouragement should take two forms. One is finding out the needs that group membership fulfills and providing alternative, constructive ways for the person to meet those needs. Simultaneously, one should work to counter the group propaganda aimed at solidifying the attitudes that support the person's membership in the group.

## SUMMARY

This chapter examined two aspects of the social context of prejudice: intergroup processes and hate group membership. Realistic conflict theory is the oldest intergroup theory of prejudice. The theory holds that people dislike members of outgroups because the ingroup is competing with the outgroup for resources. Because this competition threatens the survival of the ingroup, outgroup members are seen in negative terms. If one group wins the competition and gains dominance over the other group, the dominating group justifies its position by viewing the subjugated group as inferior and stereotypes them in negative ways or in positive ways that emphasize their low power and status. The subjugated group, in turn, can avoid conflict by accepting the dominating group's definition of their position; conversely, viewing the dominating group as oppressive can mobilize members of the subjugated group to challenge the dominating group's position. The dominating group can respond to this challenge by defining the subjugated group as threatening as well as inferior as a way of preparing to suppress the challenge; conversely, the dominating group can avoid conflict by being more tolerant of the subjugated group's desire for equality.

Social identity theory explains prejudice in terms of the link between people's self-concepts and their membership in groups that are important to them. Because people see these groups as part of themselves, they try to ensure the status of these groups by favoring ingroup members over outgroup members when allocating resources. This ingroup bias arises from feelings of competition that arise when people think of their group relative to other groups and from a need to enhance their own self-esteem by enhancing the position of their group relative to other groups. An important factor influencing people's level of identification with a group is self-categorization: seeing oneself in group rather than individual terms.

Self-categorization increases when situational factors emphasize one's group membership, when one looks to the group as a source of information on important topics, and when one has chosen to join the group. Other factors influencing identification with the group are a need to balance group and personal identity, the chronic identities one always experiences, threats to the group, and attitudes and values that emphasize the group over the individual. Although social identity can lead to prejudice, it can also lead to tolerance if ingroup members do not see their values as conflicting with those of the outgroup or if a person has a complex social identity.

Relative deprivation theory explains prejudice as a reaction to feelings of being treated unfairly: If people blame a group for their unfair treatment, they develop negative feelings toward members of that group. These feelings of unfair treatment can be personal or can lead people to see their group as the collective victim of unfair treatment. Feelings of group deprivation are more closely related to prejudice than are feelings of personal deprivation. Feelings of being more highly benefited than other groups can also cause prejudice: rather than feeling angry because the other group has deprived them of something, people derogate the other group to justify being better off. Feelings of relative deprivation can result in scapegoating: choosing a group to be the "designated villain" who caused the deprivation. Frustration-aggression-displacement theory explains scapegoating as a way of shifting blame for deprivation from one's own group to the designated group. Glick's (2002) ideological theory explains scapegoating as a way of fulfilling people's need to understand why the deprivation exists. Groups chosen as scapegoats tend to have little power, be salient to members of the ingroup, be disliked, be stereotyped in ways that make them believable as causes of the deprivation, and be seen as a threat to the ingroup.

Integrated threat theory brings realistic conflict theory, social identity theory, and relative deprivation theory together using the concept of threat. Perceptions of realistic threat can derive from intergroup conflict and feelings of group relative deprivation, and perceptions of symbolic threat can derive from social identity processes.

Hate groups are organizations whose central principles include hostility toward racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups. People attracted to hate groups tend to have negative racial attitudes, to be searching for solutions to problems and questions that have arisen in the person's life, to be young and rebellious, and to be attracted to violence. Contrary to the stereotype of hate group members, many are reasonably well-educated members of the middle class. Most hate group members are recruited by friends or relatives and undergo socialization processes that make their racial attitudes more extreme. Socialization tactics include education, isolation from opposing viewpoints, and participation in rituals. This process tends to reduce members' social networks to only other group members, provides them with a greater sense of social identity as White people, and leads them to see the world as dangerous and threatening. People who leave hate groups generally do so because they become disenchanted with the group's ideology and establish social ties outside the group that meet their psychological needs.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Realistic Conflict Theory

- Duckitt, J. (1994). *The social psychology of prejudice*. Westport, CT: Praeger.  
Chapter 6 includes a complete description of Duckitt's extension of realistic conflict theory.
- Sherif, M. (1966). *In common predicament: Social psychology of intergroup conflict and cooperation*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  
Sherif's book contains a detailed description of the Robbers Cave study and related research.
- Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1994). *Theories of intergroup relations: International social psychological perspectives* (2nd ed.). Westport, CT: Praeger.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the current status of realistic conflict theory.

### Social Identity Theory

- Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate? *Journal of Social Issues*, 55, 429–444.  
In this article Brewer provides an excellent discussion of the distinction between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.
- Brewer, M. B., & Pickett, C. L. (1999). Distinctiveness motives as a source of the social self. In T. Tyler, R. Kramer, & O. John (Eds.), *The psychology of the social self* (pp. 71–87). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
This chapter provides a recent overview of optimal distinctiveness theory.
- Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future challenges. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30, 745–778.  
Brown provides an overview of the current status of social identity theory.
- Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6, 88–106.  
Roccas and Brewer discuss the implications of having a complex versus simple social identity.

### Relative Deprivation Theory

- Glick, P. (2002). Sacrificial lambs dressed in wolves' clothing: Envious prejudice, ideology, and the scapegoating of Jews. In L. S. Newman & R. Erber (Eds.), *Understanding genocide: The social psychology of the Holocaust* (pp. 113–142). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Glick provides an excellent explanation of the psychological underpinnings of scapegoating.
- Guimond, S., & Dambrun, M. (2002). When prosperity breeds intergroup hostility: The effects of relative deprivation and relative gratification on prejudice. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 900–912.  
Guimond and Dambrun discuss the counterintuitive finding that relative gratification, as well as relative deprivation, can lead to prejudice.

Walker, I., & Smith, H. J. (2002). Fifty years of relative deprivation research. In I. Walker & H. J. Smith (Eds.), *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, and integration* (pp. 1–9). New York: Cambridge University Press.

This chapter provides a historical overview of relative deprivation theory. Other chapters in the book discuss the current status of theory, including its application to prejudice and discrimination.

Integrated Threat Theory

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), *Reducing prejudice and discrimination* (pp. 23–46). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of Stephan and Stephan’s theory.

Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10, 336–353.

The authors review the literature supporting integrated threat theory and offer suggestions for future research.

Hate Group Membership

Blee, K. M. (2002). *Inside organized racism: Women in the hate movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ezekiel, R. S. (1995). *The racist mind: Portraits of American neo-Nazis and Klansmen*. New York: Penguin.

Ezekiel, R. S. (2002). An ethnographer looks at neo-Nazi and Klan groups: The Racist Mind revisited. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 46, 51–71.

Blee (2002) and Ezekiel (1995) provide excellent ethnographic studies of hate group members that provide a good “feel” for what the people are like. Ezekiel (2002) summarizes his 1995 findings and ties them in with more recent research.

KEY TERMS

|                      |                        |                        |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| chronic identities   | group (or fraternal)   | relative deprivation   |
| cultural racism      | relative deprivation   | relative gratification |
| distributive justice | hate group             | scapegoating           |
| everyday racism      | ingroup bias           | self-stereotyping      |
| extraordinary racism | personal (or egoistic) | social identity        |
|                      | relative deprivation   | vicarious retribution  |
| false consciousness  | procedural justice     |                        |

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Describe the realistic conflict theory of prejudice.
2. Using Table 9.1 as a guide, describe how intergroup conflicts now taking place in various parts of the world fit Duckitt's model.
3. Describe the processes by which social identity can lead to prejudice on the one hand or to tolerance on the other hand. Illustrate your explanation with examples from your own experience.
4. Describe the factors that influence the degree of identification one feels with a group.
5. Explain the factors that influence self-categorization. In what ways is self-categorization similar to and different from the social categorization of others discussed in Chapter 4?
6. Explain optimal distinctiveness theory. What shortcomings of self-categorization theory does it address?
7. What are chronic social identities? Which of your social identities would you describe as chronic?
8. Explain the difference between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Why is this distinction important?
9. According to the model of vicarious retribution, what conditions would determine whether a gang member responded to an act of violence against a fellow gang member?
10. Describe the relative deprivation theory of prejudice.
11. How can feelings of relative gratification cause prejudice?
12. Think back to the theory of modern-symbolic prejudice described in Chapter 6. How are feelings of relative deprivation related to that form of prejudice?
13. What is scapegoating? Describe the frustration-aggression-displacement and ideological theories of scapegoating. What characteristics make a group vulnerable to scapegoating?
14. Describe some current examples of scapegoating. How well do the scapegoated groups fit the profile of vulnerability to scapegoating? Which theory better explains each example?
15. Explain how integrated threat theory links realistic conflict theory, social identity theory, and relative deprivation theory. How are these theories related to social dominance theory, described in Chapter 7?
16. What are hate groups? What psychological functions does hate group membership have?
17. How are hate group members recruited? What factors make a person vulnerable to recruitment by hate groups?



18. Describe the process of socializing a hate group member. What are the outcomes of the socialization process?
19. What factors motivate people to leave hate groups?
20. Describe how hate groups exploit the processes described earlier in the chapter (such as realistic group conflict, social identity, relative deprivation, and so forth) to recruit and socialize new members.

## Chapter 10

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# From Prejudice to Discrimination

Rush hour on board a bus or train.... The flood of incoming passengers begins to solidify.... I am sitting next to a window, my eyes half-closed.... Dressed conservatively in a tweed jacket and tastefully bold tie, I am an unremarkable man ..., as unnoticed as any other commuter. Except for one thing: amid the growing crush, the seat beside me remains empty. At stop after stop, ... a succession of seemingly random individual decisions coalesces into a glaring pattern of unoccupied spaces next to black males—including me. Soon the seats beside us are the only ones left. Other passengers remain standing, leaving only these seemingly quarantined seats.

—BRUCE JACOBS (1999, PP. 15–16)

### Chapter Outline

#### What Is Discrimination?

*Forms of Discrimination*

#### Interpersonal Discrimination

*The Relation between Prejudice and Discrimination*

*Regressive Prejudice*

*Reactions to Having Acted in a Prejudiced Manner*

#### Discrimination in Organizations

*Organizational Research*

*Individuals in Organizations*

#### Hate Crimes

*Hate Crime Offenders*

*Motivations for Hate Crimes*

*Effects on Victims*

#### Summary

#### Suggested Readings

#### Key Terms

#### Questions for Review and Discussion

**P**rejudice, which has been the main focus up to this point in the book, is an attitude; it deals with how people think and feel about members of other groups. Discrimination, in contrast, is behavior; it deals with how people act toward members of other groups. **Discrimination** consists of behaving differently toward people based solely or primarily on their membership in a social group. The term is usually used to refer to acting in an unfair or demeaning manner, but it can also refer to giving someone an undeserved advantage. Bruce Jacobs's (1999) experience cited above illustrates one aspect of the ongoing problem of discrimination in modern American society: Many White people avoid contact with members of minority groups, even when the avoidant behaviors cause inconvenience for themselves. Although discrimination against members of minority groups is not always as blatant as it was prior to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, it still occurs. As we discuss the research on discriminatory behavior you might be tempted to say, "Well, it's obvious: Prejudiced people discriminate," but, as we will see, there is only a moderate correlation between people's degree of prejudice and their propensity to engage in discriminatory behavior. That is, not all prejudiced people discriminate every time they have an opportunity, and some nonprejudiced people discriminate in some situations. In presenting what psychologists know about discrimination, we first look at the nature of discrimination and then focus on the two forms most often studied by psychologists, interpersonal discrimination and organizational discrimination. We conclude with a brief examination of the most severe form of discrimination, hate crimes.

While reading this chapter, bear in mind a point we made in Chapter 7 concerning prejudice: some forms, such as racial prejudice, are socially proscribed whereas other forms, such as anti-gay prejudice and prejudice against physically unattractive people, are more socially permissible. The same principle applies to discrimination. For example, David Schneider (2004) noted the following forms of socially acceptable discrimination: "Most of us would fight having a group home for convicted rapists placed next door to our home, no matter how 'cleaned up' or 'ex-' the rapists claimed to be. Most church groups do not invite homeless people to share their potluck dinners.... Many women prefer their gynecologists to be female, and most males discriminate against males as their sexual partners. That's the kind of discrimination we all know and generally approve. So it is not the fact of discrimination that is controversial, but its application to specific groups" (p. 291). Consider, for example, college students' ratings of the acceptability of prejudice and discrimination directed at various groups (Crandall, Eschleman, & O'Brien, 2002). Table 10.1 shows the groups for which prejudice and discrimination had the highest and lowest approval ratings.

## WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION?

Discrimination can manifest itself in many ways, both verbally and behaviorally, and in many settings. For example, Jennifer Livengood and Monika Stodolsak (2004) interviewed American Muslims about the discrimination they experienced in post-September 11. Common experiences included hearing racist epithets,

**TABLE 10.1 Socially Approved and Disapproved Prejudices**

| Approved Prejudices                 | Percent Approving | Disapproved Prejudices   | Percent Approving |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| Rapists                             | 98                | Mentally retarded people | 3                 |
| Child abusers                       | 98                | Native Americans         | 6                 |
| Child molesters                     | 97                | Black Americans          | 6                 |
| Wife beaters                        | 97                | Jews                     | 6                 |
| Terrorists                          | 95                | Catholics                | 6                 |
| Racists                             | 92                | Whites                   | 7                 |
| Members of the Ku Klux Klan         | 91                | Hispanics                | 7                 |
| Drunk drivers                       | 91                | Asian Americans          | 7                 |
| Members of the American Nazi Party  | 90                | Canadians                | 7                 |
| Pregnant women who drink alcohol    | 89                | Ugly people              | 10                |
| Men who refuse to pay child support | 89                | Interracial couples      | 11                |
| Negligent parents                   | 86                | People with AIDS         | 11                |
| People who cheat on their spouses   | 82                | Fat people               | 11                |

SOURCE: Crandall, Eshleman, and O'Brien (2002, Table 1, p. 362).

receiving hostile and disapproving looks, being subjected to obscene gestures, avoidance by others, and, in some cases, being personally threatened, having property vandalized, or being physically attacked. As one respondent noted, "They scream at you and ... say really mean things ... like 'you crazy terrorist, you go back home. You rag head [referring to Muslim head coverings] and you are so backward.'" (p. 192). Respondents reported experiencing 'hate stares' as they went about their everyday activities such as shopping, driving, or walking down the street. As a result, many changed their routines to reduce contact with mainstream Americans and chose to remain at home whenever possible. Many reported being fearful for their personal safety and for the safety of their friends and loved ones. In this chapter, we begin by looking at the forms discrimination can take: blatant, subtle, or covert. We then focus on the types of discrimination most often studied by psychologists: interpersonal and organizational.

### Forms of Discrimination

Given the many forms that discrimination can take, it is useful to have a system for classifying forms of discrimination to show how they relate to one another. Nijole Benokraitis and Joe Feagin (1995) developed one such system, based on

three forms of discrimination—blatant, subtle, and covert. Although Benokraitis and Feagin developed their typology in the context of sexism, it applies to other forms of discrimination as well. In Chapter 1, we discussed levels of discrimination, including interpersonal, organization, cultural, and institutional. Note that blatant, subtle, and covert discrimination can be found at all four of those levels of discrimination.

**Blatant Discrimination.** **Blatant discrimination** consists of “unequal and harmful treatment... that is typically intentional, quite visible, and easily documented” (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 39). Extreme cases of blatant discrimination, such as the murder of Matthew Shepard, a gay man who was beaten and left to die on a fence in Wyoming (*Laramie Project Archives*, 2002), and the murder of James Byrd, a Black man who was chained to the back of a truck and dragged along a road in Texas until he died (Texas NAACP, 1999), often receive national attention. However, blatant discrimination occurs in everyday contexts as well. For example, a Black college student interviewed by Janet Swim and her colleagues (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003) told of how “a man at a party addressed her by a racist label and ordered her to perform a menial task” (p. 52). To cite another example, it is not uncommon for Black women and men to experience blatant discrimination while shopping, including being followed in the store or otherwise being treated as though they are likely to steal merchandise. One study found that 35 percent of Blacks experienced negative treatment while shopping in predominantly White communities, compared to 10 percent reporting similar treatment in their own community (Lee, 2000).

Some forms of blatant discrimination against some groups are illegal and generally condemned, such as racial discrimination at work, in school, and in public accommodations. However, other forms, such as discrimination against lesbians and gay men, are often legal and are accepted as “normal” by many people. Consider, for example, a Web site on which visitors can find a picture of Matthew Shepard burning in hell, along with a record of how many days he has been there. Visitors are invited to click on his picture and hear him scream as he endures the flames of hell. However, examples of blatant discrimination against other groups are not difficult to find, especially if they are supposedly humorous. At the time of this writing, the popular Web site *You-Tube* featured of series of videos (many rated 5-star) depicting the “Amazing Racist” discriminating against Mexicans, Asians, and Muslims. Although these clips are categorized as comedy, the actions depicted are based on negative stereotypes such as the belief that all Asians eat dogs, that all Muslims have body odor, and that all Mexicans are in United States illegally.

**Subtle Discrimination.** **Subtle discrimination** consists of “unequal and harmful treatment ... that is typically less visible and obvious than blatant discrimination. It is often unnoticed because people have internalized subtle [discriminatory] behaviors as ‘normal,’ ‘natural,’ or customary” (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 41). Subtle discrimination tends to be harder to document

than blatant discrimination, but it can often be done. Unlike the other forms of discrimination, which are often intentional, subtle discrimination is often unintentional. For example, Claude Steele (1992) related a story told by a friend of his who

noticed over many visits [to her son's third-grade classroom] that the extraordinary art work of a small black boy named Jerome was ignored—or, more accurately perhaps, its significance [as a sign of artistic talent] was ignored. As genuine art talent has a way of doing—even in the third grade—his stood out. Yet the teacher seemed hardly to notice. Moreover, Jerome's reputation, as it was passed along from one grade to the next, included only the slightest mention of his talent.... Had Jerome had a reading problem, which fits [American society's stereotypic image of black children], it might have been accepted as characteristic of him more readily than his extraordinary art work, which contradicts [that image] (p. 72).

Thus, subtle prejudice had the effect of directing teachers' attention away from Jerome's artistic talent because, by society's definition, Black children do not have that particular talent. Subtle prejudice also can be manifested in everyday speech, as described in Box 10.1.

**Covert Discrimination.** **Covert discrimination** consists of “unequal and harmful treatment ... that is hidden, purposeful, and, often, maliciously motivated.... [It is] behavior that consciously attempts to ensure ... failure, as in hiring or other employment situations” (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 42). Covert discrimination tends to be very difficult to document. Examples in the employment context include tokenism, hiring one or a few members of a group as evidence that an organization does not discriminate; containment, restricting members of a group to a limited number of job categories; and sabotage, arranging for members of a group to fail, such as by assigning them low volume sales territories but setting their sales quotas at levels similar to those of salespeople with better territories (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995).

Covert discrimination is common outside of the workplace as well, including the housing market. In the United States, housing discrimination is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act of 1988; however, such unfair practices are difficult to document. Landlords, for example, may simply tell prospective renters that an available unit was just rented. Similarly, real estate agents can subtly encourage buyers to look in certain areas and to avoid others. Adrian Carpusor and William Loges (2006) studied whether landlords discriminated against prospective renters based on their ethnicity. Via email, they contacted landlords in Los Angeles County, California, about the availability of rental property. The emails were supposedly sent by prospective renters whose names varied by ethnicity: Patrick McDougal (White), Tyrell Jackson (African American), and Said Al-Rahman (Arab). The applicant with the White-sounding name received more replies (89 percent) than did the applicants with Black (56 percent) or Arab (66 percent) sounding names. Moreover, only 11 percent of the replies to the White applicant were negative, compared to 44 percent for the African American and 34 percent for

## Box 10.1 The Language of Prejudice

Some of the most common examples of subtle prejudice can be found in everyday speech. Examples include:

- **Hostile humor** calls attention to the negative stereotypes associated with outgroups, such as low intelligence, selfishness, stinginess, and alleged bad habits such as drunkenness (Ruscher, 2001). People are often tolerant of outgroup disparagement that is presented as a joke because the humor context implies that listeners should not take the speaker's remarks seriously (Ford & Ferguson, 2004). Humor can therefore also function as a justification for derogatory speech. How often have you heard someone who has just been confronted for making a prejudiced remark reply with "Hey, it was only a joke"?
- **Patronizing speech** implies that outgroups are less competent than members of the speaker's ingroup. Patronizing speech can take two forms (Ruscher, 2001). Baby talk is often directed at the older adult, implying that they have regressed cognitively to the level of infants (see Chapter 13). Although baby talk is usually well intentioned—speakers view it as comforting—recipients find it insulting. *Controlling talk* is directed at members of groups the speaker views as having lower social status and "functions to keep low-status individuals 'in their place'" by controlling the direction of the conversation (Ruscher, 2001, p. 88). For example, when talking to women, men are more likely to interrupt and to give commands than when talking to other men (Caplan, 1994).
- **Vanishing** uses linguistic devices to make outgroups disappear. A common way of doing so is to replace the active voice of a verb (for example, "Bill hit the ball") with the passive voice ("The ball was hit"). As Thomas Greenfield (1975) noted, this rhetorical device makes "the creator or instigator of action totally disappear from a reader's [or listener's] perception" (p. 146; see also Chapter 3). For example, Greenfield (1975) recounted his experiences on a guided tour of Thomas Jefferson's

home at Monticello, Virginia. He noted that the tour guide always referred to Jefferson in the active voice but always referred to the work of Jefferson's slaves in the passive voice. For example, while describing a set of interior doors with a complex operating mechanism that had required no repair in the 166 years since Jefferson's slaves had built and installed them, the guide said, "Mr. Jefferson designed these doors" (p. 147). In contrast, the guide said, "These doors *were installed* originally in 1809" (p. 147, italics in original), making the enslaved carpenters whose skilled work had created the remarkable doors effectively disappear from history.

- **Abnormalization** involves describing outgroup members in ways that emphasize their lack of compliance with ingroup norms. For example, Maykel Verkuyten (2001) conducted focus groups in which Dutch residents of Rotterdam discussed life in their neighborhoods. The participants were chosen because they lived in areas in which large numbers of immigrants also lived. She found that when immigrants were mentioned, participants almost always described them in ways that emphasized their differences from the Dutch norm, often using extreme examples to illustrate a point. For example, one participant supported his view that immigrants from India were ignorant and crazy by citing a case of a family that had built a cooking fire on the floor of their apartment.

Linguistic devices such as these serve several functions. Hostile humor and abnormalization indicate ways in which the ingroup is superior to the outgroup and patronizing speech reinforces the higher status and power of the ingroup (Ruscher, 2001). Vanishing denigrates the skills of outgroup members and denies their contributions to society, implying that progress comes only through the efforts of the ingroup (Greenfield, 1975). All forms of prejudiced speech serve to draw clear boundaries that separate the "good" ingroup from the "bad" outgroup.

the Arab. As Carpusor and Loges note, "long before an African American man gets a chance to show what he is capable of, discrimination tilts the scales against him in ways he may not even be able to observe. Arab Americans face similar obstacles" (p. 948).

## INTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION

**Interpersonal discrimination** refers to individual, person-to-person discrimination: one person treating another unfairly because of the person's group membership. This section addresses three aspects of interpersonal discrimination. The first deals with the relationship between prejudice and discrimination and the circumstances under which prejudice is more or less likely to predict discriminatory behavior. In Chapter 5, we discussed the motivation to control prejudice. Here, we discuss factors that can undermine that motivation and allow discriminatory behavior to occur. The third section examines how people react to having acted in a prejudiced manner.

### The Relation between Prejudice and Discrimination

As we noted earlier, when asked what causes interpersonal discrimination, most people would probably reply "prejudice." If that were the case, one would expect to find a strong correlation between people's prejudiced attitudes and their propensity to engage in discriminatory behavior. However, when John Dovidio and his colleagues (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996) reviewed the results of 23 studies of the prejudice-discrimination relationship, they found an average of correlation of  $r = .32$ . A meta-analysis of 60 studies found a similar correlation of  $r = .36$ , but also found a stronger relationship between prejudice and the *intention* to discriminate,  $r = .45$  (Schütz & Six, 1996). That is, the relationship between prejudice and what people say they will do is stronger than the relationship between prejudice and what they actually do. Even when researchers find fairly high correlations between prejudice and discrimination, about 30 percent of the participants in those studies exhibited behavior that was inconsistent with their attitudes (Duckitt, 1994). Although results such as these might seem discouraging, they are, in fact, consistent with the results of research on the relationship between attitudes and behavior in general. For example, Stephen Kraus (1995) found an average correlation of  $r = .38$  between attitudes and behavior across a wide variety of domains. As William Graziano and his colleagues note (Graziano, Bruce, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007), it is one thing to express negative attitudes toward a social group, but another thing to actually discriminate against someone. Hence, "the lake of prejudice is wider and deeper than the smaller pool of discrimination, even if the former feeds the latter" (p. 572). As it turns out, prejudice is related to discrimination (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1998), but the relationship is not a simple one: A number of factors influence the strength of this attitude-behavior relationship including personal stereotypes, attitude-behavior correspondence, and perceived social support for the attitude.

**Personal Stereotypes.** Recall from Chapter 3 that stereotypes can exist at two levels. Social stereotypes are characteristics of groups that most people in a society agree on and personal stereotypes are individuals' beliefs about group characteristics. Personal stereotypes usually overlap with social stereotypes, but some of their content may be different. Similarly, people recognize the social norms



about prejudice toward particular groups, but may not personally agree with those norms. Replicating the results shown in Table 10.1, William Graziano and colleagues (2007) found that people recognized that there are social norms which determine whether prejudice toward particular groups is acceptable or unacceptable. However, they also reported that people *personally* found it even more acceptable to discriminate against groups such as rapists and terrorists—those groups for which society approves prejudice.

Prejudiced people also are more likely to discriminate against those outgroup members who fit their personal stereotype than against those who do not. In a study of this process, Shawna Ramsey and her colleagues (Ramsey, Lord, Wallace, & Pugh, 1994) assessed college students' personal stereotypes of former mental patients. Several weeks later, the students read about a former mental patient who either closely matched their personal stereotype or who was very different from their stereotype but matched other students' stereotype. For example, some students stereotyped former mental patients in terms of schizophrenic symptoms whereas others stereotyped them in terms of depressive symptoms. The students then chose from a list of activities those they would be willing to engage in with the former mental patient, such as showing the person the university library or taking the person to a party. For students who read about a person who fit their personal stereotype, Ramsey and her colleagues found a correlation of  $r = .43$  between attitudes toward former mental patients and the number of activities in which they were willing to engage. For students who read about a person who did not fit their personal stereotype, the correlation was only  $r = -.07$ .

**Attitude-behavior Correspondence.** The term *attitude-behavior correspondence* refers to how well an attitude matches, as it were, the behavior it is supposed to be associated with. A higher degree of correspondence results in a higher attitude-behavior correlation. One type of correspondence that is important to the prejudice-discrimination relationship is the degree to which people can control either their responses on the attitude measure or the behavior being measured. Dovidio and his colleagues (1996) noted that explicit paper-and-pencil measures of prejudice assess controllable responses: People can think about how they want to respond and carefully choose their responses, so social desirability response bias can affect their answers; however, implicit attitude measures assess relatively uncontrollable attitudes, so there is less opportunity for social desirability response bias to affect responses (see Chapter 2). Similarly, some behaviors, such as the content of what a person says, are controllable and so can be affected by a social desirability response bias, whereas other behaviors, such as many nonverbal behaviors, are more automatic and difficult to control and so are less likely to be influenced by a social desirability response bias. Drawing on the correspondence principle, Dovidio and his colleagues proposed that scores on controllable measures of prejudice should be correlated with controllable behaviors but not with automatic behaviors and that scores on implicit measures of prejudice should be correlated with automatic behaviors but not with controllable behaviors.

John Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami, and Samuel Gaertner (2002) tested this hypothesis in a study in which White college students completed explicit and implicit measures of prejudice. The participants then discussed several race-neutral topics, such as what personal belongings were most useful to bring to college, with a Black student confederate who played the role of another research participant. The interactions were videotaped, and raters later coded the White students' behaviors for the friendliness of their (automatic) nonverbal behaviors and for the friendliness of what they said (controllable behavior). The researchers found that, as they had expected, implicit prejudice correlated with nonverbal friendliness but not with verbal friendliness and explicit prejudice correlated with verbal friendliness but not with nonverbal friendliness. Similarly, Denise Sekaquaptewa and her colleagues (Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & von Hippel, 2003) found that an implicit measure of prejudice was related to White students' tendency to ask a Black student stereotypic rather than nonstereotypic questions from a list provided by the researchers. Because students were unaware that the questions varied in how stereotypic they were, this was considered an implicit behavioral measure.

Attitude-behavior correspondence also can be assessed by the degree to which people's general attitudes toward a social group match behaviors toward a specific group member. For example, Michael Olson and Russell Fazio (2007) studied whether White students' implicit attitudes toward Blacks in general corresponded to their attitudes toward a specific Black person. They reasoned that when these attitudes were similar—that is, if a White student had positive attitudes toward Blacks, in general, and also liked a specific Black person—the speaker's nonverbal responses should indicate little discomfort. However, if this same White student disliked the specific Black person, it would be evident in nonverbal behaviors, such as self-touching and speech interruptions. Results supported their hypothesis; regardless of whether implicit attitudes toward Blacks were positive or negative, when reactions to a specific Black person differed from those implicit attitudes, nonverbal “leakage” occurred. Hence, even non-prejudiced people can appear prejudiced if they dislike a specific person.

**Perceived Social Support.** The term *perceived social support* refers to the extent to which people believe that others share their attitudes and opinions. Generally, attitudes for which people perceive more social support are more closely related to their behavior than attitudes for which they perceive less social support. For example, Gretchen Sechrist and Charles Stangor (2001) pretested White college students' level of racial prejudice and selected those with high or low scores for participation in a study conducted several weeks later. As part of the study, participants learned that either 81 percent of the students at their university agreed with their racial attitudes (high social support condition) or that 19 percent agreed with them (low social support condition). The researchers then used what is known as the waiting room ploy to assess discrimination: The research apparatus “malfunctioned” and the experimenter asked the participant to wait in the hallway, where seven chairs were lined up in a row, with a female African American student seated in the chair next to the door to the laboratory. Discrimination was

assessed by how many chairs away from the Black student the participant sat. Not surprisingly, the students who had scored low on prejudice sat closer to the Black student than those who had scored high, an average of 2 seats versus 3.9 seats away. In addition, perceived social support affected the behavior of prejudiced participants, with those who thought that most of their fellow students also were prejudiced sitting farther from the Black woman than those who thought that most of their peers were unprejudiced, an average of 4.3 seats versus 3.4 seats. Perceived social support had no effect on seating distance of the students low on prejudice. Moreover, the prejudice-discrimination correlation was larger for the students high in prejudice,  $r = .76$ , than for the students low in prejudice,  $r = .33$ .

### Regressive Prejudice

As we discussed in Chapter 5, under some conditions people are motivated to avoid appearing prejudiced. However, doing so requires a great deal of mental work: One must recognize that prejudice might be affecting one's behavior and then consciously change that behavior to produce a nonprejudiced response (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Although, this process might become automatic for some people (see Devine, 2002; Plant, 1998), others have to work at it. The laborious nature of this process is demonstrated by research showing that people experience a sense of relief when they are allowed to express prejudices they have been controlling (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Thus, it is not surprising that even people who score low on measures of prejudice report sometimes making prejudiced responses toward members of other groups (Monteith & Voils, 1998; Voils, Ashburn-Nardo, & Monteith, 2002). That is, even people who see themselves as unprejudiced and who score low on measures of prejudice sometimes find themselves acting in prejudiced ways. Box 10.2 provides an example of how an everyday event can trigger prejudiced reactions even in unprejudiced people. Such expressions of prejudice by people who are otherwise low in prejudice are labeled **regressive racism** or **regressive prejudice** (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981). Regressive prejudice occurs because controlling prejudiced responses requires attention and mental resources; when those resources are not available or when the control process is short-circuited people regress from controlling prejudice to expressing it. This section examines some of the factors that can produce regressive prejudice.

**Control over Behavior.** To avoid responding in a certain way, people must be able to control the behavior. As we noted earlier, some behaviors, such as nonverbal responses, are less under voluntary control than others, such as the content of what one says. Consequently, people may give off nonverbal cues that imply dislike of or discomfort with a member of a stereotyped group even while trying to behave in a positive manner (see, for example, Dovidio et al., 2002). In one study of this process, Dovidio and his colleagues (2002) tested White research participants for implicit prejudice against African Americans. Each participant then held a 3-minute conversation with a Black student who was working for the researchers;

## Box 10.2 Stereotype Arousal in Everyday Life

Most research on stereotype arousal uses laboratory methods, so you might wonder how well those procedures generalize to everyday life. Consider the following commercial that was televised in 1995.

The commercial opens with a picture of a poker-faced, vaguely threatening and ominous Black man with his head shaved that takes up the left two-thirds of the screen. After a moment, the following lines appear one at a time down the right side of the screen, with a pause between each:

Michael Conrad.

Male. Age 28.

Trafficking.

Armed Robbery.

Assault and Battery.

Extortion.

Rape.

Murder.

Apprehended

January 1994 by

Joseph Cruthers,

Shown here. (Urban Alliance on Race Relations, 1995)

By the time "Apprehended" appears, most people assume the picture is that of the criminal, Michael Conrad. When they learn that the picture is that of a policeman, they feel both surprised and upset that they have operated on the social stereotype that Black men are dangerous and made the racist assumption that the pictured Black man must be a criminal (Fazio & Hilden, 2001).

because the conversation was about a race-neutral topic, the White participants were presumably motivated to act in a nonprejudiced manner. However, compared to the nonverbal behavior of participants with lower prejudice scores, the behavior of those with higher scores was rated as less friendly by both the participants' Black conversational partners and White raters who saw videos of the participants' side of the conversation. Thus, when people hold stereotyped views of other groups, those views may "leak out" through their nonverbal behavior even while they are trying to control the effects of those stereotypes on other behaviors (see also Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003).

**Cognitive Demands.** As we saw in Chapter 4, cognitive demands, such as trying to remember an 8-digit number or working under time pressure, make it difficult for people to control the effects of stereotypes and prevent stereotypes from affecting their judgments. The same processes affect the expression of prejudice: Even for people who are motivated to control their prejudices, cognitive demands can reduce their mental resources and so reduce control. To demonstrate this effect, Daniel Wegner and his colleagues (reported in Wegner, 1994) had research participants complete sentences about women such as "Women who go with a lot of men are ..." (Wegner, 1994, p. 47). Half the participants were instructed not to be sexist in their responses and half received no special instructions; in addition, half the participants in each of these groups were put under time pressure to respond and half were not. Wegner and his colleagues found that participants who had been instructed to avoid sexist responses (and therefore were motivated to do so) and were not under time pressure provided fewer sexist responses (such as "sluts" to the sentence stem just given) than participants who

received no such instructions. However, time pressure undermined the ability to control prejudice of the participants who were motivated to be nonsexist: They made sexist responses at the same rate as the participants who were not motivated to control their sexism.

**Disinhibitors.** Because motivation to control prejudice derives from social norms to avoid being prejudiced, factors that reduce people's motivation to comply with social norms can also reduce motivation to control prejudice and disinhibit its expression. Two factors that motivate norm compliance are the desire to avoid the social punishments that other people would mete out for violating norms and the desire to receive the rewards that others provide for norm compliance. As a result, when people are anonymous and cannot be identified, they are less motivated to comply with norms than when they are identifiable (see, for example, Myers, 2008). Edward and Marcia Donnerstein (1976) tested the effects of anonymity on the release of prejudice in a study in which White research participants gave what they thought were electric shocks to a Black or White confederate for making errors on a learning task. Aggressive discrimination was assessed in two ways. Overt, direct aggression was measured by the setting on a dial that indicated shock level. Covert, indirect aggression was measured by shock duration—that is, how long participants pressed the button that supposedly delivered the shock. Half the participants thought that their behavior was being monitored and half thought they were anonymous.

Results showed that anonymous participants showed more direct aggression toward the Black than the White person, indicating that anonymity facilitated discriminatory behavior. Moreover, in contrast to their anonymous peers, participants who were identifiable favored the Black person by showing less direct aggression toward him than toward the White person, perhaps reflecting a motivation not to appear prejudiced. However, nonanonymous participants showed a higher level of indirect aggression toward the Black person than the White person, perhaps because covert expression of prejudice is seen as more socially acceptable.

Strong emotions also can lead people to ignore social norms. In another study of interracial aggression, angered and calm White research participants had the opportunity to administer electric shocks to a Black or White person (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981). Results paralleled those Donnerstein and Donnerstein (1976) found for anonymity: Angry participants gave stronger shocks to the Black person than to the White person, whereas calm participants gave stronger shocks to the White person. Alcohol consumption is another notorious disinhibitor of compliance with social norms. Not surprisingly, then, Laurie O'Brien and her colleagues (as reported in Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) found a correlation of .31 between alcohol intoxication (as measured by Breathalyzer tests of people leaving bars) and willingness to express prejudice against racial and religious groups.

The expression of prejudice is a forbidden act, but the implied approval of an authority figure can release normative restraints. For example, Donnerstein and Donnerstein (1976) reported a study in which White participants observed

a peer delivering an intense electric shock to a Black person. Some of the participants then saw the experimenter overseeing the study severely reprimand the person for delivering such a strong shock; other participants saw the experimenter ignore the shock level, thus implicitly giving approval to it. Participants in a control condition saw a shock being administered but did not know its intensity. All the participants then took part in the experiment. Compared to the control participants, those who saw a peer reprimanded for administering a strong shock gave weaker shocks, but those who saw no reprimand gave much more severe shocks.

The perceived costs and rewards in a situation also can influence whether people feel comfortable ignoring social norms, such as the norm to help others in need. When a motorist is stranded on a highway, for example, potential helpers must decide whether the costs of helping, such as effort, time, or potential risk, outweigh the rewards of helping, such as feeling good about relieving another person's suffering. Donald Saucier, Carol Miller, and Nicole Doucet (2005) reasoned that, in such situations, discrimination against Blacks would be more likely if people could justify the failure to help by determining that the costs were too high. These researchers conducted a meta-analysis of studies assessing whether Black and White people received help in a variety of situations. Results showed no evidence of universal discrimination against Black people who needed help. However, in situations where the failure to help could be easily justified, such as when helping would take a longer time, involved more risk, or was otherwise difficult, Black people received less help than did White people.

Finally, other people's behavior can disinhibit prejudice. Linda Simon and Jeff Greenberg (1996) created a situation in which four White research participants and a Black confederate worked in separate cubicles on a creativity task. The participants had been earlier determined to have positive, negative, or ambivalent attitudes toward African Americans. The participants labeled their answers with a code letter they wrote on a yellow sticky note attached to the answer sheet. They then evaluated what they thought were the other participants' responses (actually standard responses created by the researchers) that the experimenter passed around one at a time. Some participants received a list with no comment added to the sticky note, others received a list with a handwritten addition to the sticky note that read "I can't believe they stuck us with this Black person! (please erase this)" (the ethnic criticism condition), and a third group of participants received a list with a note that read "I can't believe they stuck us with this nigger! (please erase this)" (the derogatory ethnic label condition). As shown in Figure 10.1, participants with positive attitudes toward African Americans were unaffected by the comment manipulation, giving the Black participant's contribution a rating of about six in all conditions. Consistent with the theory of ambivalent prejudice, racially ambivalent participants inflated their ratings in the derogatory label condition, presumably to emphasize that they were not prejudiced. However, anti-Black participants who had been primed by the derogatory label felt free to express their prejudice, resulting in lower ratings than in the other two conditions.




**FIGURE 10.1** Priming as a Releaser of Regressive Prejudice

White research participants either saw no comment about a Black confederate or read a note with a critical comment that included a reference to race ("Black person") or a critical comment that included a derogatory ethnic label ("nigger"). Ratings of the Black person made by participants who had positive attitudes toward Blacks were not affected by the type of comment read. However, participants with negative attitudes toward Blacks made more negative ratings when they read the derogatory ethnic label. In contrast, the ratings made by participants characterized by ambivalent prejudice were more positive when they read the derogatory ethnic label.

**Moral Credentials.** When we, the authors, were growing up, it was not unusual for a White person who was accused of anti-Black prejudice to defend him- or herself by saying something along the lines of "How can you call me prejudiced? Why, some of my best friends are Black!" The claim of friendship was used as a kind of credential to establish the person's lack of prejudice. More recently, Benoît Monin and Dale Miller (2001) have suggested that complying with the norm to avoid prejudiced behavior can have an ironic effect: It can increase the likelihood of behaving in a prejudiced way in the future by reducing the motivation to appear unprejudiced. They believe that acting in a nonprejudiced way establishes what they call *moral credentials* by allowing people to show others that they are not prejudiced and by reinforcing their own beliefs that they are not prejudiced. Having established to themselves and to others that they are not prejudiced allows them to act in a prejudiced manner if they are disposed to do so; if challenged, they can point to their earlier behavior as evidence of their lack of prejudice.

Monin and Miller (2001) tested their theory in a set of studies in which some research participants could establish their unprejudiced credentials by either rejecting a set of stereotypical statements about women or by selecting a well-qualified woman or African American for a job. Other participants had no opportunity to act in a nonprejudiced manner. All participants then rated the extent to which they thought a given job (such as construction foreman or

police officer) was better suited for a man or woman, or a Black person or a White person. In all three experiments, participants who earlier had had the opportunity to establish that they were nonprejudiced rated the job in the second part of the study as better filled by a man or White person. Monin and Miller (2001) concluded that “the more confident people are that their past behavior reveals a lack of prejudice, the less they will worry that their future behavior is, or can be construed as, prejudiced.... By fostering self-image security ... the establishment of moral credentials emboldens the [person] to respond honestly in circumstances in which political correctness pressure militates against honest expression” (p. 40).

### **Reactions to Having Acted in a Prejudiced Manner**

Given that situations can arise that can lead people to make prejudiced responses, how do they then react to having acted in a prejudiced manner? The initial research on this topic focused on differences between people high and low in explicit prejudice. Patricia Devine and her colleagues (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Zuwerink, Monteith, Devine, & Cook, 1996) hypothesized that people with nonprejudiced self-images who act or think in a prejudiced manner experience a discrepancy between how they think they should respond (that is, in a nonprejudiced manner) and how they do respond (that is, in a prejudiced manner). This discrepancy then leads to feelings of discomfort and guilt. To test this hypothesis, they examined differences in how people believed they should respond in interactions with an African American or a gay man and how they thought they would actually respond. Not surprisingly, Devine and her colleagues found that people low in prejudice had more stringent personal standards for nonprejudiced behavior than did people high in prejudice. Nonetheless, people both high and low in prejudice felt discomfort over discrepancies between how they thought they should act and how they thought they would act. However, whereas people low in prejudice felt guilty about their discrepancies, people high in prejudice did not. Rather than feeling negative toward themselves over their discrepancies, people high in prejudice experienced negative emotions about other people, such as feeling angry and irritated at them, perhaps because they believed that other people expected them to be unprejudiced and would pressure them to behave in unprejudiced ways.

In addition to discovering their own prejudiced behavior, people may be confronted by others who point out behaviors that could indicate prejudice. How do people respond then? Alexander Czopp and Margo Monteith (2003) found that the response depended on two factors. The first was the type of prejudice involved. People felt more concerned and guilty over racial prejudice than over sexism. In fact, “the predominant evaluative sentiment resulting from confrontations about gender-biased behavior was amusement” (Czopp & Monteith, 2003, p. 541), suggesting that many people do not take gender-based prejudice very seriously. The second factor was the person who did the confronting. People were more likely to dismiss an accusation of prejudice when it came



from a member of the group toward which their prejudiced behavior was directed than when it came from a member of their own group. Czopp and Monteith suggested that this reaction occurred because people felt less threatened when confronted by a member of their own group. Thus, it appears that the greatest guilt and discomfort over acting in a prejudiced manner is elicited when people have a high internal motivation to control prejudice and when they become aware of their prejudiced responses themselves or have those responses pointed out by a member of their own group.

Researchers have found that guilt over having acted in ways that are discrepant from one's self-image leads to action that reaffirms that image (Steele, 1988). Interestingly, there seems to be no recent research on whether feelings of guilt about having acted in a prejudiced manner affect future behavior, but several older studies have done so. For example, Steven Sherman and Larry Gorkin (1980) induced some research participants to make a sexist decision by leading them to assume that a surgeon depicted in a story was male rather than female; participants in a control condition made no such decision. Later, all participants took part in a seemingly unrelated study in which they acted as mock jurors in a sex discrimination case involving a woman who alleged that she had been refused a job because of her sex, with a man being hired instead. Sherman and Gorkin found that, compared to participants in the control condition, those who earlier had been induced to make the sexist decision were more likely to see the hiring of the man as unjustified and were more likely to decide the case in favor of the woman.

Perhaps more telling are the results of an experiment conducted by Donald Dutton and Robert Lake (1973). Based on a pretest, they selected 80 students who were low on prejudice and who had also rated equality as a value that was important to them. The participants thought they were taking part in a study of physiological responsiveness to various stimuli and that high physiological arousal indicated the presence of unconscious negative attitudes toward a stimulus. While their physiological responses were recorded, participants watched a series of slides that included pictures of Black people. Half the participants received feedback that indicated unusually high responsiveness to the picture of Black people relative to neutral stimuli (thus threatening their nonprejudiced self-images) whereas the other participants received feedback that indicated similar responses to the two types of stimuli (thus leaving their nonprejudiced self-images unthreatened). All participants were paid \$2.00 in quarters (to ensure that they had change for what happened next) for their participation. On leaving the building, participants were approached by either a Black or a White panhandler who asked "Can you spare some change for some food?" Eighty-five percent of the participants in the self-image threat condition gave money to the Black panhandler compared to 45 percent of those in the nonthreat condition. In addition, the participants in the threat condition gave more money (an average of 47 cents) than the participants in the nonthreat condition (an average of 17 cents). Threat condition did not affect donations to the White panhandler. By the way, if 47 cents does not seem like much money, it is equivalent to about \$2.30 today when corrected for inflation. Thus, when people who have

nonprejudiced self-images have that image called into question, they feel guilty and that guilt motivates them to reaffirm their self-images of low prejudice by acting in an especially nonprejudiced manner.

## DISCRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS

As we noted in Chapter 1, **organizational discrimination** occurs when “the practices, rules, and policies of formal organizations, such as corporations or government agencies” result in different outcomes for members of different groups (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 44). As we also saw in Chapter 1, although more than 40 years have passed since the enactment of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, racial/ethnic and gender discrimination still exist in the workplace. We have divided our discussion of this discrimination into two parts. The first part examines employment discrimination at the organizational level. The second part examines some of the psychological variables that influence the discriminatory behavior of individual decision makers. As you read this section, bear in mind that although the effects of gender and racial bias tend to be small (see, for example, Barrett & Morris, 1993), small effects can cumulate over time to have a large impact on career outcomes. For example, Richard Martell, David Lane, and Cynthia Emrich (1996) conducted a computer simulation that modeled the potential effects of gender discrimination in an organization that had eight levels of promotion. The simulation started with an equal number of male and female new employees. Although job qualifications varied among both male and female employees, they were, on the average, the same for both groups; however, there was a very small pro-male bias for promotions at each level. After the simulation had run through all eight levels of promotion, 65 percent of the top-level jobs were filled by men. Therefore, even when discrimination has a small effect on any one decision, it can have larger effects in the long run. In addition, experiencing discrimination can have profound psychological and physical affects, a topic we discuss in Chapter 11.

### Organizational Research

Organizational researchers have conducted an enormous amount of research to determine the forms discrimination takes in organizations and the ways in which discrimination is related to characteristics of organizations. As we will see, racial discrimination has been found at many points in the employment process, including hiring, job performance evaluations, and promotions. There appears to be less gender discrimination in hiring and performance evaluation, but evidence still supports gender discrimination in promotion. Let us look at the results of some of that research.

**Hiring.** The first step in the employment process is hiring, so quite a bit of research has been conducted on the hiring process, most of it focusing on racial discrimination. One technique that has been used to study this topic is the employment audit. In an employment audit, members of two groups are matched on appearance,

education, and relevant experience, and then sent to apply for the same job. Thus, one White person and one Black person, both with the same qualifications, dressed similarly, and trained to act similarly, would apply for the same job. The dependent variable in such studies is who is more likely to be hired, the Black applicant or the White applicant? A review this research showed that for the most part, Black and White applicants experience the same outcome: in 68 percent of the cases neither was offered a job and in 15 percent of the cases both were offered a job (Heckman, 1998). However, when discrimination did occur, it favored the White applicant: overall, 27 percent of White applicants were offered jobs compared to 21 percent of Black applicants. That is, a White applicant was 1.3 times more likely to get a job than was a Black applicant.

The results of an employment audit study conducted by Marc Bendick, Charles Jackson, and Victor Reinoso (1994) illustrate some specific forms that discrimination can take. For example, they found that although employers accepted applications from Black and White job seekers at about the same rate—95 percent for Whites and 92 percent for Blacks—48 percent of the White applicants were offered interviews compared to 40 percent of the Black applicants. When more than one opening was available and the job was offered to both applicants, Black applicants were offered lower starting salaries. In addition, Black applicants were more likely to be steered toward a job at a lower level in the organization than the one they had applied for. Bendick and his colleagues also found that discrimination was more likely to occur when applications were made through employment agencies rather than directly to the company. One reason for this finding might be that the companies using employment agencies cued the agencies that they only wanted to see White applicants. For example, evidence was presented in one employment discrimination lawsuit that employers would use terms such as “all-American,” “front-office appearance,” and “corporate image” in the job descriptions they sent to employment agencies to indicate that they wanted to see only White job candidates (Wolff, 1989).

One shortcoming of employment audits is that it is impossible to perfectly match a Black and a White applicant in every regard: They are different people with different personalities, so it is always possible that any differences in the responses they received are a result of their individual characteristics rather than of their racial group membership. Therefore, researchers sometimes use matched mailed-in résumés to see whether a Black or White applicant is more likely to be called for an interview. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan (2003) conducted a large-scale study of this kind, sending out almost 5,000 résumés in response to 1,300 jobs advertised in newspapers in Chicago and Boston. They manipulated three independent variables using information in the résumés: applicant race, applicant gender and applicants’ qualifications. They manipulated race and gender by varying the applicant’s first name: “White” names included Kristin, Carrie, Brad, and Jay; “Black” names included Ebony, Latonya, Jermaine, and Leroy. The researchers chose the names based on the frequency of their appearance in birth records and checked the racial associations the names elicited by asking survey respondents to rate how “Black” and “White” each name sounded.

Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) found that, overall, only 17 percent of the applicants were called for an interview; however, 10.1 percent of the White applicants were called compared to 6.7 percent of the Black applicants. In other words, White applicants received an interview offer for every 10 résumés submitted, whereas Black applicants had to submit 15 résumés to get an interview. In addition, although White applicants with high quality résumés were more likely to be called than White applicants with low quality résumés, 11.3 percent compared to 8.8 percent, résumé quality had virtually no effect on the response rate for Black applicants: 7.0 percent for high quality résumés and 6.4 percent for low quality résumés. Note that a White applicant with a low quality résumé was 26 percent more likely to be called for an interview (8.8 percent) than a Black applicant with a high quality résumé (7.0 percent). Results were similar in Boston and Chicago and for six types of jobs ranging from clerical worker to manager across six industries. Bertrand and Mullainathan put their results in this context: “in our sample, [having] a White name is equivalent to about 8 additional years of [job-related] experience” in being called for an interview (p. 10).

An important part of the hiring process is the job interview. A review 31 studies of racial group differences in employment interview outcomes showed that, on the average, Whites received higher ratings than either Blacks or Hispanics (Huffcutt & Roth, 1998). Such racial differences in evaluations were greater for low level jobs than for higher level jobs and discrimination increased as the proportion of Black applicants increased. Thus, White job applicants are more likely to get interviews than are their equally qualified Black peers and, once interviewed, are more likely to get high ratings on suitability for the job. Box 10.3 relates one Black man’s experience in applying for a low-level job and a few of his experiences on that job.

### **Box 10.3    Invisible Man**

Lawrence Graham (1995), a highly successful Harvard educated lawyer, set out to uncover what life was like as an employee at one of the all-White country clubs in Greenwich, Connecticut. In his essay on his experiences, he first describes applying for work. His goal was to be a waiter and he applied for this job at five country clubs. As he writes, “During each of my phone conversations, I made sure that I spoke to the person who would make the hiring decision. I also confirmed exactly how many waiter positions were available, and I arranged a personal interview within forty minutes to an hour of the conversation, just to be sure that they could not tell me that no such job was available” (p. 4). Upon arrival at each of the five clubs, he was told either that there were no openings or that he was not qualified. One receptionist threatened to call security. Another employer firmly insisted he could not have been the

person she talked to on the phone. No one would even accept his application for a waiter position.

Graham did secure a job as a busboy at one of the clubs. In that role, people made negative comments about “Negroes” and other minority groups right in front of him. Example comments included “My goodness. . . . That busboy had diction like an educated White person” (p. 12). He learned that the staff quarters were unselfconsciously called the “Monkey House” because at one time all the workers had been Black. At one point, he was instructed to find the “Chinaman,” a supply clerk, and was told it was easy to remember his location because it was right next to the laundry. These and many similar experiences took place in less than a one-month period. They also took place in the 1980s, not, as you might expect by reading them, during the pre-civil-rights era of the 1960s.

There is less research on gender differences in hiring than on racial differences. However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) found that male and female applicants were called for interviews at about the same rate, 17.2 percent for women and 15.3 percent for men. Also, Heather Davison and Michael Burke (2000) reviewed 49 studies in which participants evaluated the suitability of equally qualified male or female applicants for a job. Overall, they found virtually no discrimination, although men tended to receive slightly higher suitability ratings for male-stereotyped jobs and women tended to receive slightly higher suitability ratings for female-stereotyped jobs. Thus, the research indicates that currently there is little gender discrimination in the hiring process. However, Davison and Burke noted that research reviews published in 1979 and 1988 did find evidence of discrimination, suggesting that gender discrimination has decreased over time. For example, the 1988 review (Olian, Schwab, & Haberfield, 1988) found that gender accounted for 4 percent of the variance in hiring evaluations whereas the 2000 review found that it accounted for less than 1 percent.

There is, however, one important factor that leads to gender discrimination in hiring: pregnancy. In the United States, discriminating against pregnant women violates the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, passed in 1975 as an amendment to the Civil Rights Act. However, the legality of this discrimination has not reduced the number of claims filed with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission; in fact, number of claims has increased nearly every year since 1992 (Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, 2007). Evidence that pregnancy affects hiring decisions comes from a study of undergraduate business school students who evaluated job applicants based on an interview. Although pregnant and nonpregnant applicants were seen as equally qualified, pregnant women received lower hiring recommendations than did nonpregnant applicants (Cunningham & Macan, 2007). Raters also believed that the pregnant applicant would be absent more often and would be more likely to quit than the nonpregnant applicant.

**Performance Evaluation.** Once a person is on the job, career success is strongly affected by performance evaluations: Positive evaluations can lead to valuable training opportunities, promotions, and pay raises, whereas poor evaluations can lead to losing one's job. Chieh-Chen Bowen, Janet Swim, and Rick Jacobs (2000) reviewed 27 studies of gender differences in job performance ratings in organizations. They found that, overall, men and women received equal job performance ratings, although male evaluators tended to give somewhat higher ratings to men than to women. Unlike Davison and Burke (2000), who found that both men and women received slightly higher suitability ratings for sex-stereotyped jobs, Bowen and her colleagues found that the sex typing of the job was not related to performance ratings. However, the sex stereotyping of the items on performance evaluation measures was related to the ratings: Men received higher ratings on measures that included mostly masculine-stereotyped items, women received higher ratings on measures that included mostly feminine-stereotyped items, and men and women received equal ratings on measures that contained mostly gender-neutral items. Bowen and colleagues also found that

supervisors who had more opportunity to directly observe employees' job performance gave somewhat higher performance ratings to women. They concluded that "any overall gender discrimination that one might observe in the work force is ... not directly attributable to biases in performance appraisal" (Bowen et al., 2000, p. 2206). However, their results do indicate that to the extent that performance evaluations are made by men, especially men who do not directly observe their employees' performance, and to the extent that an organizations' performance evaluations measures include masculine-stereotyped items, men will receive higher evaluations than women.

Unlike the situation for gender, race/ethnicity does appear to affect job performance evaluations. Based on a review of 48 studies, Philip Roth, Allen Huffcutt, and Philip Bobko (2003) found that White employees received higher evaluations than Black employees, although there were no differences in evaluations of Hispanic and White employees. Even when numerical ratings of job performance are the same for Black and White workers, the narrative comments that supervisors make about employee performance might be biased. For example, Patricia Thomas and her colleagues (Thomas, Edwards, Perry, & David, 1998) compared the performance evaluation comments made by the supervisors of 582 male U.S. Navy officers who had received the highest numerical performance rating. They found that White officers were more likely to be described as outstanding leaders and were more likely to be recommended for positions of command than were Black officers. In addition, White officers were more likely to be recommended for early promotion and to be described as having characteristics that other research shows lead to early promotion (Johnson, 2001). That is, promotion boards seem to use certain characteristics as cues when selecting officers for early promotion and evaluators were more likely to attribute those characteristics to White officers than to Black officers. Similarly, letters of reference for faculty positions in chemistry were similar in length and, overall, were equally positive for male and female applicants. However, letters supporting male candidates contained more standout words, such as "most" gifted and "rising" star than did letters supporting female candidates (Schmader, Whitehead, & Wysocki, 2007).

Although racial group differences in job performance evaluations might reflect racial prejudice, they might also be accurate, reflecting actual racial group differences in average job performance. For example, Roth and his colleagues (2003) found that, compared to White workers, Black workers had lower average scores on objective measures of work performance, and that these differences were about twice as large as the differences in supervisor ratings. However, even though minority group employees may actually perform at a somewhat lower level than White employees, that lower level of performance might itself be a result of prejudice and discrimination in the workplace (Greenhaus, Parasuramen, & Wormley, 1990). That is, differences in race may lead to differences work experiences which, in turn, affect job performance. The possibility is supported by the finding that although both White and Black supervisors give White workers slightly higher performance ratings than Black workers, White supervisors see larger performance differences than do Black supervisors (Stauffer & Buckley, 2005). That supervisor race affects perceptions of work performance suggests that subtle

factors may be affecting performance ratings. Research shows, for example, that members of higher status groups—in this case, White supervisors—are more likely to favor the ingroup than are members of low status groups—in this case, Black supervisors (George & Chattopadhyay, 2002); if so, this would give an edge to White workers. Organizational researchers have not paid much attention to issues such as these (Brief, 1998); however, organizational theorists have proposed a number of workplace characteristics could adversely affect minority group members' job performance (Roberson & Block, 2001).

One such characteristic is what Daniel Ilgen and Margaret Youtz (1986) called the *lost opportunities effect*: “Differential treatment of minority and majority group members may result in different on-the-job opportunities for these two groups. To the extent that minority group members have fewer and less favorable opportunities, lower performance for minorities may result” (p. 317). For example, minority group managers report that, compared to their White peers, their supervisors appear to view them as less competent (such as by reviewing their work more frequently and more closely) and give them less support and encouragement (Blank & Slipp, 1994; Greenhaus et al., 1990; James, 2000). Prejudiced Whites also can create a chilly climate for their Black coworkers. For example, Black managers reported feeling less accepted than White coworkers by their White peers (Greenhaus et al., 1990; Blank & Slipp, 1994). In addition, lower-level White workers showed more work avoidance, such as absences, as the proportion of minority workers in their work units increased and expressed stronger intentions to quit their jobs if another employment opportunity arose (Tsui, Eagan, & O'Reilly, 1992). Such coworker prejudice can have a direct effect on Black workers' job performance. For example, Black research participants who worked with a prejudiced, compared with an unprejudiced, White participant were 30 percent less productive (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001).

Ilgen and Youtz (1986) also proposed that workplace prejudice and discrimination could have an adverse effect on minority employees' morale, which, in turn, could affect job performance. On a survey of the experience of workplace mistreatment, such as being set up for failure, being treated as if they didn't exist, and being the target of insulting jokes or comments, Black workers reported more mistreatment than White workers (Deitch et al., 2003). Moreover, the experience of such mistreatment was related to reduced job satisfaction. Other research shows that lower job satisfaction is related to lower job performance (Judge, Thoreson, Bono, & Patton, 2001). For examples of some of the hassles that Black workers face, see Box 10.4.

**Promotion.** Promotion within an organization is based largely on job performance evaluations. However, as Bowen and colleagues (2000) have noted, even when women and members of minority groups receive the same performance evaluations as men and majority group members, decisions based on those evaluations can still be biased. And so it seems to be with promotions. Looking first at gender differences, researchers have found that although women and men receive, on average, equal job performance ratings, their supervisors often see them as

**Box 10.4**    **Everyday Racial Hassles at Work**

The editors of *Harvard Business Review* asked organizational consultants Keith Caver and Ancella Livers (2002) to write a fictional letter from a Black manager to a White boss describing some of the everyday, almost certainly unintentional, incidents that make Black managers feel like outsiders. The events they noted included:

- Being cast as a de facto diversity expert even though the managers' training gave them no special expertise in that field: "Despite my 15 years of experience, despite my solid track record, my new colleagues appeared to have little interest in my business expertise. Instead, they seemed to have assigned me some special role: official interpreter of minority concerns for the organization" (p. 78).
- Having one's presence questioned when others go unchallenged: "One weekend I went to the office in my normal, casual weekend attire.... Before getting into the elevator I was stopped by an informally dressed young white man who in a stern voice asked to see my identification.... I had worked here for two years, but because I was out of context, he assumed I was a thug. You might chalk it up to an honest mistake, but I can assure you he hadn't challenged any of the white people entering the building" (p. 79).
- Resentment over increased workplace diversity: Robert, a Black manager, hired a Black woman and promoted a Black man. Afterwards, "Robert

began to hear whispers in the halls—suggestions that he was building his own little 'ghetto fiefdom' and having a White colleague 'jokingly' say to him, 'So white people aren't good enough for you?'" (p.79).

- Not being trusted to do one's job properly: In addition to the comments of his peers, Robert's boss "suddenly seemed to take a greater interest in the details of his group's work—asking for reports and updates he'd never needed when Robert's team was primarily white. Subtly, his boss was letting him know that at some level he expected the team's performance to drop" (p. 79).
- Having others assume that because you are not White, you are a low-level employee: A Black woman "was recently hired as a senior vice president for a major financial institution. With the exception of a few initial interviews and meetings, she did not set foot in the organization until her first day at the office. As she emerged from the elevator, she was abruptly greeted by a white male who directed her to a small cubicle and asked her to quickly put her things away as they were expecting a new senior officer to arrive shortly" (p. 80).

The effect of experiences such as these is that for minority workers, "race is always with us. As a friend of mine said recently, 'I don't think a day goes by that I'm not reminded I'm black'" (p. 81).

having less promotion potential than men (Landau, 1995; Shore, 1992), they must wait longer for promotion (Cannings & Montmarquette, 1991; Maume, 1999), and they receive fewer promotions the higher they move in the organizational structure (Lyness & Judiesch, 1999).

Even in situations in which women receive higher job performance ratings than men, they may be promoted no faster (Cannings & Montmarquette, 1991; Shore, 1992). For example, Ted Shore (1992) studied the results of assessment center ratings of male and female managers. When managers attend an assessment center, they undergo a set of written and performance tests designed to assess their potential for promotion. Shore found that, on the average, women and men received the same scores on measures of mental ability and similar ratings on interpersonal skill. In addition, women scored higher on measures of managerial job performance. Nonetheless, women received the same overall managerial potential ratings as men and were promoted at the same rate.



Ironically, the male advantage in promotion may be greater in female-dominated occupations, such as clerical and sales, than in male-dominated occupations, such as manufacturing (Maume, 1999), an outcome called the *glass escalator effect* (Williams, 1992). For example, David Maume (1999) found that men were 17 percent more likely than women to be promoted in female-dominated occupations. Being in a female-dominated job not only increased men's odds of promotion, it decreased women's. Similarly, Christine Williams (1992) found that male nurses, librarians, elementary teachers and social workers benefited from being in a female-dominated profession both at the hiring stage and on the job. However, these men often encounter negative stereotypes, such as the perception that they are passive or feminine and they are sometimes viewed with suspicion—so much so that they “alter their work behavior to guard against sexual abuse charges, particularly those in specialties requiring intimate contact with women and children” (Williams, 1992, pp. 261–262). These negative stereotypes sometimes lead to negative self-esteem and, ultimately, career change. Interestingly, negative stereotypes also may contribute to the glass escalator effect: To avoid outsiders' criticisms and suspicions, supervisors may promote the men to higher level jobs where they have less contact with the public (Williams, 1992).

In regard to race, Black workers are less likely to be promoted than their White counterparts (Roth et al., 2003) and must wait longer for promotion (Maume, 1999). As with women and men, even when Black workers receive the same job performance ratings as their White peers, they are likely to receive lower ratings on promotion potential (James, 2000; Landau, 1995; Thomas et al., 1998). Even after controlling for differences in education and experience, Black assistant football coaches are less likely to be promoted to head coach than are their white counterparts (Sagas & Cunningham, 2005). In addition, White employees are paid more than Black employees in jobs with equivalent levels of authority (Dreher & Cox, 1996; Smith, 1997). Ryan Smith (1997) also found that although Black employees' absolute salary levels increased with promotion, the difference in Black and White workers' salaries increased with higher levels of authority: Black workers with no authority were paid 86 percent of what their White peers received, 81 percent at low levels of authority, and 77 percent at middle levels of authority. (There were too few Black managers at high level of authority for Smith to make meaningful comparisons.)

The problem begins at the lowest level of promotion. Using the results of separate surveys, David Maume (1999) and Ryan Smith and James Elliott (2002) both found that African Americans in nonmanagerial jobs were 50 percent less likely to be promoted to managerial jobs than were their White peers. Smith and Elliott further noted that when African Americans did hold first-level managerial positions, they were more likely to supervise Black workers than White workers. Because most Black workers are in low-level jobs, this ethnic matching of supervisors and employees means that most Black managers are found in low-level positions of authority. Smith and Elliott (2002) refer to this ethnic matching phenomenon as the “sticky floor” effect: “The relative position of one's ethnic group within an organization constitutes the ‘sticky floor’—one to which

individual opportunity for authority ‘adheres.’ If one’s ethnic group dominates only entry-level jobs within an organization, then one’s authority chances will be restricted largely to supervising entry-level workers. If one’s ethnic group dominates higher-level positions, then one’s authority chances will increase accordingly” (p. 274; see also James, 2000).

At least two other organizational factors are related to Black managers’ slower promotion rates relative to their White peers. First, Black employees tend to be “tracked” into certain job categories, such as affirmative action officer. Black coaches, for example, often fill positions such as recruiter or minority affairs officer that derail them from advancement to a head coach position (Sagas & Cunningham, 2005). Similarly, Sharon Collins (1997) interviewed Black executives in large White-owned corporations and found that 63 percent had been career-tracked into jobs designed to “mediate the social pressures related to black protest for civil rights, [such as] affirmative action or urban affairs manager” (p. 327). Often, the only “qualification” these executives had was their race: Professionals with advanced degrees in fields such as accounting, engineering, and chemistry were put into these positions despite the fact that they had no training or previous experience in the field. These managers were moved from their chosen career fields based solely on a stereotype—that members of minority groups make better diversity managers simply because of their group membership. Jobs in these categories tend to be “dead-end” positions or have slower promotion rates and “top out” at lower levels of authority than other jobs in other categories, such as sales and operations management, regardless of the race of the people holding the jobs (James, 2000).

Second, one’s mentor can have important effects on career progression because of the formal and informal training and social support mentors provide, and because of the connections they have with upper-level management (Roberson & Block, 2001). Because White men predominate in upper-level management positions, they can be especially helpful as mentors. For example, George Dreher and Taylor Cox (1996) found that having had a White male mentor added more than \$22,000 per year to manager’s salaries after 10 years of experience compared to managers who had had female or non-White mentors. They also found that women, African American men, and Hispanic men were less likely than White managers to have had a White male mentor.

Although it is tempting to attribute the differential outcomes for female and Black workers to intentional discrimination, Smith and Elliott (2000) see the situation differently: “We believe that something more subtle and profound occurs in the process of doing ‘business as usual’—mere maintenance of the status quo is more than enough to perpetuate racial stratification” (p. 274); the same principle applies to gender stratification.

### Individuals in Organizations

Although people very often talk about organizational discrimination and institutional discrimination, if you think about it, organizations and institutions do not discriminate: Individuals *in* organizations and institutions discriminate. That is,

individuals set and enforce discriminatory policies, make discriminatory hiring decisions, and give discriminatory performance evaluations. Even when decisions are made by committees, individuals have input into those joint decisions. Given this situation, surprisingly little research has been conducted on how individual-level psychological processes influence discriminatory outcomes in organizations (Brief, 1998; Roberson & Block, 2001). This section discusses some of those processes: stereotype fit, intergroup respect, shifting standards, contemporary prejudice, and conformity to perceived organizational norms.

**Stereotype Fit.** Madeline Heilman (1983; 2001) developed the **stereotype fit hypothesis** to explain why women hold few managerial or executive positions in organizations relative to men. The hypothesis postulates that the characteristics associated with effective managers are very similar to the cultural stereotypes of men and very different from the cultural stereotypes of women. Therefore, men are perceived as fitting into the managerial role but women are not; as a result, women are less likely to be hired for managerial positions and, once hired, less likely to be promoted into higher positions (see also Eagly & Karau, 2002). More generally, people see men as better suited for “masculine” jobs such as business manager and construction worker and women as better suited for “feminine” jobs such as nurse and secretary (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Cejka & Eagly, 1999).

Evidence for the manager-as-male stereotype has come from studies in which experienced male corporate managers rated the target groups *male manager* and *female manager* on traits that characterize effective managers (Dodge, Gilroy, & Fenzel, 1995; Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995; Martell, Parker, Emrich, & Crawford, 1998). These studies have found that male managers as a group received higher ratings on the traits than did female managers as a group. However, the results of the studies were less consistent when the research participants rated *successful male managers* and *successful female managers*: two studies found a pro-male bias (Dodge et al., 1995; Heilman et al., 1995) but one found no difference in the ratings of successful male and female managers (Martell et al., 1998). Interestingly, the one study that included female managers as participants (Dodge et al., 1995) found that they expressed a pro-female bias when rating male and female managers in general, although not when rating successful male and female managers. These results suggest that an egocentric bias might be at work when rating managers in general: Because managers are making the ratings, they see managers as having characteristics similar to their own—male-stereotypical when men are making the ratings and female-stereotypical when women are making the ratings. However, given that men predominate in positions of power in organizations, men’s belief systems are more likely to influence organizational decisions than are women’s.

Further evidence that evaluators may adjust the criteria to fit their expectations comes from a study of potential applicants for the job of police chief (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005). Undergraduates evaluated a male or a female applicant who was described as either streetwise (tough and had experience in rough neighborhoods) but not formally educated or educated but not streetwise. Raters

adjusted the criteria they believed were important for the job such that, regardless of which set of credentials the male applicant had, he was considered better qualified than the female applicant. When the male applicant was described as streetwise, for example, those characteristics were seen as most important for a police chief and not his education. Raters, then, did not stereotype the applicants, but rather adjusted “their notion of ‘what it takes’ to do the job well in a manner tailored to the idiosyncratic credentials of the person they wanted to hire” (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005, p. 478)—in this case by choosing the male applicant.

An example of stereotype fit in operation comes from a study of the evaluations and decisions that employment interviewers made about male and female applicants for managerial jobs (Van Vianen & Willemssen, 1992). Consistent with the stereotype fit hypothesis, interviewers believed that the ideal job applicant would have more masculine traits than feminine traits. Moreover, although interviewers regarded the male and female applicants as being equally qualified in terms of education and experience, they were more likely to recommend that male applicants be hired. Finally, interviewers attributed more masculine traits to successful applicants than to unsuccessful applicants, indicating that masculinity played an important role in their decisions. In short, because the interviewers saw female applicants as less masculine than male applicants and viewed the jobs as requiring masculine traits, they were less likely to recommend that female applicants be hired even though they had the same objective qualifications as the male applicants.

Stereotype fit (or lack of fit) can also influence performance evaluations. Jennifer Boldry, Wendy Wood, and Deborah Kashy (2001) examined this influence in a study of ratings male and female ROTC cadets made of one another. They found that although male and female cadets scored equally well on objective measures of military performance, female cadets received lower ratings on motivation and leadership from their fellow cadets. Thus, equal performance, when filtered through gender stereotypes, can lead to different evaluations. Also recall the research discussed earlier that found that women are less likely to be promoted despite equal job performance evaluations (Landau, 1995; Lyness & Judiesch, 1999; Maume, 1999); similar processes might be operating in those situations.

Although Heilman (1983, 2001) developed the stereotype fit hypothesis to explain gender differences in organizational outcomes, it can also explain racial and ethnic group differences in outcomes; however, less research has been conducted in that context. One study that has addressed this question examined experienced White managers' ratings of managers, African Americans, and Whites on a set of traits characteristic of good managers (Tomkiewicz, Brenner, & Adeyemi-Bello, 1998). Results showed a correlation of  $r = .54$  between the ratings of managers and the ratings of Whites but a correlation of only  $r = .17$  between the ratings of managers and the ratings of African Americans, indicating that Whites were seen as fitting the managerial role better than were African Americans. Similarly, White managers in the hospitality industry saw a correspondence between the category “successful middle manager” and the categories “Caucasian American middle

manager" ( $r = .53$ ) and "Asian American middle manager" ( $r = .56$ ; Chung-Herrera & Lankau, 2005). They also saw a relationship between the categories "successful middle manager" and "African American manager," but this correlation,  $r = .24$ , was significantly lower than the relationships found between successful and White or successful and Asian managers. The relationship between "successful middle manager" and "Hispanic American manager,"  $r = .13$ , was not significant.

Similar processes operate for lower level jobs as well. For example, Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn Neckerman (1990) interviewed 185 Chicago-area employers about their impressions of workers from various racial and ethnic groups who fill low-level jobs such as sales clerk, typist, restaurant worker, and assembly worker. They found that employers generally perceived Blacks and Hispanics as having none of the characteristics of good workers, seeing them as unskilled, illiterate, dishonest, unmotivated, involved with drugs and gangs, lacking a work ethic, and having few interpersonal skills. The employers contrasted Blacks and Hispanics with recent immigrants from central Europe, whom they saw as having all the characteristics of desirable workers. These stereotypes were reflected in employee recruitment strategies. For example, Kirschenman and Neckerman (1990) noted that "one company advertised for skilled workers in Polish- and German-language newspapers, but hired all its unskilled workers, 97 percent of whom were Hispanic," through employee referrals (p. 210).

Employers did have subcategories within their stereotypes, however. For example, they differentiated between "desirable" Black workers—those who had middle- or working-class backgrounds—from "undesirable" Black workers—those who resided in urban ghettos. However, employers tended to use race as a marker for ghetto resident, assuming that Black job applicants were ghetto residents (and therefore would not be good workers) unless the applicants provided evidence of being "desirable." Such evidence included speaking standard English, dressing appropriately for the job interview, being able to demonstrate job-related skills, having a history of steady employment, and providing a non-ghetto address. In sum, Kirschenman and Neckerman (1990) found that employers assumed that Blacks and Hispanics were unqualified for even low level jobs unless the applicant proved otherwise, but applied less stringent criteria to members of other groups.

Finally, although stereotype fit can result in a disadvantage for some groups, it can confer an advantage on other groups. For example, the Asian stereotype includes being talented at math and computers whereas the female stereotype includes having little talent in those domains. Jennifer Steele and Nalini Ambady (2004) hypothesized that an Asian American woman's perceived qualification for a computer technician job would depend on whether her Asian identity or her female identity was salient to the decision maker. College student participants read the description of a student computer technician job, reviewed a completed application for the job, and then interviewed the applicant, an Asian American woman. The application form was designed to emphasize either the Asian or female aspect of the applicant's identity. When the applicant's Asian identity,

rather than her female identity was salient, participants gave her a stronger hiring recommendation and recommended a 12 percent higher starting salary.

**Intergroup Respect.** One explanation for organizational discrimination, then, is stereotype fit: Because the stereotype of White men provides a better fit to the managerial stereotype than do the stereotypes of minority group members or women, White men are selected over equally, or even better, qualified members of other groups. Lynne Jackson, Victoria Esses, and Christopher Burris (2001) have proposed a different explanation. They have hypothesized that it is not a decision maker's group stereotypes that primarily affect discriminatory decisions, but rather it is the amount of respect the decision maker has for the group that affects decisions. They define respect as "feelings of esteem for another that manifest in both valuing the person's feelings, thoughts, and behaviors as well as willingness to be influenced by that person" (pp. 48–49). Jackson and her colleagues propose that people hold different degrees of respect for various groups based on the amount of power the groups have in society. For example, "differential respect for men and women may have its origins in the social structure. In most contemporary cultures, men continue to hold higher social status than women.... Relatedly, men generally still have more power than women in society (e.g., in politics and economics), in the workplace, and in interpersonal relationships... Because many positions occupied by men are high in status, people are likely to more frequently act deferentially to men than to women" (Jackson et al., 2001, p. 49). Living in such a social context, they argue, leads people to develop more respect for men as a group than for women as a group (although, of course, individual women can be respected more than individual men).

Jackson and her colleagues (2001) conducted three studies to test the hypothesis that respect outweighs stereotypes in affecting hiring decisions. In the first two studies, research participants read a description of a gender-neutral job and an application for the job from a man or a woman. Participants rated the applicant on the degree of respect they felt for him or her, the extent to which male and female stereotypes described the applicant, and how suitable the applicant was for the job. The researchers found that although both respect and stereotypes had positive correlations with job suitability ratings, respect had a much stronger relationship. In the third study, the researchers manipulated both how respected the applicant was by a previous employer and the applicant's male and female stereotypic characteristics using a letter of recommendation in the applicant's file. They also manipulated whether the applicant was applying for a high or low status job. They found that greater respect led to stronger hiring recommendations, especially for the high status job, and that having more masculine stereotypic traits led to stronger hiring recommendations for both types of job; feminine stereotypic traits were not related to hiring recommendations. As in the first two studies, respect had a stronger effect than stereotypes. Taken together, these findings indicate that the effect group membership has on hiring goes beyond how decision makers think about groups (stereotypes) to include how they feel about groups (respect). This distinction is important because it

suggests that eliminating reliance on stereotypes may not eliminate discrimination that is rooted in differences in respect for different social groups.

**Shifting Standards.** Think back to two of the sets of research results on gender discrimination in organizations that we presented earlier. First, on the average, women and men receive equal job performance evaluations. Second, on the average, women are less likely to get promoted than men. Given that rewards such as promotions are supposed to be based on performance, these two sets of findings appear to contradict one another: given equal performance, women and men should be promoted at equal rates. One explanation for this apparent contradiction lies in Monica Biernat's (2003) **shifting standards model** of evaluation that we introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. Recall that the model proposes that negative stereotypes lead people to hold lower performance expectations for women and members of minority groups. When evaluators use subjective criteria to rate performance, a person is rated relative to the expectations the evaluator has for the person's group. Because most workplace performance evaluation measures use subjective rating scales (see, for example, Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), job performance ratings are vulnerable to this bias. For example, a woman manager's performance would be rated relative to the evaluator's expectations for woman managers as a group. The top section of Figure 10.2 illustrates this process. Janet and Jason work for the same manager and perform at the same level. However, because their manager has lower expectations for female employees (that is, the female standards are shifted to the left of the male standards in this example), the same level of performance results in a higher rating for Janet than for Jason.

The bottom section of Figure 10.2 provides a hypothetical example of how shifting standards can also influence the interpretation of performance ratings. In this example, Jamal, who is Black, and Jerry, who is White, work for the same manager, who gives them both a (very good) rating of 4 on a 5-point scale. But their manager has, probably unconsciously, rated Jamal and Jerry relative to the expectations he has for the performance of Black and White employees. That is, he saw Jamal's performance as "very good for a Black employee" and Jerry's as "very good for a White employee." However, because of the different standards used for rating Black and White performance, Jamal actually scores lower on an objective common scale that takes both race-based scales into account. Biernat (2003) notes that it is the objective common scale, not the race-based subjective scales, that determines the distribution of organizational rewards such as promotions and pay raises. Thus, although both Jamal and Jerry received ratings of 4 on their annual performance evaluations, Jerry is more likely to get a promotion or pay raise because his 4 translates to a 7 (very good) on the objective scale whereas Jamal's 4 translates to a 4 (average).

Recall, for example, the study conducted by Monica Biernat and Theresa Vescio (2002) that we described in Chapter 4, in which participants took the role of the manager of a coed softball team. Even when male and female players were evaluated as equal in athletic ability, men were more likely to be chosen as starting players and to be placed in the top of the batting order. Thus, men




**FIGURE 10.2** Shifting Standards of Evaluation

*Top Section:* Janet and Jerry perform at the same objective level, but because the evaluator's expectations for female performance are lower than his expectations for male performance, Janet gets a higher performance rating. *Bottom Section:* Jamal gets a high rating of 4, but it is relative to the low expectations the rater has of Black employees. Jerry gets a high rating of 4, but it is relative to the higher expectations that the rater has for White employees. As a result, when the two ratings are transformed to a common scale, such as if the rater had to rank employees, Jerry comes out ahead of Jamal.

SOURCE: Adapted from Biernat (2003, Figure 1. p. 1021).

received more rewards than women, presumably because shifting standards put them higher on the objective scale the participants used to make their choices. These kinds of differential decisions are made not only by evaluators but also by other people who use the evaluations to make decisions. For example, Biernat (2003) reported the results of a study in which participants read a letter of recommendation; half the participants thought it was written on behalf of a Black job applicant and half that it was written on behalf of a White job applicant. The participants interpreted the letter to mean that, in objective terms, the Black



applicant had performed less well on the job described in the letter than had the White applicant. Participants apparently assumed that the letter writer had used lower standards to evaluate the Black applicant's performance.

**Contemporary Prejudice.** In Chapter 6 we noted that, because of contemporary social norms that condemn prejudice, prejudice and discrimination tend to manifest themselves in subtle ways and in situations in which prejudiced behavior can be attributed to other causes. Thus, for example, a prejudiced person could claim that she voted against a Black political candidate not because he was Black, but because his platform was too liberal. In the employment context, a prejudiced employer may use applicant characteristics as a reason to reject a Black job applicant even while hiring a White applicant with the same characteristic. For example, Gordon Hodson, John Dovidio, and Samuel Gaertner (2002) asked White college students who had been classified as being high or low on racial prejudice to make college admission decisions about Black and White applicants. The researchers created two mixed qualification applicant conditions, a clearly high-qualification applicant condition, and a clearly low-qualification applicant condition. In one mixed-qualification condition, the applicant had high Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) scores but a low high school grade point average (GPA); in the other mixed qualification condition, the applicant had a high GPA but low SAT scores. The high qualification applicant had both high SAT scores and a high GPA; the low qualification applicant had both low SAT scores and a low GPA.

Both high- and low-prejudice participants accepted the highly qualified Black and White applicants at the same rate (100 percent) and rejected the poorly qualified Black and White applicants at the same rate (69 percent). However, high-prejudice participants were more likely to accept the mixed-qualification White applicant (74 percent) than the mixed-qualification Black applicant (44 percent); the reverse was true for low-prejudice participants although the difference was not as large: 86 percent accepted the Black applicant and 64 percent accepted the White applicant. Participants also rated how much the applicant's SAT scores and GPA influenced their decisions. The high-prejudice participants who had evaluated the mixed qualification Black applicant rated whichever piece of negative information they had seen—SAT scores in the one condition and GPA in the other condition—as most influential. Low-prejudice participants showed the opposite pattern, focusing on whichever piece of information was more positive. Thus, both high- and low-prejudice participants seized on the information that was consistent with their racial attitudes—positive for those low in prejudice and negative for those high in prejudice—and used that information to justify their decisions.

Employers may also use business-related factors to justify discrimination, the most common being maintaining workplace harmony and placating customers (Brief, 1998; Kirschenman & Neckerman, 1990). Kirschenman and Neckerman (1990) found that many of the employers they interviewed were reluctant to hire minority workers because they thought doing so would upset their White employees, leading to morale and productivity problems. This reluctance was

reflected in hiring practices: Employers who said they valued teamwork highly were twice as likely to have racially homogeneous workforces than those who thought that teamwork was less important. Unfortunately, these employers' concerns may have a basis in reality: lower-level White workers, for example, show more work avoidance as the proportion of minority workers in their work units increases (Tsui et al., 1992). Kirschenman and Neckerman (1990) also noted that some employers believed that they would lose customers if they hired minority workers. They quoted one restaurant owner as saying, "I have all white waitresses for a very basic reason. My clientele is 95 percent white. I simply wouldn't last very long if I had some black waitresses out there" (p. 220). This concern may also be based in reality: A White suburban restaurant owner who had hired Black wait staff because he could not find enough White workers received comments from his White customers such as "Why do you have *those* people out here?" (p. 220, emphasis in original). Customer demand can also work in the other direction: Harry Holzer (1996) found that employers with a predominantly Black customer base were more likely to hire Black workers than White workers. At colleges and universities, important "customers" include alumni, particular those who donate to the university. Michael Sagas and George Cunningham (2005) suggest that the possibility of alienating White alumni boosters may be one reason why Blacks are less likely to be hired as head college football coaches.

**Conformity to Perceived Norms.** Finally, individuals might make discriminatory decisions because they believe those decisions are consistent with company norms. For example, using a methodology developed by Arthur Brief and his colleagues (Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000), Lars-Eric Petersen and Joerg Dietz (2005) asked German students to imagine they were a department head for a German fast-food chain. Their task was to select three candidates for a job interview, based on a pool that contained both foreign and German applicants. Half of the participants read a memo from the company president that commented on the number of foreign applicants and noted the importance of maintaining a homogeneous workforce. The memo also noted that the company employed almost exclusively Germans. The remaining participants read no such memo. In addition, participants were categorized as either high on a measure of subtle prejudice, high on a measure of blatant prejudice, or nonprejudiced. Individuals high on subtle prejudice were less likely to select foreign applicants when they saw the memo than when they did not. Ratings of nonprejudiced and blatantly prejudiced participants were unaffected by the memo. These findings suggest that individuals who are blatantly prejudiced do not need a justification to discriminate: these students were less likely to select foreign applicants regardless of whether they saw the memo. Consistent with findings from previous research (see Brief et al., 2000), those who were subtly prejudiced made discriminatory decisions when they believed that doing so would please their boss. By the way, if pressure from a company president to discriminate seems far-fetched, see Box 10.5, which describes the event that led to Brief and colleagues' research.

### Box 10.5 “Lightening Up” Shoney’s

In 1992 the restaurant chain Shoney’s Incorporated paid \$132.5 million to settle an employment discrimination lawsuit. The evidence in the case revealed a long-standing policy of minimizing the number of Black employees in the company, especially in customer-contact jobs. For example, 75 percent of Shoney’s Black restaurant workers held minimum-wage jobs such as dishwasher, cook, and breakfast-bar attendant (Watkins, 1993). These employment policies were a direct reflection of Chief Executive Officer Ray Danner’s views. For example, one former Shoney’s vice president described what he called Danner’s Laws: “Blacks were not qualified to run a store. Blacks were not qualified to run a kitchen of a store. Blacks should not be employed in any position where they would be seen by customers” (Watkins, 1993, p. 427).

Danner’s justification for his policies was that White customers did not want to see Black employees and would not patronize restaurants that employed Black customer service staff. In pretrial testimony Danner said, “In looking for anything to identify why [a restaurant] is under-performing in some cases, I would probably have said that this is a neighborhood of predominantly white neighbors, and we have a

considerable amount of black employees and this might be a problem” (Watkins, 1993, p. 427). Steve Watkins (1993) reported that “the smoking gun in the case came in the form of a letter Danner wrote complaining about the performance of [one restaurant] and comparing the racial makeup of the store, which had several black employees—some of whom were later fired—to the all-white, or nearly all-white, composition of other fast-food restaurants Danner visited in the area” (p. 427).

When executives from company headquarters visited restaurants, they would tell managers whom they thought had hired too many Black workers “to ‘lighten up’ their store—a company euphemism for reducing the number of black workers—and hire ‘attractive white girls’ instead” (Watkins, 1993, p. 424). In another instance, “two black Shoney’s employees said they were ordered by their manager to hide in a restroom because some company executives had shown up for a surprise visit and there were ‘too many’ blacks at work that day” (Watkins, 1993, p. 426). These anti-Black policies did not affect only Black employees: Watkins reported that White restaurant managers who disobeyed orders to “lighten up” their staff were fired.

## HATE CRIMES

Hate crimes (also called bias crimes) are, perhaps, the most severe form of discrimination. **Hate crimes** are criminal offenses in which there is evidence that the victims were chosen because of their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, disability, or sexual orientation (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 1999). Although whether a crime is caused by bias rather than some other motive (such as personal animosity unrelated to prejudice) is sometimes a matter of judgment, in many cases the evidence is fairly obvious. For example, a survey of gay, lesbian, and bisexual hate crime victims found that in 53 percent of the cases the offender made an explicit statement about the victim’s sexual orientation (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). In addition, hate crimes usually have no motivation other than attacking a member of a particular group. “There appear to be no gains for the assailant: There is no attempt to take money or personal items and there is no prior relationship between the victim and offender” that could provide a personal motive, such as revenge (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002, p. 304).

Table 10.2 presents some of the characteristics of the hate crimes reported to the FBI in 2006. The FBI received 7,720 reports of hate crimes that year

**TABLE 10.2    Characteristics of Hate Crimes  
Reported in 2006**

|                                                      |       |
|------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| <b>Victim Group</b>                                  |       |
| <i>Race/ethnicity (65.6% of all hate crimes)</i>     |       |
| Black                                                | 52.7% |
| White                                                | 16.7% |
| Hispanic                                             | 12.9% |
| Asian                                                | 3.8%  |
| American Indian                                      | 1.2%  |
| Multiple races, group                                | 12.7% |
| <i>Religion (18.1 of all hate crimes)</i>            |       |
| Jewish                                               | 65.4% |
| Islamic                                              | 11.9% |
| Catholic                                             | 4.9%  |
| Protestant                                           | 3.7%  |
| Other                                                | 14.2% |
| <i>Sexual orientation (15.3% of all hate crimes)</i> |       |
| Male homosexual                                      | 62.0% |
| Female homosexual                                    | 13.7% |
| Heterosexual                                         | 2.0%  |
| Other                                                | 29.9% |
| <i>Disability (1% of all hate crimes)</i>            |       |
| Mental                                               | 77.8% |
| Physical                                             | 22.1% |
| <b>Race of Offender</b>                              |       |
| White                                                | 58.6% |
| Black                                                | 20.6% |
| Unknown                                              | 12.9% |
| <b>Type of Offense</b>                               |       |
| <i>Against Persons (56.5% of all hate crimes)</i>    |       |
| Aggravated assault                                   | 21.6% |
| Simple assault                                       | 31.9% |
| Intimidation                                         | 46.0% |
| Other violent crime                                  | 0.3%  |
| <i>Property (43.2% of all hate crimes)</i>           |       |
| Vandalism                                            | 80.4% |
| Burglary or theft                                    | 16.9% |
| Arson                                                | 1.2%  |
| Other                                                | 2.7%  |

SOURCE: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2006).

involving 9652 victims, which is probably fewer than the true number given that most crimes of all kinds go unreported (Strom, 2001). As Table 10.2 shows, most hate crimes were based on the victims' race or ethnicity. However, one does not have to be a member of a minority group to be a victim of a hate crime: in 2006, 16.7 percent of the victims were White. The majority of the crimes (56.5 percent) were against persons, such as assault or intimidation; 43.2 percent were crimes against property, such as vandalism, burglary, or a motor vehicle theft. A study of hate crimes reported from 1997–1999 showed that most victims were male (62 percent) and young (65 percent were under 35 years of age), most of the crimes were violent (60 percent), and 18 percent involved the use of a deadly weapon (Storm, 2001). Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt (2002) have further noted that hate crimes are excessively brutal compared to crime in general: 58 percent of hate crimes involve assaults compared to 7 percent of all crimes and 30 percent of hate crime assault victims receive physical injuries compared to 7 percent of victims for assaults in general.

In this section, we discuss three aspects of hate crimes. First, we look at some of the characteristics of hate crime offenders. We then examine the motivations that offenders have for taking part in hate crimes. We conclude with a brief discussion of the effects of hate crimes on the victims.

### **Hate Crime Offenders**

Who commits hate crimes? There are two ways of looking for answers to this question. One approach is to examine victim descriptions of offenders, such as those contained in the reports of hate crimes collected by the FBI. Kevin Strom's (2001) analysis of hate crimes reported from 1997–1999 showed that, like most offenders, hate crime perpetrators are disproportionately male (84 percent) and young: 62 percent are under 24 years of age and 79 percent are under 35 years of age. Vicky Kielinger and Susan Paterson (2007) examined London police records of hate crimes based on racial or sexual orientation bias; their analysis showed that two thirds of the suspects were known by the victim, either as neighbors, colleagues, or school mates. As we will discuss, this is consistent with research showing that hate crimes are generally not committed by members of hate groups, but instead tend to be opportunistic crimes.

Another approach to determining offender characteristics is to conduct surveys and examine the characteristics of people who admit to having participated in hate crimes. Karen Franklin (2000) investigated anti-gay behavior and found that 10 percent of her sample of 489 community college students admitted having assaulted a lesbian or gay man (or someone the respondent thought was lesbian or gay) and that an additional 24 percent admitted engaging in verbal abuse. Like Strom, Franklin found that offenders were disproportionately male. (She did not report results by age of respondent.) Franklin also found that men were increasingly likely to be offenders as the violence of the behavior increased: Men were the perpetrators in 64 percent of name-calling incidents, 79 percent of intimidation incidents, and 92 percent of physical attacks. In addition, Franklin found that, relative to their representation in her sample, African Americans were

more likely than members of other racial groups to admit to having engaged in anti-gay behaviors: African Americans constituted 19 percent of offenders versus 12 percent of the sample. African Americans were also more likely to admit to physical violence than members of other groups: 29 percent versus 4 percent to 11 percent for other groups.

Although one might think that hate crime offenders hold extremely negative intergroup attitudes or are unusually aggressive people, that is not always the case, as we will see shortly. Also, as we saw in Chapter 9, very few hate group members commit hate crimes. What factors, then, motivate people to commit hate crimes? The next section addresses that question.

### Motivations for Hate Crimes

Why do people commit hate crimes? Based on an analysis of 169 hate crimes reported to the Boston police in 1991 and 1992, Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt (2002) proposed four motivations for engaging in hate crimes: thrill seeking, defending one's "territory" from outsiders, retaliation for a perceived offense committed by an outgroup member, and a commitment to a racist, anti-gay, or other bigoted ideology. Franklin (2000) has identified a fifth motivation, peer group dynamics, that Levin and McDevitt had included as part of thrill seeking (McDevitt et al., 2002). Bryan Byers and Benjamin Crider (2002) have suggested that seeing hate crime as a normal behavior may facilitate, if not motivate, such behavior. Franklin (2000) also examined people's reasons for not carrying out anti-gay behaviors. Let us look at these motives.

**Thrill Seeking.** Thrill seeking as a motivation for a hate crime entails committing the crime out of a desire for excitement, as an antidote for boredom. For example, McDevitt and his colleagues (2002) noted that young people who had been arrested for hate crimes "often told police that they were just bored and looking for some fun.... The attack in these thrill-motivated cases was triggered by an immature desire to display power and to experience a rush at the expense of someone else.... Several of these young offenders revealed that their only benefit from the attack was some vague senses of their own importance: a sadistic high as well as bragging rights with their friends" (pp. 307–308).

Thrill seekers generally have little commitment to bias and often express little animosity toward the group whose members they have attacked (Byers, Crider, & Biggers, 1999; Franklin, 2000; McDevitt et al., 2002). Rather, they are bored and see violence as a way of alleviating their boredom. For example, Byers and Crider (2002; Byers et al., 1999) interviewed young men who, as teenagers, had participated in criminal and harassing behavior against the Amish residents of the rural county in which they and their Amish victims lived. These offenses are so common, and so commonly accepted by the non-Amish, that there is a local word for them, *claping*. The role played by boredom in hate crimes is illustrated by the comments of one of Byers and colleagues' (1999) respondents, who offered this explanation for his behavior: "It was what our friends were doing at the time to pass the summer months away or whatever. That was what we were doing on Friday

nights” (p. 85). The results of Byers and colleagues’ (1999; Byers & Crider 2002) interviews suggest that a lack of respect rather than animosity might be the emotional facilitator of thrill seekers’ behavior. One of their respondents told them, “I just had the mentality that they are just Amish.... It is like, we can pick on them because they are so different” (Byers et al., 1999, p. 87) and another said, “It is because I still have some feeling that they almost ‘deserved it’ for some unknown reason because they are different” (p. 88).

Thrill seekers tend to choose as targets people they see as providing easy and safe opportunities for violence. For example, an offender who, along with a friend, targeted gay men as robbery victims said, “It wasn’t because we had something against gays, but because we could get some money and have some fun. It was a *rush*. A serious rush. Massive rush.... It was nothing at all against gays. They’re just an easy target. Gays have a reputation that they can’t fight [back]” (Franklin, 1998, p. 14, emphasis in original). Similarly, one of Byers and Crider’s (2002) respondents said of the Amish, “They are an easy target. They offer an easy target because they ‘turn the other cheek’ and don’t fight back” (p. 131). Another characteristic that makes a group an easy target for thrill seekers is an unwillingness or inability to report the crime. For example, one of Byers and Crider’s (2002) interviewees noted that the Amish “can’t call the cops [because of their rejection of modern technology, such as telephones] and don’t believe in suing” (p. 135). Similarly, lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals may be seen as easy targets because they are reluctant to report hate crimes due to concern over police harassment or public disclosure of their sexual orientation (Herek et al., 2002).

Thrill seekers often justify their actions by minimizing the crime’s impact on the victims and by portraying their actions as harmless fun (Byers et al., 1999; Franklin, 1998). One of Byers and colleagues’ (1999) respondents said, “It was all, I always thought clean fun.... We always looked at it as there are a lot worse things that we could be doing” (p. 85). Byers and his colleagues found that denying that they had hurt anyone was a common justification offenders gave for their behavior. One of their respondents said about destroying an outhouse, “No one ever really got hurt, and it wasn’t really that much property damage. It was pretty much just a mess to clean up” (p. 85). Besides, one respondent explained, clapping causes no real injury because the Amish should expect to be harassed: “Stuff like that happens to them. It happens to them all the time. They are used to it I think” (Byers et al., 1999, p. 86).

**Territorial Defense.** In defensive hate crimes, the perpetrators see themselves as protecting their own territory from invasion by outsiders. The purpose of this type of hate crime is to coerce the outsiders to go away and to send a more general message that members of the victim’s group are not wanted in the offenders’ neighborhood. For example, Donald Green, Dara Strolovitch, and Janelle Wong (1998) found that the incidence of hate crimes was higher in all-White neighborhoods into which minority group members were moving compared to similar neighborhoods which remained all White. Defensive hate crimes constituted 25 percent of Levin and McDevitt’s (2002) sample of cases.

**Retaliation.** In retaliatory hate crimes, the offenders are seeking revenge for a real or rumored attack on a member of their ingroup. McDevitt and his colleagues (2002) note that “whether the [attack] actually occurred is often irrelevant. Sometimes a rumor of an incident may cause a group of offenders to take vengeance, only to learn later that their original information was merely unfounded hearsay” (p. 309). Although retaliatory attackers cite revenge as the reason for their actions, they usually do not seek out the person they believe committed the offense against their group, but target any available member of the group. This is consistent with the *vicarious retribution model*, discussed in Chapter 9, which explains how groups decide when to retaliate against an outgroup (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006).

This kind of generalized retaliation may be especially likely to occur when the real target of the offenders’ anger is out of their reach. As Levin and McDevitt (2002) noted, “After [the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks], what made it especially tempting to target college students who spoke with an accent and had a dark complexion was the ambiguity in identifying the real enemy. President Bush blamed Osama bin Laden, a shadowy figure who resided in a far-off land and had been seen only a few times on videotape. For most Americans, bin Laden ... was an abstraction, little more than a caricature. It was therefore far more satisfying psychologically to target flesh-and-blood human beings [who were close at hand]—international students” (p. 5). Retaliatory hate crimes constituted 8 percent of Levin and McDevitt’s (2002) sample of cases.

**Mission.** Mission-motivated hate crimes are carried out because of a commitment to a bigoted ideology. In these kinds of crimes, “the perpetrator seeks to rid the world of evil” (McDevitt et al., 2002, p. 309). Some mission-oriented offenders are members of hate groups, although they may be acting without the knowledge or support of the group’s leadership. As we saw in Chapter 9, the leadership of many hate groups publicly oppose violence, seeing it as a threat to their recruitment efforts. Other mission-oriented offenders act on their own, seeing themselves as victims of conspiracies by groups against whom they seek revenge (Levin & McDevitt, 2002). Mission hate crimes are extremely rare; they constituted less than 1 percent of Levin and McDevitt’s (2002) sample of cases.

**Peer Group Dynamics.** Many hate crimes, especially thrill- and defense-motivated crimes, are committed by groups of offenders, almost always young men who know one another (Levin & McDevitt, 2002), so peer group dynamics can play an important part in motivating participation in these crimes (Byers et al., 1999; Franklin, 1998, 2000; McDevitt et al., 2002). As Kathleen Blee (2007) notes, to outsiders the violence can appear “pointless, irrational, or the product of immaturity or personality disorders” but to group members may convey “a sense of strength, inviolability, purpose, and agency” (pp. 263–264) that promotes group affiliation and solidarity. Offenders motivated by peer group concerns act out of “the desire to feel closer to friends, to live up to friends’ expectations, and to prove toughness and [in the case of anti-gay crimes] heterosexuality to friends” (Franklin, 2000, p. 347). As this emphasis on toughness and



heterosexual masculinity suggests, Franklin (1998) noted that men are more strongly motivated by this factor than are women, at least in the anti-gay context (see also Chapter 12). The group-centered nature of some hate crimes is illustrated in the interviews Byers and his colleagues (1999) conducted with perpetrators of hate crimes against the Amish: “When asked if a person were to clape alone, subjects responded that the person would have to be ‘sick’ to do such a thing” (p. 84). Another said, “It was a kind of male bonding.... It kind of drew us all closer because we went out and did something” (p. 89).

Like thrill seekers, peer-motivated hate crime offenders exhibit little animosity toward their victims’ groups, but also exhibit little respect for them (Byers et al., 1999; Franklin, 1998). However, unlike thrill seekers, they sometimes do acknowledge that the victim was harmed, but tend to minimize their personal responsibility. Instead, they portray themselves as having had little choice in the matter (Byers et al., 1999; Franklin, 1998). For example, some of Byers and colleagues’ (1999) respondents blamed their behavior on peer pressure or local norms, giving explanations such as “The harassment was almost common nature” and “[It] is because of the way I was raised” (p. 92).

McDevitt and his colleagues (2002) note that many offenders who act on the basis of peer group concerns may be unwilling participants in the crime: They do not approve of violence (or, perhaps, even prejudice), but go along with the group because they feel that if they do not they will lose the approval of their friends. In many instances, unwilling participants do not actively take part in the crime, but also do nothing to prevent it or stop it once it has begun and are unwilling to provide information to authorities afterwards (see also Byers et al., 1999). Thrill-motivated hate crimes were the ones most commonly found in Levin and McDevitt’s (2002) Boston sample, constituting 66 percent of the cases.

**Normalization.** Based on their interviews with participants in anti-Amish hate crimes, Byers and Crider (2002) have suggested that one factor that facilitates, if not motivates, such crimes is community acceptance of such behavior. That is, the community in which the offenders live views such actions as normal behavior and so do not strongly condemn it, try to prevent it, or punish it. Byers and Crider (2002) noted that “victimization of the Amish was sometimes considered a rite of passage [in the local non-Amish community].... If people believe that claping is harmless, there is a lower likelihood of intervention from parents, teachers, or criminal justice officials” (pp. 133–134). This attitude was reflected in comments made by Byers and Crider’s (2002) interviewees. For example,

[Claping] is socially acceptable here.... [Interviewer: In this community?] Extremely, in this community. They just pretty much shrug and it is “boys growing up.” If I lived here and I had kids and they were 16 or 17, then it would not surprise me if I just said it is just “kids growing up.”... I think that most people would see it as something as I will turn my back to it and pretend that it is not there. Like when people are watching t.v. and you see the starving kids, everyone just turns the channel. It is the same thing.... If something bad really did happen like say somebody got killed or whatever I would say that the

## Box 10.6 The Lynching of Blacks in the United States

Although the exact number of lynchings of Blacks that occurred in the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries remains unknown, estimates range from 2,500 to over 3,400 (see Leader, Mullen, & Abrams, 2007). As we have seen throughout this text, history is replete with examples of such violence against outgroups and, at one point in U.S. history, lynchings were, if not sanctioned, certainly overlooked. Consider the now well-known lynchings of two Black teenagers that occurred in Marion, Indiana in 1930. These young men were accused of raping a White woman and killing her boyfriend. Although the teens had confessed and were awaiting trial, rumors spread that they would be let off easy; in response, family members and their supporters stormed the jail. The teens were, one at a time, dragged to the courthouse square and lynched. Evidence that such actions were normalized at that time in U.S. history comes from James Madison's (2001) analysis of the crowd's response. He writes:

[Police] reported a scene of peace and remarkable good humor. One of the mob who had helped with the rope went with his young wife to a nearby restaurant for a late dinner. But the crowds did not disperse. People milled around through the night. A woman nursed her baby. Fathers held up older children to see the two bodies... Newcomers kept arriving, including the youth group from Antioch Methodist Church... Cars [were] parked at all angles, jammed together like matchsticks around the Courthouse Square. . . Souvenir collectors cut pieces of clothing from the two bodies and bark from the lynching tree (p. 10).

These actions continued through the night. In fact, although the second lynching occurred at

10:30 p.m., it was 5:45 the next morning before the crowd would allow the bodies to be cut down.

What conditions lead people to participate in such savage cruelty? To examine this question, Tirza Leader, Brian Mullen, and Dominic Abrams (2007) studied reports of 300 lynchings that occurred in the United States between 1899 and 1946. Results showed that as crowd size increased, lynchings became more savage, perhaps because bystanders felt anonymous in the larger groups. As the crowd size increased, norms seemed to shift, allowing the display of antisocial behavior. Leader and her colleagues also found that atrocities were greater when the victim's alleged crime was more severe, perhaps providing further justification for the group's cruelty. The researchers also considered the possibility that increases in the Black population fed White people's desire to protect their territory; however, they found no evidence that the severity of the lynchings increased in those areas with higher proportions of Blacks, suggesting that people were not responding to population changes.

As Leader and colleagues (2007) note, lynching in the United States has come to define a certain time in the past and a culture that was less sophisticated and less educated" (p. 1340). Even at the time, not everyone accepted lynching as normal behavior. As Madison (2001) notes in his report on the Marion lynching, the teens' jailors tried desperately to prevent the lynchings and, although the details are not certain, a voice of reason, shouting from the crowd, was able to stop the lynching of a third teen. Moreover, some people in the crowd were horrified by what they witnessed and some were physically ill. Then, as now, acceptance of violent group behavior is far from inevitable.

community would be, "That is a shame and all that," but then the entire town would be like "Oh well." I really think it would be that way (pp. 136–137).

Claping is so acceptable in the community where Byers and Crider conducted their interviews that one of the researchers was invited out on a claping expedition (he declined the invitation). Box 10.6 describes the normalization of a more severe hate crime, the lynching blacks in 19th and 20th centuries.

**Inhibiting Factors.** It is often as informative to understand why people do not engage in a behavior as why they do engage in it. A unique aspect of Franklin's (2000) study is that she asked the nonoffenders in her sample why they "have

never harassed or beaten up a homosexual” (p. 353). She identified a number of reasons, although she did not report the number of people giving each type of reason. Some people’s responses implied that they refrained from anti-gay behavior because of a lack of opportunity, saying they avoid homosexuals or never see homosexuals. Others reported a fear of negative consequences, such as getting into trouble with authorities or peer disapproval. Some respondents cited a belief in nonviolence or other religious or moral beliefs. A final reason was knowing someone who was homosexual. Franklin also noted that these restraining beliefs may be fairly weak and so may easily break down under pressure. For example, 38 percent of her respondents who had never engaged in anti-gay behavior “reported some likelihood to verbally or physically assault a homosexual who flirted with or propositioned them” (Franklin, 2000, p. 353).

### Effects on Victims

Surveys conducted in different parts of the United States over a period of 10 years have provided an unusually consistent set of results regarding the effects hate crimes have on their victims: Hate crime victims suffer more severe psychological consequences from their victimization and these negative effects last longer compared to victims of similar crimes that were not motivated by bias (Ehrlich, 1999; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999; McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2001). Moreover, hate crime victims who experienced severe violence, such as sexual assault, reported greater psychological distress than those who were threatened but did not experience physical violence (Rose & Mechanic, 2002). Table 10.3 lists some of the outcomes that hate crime victims experience to a greater extent than victims of other crimes. In addition, compared to victims of nonbias crimes, hate crime victims report feeling less control over their lives. One factor that helps crime victims deal psychologically with their victimization is the feeling that they can control what happens to them and, as a result, do things that will prevent

**TABLE 10.3 Effects of Hate Crimes on Victims**

Compared to victims of similar crimes that were not motivated by bias, hate crime victims experience more:

- Nervousness, anxiety, depression, and stress
- Intrusive thoughts about the crime
- Trouble concentrating or working
- Anger and a desire to retaliate
- Feelings of being exhausted and weak for no reason
- Fear of future trouble in life
- Distrust of people
- Fear of crime and feelings of personal vulnerability
- Difficulty coping with the effects of victimization
- Difficulty in relationship with spouse or significant other

Ehrlich, Larcom, and Purvis (1995); Herek, Gillis, and Cogan (1999); and McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, and Gu (2001).

them from being victimized again (Davis, Taylor, & Titus, 1997). However, hate crime victims tend to be chosen at random and so believe that there is nothing they can do to avoid becoming a victim again: "Victims are aware that their overt actions did nothing to precipitate their victimization; being the 'wrong person,' at the wrong time and place, qualifies the bias victim [to become a victim]. Therefore, if the impetus for victimization is something that is outside the bias victim's control before the incident, it is reasonable that there would be little the victim would do differently subsequent to the incident" (McDevitt et al., 2001, p. 711). These feelings of lack of control exacerbate the negative psychological consequences of having been a crime victim.

Perhaps because of this, hate crime victims do not always immediately label their experience as a hate crime, even if authorities have made that determination. For example, Kathleen Blee (2007) interviewed members of an Islamic community whose mosque had been destroyed by arson. Despite clear evidence that the arson was not a random act of violence, including a note left at the arson site explicitly stating "we hate you and we want you to leave" (p. 265), members resisted that interpretation, at least initially. Interestingly, those with higher status positions or who had been in the community a longer period of time were particularly likely to dismiss the possibility that the crime was directed at Muslims. Similarly, Blee interviewed members of a Jewish community which experienced the fire-bombing of its Holocaust museum. Some initially interpreted the event as due to anti-Semitic violence but later changed their minds; others initially looked for other interpretations but, over time, came to believe it was a hate crime. Hence, "[w]hether and how victims interpret violent acts as hate violence are the products of collective and individual processes of interpretation" (Blee, 2007, p. 266).

A special characteristic of hate crimes is what McDevitt and his colleagues (2001; see also Ehrlich, 1999) call **secondary victimization**: A hate crime has psychological effects not only on the victim but also on members of the victim's group. These secondary victims experience, at least temporarily, heightened anxiety over the possibility of becoming victims themselves. Secondary victimization is a major goal of defense-motivated hate crimes and is often a secondary goal of others (McDevitt et al., 2001). As McDevitt and his colleagues (2001) note, "a cross burning not only affects the immediate family [that was victimized], but any African American who becomes aware of the incident" (p. 698). As the Chinese military strategist Sun T'zu said over 2,000 years ago: "Kill one, frighten 10,000." There are few data on the extent of secondary victimization in hate crimes, but Howard Ehrlich (1999) reported that surveys of college students following on-campus hate crimes have found that about two-thirds of other members of the victim's group experience fear of becoming victims themselves. Paul Iganski (2007) interviewed people who, although not victims of hate crimes themselves, saw hate-related violence in their jobs as district attorneys or police officers. These individuals reported that hate crimes had many consequences for the communities in which they took place, including increased anxiety, the potential for more crime due to retaliation, and ripple effects that led some group members to respond as if they had themselves been victimized. Thus, hate crimes victimize not just individuals but entire social groups.

## SUMMARY

Discrimination consists of treating people differently, and usually unfairly, based solely or primarily on their membership in a social group. Discrimination is therefore a matter of behavior (including verbal and nonverbal behavior), whereas prejudice is an attitude that can motivate discriminatory behavior. Discrimination can take any of three forms. Blatant discrimination is intentional and obvious. Subtle discrimination is less visible and obvious than blatant discrimination, is often unintentional, and derives from people having internalized discriminatory customs and social norms. Covert discrimination is hidden but intentional, and often motivated by malice.

Although prejudice can motivate discrimination, not all prejudiced people discriminate when they have the opportunity and nonprejudiced people can discriminate without intending to. A number of factors influence the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. Prejudice is more likely to manifest itself in discrimination when the target of the discrimination matches the prejudiced individual's personal stereotype of the outgroup. Implicit prejudice is most likely to result in automatic, uncontrollable behaviors, whereas explicit prejudice is most likely to affect controllable behaviors. Finally, people are more likely to act on their prejudices when they believe that other people agree with them.

Because of the egalitarian norm that exists in modern society, most people are motivated to control any prejudice they feel and to avoid discriminatory behavior. However, regressive prejudice occurs when people lose control over their prejudiced responses and act in a discriminatory manner. Thus, people can exhibit nonverbal indicators of prejudice, which are usually not under voluntary control, while trying to appear unprejudiced through their controllable behaviors. Just as high cognitive demands can lead people to apply stereotypes, such demands can let prejudiced behaviors "leak out" by undermining control. Alcohol consumption and strong emotions, such as anger, can also reduce control over behavior. Because people are less motivated to comply with social norms when other people cannot identify them, anonymity facilitates discriminatory behavior, as does the actual or implied approval of authority figures. When people can otherwise justify their actions, such as when they decide the cost of helping another person is too high, discrimination is more likely. Seeing other people act in a prejudiced manner can also disinhibit prejudice. Finally, if individuals believe that they have established their credentials as unprejudiced people, they may let their control lapse and act in a discriminatory manner.

Research on discrimination in organizations indicates that Black job applicants who submit résumés are less likely to be called for interviews than equally qualified White applicants and receive lower ratings on interview performance. As a result, they are less likely to be hired. In contrast, there currently seems to be little gender discrimination in hiring—unless the applicant is pregnant. Once on the job, there seems to be little gender bias in performance evaluations;

however, Black workers receive lower performance evaluations than White workers, especially from White supervisors. Even when numerical ratings for Black and White employees are identical, White employees tend to get more positive narrative comments. Black employees perform less well on objective measures of job performance, so evaluations might simply be reflecting that difference. However, the lower objective performance might itself be a result of prejudice, reflecting lost opportunities, such as for additional training, and lower morale caused by prejudice and discrimination.

Even when women and members of minority groups receive the same performance evaluations as men and Whites, they are less likely to be promoted, are promoted more slowly, and are more likely to end their careers at a lower organizational level. Also, ethnic minorities can be “tracked” into certain job categories, such as affirmative action officer, that offer fewer opportunities for advancement. In addition, the pay differential between Black and White workers increases as level of authority increases. Black workers may experience slower promotions because of the sticky floor effect—Black managers tend to supervise Black workers who are disproportionately found at lower organizational levels, are tracked into jobs with little promotion potential, and have fewer influential mentors to help them in their careers.

A number of individual-level processes contribute to discrimination in organizations. The stereotype fit hypothesis holds that women and members of minority groups are underrepresented in managerial positions relative to White men because the White male stereotype matches the stereotype of the effective manager whereas the female and minority stereotypes do not. As a result, women and minority group members are perceived as less qualified despite their objective qualifications. Similar processes also can operate for lower level jobs: The generally negative stereotypes of minority groups contradict the “good worker” stereotype. Women and members of minority groups also may be excluded from prestigious jobs because, as groups, they garner less respect than White men. The finding that women and members of minority groups are less likely to be promoted even when they receive the same performance evaluations as men and Whites may be a result of the shifting standards effect: Because evaluators have lower expectations for women’s and minority groups’ performance relative to men’s and Whites’, the same subjective rating translates into a lower rating on an objective common scale that takes the race-based evaluations into account. Rewards such as promotions are based on the common scale.

Contemporary prejudice can lead prejudiced decision makers to put more weight on the negative aspects of a minority group member’s qualifications when both positive and negative information is available, leading to an adverse decision that can be justified by the negative information. Employers also may use business-related justifications, such as maintaining work group harmony and customers’ prejudices, as justifications for not hiring minority workers. Finally, people tend to comply with what they perceive to be the requirements of organizational norms and authority figures. Thus, if they perceive the organizational

norm as calling for discrimination or perceive that authority figures prefer to have as few minority workers as possible, even low prejudiced people may discriminate to comply with those demands.

Hate crimes are criminal offenses in which evidence shows the victims were chosen because of their group membership. Hate crime offenders are primarily young men. Several motives exist for hate crime. The most common seems to be thrill seeking: People are bored and see picking on or assaulting a member of an outgroup as a way of getting some excitement. They often have no strong animosity toward their victims' groups; they choose as targets members of groups they believe are unlikely to fight back or to report the crime. They often justify their actions by minimizing their impact on the victim or portraying their actions as harmless fun. Defensive hate crimes are designed to drive outgroup members from ingroup "territory" and to send a general message to other members of the victim's group to stay away. Retaliation crimes are carried out in response to an actual or rumored hate crime against a member of the offender's group. Mission hate crimes occur because of a commitment to a bigoted ideology and to rid the world of a perceived evil. Peer group dynamics contribute to hate crimes because offenders are often trying to impress members of the peer group, are going along with what they see as the group norm, or have succumbed to group pressure to participate. Community norms also can facilitate hate crimes by viewing them as normal behavior and refraining from disapproving of or punishing them. Factors that can inhibit people from committing hate crimes include lack of opportunity, fear of negative consequences, religious or moral beliefs, or knowing a member of the targeted group.

Hate crimes generally have more severe psychological consequences for their victims than do nonbias-motivated crimes, and those effects last longer. The effects may be more severe and longer lasting because hate crime victims feel that they cannot do anything to avoid being victimized in the future. However, not all hate crime victims see the experience in the same way and how they view the experience can change over time. Hate crimes also result in secondary victimization: A hate crime has negative psychological effects not only on the victim, but also on other members of the victim's group, who experience heightened anxiety over the possibility of becoming victims themselves.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### The Relation of Prejudice to Discrimination

Crandall, C. S., Eshleman, A., & O'Brien, L. (2002). Social norms and the expression and suppression of prejudice: The struggle for internalization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82, 359–378.

Crandall and his colleagues present a set of studies on the role of social norms in prejudice and discrimination.

## Regressive Prejudice

Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and experience of prejudice. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129, 414–446.

This article includes a comprehensive review of factors that act as releasers of regressive prejudice, which Crandall and Eshleman refer to as justifications.

## Reactions to Having Acted Prejudiced

Czopp, A. M., & Monteith, M. J. (2003). Confronting prejudice (literally): Reactions to confrontations of racial or gender bias. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29, 532–544.

Devine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with and without compunction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60, 817–830.

Devine and colleagues' article describes some of the initial theory and research on how people with unprejudiced self-concepts react to having acted in a prejudiced manner. Czopp and Monteith examine the issue in the context of responses to having acted in a prejudiced manner toward different groups.

## Organizational Discrimination

Roberson, L., & Block, C. J. (2001). Racioethnicity and job performance: A review and critique of theoretical perspectives on the causes of group differences. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 23, 247–325.

Roberson and Block discuss four models of factors that affect minority group members' work performance. Although the discussion focuses on work performance, the principles they discuss generalize to other processes, such as hiring and promotion.

## Hate Crimes

Blee, K. (2007). The microdynamics of hate violence: interpretive analysis and implications for responses. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 51, 258–270.

Ehrlich, H. J. (1999). Campus ethnoviolence. In F. L. Pincus & H. J. Ehrlich (Eds.), *Race and ethnic conflict: Contending views on prejudice, discrimination, and ethnoviolence* (2nd ed., pp. 277–290). Boulder, CO: Westview.

Levin, J., & McDevitt, J. (2002). *Hate crimes revisited: America's war on those who are different*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

McDevitt, J., Levin, J., & Bennett, S. (2002). Hate crime offenders: An expanded typology. *Journal of Social Issues*, 58, 303–317.

Blee interviewed victims of hate crimes and discusses the factors that influence their interpretation of the event. McDevitt and his colleagues (2002) present an overview of Levin and McDevitt's (2002) typology of hate crime offenders. Levin and McDevitt's (2002) discuss the typology in more detail and provides a number of case descriptions for each type. They also discuss issues involved in policing, public policy, and prevention, among others. Ehrlich (1999) discusses the problem of hate crime on college campuses, usually considered to be bastions of tolerance (see also Levin and McDevitt's Chapter 9).



## KEY TERMS

|                        |                          |                           |
|------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| blatant discrimination | organizational           | social norms              |
| covert discrimination  | discrimination           | stereotype fit hypothesis |
| discrimination         | regressive racism        | subtle discrimination     |
| hate crimes            | (prejudice)              |                           |
| interpersonal          | secondary victimization  |                           |
| discrimination         | shifting standards model |                           |

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Define discrimination. How does discrimination differ from prejudice? How are the two concepts similar?
2. Define the three forms discrimination can take and give an example of each. Review the types of contemporary prejudice we discussed in Chapter 6. What forms of discrimination do you think those types of prejudice likely result in?
3. Describe the factors that influence the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. That is, under what conditions is prejudice most likely to result in discrimination?
4. What are social norms? How are they related to prejudice and discrimination? What experiences have you had with social norms and prejudice and discrimination?
5. What is regressive prejudice? Describe the factors that can precipitate it. Have you observed any instances of regressive prejudice? If so, describe them and explain what factors led to the release of discriminatory behavior in those cases.
6. What is an employment audit? Do you think that employment audits are effective tools for studying discrimination in hiring? Why or why not?
7. What has research discovered about race and gender discrimination in hiring? What has research discovered about race and gender discrimination in performance evaluation?
8. Researchers have found that Black workers usually get lower scores on objective measures of job performance than do White workers. What is the relevance of this finding for interpreting race differences in supervisor evaluations, which generally have a strong subjective element?
9. What has research discovered about race and gender discrimination in promotions? What organizational factors might contribute to these differences?
10. Describe the costs and benefits for men who are in a female-dominated profession.

11. What is the stereotype fit hypothesis? How does it explain race and gender differences in hiring, performance evaluation, and promotion?
12. Describe how differences in the amount of respect that different social groups receive are related to organizational discrimination.
13. What is the shifting standards effect? How does it explain race and gender differences in hiring, performance evaluation, and promotion?
14. Explain the role contemporary prejudice plays in organizational discrimination.
15. Explain the role conformity to perceived norms plays in organizational discrimination.
16. If an employer believes that his White customers do not want to interact with people of other ethnicities, does that justify his decision not to hire non-White workers? Explain your reasoning.
17. Rather than attributing the differential outcomes minority and female workers experience in organizations to intentional discrimination, Smith and Elliott (2002) wrote that “We believe that something more subtle and profound occurs in the process of doing ‘business as usual’—mere maintenance of the status quo is more than enough to perpetuate ... stratification” (p. 274). Do you agree or disagree? Explain the reasons for your position.
18. What are hate crimes?
19. Describe the characteristics of hate crime offenders.
20. Explain how thrill seeking can motivate hate crimes. Who do thrill seekers choose as victims? How do they justify their behavior?
21. Some researchers believe that thrill-seeking hate crime offenders feel little animosity toward their victims or their groups. Do you agree or disagree? Explain the reasons for your position.
22. Explain territorial defense as a motivation for hate crimes.
23. Explain retaliation as a motivation for hate crimes.
24. What are mission-motivated hate crimes? Why do you think they are so rare?
25. Explain the role that peer group dynamics play in hate crimes.
26. Explain how community attitudes can affect the occurrence of hate crimes.
27. In what ways do the psychological consequences differ for the victims of hate crimes and those of crimes not motivated by bias? What causes these differences?
28. Explain the concept of secondary victimization.

# Chapter 11

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## The Experience of Discrimination

Oh, is there still racism?

—ANONYMOUS STUDENT, ON HEARING THAT A COURSE  
ON RACISM WAS BEING OFFERED ON HER CAMPUS,  
QUOTED IN TATUM (1997, P. 3)

I don't think White people, generally, understand the full meaning of racist discriminatory behaviors directed toward Americans of African descent. They seem to see each act of discrimination or any act of violence as an "isolated" event. As a result, most White Americans cannot understand the strong reaction manifested by Blacks when such events occur. They feel that Blacks tend to "overreact." They forget that in most cases, we live lives of quiet desperation generated by a litany of *daily* large and small events that, whether or not by design, remind us of our "place" in American society.

—ANONYMOUS BLACK PROFESSOR, QUOTED IN FEAGIN  
AND SIKES (1994, PP. 23–24, EMPHASIS IN ORIGINAL)

### Chapter Outline

#### Social Stigma

*What Defines a Stigmatized Group?*  
*Stigma by Association*  
*Tokenism*

#### Responses to Prejudice and Discrimination

*Attributional Ambiguity*  
*Personal/Group Discrimination*  
*Discrepancy*

## Consequences of Prejudice to the Target

*Stereotype Threat*

*Vulnerability to Stress*

*Threats to Self-Esteem*

## Coping with Discrimination

*Psychological Disengagement and Disidentification*

## *Behavioral Compensation*

### Summary

### Suggested Readings

### Key Terms

### Questions for Review and Discussion

As we saw in Chapter 6, many White Americans think prejudice is more or less a thing of the past. It is certainly true that more blatant forms of prejudice have declined in the United States, because of both legislative and social changes. It is also true, however, that the existence of prejudice and discrimination can simply be invisible to many members of the majority group. It is sometimes difficult for the majority group to accept that, for many people, prejudice and discrimination are a “lived experience” (Feagin & Sikes, 1994, p. 15) and are not inconsequential beliefs and actions that can simply be overlooked while “getting on with one’s life.” Instead, for members of stereotyped groups, these experiences are woven into the fabric of their lives. Much of this book has focused on theories about and research on prejudiced people. In this chapter, we tell the story of prejudice and discrimination from the point of view of those lived experiences, focusing on the social psychological research that describes and explains them.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, prejudice and discrimination can take many forms, depending on the actor, the situation, and the historical time period in which a person lives. These factors similarly affect those who experience prejudice, creating a dynamic interchange between those who treat others unfairly and those who are the recipients of this injustice (Dovidio, Major, & Crocker, 2000). This chapter focuses on the consequences of this exchange as they affect every aspect of the stigmatized person’s life, including their academic and economic achievement and their physical and mental well-being.

## SOCIAL STIGMA

To fully understand what it is like to experience discrimination, it is important to know what factors set others apart from the dominant group, increasing the likelihood that they will be discriminated against. Recall from Chapter 1 our discussion of *group privilege*. This privilege is defined as membership in the dominant group, a status that is seen as normal and natural and is usually taken for granted (A. Johnson, 2006). Dominant group membership is sometimes referred to as majority group membership, but this is somewhat of a misnomer. Privileged status often comes from being in the majority; however, it is not defined simply by

a group's numerical advantage. For example, the British rule of India lasted more than 300 years; during that time, Indians faced severe racial discrimination from the British even though the Indians greatly outnumbered the British (Dirks, 2001). Similarly, although Blacks in South Africa outnumber Whites four to one, until 1994 Blacks were subjected to apartheid laws that enforced their segregation from Whites, governed their social life, and limited their employment options (Beck, 2000). The vestiges of apartheid continue to affect Blacks in South Africa. Privileged status, then, is defined less by a group's numbers and more by its power and influence. We begin our discussion by outlining the factors that delineate a group's privileged or disadvantaged status.

### What Defines a Stigmatized Group?

Whether they are consciously aware of it or not, individuals with privileged status define which groups do or do not share this status. In social psychological terms, those groups that do not share this status are **stigmatized** or deviant. Stigmatized groups differ from the privileged or dominant groups in terms of appearance or behavior. Members of stigmatized groups violate the norms established by the dominant group on these dimensions and, as such, are marked by the resulting social stigma (Jones et al., 1984). Because of this, members of stigmatized groups are sometimes referred to as *the marked* and those who are the actors, or the ones who stigmatize, are sometimes referred to as *the markers*. Marked individuals are "devalued, spoiled, or flawed in the eyes of others" (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, p. 504). The consequences of this devaluation are far reaching and can include dehumanization, threat, aversion, and other negative treatment, including subtle forms of discrimination (Dovidio et al., 2000).

Which groups are stigmatized by the privileged or dominant group? The answer depends on the culture and on the historical events that led to the current cultural context. As we saw in Chapter 1, for example, the Irish and Italians were once considered non-White and were targets of discrimination in the United States; today, they are accepted as part of the White majority (Rubin, 1998). Returning to our earlier examples, India is now governed by its own people and is not subject to British dominance and Blacks in South Africa have made significant strides toward undoing the effects of apartheid. Hence, historical events and changes in laws and social norms affect cultural beliefs about who can or should be stigmatized, even if it sometimes takes many years to see their effects. More generally, dominant group members determine which individuals are stigmatized, based on any number of characteristics, including membership in an underrepresented basic social category, such as ethnicity or old age, or in a socially deviant category defined by physical or mental disability, weight, socioeconomic status, or sexual orientation. People also can be stigmatized because of their acne, their mother's alcoholism, a speech impediment, or illness, among many other things (Jones et al., 1984). To be stigmatized, then, individuals must have a characteristic that is devalued by the dominant group and that sets them apart from that group. Regardless of the source of the stigma, in all cases, there is shame associated with being marked (Goffman, 1963).

As you read this list of stigmatized groups, you might have concluded that almost everyone has had the experience of being different from the majority and has suffered because of it. It is true that being different from the group is often part of normal human life. If you have had such experiences, it may give you some insight into what it is like to be a member of a stigmatized group. But for majority group members, many times these experiences are short-lived or otherwise benign. *Benign stigmas*, such as acne, a correctable speech impediment, or a short-term illness, differ in important ways from the more harmful stigmas social scientists most often study, such as those based on ethnicity, severe mental illness, or sexual orientation. Because these latter stigmas typically have more negative consequences, ranging from depression to extreme violence against the stigmatized group, they are the focus of this chapter. Edward Jones and his colleagues (1984) have identified five dimensions that are particularly helpful in differentiating between harmful and benign stigmas: course, concealability, aesthetic qualities, origin, and peril.

1. *Course.* Benign stigmas are often temporary; that is, the course of the stigma is short. For example, acne is usually outgrown or can be cured by a dermatologist. In contrast, the course of many negative stigmas cannot be changed. An individual's ethnicity is typically part of his or her lifelong identity, for example. Another term that is sometimes used is *stability*; some stigmas are perceived to be stable, or permanent, whereas others are perceived to be unstable and so can change over time. In general, people believe that physically based stigmas, such as blindness or cancer, are stable and that mental-behavioral stigmas, such as drug abuse or obesity, are unstable (Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). In general, stable stigmas have more negative consequences for the stigmatized person.
2. *Concealability.* Some stigmas are concealable, which means they can be hidden or controlled by the stigmatized person. Such stigmas can be avoided simply by keeping the stigma private, such as by not talking about one's alcoholic mother, or can be hidden, such as by wearing makeup to cover a scar or birthmark. Moreover, some individuals can and do choose to "pass" for a member of a different ethnic group, thus concealing their group membership. However, as John Pachankis (2007) explains, concealing a stigma does not reduce the guilt and shame associated with that stigma. Moreover, the need to continuously monitor behavior so that the stigma remains undisclosed can be anxiety provoking. As he notes "[i]n every new situation that is encountered, such individuals must decide who among the present company knows of their stigma, who may suspect this stigma, and who has no suspicion of the stigma" (p. 328). Many gay men and lesbians, for example, are not open about their relationships out of fear of social rejection, loss of employment, or the threat of physical violence; as a result they often find themselves lying about or hiding an important part of their life and they feel guilt and shame because they must do so (Meyer, 2003). Similarly, people often fail to seek treatment for mental illness because of the stigma associated with revealing their problem (Corrigan, 2004). People who have stigmas that cannot be concealed have a different set of problems; they

realize their membership in a stigmatized group is apparent and this, in turn, affects their thoughts, feelings, and behavior. They must always directly cope with the prejudice and discrimination associated with their group membership (Crocker et al., 1998).

3. *Aesthetic qualities.* Aesthetics refers to what is beautiful or appealing. As we discussed in Chapter 3, many stereotypes are triggered by physical appearance cues (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and many stigmas are based on this dimension as well. In general, less physically attractive people are more likely to be stigmatized (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991). One reliable indicator of physical attractiveness is facial symmetry, or the degree to which the left and right sides of the face are mirror images of each other (Langlois & Roggman, 1990). Individuals with facial disfigurement typically do not meet this standard and are likely to be stigmatized. In North American culture, slimness is emphasized and overweight people become the targets of discrimination (Crandall et al., 2001). Similarly, a central component of the old-age stereotype is a decline in physical attractiveness and mobility (Slotterback & Saarnio, 1996).
4. *Origin.* This term refers to how the stigma came to be and whether its onset was under the control of the stigmatized individual. Stigmas perceived to be controllable include drug addiction, acquisition of HIV, and obesity; those perceived to be uncontrollable include cancer and heart disease (Weiner et al., 1988). Physical characteristics that one is born with, such as race or many disabilities, also are perceived to be uncontrollable (Jones et al., 1984). People's beliefs about the controllability of a stigma have important implications for acceptance of the stigmatized other. When people believe that a stigma is uncontrollable, they feel more pity and less anger toward the stigmatized individual compared with when the stigma is perceived as controllable (Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Weiner et al., 1988). This viewpoint is evident in this excerpt from a letter to the editor that appeared in the *Chronicle Review*: "Race is something that a person has no control over; hence racism is wrong. Homosexuality is a choice a person makes, and therefore it is not wrong to disagree with it" (Colvin, 2003, p. B4). Research suggests that others share Colvin's viewpoint. For example, Bernard Whitley (1990) found that people who believed that sexual orientation was controllable had more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men than did people who believed sexual orientation was not controllable.
5. *Peril.* Members of some stigmatized groups are perceived, correctly or incorrectly, to be dangerous. Persons with a mental illness, for example, are stereotypically perceived to be dangerous, even though statistically they are no more likely to commit violent crime than people not so diagnosed (Corrigan & Penn, 1999). As we saw in Chapter 3, people stereotypically assume that Blacks are more dangerous than Whites (Duncan, 1976). Especially in the early years of the AIDS epidemic, the stigma associated with HIV infection was found to be related to the belief that persons with

AIDS were highly contagious and therefore dangerous (Triplet & Sugarman, 1987). In general, groups assumed to be more dangerous are more stigmatized than groups perceived as less dangerous (Jones et al., 1984).

### Stigma by Association

So far, we have discussed what sets individuals apart from the dominant group. One underlying assumption is that the dominant group generally rejects members of stigmatized groups. But what happens when a member of the majority group associates with a stigmatized person? Erving Goffman (1963) proposed that such an association would result in a “courtesy stigma” whereby the majority group member would also then be stigmatized. In the past, mainly anecdotal data supported this possibility. However, recent research suggests that Goffman’s hypothesis was correct. For example, Steven Neuberg and his colleagues (Neuberg, Smith, Hoffman, & Russell, 1994) asked male research participants to watch a social interaction that they believed was between either two friends or two strangers. In the course of the conversation, one of the men (Person A) discussed his relationship as being with either a woman or a man, which also revealed that he was either heterosexual or gay. Person B, the other man, was presented as heterosexual. Results supported Goffman’s hypothesis: there was a “courtesy stigma” or a *stigma by association* with the gay man. That is, male research participants were less comfortable with Person B when they believed he was a friend of, rather than a stranger to, the gay Person A. When Person A was described as heterosexual, Person B’s evaluations did not depend on how well he knew Person A. Janet Swim and her colleagues (Swim, Ferguson, & Hyers, 1999) also found that people fear stigma by association with gay people. In their study, heterosexual women behaved in ways that socially distanced themselves from a lesbian, even when doing so required agreeing with socially unpopular positions or making sexist responses.

Additional research suggests that simply interacting with an obese person can produce a courtesy stigma. Research participants were less likely to recommend hiring a job applicant who was shown interacting with an overweight person at a social gathering, regardless of how well the applicant knew the overweight person (Hebl & Mannix, 2003). Similarly, children as young as 5 years old dislike girls more when they are pictured next to an overweight rather than an average weight child. However, this courtesy stigma did not emerge for boys who were pictured with an overweight boy (Penny & Haddock, 2007). Finally, individuals who are dating a person with a disability are subject to stigma by association, including the perception that they are less intelligent and sociable than those dating a nondisabled person (Goldstein & Johnson, 1997). Yet some aspects of this stigma by association were positive, including the perception that those dating the disabled were more nurturant and trustworthy than those not doing so. Even so, these positive perceptions are consistent with the idea that those associated with stigmatized others are different. As the authors note, even respondents’ positive comments focused on this difference, pointing out, for example, how



much a person had to give up to date someone with a disability. In many cases, the comments indicated sympathy for the nondisabled person. Taken together, these studies suggest that Goffman's idea has merit; there are social consequences for associating with a deviant.

### Tokenism

We noted above that being a numerical minority is not, in and of itself, sufficient to produce stigmatized status. That is, power and status are important components of defining privilege and nonprivilege. This does not mean, however, that being in the minority produces no negative effects, particularly in certain situations or settings. That is, one can be in the majority or near majority in a larger population, but still have stigmatizing experiences from being a minority within a particular context. Women, for example, are now represented in the labor force at numbers nearly equal to men. Many, however, still have negative experiences that result from being in the minority in some environments, such as being the only woman in a particular work group (Yoder, 2002). When individuals are a statistical minority within a particular setting, they can be treated as tokens and can be stigmatized because of it. In general, token status occurs when there is a preponderance of one group over another, such as when one gender or ethnicity is in the majority and only a few individuals from another gender or ethnicity are represented (Kanter, 1977).

Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) pioneered the research on tokenism in her case study of a multinational Fortune 500 corporation. Kanter highlighted three perceptual tendencies that affected the daily lives of tokens: visibility, contrast, and assimilation. *Visibility* refers to the tendency for tokens to get attention or, as she put it, "capture a larger awareness share" (p. 210). Consider, for example, this visual field containing a series of 9 Xs and only 1 O:

X X X X X X X O X X

Notice that your eyes tend to be drawn toward the O and not to any individual X. As we saw in Chapter 3, the perceptual process is similar in social situations; people's attention also tends to be drawn to the novel or unique person rather than to members of the majority group (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Members of the minority, or token group, are simply noticed more than are other group members. *Contrast* refers to the polarization or exaggeration of differences between the token and the dominant group. A White person in a group comprised only of Whites, for example, might not think much about her or his racial identity. The presence of a Black person, however, brings race to the forefront, raising awareness of race for members of the dominant group. Similarly, adding a woman to an all-male work group can raise awareness of gender issues. Often, both dominant and token group members are uncomfortable when this happens. *Assimilation* occurs when the token is stereotyped; in particular, the token's characteristics are distorted so that she or he fits the expected stereotype. A group of men, then, notice when a token woman behaves in a way that confirms their stereotypes about women and

often generalize from that confirmation. However, the same men tend not to notice when the woman's behavior does not conform to their gender stereotypes.

These perceptual tendencies have important consequences for the token, which Kanter (1977) illustrated with examples from her case study. She found, for example, that whenever token women did something unusual, it stood out. As she describes it "[t]hey were the subject of conversation, questioning, gossip, and careful scrutiny... Their names came up at meetings, and they would easily be used as examples... [S]ome women were even told by their managers that they were watched more closely than the men" (p. 212). This was a double-edged sword; their achievements were noticed, but so were their mistakes. And, their actions were seen as representative of all women, not just of themselves as individuals. Consequently, even small decisions, such as what to wear to a business meeting, became important. Most people find such situations difficult to navigate, as the additional examples provided in Box 11.1 illustrate. Tokens often feel isolated but, at the same time, must go on as if the differences do not exist and do not affect their work. Solos, or people who are the only minority member in a majority group, often feel alone and without support (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). As one Black woman wrote, "the responsibility associated with being the only Black female in my college and only one of a handful in the university, was overwhelming. I have suffered several instances of burn-out and exhaustion. As a consequence I have learned to maintain a less visible profile as a coping and survival strategy" (Moses, 1989, p. 15). All told, the negative effects of being in the minority can create what has been called the "chilly climate" (Sandler & Hall, 1986). Tokens do not feel welcome or supported in their environment and often their work and personal lives suffer because of it.

Although Kanter (1977) defined token status as simply being in the numerical minority, more recent work suggests numbers alone do not define token status. For example, women who pursue nontraditional occupations are more likely to experience the effects of tokenism than are women in traditional occupations (Yoder, 2002). A survey of undergraduates, for example, found that women in male-dominated academic areas, such as math, science, and engineering, reported higher levels of current sex discrimination than did women in female-dominated academic areas, such as the arts, education, and social science (see Figure 11.1; J. Steele, James, & Barnett, 2002). However, men's perceptions of current sex discrimination were not affected by their area of study. This pattern also emerged in a measure of whether sex discrimination was expected in the future; women in male-dominated professions were most likely to hold this expectation and were most likely to consider changing their major. As we discussed in Chapter 10, men in female-dominated occupations, such as nursing and social work, rarely have the same negative experiences as women in male-dominated professions and may even be on the fast track to promotion (Maume, 1999; Williams, 1992), although there may be exceptions in some settings. For example, Susan Murray (1997) found that male child-care workers were pushed away from performing tasks that require nurturing and received the clear message that child care was women's work. These

## Box 11.1 The Chilly Climate: Personal Experiences

What does happen to the deviate? The deviate can convert, but short of a sex change operation, a time machine to age me, and a personality overhaul, conversion seems out of the question for me. Be isolated? That originally was all right with me, but that surely does not make me a team member. What can I do? Yet, the failure is placed squarely on my shoulders. "What is wrong with you?" "Why can't you get along?" These questions haunt me, undermining my self-image.

—JAN YODER (1985, p. 67)

It is difficult to document exactly what form a token's negative experiences might take. That is, the actual events that comprise those experiences are very personalized. Moreover, many of the individual instances that lead to the isolation and loneliness experienced by tokens seem harmless on the surface, especially to those who are not directly living with them. As you read the personal accounts described in this chapter, they too may seem harmless. Keep in mind, however, that the research evidence suggests that, over time, such experiences affect those in token roles by isolating them from the dominant group, lowering their self-esteem, and creating loneliness (Sue et al., 2007). As a respondent in Paula Caplan's (1994) survey of women in academe described, their cumulative impact is similar to "lifting a ton of feathers" (p. 9). Over time, their weight is unbearable.

This weight is illustrated by the opening quote in this box, which came from Jan Yoder's (1985) first person account of being the first female civilian faculty member at a United States military academy. Her writings captured her dilemma about how to respond to her interactions with the military officers who comprised 97 percent of the faculty. As she notes in her account, no one event seemed overly traumatic. Yet, because of their cumulative impact, she stayed only six months. Here are a few of her experiences:

Because she openly questioned the sexism of some exam questions, she was given a suggestion book so she could quietly record her objections without disrupting faculty meetings.

Her department chose to use "Macho Man" as its theme song, a song few women would choose to represent themselves.

Gossip about her ranged from "she's a lesbian" to "she is heterosexual, but promiscuous."

Despite her efforts to clarify her position in the academy, at social gatherings it was widely assumed that she was the wife of one of the officers.

Jan Yoder is now a highly successful faculty member at the University of Akron. Her study of Black women firefighters (Yoder, 1997) shows how the experience of being a token can threaten the safety of both the firefighters and those they are protecting. One Black woman in her study reported that, in response to a request for help, she received no constructive information, but instead was written up for presumed negligence. A coworker directly told another Black woman that when there was a fire, she was not to touch anything, but rather to stay out of the way. Many of the women reported receiving the "silent treatment," with the men literally walking out of the room when they entered. One reported that, during her formal testing, she was required to hoist a hose onto a shelf that suddenly had been raised five inches above where it was during training.

One of the ways tokens can be made to feel alienated is through the conversations majority group members initiate with them. Black managers, for example, express frustrations with queries that seem to hold them accountable for other Blacks' behaviors, such as "Why do all the Blacks sit together?" and the relative lack of discussion about business-related topics, such as how to make the company succeed (Caver & Livers, 2002). Blacks often feel invisible as well. Anderson Franklin (2004) describes the experience of a successful Black manager who took a White business client out for dinner in New York City. The *maitre d'* ignored the Black manager, instead asking the White client if he had reservations. And, after dinner, the waiter returned the Black manager's credit card to the White client. After dinner, the White client easily found a cab, but the Black manager was ignored by cabdrivers for over 15 minutes, even as other Whites successfully hailed a cab. Echoing the sentiments expressed by others in this chapter, at the individual level, such actions may seem harmless to dominant group members, but to tokens "[i]t's the cumulative effect that wears us down" (Caver & Livers, 2002, p. 78).

Many others have written about these individualized experiences. Researchers look across such events and, based on patterns, draw conclusions about the short- and long-term effects of being a token. On a positive note, research suggests that when the group composition changes so that, for example, several women become part of an otherwise male-dominated group, these negative experiences dissipate and job satisfaction improves (Niemann & Dovidio, 1998).




**FIGURE 11.1** Perceived Current Sex Discrimination by Gender of Respondent and Academic Area

Female undergraduates in a male-dominated academic area reported higher levels of sex discrimination than did female undergraduates in a female-dominated academic area or male undergraduates in either academic area.

SOURCE: Adapted from Steele, James, and Barnett (2002).

men reported feeling under suspicion, especially about their sexual motives for choosing a career in child care.

The majority of the research on tokenism has focused on women who occupy nontraditional roles and remain the minority in those roles. Only a few studies have examined the experiences of people of color (see Moses, 1989, for one example). Jan Yoder (1997) studied the experience of Black women who were training to be firefighters; these women were a double minority in that setting. She found that their efforts sometimes were directly sabotaged by their superiors and coworkers (see Box 11.1). Additional factors, such as one's status in an organization, also may affect one's experience as a minority. Mary Kite and Deborah Balogh (1997) found that untenured women faculty were more likely than untenured men to report the kinds of negative interactions that are typically associated with the chilly climate, such as being excluded from social events or having their comments ignored at meetings. Tenured women and men did not differ in their reports about negative interactions, even though, at that time, both tenured and untenured women were a statistical minority at their university. This may be because their secure status or their experience in the environment provided tenured women with a buffer from the effects of tokenism.

## RESPONSES TO PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

The personal experiences and experimental research we described in Chapter 10 provide a snapshot of the many and varied forms prejudice and discrimination can take. We focus here on how these behaviors affect stigmatized group members. The effects can be viewed on a continuum. At one end of the continuum are discriminatory behaviors that can make stigmatized group members uncomfortable; at the other end of the continuum are behaviors that cause members of stigmatized groups to lose job opportunities and that can affect their health and well-being. Social psychologists have documented that stigmatizing experiences can create uncertainty for members of stigmatized groups, especially in how to interpret interactions with members of the dominant group. We turn to this research next.

### Attributional Ambiguity

Most people find it difficult to talk directly about stereotyping and prejudice. When members of dominant and stigmatized groups interact, the topic of prejudice can become the proverbial “elephant in the room.” Recall from our discussion above, for example, that when tokens are present, it increases the likelihood the majority group members will think about their own group membership, even if they do not discuss this awareness. In these situations, both dominant and minority group members can become uncomfortable. One cause of this discomfort is the ambivalent attitudes that dominant group members often hold toward stigmatized groups. People who are not disabled, for example, often report feelings of both sympathy and anger toward those who are (Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Fichten & Amsel, 1986). Similarly, Whites often hold ambivalent attitudes about Blacks, viewing the group positively on some dimensions and negatively on others (Czopp & Monteith, 2006). Moreover, as we discussed in Chapter 6, what people are willing to say about stigmatized groups has changed; in the United States, people today are much more accepting of the principle of equality for all people and most people want to avoid the appearance of being prejudiced. This does not mean, however, that prejudiced attitudes have disappeared.

Members of stigmatized groups are well aware of these mixed reactions. This awareness leads to a situation that Jennifer Crocker, Brenda Major, and their colleagues (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991) refer to as **attributional ambiguity**. That is, members of stigmatized groups often find it difficult to interpret feedback from dominant group members. Although such feedback may be based on the stigmatized group member’s actual ability or achievement, it also may be based on feelings of sympathy or pity or on the desire on the part of the dominant group member to appear unbiased. Research shows, for example, that Whites sometimes give more positive feedback to Blacks than to Whites for the same poor performance, perhaps to avoid the appearance of being prejudiced (Harber, 1998; see also Chapter 6). Questions arise, then; for example, a Black

person might wonder whether his supervisor's evaluation reflects his competence or stems from the supervisor's biases and prejudices. The answer to this question is unclear, leaving the stigmatized person unsure about how to interpret the feedback.

Crocker and her colleagues (1991) demonstrated the effects of attributional ambiguity in a study that was supposedly about friendship development. Participants were paired with a White student in an adjoining room who was actually a confederate of the experimenter. To manipulate whether the confederate knew the participant's race, either the blinds were drawn between the two rooms (so the participant could not be seen) or they were not. The participants described their likes and dislikes on a form that was allegedly shown to the confederate. Next, participants received bogus feedback indicating that the other person had either a positive or negative reaction to the information. When the other person could not see them, Black participants were more likely to attribute negative than positive feedback to prejudice. In contrast, when Blacks knew their partner could see them, they attributed both the positive and negative feedback to prejudice. White participants' attributions to prejudice were unaffected by the valence of the feedback or by whether their partner knew their race. These results suggest that stigmatized group members sometimes *discount* feedback from the majority group because they believe it is based on factors other than their ability or performance (Crocker & Major, 2003).

Members of stigmatized groups do not always discount positive feedback, however, and instead may *augment* it, or conclude that the positive evaluation was due to their own deservingness. In one study, for example, unattractive people found positive feedback to be more believable than did attractive people in a similar situation, perhaps because the unattractive participants did not think their partner had ulterior motives—in this case, an other-sex attraction toward them. Attractive people, in contrast, may have assumed attraction played a role and, as such, discounted the feedback (Major, Carrington, & Carnevale, 1984). When ulterior motives are not suspected, then, people are more likely to conclude that the feedback is due to their abilities or characteristics, but when such motives are suspected, members of stigmatized groups do not believe the positive feedback and conclude that it was due to factors such as the evaluators' desire to appear unbiased or to their sympathy or pity.

What are the psychological consequences of receiving unclear feedback? Research shows that such consequences depend on whether stigmatized group members augment or discount the feedback and on the valence of the feedback. Discounting negative feedback, for example, has self-protective consequences. In the Crocker and colleagues (1991) study described above, Black participants who could attribute negative feedback to prejudice were less depressed than those who could not. In contrast, discounting positive feedback tends to produce lower self-esteem, even when compared to those individuals who received negative feedback (Crocker et al., 1991). However, attributing negative feedback to prejudice is not always beneficial; stigmatized group members who frequently see themselves as a victim of prejudice in many situations have lower self-esteem (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999), a point

we return to later in this chapter. Moreover, individuals who strongly identify as members of their social group do not psychologically benefit from attributing negative feedback to prejudice (McCoy & Major, 2003).

Interestingly, both stigmatized and dominant group members are aware that people are likely to consider another's racial group membership when evaluating them. For example, Bruce Blaine and his colleagues (Blaine, Crocker, & Major, 1995) asked undergraduates to put themselves in the shoes of Blacks or women and imagine how they would feel if they were offered a job for one of two reasons: they were qualified for the job or the employer felt sympathy for past discrimination against their group. Participants who imagined the job offer was motivated by sympathy reported that they would have lower self-esteem, higher depression, more hostility, and lower motivation than those who imagined the job offer was based on their qualifications. Follow-up studies showed that these effects were quite general. For example, similar patterns emerged regardless of whether the employer felt sympathy because of employment discrimination specifically or felt sympathy for the stigmatized group in general, in this case people with disabilities (Blaine et al., 1995). Research also has found that both Whites and Latinos who portrayed Latinos in a virtual world discounted negative feedback about their performance more than those who portrayed Whites in this virtual world (Hoyt, Aguilar, Kaiser, Blascovich, & Lee, 2007).

Interestingly, self-esteem can be affected even if the stigmatized group member does not blame the evaluator for the negative feedback (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993). Overweight women who received negative social feedback from a male evaluator were more likely to attribute the negative feedback to their weight than were normal-weight women, but did not dislike the evaluator for providing this feedback. That is, they did not attribute his feedback to prejudice. Even so, the overweight women who received negative feedback reported being in a more negative mood, and reported higher levels of depression and anxiety than did normal-weight women who received negative feedback or women of any weight who received positive feedback. Overweight women are not getting a boost to their self-esteem, but instead may shoulder the blame for their weight. This may have harmful consequences. For example, the overweight may conclude that they will fail at dieting or following an exercise program and therefore not try or give up too easily. If, instead, the overweight had benefited from this buffer, they might be more willing to try and succeed in these endeavors.

In summary, research on attributional ambiguity shows that stigmatized people consider the source when receiving feedback and, if they believe the source is prejudiced against them, weigh that feedback differently. When the feedback is negative and can be attributed to prejudice they discount it. They also sometimes discount positive feedback because they doubt its validity, believing instead it stemmed from the evaluator's ulterior motives. Other times, for example when ulterior motives are not suspected, stigmatized individuals augment the positive feedback, deciding it must be due to their ability or characteristics. For minorities, discounting negative feedback has beneficial effects on self-esteem, but discounting positive feedback does not. Overweight women, however, do not gain a psychological benefit from attributing negative feedback to prejudice.

### Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy

You have no doubt heard about serendipitous research findings that were at first puzzling but later led to important new theories and research. Faye Crosby (1984) stumbled across just such a phenomenon when she surveyed working women who lived in a Boston suburb. Objective indicators showed that these women were being discriminated against; for example, the women earned between \$5,000 and \$8,000 less than men for equivalent jobs. Yet Crosby also found that the women were just as satisfied with their job as the men were. Perhaps even more puzzling was that the women were well aware that sex discrimination existed in the United States and, moreover, they were aggrieved by this state of affairs. They just did not believe this discrimination was happening in their own lives.

Crosby's (1984) surprising finding has led to a great deal of research on what is now known as the **personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD)**, people's belief that their group, as a whole, is more likely to be discriminated against than they, themselves, are as individuals (Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). Researchers have reported findings consistent with this hypothesis with groups as diverse as Black college activists, French Canadians in Quebec, Canada (who live in a largely English-speaking country), English-speaking residents of Quebec (where French is the dominant language), unemployed workers in Australia, and lesbians (see reviews by Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell, & Whalen, 1989 and Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994). Figure 11.2 illustrates the pattern the PGDD generally follows; lesbians perceived higher levels of discrimination for their group at a national and a local level than for themselves. They also believed lesbians at the local level and the national level had a greater need to hide their sexual orientation at work than they themselves did (Crosby et al., 1989).

**Cognitive Explanations.** There are two main categories of explanations for the PGDD: cognitive and motivational. Proponents of cognitive explanations suggest the personal/group discrimination discrepancy is simply a function of the way people process information. For example, Faye Crosby and her colleagues (Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986) found that when participants evaluated information about discrimination in the aggregate form (that is, they read about patterns of discrimination compiled over several individuals), they believed that discrimination occurred. But when the same information was presented on a case by case basis, they failed to perceive discrimination. Hence, the way in which the information was presented and processed either produced or inhibited the perception of discrimination. Research also has demonstrated that the PGDD is quite general, applying to domains unrelated to discrimination, such as the economy and the threat of AIDS (Moghaddam, Stolkin, & Hutcheson, 1997). People believe, for example, that a good economy is more likely to benefit their group as a whole than them as individuals. Such findings suggest a general process is operating that extends beyond perceptions of discrimination. It may be that the PGDD emerges because group examples more readily come to mind than do individual examples or because group information is more easily processed than is






**FIGURE 11.2** Lesbians' Ratings of Perceived Discrimination at the Personal, Local, and National Level

Lesbian respondents saw more evidence of discrimination at the local level than at the personal level and the highest level of discrimination at the national level. They also believed lesbians at the local level and the national level had a greater need to hide their sexual orientation at work by appearing heterosexual than they themselves did.

SOURCE: Adapted from Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell, and Whalen (1989).

information about the self. Supporting this possibility, research shows that the PGDD is found for perceptions of positive events as well as negative events; people believe, for example, that the group, overall, is more likely than they, as individuals, to have warm and supportive friends or to benefit from the improved efficiency of computers (Moghaddam et al., 1997).

Another cognitive-based explanation is that people are using different comparison standards when judging their own versus the group's level of discrimination. That is, when deciding about their personal experience with discrimination, people consider their experiences in comparison with their own group members, but when deciding about the groups' discriminatory experiences, they compare themselves to other groups (Taylor et al., 1994). Women, then, may believe that they, personally, are better off than most women, but that their group is doing worse, on the whole, than men are. If this is the case, making the referent group explicit should reduce the PGDD. Research supports this possibility (Quinn, Roese, Pennington, & Olson, 1999). Ratings made in the absence of a referent led people to use ingroup comparisons for judgments of personal discrimination and outgroup comparisons for judgments of group discrimination. Moreover, providing a specific referent to an ingroup, in this case by asking women to compare their personal level of discrimination to other women's, reduced the PGDD. Perceptions of how often discriminatory acts occur also affects the PGDD;

women see a smaller PGDD for discriminatory acts thought to occur frequently in the workplace, such as being told to act in feminine ways, compared to events thought to occur infrequently, such as not receiving the same raise as their male colleagues (Fuegen & Biernat, 2000).

Taken as a whole, these studies show that the way people process information in general, and about discrimination specifically, affects their views about their own and their group's experience with discrimination. It should be noted, however, that neither making the referent group explicit nor including information about frequency or severity of discrimination completely eliminates the PGDD. For example, making the referent explicit by asking women to compare their level of discrimination specifically to men's does not reduce the PGDD (Quinn et al., 1999). Cognitive explanations tell us something, but not everything, about why the PGDD occurs (Taylor et al., 1994).

**Motivational Explanations.** Motivational explanations assume that people have reasons for believing that they are not personally discriminated against, even while recognizing that their group is. The motivational explanation that has received the most support is Crosby and colleagues' (1986) hypothesis that people want to deny or minimize their own experiences with discrimination. Recall from our earlier discussion that, in Crosby's studies (Crosby, 1984; Crosby et al., 1986), people reported little personal experience with discrimination, even though by objective indicators discrimination existed. There are several reasons why individuals might deny their personal experiences with discrimination (Taylor et al., 1994). In some instances, individuals might take personal responsibility for their situation, and thus not acknowledge that the poor treatment they received could be due to discrimination. In other instances, people deny discrimination to justify their failure to accuse a specific discriminator or their decision not to take action against the unfair treatment. Finally, people may view their own situation as relatively harmless compared to more dramatic examples of discrimination, particularly those highlighted in the mass media.

Mauricio Carvallo and Brett Pelham (2006) have proposed another reason people deny personal discrimination: they have a strong need to affiliate and bond with other people. These authors note that stigmatized group members often are discriminated against by people with whom they have meaningful relationships, such as friends and coworkers. Therefore, acknowledging this discrimination would mean also acknowledging that they do not fit in with their social group. Consistent with this perspective, Carvallo and Pelham found that people who have a high need to belong were more likely to believe that their group experiences discrimination but were less likely to believe that they personally are discriminated against. They also found that when people were made to feel accepted by their group, they were more likely to acknowledge personal discrimination than were individuals in a control condition.

People also can recognize the social costs of claiming discrimination and, as a result, try to avoid those costs by not making claims of unfairness (Kaiser & Miller, 2001a). The social costs of claiming discrimination include being viewed negatively by members of the dominant group, such as being labeled a whiner or someone

who takes advantage of possible discrimination for personal gain (Feagin & Sikes, 1994). To see if such outcomes occur, Cheryl Kaiser and Carol Miller (2001a) asked introductory psychology students to read a description of a Black student who failed a test that had been scored by one of eight White judges. The potential bias he faced was manipulated: either none, four, or all of these White judges reportedly had a history of discriminating against Blacks. The research participants learned of this possible discrimination and that the student had failed the test. They also learned that the Black student attributed his failure to either the quality of his answers or to discrimination. Regardless of how much possible prejudice he had faced, participants were more likely to label the student as a complainer and to evaluate him less favorably when he made attributions to discrimination rather than ability. Interestingly, however, the student who attributed his failure to discrimination also was seen as truer to himself than the student who attributed his failure to ability.

Additional research suggests that members of stigmatized groups are aware of such perceptions and this awareness affects their decision to report or confront discrimination. Women and Blacks who received a failing grade on a creativity test, for example, were more likely to attribute the failure to discrimination when reporting their attributions anonymously or when their explanation would be seen only by a stigmatized group member, compared to when the explanation would be seen by a dominant group member (Stangor, Swim, Van Allen, & Sechrist, 2002). For members of nonstigmatized groups, attributions were unaffected by who would see the results. The stakes of the encounter matter, too. Nicole Shelton and Rebecca Stewart (2004), for example, found that women who were being interviewed for a competitive, high paying job were less likely to confront a male interviewer who asked sexist questions than were women who were being interviewed for a low paying, less competitive job. This awareness also may play a role in the PGDD; supporting the idea that members of stigmatized groups want to distance themselves from negative attributes associated with their group, Gordon Hodson and Victoria Esses (2002) found that women were more likely to think that negative attributes (including being the target of discrimination) applied to the ingroup than to themselves, suggesting that they wanted to distinguish themselves from the group on these attributes. However, this distancing was not found for positive attributes; instead, they were more likely to report that positive attributes applied to themselves than to the ingroup. These effects were more pronounced for women who strongly identified with their group and, therefore, were more invested in how they and their group were perceived.

**Perceiving Discrimination.** It would be incorrect to conclude, however, that people never recognize that they are personally being discriminated against. Donald Taylor and his colleagues (1990) found that both Haitian and Indian immigrants to Canada reported significant personal experience with discrimination, even though they believed that their group experienced more discrimination, as a whole, than they did as individuals. Similarly, single mothers receiving government assistance reported feeling that their lives were somewhat unfair and evidenced resentment

toward their situation, but still believed themselves to be better off than other mothers in their situation (Olson, Roese, Meen, & Robertson, 1995). There also may be individual differences in the tendency to minimize one's own experience with discrimination; the more typical of their group that Iranians perceived themselves to be, the less likely they were to exhibit the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (Verkuyten & Nekuee, 2001). Similarly, Don Operario and Susan Fiske (2001, Study One) found that non-Whites who were low and high identifiers with their group reported equal amounts of discrimination directed at their group, but differed in their perceptions of personal discrimination: high identifiers were more likely to report discrimination directed at themselves than were low identifiers. Results of a second study (Operario & Fiske, 2001, Study Two), suggest that this pattern emerged because high identified minorities are more sensitive to possible discrimination and, therefore, react to both subtle and obvious indicators of prejudice, whereas those less highly identified reacted only to obviously prejudiced actions. That is, those who identify strongly with their group may simply be more likely to notice and react to subtle forms of prejudice.

Interestingly, research suggests that this heightened sensitivity might be counterproductive. Elizabeth Pinel (2002) found that women who were high in *stigma consciousness*—that is, who believe that they live in a stereotyped world and that this affects their interactions with outgroups—were more critical of men who they believed to be sexist. This criticism, in turn, elicited more negative criticism from those men. The end result was that the women concluded that they were incompatible with the sexist men. No such effects emerged for women low in stigma consciousness or for women who believed they were interacting with nonsexist men. It is important to note that these results emerged independently of the men's actual sexist beliefs; the experimenter controlled who was described as sexist. Therefore, the differences in ratings were due to the women's expectations and how the interaction was affected by them, and not to sexist behavior on the men's part.

It may seem that there is a contradiction between the studies on attributional ambiguity, described above, which suggests that members of stigmatized groups are well aware that they personally might be discriminated against because of their stigmatized status and the PGDD, which suggests that people deny personal discrimination. As often happens in social science, bodies of literature address questions in different ways, resulting in seemingly subtle differences that account for such contradictions. In this case, studies of attributional ambiguity focus on a single, specific, instance of discrimination, whereas the personal/group discrepancy focuses on broad patterns of perceived discrimination. For example, studies of attributional ambiguity that focus on one interaction show that attributions to prejudice can protect self-esteem. This protection is not evident when individuals make attributions to broader, more stable patterns of discrimination; that is, when they consider, overall, how prejudice affects them as an individual, people report that their psychological well-being is adversely affected (Branscombe et al., 1999). But, as we saw with the personal/group discrimination discrepancy, they still may believe these effects are worse for their group than for themselves.

We have more to say about the effects of experiencing discrimination on mental health later in this chapter.

## CONSEQUENCES OF PREJUDICE TO THE TARGET

During the 1990s, there were impressive increases in minority group members' and women's participation in undergraduate and graduate education. Women, for example, are now more likely to enroll in college than are men and Blacks and Hispanics are enrolling in record numbers. These gains, however, do not necessarily translate into greater academic achievement for these groups. Minority student attrition rates are higher than Whites' at both the graduate and undergraduate level, and both women and minorities continue to be underrepresented in science and engineering (National Science Foundation, 2002). Moreover, college entrance exam scores continue to differ by sex and ethnicity. Boys, for example, score higher than girls on the math section of the SAT and Whites score higher on both the math and verbal sections than do Blacks and Latinos (College Board, 2003).

One explanation that has been offered for these differences is that women and minorities are not as able or as well prepared as their White male counterparts (Benbow & Stanley, 1980; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Yet, abundant evidence refutes this claim. For example, when women and minorities participate in programs designed specifically for underrepresented groups, they can and do succeed (Fullilove & Triesman, 1990; Grimmer, Bliss, & Davis, 1998). Moreover, research indicates that girls receive higher grades in math courses than do boys (Kimball, 1995) and that males' math advantage may be limited to certain types of standardized tests. Scores on high school achievement tests in 10 U.S. states, for example, showed no gender difference in scores on the math portion of the exam (Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, & Williams, 2008). Hence, the accuracy of the stereotypic belief that women and minorities are less capable than men or White students is highly suspect. As we will discuss in the next section, situational factors have an important influence on the success of individuals who are underrepresented in a specific discipline (such as women in math and science) or in an academic setting more generally (such as Blacks at most colleges and universities).

### Stereotype Threat

If situational factors can raise the achievement of women and minorities, can they also hinder their performance? Research evidence suggests that they can. Consider, for example, that Blacks are well aware that a negative stereotype exists about their academic abilities. According to Claude Steele (1997), this knowledge produces a "threat in the air" (p. 617). Blacks realize that they can be judged or treated in terms of this negative stereotype and can be fearful of confirming that judgment. If this fear is strong enough and also is personally relevant to the stereotyped group member, it can create a **stereotype threat**

that interferes with academic achievement (Aronson, Quinn, & Spencer, 1998). As we will see, this phenomenon can affect a person's behavior even though no discriminatory actions actually were directed toward her or him.

In one of the first demonstrations that stereotype threat affects Blacks' achievement, Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995) asked Black and White undergraduates to take a test composed of the most difficult verbal questions from the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). Half of the participants were told the test was diagnostic of intellectual ability (the diagnostic condition); the other half were told the test was simply a laboratory problem-solving task (the nondiagnostic condition). Steele and Aronson proposed that the diagnostic condition induced stereotype threat for Blacks because their exam performance could support or refute the stereotype that Blacks have low verbal ability. Supporting this hypothesis, in two separate studies, Black participants in the diagnostic condition scored lower than Blacks in the nondiagnostic condition or Whites in either condition. Figure 11.3 presents these results for the number of items solved correctly, collapsed across Studies One and Two. Results of a third study showed that Blacks who were told the test was diagnostic also were more likely to complete word fragments in terms of the social stereotype of Blacks (for example, completing \_\_ Z Y as LAZY) than were Blacks who participated in the nondiagnostic condition, or Whites in either condition. Similarly, compared with their peers in other conditions, Blacks in the diagnostic condition were more likely to complete word fragments in a way that indicated self-doubt (for example, completing L O \_ \_ \_ as LOSER) and were more likely to distance themselves from stereotypically Black activities, such as liking jazz or basketball. Because these tasks were completed before the actual diagnostic test was taken,




**FIGURE 11.3** Mean Items Solved by Participant Race and Test Diagnosticity

Blacks' performance on a test of verbal ability were affected by whether the test was described as diagnostic, and thus produced stereotype threat, or nondiagnostic (nonthreatening). White's performance was unaffected by how the test was described. These scores are adjusted for overall verbal ability, as measured by the SAT.

SOURCE: Adapted from Steele and Aronson (1995) Studies One and Two.

these findings suggest that the mere expectation of taking a potentially stereotype-confirming test brought up stereotypic thoughts, self-doubt, and a desire to be seen as different from the Black stereotype.

**General Features of Stereotype Threat.** There are several keys to understanding how stereotype threat operates (Aronson et al., 1998; C. Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2003). One is that stereotype threat stems from situational pressures that bring the stereotype to mind, not merely from internalization of the negative stereotype. In fact, people need not believe the stereotype about their group, or even be worried that it applies to them personally, for it to influence behavior. Claude Steele (1997) cites the example of a Black man waiting at an ATM machine for a woman to complete her transaction. This man is likely aware of the stereotypic belief that Black men are violent and, even though he himself has no violent intentions, he might be still concerned that the woman will fear him. The situations that produce stereotype threat vary widely and range from the diagnosticity of the test, as we saw in the Steele and Aronson (1995) experiment, to whether a person is a minority in a situation. Michael Inzlicht and Talia Ben-Zeev (2003), for example, showed that women who took a math test in a group of other women, and were therefore in the majority, scored higher than women who took the same test in a group of other men and were therefore in the minority. The effects of stereotype threat have been demonstrated both in the lab and in naturally occurring environments.

A second key feature of stereotype threat is that it is a quite general process that can affect any group for which a negative stereotype exists. Jean-Claude Croizet and Theresa Claire (1998), for example, investigated whether stereotype threat could result from the stereotypic belief that individuals from a lower *socio-economic status* (SES) are less intelligent than those from a higher SES background. Participants were French undergraduates from both high and lower SES who completed the verbal portion of the GRE under one of two instruction sets: The test was described either as an assessment of intellectual ability for solving verbal problems (the diagnostic condition) or as an assessment of lexical memory (the nondiagnostic condition). Results supported the stereotype threat hypothesis. Lower SES participants in the diagnostic condition tried fewer items and answered fewer questions correctly than did lower SES participants in the non-diagnostic condition. Scores for the higher SES participants were not influenced by instruction set.

Stereotype threat also has been demonstrated for women and Latinos and has been shown to operate in a variety of academic settings ranging from middle schools to private and public colleges and universities (C. Steele et al., 2003). Evidence for stereotype threat also has been found in a number of performance domains, such as athletics (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999) and the workplace (Roberson, Deitch, Brief, & Block, 2003). Despite this generality, certain conditions are more likely to produce stereotype threat; for example, more negative stereotypes generally produce stronger stereotype threat (C. Steele et al., 2003). Moreover, stereotype threat has its strongest effects on those individuals whose self-esteem is tied to their performance in a domain or

who have the greatest chance for success in that area of achievement. As Joshua Aronson and his colleagues (1998) put it, “all other things being equal, the more a person cares about being good at something, the greater will be his or her distress about stereotypes alleging a lack of ability” (p. 87). Whites who believe their athleticism is important to their identity are more threatened by the stereotype that “Blacks are more athletic than Whites” than are Whites for whom athleticism is unimportant (Stone et al., 1999). Similarly, women who strongly identify with being a woman are more likely to experience stereotype threat on a test of their math ability than those who do not have a strong gender identification (Schmader, 2002).

A third key feature of stereotype threat is that the nature of the threat varies by the specific context of the negative stereotype. The type of threat that would affect women, for example, could be very different from the type of threat that would affect older adults or athletes. Women, for example, are likely threatened in the arena of mathematical ability, older adults in the area of memory, or athletes on the football field. Moreover, stereotype threat does not generalize to other situations. Women’s performance on an English exam, for example, would not be hindered by a threat about their mathematical ability. Stereotype threat also can be produced in groups whose members are not normally threatened by a belief. White men generally do not worry about their math ability, for example, and are not stereotypically believed to do poorly in math. Yet White men experienced significant performance drops when they believed the test was designed to determine why Asian males outperform White males in math (C. Steele et al., 2003).

Evidence suggests that stereotype threat operates by changing the way information is processed, specifically by reducing people’s working memory capacity (Schmader & Johns, 2003). That is, stereotype threat is not just an emotional reaction to the possibility of confirming a stereotype about one’s group but also a cognitive reaction. In one relevant experiment, working memory was assessed by the operation span test, during which participants evaluated mathematical equations while memorizing words for later recall. Male and female undergraduates were told that this was a test of the ability to either remember two different pieces of information simultaneously (nonthreatening condition) or to solve complex mathematical equalities (condition threatening to women). Those in the threatening condition also were told that gender differences in this ability might explain gender differences in math performance. Results showed that men’s operation span test scores did not differ based on how the test was described. Women, however, scored lower under stereotype threat conditions than under nonstereotype threat conditions (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Apparently, the added threat taxes cognitive resources, resulting in lowered attention for those under this threat. Interestingly, holding stereotypic beliefs also can impair the cognitive performance of nonthreatened group members; research demonstrating such effects is presented in Box 11.2.

**Reducing Stereotype Threat.** While reading about research confirming that stereotype threat can affect achievement, you may have noticed an important point. That is, when participants believed the test was not indicative of ability,



## B o x 11.2 Holding Racial Stereotypes Can Be Hazardous to Your Performance

In this chapter, we describe the many negative consequences of stereotyping and prejudice to those who are targets of these beliefs and actions. An implication one might draw from this discussion is that there are no negative consequences for those who hold stereotypic beliefs or discriminate against members of stigmatized groups. Research suggests, however, that this is not the case and that, instead, holding negative stereotypes or discriminating against others can impair people's cognitive performance. For example, Jennifer Richeson and Nicole Shelton (2003) examined the effects of interacting with a Black person on Whites' executive function. *Executive function* refers to the ability to plan, organize, and strategize; when this function is impaired, as when resources are overextended, cognitive performance suffers. Participants in this study completed the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), which, as you learned in Chapter 2, is an indirect measure of racial prejudice. Then, at the request of either a Black or White experimenter, they were videotaped while commenting on two controversial issues—one of which was racial profiling in post–September 11 America. Finally, they completed the Stroop test, which requires good executive function. Results showed that the more negative the participants' implicit attitudes were, the more likely it was that interacting with a Black person reduced their executive function. In contrast, interacting with a White person did not affect executive function, regardless of the participants' implicit racial attitudes. A subsequent study (Richeson et al., 2003) used a similar procedure, but also assessed neural activity in the brain regions that control executive function. This activity was assessed as participants responded to familiar and unfamiliar photographs of Black faces. Changes in brain activity were significantly correlated with racial attitude, and these changes also predicted performance on the Stroop test. No such relationships were found when participants responded to White faces. These results further support the hypothesis that, for those who are racially biased, interracial contact impairs executive function.

The ability to cope with stress is also compromised for White individuals who are racially biased and are

being evaluated by a Black person. Wendy Mendes and her colleagues (Mendes, Gray, Mendoza-Denton, Major, & Epel, 2007) had adult White women and men between the ages of 18 and 55 complete the IAT online. Later, these individuals came to their laboratory and gave a speech that was evaluated by two interviewers—a task most people find to be stressful. The interviewers were either both Black or both White. Both physiological measures (assessed by neuroendocrine responses) and behavioral measures (assessed by interviewers' ratings of the speakers' anxiety level) indicated that the racially biased White participants who were evaluated by Black interviewers had the most difficulty coping with this stress. In contrast, White speakers with egalitarian attitudes evidenced healthy coping regardless of the interviewer's race.

Although the research we have described found larger deficits for individuals with negative racial attitudes, evidence for more general effects also exists. Specifically, priming non-Blacks with the Black stereotype can lower performance on standardized tests (Wheeler, Jarvis, & Petty, 2001). Participants who wrote an essay about a day in the life of a Black college student, and thus had their stereotypes about Blacks primed, subsequently scored lower on the math section of the GRE than did students who wrote about a White student, and thus did not have their Black stereotypes primed. These effects emerged regardless of their scores on the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981). Results of a second study showed that these effects were stronger for participants who included stereotypic content in their essays, supporting the argument that stereotypic beliefs played a role in producing them.

In this chapter, and throughout the book, we have provided many reasons why stereotyping and prejudice are harmful. As social psychologists know well, personal involvement increases people's attention to persuasive messages, making it more likely that high quality arguments will be accepted (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Perhaps raising awareness of findings such as these can produce such increased involvement, leading reluctant individuals to recognize the harmful effects of prejudice.

those who would otherwise be threatened by group stereotypes performed well. Thus, women, who believed a math test did not show gender differences performed as well as men on that test (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 2001). Findings such as these suggests that the way in which achievement tests are

described to test takers may affect their scores. It is possible, for example, that the combination of describing IQ tests as diagnostic and the awareness of a test-related stereotype (for example, that those from a lower SES will achieve lower scores) actually produces those lower scores. If so, SES differences might disappear if the IQ tests generally were presented as nondiagnostic (Croizet & Claire, 1998). Yet, as Steele and his colleagues (2003) note, the diagnostic purposes of standardized tests are well known and it seems unlikely that simple instructions would override this effect outside the laboratory. Certainly, however, taking care that instructions are as neutral as possible is important, especially for tests that are not already labeled as diagnostic. Another way to reduce stereotype threat is to teach students about the possibility that their performance may be affected by it. Women's math tests scores were higher when they were told in advance about the conditions that produce stereotype threat (Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005).

Research also has demonstrated that the effects of stereotype threat are most likely to be seen when the task at hand is difficult or frustrating and least likely to emerge when the task is easier (Spencer et al., 2001). This may explain why women do better than men in math courses but not on the SAT; course grades are based on previously studied material and so tests of those skills may be less threatening. Interventions that reduce the stress associated with a test, then, may reduce stereotype threat. Other promising interventions include encouraging students by letting them know that intelligence and achievement are improvable or by having them participate in well-designed programs for high-achieving (not remedial) students (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2001). It is important to note that such strategies have produced long-term improvements in achievement (see Aronson et al., 1998).

Providing role models also reduces stereotype threat. College women, for example, performed better on a difficult math test after reading about successful women, compared to women who read about successful corporations (McIntyre, Paulson, & Lord, 2003). Stereotype threat also can be reduced by changing how feedback is given. As we saw in our discussion of attributional ambiguity, Blacks have reasons to distrust feedback. But research shows that individuals who are told both that standards are high and that they can achieve those standards accept the feedback and are motivated to respond to it (Cohen, Steele, & Ross, 1999). As Steele and his colleagues (2002) point out, such statements de-emphasize negative stereotypes and affirm ability, thereby reducing stereotype threat. As Joshua Aronson and his colleagues (1998) put it "there is nothing special about the personalities, the belief systems, or the values of women and minorities that undermines their performance. Rather, we argue, they fall victim to a situation that undermines their performance. This situation, which we have labeled stereotype threat, arises when negative stereotypes are available as a possible explanation for performance. What is hopeful about this analysis is that situations can be changed" (p. 99). As researchers continue to discover ways to change these situations, and the threat that accompanies them, the negative consequences of that threat can be eradicated.

**Stereotype Lift.** As we noted earlier, people are well aware of the diagnostic purposes of intelligence and achievement tests; cultural expectations about which groups tend to perform better on such tests also are well known (C. Steele, 1997). Research on stereotype threat documents how this knowledge can hinder achievement for members of those groups for whom expectations are low. But research also suggests that this same information can provide a performance boost, or *stereotype lift*, for members of nonstereotyped groups (Walton & Cohen, 2003). This lift can occur if members of nonstereotyped groups engage in downward social comparisons; that is, if they are evaluating their abilities by comparing themselves to others who are doing worse than they are (Fein & Spencer, 1997). The boost that accompanies this comparison theoretically occurs because these downward comparisons alleviate the doubt or anxiety associated with possible failure in achievement-related domains.

This idea was tested by Greg Walton and Geoffrey Cohen (2003) who reviewed 43 studies that assessed the test performance of members of stereotyped and nonstereotyped groups. Results showed that, overall, members of nonstereotyped groups performed better when the test situation produced stereotype threat for the members of the stereotyped groups. That is, what was a drain on performance for the threatened group became a boost in performance for the nonthreatened group. Moreover, the effects of stereotype lift emerged even when threat was introduced through situational cues, and thus was not made explicit in the study. Such outcomes suggests that members of nonstereotyped groups automatically link negative stereotypes and intellectual tests and, therefore, receive the resulting performance lift.

The real-world implications of this are significant. Walton and Cohen, for example, note that stereotype lift results in a 50-point advantage on the SAT for White men compared to stereotype-threatened groups, a difference large enough to make the difference in college admission decisions or awarding of scholarships. Awareness of, and advocacy against, such inequities can result in positive changes. The outcome of a legal challenge illustrates how this can happen. Fair Test filed a legal complaint against the Educational Testing Service and the College Entrance Examination Board (*Test makers to revise national merit exam to address gender bias*, 1996), charging that the Preliminary SAT (PSAT) was gender biased, resulting in girls being underrepresented in the group of National Merit Scholarships. This bias resulted in boys receiving millions of dollars more in scholarships than girls. As part of the settlement, the PSAT was revised; the new test has significantly increased the number of female National Merit Semi-Finalists. Consistent with research on reducing stereotype threat, these gains were achieved by adding a writing component, an area of the test that is not threatening to girls. Doing so should also theoretically reduce stereotype lift to boys on the PSAT.

### Vulnerability to Stress

Research on stereotype threat and stereotype lift addresses how prejudice and discrimination can affect the economic and academic success of stigmatized

group members. Experiencing discrimination also can have a profound influence on an individual's physical and mental health. Such effects are linked to the stress associated with chronic exposure to discriminatory actions and can have both short- and long-term effects.

**How Prejudice and Discrimination Can Produce Stress.** It is well-established that stress can produce psychological and biological changes that result in disease (Lazarus, 1993). Kevin Allison (1998) has argued that either the chronic experience of prejudice, such as repeatedly being stared at in social situations, or the experience of a major individual incidence of prejudice, such as being threatened with physical violence, can produce the chronic stress commonly associated with disease. The impact of subtle prejudice is less intense than the impact of major incidents, but both can have mental and physical health consequences (Sue et al., 2007).

Experimental evidence supports Allison's (1998) assertion. For example, Blacks who completed an achievement test under stereotype threat conditions had elevated blood pressure levels compared to Blacks who took the test under nonthreatening conditions or Whites under either condition (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001). This finding suggests that Blacks' higher incidence of hypertension compared with Whites may stem, at least in part, from their real-life experience in threat-producing situations. Evidence further suggests that the effects are not limited to situations that meet the conditions for stereotype threat. A study of nearly 2,000 Black Americans found a positive relationship between experience with racial discrimination and high blood pressure (Krieger & Sidney, 1996). Similarly, research shows that gay men who reported experiencing anti-gay violence or discrimination during the previous year showed higher levels of psychological distress than gay men who did not report such experiences (Meyer, 2003).

A second way in which experiencing prejudice and discrimination can produce stress is through events that are normative and nonnormative for certain stigmatized groups (Allison, 1998). Examples of normative events include identity development and school socialization; these experiences are part of the developmental process but differ across stigmatized groups. For example, it is typical for adolescents to struggle with their sexual identity development. Yet, for gay and lesbian adolescents, this normative experience has the added stress that stems from knowing prejudice toward their group is widespread. Heterosexuals, for example, do not worry about "coming out" to parents or friends about their attraction to members of the other sex; gay men and lesbians know that telling others of their attraction to same-sex others can result in personal rejection or physical and verbal abuse (Pilkington & D'Augelli, 1995). Correlational data reveal that lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) youth who have disclosed their sexual orientation to family and friends are at a greater risk for a suicide attempt than LGBs who have not made such a disclosure (Rotheram-Borus & Fernandez, 1995). Nonnormative life stresses are those experienced only by members of stigmatized groups. Minority immigrants, for example, often experience prejudice and discrimination during the acculturation process either because of language difficulties or

because they violate cultural norms, increasing their stress levels as they try to adapt to their new environment (Allison, 1998).

Prejudice and discrimination also can produce stress through indirect means. That is, some life events are more likely to happen to individuals from stigmatized groups—not because of their group membership, *per se*, but because of situational factors related to their group membership. Children from a low SES background, for example, are more likely to attend poorly funded schools, live in lower quality housing, and have poorer nutrition than students from higher SES backgrounds, all of which affect their physical and mental health and their success in school. These effects are indirectly related to ethnicity (Arnold & Doctoroff, 2002). That is, race in and of itself does not predict academic achievement; given similar opportunities, both Blacks and Whites are successful in school. However, because ethnic minority children are overrepresented in lower SES groups, they are more likely than White children to experience academic failure that results from poverty. African Americans are more likely than their White counterparts to experience a variety of stressful events, including the divorce or separation of their parents, death of a friend, birth of a sibling, or residence in a violent neighborhood (Garrison, Schoenbach, Schluchter, & Kaplan, 1987). These stressors create a cycle of stress; research has demonstrated, for example, that experiencing a high level of stress makes individuals more vulnerable to the effects of subsequent stressors (Allison, 1998). Evidence also suggests possible indirect effects of higher SES for Blacks. Specifically, mortality rates are higher for Blacks with more advantaged socioeconomic status, perhaps because these individuals have more day-to-day contact with Whites in traditionally all-White workplaces (Feagin & McKinney, 2003). As we saw in our discussion of tokenism, when a person of a different ethnicity joins a formerly all-majority group, the majority is more likely to think about ethnicity, and perhaps to be uncomfortable with having to do so. This discomfort can affect interactions between minority and majority members which, in turn, can result in stress for the minority group member that may affect both mental and physical health. Famous minorities are not immune from this stress, as the examples in Box 11.3 illustrate.

**Stress-Related Responses to Prejudice and Discrimination.** As we noted above, stress produces physiological changes that can affect both mental and physical health. What effects do those stressors have on the people who experience them? To find out, Joe Feagin and Karyn McKinney (2003) conducted focus groups with economically successful African Americans to explore their perceptions of the effects of racism on their physical and mental health. Respondents often noted that racially-related stress affected their immune systems, making them more susceptible to colds and other diseases. Reports of elevated blood pressure, headaches, insomnia, and stomach problems also were common. Some respondents referred to “nine-to-five” headaches that would be present while they were at the workplace, but would lift on leaving. As one respondent put it, “I would have this headache. And it would be for eight hours until I walked out the door and then it was like a weight was lifted off” (p. 73).

**Box 11.3 Can Discrimination Affect the Rich and Famous?**

People of color remain a minority in many arenas, including certain sports and in the television and movie industry. Are the effects of this minority status outweighed by success? Consider this: Arthur Ashe, America's first Black male tennis star, suffered much adversity in his life, including losing his mother at a young age and acquiring AIDS from a blood transfusion, which led to his death. Yet when asked to describe his most difficult challenge, he replied, "Being Black is. No question about it. Even now it continues to feel like an extra weight tied around me" (quoted in Schuster, 1993, p. 1C).

Even respected journalists have been known to make unfortunate racist comments concerning famous sports figures. First, Golf Channel anchor Kelly Tilghman stated on air that the only way for challengers to compete against the successful golfer, Tiger Woods, would be to "lynch him in a back alley." This unfortunate comment led to *Golfweek* magazine featuring a noose on the cover of its January 19, 2008 issue. The ensuing controversy resulted in the firing of the magazine's vice president and editor, Dave Seanor (*Golfweek fires editor*, 2008). As we discussed in Chapter 1, nooses are a strong symbol of hostility toward Blacks; the use of such a symbol by major media outlets should be unthinkable.

Another example of how racism can affect even the most successful comes from the media's response to the question of whether the prestigious Masters Golf Tournament should open its doors to women (Vitello, 2004). The club that hosts this tournament only allows male members, a tradition that was challenged publicly by Martha Burk, head of the National Council of Women's Organizations. Yet who was put on the spot to respond to this challenge? Paul Vitello (2004) asked his readers to consider which of these possibilities was the most likely candidate: (a) the club members themselves; (b) the Professional Golfer's Association; (c) any number of White male golfers who have played in or won the tournaments and/or the women they love; and (d) CBS, the network that broadcasts the Masters. The answer is none of the above; Tiger Woods, the golf phenomenon of Black and Thai ethnicity, was the person singled out and asked

to boycott the tournament. As Vitello (2004) writes, "somehow, because the subject was discrimination, the attention turned to the man of color—the guy whose ancestors were hurt most by the ugly history of white-men-only discrimination in America" (p. 253). Never mind that the issue concerned sex discrimination and that, by boycotting the tournament, Woods would have given up the chance to win the Masters three years in a row, a feat no one has accomplished. As is often the case for tokens, Woods was put in the position of responding not only to actions against his race, but to all discriminatory actions.

One of the stressors these athletes were responding to concerned being asked to serve as a spokesperson for their race. Arthur Ashe, for example, was referring both to his experiences with discrimination and to his position as the first Black tennis star, noting that this role often put him in the position of being spokesperson for his race, a common experience for members of underrepresented groups (Sandler & Hall, 1986). He could never be quite confident that the attention he received was due to his success and not his race. In response to both the decision to include the noose on the cover of *Golfweek* and to the controversial issue of Augusta National having women as members, Woods was asked to be a spokesperson for all underrepresented groups. In both cases, his comments simply referred to such incidents as unfortunate.

On the surface, asking individuals to speak for their group or to stand up for discrimination seems like a supportive gesture on the part of the majority. After all, it does recognize that differences in perspectives can exist. A closer examination, however, shows the problem with the approach. First, it is possible that the majority and minority groups agree on an issue. Second, as we saw in Chapter 3, it reflects a belief in outgroup homogeneity—that outgroup members are all alike and one person can speak for the entire group. Third, it puts the minority group member in the spotlight, which results in her or his actions being highly scrutinized (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Not surprisingly, most minority group members find this extra attention uncomfortable and would prefer that all perspectives representing their group's viewpoints were heard (Sandler & Hall, 1986).

Similarly, college students who reported having fewer positive interracial interactions also reported having more headaches and chronic fatigue and students who anticipated experiencing racially biased treatment scored higher on a measure of psychological distress (Littleford & Wright, 1998).

Feagin and McKinney also found that one way many Blacks coped with these stressors was by engaging in behaviors that are more or less socially accepted but unhealthy such as alcohol and tobacco use or excessive eating. Although such coping mechanisms can help reduce stress in the short-run, they also can obviously have long-term negative health consequences. These coping mechanisms may also affect their children's well-being. Fredrick Gibbons and his colleagues (Gibbons, Gerrard, Cleveland, Wills, & Brody, 2004) found that parents' experience of racial discrimination led to increased parental distress, which indirectly increased parental substance use at the time and two years later. Moreover, their children were aware of their parent's distress and this awareness was related to the children's future substance use. Results also showed, however, that effective parenting reduced the chances that the child would smoke or drink alcohol in the future.

A common, but far from universal, response to racism is frustration, anger, and even rage (Feagin & McKinney, 2003; Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). Although members of minority groups may be reluctant to express these feelings, failing to do so can produce higher blood pressure and greater sleep disturbance (E. Johnson & Greene, 1991). What is the best way to cope? Feagin and McKinney (2003) offer several effective strategies including internally focused or cognitive-based coping, such as adjusting one's own attitudes, being more accepting of what appears to be unintentional discrimination, becoming desensitized to discriminatory acts, or framing the acts as due to White ignorance. Also effective are behavioral strategies, such as verbally confronting discrimination or protesting through formal channels.

Another factor central to effective coping is knowing when one has or lacks control of either the situation or the response to it. As one respondent from Feagin and McKinney's (2003) sample put it, "When I feel that I'm in control, I never get angry.... And I am in control of every racial situation. I am not the sick one.... I'm in control, I don't get mad anymore" (p. 140). By recognizing what can and cannot be controlled, members of stigmatized groups can minimize the psychological costs they incur by reacting—that is, how their own anger can affect their lives—and also can reduce the likelihood that they will internalize the incident, realizing it is not them but the other person or the situation that is to blame. If parental socialization includes a discussion about racism, this strategy also appears to provide a buffer against the negative mental health consequences of experiencing discrimination (Fischer & Shaw, 1999). These strategies focus on how members of stigmatized groups can address prejudice and discrimination. Of course, the burden of addressing these beliefs and behaviors does not rest solely with them. In Chapter 14, we discuss in detail strategies privileged group members can use to reduce prejudice and discrimination.

### Threats to Self-Esteem

Fifty years ago, most social scientists would have said that minority group members have low self-esteem. Theoretically, this situation was expected because it was assumed that these individuals would have accepted and internalized the dominant group's stigmatizing beliefs about them. This viewpoint was consistent

with important theories of the time, such as the concept of the “looking glass self” proposed by Charles Horton Cooley (1902). According to this and similar theories, our self-images are, in part, formed by imagining how we look to others and how others judge us. When those imaginings are negative, self-worth suffers. As we have seen throughout this book, stigmatized group members have a multitude of experiences, both historical and personal, that suggest such negative evaluations exist. But do these experiences affect their self-esteem?

It turns out that this question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. We focus here on the results of a major review of this literature, conducted by Jean Twenge and Jennifer Crocker (2002), who examined data from 712 studies that encompassed over 375,000 participants. Results showed that important differences in self-esteem emerged across ethnic groups. One major finding is that Blacks have higher self-esteem than any other ethnic group studied, including Whites. This pattern of results is particularly interesting because studies of Americans’ general attitudes toward social groups find Blacks to be more devalued than Whites, Asians, or Hispanics (Wilson, 1996a). Clearly, Black’s self-concepts are not simply reflecting societal attitudes toward their group. Interestingly, the evidence also suggests that Blacks’ higher self-esteem is linked to their racial identity. For example, by looking at studies across time, Twenge and Crocker showed that there were larger differences between Blacks’ and Whites’ self-esteem around and after the time of the civil rights and Black power movements in the United States (see also Gray-Little & Hafdahl, 2000), presumably because such actions raised awareness of and confidence in their group identity. Moreover, self-esteem was higher among college-age Blacks, who may be learning more about their culture and heritage (Twenge & Crocker, 2002).

However, the different patterns observed across ethnic groups suggest that a single theory is unlikely to account for the data. In contrast to Blacks, Asians and Hispanics had lower self-esteem than Whites, so not all ethnic groups form a positive social identity relative to the dominant group. In addition, Twenge and Crocker (2002) found little evidence that racial identity improved self-esteem for Asians and Hispanics. Instead, the data for these groups appear to be most consistent with the idea that there are cultural differences in how people evaluate themselves. For example, cultures differ in their endorsement of individualism or collectivism. *Individualism* refers to the idea that people are independent of one another and that individuals should focus on their personal goals, personal uniqueness, and personal controls. *Collectivism* refers to the idea that group members are bound together and are obligated to one another (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). People with an individualist perspective tend to see the self as stable and transcending relationships and situations. That is, they emphasize the individual over the group. In contrast, people with a collectivist perspective tend to believe the self is flexible and varies with the situational context and, accordingly, de-emphasize the importance of the self relative to the group. Maintaining and enhancing self-esteem is associated with individualism; it is acceptable in an individualist culture to stand out from and be superior to others. Collectivist cultures, in contrast, emphasize self-criticism both because it is believed this leads to self-improvement and because it promotes harmony with



### Box 11.4 Are Asians Americans a “Model Minority”?

Statistically, Asian Americans are an underrepresented group in the United States. Yet when people think about minorities, particularly those who are stigmatized, this group does not readily come to mind. You may have noticed, for example, that Asian Americans are rarely a subject of social psychological research on prejudice and discrimination, especially when compared to Blacks and women. One reason Asian Americans are often overlooked may stem from the perception that they are seen as the “model minority.” That is, as a group, Asian Americans are well-integrated into the culture of the United States and the characteristics associated with them—high achievement and economic success—are the same characteristics associated with Americans in general (Lee, 1996). As Daphna Oyserman and Izumi Sakamoto (1997) point out, however, the blurred boundaries between “Asian” and “American” is a mixed bag. It is a good thing to be seen as a model, but viewing Asian Americans in this light is also a way to marginalize the group.

Oyserman and Sakamoto (1997) studied Asian Americans’ perceptions of the stereotypes held about

their group and their reaction to those stereotypes. Results showed that some respondents believed that non-Asians perceive them as high achieving and highly motivated—in short, a model minority. Those who made this observation also believed this to be a positive perception that held a kernel of truth. Other respondents, however, viewed the “model minority” label negatively and believed it overlooked their personal role in their success. That is, they thought their success was being attributed to their group membership, rather than their own abilities and efforts. They also believed that the label kept them out of the societal mainstream. Oyserman and Sakamoto (1997) also found that Asian Americans believe non-Asians hold negative stereotypes about their physical appearance and mannerisms, stereotyping them as short, nearsighted, and having poor English-speaking ability. Asian Americans also believed others perceived them as exclusionist, keeping with their own race and holding condescending views about other races.

These perceptions also are not unfounded. Monica Lin and her colleagues (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005) showed that Whites believe Asian

others. Because the commonly used self-esteem measures contain items consistent with the individualist perspective, self-esteem should be higher in groups that come from those cultures rather than from collectivist cultures.

Twenge and Crocker’s (2002) results are consistent with this perspective. The self-esteem of individuals from collectivist cultures, such as Asian Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans was lower than the self-esteem of individuals from individualist cultures, such as Whites and Blacks in the United States. It might surprise you to learn that Asian Americans experience lower self-esteem than do Blacks or Whites. Many people view this group as a so-called model minority and, as such, expect them to be unaffected by prejudice and discrimination. See Box 11.4 for more about this stereotypic perception.

The question of whether and why stereotyping and prejudice affect self-esteem is far from settled. We saw in our discussion of attributional ambiguity that attributing discrimination to prejudice can actually buffer self-esteem. However, this buffering effect is far from universal, particularly when viewed outside of the context of a particular instance of discrimination. Women who perceive high levels of discrimination, for example, also report higher levels of depression than women who perceive less discrimination (Kobrynowicz & Branscombe, 1997). In addition, asking women to think specifically about the ways they have been discriminated against leads to reductions in self-esteem

Americans have poor social skills. Indeed, a variety of negative stereotypes about Asians exist in concert with the "model minority" label. Whites believe Asians are ambitious, hardworking, and intelligent, but they also see them as pushy, selfish, deceitful, and nerdy (Ho & Jackson, 2001). Moreover, negative attitudes and emotions are particularly strong when White people feel threatened by Asians Americans' academic success (Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & Polinfroni, 2008).

The belief that Asian Americans are highly competent workers appears to coexist with the belief that they are unsociable. Research suggests this latter belief is used to justify discrimination against Asian Americans (Lin et al., 2005). That is, Asian Americans are characterized as working too hard and unfairly succeeding at the cost of positive social relations. The "model minority," then, pays a price for being perceived as competent. This price is evident in Asian American's reports about their experiences. Oyserman and Sakamoto (1997), for example, found that about half of their Asian American sample reported having a set of coping strategies to deal with these negative perceptions. Many of these experiences are similar to those of other stigmatized group members, including the experience of being singled out, being stared at, not

having their groups' voice represented in the media, or, relatedly, having people make assumptions about their perspective based solely on their group membership.

Moreover, model minority status does not appear to ameliorate workplace discrimination; Asian Americans report levels of workplace discrimination that are similar to Hispanics, and significantly less than Whites (although Blacks report higher levels of such discrimination; Bell, Harrison, & McLaughlin, 1997). Another downside to model minority status is that needed help is sometimes not offered. Asian Americans who are poor at math (and so violate the stereotype that all Asian Americans are mathematically talented), for example, might not receive mentoring or other help (Goto, 1999). Research shows that successful Asians Americans are less likely to have a mentor than are successful managers from other minority groups and they report being less satisfied with the mentoring experiences they do have (Thomas, 1991). It may be that the "model minority" stereotype is preventing Asian Americans from getting effective mentoring, perhaps because of the very success that led to this label (Goto, 1999). Many Asian Americans have succeeded in spite of this, but that does not mean it has not hindered others' progress.

(Branscombe, 1998). It seems clear that there is no one answer to the question of whether one's group membership, or experiencing prejudice and discrimination related to that membership, affects self-esteem. The outcomes depend on when and how the question is asked, the cultural context within which a stigmatized group lives, and whether the individuals themselves readily perceive discrimination in their lives. Research questions related to this issue will no doubt continue to attract the attention of social science researchers.

## COPING WITH DISCRIMINATION

As we have seen throughout this chapter, living with prejudice and discrimination creates a threatening situation that can be difficult to deal with and individuals who are in this situation use a variety of coping strategies to do so. Some of these strategies were discussed in the section on stress-related responses to prejudice and discrimination. We next consider two additional coping strategies that have been studied by social justice researchers: psychological disengagement and behavioral compensation.

### Psychological Disengagement and Disidentification

One coping strategy employed by stigmatized group members is **psychological disengagement**, “a defensive detachment of self-esteem from outcomes in a particular domain, such that feelings of self-worth are not dependent on successes or failures in that domain” (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998, p. 35). That is, when individuals disengage, they produce a psychological separation from themselves and the arena in which they might fail, thereby protecting their self-esteem. A person who fears poor performance in an achievement-related area, for example, might psychologically prepare for failure by deemphasizing the importance of success in that area. One way to manage this is by **disidentification** or devaluing the domain (Schmader, Major, & Gramzow, 2001; C. Steele, 1997). When people disidentify with a domain, they define or redefine their self-concept so that the domain is no longer an area of self-identification. Women who believe they might be unsuccessful at math, then, might disidentify with a career in mathematics, and instead associate their self-worth with literature. For these women, then, failure at math would not affect their self-esteem. A second way to separate stereotypic expectations of failure from individual self-esteem is by discounting the feedback as inaccurate or invalid, particularly because its source was a prejudiced other (Crocker et al., 1991). We discussed this process under the section of this chapter on attributional ambiguity.

It is important to note that psychological disengagement refers to the distancing of the self from areas in which one's group is negatively stereotyped and, therefore, expected to fail. In our example, a woman's belief that she might fail at math is tied to the cultural stereotype that women, in general, are not mathematically inclined. This process also can operate on an individual level—that is, for reasons not linked to group stereotypes. Sabotaging one's performance out of fear of failure, called self-handicapping, can have similar self-protective outcomes (Berglas & Jones, 1978). Our focus, here, however, is on disengagement that is related to group membership. Theoretically, the disengagement emerges in response to systemic injustice, or the belief that discrimination has produced differences between social groups that cannot be overcome at a personal level, no matter how motivated or competent an individual member of that group is (Schmader et al., 2001).

Research suggests that Black students are particularly likely to disengage their self-esteem from their performance in intellectual or academic domains, especially when compared to Whites. A study of a large, nationally representative sample of middle and high school-aged children found that Blacks' achievement was lower than Whites' in three of the four content areas studied (Osbourne, 1995). Despite this, Blacks reported higher self-esteem than did Whites. Moreover, the relationship between grade point average and self-esteem weakened for Blacks as the children reached more advanced grade levels, suggesting that disengagement is more likely after more academic feedback and experience. A similar pattern emerged for Black males, but not Black females, when the relationship between academic achievement and self-esteem was examined. No such weakening occurred for White students. Moreover, based on both empirical data and a recent review of this literature,

Toni Schmader and her colleagues (2001) concluded that this disengagement of the self from academic domains occurs not because ethnic minorities devalue education but rather because they discount the academic feedback they receive from White evaluators.

Much of the evidence on ethnic differences in engagement is based on correlational data that cannot definitely confirm the cause. To test the role of engagement experimentally, Brenda Major and her colleagues (1998, Study One) had Blacks and Whites take either an easy or difficult test, so that participants experienced success or failure in an academic domain. If Blacks are disengaging from academic performance in general, their self-esteem should be less affected by negative feedback in such situations than should the self-esteem of Whites. Results supported this prediction; White's performance-related self-esteem was lower when they took the difficult test and experienced failure than when they took the easy test and succeeded. In contrast, Blacks' performance-related self-esteem was not affected by which test they took.

Major and her colleagues (1998) conducted a follow-up study that examined whether test failure would be more likely to affect individuals who were chronically disengaged intellectually, compared with those who chronically engaged on this factor. Level of intellectual engagement was assessed in advance on a measure designed for that purpose. Procedures were otherwise similar to Study One, except that all participants in Study Two believed they performed poorly on the test. Results showed that Blacks who were chronically disengaged with intellectual tests tended to have higher self-esteem following failure than Blacks who were not so disengaged. Whites' self-esteem was unrelated to their level of intellectual engagement. Taken together, research on psychological disengagement suggests that Blacks can protect their self-esteem by disengaging themselves from academic or achievement-related domains. Yet, doing so has costs; disconnecting from academic achievement may result in poor performance in school, which is linked to higher dropout rates, lower college acceptance rates, and the receipt of fewer scholarships to support higher education. It is also linked to fewer opportunities for job success (C. Steele, 1997).

### Behavioral Compensation

As we have seen throughout this chapter, for members of stigmatized groups the experience of prejudice and discrimination is not a one-time or unusual event. Because of this, individuals develop strategies that help them cope with the experience. A strategy labeled **behavioral compensation** has recently received attention and concerns how people behave when they expect to be discriminated against. Carol Miller and her colleagues (Kaiser & Miller, 2001b; Miller & Myers, 1998) have proposed that, in such situations, people sometimes compensate for potential discrimination by changing their behavior in ways that disconfirm the stereotype.

According to this perspective, individuals develop a set of skills to help them achieve desired outcomes. In the case of potential discrimination, these skills are above and beyond what is needed to succeed in a typical social interaction. This is

because when prejudice is a possibility, the individual must overcome an added burden to be successful in an interaction. Heavyweight people, for example, know that they may face discrimination because of their weight; this discrimination can take the form of overhearing unflattering comments about their size, being avoided or excluded, job discrimination, and even physical violence (Miller & Myers, 1998). To compensate for possible discrimination, heavyweight individuals might use humor in a social interaction to increase the chances that they will be liked. According to Miller and Myers (1998), when prejudice is particularly severe, higher levels of compensation are required to overcome it. Increased prejudice also reduces the chances that the compensation will be successful.

Experimental evidence suggests stigmatized people do compensate for potential discrimination. In one relevant experiment, Cheryl Kaiser and Carol Miller (2001b) asked women to complete a test of their future career success. This test required them to write an essay about what their lives would be like in 10 years. The women also were told, either before or after completing the essay, that the panel of men who would be evaluating their results was composed entirely of prejudiced men or that either 50 percent or none of the panelists were prejudiced men. Independent evaluators rated the essays on the extent to which they conformed to gender stereotypes and gave their overall impression of the essays. Results showed the content of the essays varied depending on who the participants thought would evaluate them: The essays of those forewarned about prejudice included fewer references to stereotypically feminine topics, such as the importance of family and niceness, compared to essays written by those who believed none of the panelists were prejudiced or who were informed of possible discrimination after the fact. The authors believe that these differences were due to the women's desire to distance themselves from femininity as a way to compensate in advance for the judges' possible sexism. An interesting additional finding was that those who wrote the essays that distanced themselves from femininity created a more negative impression overall; Kaiser and Miller speculate that this outcome was due to overcompensation—that is, these women inadvertently created the impression that they were unfeminine and strident.

To test the possibility that behavioral compensation varies by the demands of the situation, Carol Miller and her colleagues (Miller, Rothblum, Brand, & Felicio, 1995) studied the impressions overweight and normal-weight women made in a telephone conversation. In some cases, their conversational partner could see them, in others the partners could not be seen. This manipulation was designed to increase the demands of the situation for those who could be seen; presumably, the overweight women felt an extra burden because they expected discrimination based on their weight. The authors also varied whether the overweight women believed or did not believe their partner could see them. In all cases, the interaction was videotaped, so a visual record was created. Of interest were the partners' ratings of the overweight women's social skills after the conversation. Results showed that overweight women received more negative evaluations than normal-weight women when their partner could see them and they were not aware that they could be seen. When they were aware that they could be seen, overweight women were rated similarly to normal-weight

women. That is, they were able to successfully compensate for potential prejudice by using their social skills more effectively.

People's ability to compensate for prejudice depends on a number of factors. First, the demands of the prejudice-related situation must not be so high that the person cannot overcome them. Second, the person must acquire and effectively use the skills needed for compensation and there are probably individual differences in the ability to do so (see Miller & Myers, 1998 for a review). Finally, there may be unintended consequences to behavioral compensation. People who expect to compensate for the effects of prejudice may "slack off" in situations where prejudice is not a factor and, in doing so, fail to use the appropriate level of effort required in that social setting. They also may overcompensate, as we saw in the Kaiser and Miller (2001b) study, by trying too hard, talking too much, or coming on too strong. In short, stigmatized individuals may misjudge the requirements of the social interaction and either do too much or too little. Certainly, this is a burden not faced by members of nonstigmatized groups.

## SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed the research on stereotyping and prejudice from the perspective of stigmatized group members. Five factors distinguish whether a stigma is benign or harmful: course, concealability, aesthetic qualities, origin, and peril. Stigmas can be acquired by association: people associate negative characteristics with dominant group members who socialize with or support stigmatized others. Tokens are individuals who are a minority in a majority group; these individuals stand out from the group and often have negative experiences because of it. Rosabeth Kanter (1977) emphasized the perceptual tendencies of visibility, contrast, and assimilation that produce these negative experiences. More recent work describes the chilly climate that can accompany tokenism and its effect on the individuals who experience it.

Social psychologists have proposed several theories about how people respond to prejudice and discrimination. Work on attributional ambiguity shows that members of stigmatized groups know that dominant group members have both positive and negative reactions to them and that these reactions can lead to both favorable and unfavorable evaluations. What is important is that, in both cases, the stigmatized person believes these evaluations may be due to their group membership, not their ability. Ironically, this makes it difficult for members of stigmatized groups to know which actions and behaviors are sincere and which stem from prejudice or from a desire to appear unbiased. Attributing negative feedback to prejudice can provide a buffer to self-esteem, but this buffer may come at a cost. One potential cost can be seen in research on the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD)—the tendency to believe that one's group is more likely to experience discrimination than one is as an individual group member. The PGDD has been demonstrated in a number of contexts and may be explained by cognitive factors, such as differences in how information about individuals and groups is

processed, or by motivational factors, such as the desire to deny personal discrimination as a justification for not taking action against it.

Experiencing discrimination has a number of personal consequences for the target. For example, research on stereotype threat suggests that stigmatized group members are aware that they are stereotyped and that, especially in achievement settings, they fear confirming those stereotypes. This fear itself can then undermine academic achievement. The general features of stereotype threat include the importance of situational factors in producing the threat and the generality of its effects. Stereotype threat also can change the way people process information. However, researchers have shown that, under certain conditions, stereotype threat can be reduced. Finally, nonstereotyped group members sometimes experience stereotype lift, a gain that emerges from the same situations that produce stereotype threat for the stereotyped group.

Throughout this chapter, the stressful byproducts that result from experiencing prejudice were emphasized. These byproducts affect physical health, producing hypertension, headaches, and other ailments, and mental health, such as depression and coping. Although strategies are available that reduce these effects, some are unhealthy and many put the burden on the stigmatized group member rather than the prejudiced actor. One negative outcome of discrimination is low self-esteem, which appears to affect Asians and Hispanics more than Blacks and Whites. Differences between individualist and collectivist cultures may explain these effects, particularly because the former emphasizes the self and the latter emphasizes the group.

Individuals can cope with discrimination by psychologically disengaging or putting a psychological separation between themselves and the arena in which they might fail. This can be accomplished by disidentification, or devaluing the domain, or by discounting the feedback. Doing so often has the unfortunate effect of lowering academic achievement. Individuals may also use behavior compensation as a way to cope with prejudice and discrimination. That is, they develop a set of skills that allow them to compensate for potential discrimination by changing their behavior in ways that disconfirm the stereotype. Doing so has both an upside and a downside.

This chapter includes a number of personal stories of the effects of experiencing prejudice and discrimination. It is important that dominant group members listen to those stories and understand the cumulative effect of even seemingly small incidents of discrimination. It is this cumulative impact that is often most detrimental to those who experience discrimination because of their group membership.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### The Target's Perspective

Oyserman, D. & Swim, J. K. (Ed.) (2001). Stigma: An insider's perspective [Special Issue]. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57(1).

Swim, J. K. & Stangor, C. (Eds.) (1998). *Prejudice: The target's perspective*. San Diego: Academic Press.

Both resources have a number of articles that are relevant to the issues in this chapter. Both include general discussions of theories and data as well as articles devoted to specific stigmatized groups, such as the overweight, women, or specific racial groups.

### Social Stigma

Jones, E. E., Farina, A., Hastorf, A. H., Markus, H., Miller, T., & Scott, R. (1984). *Social stigma: The psychology of marked relationships*. New York: Freeman.

Although a great deal of research has addressed stigma since the publication of this book, it remains one of the best resources on this topic because of its clear explanations.

Weiner, B., Perry, R. P., & Magnusson, J. (1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55, 738–748.

An accessible research article that examines people's perceptions of and reactions to stigmatized individuals.

### Personal Experiences as Tokens or Members of Stigmatized Groups

Dews, C. L. B. (Ed.) (1995). *This fine place so far from home*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Tokarczyk, M. M. & Fay, E. A. (Eds.) (1993). *Working-class women in the academy: Laborers in the knowledge factory*. Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press.

Both books contain collections of essays from women and men from lower class and/or ethnic minority backgrounds who are currently working in academia. Many essays explore their experiences, including their feelings of isolation and the ways in which the subtle message that they are “different” is conveyed. Their experiences will resonate with many students, especially students of color and first generation college students.

Graham, L. O. (1995). *Member of the club: Reflections on life in a racially polarized world*. New York: Harper Collins.

This highly readable book contains a series of essays that address racism in the United States. Graham is a highly successful Harvard-trained lawyer who writes about his difficulty in finding acceptance in either the White professional or the Black community. One essay, for example, describes his undercover job as a busboy in an all-White Connecticut country club. Others address topics from interracial marriage to Black men's dining experiences in top New York restaurants.

Herek, G. M. & Berrill, K. T. (Eds.) (1992). *Hate crimes: Confronting violence against lesbians and gay men*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

This excellent volume contains a number of powerful “Survivor Stories” of victims of anti-gay and lesbian violence. Many were based on testimony at the 1996 anti-gay violence hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of



the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. The stories are brief and memorable and put a human face on the problem of violence against gays and lesbians.

### Responses to Negative Behaviors

Crocker, J. & Major, B. (2003). The self-protective properties of stigma: Evolution of a modern classic. *Psychological Inquiry*, 14, 232–237.

Crocker and Major's work on attributional ambiguity was recognized as a modern classic; in this article, they discussed the source of their ideas and how they developed them. They also discuss how their research has influenced other theorists.

Crosby, F. J. (1984). The denial of personal discrimination. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 27, 371–386.

Taylor, D. M., Wright, S. C., & Porter, L. E. (1994). Dimensions of perceived discrimination: The personal/group discrimination discrepancy. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson (Eds.), *The psychology of prejudice: The Ontario symposium* (Vol. 7, pp. 233–255). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Crosby's paper provides a highly readable discussion of the personal group discrimination discrepancy. Taylor's review discusses newer theories about the causes of the PGDD.

### Stereotype Threat

Steele, C. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. *American Psychologist*, 52, 613–629.

Steele, C., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69, 797–811.

These widely cited articles provide both a theoretical overview of stereotype threat and a description of research demonstrating the basic effects. The authors also discuss the applied implications of their findings and offer suggestions for overcoming stereotype threat. Although many more recent articles exist, including more current review articles, these remain the standards for those new to the literature.

### Coping with Discrimination

Feagin, J. R., & McKinney, K. D. (2003). *The many costs of racism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Reviews the cost of White racism from the perspective of African Americans, covering physical and mental health costs and family and community costs. The book has many engaging examples and also focuses on strategies for overcoming racism.

Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2001). Reacting to impending discrimination: Compensation for prejudice and attributions to discrimination. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27, 1357–1367.

Relatively little research has addressed how people's behavior changes when they expect to be discriminated against. This clever study gets at both the behavior of the person expecting discrimination and independent assessments about how those behavioral changes might affect the interaction.

Major, B., Spencer, S. J., Schmader, T., Wolfe, C., & Crocker, J. (1998). Coping with negative stereotypes about intellectual performance: The role of psychological disengagement. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24, 34–50.

This groundbreaking paper provides experimental evidence for psychological disengagement.

### KEY TERMS

|                         |                    |                   |
|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| attributional ambiguity | personal/group     | psychological     |
| behavioral              | discrimination     | disengagement     |
| compensation            | discrepancy (PGDD) | stereotype threat |
| disidentification       |                    | stigmatized       |

### QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. Explain the concept of stigma and describe the five factors that distinguish between harmful and benign stigmas.
2. Do you think the basis of their stigma matters from the point of view of marked, or stigmatized, individuals? Explain your answer.
3. Give examples of groups in the modern world who are numerically a majority but are nonetheless stigmatized.
4. Explain why researchers often consider women to be a stigmatized group.
5. Define stigma by association. How are your own interactions affected by the possibility of this stigma?
6. Give examples of token groups outside the corporate setting studied by Kanter (1977). Explain how the concepts of visibility, assimilation, and contrast relate to these groups.
7. If you were doing research on the effects of tokenism, how would you determine whether a particular person's experiences were unique to that person or part of an overall pattern of discrimination toward her or his social group?
8. Explain the concept of attributional ambiguity. Why would a stigmatized group member experience attributional ambiguity?
9. What reactions might a member of a stigmatized group have to positive feedback given by a majority group member? Think of situations where each reaction might be more likely.

10. What is the personal/group discrimination discrepancy? Outline the available support for cognitive and motivational explanations for the personal/group discrimination discrepancy. Which explanation do you think is more accurate and why?
11. Explain the concept of stereotype threat. Outline the keys to understanding how stereotype threat operates.
12. If you were an elementary school teacher, how would you prepare your students for standardized tests so that the effects of stereotype threat would be minimized?
13. Describe the stressors that result from experiencing discrimination. How could these stressors be minimized?
14. Is the stress associated with experiencing discrimination the same or different from other types of stress? Explain your reasoning.
15. Who is more responsible for reducing the mental health consequences of experiencing discrimination, the stigmatized or the majority group member? Explain your reasoning.
16. Consider the current literature addressing how experiencing discrimination affects self-esteem. What are the most important questions that remain unanswered? If you were planning to conduct research on this issue, what would be your focus? Why?
17. Explain the concept of psychological disengagement.
18. Distinguish between disidentification and discounting.
19. How might psychological disengagement affect the school performance of Hispanics in the United States?
20. Explain the concept of behavioral compensation. Explain how members of stigmatized groups use behavioral compensation in situations where they might be discriminated against. Does behavioral compensation do more harm than good? Explain your reasoning.
21. The work cited in this chapter examines social psychological theory, but also emphasizes individual experience. How should researchers balance these two perspectives?
22. Consider the quotations that opened this chapter. Do you believe dominant group members can ever understand what it is like to experience discriminatory behaviors? Why or why not? Are there factors that will make this understanding more likely?

## Chapter 12

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# Gender and Sexual Orientation

*We have stopped on our journey; when my father says to we will go on, leaving this paradise, leaving the family place. We have my father's job. Like him, I will be strong all of my life. We are men. If we squint our eyes in the sun we will see far. I'm ready. It's good, this resolve.*

—EXCERPT FROM “A FAREWELL, AGE 10” BY WILLIAM STAFFORD. COPYRIGHT © 1999 BY THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM STAFFORD. REPRINTED FROM THE WAY IT IS: NEW & SELECTED POEMS, BY PERMISSION OF GRAYWOLF PRESS, SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA.

Female students feel that they have to conform to traditional ideals of femininity while also accomplishing the highest level of academic success. They need to be attractive, but not too attractive, smart, but not too smart. The ideals affect, among other things, how women dress, eat, study, date, and show initiative.

—KATE DUBE, COMMENTING ON THE EXPECTATION THAT DUKE UNIVERSITY WOMEN UNDERGRADUATES ACHIEVE “EFFORTLESS PERFECTION” (2004, P. 45)

### Chapter Outline

#### Gender-Based Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

*Gender Stereotypes*

*Attitudes toward Women and Men*

*Subtypes of Women and Men*

*Women in the Workplace*

*The Male Gender Role*

#### Heterosexism and Sexual Prejudice

*Stereotypes of Lesbians and Gay Men*

*Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities*

*Coming Out*

*Heterosexism in the Workplace*

#### Summary

#### Suggested Readings

#### Key Terms

#### Questions for Review and Discussion

The quotes at the beginning of this chapter, reprinted from two very different sources, share an important commonality: They both illustrate the prescriptive nature of gender stereotypes. Recall from Chapter 1 that stereotypes often have both a descriptive component (what is) and a prescriptive component (what should be and should not be; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). William Stafford's poem conveys a definite message about what the boy believes he should be like as a man; Kate Dube's observation focuses on what Duke University undergraduate women, and probably many other undergraduate women, believe is expected of them. In the United States and most other cultures, one need not look far to find such assertions that convey the prescriptive nature of gender stereotypes. If you doubt this, pick up a magazine or flip through the television channels to see how long it takes to find messages about the appropriate social roles for the sexes. Chances are it will not take long. Or, take a trip to the baby section of any department store; you will readily see that children's clothing is gender segregated and gender stereotypic. In many countries, boys' clothing is decorated with trucks, tools, and balls whereas girls' clothing is decorated with dolls, hearts, and flowers—early life messages that tell children the kinds of people they “should” become.

The first section of this chapter focuses on the content of those gender-associated messages and the consequences of adhering or refusing to adhere to them. Beliefs about what constitute appropriate roles for women and men also influence beliefs about sexual orientation. These beliefs result in a strong cultural bias toward *heterosexism*, or the ideological system that prescribes heterosexuality and denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes sexual minority groups (Herek, 2007). Research on the nature of this cultural bias and its relationship to anti-gay prejudice and discrimination is summarized in the second part of this chapter.

## GENDER-BASED STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION

All cultures have established sets of beliefs about men and women and the traits and roles they should possess and occupy (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998). Mary Kite, Kay Deaux, and Elizabeth Haines (2008) describe these sets of beliefs as a **gender belief system** that includes both descriptive and prescriptive elements. The information contained in the gender belief system encompasses stereotype content, attitudes toward the appropriate roles for women and men, and perceptions of those who violate gender-based expectations (see Figure 12.1). These elements influence both people's self-concept and their perceptions of others. As with information about other social groups, the content of this belief system is conveyed through the media, and through parental and peer influence among other sources; learning about this content begins early in life and continues throughout the life span (see Chapters 3 and 8). We begin by summarizing research on gender stereotypes, which Kay Deaux and Marianne LaFrance (1998) argue is the most fundamental aspect of the gender belief system.




**FIGURE 12.1** The Gender Belief System

This figure illustrates the components of the gender belief system including beliefs about gender roles, gender-associated stereotypes, attitudes toward women's and men's gender roles, and perceptions of those who violate those roles, including violations based on sexual orientation.

### Gender Stereotypes

Early work exploring the content of gender stereotypes was conducted in the late 1960s by Paul Rosenkrantz, Inge Broverman, and their colleagues (Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman, & Broverman, 1968). Their research and many subsequent studies identified two clusters of traits, one associated with men and the other associated with women, which represent a core component of gender-based stereotypes (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998). Stereotypes about men's traits are represented by a competence cluster that includes characteristics such as independent, strong, and self-confident. Researchers label this cluster *agentive* or *instrumental*. Stereotypes about women's traits are represented by a warmth-expressiveness cluster that includes characteristics such as emotional, helpful, and kind. Researchers label this cluster *communal* or *expressive*. Table 12.1 contains a list of the gender-associated characteristics contained in these clusters.

The traits associated with women and men have been widely researched for many years; indeed countless studies have replicated the basic pattern described above. The majority of this research has focused on positive traits; however, people also associate negative characteristics with the sexes. Women, for example, are seen as bitchy, ditzzy, indecisive, jealous, and moody whereas men are seen as arrogant, insensitive, loud, pigheaded, and sexist (Oswald & Lindstedt, 2006; Spence, Helmreich, & Holohan, 1979). Researchers also have noted that gender-associated beliefs are multidimensional, encompassing ideas about women's and men's physical characteristics, roles, cognitive abilities, and emotions in addition to their traits (see Table 12.1). Men, for example, are assumed to be the head of the household and are believed to enjoy watching sports on television, whereas women are assumed to be

**TABLE 12.1 The Content of Gender Stereotypes**

|                                 | Beliefs about Women                                                                                                                                                | Beliefs about Men                                                                                                                                                                               |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Traits</b>                   | Able to devote self to others<br>Aware of others' feelings<br>Emotional<br>Helpful<br>Gentle<br>Kind<br>Understanding<br>Warm                                      | Active<br>Can make decisions easily<br>Competitive<br>Feels superior<br>Independent<br>Never gives up easily<br>Self-confident<br>Stands up well under pressure                                 |
| <b>Roles</b>                    | Cooks the meals<br>Does the household shopping<br>Does laundry<br>Is fashion conscious<br>Source of emotional support<br>Takes care of children<br>Tends the house | Assumes financial obligations<br>Head of household<br>Financial provider<br>Leader<br>Responsible for household repairs<br>Takes initiative in sexual relations<br>Watches sports on television |
| <b>Physical Characteristics</b> | Beautiful<br>Cute<br>Dainty<br>Gorgeous<br>Graceful<br>Petite<br>Pretty<br>Sexy<br>Soft voice                                                                      | Athletic<br>Brawny<br>Broad-shouldered<br>Burly<br>Muscular<br>Physically strong<br>Physically vigorous<br>Rugged<br>Tall                                                                       |
| <b>Cognitive Abilities</b>      | Artistic<br>Creative<br>Expressive<br>Imaginative<br>Intuitive<br>Perceptive<br>Tasteful<br>Verbally skilled                                                       | Analytical<br>Exact<br>Good at abstractions<br>Good at numbers<br>Good at problem solving<br>Good with reasoning<br>Mathematical<br>Quantitatively skilled                                      |

SOURCE: Kite (2001, p. 563). With permission from Academic Press.

fashion conscious and perceived as the caretakers of the house (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1984). Moreover, men are thought to be good at abstract thinking and problem solving whereas women are thought to be artistically and verbally skilled (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Oswald & Lindstedt, 2006).

Women's and men's physical characteristics also figure prominently in people's gender belief system. Women are viewed as dainty and pretty for example, whereas men are viewed as muscular and rugged (Cejka & Eagly, 1999). Evidence suggests that women's and men's facial characteristics affect other gender-stereotypic beliefs. The male face is typically dominated by a prominent browridge and noseridge, a larger jaw, and thicker eyebrows—an overall more mature-looking face. The female face is more likely to have full cheeks, a small jaw, and large eyes—an overall more babyish appearance. Research on perceptions of these typical faces has revealed that men with the typical male face are believed to be more powerful, dominant, and shrewd and that women with the typical female face are believed to be weaker, submissive, and naive. Note that these assumptions map onto the personally traits generally associated with the sexes. When researchers created faces that softened the prominence of these gender-linked physical characteristics, the associated gender stereotypes also were eliminated (Friedman, Putnam, Hamberger, & Berman, 1992), suggesting that at least some of the traits associated with men and women come from differences in physical appearance. Box 12.1 describes differences in the way women and men have been physically depicted in both modern times and throughout history.

Our gender belief system also encompasses ideas about the appropriate emotions for the sexes. Ashby Plant and her colleagues (Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000) studied 19 emotions, including guilt, sadness, fear, and sympathy. Women were perceived as more likely than men to both experience and express the majority of those emotions; men were perceived as more likely to experience and express only anger and pride. Moreover, results of a second study by Plant and her colleagues (2000) showed that the actor's gender influenced interpretation of emotional displays. Men's expression of anger was interpreted as representing only anger, but the same expression by a woman was interpreted as a combination of anger and sadness, perhaps because it is less socially acceptable for women to show anger. Although both women and men are viewed unfavorably when they overreact emotionally to an event, these judgments are more severe when their emotional response is gender stereotypic. For example, Sarah Huston-Comeau and Janice Kelly (2002) found that people viewed men more negatively when their overreaction was in response to an anger-arousing event but viewed women more negatively when their overreaction was in response to a happy event.

Some other dimensions of gender-stereotypic beliefs merit attention. First, people's beliefs reflect **gender polarization**, the assumption that gender-associated characteristics are bipolar (Bem, 1993); that is, people believe that what is masculine is not feminine and that what is feminine is not masculine. A corollary of this belief is that people expect a person who is masculine (or feminine) on one gender-stereotypic dimension to be masculine (or feminine) on other dimensions. People expect, for example, that a man who occupies a stereotypically masculine social role also will have stereotypically masculine physical characteristics and personality traits (Deaux & Lewis, 1984). Conversely, people do not expect a woman with stereotypically feminine physical characteristics to have stereotypically masculine personality traits. Second, judgments about power and status are associated with gender stereotypes. High-status individuals are believed to have stereotypically male traits and low status individuals are



**Box 12.1 Face-ism**

Sexism can exist right under our eyes, but is often out of our awareness. Imagine, for example, two separate billboards, one depicting a male model and the other a female model. What is the focus of each billboard? Would you be surprised to learn that the man's face was more prominent than the woman's? According to Dane Archer and his colleagues (Archer, Iritani, Kimes, & Barrios, 1983), you should not be. Moreover, these authors believe that how the media depicts women and men "may (wittingly or not) communicate something important about the relative importance for each sex of the mind and body. Because the face and head are the centers of mental life—intellect, personality, identity, and character—the relative prominence of this part of the anatomy may be symbolically consequential" (p. 72). By making the male face prominent, they argue, the conveyed message is that men's essence resides in the head and face more so than does women's. Women's essence, in contrast, is conveyed by the more frequent depiction of her body.

Archer and colleagues (1983) tested these ideas by comparing the relative size of male and female faces in a variety of photographs and drawings, a measure they refer to as *face-ism*. In one study, the researchers coded 1,750 published photographs in five prominent U.S. magazines. Results showed a strong tendency for men to be represented by their faces and for women to be represented by their bodies. A second study replicated this pattern for major periodicals from 12 societies within Europe, the Far East, Africa, and South America. Yet another study found similar results when artwork produced between the 15th and the 20th centuries was examined. The same pattern emerged when undergraduates drew a woman or a man on a blank piece of paper. These artists were more likely to

fill in men's facial features, but to omit this detail in drawings of women. Similarly, a study of the facial prominence of elected officials in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Norway found that male politicians' faces were more prominent than female politicians' faces, even though there were no differences in the actual body proportions of the women and men (Konrath & Schwarz, 2007). Does face-ism affect person perception? The data suggest that it does; people depicted by high-prominence faces are seen as more intelligent, ambitious, and assertive, than people depicted with low-prominence faces (Archer et al., 1983; Schwarz & Kurz, 1989).

The results of these studies are striking for a number of reasons. First, the creators of the photographs and artwork could not have known their work would be part of a research project, so this could not have affected the images they produced. It is also unlikely that the students asked to draw women and men could have guessed the experimenters' purpose. Second, researchers have replicated these findings across medium, culture, and time. Recent research suggests that gender differences in facial prominence may be disappearing (Nigro, Hill, Gelbein, & Clark, 1988), but this disappearance may depend on the context in which women and men are portrayed. Justin Matthews (2007) found that in photographs depicting intellectual occupations, men's facial prominence was greater but in photographs depicting physical occupations, women's facial prominence was greater. Chances are, unless you had read about this research previously, you were unaware that women and men are depicted differently in the media. Does being unaware of these differences mean they do not affect perceptions of women and men and their appropriate roles? You decide.

believed to have stereotypically female traits (Conway, Mount, & Pizzamiglio, 1996). Finally, people have definite ideas about how women and men should behave, based on their gender-associated beliefs and, as we will discuss later in this chapter, often view those who violate gender roles negatively.

**How Widespread are Gender-Stereotypic Beliefs?** Psychologists often are criticized for their reliance on college students as research participants and their failure to explore the beliefs and attitudes of other groups. However, research exploring the sexes' perceived agency and communion does not follow this pattern. Indeed, one of the remarkable aspects of this research is the consistency of the results across respondent age, geographic region, and, with some exceptions we

discuss below, across time. Similar constellations of gender-associated traits, for example, have been found college students, the general population of the United States, and in 30 other countries (Williams & Best, 1990). Moreover, research conducted in the 1990s found basically the same set of gender-associated traits as research published 20 years earlier (A. Harris, 1994; Lueptow, Garovich, & Lueptow, 1995). Gender-stereotypic traits, then, appear to have a remarkable universality and stability. Other gender-associated beliefs also have been replicated cross-culturally (Glick et al., 2000).

Despite this consistency, a word of caution is in order. This research, although extensive, is usually based on studies that, either implicitly or explicitly, assess the perceptions of middle-class White people or, in the case of the cross-cultural studies, on the perceptions of the majority groups in the respective countries. Results of the few U.S. studies that have examined whether perceptions vary by social class or ethnicity suggest a complexity that remains poorly understood. When the ethnicity of the person being rated is taken into account, for example, free-response assessments show that White women and men are described differently than Black and Asian women and men. Black women are thought to be more agentic and less communal than White women, for example (Landrine, 1985; Niemann, Jennings, Rozelle, Baxter, & Sullivan, 1994). People also believe that lower-class women are more confused, dirty, hostile, inconsiderate, and irresponsible than middle-class women (Landrine, 1985). These studies, although few in number, testify to the gaps in current understanding of how gender stereotypes are affected by knowledge of other social group memberships. Similarly, researchers have relied heavily on the perceptions of White respondents and too little on the perceptions of people of color, even though there may be ethnic group differences in how women and men are perceived. For example, Amanda Durik and her colleagues (2006) found that White respondents were more likely to associate emotionality with women than were Black, Asian, or Hispanic respondents.

**Accuracy of Gender-Associated Beliefs.** How well do gender stereotypes map onto the actual characteristics of women and men? One way to answer this question is simply to see whether women and men possess the characteristics associated with their social group (see Chapter 3). The available research shows that, on average, stereotypic beliefs mirror the characteristics women and men use to describe their own traits—that is, men are more likely than women to describe themselves as independent and competitive and women are more likely than men to describe themselves as gentle and helpful (Lippa, 2005). These findings suggest that, at the group level, people are reasonably accurate observers of women's and men's characteristics (Swim, 1994).

Yet this accuracy comes at a cost. The knowledge that gender stereotypes are generally accurate at the group level can easily lead to erroneous conclusions about individual women and men. Such inaccurate conclusions are often rooted in the belief that there is no overlap between the sexes in the distribution of gender-associated traits—for example, a belief that all women are kinder than all men. In fact, some men are higher in communion, or in female-associated traits, than are most women and some women are higher in agency, or male-associated

traits, than are most men. Because there is considerable variability on these trait clusters within each sex, it may be inaccurate to conclude that a particular man is agentic or that a particular woman is not. Another problem with drawing conclusions about what women and men are like is that such assumptions also sometimes move gender-stereotypic beliefs from descriptive to prescriptive—that is, they lead to assumptions about what women and men should or should not be like. When that happens, prejudice and discrimination can result, perhaps especially toward those who do not fit with expectations. For example, the assumption that all men are assertive and that, therefore, every man should be assertive, could lead to negative perceptions of men who are not assertive.

**Change Over Time.** Jean Twenge (1997a) found that today's women are significantly more likely to report having agentic characteristics compared to women of 20 years ago. However, over the same time period, women's self-endorsement of communal traits has not changed, nor has men's self-endorsement of either agentic or communal traits. (Which is not to say there will be no change on these characteristics during the next 20 years.) These changes have not gone unnoticed. When Amanda Diekmann and Alice Eagly (2000) asked people to describe the gender-associated characteristics of women and men in the past (1950s), present, and future (2050), they found that, across all time periods, people believed women were more communal than men and that men were more agentic than women. However, mirroring Twenge's (1997a) findings about changes in self-perceptions over time, people believed that women's and men's agency is more similar today than in the past. This change is due to the perception that women today are more agentic than in the past, but that men's agency has not changed over time. Respondents also predicted this pattern of change would continue into the future (see Figure 12.2). In contrast, men's and women's communion was predicted to be relatively stable over time. Stereotypic gender beliefs, then, reflect the dynamic changes women and men perceive in their own gender roles and that perception has led people to expect more change in the future. People also expect that as gender roles change, women in competitive, traditionally male-associated roles will be more accepted (Diekmann & Goodfriend, 2006).

### Attitudes Toward Women and Men

As we noted, men are perceived to have a higher social status than women (Conway et al., 1996). Does this higher status result in greater liking for men? Research suggests that the answer is no; instead, there is a bias in favor of women that Alice Eagly and Antonio Mladinic (1994) have dubbed the *women are wonderful effect*. Their work shows that the global category "women" is viewed more positively than the global category "men" on traditional evaluative measures. This finding has been widely replicated and is supported by earlier research on attitudes toward the sexes (Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1991), although, interestingly, the pattern went unnoticed for many years. This pattern also emerges in measures of implicit attitudes toward women and men. Laurie Rudman and Stephanie Goodwin (2004) found that positive words, such as good, happy, and paradise, are associated




**FIGURE 12.2** Perceived Agency over Time by Sex of Target

People believe that women's and men's agency is more similar in the present than in the past; they also believe that in the future, women and men will become increasingly similar on this dimension.

SOURCE: Adapted from Diekmann and Eagly (2000).

more often with women than with men, a preference that was particularly strong for women participants.

As you might know from your own experiences, however, being liked does not automatically lead to being treated fairly. Gender-based prejudice is widespread and well documented and, more often than not, affects women more negatively than men. Consider, for example, the gender wage gap: in 2000, U.S. White women earned 72.2 percent of what White men earned. This gap was even larger for Black and Hispanic women, who that year earned 64.6 percent and 52.8 percent, respectively, of what White men earned (National Committee on Pay Equity, 2004). Moreover, such discrimination is not limited to the United States. Across the 15 member countries in the European Union, women earn 87 percent of what men earn (Broughton, 2002). Even larger wage gaps are present in Asian, Middle Eastern, and South American countries (Nierenberg, 2002). Box 12.2 describes a recent example—the pay equity dispute between two major corporations and their female employees.

Sometimes the discrimination women face is more subtle, as demonstrated by research on gender differences in the prices paid for new cars. Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman (1995) had male and female Black and White research assistants visit new car dealers in the Chicago area and use identical negotiating strategies to determine a price for a new car. Even when these equivalent strategies were

## B o x 12.2 “Rife with Discrimination”

On June 22, 2004, federal judge Martin Jenkins certified a lawsuit by six current and former Wal-Mart employees as a class action affecting more than 1.6 million women who have worked at Wal-Mart stores since December 1998. Although Wal-Mart appealed this ruling, it was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in February 2007. With these rulings, the case became the largest workplace-bias lawsuit in United States history (Greenhouse & Hays, 2004). What is this dispute about? According to Brad Seligman, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, “Wal-Mart is rife with discrimination” (Armour, 2004, p. B3). The complaint alleges that although the hourly sales workforce at Wal-Mart is predominantly female, men are disproportionately assigned to some departments such as hardware, electronics, and sporting goods, areas that offer better pay and greater chance for advancement. Moreover, although women are the majority of employees at the lower ranks, they comprise less than 10 percent of all store managers and approximately 4 percent of district managers—numbers substantially lower than found in Wal-Mart’s top competitors. Moreover, according to the plaintiffs’ lawyers, women store managers earned an average of \$89,280 in 2001, compared to male store managers’ earnings of \$105,682; at the district manager level, the gap was even wider (\$239,519 for men versus \$177,149 for women).

The effects of this alleged discrimination are vividly illustrated in the plaintiff’s personal stories. Melissa Howard was expected to attend monthly sales meetings at a Hooters restaurant and was pressured to

enter a strip club on a business trip. When Stephanie Odle complained that a less-experienced male manager was earning \$20,000 more than she, she was told the man was a single father with children to support; Kim McLamb received a similar reply when she questioned women’s lower salaries (Armour, 2004). Angela Horton believes her career was damaged by subtle sexism, but was reluctant to complain after hearing managers refer to other women complainants as “whiners” (Cummins, 2004).

That the case will be heard as a class-action suit does not mean, however, that Wal-Mart is guilty; such a determination depends on the outcome of the upcoming trial. Yet echoes of this case can be seen in the recently settled case against Morgan Stanley, brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The lead plaintiff for this case, Allison Schieffelin, claimed she was denied a promotion even though less-qualified men were granted one, and that her complaint about this situation led to her firing (Ackman, 2004). News reports suggest the settlement was reached, at least in part, to avoid testimony from witnesses who claimed they were groped sexually and were the recipients of lewd comments. Moreover, witnesses claimed clients were taken to men-only strip club outings (McClam, 2004). For now, both cases are making headlines and, in the Wal-Mart case, some analysts predict the backlash may be “felt across the workplace landscape” (Arisa Lieberwitz, quoted in Joyce, 2004, p. 1) as other companies consider their policies and practices and other women weigh their own situations.

used, White females paid, on average \$94 more for a car and Black females paid, on average, \$411 more for a car than did White males. (This subtle discrimination especially affected Black males who paid, on average, \$1,100 more for a car than White males.) Other examples of less obvious discrimination against women were discussed in Chapter 10.

What explains the paradox between the generally positive view of women and the overwhelming evidence that gender-based discrimination exists? To begin our explanation of this *discrimination-affection paradox* (Eckes, 1994), we must first distinguish between women as a social group and women as occupants of social roles. As we saw above, affective responses to the social group “women” are generally positive. Yet much of the work on attitudes toward women does not focus on this larger social group but, instead, examines attitudes toward women in particular social roles and, in particular, women who occupy non-traditional roles.

### Subtypes of Women and Men

Women and men work and play together frequently and in a variety of contexts and, often, our closest and most intimate relationships are with members of the other sex. Because of this, having and using detailed information about the other sex plays an important role in our navigation of the social world. As we discussed in Chapter 3, one strategy people use to handle such complex information is to create **subtypes**, or categories that are subordinate to the more basic categories of sex, race, and age. Abundant evidence shows this to be a common practice for gender-related categorization. Indeed, over 200 gender-associated subtypes have been identified (Deaux, Winton, Crowley, & Lewis, 1985; Eckes, 1994; Vonk & Ashmore, 2003). Research further shows, however, that these many subtypes can be grouped into major categories such as occupations (career woman, secretary), family roles (housewife, family man), ideologies (bourgeois, feminist), physical features (athletic woman, athletic man), and sexuality-related subtypes (sexy woman, macho man; Carpenter & Trentman, 1998). Roos Vonk and Richard Ashmore (2003) explored how subtypes were categorized by examining the perceived similarities and differences among them. Results suggested that people first created separate groups for male and female subtypes; this was evidenced by the presence of a strong masculine and feminine dimension that distinguished the subtypes. People also categorized the subtypes as traditional (for example, housewives and family men) or modern (for example, businesswomen and eternal bachelors). Finally, people divided gender-based subtypes by age, with younger subtypes including “adolescent” and “prissy girl” and older subtypes including “granddad” and “old maid.”

As we saw in Chapter 5, the Stereotype Content Model predicts that, when evaluating others, people appear to distinguish between liking and respect and make relatively independent judgments on these two dimensions (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). These distinctions apply to judgments of gender-associated subtypes as well. That is, people may like housewives, but not respect them and, conversely, may respect successful businessmen, but not like them. Supporting the idea that people distinguish between these dimensions, Thomas Eckes (2002) found that subtypes such as “housewife” and “senior citizen” were rated high on warmth but rated low on competence, but the reverse held for subtypes such as “feminist” and “manager” (see also Wade & Brewer, 2006). Moreover, subtypes rated as high on competence were viewed as having higher status than those low on competence whereas subtypes rated as high on warmth were perceived as being more cooperative than those rated low on warmth (Eckes, 2002). One answer to the question of whether women and men are liked, then, is that it depends on the roles occupied by the person being evaluated. People who fill roles requiring male-associated characteristics, such as competence, are not necessarily liked and people who fill roles requiring the female-associated characteristics, such as warmth, are not necessarily respected. Other research shows subtypes defined as traditional are preferred to subtypes defined as modern (Haddock & Zanna, 1994; Kite & Branscombe, 1998) and that subtypes reflecting sexuality (macho men and sexy women) receive relatively low evaluations (Kite & Branscombe, 1998). Research examining the sometimes puzzling response to the nontraditional category “feminist” is presented in Box 12.3.

### Box 12.3 Stereotypic Perceptions of Feminists

"Feminism is the radical notion that women are people" reads a button available from the National Organization of Women (NOW, 2008). This idea has been promoted by women's movements since the work of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and their colleagues finally resulted in the ratification of the 19th amendment, giving women the right to vote. Rush Limbaugh (2004), in contrast, refers to "feminazis" (with Hillary Clinton as the representative example) and contends that feminists wrongly encourage women to have a career and, in the process, give up traditional roles that are actually more important to them.

Research on stereotypic perceptions of feminists reveals evidence of both viewpoints. On the one hand, Jean Twenge and Alyssa Zucker (1999) found that feminists are seen as serious, intelligent, knowledgeable, productive, and modern; on the other hand, they were rated as stubborn, angry, and nontraditional. Moreover, feminists were believed to be assertive and career oriented, opinionated, active, and outspoken, with left-leaning political beliefs, but not "anti-male." Interestingly, feminists were thought to be only somewhat more likely to be female than male and the stereotype that "feminists are lesbians" was not supported by the data. Even so, Twenge and Zucker found their respondents were generally reluctant to identify as "feminist" (25 percent reported being somewhat or definitely feminist). Moreover, when asked to write a story about a female or male feminist, a sizable number (36 percent) included negative statements. Some statements about the female feminist were extremely negative ("she probably worships Satan" or she "decided to stop caring for her feminine hygiene") as were statements about the male feminist (suggesting he was a cross-dresser or had renounced his manhood).

As the authors note, these perceptions may prevent even those who hold feminist beliefs from adopting that label. Research supports this claim. For example, women who read a paragraph describing positive stereotypes about feminists were nearly twice

as likely to self-identify as feminist (31 percent) than those who read a paragraph describing negative stereotypes about feminists (17 percent) or participants in a control group (who read a paragraph unrelated to feminism; 18 percent; Roy, Weibust, & Miller, 2007). That the number of women who self-identified as feminist was similar for negative stereotype group and the control group suggests that "feminist" is typically associated with negative stereotypes. Research also suggests women choose not to identify themselves as feminist because they believe men do not want to date feminists and that feminist attitudes create conflict in heterosexual relationships (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007). However, these stereotypic beliefs can be changed, for example by completing a psychology of women course; women and men who do so are more likely to identify as feminist (Yoder, Fischer, Kahn, & Groden, 2007).

Interestingly, research suggests that the title "Ms."—introduced in the 1960s as a courtesy title for women that did not indicate marital status—is now evaluated more positively than in the past, even though it is associated with feminism. Evaluation of this title is similar to that of other women's courtesy titles, such as Mrs. and Miss (Crawford, Stark, & Renner, 1998). However, women who use the title Ms. are stereotypically perceived as more agentic and less communal than women who use the title Miss or Mrs. (Malcolmson & Sinclair, 2007). Carol Lawton and her colleagues (Lawton, Blakemore, & Vartanian, 2003) found that people (and especially younger people) associate the title "Ms." with unmarried women, and particularly with those who are too old to use the title "Miss." This finding suggests that the title is no longer clearly associated with a neutral marital status. As Mary Crawford and her colleagues (1998) note, it is possible that "Ms." has lost its association with feminism and, for that reason, is viewed more positively by today's college students. Whether the title "feminist" loses or gains status over time remains to be seen, but for now, it seems, both the Rush Limbaugh and the NOW perspective are represented in people's perceptions.

**Attitudes Toward Women's Rights and Responsibilities.** As we have seen, attitudes toward the social category "woman" are positive, but attitudes toward particular subtypes of women may or may not be positive and some of the most disliked subtypes represent women in nontraditional roles. Research also has focused specifically on attitudes toward those nontraditional roles. One of the instruments most commonly used to assess these attitudes is the Attitudes toward

Women Scale (AWS; Spence & Helmreich, 1972); this instrument and others like it focus on explicit beliefs about women's rights and responsibilities. Sample items from the AWS are presented in Table 12.2. Individuals agreeing with these and similar items are labeled traditional in their gender-role attitudes; those disagreeing are labeled nontraditional. This and similar measures assess blatant prejudice toward women's rights and responsibilities (see Chapter 6).

Early research using measures such as the AWS showed that a significant proportion of the population expressed negative attitudes toward nontraditional women's roles but that women typically held more egalitarian views, overall, than did men (Spence & Helmreich, 1972). In recent years, however, this distribution has changed; researchers now generally find both women and men have positive attitudes toward women's rights and responsibilities as assessed by the AWS and similar instruments (Spence & Hahn, 1997; Twenge, 1997b). As we saw in Chapter 6, these findings suggest that people today are less likely to directly express blatant prejudice than they were in the past.

Yet, as we also saw in Chapter 6, this does not mean that gender-based prejudice has disappeared. Research using measures of subtle sexism, such as the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim et al., 1995), the Neosexism Scale (Tougas et al., 1995) and the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1997) shows that gender-based prejudice today is expressed in less direct ways. Items from these measures are presented in Table 12.2. Modern sexists, for example, believe that gender-based job segregation can be explained by biological differences between the sexes, and they are less likely to believe this segregation is due to discrimination against women (Swim et al., 1995). Modern sexists also hold negative attitudes toward feminism and the women's movement (Campbell, Schellenberg, & Senn, 1997). Finally, modern sexists believe that it is important to stay the course and maintain current gender roles, and so do not support policies such as affirmative action that might reduce gender inequality (Tougas et al. 1995). As we saw with traditional gender-role attitudes, modern sexist beliefs often are directed toward women in nontraditional roles.

**Hostile and Benevolent Sexism.** Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (1996, 1997) have proposed there are actually two separate, but related, dimensions of modern sexism: hostile and benevolent sexist beliefs. *Hostile sexist beliefs* are derogatory, such as the beliefs that women demand special privileges and want to control men through marriage and their sexual wiles. *Benevolent sexist beliefs* are more positive, such as the beliefs that women are nurturing, morally pure, and deserving of adoration. It is both possible and common for people to hold both sets of beliefs, even though doing so means holding two contradictory attitudes toward women at the same time. The ambivalence this creates can result in oscillation between these two attitudes, such as loving and hating women at the same time (Glick & Fiske, 2001). This ambivalence, which is an important component of Ambivalent Sexism Theory, provides another possible explanation for the discrimination-affection paradox.

Benevolent sexist beliefs result in the *women are wonderful effect* described earlier—the affection part of the paradox. Those holding these beliefs view women who occupy traditional roles, such as homemaker and mother, in positive



**TABLE 12.2 Sample Items from Measures of Attitudes toward Women and Men**

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**Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS; Spence & Helmreich, 1972)**

- Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming good wives and mothers.
- The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
- In general, the father should have greater authority than the mother in the bringing up of children.

**Modern Sexism Scale (Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995)**

- Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States.
- It is rare to see women treated in a sexist manner on television.
- Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination.

**Neosexism Scale (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995)**

- Women's requests in terms of equality between the sexes are simply exaggerated.
- Women shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted.
- Over the past few years, women have gotten more from the government than they deserve.

**Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996)**

*Benevolent Sexism*

- Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.
- Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.
- A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man.

*Hostile Sexism*

- Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash.
- Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality."
- Women are too easily offended.

**Ambivalence toward Men Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999)**

*Benevolence toward Men*

- *Benevolence toward Men*
- Even if both work, woman should take care of man at home.
- Men are more willing to risk self to protect others.
- Women are incomplete without men.

*Hostility toward Men*

- Most men are really like children.
  - Even sensitive men want traditional relationships.
  - When men "help" women it is to prove they are better.
-

terms. Because these roles are those associated with the general social category “women” (Eagly, 1987; Glick & Fiske, 2001), such benevolent sexist beliefs lead to women in general being seen in positive terms. Thus, women (or at least traditional women) are wonderful because of their nurturance and purity. From the viewpoint of the benevolent sexist, keeping women in these traditional roles shields them from the stress of high-status roles, such as those traditionally occupied by men; to benevolent sexists, this shielding is a form of chivalry and male self-sacrifice. However, in doing so, benevolent sexists also are discriminating against women by excluding them from roles that afford more prestige in society. As a result, women are the targets of discrimination (by being locked into a limited set of social roles) at the same time that they are the recipients of liking and admiration. This combination of affect and discrimination, then, also serves as justification for men’s greater power and privilege (see Chapter 1; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Glick et al., 2000). Men have to take on the “tough jobs” from which women must be protected.

What about women who embrace nontraditional roles? Attitudes toward these women account for the discrimination part of the paradox, and it is here that hostile sexist beliefs become important. People endorsing hostile sexist beliefs view some women, such as those who occupy nontraditional roles, as a direct threat to male status and power and they dislike those women because of it. According to Glick and Fiske (2001), it is the coupling of negative reactions toward nontraditional women (hostile sexist beliefs) with positive reactions toward traditional women (benevolent sexist beliefs) that helps maintain the status quo. That is, these reactions produce the dual strategies of rewarding “appropriate” behavior and punishing “inappropriate” behavior. As these authors put it, under this arrangement “women receive special privileges, as long as they stay in line” (Fiske et al., 1999, p. 484). To “stay in line” means maintaining prescribed gender roles, not competing with men in their traditional gender-role domain, and seeking intimacy through heterosexual interactions. Interestingly, across 19 countries, both men’s benevolent and men’s hostile sexist beliefs were negatively correlated with measures of gender equality in that society (Glick et al., 2000). For example, the higher men’s benevolent sexism scores in a country were, the less likely it was that the women in that country were represented in high-status jobs in business and government. These results are correlational and do not demonstrate that men’s sexism causes gender inequality. Even so, these results suggest that individually held beliefs do relate to women’s welfare at the national level.

### **Women in the Workplace**

A Dilbert cartoon depicts a female supervisor asking a male subordinate to kill a mouse in her office. He remarks that after 20 years of the women’s movement, nothing has changed—to which she responds that if he does not remove the mouse, he will be fired. He concedes that *that part* has changed. This interaction reflects a fundamental conflict. Women’s roles have changed and there are many models of successful women in all arenas. Even so, expectations about what

women are like have not kept pace with women's changing roles. Women in nontraditional roles are still expected to behave like "women." In this section, we address how this conflict affects women's advancement.

To begin our discussion, we focus first on some basic statistics about women in the workforce and at the entry point to high-level jobs: higher education. Although room for improvement remains, women are present in increasing numbers in higher education and in the workplace. Today, the majority of U.S. undergraduates are women (National Center for Education Statistics, 2007) and these women are more likely to earn a baccalaureate degree and a graduate degree than are men (National Opinion Research Center, 2003; Syverson, 2003). In the United States, 46 percent of all workers are women (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008), and women are achieving ever higher levels in the workplace; 51 percent of people with executive, administrative, and managerial positions are women, up from 41 percent in 1983 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008). The numbers, then, are changing and women's presence is being felt.

Even so, many jobs remain gender segregated. Occupations such as secretary, speech therapist, and elementary school teacher are predominated by women, whereas occupations such as engineer, dentist, and physician are predominated by men (see Betz, 2008). For women, this job segregation often leads to a *sticky floor* because many of the traditionally female occupations do not offer avenues for promotion or advancement and, as such, are dead-end jobs (Gutek, 2001). At the highest professional levels, White men are, without question, dominant. As of the mid-1990s, men comprised 85 percent of tenured professors, 89 percent of the membership in the U.S. House of Representatives, 90 percent of the U.S. Senate, 95 percent of *Fortune 500* corporate executive officers, and 99.9 percent of athletic team owners (see Fassinger, 2001). These numbers support the claim that even women who gain entry into professional jobs often reach what is known as the *glass ceiling*, an invisible barrier that prevents women (and minorities) from reaching the highest levels of an organization (Gutek, 2001; Thomas, 2005). As we saw in Chapter 10, evidence suggests that men have an advantage even in careers where women outnumber them. That is, men who work in female dominated professions often ride a *glass escalator*—or are on a fast track to management positions.

**Role Congruity Theory.** What are the factors that prohibit women's entry into professional positions and further limit the success of those women who do gain entry? Alice Eagly and Steven Karau (2002) have proposed that two types of prejudice prevent women from pursuing high-level positions or succeeding when they do obtain such positions. Their theory focuses on women leaders, but their predictions can be generalized to other high-achievement settings. According to their *role congruity theory*, one form of prejudice stems from the belief that women are less likely than men to be successful in a leadership role. This belief can prevent women from seeking high-level jobs and from being selected for them when they do seek them. Where does this belief come from? Recall from Chapter 3 that people observe women and men in their social roles and, from these observations, draw conclusions about the characteristics the sexes have. This prediction, based

on social role theory (Eagly, 1987; see Chapter 3), explains why men are perceived to be agentic. Specifically, men, more than women, tend to be observed in the higher-status, breadwinner role, which requires those characteristics. From the observation of men in those roles, people conclude that men have the agentic attributes associated with that role. Women, in contrast, tend to be observed in lower-status roles that require communal attributes; people, then, conclude that women are communal. People also observe that the leadership role requires agentic traits and is typically occupied by men; because of this, they conclude men are best suited to be leaders.

Research shows this theory can account for who is selected to be a leader. Alice Eagly and Steven Karau (1991), for example, reviewed 58 studies on leader emergence and found that, consistent with **role congruity theory**, men were more likely to emerge as leaders than were women. Research also shows that who emerges as a leader depends on both the leaders' characteristics and the task at hand. Barbara Ritter and Jan Yoder (2004) paired individuals high and low in dominance and assigned them to work on identifying the steps involved in either a masculine task (playing a football game), a feminine task (planning a wedding), or a gender-neutral task (planting a garden). Some dyads were same sex (that is, two men or two women); others were mixed sex (one man and one woman). In the same-sex dyads, for whom gender-based expectations did not matter, the dominant individual consistently emerged as the leader, regardless of the task. In mixed-sex dyads, however, the man more often emerged as the leader when the task was masculine or gender neutral, regardless of his dominance level. Often, this happened because the dominant woman actually appointed the low-dominance man to be leader. As Ritter and Yoder note, even when women are better equipped to serve as leader, they acquiesce to the man when the task is masculine (that is, gender-role incongruent for them). Only when the woman was dominant and the task was feminine (gender-role congruent) was she more likely to emerge as leader in mixed-sex dyads.

What happens when women overcome this first form of prejudice and assume a leadership role? Role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) predicts that the second form of prejudice now comes into play. According to this theory, these women face a higher probability of negative evaluations than do men in a similar role. This is because those women leaders occupy a role that violates expectations in two ways. First, it violates the expectation about what leaders should be like (high-status males). Second, it violates expectations of what women should be like (communal; recall that the leadership role requires agentic traits). For women leaders, these expectations are at odds but, for male leaders, they are not because the role of male and leader are thought to overlap. These ideas are similar to the *stereotype fit hypothesis*, discussed in Chapter 10, which proposes that the characteristics associated with managers are similar to the cultural stereotypes of men and different from the cultural stereotypes of women.

**Women in Faculty Roles.** Consider the experiences of female faculty members at a college or university. As with many other types of women professionals, these women face a double bind because the stereotypic perception of a faculty

member is similar to the male gender role—faculty are expected to be directive, assertive, and knowledgeable, for example—but dissimilar to the female gender role requiring nurturance, warmth, and supportiveness (Caplan, 1994). The effects of this double bind emerge in a number of ways. One consequence is that women are sometimes held to a different standard than are men. Women who choose a less-structured classroom style, for example, report more negative student reactions than do men who choose a similar classroom style (Statham, Richardson, & Cook, 1991). Moreover, women are expected to interact socially with students outside of class, yet men are not expected to do so (Kierstead, D'Agostino, & Dill, 1988). Student evaluations of teaching also have been shown to be gender biased, particularly for women in traditionally male-dominated fields such as chemistry (Basow, 1995; Basow & Silberg, 1987). Moreover, women and men students may have opposing expectations that put women faculty in an unresolvable bind. One study found that female students preferred women who used an affiliative lecture style that encouraged discussion and interaction but that male students preferred women who used an instrumental lecture style that focused on providing information; ratings of male faculty were not influenced by their lecture style (Winocur, Schoen, & Sirowatka, 1989). These outcomes are consistent with role congruity theory. Women faculty are believed to have characteristics that are at odds with the professor role and this perceived role conflict leads to different expectations about and negative evaluations of their performance. Expectations for “male” and “professor” are similar, so men do not experience a double bind.

Although women can and do successfully meet the demands of the leadership role (Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995), resolving this double bind is not easy. As Anna Quindlen (2008a) wrote about Hillary Clinton's campaign to be the Democratic Party's nominee for U.S. President, “Senator Clinton has not only had to prove she is strong enough to be commander in chief, she has had to prove she is soft enough to feel your pain. For a man in a position of leadership to be sure and sympathetic is a bonus; for a women, it's a base line.” Hence, being perceived as too similar to a man can actually work to a woman's disadvantage because, by doing so, she violates the expectations of her own gender role. This can lead to unfavorable evaluations, even for successful women, as Madeline Heilman and her colleagues (Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004) showed. These researchers had students review the educational history and career trajectory of two hypothetical employees, one male and one female whose job performance record was either successful or a mixture of successes and failures. When job performance was ambiguous, the male employee was rated as more competent than the female employee, but both were seen as likeable. Not surprisingly, the successful man was both liked and seen as competent. The successful woman, however, earned high marks for competence but lost out in pleasantness. Characteristics associated with the successful woman included selfish, manipulative, and untrustworthy. Consistent with role congruity theory, a second study showed these effects were limited to employment areas that are typically male dominated. Such negative labeling of competent women is not uncommon. Eagly and Karau (2002) cite several examples of nicknames applied to

some very successful women, including the labeling of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as the “Iron Lady” and the more general tendency to refer to powerful women by terms such as “dragon lady” and “battle ax.”

**Improving Women’s Chances for Success.** What factors discourage girls and women from pursuing nontraditional careers? One is a perceived lack of fit in certain careers. As we saw in Chapter 11, female undergraduates perceive more discrimination in male-dominated academic areas than in female-dominated academic areas (Steele, James, & Barnett, 2002). Hence, women’s subjective perceptions of the environment affect how welcome they feel in nontraditional situations. This perceived lack of fit has both physiological and social consequences. For example, women in male-dominated academic areas paid closer attention to a video depicting an opportunity to attend a summer conference when the participants were predominantly male, compared to when equal numbers of women and men were depicted. They also showed greater physiological response to the male-dominated video and reported a lower sense of belonging, compared to when women and men were equally represented in the video (Murphy, Steele, & Gross, 2007).

Another factor that may limit women’s achievement is a lack of math background. Recall from Chapter 11 that when people fear their poor performance will confirm a stereotype about their group, it can create a *stereotype threat* that interferes with their academic achievement. Hence, girls who believe a test is diagnostic of their math ability perform worse on a math test than those who believe the test does not indicate ability (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 2001). Mara Cadinu and her colleagues (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 2005) found that one reason for this effect is that women under stereotype threat have more negative thoughts about their math ability than those in a no threat condition; these researchers propose that these negative thoughts are responsible, at least in part, for women’s poorer performance. However, as we also saw in Chapter 11, the effects of stereotype threat can be reduced. For example, when women under stereotype threat conditions also self-affirmed by listing characteristics and values that are personally important to them, their math performance exceeded that of women who were threatened but did not self-affirm (Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006). Women’s confidence in their ability can be bolstered, then, increasing the chances for success.

Although it may seem counterintuitive, directly teaching girls about gender-based occupational discrimination also has positive effects. For example, Erica Weisgram and Rebecca Bigler (2007) taught middle-school girls about science careers and involved them in hands-on science projects. In addition, half of the group learned about notable female scientists who had faced and overcome gender discrimination in their field and half received no additional information. Those girls who learned about discrimination had higher self-confidence and a greater interest in pursuing science, perhaps because they were presented with role models who had been successful in spite of discrimination. Penelope Lockwood (2006) also found that women who could identify successful women role models reported being inspired by them and that this positively affected their career expectations.

A number of other factors also improve women's chances for success in non-traditional fields. For example, some leadership roles require skills that women are more likely to possess, such as cooperation and affiliation; in such situations, the tendency to view women as less qualified should disappear or weaken (Eagly & Karau, 2002). It is also important to note that not everyone is biased against women in nontraditional roles. Women, for example, generally give higher ratings to female professors than do men (Basow, 1995; Basow, Phelan, & Capotosto, 2006). Similarly, women tend to have less gender-stereotypic views of managerial roles and, therefore, may be less biased toward women leaders than men are (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Finally, individuals scoring low on a measure of hostile sexism evaluated a female candidate for a managerial job more positively than those scoring high on that measure (Masser & Abrams, 2004).

How much the nontraditional woman, herself, deviates from her prescribed gender role might also affect how she is perceived and, therefore, her chances for success. Women who behave in particularly assertive, directive, or self-promoting ways more clearly violate traditional gender roles than do women who take a more communal approach to leadership. Supporting this premise, a review of the literature found that, across 61 studies, women who had a particularly autocratic leadership style were evaluated more harshly than males using a similar style (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992). This does not mean, however, that women can never speak out. Women in the natural sciences who perceived sexism in their work environment were less satisfied with their job; however, women who also perceived that they had a voice in departmental matters and could advocate for change had more positive views about their job (Settles, Cortina, Stewart, & Malley, 2007). More generally, women who responded assertively when confronting gender discrimination reported being more satisfied in situations involving conflict, suggesting that women can effectively handle sexist responses (Hyers, 2007).

### The Male Gender Role

"If they don't have the guts, I call them girlie men." So said Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (2004) in response to what he perceived as a lack of courage in members of the California legislature during a political battle over the budget. Regardless of what you know about the specifics of that battle, the message is clear: Men without courage are seen as feminine and that is not a good thing. Similarly, as we saw in William Stafford's poetry that opens this chapter, society expects men to be strong and in control. Research supports the existence of this masculine ideology: Boys and men are discouraged from exhibiting feminine characteristics, but are encouraged to exhibit an aura of toughness and violence. Men also are expected to strive for power and success, to stand on their own two feet, and to be tough and daring (Fischer & Good, 1998; Fischer, Tokar, Good, & Snell, 1998). The perception of men as threatening and intimidating may explain the *women are wonderful effect* that we discussed earlier (Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). However, recent research also shows that, as we saw for attitudes toward women, attitudes toward men have both benevolent and hostile components (see Table 12.2 for example items from a measure of these attitudes). Benevolent sexist attitudes

toward men reflect the belief that men must be protected and nurtured whereas hostile sexist attitudes toward men reflect a resentment of their higher status and power (Glick & Fiske, 1999).

As we saw in Chapter 8, children learn the importance of conforming to these gender-role expectations at an early age and there are many messengers, including parents, teachers, peers, and the media. For boys and men, perhaps the worst role violation is any appearance of femininity or weakness. Even very young children make it clear to boys that feminine behavior is unacceptable (Fagot, 1985). The more feminine a boy is perceived to be, the more unpopular he is expected to be; these predictions are especially strong when made by other boys (Berndt & Heller, 1986; Zucker, Wilson-Smith, Kurita, & Stern, 1995). People also expect that boys' femininity is permanent (Martin, 1990). When girls behave like tomboys, in contrast, it is likely to be ignored (Fagot, 1985), perhaps because people assume they will outgrow their boyish behavior (Martin, 1990). As adults, feminine men are thought to be poorly adjusted in their careers, their relationships, and their sexuality (Tilby & Kalin, 1980).

Joseph Pleck (1981) has argued that it is nearly impossible for men to meet their gender-role expectations, especially at a time in U.S. history when gender roles are changing. Men, for example, are increasingly likely to take on child care responsibilities and to help with laundry and other household chores (although not to the extent that women do). The mismatch between what men are expected to do and what they can realistically do creates *sex role strain*. Evidence suggests that the stress of trying to meet these contradictory expectations can have a variety of negative consequences for some men, including low self-esteem, increased probability of drug use, suspension from school, and other unhealthy behaviors (Pleck, Sonenstein, & Ku, 1993), which may then lead some men to violent and aggressive acts (Kimmel, 2002). As we see in the next section, acceptance of the traditional male gender role is also strongly associated with anti-gay prejudice (Pleck, Sonenstein, & Ku, 1994).

Overall, relatively little research has examined the male gender role, perhaps because this role has traditionally been considered "normal" or "natural" and the female role has been seen as a variation of that role (Matlin, 2004). However, as Janet Hyde (2007) notes, there are many reasons why people should care about men's gender roles, including finding ways to help men function effectively as fathers, life partners, and workers and understanding why some men are committed hate crimes and violence against women.

## HETEROSEXISM AND SEXUAL PREJUDICE

Gays have all the rights that they want. All they gotta do is marry a person of the opposite sex...You shouldn't have special rights just because of the kind of sex you have.

Where's that in the Constitution?

—Anonymous attendee of the Republican National Convention, quoted in Stewart (2008)



[I]t's not really courts and legislatures that will settle this issue. It's the neighbors, friends, and family members who have come out and made the political personal—and lovable. Jennifer? Smart, funny Jennifer? Of course she should be able to marry Anne. They're perfect together.

—Anna Quindlen (2008b)

As the speaker in the first quote above correctly notes, gay men and lesbians in the United States have no Constitutional right to marriage or to other rights guaranteed to other minority groups by federal law, such as protection from employment or housing discrimination. Until the Supreme Court ruled otherwise (*Lawrence v. Texas*, 2003), sexual acts between two men were illegal in 13 U.S. states. However, as Gregory Herek (2007) notes, change is in the air. At this writing, eight U.S. states and over 100 U.S. cities have passed anti-discrimination laws to protect the civil rights of lesbians and gay men (Day & Schoenrade, 2000). In the United States, 26 states have constitutional amendments prohibiting gay marriage; however, six states allow either gay marriage or gay civil unions and gay marriage is legal in several countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Spain and South Africa. It is impossible to predict whether other U.S. states and additional countries will legalize gay marriage, but it is safe to say that this issue has changed the conversation about gay rights and has influenced public attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. As the quote from Anna Quindlen suggests, knowing a gay or lesbian has and will continue to affect social attitudes.

As we discussed in Chapter 11, individuals with privileged status determine which groups are stigmatized and, as we will see, sexual minorities clearly are. This stigma is manifested both at the societal level through, for example, the laws described above and at the personal level through the beliefs of people who are prejudiced against nonheterosexuals (Herek, 2007). At the societal level, the stigma against this group is labeled **sexual stigma**, or the “negative regard, inferior status, and relative powerlessness that society collectively accords to any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community” (Herek, 2007, p. 906). At the personal level, **sexual prejudice** refers to negative attitudes based on sexual orientation (Herek, 2000). In this section, we summarize the research examining stereotypes about and attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. We also discuss discrimination based on sexual orientation, particularly in the workplace. Throughout our discussion we consider how prejudice against sexual minorities is similar to and different from the other forms of prejudice considered in this text.

### Stereotypes of Lesbians and Gay Men

As we discussed earlier in this chapter, people have gender-associated beliefs that both describe what women and men are like and prescribe what they should and should not be like. These gender-role expectations are echoed in stereotypes about gay men and lesbians. When people are asked to list characteristics associated with gay men, for example, the most frequently noted characteristics are feminine, has feminine qualities, high-pitched voice, and feminine walk, mannerisms,

or clothing (Kite & Deaux, 1987; Madon, 1997). Lesbians are most frequently described as masculine, with short hair, a masculine appearance, and masculine clothing (Eliason, 1997; Kite & Deaux, 1987). A similar pattern emerges when people evaluate gays and lesbians on specific gender-associated characteristics such as those listed in Table 12.1. Gay men are rated as more similar to heterosexual females than to heterosexual males, especially on the components reflecting physical characteristics and social roles. Lesbians are seen as more similar to heterosexual men than to heterosexual women on these gender-associated components (Kite & Deaux, 1987; Weakland & Kite, 1999). People also believe that lesbian couples have one masculine person who fulfills the dominant role and one feminine person who fulfills the submissive role (Corley & Pollack, 1996). Apparently, even in relationships involving two women, people expect the traditional heterosexual gender roles to be present.

Although both lesbians and gay men are presumed to have the gender-associated characteristics of the other sex, evidence also suggests that the relationship is stronger for gay men than for lesbians. To account for this difference, Donald McCreary (1994) has proposed the **sexual orientation hypothesis**—the prediction that people are more likely to believe feminine men are gay than to believe that masculine women are lesbian. Results of several studies support this hypothesis. First, people presume that men with feminine characteristics are gay and, although they also predict that masculine women are lesbian, their estimates of this likelihood are not as high (Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Martin, 1990; McCreary, 1994). Men's use of feminine language is seen as an indication of a homosexual orientation, but women's use of masculine language is not seen as evidence of lesbianism (Rasmussen & Moely, 1986). Finally, the belief that lesbian women are similar to heterosexual men is not as firmly held as the belief that gay men are similar to heterosexual women (Kite & Deaux, 1987). We return to this discrepancy when we discuss sex differences in anti-gay prejudice.

More generally, gays and lesbians are stereotypically perceived as "different." As Gregory Herek (2003) states, "*homosexual* has been defined as a counterpart to the normal person" (p. 277, italics in original). It was not so long ago that homosexuality was classified as a mental illness; this designation was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association in 1973 (Bayer, 1987). A significant portion of the U.S. population continues to view homosexuality as unnatural and lesbians and gay men as generally deviant (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). Both college students and Master's students in counseling programs believe that gay men are anxious and are likely to have personality, mood, and eating disorders as well as sexual and gender identity disorders (Boysen, Vogel, Madon, & Wester, 2006). Other common stereotypes are that gays and lesbians have domineering mothers, are cross-dressers, and are child molesters (Eliason, Donelan, & Randall, 1992; Gilman, 1985; LaMar & Kite, 1996). Many of these beliefs are more strongly held about gay men than about lesbians (Herek, 2002). Gay men also are likely to be seen as hypersexual (Gilman, 1985).

It is important to note that, historically, researchers have focused on stereotypes about and attitudes toward gay men, perhaps because gay men's sexuality is viewed as more serious than lesbians' or, more generally, because lesbian

sexuality has been generally invisible in Western societies (Blackwood & Wieringa, 2003). As a result, measures initially developed to assess stereotypes of gay men have often simply been slightly altered (by changing the term “gay man” to “lesbian”) to assess perceptions of lesbians (Herek, 2002). The stereotypes people typically are queried about, therefore, may be more applicable to gay men than to lesbians. An exception is Mary Amanda Dew’s (1985) work, which demonstrated that lesbians were stereotypically perceived as unattractive, especially by those who were less tolerant of both homosexuality and women’s rights. More recently, Wayne Wilkinson (2006, 2008) explored the relationship between hostile sexism and anti-lesbian attitudes. Recall that hostile sexists prefer that women occupy traditional gender roles. Perhaps because of this, Wilkinson found hostile sexism to be related to anti-lesbian attitudes, suggesting that one reason people hold these negative attitudes is because they believe lesbians violate traditional gender roles. Wilkinson’s found these variables to be related, suggesting that people hold anti-lesbian attitudes at least in part because they believe lesbians are violating those traditional roles. In any case, research conducted to date shows that stereotypes of both lesbians and gay men are generally negative. People also have negative emotional reactions to gays and lesbians (Herek, 2002); such negative reactions have even been used as justification, albeit unsuccessfully, for the murder of a lesbian (Box 12.4).

### Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities

Public opinion toward gay men and lesbians is changing and people are more likely to be accepting of gays and lesbians than in previous decades. Compared with the 1970s, for example, when about two-thirds of the U.S. population believed homosexuality was always wrong, by the 1990s 56 percent expressed this

#### Box 12.4 Eight Bullets

On May 13, 1988, Claudia Brenner was on the second day of a backpacking trip with her partner, Rebecca Wight. On their hike, they met a stranger who, it was later learned, was named Stephen Carr. Little did they know that he altered his path so that they would once again meet—although he would stay hidden. After watching Brenner and Wight make love, Stephen Carr shot the couple eight times and left them for dead. Claudia Brenner escaped to safety, miraculously surviving five bullet wounds. She knew if she did not leave the scene, she would not live and her perpetrator would likely not be apprehended. She also knew that Rebecca Wight would not survive even if she stayed.

Stephen Carr was arrested, brought to trial, and convicted of first degree murder. During the trial,

Carr claimed he was provoked to murder by the disgust he experienced witnessing their sexual relations, which he claimed “produced a reaction of overwhelming revulsion that led to the crime” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. B6). Claudia Brenner’s (1992) survivor’s story is one of many thousands, albeit one of the more brutal. These many experiences compelled researchers and social activists to successfully push for the passing of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, which requires the Justice Department to collect data on crimes that stem from prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity—the first federal law ever to include sexual orientation (Herek & Berrill, 1992).

belief (Yang, 1997). Notice, however, that the majority of the U.S. population still holds a negative opinion about homosexuality. In Great Britain, acceptance of homosexuality has changed little since the 1980s, with 58 percent of respondents expressing acceptance in 1990 compared to 53 percent in 1985 (Hays, 1997). Heterosexual German people's attitudes toward gay men and lesbians are also generally negative (Steffens & Wagner, 2004).

As we saw in Chapter 7, however, a number of individual difference variables influence people's attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Younger people are generally more accepting of gays and lesbians than are older people (Neidorf & Morin, 2007; Steffens & Wagner, 2004). Those with the most negative attitudes tend to be high on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and to hold fundamentalist religious beliefs (Whitley, in press). Findings such as these support the idea, presented in Chapter 3, that people have different motivations for holding heterosexist beliefs. For some, heterosexism stems from conformity to authority, for others from a desire to conform to the expectations of one's social group, and for others from a strong belief that homosexuality is immoral (Herek, 1986). People also may hold more positive attitudes toward individual gay men and lesbians than toward lesbians and gay men as a social group (Laner & Laner, 1979; Lord, Lepper, & Mackie, 1980; see Chapter 4 for a discussion of individuation and its effect on attitudes toward social groups). Another important individual difference variable is whether a person knows a lesbian or gay man personally; those who do are much less likely to hold negative attitudes toward that individual, especially if the relationship is a close one (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). Keep in mind, however, that correlation is not causality. Individuals who are more accepting of gays and lesbians are more likely to report such close relationships, suggesting that they are open to knowing about and accepting another's sexual orientation. Supporting this idea, the Pew Research Center (2006) reports that women, younger people, college graduates, and people who self-identified as politically liberal were more likely to report that someone close to them is gay. "Coming out" to intolerant individuals who are not so accepting may not improve their attitude and carries considerable risk, as we will see later (Herek, 2003).

**Sex Differences in Anti-Gay Prejudice.** One of the most consistent individual differences in attitudes toward homosexuality is that heterosexual men have greater intolerance of homosexuality than do heterosexual women. Mary Kite and Bernard Whitley (1996, 1998) reviewed 112 studies examining men's and women's attitudes toward homosexuality and found that overall men were more negative than women. This greater negativity was particularly strong when the person being rated was a gay man; indeed, the sexes held similar attitudes toward lesbians. This pattern is found in studies of both college students' attitudes and national survey samples (Herek, 2002; Kite & Whitley, 1996). Men also hold more negative attitudes toward homosexual behavior than do women, although this sex difference is smaller than that found for attitudes toward gays and lesbians as a social group (Kite & Whitley, 1996, 1998). This is noteworthy because men generally hold more permissive attitude toward sexual behavior than do

women (Oliver & Hyde, 1993); apparently this permissiveness does not extend to homosexual acts. Heterosexual men also behave differently toward gay men than toward lesbians; those who reported high levels of anti-gay bias, measured by ratings of discomfort with being physically close to a gay man, had a stronger physiological response to pictures of gay male couples than to pictures of lesbian or heterosexual couples; heterosexual women's physiological responses to these photographs did not differ, even if they were biased against homosexuality (Mahaffey, Bryan, & Hutchison, 2005).

Why would men be more negative toward homosexuality, especially gay male homosexuality, than would women? Kite and Whitley (1996, 1998) have theorized that the gender belief system model described earlier in this chapter can explain this pattern. As noted earlier, people clearly associate homosexuality with other-sex gender roles and these associations appear to be more firmly held for gay men than for lesbians. These beliefs are part of the larger gender-based norms dictating that men should be masculine and should eschew femininity (Bem, 1993; Hort, Fagot, & Leinbach, 1990). These norms prescribe that any action or feeling that violates this expectation, especially one associated with femininity, should not and will not be tolerated. Not only are men expected to reject their own femininity, they are expected to reject others' femininity as well. Because gay men are seen as feminine, then, they would be among those rejected. Indeed, rejecting homosexuality is a straightforward way to show compliance with this social norm. Supporting this idea, Frances Shen and colleagues (Shen, Longo, Ernst, Reeder, & Pryor, 2004) provide evidence that men are motivated to follow this norm; they found that threatening men's masculinity by telling them they scored poorly on a test of masculine knowledge resulted in defensiveness toward homosexuality and expression of more anti-gay attitudes. Similarly, men who were told that a personality test revealed they were feminine, and thus had their masculinity threatened, were more negative toward an effeminate, but not a masculine gay man (Glick, Gangl, Gibb, Klumpner, & Weinberg, 2007).

Why would women be excused from this rejection of homosexuality? One answer stems from the relatively higher status of the male gender role (Bem, 1993; Conway et al., 1996). Men have more to lose when they step outside their gender roles, including the status associated with that role. Women, however, can follow a cultural gender script that offers greater flexibility and, accordingly, does not dictate that homosexuality be rejected. In short, women are allowed to accept homosexuality whereas men are not, in part because lesbianism (or behaving similarly to the male gender role) does not result in a loss of status. In fact, women taking on traditional men's roles might be seen as a step up (Tilby & Kalin, 1980). Following this reasoning, women need not reject either gay men or lesbians because failing to do so will not affect their social standing; men also need not reject lesbians because those women are not violating the male gender role. Another possible explanation for heterosexual men's greater acceptance of lesbianism is described in Box 12.5.

If the gender belief system model can explain attitudes toward homosexuality, then there should be a relationship between anti-gay prejudice and gender-role attitudes; research indicates that this is the case. Bernard Whitley (2001)

**Box 12.5 Heterosexual Men's Attitudes Toward Lesbianism**

As noted in the text, one answer to the question of why heterosexual men's attitudes toward gay men are more negative than heterosexual women's and more negative than their own attitudes toward lesbians is based on the stereotypic perception of gay men as being feminine and as violating male sex role norms. In a sense, this answer says, heterosexual men see gay men as "gender traitors" and devalue and reject them for that reason.

Another approach to answering this question focuses on heterosexual men's attitudes toward lesbians. It makes just as much sense to ask why heterosexual men view lesbians more positively than gay men as it does to ask why they view gay men less positively than lesbians. Laura Louderback and Bernard Whitley (1997) proposed that one reason for heterosexual men's more positive attitudes toward lesbians is that they see lesbianism through an erotic lens. They noted that researchers had found that sexual activity between women was a common theme in pornographic films marketed to male audiences and that scenes depicting such activity often concluded with a male character joining the women for group sex (for example, Brosius, Weaver, & Staab, 1993). Louderback and Whitley reasoned that themes such as these may give the impression that women who are sexually interested in women also have a sexual interest in men, and so male consumers of pornography may see lesbians in positive terms as potential sex partners.

Louderback and Whitley tested their hypothesis by having male and female heterosexual college students rate their attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and the extent to which they found the idea of male-male and female-female sexual activity erotic. Consistent with the results of previous research, Louderback and Whitley found that heterosexual men made more negative ratings of gay men than did heterosexual women and that their ratings of gay men were more negative than their ratings of lesbians. They also found that heterosexual men rated female-female sexual activity more positively than did heterosexual women. When the researchers examined sex differences in attitudes toward homosexuality with differences in the erotic value of same-sex sexual activity controlled, they found the difference in heterosexual men's ratings of lesbians and gay men to be greatly reduced, indicating that the erotic value they assigned to lesbianism was a factor in producing the difference in attitudes. The results of a follow-up study (Whitley, Wiederman, & Wryobeck, 1999) found that, as Louderback and Whitley had proposed, exposure to pornography was a factor that contributed to heterosexual men's eroticization of lesbianism. Louderback and Whitley (1997) concluded that "because female homosexuality [has] an erotic value for heterosexual men, it ameliorates their attitudes toward lesbians relative to their attitudes toward gay men" (p. 181).

reviewed the results of 42 studies and found that people who endorsed traditional gender-role attitudes also tended to have negative attitudes toward homosexuality. Moreover, consistent with the finding that men, more than women, are expected to reject gender-role violators, Whitley found that the relationship between gender-role attitudes and attitudes toward homosexuality was stronger for men than for women. Men's emotional reactions to gay men differ depending on their sex role attitudes as well; men who hold traditional sex role attitudes also express more anger toward gay men which may lead to aggression against those men (Parrott & Zeichner, 2008). These findings support the hypothesis that gender-role beliefs are related to anti-gay attitudes.

**Civil Rights Attitudes.** The work described above reviews affective responses to lesbians and gay men, but these attitudes do not necessarily reflect how people feel about gay and lesbian civil rights. Research suggests that people have a complicated set of reactions to this issue. In the United States, national opinion poll data show relatively high support for equal employment rights, but less support

for passing laws to ensure those rights (Herek, 2002). Opposition to gay marriage appears to be declining. In 1997, 73 percent of U.S. survey respondents opposed legalizing gay marriage; in 2004, 63 percent expressed opposition and in 2006 only the slightest majority (51 percent) did so (Pew Research Center, 2006). The Pew Research Center (2006) also reports greater acceptance of gays and lesbians adopting children (60 percent in 2006 versus 38 percent in 1999) and of allowing gays to serve openly in the military (60 percent in 2006 versus 52 percent in 1994). As we noted at the beginning of this section, change is certainly in the air. Several individual difference variables predict attitudes toward those civil rights. That is, people who believe homosexuality is a lifestyle choice are less accepting of gay rights than those who believe sexual orientation has a biological basis. Those who are politically conservative, have little contact with gays, and hold more fundamental religious beliefs are also more likely to oppose gay rights (Wood & Bartkowski, 2004). Men are less accepting than are women of equal housing and employment rights (Herek, 2002; LaMar & Kite, 1996) and for gays in the military (M. Harris & Vanderhoof, 1995), but the sexes are equally accepting on measures of global civil rights (Davies, 2004). Finally, people with positive attitudes toward feminism are more accepting of gay civil rights, but attitudes toward male toughness and hostile sexism are unrelated to those attitudes (Davies, 2004).

**Attitudes Toward Bisexuals.** So far, we have focused on heterosexism and its relationship to anti-gay prejudice. However, recall that heterosexist attitudes deny and degrade any nonheterosexual behavior. Therefore, bisexuals also should be viewed as unacceptable. Unfortunately, little research has been conducted on stereotypes about and attitudes toward bisexuality. As MacDonald (1981) noted, historically researchers have not differentiated between bisexuals, gay men, and lesbians, implying that they believe “bisexuals are really homosexuals who are engaging in homosexual denial” (p. 99). He argues that bisexuality is seen as more of a transitory stage or an act of curiosity than a clear sexual preference. Another criticism of bisexuals is that they are sitting on the fence and, by doing so, are taking advantage of heterosexual privilege (Strong, DeVault, Sayad, & Yarber, 2005).

The available research suggests that heterosexuals, gay men, and lesbians all hold relatively negative attitudes toward bisexuality (Eliason, 1997; Mohr & Rochlen, 1999; Steffens & Wagner, 2004) and that gays and lesbians often exclude bisexuals from their communities (Bohan, 1996). That gays and lesbians reject bisexuals in both attitudes and actions suggests that they see them as an outgroup and treat them as such, although this possibility needs to be researched further. In general, beliefs about bisexuals center around sexuality and relationships. One common belief is that bisexuals are promiscuous (Ochs, 1996). Leah Spalding and Letitia Peplau (1997), for example, asked heterosexuals to evaluate a dating couple who was described as either bisexual, heterosexual, or homosexual. Respondents thought bisexuals were less likely to be monogamous and, therefore, expected them to more readily cheat on their partner than would heterosexuals. They also believed bisexuals were more likely to give their partner a sexually transmitted disease. But they also thought bisexuals would be more likely to sexually

satisfy their partner than would heterosexuals, gays, or lesbians. Interestingly, people rated male and female bisexuals similarly and were not more positive toward bisexuals currently dating an other-sex partner—even though by doing so they were conforming to heterosexual norms. However, people believed a bisexual was more likely to cheat on a heterosexual partner than a gay or lesbian partner.

Taken together, the available research, although limited, suggests that heterosexism is operating and that bisexuals are not viewed positively. However, as we saw for attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, heterosexuals who are younger, better educated, less politically conservative, and less authoritarian are more accepting of bisexuals (Herek, 2002). Finally, we mention briefly that even less is known about attitudes toward *transgendered people*—those whose biological sex does not match their own gender-role self-concept (Hill, 2008). However, because a common misconception is that gay men and lesbians want to be members of the other sex (Kite & Deaux, 1986) and, more generally, because these individuals also violate traditional gender roles, it is likely that attitudes toward the transgendered would be similar to those toward gays and lesbians and that they would also be negative. Supporting this idea, Darryl Hill and Brian Willoughby (2005) studied Canadian college students' attitudes and found a moderate correlation between anti-gay prejudice and transphobia, or negative attitudes toward the transgendered (Study Three). They also found that men were less accepting of the transgendered than were women (Study One) and that students who personally knew a transgendered person were more accepting than those who did not (Study Three). Hill and Willoughby also found that Canadian parents who held negative attitudes toward transgendered people were more likely to reject children whose behaviors violated traditional gender roles (Study Two). Sam Winter and his colleagues (Winter, Webster, & Cheung, 2008) studied Hong Kong undergraduates' attitudes toward the transgendered and found them to be more negative than Canadian undergraduates'. They also found Hong Kong men's attitudes were more negative than Hong Kong women's. Intersexuals—those whose sexual anatomy is ambiguous and does not fit the traditional categories of “male” or “female” may be exempt from gender-role expectations, however. Anne Mason and her colleagues (Mason, Ben-Zeev, & Ilani, 2008) found that masculine women were rated more negatively than feminine women, but the intersex were evaluated positively regardless of their perceived masculinity or femininity.

### Coming Out

As we discussed in Chapter 11, homosexuality is a concealable stigma. That is, unlike with race or gender, you would not know an individual's sexual orientation unless the person told you directly or you learned it from a third party. Some sexual minorities choose to pass as heterosexuals in at least some social situations out of fear of social rejection, loss of employment, or the threat of physical violence. How do gay men, lesbians, or bisexuals decide whether to disclose their sexual orientation? The answer is not simple. To understand the complexity of this decision, first keep in mind that heterosexuals are free to openly discuss their intimate relationships (Herek, 2003). Heterosexuals, for example,



can display pictures of the people they are dating in their offices or dorm rooms. They can talk about plans for the weekend with their spouse or greet her or him with a kiss in front of friends. These acts are part of a larger heterosexual privilege this is taken for granted; such privileges are not extended to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals (Johnson, 2006; see Chapter 1). Not disclosing a nonheterosexual orientation, then, means that even casual details about one's intimate relationships must be kept secret, creating stress and anxiety (Day & Schoenrade, 2000). One way heterosexual privilege is evidenced can be seen by the questions posed in Box 12.6; these represent queries heterosexuals never have to answer in practice, but are often posed to gays and lesbians who openly discuss their sexual orientation.

The disclosure of one's heterosexuality, then, can be done casually, but disclosure of a homosexual or bisexual orientation is not taken so lightly. As Gregory Herek (2003) notes, this is because disclosing a homosexual or bisexual orientation leads to assumptions about the individual's personality and lifestyle. A heterosexual orientation is not viewed this simplistically because a heterosexual's orientation is not considered to be the single defining factor in her or his life (Herek, 2003; Johnson, 2006). Put another way, most people do not have strong stereotypes of heterosexuals, so knowing that another is heterosexual does not lead to conclusions about what the person is like. However, as we discussed, people do have definite stereotypes of gays and lesbians and, therefore, believe knowing a person is not heterosexual provides a lot of information about her or him (Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Kite & Deaux, 1987). Heterosexuals, then, can

### Box 12.6 The Heterosexual Questionnaire

Martin Rochlin (1977) developed a set of questions for heterosexuals that are similar to those gays and lesbians are often asked about when discussing their sexual orientation, but that heterosexuals are rarely asked. Some of the questions he poses are:

- What do you think caused your heterosexuality?
- When and how did you decide you were heterosexual?
- It is possible that your heterosexuality is just a phase that you may grow out of?
- Is it possible that your heterosexuality stems from a fear or dislike of others that are the same gender as you?
- If you've never slept with a person of the same sex, is it possible that all you need is a good gay lover?
- Do your parents know you're straight? Do your friends and/or roommate know? How did they react?
- Why do you insist on flaunting your heterosexuality? Can't you just be who you are and keep it quiet?
- Why do heterosexuals place so much emphasis on sex?
- A disproportionate majority of child molesters are heterosexual. Do you consider it safe to expose children to heterosexual teachers?
- Just what do women and men do in bed together? How can they truly know how to please each other, being so anatomically different?

That heterosexuals are rarely asked these questions reflects a form of privilege, especially the freedom to talk about personal relationships openly without seeming to flaunt one's sexuality, the knowledge that one's heterosexuality will not be used to undermine achievement, and the assurance that one's hiring, promotion, or firing are unrelated to sexual orientation (Johnson, 2006). If you are a heterosexual, how would you answer such queries?

make casual conversation about their intimate relationships without being stereotyped but gays, lesbians, and bisexuals do not have this luxury.

The problem this creates is related to another issue Herek (2003) discusses: In our society, self-disclosure is generally expected to be reciprocal; if a new friend tells you something personal, you are likely to respond with a similarly personal anecdote. Yet if disclosing something as simple as your partner's name can lead to rejection, reciprocity between heterosexuals and gays can be problematic; without coming out, gays and lesbians cannot match the intimacy level of many personal conversations. Finally, choosing not to self-disclose carries another risk: Failing to let another know you are gay or lesbian early in the relationship can create distrust or discrediting when the information is finally shared (Goffman, 1963). Even people who are accepting of gays and lesbians may wonder why they were not told sooner and might also believe they were lied to unnecessarily. Illustrating the complexity of the decision to come out, Debra Oswald (2007) found that people rated a gay man who concealed his sexual orientation negatively, but they also were more willing to socialize with him, perhaps because they believed that socializing with an openly gay man might result in a courtesy stigma or having negative characteristics attributed to them because of who they associated with (see Chapter 11).

### **Heterosexism in the Workplace**

Regardless of whether the general public is accepting of gays and lesbians or their civil rights, the fact remains that discrimination based on sexual orientation is legal in much of the United States. Gays and lesbians face myriad forms of discrimination that, similar to gender-based discrimination, can affect their physical health, as when gays and lesbians experience violence, or their pocketbooks, as when they lose their job because of their sexual orientation. We discussed violence against gays and lesbians in the context of hate crimes in Chapter 10 and some mental and physical health consequences of being a sexual minority in Chapter 11. Here, we focus on workplace discrimination.

On a positive note, an increasing number of organizations, including colleges and universities, are denouncing such discrimination and even have written policies prohibiting it (van der Meide, 2000). On the downside, however, significant numbers of gays and lesbians report workplace discrimination; estimates across samples vary from 25 percent to 66 percent of gay and lesbian employees (Croteau, 1996). This discrimination can be formal or informal (Levine & Leonard, 1984). Formal discrimination is based on institutional policies, such as the decision to not hire gays or lesbians or the failure to provide benefits to same-sex partners. Informal discrimination includes harassment, such as negative comments or property violence. It might also include actions that indicate a lack of respect or acceptance.

One important factor sets this type of discrimination apart from workplace discrimination based on race or gender: As we noted, gay men and lesbians usually can choose whether and when to reveal their sexual orientation. Evidence from the workplace (Ragins & Cornwell, 2001) suggests that around 12 percent of gays and lesbians stay completely in the closet; others (around 37 percent)

choose to disclose to only a few people. Approximately 25 percent of gays and lesbians report being “out” to most people and approximately 26 percent report being “out” to everyone in the workplace. In a workplace setting, a misstep in the self-disclosure process can lead to negative job evaluations or loss of opportunity. At the extreme, it can lead to termination.

Is it safer to self-disclose in some workplaces than in others? According to Belle Rose Ragins and John Cornwell (2001), the answer is yes; a number of factors make a workplace less heterosexist. They documented these factors in a national survey of members of U.S. gay rights organizations who described their job satisfaction and workplace experiences and reported whether they had come out to their coworkers. One important factor in coming out was the presence of other gays in the workplace, either as a supervisor or as a coworker; when other gays were present, self-disclosure was more likely and job satisfaction was higher. A second factor was whether the organization had gay-friendly policies—if it did, the work environment was seen as better and people felt freer to come out. Moreover, these researchers showed that the most gay-friendly policy is one that openly welcomes gay partners at social functions; as they put it, these organizations “walk the talk” (p. 1256). A third factor is whether the place of employment is in a locale where legislation prohibits discrimination against gays. If so, gays and lesbians fared better. Organizations that were gay friendly on these factors also provided better environments for those who chose not to come out. Moreover, the positive effects of these environments extended to overall career attitudes; gays and lesbians who worked in such environments felt better about their career and were more committed to it. Another study showed these experiences were similar for women and men and for White people and people of color (Ragins, Cornwell, & Miller, 2003). Regardless of whether workers choose to disclose their sexual orientation, those whose workplace is accepting of gays and lesbians report less work-related stress and more job satisfaction (Day & Schoenrade, 2000; Driscoll, Kelley, & Fassinger, 1996). However, gays and lesbians are more likely to disclose their sexual orientation in organizations that have written nondiscrimination policies or otherwise actively show support for gay/lesbians activities and, in those environments, gays and lesbians report less job discrimination and better treatment by coworkers and supervisors (Griffith & Hebl, 2002). Box 12.7 discusses how a transsexual’s decision to come out can affect the workplace.

At the individual level, no one factor accounts for anti-gay prejudice. Gender-associated beliefs matter, but so do individual difference variables such as social dominance orientation and religious beliefs (Kite & Whitley, 1998; Herek, 2002). Some evidence suggests that heterosexism springs from the same well as sexism and racism and, indeed, these factors are correlated (see Cunningham, Nezelek, & Banaji, 2004, for a review). Yet elements of anti-gay prejudice strongly suggest its uniqueness. That is, this prejudice is based on the combined effects of gender-role expectations, religious beliefs, and a general tendency to reject those who are different from oneself. Moreover, for no other group is sexuality so strongly linked to perceptions and attitudes (Herek, 2004).

**Box 12.7 Transsexuals in the Workplace**

As we noted earlier, transgenderism refers to the belief that one's gender identity does not correspond with one's biological sex. Transsexuals are individuals for whom the sense that they are "trapped in the body of the other sex" is so strong that they may decide to take sex hormones or have surgery to actually become the other sex (Hill, 2008). As Jean Barclay and J. M. Scott (2006) note, like gays and lesbians, transsexuals can choose to hide their true feelings about their gender. However, if they decide to pursue gender reassignment or to dress in the attire that matches their sexual identity, concealment is no longer possible. In the United Kingdom, where Barclay and Scott work, transsexual people are protected against workplace discrimination. However, because the legal system provides little guidance for how employers can effectively deal with a transsexual employee, the authors have written a guide to "change management" in the workplace, identifying good practices for employers who have a transsexual employee.

Barclay and Scott (2006) note that transsexuality is relatively rare, affecting approximately 1 in 30,000 men and 1 in 100,000 women. Hence, having a transsexual worker would be unusual. Because of this, it is likely that a transsexual person will feel isolated and it is important that the employer be aware of this. Employers also should realize that although transsexuals are changing their sex, they still want to be accepted as the same person with the same set of skills and abilities they have always had. Similar to our discussion of gays and lesbians, transsexuals do not want to be thought of simply in terms of their gender identity or their genitals. Hence "maleness and femaleness [should be thought of as] more like points on a continuum, rather than two discrete states" (Barclay & Scott, 2006, p. 491). Although it may be difficult to accept a transsexuals' new gender, it is

important for everyone to realize that physical appearance does not define who people are.

Employers need to understand the issues a transsexual faces, but must also consider how coworkers will react when learning about the transsexuals' identity. Responses might range from anger to astonishment to snickering. Inappropriate reactions should be discouraged. Also, similar to our discussion of gays and lesbians who do not initially come out at work, coworkers may have trust issues with transsexuals who disclose after they have been in the workplace for some time; they may feel that a transsexual who concealed her or his "true" gender might be concealing other things as well. Employers might not realize that seemingly straightforward issues, such as restroom use, can become problems. For example, Barclay and Scott discuss the case study of a male-to-female transsexual where the female coworkers did not feel comfortable with a biological male using the women's room and the male coworkers felt that the transwoman was no longer a man and should not share their restroom. The issue was resolved by having the transwoman use a separate toilet.

Dealing with these and the many other sensitive issues involving a transsexual's decision to change gender require careful consideration. Effective communication is key to alleviating negative reactions. Barclay and Scott note that an emphasis on institutional support for diversity can go a long way toward addressing the feelings of both the transsexual and the coworkers, as can emphasizing the nondiscriminatory practices that the workplace supports. One possibility is for management to set up a transition team that helps all stakeholders adjust to the change. Everyone involved, including the transsexual person, should recognize that there will be a transition period and that acceptance will not be automatic. However, education and raising awareness will increase tolerance and acceptance in this unusual situation.

**SUMMARY**

The gender belief system includes stereotypes about and attitudes toward women and men and the roles deemed appropriate for them in society. Gender stereotypes are multidimensional and include male-associated traits represented by the agentic cluster and female-associated traits represented by the communal cluster. They also include beliefs about men's and women's appropriate social roles, their

cognitive abilities, their physical characteristics, and the emotions deemed appropriate for them. These components of the gender belief system are gender polarized—that is, people believe what is masculine is not feminine and vice versa. Research has documented that these beliefs are highly stable across time, respondent age, and culture; even so, differences due to the social class and ethnicity of the people being rated remain poorly understood. Gender stereotypes emerge in subtle ways, as illustrated by the research on face-ism. This research suggests that portrayals of men typically focus on their face, suggesting they are intelligent and of high character whereas portrayals of women typically focus on the body, suggesting this is their most important feature.

Researchers have looked at attitudes toward women and men in two ways. First, they have explored attitudes toward the social groups “women” and “men.” This research shows that women are wonderful—that people like the typical woman more than they like the typical man. But the second way researchers explore these attitudes tells a different story. This research looks at particular subtypes of women and men. People have many gender-associated subtypes that can be grouped into major categories such as occupations, ideologies, physical features, and sexuality. Research shows that people have more positive attitudes toward individuals who occupy traditional subtypes compared with individuals who occupy nontraditional subtypes.

Researchers also have focused on attitudes towards women’s rights and responsibilities. These studies show that people hold less traditional attitudes toward women’s rights than they did in the past. However, research on modern sexism shows that people are still willing to indirectly express negative attitudes toward women in nontraditional roles. There is, then, a discrimination-affection paradox; people like women as a social group, but still discriminate against them. Ambivalent sexism theory suggests that the concepts of benevolent and hostile sexism help to explain this paradox. Benevolent sexism rewards traditional women whereas hostile sexism punishes nontraditional women. Together, these two attitudes work to maintain the status quo.

Maintaining the status quo means keeping women out of leadership roles. According to role congruity theory, two forms of prejudice keep women from such positions. The first form of prejudice stems from the belief that women do not possess the characteristics needed for leadership; this belief discourages women from pursuing it in the first place. Yet even when women do pursue and land leadership positions, they face a double bind created by expectations of what women are like and what leaders should be like—that is, a man. Because women cannot meet both sets of expectations, they may face negative performance evaluations. However, this situation can be modified by a number of factors, including training women about possible discrimination, providing role models, addressing stereotype threat, and considering how situational factors affect perceptions of people in nontraditional roles.

The male gender role also is limiting; people expect men to be strong and tough. These expectations have negative consequences for men and boys and sometimes can lead to negative behaviors such as drug abuse, low self-esteem, and anti-gay prejudice. These expectations for men also are part of the gender belief system. Such beliefs are linked to stereotypes about gay men and lesbians, which

includes the belief that they have the characteristics of the other sex. However, research also supports the sexual orientation hypothesis that people are more likely to believe feminine men are gay than to believe that masculine women are lesbian. Anti-gay attitudes are linked to the gender belief system. Men, for example, hold especially negative attitudes toward homosexuality, perhaps because they believe they are expected to conform to the male gender role and reject anything associated with femininity generally and gay men specifically. Failing to do so can result in a loss of status. Women, in contrast, are not so clearly expected to reject either gay men or lesbians, perhaps because they occupy a lower status social role; for women, then, accepting homosexuality does not result in a loss of status. More generally, gays and lesbians are stereotypically viewed as violating what is “normal.”

Over time, people have become more accepting of homosexuality, and people today are particularly willing to grant gay men and lesbians civil rights. Acceptance of gay marriage is more common than in the past, but not everyone believes it is appropriate. Individual difference variables, such as age, gender, and education, affect acceptance of gays' and lesbians' civil rights. Attitudes toward bisexuals have received little research attention, but the available data suggest they also are viewed negatively; stereotypes about these individuals focus on their sexuality and, especially, their promiscuity. The available research also shows that people hold negative attitudes toward the transgendered. Finally, a number of individual difference variables are related to anti-gay prejudice. For example, those who are high on social dominance and right-wing authoritarianism are particularly negative, as are those who hold fundamentalist religious beliefs. People who know a gay or lesbian personally tend to be more accepting.

A number of factors affect whether gays and lesbians choose to “come out.” Although heterosexuals take for granted that they are free to talk about their relationships, gays and lesbians do not have the option of casual self-disclosure. This is because a heterosexual orientation is not presumed to be the single defining factor in one's life, but a homosexual orientation often is. Because of this, gays and lesbians may choose not to talk about their relationships at all. Even if a gay man or lesbian later concludes it is safe to discuss her or his sexual orientation, it can have negative repercussions. For example, they might be distrusted for not sharing this information sooner, and the other person may feel hurt that they were not told at the beginning. Self-disclosure in the workplace is an important issue for gays and lesbians as revealing one's sexual orientation can lead to negative job evaluations or termination, regardless of performance. Some workplace environments make gays and lesbians feel more welcome, and they are more likely to thrive in those more friendly settings.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Gender

Deaux, K., & LaFrance, M. (1998). Gender. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 788–827). Boston: McGraw-Hill.

This comprehensive chapter reviews the whole of social psychological knowledge about gender, including gender-associated stereotypes, attitudes, and the important role context plays in gender-based interactions.

Frieze, I. H. & McHugh, M. C. (Eds.) (1997). Measuring beliefs about appropriate roles for women and men. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 21.

This special issue includes a number of relevant articles on blatant and modern sexism. Other influential articles, by Glick and Fiske, are noted in the Suggested Readings for Chapter 5.

Unger, R. K. (Ed.) (2001). *Handbook on the psychology of women and gender*. New York: Wiley.

This edited volume is another excellent resource. Part II includes chapters on men and masculinity, gender roles, gender and language, gender and social interaction, and sexualities.

Worrell, J. (Ed.) (2001). *The encyclopedia of women and gender: Sex similarities and differences and the impact of society and gender*. New York: Academic Press.

This is a highly accessible resource, with entries covering many relevant topics including gender stereotypes, men and masculinity, prejudice, women in nontraditional work settings, and working environments.

### Heterosexism and Anti-Gay Prejudice

Garnets, L. D. & Kimmel, D. C. (Eds.) (2003). *Psychological perspectives on lesbian, gay, and bisexual experiences*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Section Two of this book focuses on sexual prejudice, discrimination, and violence and includes chapters on sexual prejudice and the mental health consequences of anti-gay violence.

Herek, G. M. (2007). Confronting sexual stigma and prejudice: Theory and practice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 63, 905–925.

Herek received the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award from the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. This publication summarizes his award address and provides both a historical and a current overview of the literature on sexual stigma, heterosexism, and sexual prejudice.

Ragins, B. R. & Cornwell, J. M. (2001). Pink triangles: Antecedents and consequences of perceived workplace discrimination. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 86, 1244–1261.

This award-winning paper provides an excellent review of workplace discrimination and its effects on the experiences of gays and lesbians.

### KEY TERMS

gender polarization  
sexual orientation  
hypothesis

sexual prejudice  
sexual stigma

subtypes

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. List the components of the gender belief system and give an example of each.
2. Kay Deaux and Marianne LaFrance (1998) argue that gender stereotypes are the most fundamental aspect of the gender belief system. Do you agree or disagree and why?
3. List the two constellations of traits that are associated with women and men. What characteristics comprise these two constellations?
4. What is face-ism? Find examples from the media, magazines, or art. Then see if you can find counterexamples.
5. Which emotions are stereotypically associated with women and which are associated with men? Do you think this affects the emotions women and men display? If so, how?
6. What is gender polarization? Do you believe that this belief accurately reflects men's and women's actual characteristics?
7. Provide evidence supporting and refuting the accuracy of gender stereotypes.
8. What is the *women are wonderful effect*? Does this effect apply to all women? Why or why not?
9. List three major ways women are discriminated against in the United States and around the world.
10. Why do you think these patterns are similar cross-culturally?
11. Is modern sexism more or less harmful than blatant sexism? Defend your answer.
12. Describe how blatant sexist attitudes have changed over time. Do you believe modern sexist attitudes will also change? Why or why not?
13. What is the discrimination-affection paradox? How does ambivalent sexism theory account for it?
14. List the dimensions people use to categorize subtypes of women and men. What dimension distinguishes subtypes that are liked and disliked?
15. How do you feel about feminists? Why do you believe attitudes toward feminists are polarized?
16. Explain how hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes work in tandem to "keep women in their place."
17. According to role congruity theory, what two forms of prejudice combine to limit women's entry into and success in leadership roles?
18. Think of an example of a highly successful woman. Does her experience encourage or discourage you? Why? Use the theories described in this chapter to explain your viewpoint.
19. Describe ways in which the male role is prescriptive. Do you believe these prescriptions affect men's lives in important or minor ways or both?



20. Research shows the worst insult directed toward a man, but not toward a woman, is “homosexual” (Preston & Stanley, 1987). Explain this result in terms of the sexual orientation hypothesis.
21. What stereotypes are associated with lesbians and gay men?
22. Researchers are more likely to study stereotypes about and attitudes toward gay men than toward lesbians. Why do you think this might be the case?
23. Use the gender belief system model to explain why men, compared with women, are more intolerant of gay men.
24. Speculate what might happen to the greater acceptance of lesbianism as women gain power and status in U.S. society.
25. Which civil rights are people most willing to grant gays and lesbians? Why do you think people are willing to grant some rights and not others?
26. Based on your knowledge of ingroups and outgroups, why would gays and lesbians be intolerant of bisexuals?
27. According to Greg Herek (2003), what factors influence whether a lesbian is likely to disclose her sexual orientation? Would a gay person in your class be likely to come out? Why or why not?
28. List the factors that affect whether gays and lesbians experience workplace discrimination.
29. Distinguish between formal and informal discrimination against gays and lesbians. Give an example of each type.
30. If you learned that a person in your class was transsexual, what could you do to make that person feel more accepted?

# Chapter 13

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## Age, Ability, and Appearance

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We who are not physically handicapped are the 'temporarily able-bodied.' I like that because it reminds us that affliction and decline are coming to us all; they are incidental to our humanity. To be human is always to be more or less needy; it is to be increasingly needy the longer we live.

—GEORGE WILL (1986, QUOTED IN RICHARDS, 2007)

### Chapter Outline

#### Ageism

*When Does Old Age Begin?*

*Beliefs about Older Adults*

*Age-Based Discrimination*

#### Ability

*Who Is Disabled?*

*The Stigma of Disability*

*Physical Disabilities*

*Communication between PWDs  
and the Nondisabled*

*Mental Illness*

#### Appearance

*Physical Attractiveness*

*Height*

*Weight*

#### Summary

#### Suggested Readings

#### Key Terms

#### Questions for Review and Discussion

The research and theories about prejudice and discrimination that we have discussed so far have focused primarily on relatively immutable social categories. People are born into their racial group and although some people can pass as a member of another race if they choose, for the most part race is an unchanging part of the self. Similarly, only a small minority of the population changes their gender and, for the majority, it would be unthinkable. The preponderance of the evidence confirms that sexual orientation is biologically determined, at least for men. As the opening quotes to this chapter suggest, however, some social category memberships are temporary. We are young for a time, but inevitably we march toward old age. As we will see, with age comes an increased chance for disability—the loss of the able-body that George Will refers to. Of course, for some, disability begins earlier in life or even at birth, but regardless of its genesis, it is viewed negatively. Some aspects of people’s physical appearance are stable, such as adult height or basic facial structure, but other aspects of their physical appearance, such as weight or facial attractiveness, can be changed, sometimes voluntarily, through make-up or surgery, and sometimes involuntarily through illness, biological factors, or age-related decline.

What these social categories have in common is that they are sources of interpersonal bias. It is somewhat puzzling that people would react negatively to members of social groups that they or their close friends or relatives might well join, but nevertheless, they do. In this chapter, we review the research and theories that address this bias. In the first section of this chapter, we examine prejudice and discrimination based on age. There are cultural expectations that aging involves both physical and mental decline and these expectations form the core of ageist beliefs. These beliefs have consequences; our behavior toward older adults, for example, is affected by our expectations about what they should be like. These expectations affect older adults’ experiences in the workplace, in the health care system, and in everyday interactions with families and friends. We next turn to prejudice and discrimination directed toward individuals with physical and mental disabilities. As we will see, research suggests that people with disabilities are stigmatized in American society and the degree of stigmatization depends, in part, on the nature of the disability. In the last section of this chapter, we examine the benefits accrued by the physically attractive and the detriments experienced by less attractive individuals, especially the overweight.

## AGEISM

When thinking about **ageism**, or evaluative judgments about persons made simply due to their advanced age (Butler, 1969), a logical first question is “When does old age begin?” If you were to answer this question based on the content of greeting cards, you would conclude that anyone over the age of 40 is past her or his prime. These individuals can expect birthday parties decorated with black crepe paper and cardboard tombstones reading “over the hill.” The message that youth is valued over old age is conveyed in this and many other ways. Yet the reality is that even though most people slow down with age—at least compared

to when they were in their 20s—many also find reaching middle and old age brings stability and happiness (see Erber, 2005, for a review). Older adults with good health and strong social support networks report higher levels of satisfaction and have fewer complaints than their younger counterparts (Morgan, 1992). Moreover, a study of a representative sample of U.S. citizens found that older adults are more likely to experience positive emotions, such as ease and contentment, and are less likely to experience negative emotions, such as anxiety and anger, than their younger peers (Ross & Mirowsky, 2008; see also Lawton, Kleban, Rajagopal, & Dean, 1992). Box 13.1 describes other advantages of aging. As we will discuss, these advantages are not necessarily represented in people's beliefs or in how they treat older adults.

### When Does Old Age Begin?

Researchers often think of age in terms of broad categories, such as young, middle aged, and older adult (Kite & Wagner, 2002). The “older adult” category is sometimes further subdivided into the “young-old” and the “old-old” (Neugarten, 1975) to capture the trend toward more negative attitudes toward the oldest individuals (Hummert, Garstka, & Shaner, 1997; Kogan, 1979). Sometimes researchers assign specific ages to these categories; in these cases, the typical pattern is to label adults in their 20s and early 30s as young, those between 35 and 60 as middle-aged, those between 60 and 75 as young-old, and those older than 75 as old-old (see also Erber, 2005). When research participants list the specific ages associated with general age-based categories, their estimates correspond fairly well to those of researchers. Respondents in 19 countries reported that middle age begins around age 40 and old age begins at 60 (Best & Williams, 1996). The U.S. general population tends to believe women reach the categories “middle aged” and “old” at a younger age than do men (Zepelin, Sills, & Heath, 1986). However, specific age categories have less influence over age-related prejudice than does other information about the

#### **Box 13.1    The Advantages of Aging**

Although “old age” and “decline” might be synonyms for many, this need not be reality. Erdman Palmore (1979, 1999) has identified the ways growing old benefits both society and the individual, all of which are supported by empirical research. Society benefits because older adults are more law abiding and are more likely to vote or otherwise participate in the political process. Moreover, older adults are the core of many volunteer organizations and those who continue to work tend to be as good or better at their jobs than are younger people. At a personal level, people over the age of 65 are less likely to be crime victims and

have a lower accident rate than younger people. Many, but not all, older adults have sufficient economic resources to allow them to retire and live a comfortable life, in part because their taxes are lower and they receive many free or reduced-rate services. They are also less likely to experience mental illness, alcoholism, or drug abuse. Finally, older adults are free to be eccentric. As Jenny Joseph (2001) warns, “When I am an old woman, I shall wear purple with a red hat that doesn’t [match] ... and I shall sit down on the pavement when I am tired ... and press alarm bells ... and make up for the sobriety of my youth” (pp. 29–30).

people being evaluated. Survey respondents, for example, report that deciding whether a person has reached old age depends on factors such as whether she or he is “senile” or “useless.” As Erdman Palmore (1999) points out, there is a contradiction between using the term “old” to refer to chronological age and using “old” to mean worn out, useless, or debilitated. The former need not bring to mind negative beliefs and attitudes, but the latter certainly does.

It is also worth noting that older people often report feeling younger than their actual age (Montepare & Lachman, 1989). Even people as old as 75 deny that they are old, probably because of the term’s negative connotations (see Palmore, 1999). As the philosopher Frances Bacon put it, “I will never be an old man. To me, old age is always 15 years older than I am.” As this reluctance suggests, our attitudes toward aging are a bit paradoxical—we dread aging and but also eschew the alternative: death. After all, if you are not aging, you are no longer living. Interestingly, Jeff Greenberg and his colleagues (Greenberg, Schimel, & Martens, 2002; Martins, Goldenberg, & Greenberg, 2005) have argued that it is precisely the fear of death that makes aging threatening. As they put it, “[t]he elderly represent the threat to the young of their own fate: the prospects of diminishing beauty, health, sensation, and, ultimately, death” (Greenberg et al., 2002, p. 29). This premise, based on terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; see Chapter 7), leads to the prediction that younger people cope with this threat by physically distancing themselves from older adults—for example, by avoiding places that older adults frequent or by keeping them out of the workplace. Another coping strategy is to use psychological distancing—for example, exaggerating the differences between their own group and “older people.” Supporting these ideas, Andy Martens and colleagues (Martens, Greenberg, Schimel, & Landau, 2004; Study Two) found that when college students were reminded of their mortality, they viewed older people as more different from themselves, and rated them less favorably, than did college students who were not so reminded. Results of another study (Martens et al., 2004; Study Three) showed that this distancing was particularly likely for individuals for whom mortality was made salient and who had, during an earlier pretest, rated their own personalities as similar to older adults’.

As people age, their fear of death declines and, after about age 60, appears to level off (Cicirelli, 2002). This finding is paradoxical because, as people age, death is necessarily more eminent. Research suggests that to cope with this reality, older adults use many strategies that promote a positive self-image. They may, for example, find negative examples of aging and then demonstrate that “that’s not me.” Relatedly, they may associate with positive groups, such as the Older Women’s League and the American Association of Retired Persons. Another strategy is to use positive language, referring to themselves as “older adults” rather than “senior citizens” (Harwood, Giles, & Ryan, 1995). Older adults also may adjust their expectations about what they can and should accomplish and may worry less about conforming to social norms or having others’ approval (McCoy, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2000). Interestingly, although younger people are more judgmental when they are made aware of their

own mortality (Greenberg et al., 1990), older people are less judgmental when reminded of death (Maxfield et al., 2007), suggesting that older adults are able to deal with death without rejecting others.

### Beliefs about Older Adults

Recall from Chapter 3 that age is a basic social category and, as such, is one of the first things people notice about others. As is true for the other basic categories, people generally know what characteristics are associated with old age in their society, even if they, personally, reject the negative aspects of those beliefs. Neale Chumbler (1995) classified college students' age-related stereotypes into four factors: intolerance, health, personality, and activity. Others have found similar factors, including a negative physical appearance factor that is similar to the health factor, a sociable/isolation factor, similar to the activity factor, and a dejected factor (Kite, Deaux, & Miele, 1991; Palmore, 1999). Representative characteristics for each factor are presented in Table 13.1. As you look at this table, notice that many age-related stereotypic beliefs are negative, but that positive beliefs about older adults also are represented.

Amy Cuddy and Susan Fiske (2002; Cuddy, Norton, & Fiske, 2005) suggest that these age-based stereotypes reflect the *stereotype content models*' (SCM) warmth and competence clusters (see Chapter 5). Recall that the SCM proposes that group members are stereotypically characterized by these clusters. Cuddy and Fiske (2002) compared the perceived warmth and competence of 24 groups, including older people, people with disabilities, the educated, the poor, and five ethnic minorities. Older adults were rated as less competent than 75 percent of the groups, but were rated as warmer than 92 percent of those groups. Mary Kite and her

**TABLE 13.1 The Content of Age-Based Stereotypes**

| Factor               |                                  |                           |                 |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| Intolerance          | Health/Physical Appearance       | Personality               | Dejected        | Activity/Sociability |
| Get upset easily     | Have health problems             | Are set in their ways     | Poor            | Unproductive         |
| Talk to themselves   | Never fully recover from illness | Meddlesome                | Hopeless        | Not optimistic       |
| Grouchy              | Walk slowly                      | Old-fashioned             | Unhappy         | Physically inactive  |
| Intolerant/Impatient | Wrinkled                         | Think about good old days | Lonely          | Active outside home  |
| Rigid                | Talks slowly                     | Give good advice          | Insecure        | Has lots of friends  |
| Critical             | Hard of hearing                  | Interesting to meet       | Complains a lot | Has hobbies          |
| Miserly              |                                  | Good companion            |                 |                      |
|                      |                                  | Likeable                  |                 |                      |
|                      |                                  | Interesting               |                 |                      |
|                      |                                  | Experienced               |                 |                      |

colleagues (Kite, Stockdale, & Whitley, 2002; Kite, Stockdale, Whitley, & Johnson, 2005) reviewed a large number of studies of perceptions of older adults. Consistent with Cuddy and Fiske's analysis, older adults were rated as less competent and less agentic (that is, self-confident, independent, and strong) than were younger adults. However, older and younger adults' communion (that is, warmth and kindness) were viewed similarly (Kite, Stockdale, & Whitley, 2004). Perceivers, then, see older adults as lacking competence and activity, relative to other groups, but generally see them as having communal traits. These beliefs appear to be held cross-culturally; respondents in Belgium, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, and South Korea all rated older adults as higher in warmth than in competence (see Cuddy et al., 2005). These beliefs reflect a *benevolent ageism*, similar to the idea of benevolent sexism (see Chapters 6 & 12), in which older adults are thought to be kind, but also in need of care. As Daphne Bugental and Jessica Hehman (2007) note, seeing older adults as "weak but wonderful" can lead to a tendency to over-help them. Such paternalistic views may, in turn, lead adults to see themselves as helpless.

Another stereotypic belief is that older adults are less physically attractive than younger adults. Observers, even children as young as preschool age, can readily identify the physical changes that accompany aging, such as wrinkling, sagging, and the presence of a double chin (Zebrowitz, 1996). Such changes are not viewed positively. Consider the number of terms used for older adults that reflect unattractiveness, such as crone, fossil, goat, hag, witch, withered, wizened, and wrinkled (Palmore, 1999). Moreover, Mary Lee Hummert (1994) found that as the perceived age of a person increased so did the number of negative stereotypes about that person. This pattern was particularly strong for older women. Wernick and Manaster (1984) also found that unattractive faces were perceived to be older than attractive faces, but only by younger raters; older raters' age estimates did not depend on facial attractiveness. Perceivers also judge others based on their gait, associating a youthful walking style with greater movement and a bouncy rhythm, compared to an older walking style (Montepare & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988). People walking with a youthful gait are seen as more powerful, sexier, and happier than those walking with an older gait. Interesting, these perceptions hold even when observers know the age and sex of the walker—that is, older adults walking with a youthful style create the same positive impression as younger adults who conveyed this exuberance.

A man, even an ugly man, can remain eligible [for marriage] well into old age. He is an acceptable mate for a young, attractive woman. Women, even good looking women, become ineligible (except as partners of very old men) at a much younger age.

—Susan Sontag (1979, p. 465)

**Is There a Double Standard of Aging?** The above quotation is from a well-known essay on the **double standard of aging**—the idea that aging occurs at an earlier age and has more serious consequences for women than for men. Susan Sontag's essay focused largely how changes in women's physical appearance

affect perceptions of them, especially the idea that older women are less sexually desirable than younger women. Does research support the existence of this double standard? Yes, under some conditions. But, as we will see, not always.

Research shows that women are believed to enter both middle and old age at a younger age than men; women are thought to reach middle age approximately 2 years ahead of men and old age and the “prime of life” approximately 5 years earlier than men (Seccombe & Ishii Kuntz, 1991; Zepelin et al., 1986). Similarly, Francine Deutsch and her colleagues (Deutsch, Zalenski, & Clark, 1986) found that both men’s and women’s perceived physical attractiveness declined with age, but that the decline for women was perceived as greater. It was not until old age that men’s unattractiveness was perceived to exceed women’s. This double standard extended to women’s perceived femininity as well. Older women’s femininity was thought to diminish as they aged but perceptions of men’s masculinity did not vary with their age.

Research conducted by Mary Harris (1994) supports the idea that age-related physical changes affect perceptions of women more than men. Participants in her study found the physical changes associated with aging to be unattractive, especially for women. Interestingly, however, she also found characteristics typically associated only with male aging, such as balding, to be unattractive. Moreover, her findings indicated that women are thought more likely than men to conceal signs of aging, such as by coloring gray hair or using wrinkle cream. These beliefs were supported by women’s and men’s reports of their actual attempts at age concealment (Harris, 1994). Women were much more likely to report coloring their hair (67 percent) than were men (23 percent). Women also reported having plastic surgery (38 percent) more often than men (17 percent) and they more frequently reported using wrinkle cream (75 percent of women compared to 13 percent of men). The stereotypical perception that women lie about their age also was confirmed: 52 percent of women reported doing so, compared with 34 percent of men. Despite these findings, the benefits of being more attractive than one’s peers, discussed later in this chapter, do not disappear for older adults. Douglas Johnson and John Pittenger (1984) found that attractive people between the ages of 60 and 93 were judged to have a more favorable personality, to have more successful life experiences, and to have greater occupational achievements than less attractive people of the same age.

Does the double standard of aging affect other age stereotypes besides physical appearance? Mary Kite and her colleagues (2005) explored this question by reviewing studies examining perceptions of women and men of different ages on three dimensions: evaluation, behavior/behavioral intentions, and competence. As we explained in Chapter 1, evaluations reflect affective responses to groups, as indexed by items such as “good/bad” or “positive/negative.” Behaviors reflect discrimination toward a group, such as actual offers of help or tone of voice used in addressing a person. Behavioral intentions reflect how people believe they will act, such as a treatment plan for a hypothetical patient. The competence dimension represents the stereotypic belief that older adults are less able than are younger people. To make the relevant comparisons, Kite and colleagues computed the average size of the difference in, for example, evaluations of older and



younger men. This average difference was compared to the size of the difference between evaluations of older and younger women. A double standard of aging would be in evidence if people saw larger differences between younger and older women than between younger and older men. These researchers made similar comparisons for behaviors/behavioral intentions, and judgments of competence.

On the evaluation dimension, Kite and colleagues (2005) found that perceived age differences were larger for women than for men, although the absolute size of this difference was not large (see the first pair of bars in Figure 13.1). So, evidence shows that a double standard of aging favoring men exists on this dimension, but the size of the difference is not compelling. As shown in the second pair of bars in Figure 13.1, on the behavior/behavioral intentions dimension, there were larger differences in the treatment of younger and older women than in the treatment of younger and older men, providing evidence of a double standard favoring men on that dimension. Finally, as shown in the third pair of bars in Figure 13.1, for measures of competence, the double standard of aging was reversed; people saw larger differences in the competence of younger and older men than in the competence of younger and older women. Interestingly, this pattern is consistent with the stereotype that men are agentic; as we explained in Chapter 12, competence is an important component of that trait cluster. Other research has shown that men's, but not women's, aging is associated with a loss on that dimension of their masculinity (Kite, 1996; Thompson, 2006).

Additional research has shown that specifically stating that an older person is "mentally healthy, mature, and socially competent" results in no double standard of aging, but describing the older person as "typical" does produce a double standard (Canetto, Kaminski, & Felicio, 1995). The double standard of aging, then, appears to have a "now you see it, now you don't" quality. It may be that the double standard applies to women's physical appearance, but not their competence; for men, the reverse may be true. Also, the double standard may have less to do with how well older women are liked, compared to men than with how they are treated. The raters' sexual orientation also influences judgments. Ursina and Christof Teuscher (2007) found that, overall, youthful faces were rated as more attractive than older faces, but men especially preferred younger faces when the person depicted was sexually interesting. That is, heterosexual men preferred younger female faces and gay men preferred younger male faces. Lesbian and heterosexual women both preferred younger faces but did not see differences in men's and women's attractiveness. Finally, some evidence suggests that the double standard may simply disappear at a certain age. Agnes O'Connell and Naomi Rotter (1979) found that women's and men's competence was perceived similarly at age 75, but at earlier ages, men were seen as more competent than were women. As these findings suggest, the perceived relationship between gender and aging is quite complex and, before firm conclusions can be drawn, additional research and a new perspective on these comparisons is needed.

**Subtypes of Older Adults.** As we noted in Chapters 3 and 12, people use basic category membership as a first pass in their judgments of others and, as we have seen,




**FIGURE 13.1** Comparisons of Younger and Older Women and Men by Type of Dependent Measure

Supporting the double standard of aging, there are larger differences between how older and younger women are evaluated and treated than between how older and younger men are evaluated and treated. However, this double standard appears to reverse for competence ratings; here people see larger differences between younger and older men's competence than between younger and older women's competence.

SOURCE: Adapted from Kite, Stockdale, Whitley, Jr., and Johnson (2005).

researchers have consistently found bias against the basic category “older adults.” As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, however, when people are asked to make detailed judgments of others, they go beyond basic categorization and often turn to subtypes of that category. Research shows that people also have a well-defined set of subtypes about older adults and that they use these in their evaluations of that group. Mary Lee Hummert and her colleagues (Hummert, 1990; Hummert, Garstka, Shaner, & Strahm, 1994) have identified a set of these subtypes—some positive and some negative—that reflect shared stereotypes of older adults (see also Schmidt & Boland, 1986). Negative subtypes include Severely Impaired, Shrew/Curmudgeon, Despondent, and Recluse. Positive subtypes include John Wayne Conservative, Golden Ager, and Perfect Grandparent. These subtypes are shared by young, middle-aged, and older adults. Members of these latter two groups identified additional subtypes, such as Small Town Neighbor, which suggests that people make greater distinctions among categories as they become members of them (Hummert et al., 1994).

In general, negative beliefs about older adults are limited to individuals in the negatively subtyped groups (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Schmidt & Boland, 1986). Moreover, as we saw in our discussion of gender-based prejudice (see Chapter 12),

this pattern points to the importance of contextual or role information in understanding stereotyping and prejudice. When more detailed information is available, people evaluate older adults based on their subtype rather than their chronological age (Hummert, Garstka, Shaner, & Strahm, 1995; Schmidt & Boland, 1986). Memory problems, for example, are perceived to be more prevalent for the Despondent subtype than for others, such as the Golden Ager (Hummert et al., 1997). Negative attitudes diminish even when the contextual information provided is fairly minimal—for example, if the person is described simply as healthy or employed (Kite et al., 2005). Moreover, when the information is extensive, the influence of age on the evaluation of the person can disappear or even be reversed. Individuals described as healthy, for example, are rated more positively than unhealthy targets, regardless of their age (Gekoski & Knox, 1990), and David Ross and his colleagues (Ross, Dunning, Toggia, & Ceci, 1990) found that a 74-year-old witness who testified competently was evaluated as more credible than a 21-year-old witness of similar competence. Indeed, across 24 studies, Kite and her colleagues (2005) found that differences in evaluations of older and younger adults were minimal when extensive information was provided about the people being rated.

**The Forgetfulness Stereotype.** It happens to all of us. We walk into the next room and suddenly cannot remember our reason for doing so. Or, we go to the grocery and forget the one item we needed the most. For those middle aged and older, such actions are labeled “Senior moments” whereas for younger people, they are seen as a sign of busyness or stress. Indeed the existing literature documents that people firmly believe that memory declines with age, and does so precipitously after age 40 (Hertzog, Lineweaver, & McGuire, 1999). Of course, not all memory failures are viewed as equally serious. Forgetting the name of a new acquaintance is not as significant as forgetting the name of a lifelong friend. Joan Erber (1989) has documented these differential perceptions of everyday forgetfulness and has shown that people do recognize that certain types of memory failures are more significant than others. Even so, she found that younger people also saw identical acts of forgetfulness as more troublesome for 70-year-olds than for 30-year-olds. Older perceivers were more even-handed, seeing little difference in the seriousness of memory failure due to the actor’s age. In fact, older adults saw forgetting as less serious, overall, than did younger people. Even so, research shows older adults are more likely to expect a decline in memory than are younger adults (Ryan, 1992). Older perceivers, then, may be more likely to recognize memory decline, but also may be more understanding of forgetfulness when it occurs than are younger perceivers.

Other research shows that memory failure is viewed as more worrisome and less controllable when exhibited by older rather than younger targets (Bieman-Copland & Ryan, 1998) and people are more likely to recommend medical evaluation for older people who forget things (Erber & Rothberg, 1991). In contrast, people believe that younger people’s forgetfulness can be explained by their lack of attention (Erber, Szuchman, & Etheart, 1993). Finally, making excuses for memory failure can add humor to the situation, but may actually

lead to more negative perceptions of the failure, including the prediction that the person's memory will fail in the future (Ryan, Bieman-Copland, Kwong See, Ellis, & Anas, 2002).

In the research described so far, perceivers had only minimal information about the person they were rating. What happens when more extensive information is provided, such as whether the person is often or seldom forgetful? Consistent with what you now know about the role of individuating information in stereotype application, this more detailed information plays an important role in judgment. Research shows that respondents were more likely to rely on the least forgetful person when they needed help with a memory-related task, regardless of that person's age (Erber et al., 1993). Interestingly, an unexpected finding emerged: When choosing between the older and younger person, raters preferred the older adult overall, regardless of level of forgetfulness. Results of a second study (Erber et al., 1993) suggested that this was because people did not associate dependability with forgetfulness for older targets, but they did see a relationship between those two variables for younger targets. That is, they saw the older adults as dependable regardless of their foibles and were therefore forgiving of their errors. Younger people's forgetfulness was seen as due to unreliability. Other research showed that people assigned tasks to volunteers based on their level of forgetfulness rather than their age (Erber, Etheart, & Szuchman, 1992). And, as before, participants had a higher opinion of the older adults' memory, regardless of whether or not they were forgetful. These findings generalize to the employment setting as well; Joan Erber and Debra Danker (1995) found that attributions about memory failures did not differ by employee age. If the situation was high pressure, however, perceivers predicted future problems for older employees and were less likely to recommend training as a remedy for older employees' failure, perhaps because they saw the situation as unchangeable. Having additional information, then, can reduce but not eliminate the stereotype that older people have memory problems.

**How Do the Media Portray Older Adults?** If people are generally positive toward older adults who are competent, happy, and successful, one question to consider is whether the older adults in the media have these characteristics. In Chapter 3, we explained that the media have a powerful influence on beliefs about and attitudes toward social groups. One way to look at the media's influence on age-related perceptions is to simply ask how often older adults appear in the media. The answer is, not very often. Evidence suggests that older adults appear relatively rarely in both print media (Palmore, 1999) or on television (Robinson & Skill, 1995). On prime-time television, for example, only about 3 percent of the characters are over the age of 65 and, of those, less than 10 percent occupy a major role (Robinson & Skill, 1995). Psychologists themselves are often no better about bringing forward issues relevant to older people; the majority of psychology textbooks give only minimal attention to such topics. When they do so, they often send negative or mixed messages, such as by positioning a picture of a decrepit older adult next to text describing an optimistic view of aging (Whitbourne & Hulicka, 1990).

Older adults are also relatively invisible in magazine advertisements, a situation that appears to have changed little since the 1950s. Patricia Miller and her colleagues (Miller, Miller, McKibben, & Pettys, 1999) found that in magazines such as *Better Homes and Gardens* and *Popular Mechanics* older adults were represented in an average of 9.8 percent of advertisements depicting people. Even though those depictions were generally positive, the percentage that were negative subtypes had increased over time to its current level of 25 percent. Even in a magazine written specifically for people over the age of 50, *Modern Maturity*, only 42 percent of the advertisements included an older adult (Baker & Goggin, 1994). Interestingly, the majority of the older adults depicted were male (60 percent) even though women outnumber men in this age group. The relative absence of older adults in *Modern Maturity* was especially noteworthy when the advertisements were for clothing, automobiles, and drugs. In fact, virtually none of the clothing advertisements featured older adults. Imagine, in contrast, a magazine such as *Seventeen* or *Cosmopolitan* failing to use models representative of their target audience. Similarly, William Bailey and his colleagues (Bailey, Harrell, & Anderson, 1993) found that in publications such as *Good Housekeeping*, *Time*, and the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, older women were most frequently seen in ads for pharmaceuticals. Younger women, in contrast, were most frequently depicted in advertising for self-care products.

Older adults remain startlingly underrepresented in television commercials, appearing in approximately 7 percent of advertisements (Roy & Harwood, 1997). As Baker and Goggin (1994) found for printed advertisements, women were particularly underrepresented for their actual numbers, comprising only 38 percent of older characters even though they constitute the majority of the older adult population. Yet Abhik Roy and Jake Harwood (1997) found approximately 95 percent of the older adults who appeared in television commercials took strong, active, or happy roles. Similarly, Darryl Miller and his colleagues (Miller, Leyell, & Mazachek, 2004) found that older adults were more likely to be portrayed positively (78 percent) than negatively (12 percent). They also found that the mostly commonly depicted subtype was the “adventurous golden ager,” followed by the “perfect grandparent” and the “productive golden ager.” Only a small percentage of the commercials featured severely negative subtypes, such as “mildly impaired” and “despondent.”

When older adults appear as characters in prime-time programming, they are generally portrayed positively although this is more true for older males than for older females (Dail, 1988). However, when older adults are portrayed in the news or in documentaries, the focus is usually on a negative event or a problem (Atchley, 1997). There appear to be bright spots, then, in how the media portray older adults. Even so, it seems there is room for improvement, especially in advertising. At the very least, the size of the older population is inaccurately depicted in the media; older adults are clearly underrepresented relative to their numbers (Vasil & Wass, 1993). Given the well-documented influence of the media on stereotypes (see Chapter 3), having more—and more positive—representation of older adults in the media could only improve how they are perceived.

## Age-Based Discrimination

As we saw in Chapter 10, discrimination against less powerful groups is a fact of life. There are three areas in which discrimination toward older adults is particularly acute. One is discrimination in the workplace; such discriminatory acts have been documented in both the job-seeking process and performance evaluations. The second is in the language people use in conversation with older people. The third is in the way older adults are evaluated and treated in the health care system.

**Workplace Discrimination** Workplace discrimination against older people has interested gerontologists for over half a century (Tuckman & Lorge, 1953). Such discrimination has been illegal in the United States since 1967, when President Lyndon Johnson signed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), prohibiting age discrimination in the workplace for individuals over 40. This legislation, however, seems to have had little effect. The number of lawsuits alleging age discrimination has continued to increase, not decrease (Grosch, Roberts, & Grubb, 2004), although this trend may reflect greater awareness and reporting of age-based employment discrimination. On a positive note, the people alleging age discrimination have won many of these lawsuits (McCann & Giles, 2002).

Erdman Palmore (1999) calls workplace discrimination the most common type of economic discrimination against older people. The case is particularly easy to see for older workers who lose their jobs; they often have difficulty securing a new one and, when successful, often take a greater earnings loss than younger workers in the same situation (U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, 1986). This difficulty was documented by a clever study on age discrimination in the hiring process. Marc Bendick and his colleagues (Bendick, Brown, & Wall, 1999) trained four teams of testers, each of which had a younger and older member, in résumé preparation and interviewing. These pairs then interviewed for jobs in Washington, DC, and the surrounding area. Overall, the young applicant was much more likely to receive a favorable response to a résumé. The applicants also were treated differently during the interview process. Older applicants waited longer before their interviews, had shorter interviews, were less likely to be called by their first name, and were more likely to be perceived as overqualified for the job. In short, as the authors concluded, the job search process is far from age blind, but instead is influenced by employers' age-based expectations.

Recall from Chapter 10 that hiring decisions are influenced by the perceived fit between the candidate and the job. Amanda Diekmann and Leigh Hirnisey (2007) tested whether such perceived fit affected hiring decisions for younger and older candidates. Results of three experiments showed that, consistent with the stereotype that older adults are inflexible, participants were less likely to recommend hiring an older applicant when the company was described as dynamic rather than stable. In contrast, hiring recommendations for a young applicant did not depend on the company's characteristics. Hence, as we saw in studies of gender and race discrimination in the hiring process, people's evaluations are swayed by their stereotypic beliefs about whether the candidates are a good fit for the position.

Things are not much better once an employee is hired. Lisa Finkelstein and her colleagues (Finkelstein, Burke, & Raju, 1995) reviewed the literature on age discrimination in both real and simulated employment settings. In the typical study they examined, respondents made employment decisions, such as hiring or promoting an individual, or evaluated the candidate's employment-related skills, such as their potential for development or interpersonal skills. Results of those studies examining job qualifications showed that younger evaluators were biased in favor of workers their own age, but older evaluators were more even handed. On the other dependent variables, the available research was limited to younger people's evaluations; results of these studies also showed that younger raters favored younger workers. Yet consistent with our earlier discussion of the effects of individuating information on attitudes and behavior, when the worker was presented in a positive light, younger raters' preference for younger workers was decreased compared to when no additional information was available.

Evidence abounds that discrimination in the workplace is rooted in inaccurate beliefs. Employers believe that workers over the age of 55 are unable to meet the physical demands of the workplace, even though today only a small percentage of jobs involve manual labor (Mirvis, 1993). Furthermore, older workers are believed to have high rates of absenteeism, even though these beliefs are not supported by attendance data (McCann & Giles, 2002). Even in physically demanding jobs, there is little evidence for age-related decline in actual performance. For example, Frank Landy (1996) found that police officers and firefighters over the age of 50 were less likely to die of catastrophic illness or injury than were their younger counterparts. Similarly, although employers generally believe that work productivity declines with age (Munk, 1999), evidence suggests that older workers may actually be more productive than their younger counterparts (Forteza & Prieto, 1994). In short, evidence suggests that, because of stereotypic beliefs, older workers have difficulty changing jobs or getting a fair shake in the job they hold. And, while on the job, they often endure ageist comments, such as "old and tired," "too long on the job," or "we need young blood around here" (McCann & Giles, 2002). Box 13.2 describes more appropriate ways to refer to older adults.

**Communication with Older Adults.** Think about the last time you had a conversation with an older person. Was your conversational style different than it might have been if discussing the same topic with a younger person? Did you believe, for example, that you had to explain things in more detail or did you keep the conversation at a superficial level? Research suggests that these kinds of changes are not uncommon. In interactions with older adults, younger people often use **patronizing speech**, or change their conversational strategies in ways that reflect age stereotypic beliefs (Hummert & Ryan, 1996; Ryan, Giles, Bartolucci, & Henwood, 1986). Examples of patronizing speech include simplifying one's speech, such as by speaking more slowly or using simple vocabulary; using clarification strategies, such as by making an effort to speak especially clearly; using a demeaning emotional tone, such as by being bossy or overly familiar; or by keeping the conversation at a superficial level. An extreme form of patronizing talk is *elderspeak*, or the tendency to use baby talk in conversations with

**Box 13.2 People First Language**

"People first" language refers to a manner of speaking that focuses on individuals and not their social category or, especially, their limitations. The point of this language is to emphasize who the person is and avoid associating that person with negative stereotypes. People first language is most commonly recommended when describing people with disabilities. For example, saying "a person who is blind" is preferred to "a blind person" (Life Span Institute, 2004). However, people first language also applies to older adults. Terms such as *elderly* and *aged* have taken on negative connotations and may be considered disparaging. For this reason, two of the major journals within the field of gerontology, *Journal of Gerontology* and *Gerontologist*, both have an editorial policy that terms such as *elderly* and *aged* may not be used as nouns, although they are permitted as adjectives. Instead, the

Gerontological Society of America recommends the following terms: *older people*, *older adults*, *older persons*, or *elders*, as does the American Psychological Association [APA] (2001). APA also recommends the use of *dementia* rather than *senility* to describe age-related decrements in cognitive functioning.

People sometimes feel frustrated with changes in language and have difficulty adjusting to new terminology. You may be one of them. However, over time, such changes become second nature. As you become aware of what might seem to be subtle differences in terminology, you will also notice that major news organizations such as the Associated Press (Goldstein, 1992) have adopted the use of this terminology. And you will find that those individuals who benefit from "people first" language will sincerely appreciate your efforts.

older people (Kemper & Harden, 1999). Elderspeak is reflected in a higher voice pitch, slow speech rate, and shorter utterances (Harwood et al., 1995). Interestingly, listeners are able to discern whether speakers are talking to an older or a younger person just by hearing such voice cues (Montepare, Steinberg, & Rosenberg, 1992).

Speakers have been found to use patronizing talk in a variety of settings, including nursing homes (Caporael & Culbertson, 1996), interactions between strangers (Coupland, Coupland, Giles, Henwood, & Wiemann, 1988), and interactions between family members (Montepare et al., 1992). Evidence suggests that use of elderspeak and other forms of patronizing speech are rooted in negative stereotypes of older adults and the mistaken assumption that many or most older adults have memory or hearing problems (Hummert, 1999; Hummert, Garstka, & Shaner, 1995). In other words, people use these forms of speech to accommodate what they believe to be the needs of older adults. For example, in a classic study demonstrating these effects, Kenneth Rubin and Ian Brown (1975) asked undergraduates to explain a game to a same-aged partner or an older adult. Participants used less complex speech with an older adult than with a peer. Evidence suggests, however, that patronizing speech is used less frequently when the older adult is positively stereotyped, compared to when he or she is negatively stereotyped or no information is given (Thimm, Rademacher, & Kruse, 1998). Yet even with this positive information, speech patterns still differed toward older and younger conversational partners. Jon Nussbaum and his colleagues (Nussbaum, Pitts, Huber, Krieger, & Ohs, 2005) suggest that patronizing speech is most problematic during interactions between strangers, such as in stores, work settings, or other public places. In such environments, older adults may



encounter behaviors such as “service personnel rolling their eyes and drawing attention to the older person’s lack of competence or physical abilities [that] reinforce older individuals’ views of their age group as less valuable members of society” (p. 294).

Both older adults and impartial observers find patronizing speech to be disrespectful and demeaning (Ryan, Meredith, & Shantz, 1994); however, the relationship between the speaker matters as well. Older adults tend to associate elderspeak from friends with warmth but to interpret elderspeak from service workers as condescending (O’Connor & St. Pierre, 2004). Older adults are also more forgiving when they believe the patronizing speakers have good intentions (Hummert & Mazloff, 2001). Even so, older adults are less likely to use elderspeak when talking to other older people (Kemper & Kemptes, 2000), perhaps because they realize it has negative connotations. This is not to say that older adults require no accommodations in the way a message is presented. Elderspeak can, for example, improve recall of medical information (McGuire, Morian, Coddling, & Smyer, 2002). However, individuals who are appropriately trained can reduce their use of elderspeak while still retaining quality care (Williams, Kemper, & Hummert, 2003). Before assuming that patronizing speech is appropriate, keep in mind the power of the self-fulfilling prophecy, discussed in Chapter 3. Treating older adults as if they cannot understand may actually reduce their ability to do so.

**Health Care for Older Adults.** One of the strongest stereotypes about older adults is that illness is normal and, perhaps, irreversible (see Palmore, 1999). Unfortunately, evidence suggests that health care providers are just as likely to hold these stereotypic beliefs as are members of the general population (Greene, Adelman, Charon, & Hoffman, 1986; Reuben, Fullerton, Tschann, & Croughan-Minihane, 1995). Do these beliefs affect the quality of care older people receive?

The evidence is mixed. Research shows that older adults are sometimes treated unfairly. David Reuben and his colleagues (1995), for example, surveyed beginning medical students across the five campuses of the University of California schools of medicine and found that they saw 70-year-old patients as more ineffective, dependent, and personally unacceptable than a comparable 35-year-old patient. Moreover, when evaluating a hypothetical case of an acutely ill patient, they indicated they would be significantly less likely to pursue aggressive treatment when the person was 85 years old rather than 10 years old. Other research shows that students majoring in therapeutic recreation prefer to work with younger clients (MacNeil, Hawkins, Barber, & Winslow, 1990). Michele Greene and her colleagues (1986) found age-related bias in actual interviews between physicians and patients. Although interviews with people of different ages did not differ in length, the topics covered varied. For example, physicians discussed fewer medical and psychosocial issues with older clients and provided better information and support to younger clients. Finally, physicians were more engaged, patient, and respectful of younger clients. Daphne Bugental and Jessica Hehman (2007) reviewed the literature on the experiences of women and ethnic minorities in the health care system and

concluded that both groups experience double jeopardy—that is, the combined effect of age and race (or age and gender) lowers the chances that these patients receive quality care. Physicians, for example, are particularly likely to dismiss the health care concerns of older women and ethnic minorities and they are less likely to refer older Black women for breast cancer screening than older White women.

Even psychiatrists specializing in geriatrics can be biased; for example, in reviewing a hypothetical case history, these physicians were less likely to take a sexual history or recommend appropriate treatment of an older man with sexual dysfunction than a middle-aged man with the same presenting problem (Bouman & Arcelus, 2001). Moreover, evidence suggests that emotional problems may be masked by symptoms associated with the “normal” aging process and, hence, overlooked (Katz, Curlick, & Nemetz, 1988). However, treatment is not always biased: Eric Hillerbrand and Darlene Shaw (1990) reviewed medical records of older and younger patients and found that, in general, psychological evaluation and assessment, recommendations for follow-up, and behavioral interventions did not differ by patient age; however, in areas such as suicide ideation and attention, evaluations were less complete for older patients. Lilian-Jean Reekie and Finy Hansen (1992) found that social workers evaluated depressed clients similarly, regardless of their age. Similarly, undergraduates’ evaluations of a client depicted in a mock intake interview did not differ by client age (Matyi & Drevenstedt, 1989).

Findings based on hypothetical cases may not be representative of older adults’ real experiences. Another factor to consider is that, as Monisha Pasupathi and Corinna Löckenhoff (2002) have noted, some observed treatment differences may be rooted in real differences between older patients and younger patients. For one thing, older people are more likely to visit a physician over the course of the year, in part because they are more likely to suffer from chronic health problems (see Erber, 2005). Moreover, older people may behave differently than younger people during a medical exam. Older adults may expect the physician to take control over their health care, for example. Older adults also are more likely to bring a third party to office visits, which may affect the interaction. Such behaviors may affect physicians’ perceptions; those who primarily treat older patients with a chronic illness have been found to hold more stereotypic beliefs about older adults (Revenson, 1989). Some of the observed treatment differences, then, may be due to the real expectations and demands of older patients. This does not mean that cognitive biases are not operating, perhaps exacerbating real differences. And, if cognitive biases are present, they may prevent older adults from getting treatment that would improve their condition (Grant, 1996).

Finally, differences in the extent to which people accept age stereotypes as applicable to themselves can affect their health and well-being. Research conducted by Becca Levy and her colleagues (Levy, Slade, Kunkel, & Kasl, 2002) showed that individuals who, at a younger age, had disagreed with the statement “when you get older, you are less useful” lived on average 7.5 years longer than those who had agreed with the statement. This survival advantage remained even when baseline data, such as age, gender, and functional health, were taken into account. In another study, Levy (1996) found that older individuals

primed with positive age stereotypes performed better on a later memory test than those primed with negative stereotypes (see Chapter 2 for a description of how priming works). Exposure to positive stereotypes also has been shown to increase older adults' walking speed (Hausdorff, Levy, & Wei, 1999) and to improve their handwriting (Levy, 2000). Unfortunately, activation of negative stereotypes about older adults can begin in childhood and continue throughout the life cycle and is, therefore, difficult to counteract in the long term (Levy, 2003). Hence, regardless of whether negative stereotypes are held by the young, the old, or both, research shows they can have detrimental effects as people enter old age, often resulting in discriminatory acts against older adults.

## ABILITY

As George Will's quote at the beginning of this chapter reminds us, both our physical and mental ability can change, sometimes quickly and sometimes irreversibly. Some researchers have suggested that this knowledge explains people's discomfort with disability and the prejudice and discrimination that results from this discomfort (Hebl & Kleck, 2000). Negative attitudes may also be linked to the belief that those who have lost some abilities are flawed or are in need of rehabilitation (Asch & McCarthy, 2003). As you read the research summarizing these reactions, keep in mind that *persons with disabilities* (PWDs) do not view themselves in this way and these individuals are just as likely to lead full and happy lives as are more able-bodied people. Despite this success, prejudice and discrimination are a fact of life for PWDs. Because of this, their needs and experiences, including the need for civil rights, are similar to those of other minority groups (Fine & Asch, 1993). We begin by providing statistics about who is disabled in the United States. We then review beliefs about persons with physical disabilities, explain how these beliefs affect social interactions, and describe how those interactions can be improved. We then turn to research on attitudes toward persons with mental illness.

### Who is Disabled?

As Adrienne Asch and Henry McCarthy (2003) note, disability is commonly associated with "the deaf, blind, orthopedically impaired, or mentally retarded," but the legal definition of disability covers "relatively hidden conditions such as arthritis, diabetes, heart disease, back problems, cancer, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, HIV/AIDS, and chronic fatigue syndrome" (p. 254). **Disability** is legally defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], 2000). Note that this definition does not specify which conditions qualify as a disability, but rather outlines the criteria that employers, universities, or other groups must use in determining whether someone is disabled. The purpose of the

EEOC's definition is to identify who, on the basis of their current or past disability, is legally protected against discrimination and is eligible for educational and rehabilitation services.

Similar to the concept of race, disability is a social construct (Fine & Asch, 1993) and, to some extent, the presence or absence of a disability is in the eye of the beholder. Also similar to race (see Chapter 1), there are no objectively defined categories of disability. Instead, the U.S. Census uses self-report data on the ability to perform activities to determine the numbers of people with disabilities. These data show that approximately 18 percent of the noninstitutionalized U.S. population has a disability; the majority of these individuals (63 percent) report having a severe disability (Steinmetz, 2006). Incidence of disability increases with age; 72 percent of people 80 and older have a disability, compared with 19 percent of people between the ages of 45 to 54 and 8 percent of people under the age of 15. Adult women (20 percent of all females) are more likely to be disabled than are adult men (17 percent of all males), but for those under age of 15 boys (11 percent) are more likely to be disabled than girls (6 percent). The poverty rate is much higher (26 percent) for people with severe disabilities than for those with nonsevere disabilities (11 percent) or those with no disability (8 percent). Incidence of disability for Blacks (20 percent) and Whites (19 percent) is similar and higher than for Hispanics (14 percent) or Asians (12 percent). Unemployment is much higher for those with a severe disability (57 percent) than for those with a nonsevere disability (18 percent) or no disability (12 percent).

### The Stigma of Disability

As we saw in Chapter 11, *stigmatized* individuals are viewed negatively because of their group membership and, in the social science literature, ability status is often studied from this perspective. As we also discussed in Chapter 11, the extent to which people are stigmatized depends on a number of factors, including whether the stigma is concealable, is aesthetically appealing, is perceived as controllable, or is perceived as potentially dangerous. Disabilities differ on all these dimensions and, accordingly, some PWDs are more stigmatized than others. Epilepsy, for example, is generally concealable, does not obviously affect a person's appearance, is uncontrollable, and does not put the perceiver in danger. In contrast, paraplegics are readily identified as disabled and people see the condition as physically unappealing. The cause might be viewed as controllable if, for example, the impairment was due to a car accident, but people do not feel at peril in the presence of a paraplegic. Whether mental illness can be concealed depends on its severity, but people often believe it can be controlled and that those with uncontrolled mental illness are dangerous. In general, disabilities that are seen as controllable are viewed more negatively, as are those that are viewed as aesthetically unappealing and dangerous (see Chapter 11). Annette Towler and David Schneider (2005), for example, examined people's perceptions of stigmatized groups and found that physical disabilities were seen as less controllable and more desirable than were mental illness or stigma based on physical appearance.

Because the nature of disability differs so widely, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about when and why PWDs experience prejudice and discrimination. Even within a disability category, PWDs have differing degrees of dysfunctionality, ranging from minor to severe. Some people have mild hearing loss, for example, while others are completely deaf. Some disabilities, such as terminal cancer, are progressive, others are static (Fine & Asch, 1993). What is clear, however, is that prejudice and discrimination lead to serious problems for PWDs. As Joseph Schneider (1988) notes “many people [with a disability] find coping with the social meanings and practices surrounding disability considerably more difficult than coping with the physical or biological limitations they have” (p. 64). As we noted in Chapter 1, it is important to avoid incorrect assumptions about the disabled, such as concluding that a disabled person’s problems are caused by their disability, that persons with disabilities need help and social support, or that a person’s disability is central to their self-concept. As can be seen in Box 13.3, even those who are well-informed can fall prey to stereotypic beliefs.

As you read about research on this topic, keep in mind some important limitations of these studies. First, much of the research on disability-related prejudice focuses on individuals who have a visible impairment that affects their physical functioning and is relatively permanent. Relatively little is known about reactions to those with less visible or temporary disabilities. Second, much of this research is based on self-report measures, which can be affected by social desirability concerns (see Chapter 2). As we have seen in several chapters, people’s responses to stigmatized groups can be strongly affected by the need to appear unprejudiced. Third, researchers sometimes employ confederates to gauge people’s actual behavior toward PWDs, but these individuals often are not themselves disabled. It is important to note that these confederates’ behaviors

### **Box 13.3 Not All Blind People Read Braille**

David Johnson, a faculty member at John Brown University, is an expert on teaching and mentoring students with disabilities and is very familiar with the guidelines for accommodating students’ needs, including the need to modify course assignments or class presentations and to ensure that classroom-related technology is accessible to all students. However, as he explains,

[f]aculty sometimes adopt [a] stereotype that involves students’ unique abilities, rather than disabilities. For example, 20 years ago, a student who was blind informed me during the spring semester that she would be taking my statistics course in the fall semester. With all good intentions, over the summer, I had handouts, homework, statistical tables, and other course

materials translated into Braille for this student. Why? How else would a blind person be able to read? My stereotype of blindness included the ability to read Braille. Fortunately, this student did, in fact, read Braille, rewarding my efforts. Subsequently, I discovered that Braille reading among the blind was quite low. In fact, due in part to mainstreaming of blind students over the last few decades, fewer learn Braille, which reduced the literacy rate of this group. My good intentions to accommodate this student and to be prepared well in advance of her enrollment was based on a stereotype and lack of information that could have resulted in considerable wasted time (Johnson, 2006, pp. 154–155).

may be different from persons who are actually disabled. It is possible, for example, that these actors' negative stereotypes about disability influence both their own behavior and peoples' reactions to them (Fine & Asch, 1993; Hebl & Kleck, 2000). Moreover, persons with a disability likely develop strategies that facilitate interactions with the nondisabled; it is unlikely that confederates playing the role of a PWD use these strategies. Finally, researchers often focus on initial, one-time interactions, which tells us little about how people's responses change over time as they gain knowledge and experience about disability.

### **Physical Disabilities**

Self-report studies show that college students generally have positive attitudes toward persons with physical disabilities. One commonly used attitude measure is the Disability Social Relationship (DSR) scale which assesses people's willingness to work with, date, or marry a PWD. Eric Gordon and his colleagues (Gordon, Minnes, & Holden, 1990) found that people were most open to working with a PWD, but that they also were open (to a lesser degree) to the possibility of dating or marrying a PWD (see also Hergenrather & Rhodes, 2007). To some extent, then, attitudes depend on the social context. Attitudes also vary by type of disability; people are less accepting when the disability is cerebral palsy rather than epilepsy or blindness (Gordon et al., 1990). In general, women's self-reported attitudes toward disability are more positive than men's (Chen, Brodwin, Cardosa, & Chan, 2002; Hergenrather & Rhodes, 2007), but not all research shows a sex difference (Loo, 2001).

The actual dating experiences of women with disabilities suggest that social desirability might be influencing these positive assessments. For example, Harilyn Rousso (1988) found that adult women who were disabled before adolescence experienced their first kiss, first date, and first sexual contact at a later age than did those who were disabled after adolescence. Rousso also found that parents were much less likely to discuss dating, marriage, and having children with daughters who were disabled before adolescence. Moreover, these women reported that their parents gave them mixed or negative messages about their sexual and social potential, suggesting that the parents had internalized societal myths about these topics. However, Russo's respondents did report receiving positive messages about their educational and career potential.

Other research also shows that the actual experiences of PWDs do not match the relatively positive responses found on attitude scales. PWDs report that non-disabled people often stare, laugh at them, or simply ignore them (Hebl & Kleck, 2000). College students with disabilities report experiencing a chilly classroom climate (see Chapter 11) as evidenced by some faculty members' behavior toward them. Students, for example, were told that their disability was "their problem," were encouraged to enroll in different sections of a course, or were told that they could not succeed without a tutor (Beilke & Yssel, 1999).

Whether PWDs experience employment discrimination appears to depend on the nature of their disability. For example, Drew Gouvier, Sara Sytsma-Jordan, and Stephen Mayville (2003) asked advanced undergraduate business students to

evaluate job applicants for a more complex (phone operator) or less complex job (janitor). Applicants had one of four disabilities: developmental, chronic mental illness, back injury, or head injury. In all cases, the applicant information showed they were qualified for the job. Even so, the applicant with the back injury was rated as having better interpersonal skills and was predicted to have better job performance than applicants in the other three categories. However, the developmentally disabled applicant received the least negative ratings on a general evaluation measure. Hiring decisions were influenced by job complexity as well. The applicant with a back injury was preferred for the high complexity job; applicants from the other three categories were viewed similarly. For the low complexity job, raters were equally likely to recommend applicants with a back injury, a developmental disability, or a head injury, but were less likely to recommend the applicant with chronic mental illness. Other research shows that people prefer job applicants with who have nonvisible disabilities, particularly when the job involves greater contact with the public (Gouvier, Steiner, Jackson, Schlater, & Rain, 1991).

As with older adults, people sometimes infantilize PWDs. For example, Kenneth Robey, Linda Beckley and Matthew Kirschner (2006) studied the implicit attitudes of staff who work with PWDs in a school or hospital setting. They found that respondents implicitly associated disability-related words with childhood and with words that had a negative connotation. However, on explicit attitude measures, no such associations were found. Other research shows that people use patronizing speech when interacting with someone who has a visible disability. College students, for example, used more words and used a higher voice pitch when giving directions to a person in a wheelchair rather than a nondisabled adult (Liesner & Mills, 1999), a tendency that may be more pronounced for female than for male speakers (Gouvier, Coon, Todd, & Fuller, 1994). As we saw with older adults, casual listeners can detect these changes and, in the case of PWDs, assume the person being addressed has a more severe condition than when normal speech is used (Coon, Gouvier, Caldwell, & Huse, 1991).

Another common belief is that PWDs need help or special consideration. Although this belief is usually based on good intentions, PWDs often find it to be patronizing and infantilizing. For example, Elaine Makas (1988) compared the responses of PWDs to those of nondisabled students on the Issues in Disability Scale (IDS), a measure of attitudes toward PWDs in a variety of settings. The PWDs disagreed with the college students on two clusters of items: *Giving the Disabled Person a Break*, which included items suggesting that PWDs need special concessions, and *Disabled Saint*, which included items suggesting that PWDs had especially positive characteristics. PWDs were less likely than the nondisabled to accept either that PWDs need special treatment or that PWDs were particularly courageous or easy-going. Moreover, PWDs reacted negatively to the idea that others would hold these beliefs. As Makas notes, these differing perceptions can lead to misunderstandings between PWDs and the nondisabled; for example, a nondisabled person may not understand that suggesting a PWD needs extra time to complete a task can be perceived negatively. As we saw with older adults, the belief that PWDs need special consideration can lead to the problem of “overhelping” which, ironically, can lead to greater dependence and may reduce

**Box 13.4 The Experience of Disability**

As Joseph Schneider (1988) notes, much of the research on PWDs is conducted from the perspective of the “experts” who focus on theories and research techniques. Although this research aids in understanding stereotyping and prejudice toward PWDs, it does not necessarily include the voices of those who have a disability. To represent these voices, Schneider interviewed 80 people with epilepsy, a nonvisible disability that can lead to seizures that are often unpredictable. Respondents described their interactions with others and many noted that they were often told, directly or indirectly, that they were incompetent and in need of special help. For example, respondents reported that family members regularly reminded them to take their medication and of how to respond if they had a seizure. Here is what a 35-year-old woman said of her parents’ behavior:

They don’t let you forget you have it. If they could only just forget about it, you know? I think they are well-intentioned, but it’s just that it’s always in the back of their mind. “Well, you have epilepsy, and I’ll do this for you and I’ll do that for you.” (p. 71)

Often, family members focused on what the person with epilepsy was *unable* to do. One man described his experience growing up:

Mostly [my father] told me I’d never be able to do things like everybody else could.... One main thing that really stuck in my head was my father always told me, and my mother [did] too.... I’d never be able to live a normal life, y’know. I couldn’t get a job where any tools were around, or machinery; couldn’t drive, couldn’t go out climbin’ hills or something. Couldn’t be in the boat. (p. 69)

In some cases, however, respondents took such admonishments as a challenge and set out to prove

what they could do. And, such negative messages were not universal. In some families, the message was that epilepsy did not define them, that it was controllable, and that it was not an excuse for lack of effort or failure.

Another concern voiced was how others responded to their seizures. Respondents were aware that both friends and coworkers worried that they would have a seizure and they would not know what to do. Because of this, the person with epilepsy was sometimes treated as though a seizure was imminent and, therefore, others needed to “keep an eye on them.” As one woman stated:

Like after I fall on the job, I’ve got people coming up and checking on me all night to see if I’m okay. You get to feel like a little baby after a while and you don’t get treated the same. Every once in awhile you’ll see somebody coming in like to go to the bathroom on my floor when there’s one on their floor.... In a way it makes you feel kind of bad you can’t operate on your own two feet. (p. 73)

While someone is experiencing a seizure, help may be needed (although often the best response is to do nothing). However, seizures are generally of short duration and the person with epilepsy is then able to function competently. Even so, Schneider reported that his respondents found it difficult to refuse the extra help that was offered even though there were costs to them, including the possibility of becoming too dependent on others. However, as we discussed, reactions to PWDs are socially constructed and, as such, can be changed. Frank communication about how to respond and gaining experience can help the nondisabled become more comfortable interacting with PWDs.

the PWDs self-confidence (J. Schneider, 1988). In Box 13.4, these problems are discussed from the perspective of people with epilepsy.

### **Communication between PWDs and the Nondisabled**

Disabled persons are a relatively small percentage of the population, so most nondisabled individuals have had limited interactions with PWDs. This leads to uncertainty about, for example, whether it is okay to ask questions, to offer help,



or to express sympathy. Nondisabled people can have inaccurate stereotypes, such as the belief that PWDs are bitter or emotional about their stigma or will be overly sensitive (Belgrave & Mills, 1981). Perhaps because of this, both disabled and nondisabled people feel awkward in mixed social interactions that involve members of both groups (Hebl, Tickle, & Heatherton, 2000). As we saw in Chapter 5, when people are uncertain about how to behave toward members of other social groups, negative emotions such as anxiety are common. This anxiety may explain why nondisabled people will avoid interacting with stigmatized group members if they think that their motives for doing so will go undetected. Hence, college students were more likely to avoid sitting next to a person with a brace when there was a plausible excuse for doing so (Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979).

According to Harlan Hahn (1988), for the nondisabled, two types of anxiety can emerge in interactions with PWDs. One, *aesthetic anxiety*, represents the “fears engendered by persons whose appearance deviates markedly from the usual human form or includes physical traits regarded as unappealing” (p. 42). This type of anxiety is strongly linked to cultural beliefs about PWDs and leads people to shun those who are physically unattractive. The second, *existential anxiety* is “the perceived threat that a disability could interfere with functional capacities deemed necessary to the pursuit of a satisfactory life” (p. 43). This type of anxiety leads to the belief that the disabled are helpless or dependent and is related to the fear of losing one’s own physical abilities. Both types of anxiety are rooted in a lack of experience with or knowledge about PWDs.

Fortunately, good communication can resolve misunderstandings that stem from these anxieties. Table 13.2 lists communication strategies that nondisabled persons can use in interactions with PWDs. More generally, Simi Linton (2008), a disability rights scholar, notes that the terms “disability” and “disabled people” are preferable to terms such as “handicapped” and “crippled” or well-meaning words such as “physically challenged” or “special people.” These seemingly positive terms are not used by PWDs themselves (Hebl & Kleck, 2000) and should be avoided. Similarly, using the term “normal” to describe nondisabled people implies that PWDs are “abnormal” and terms such as “afflicted” and “suffering from” convey negative information (Olkin, 1999). As was explained in Box 13.2, people first language should be used. With practice, communication between PWDs and the nondisabled can improve. For example, medical students reported that communication training increased their comfort in working with patients with a severe developmental disability (Eddey, Robey, & McConnell, 1998).

Persons with disabilities can also work to improve communication with the nondisabled. For example, PWDs can address misstatements in a way that both provides information and acknowledges the speaker’s good intentions (Makas, 1988). A positive interpersonal style also can improve communication (Hebl & Kleck, 2000). It is helpful if the PWD acknowledges the disability. For example, Albert Hastorf, Jeffrey Wildfogel, and Ted Cassman (1979) found that when a paraplegic acknowledged the problems of being in a wheelchair and noted that people should be encouraged to talk about those problems, nondisabled students were much more likely to choose him as a partner for a subsequent study,

**TABLE 13.2 The Ten Commandments of Communicating with People with Disabilities**

- 
1. Speak directly rather than through a companion or sign language interpreter who may be present.
  2. Offer to shake hands when introduced. People with limited hand use or an artificial limb can usually shake hands and offering the left hand is an acceptable greeting.
  3. Always identify yourself and others who may be with you when meeting someone with a visual disability. When conversing in a group, remember to identify the person to whom you are speaking. When dining with a friend who has a visual disability, ask if you can describe what is on his or her plate.
  4. If you offer assistance, wait until the offer is accepted. Then listen or ask for instructions.
  5. Treat adults as adults. Address people with disabilities by their first names only when extending that same familiarity to all others. Never patronize people in wheelchairs by patting them on the head or shoulder.
  6. Do not lean against or hang on someone's wheelchair. Bear in mind that people with disabilities treat their chairs as extensions of their bodies. And so do people with guide dogs and help dogs. Never distract a work animal from their job without the owner's permission.
  7. Listen attentively when talking with people who have difficulty speaking and wait for them to finish. If necessary, ask short questions that require short answers, or a nod of the head. Never pretend to understand; instead repeat what you have understood and allow the person to respond.
  8. Place yourself at eye level when speaking with someone in a wheelchair or on crutches.
  9. Tap a person who has a hearing disability on the shoulder or wave your hand to get his or her attention. Look directly at the person and speak clearly, slowly, and expressively to establish if the person can read your lips. If so, try to face the light source and keep hands, cigarettes and food away from your mouth when speaking. If a person is wearing a hearing aid, don't assume that they have the ability to discriminate your speaking voice. Never shout to a person. Just speak in a normal tone of voice.
  10. Relax. Don't be embarrassed if you happen to use common expressions such as "See you later" or "Did you hear about this?" that seems to relate to a person's disability.
- 

SOURCE: Wilken and Ward (2007). Copyright © Irene Ward & Associates 2003. For information on the video training program, contact PDA, [www.disabilitytraining.com](http://www.disabilitytraining.com) or (800) 543-2119.

compared to when his disability was not discussed. As Michelle Hebl and Robert Kleck (2000) note, acknowledging the disability may "reduce stereotypy by straightforwardly addressing the source of the tension [in] a social interaction and allowing interactants to get beyond it sooner than might otherwise occur without the acknowledgment" (p. 430).

### **Mental Illness**

Stereotypes about persons with mental illness include that they are withdrawn, depressed, tense, unpredictable, dangerous, and aggressive (see D. Schneider, 2004). However, the core stereotypes appear to be perceptions of dangerousness and

unpredictability. In general, attitudes toward mental illness are more negative than attitudes toward physical disability. For example, Phyllis Gordon and her colleagues (Gordon, Feldman, Tantillo, & Perrone, 2004) found that mental retardation and mental illness were the least socially accepted disability categories and that cancer, arthritis, and diabetes were the most socially accepted. They also found that people were less likely to want to be friends with persons with a mental illness than with persons with other disabilities. Similarly, students in an occupational therapy program gave higher preference scores to persons with diseases such as asthma, diabetes, and arthritis than to persons who were mental retarded or mentally ill (Lyons & Hayes, 1999).

Mental Health America (2007) surveyed a representative sample of Americans about their mental health attitudes. Results showed that 72 percent of respondents today see depression as a serious medical illness rather than a sign of personal weakness compared to 38 percent in 1996. However, they were more likely to see mental illness as a sign of weakness than cancer or diabetes (see Table 13.3) and they reported they would be more comfortable sharing the fact that they had diabetes or cancer with friends or coworkers than depression, bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia. Most Americans reported that they would be comfortable having a neighbor with depression, but less comfortable with a coworker, teacher, romantic partner, or elected official with depression. Comfort levels were much higher for a person with cancer or diabetes. An earlier survey of a representative sample of U.S. residents found a similar pattern of results (Martin, Pescosolido, & Tuch, 2000).

**Perceived Controllability and Dangerousness.** People's beliefs about mental illness are influenced by how controllable they view the disorder to be. For example, people believe that cocaine addiction is the most controllable psychiatric disorder, followed by psychosis, depression, and mental retardation. Persons with

**TABLE 13.3 Attitudes toward Mental Illness**

|                                           | Depression | Bipolar Disorder or Schizophrenia | Cancer | Diabetes |
|-------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------|--------|----------|
| Health Problem, not weakness              | 72%        | 93%                               | 97%    | 96%      |
| Would share with close friend or coworker | 67%        | 58%                               | 82%    | 85%      |
| Comfortable interacting with ...          | 63%        | 45%                               | 92%    | 94%      |
| Comfortable having:                       |            |                                   |        |          |
| Friend                                    | 91%        | not asked                         | 92%    | 94%      |
| Coworker                                  | 47%        | not asked                         | 93%    | 97%      |
| Elected official                          | 51%        | 29%                               | 90%    | 93%      |
| Teacher                                   | 39%        | 20%                               | 92%    | 94%      |
| Romantic partner/date                     | 47%        | 23%                               | 78%    | 87%      |

SOURCE: Mental Health America (2007).

mental retardation are believed least likely to recover, followed by persons with cocaine addiction, psychosis, and depression (Corrigan et al., 2000). When mental illness is thought to be controllable, perceivers are more likely to avoid a person with mental illness, to withhold help, and to endorse coercive treatment (Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003).

Results from a face-to-face survey of a representative sample of adults living in the United States showed that perceived danger also influences attitudes toward persons with a mental illness (Martin et al., 2000). In this study, respondents read a vignette that described people who met the criteria for one of four mental health disorders: schizophrenia, major depression, alcohol dependence, and drug dependency. However, to reduce the possibility that social desirability would influence responses, only the behaviors associated with the diagnosis, and not the mental health diagnosis itself, were provided. Respondents indicated how willing they were to interact with the person and how dangerous they thought the person was. They also reported how likely it was that the mental problem was caused by bad character, a chemical imbalance, stress, or a genetic problem. Bad character was reported to be a likely cause for only one mental health problem—drug dependence. A chemical imbalance was seen as the most likely cause of schizophrenia and stress was seen as the most likely cause for alcohol dependence and depression. Those who attributed the mental health problems to genetic causes or stress were most willing to interact with the person in the vignette and those who attributed the problem to bad character were least willing. Regardless of the perceived cause of the mental problem, as perceived danger increased, the willingness to interact with the person decreased. Other research, using a similar methodology, has shown that people with a cocaine dependence are perceived to be most dangerous, followed by alcohol dependence, schizophrenia, and major depression (Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999). Similarly, other research found that avoidance was more likely and coercive treatment was seen as more acceptable when perceptions of danger were high. Conversely, people who had had experience with mental illness were more likely to offer help and less likely to avoid people with psychiatric disorders (Corrigan, Markowitz et al., 2003).

Mental illness is a concealable stigma; in general, persons with a mental illness choose whether to disclose this information (Corrigan & Lundin, 2001). However, perceivers believe that cues such as exhibiting bizarre behavior, displaying poor social skills, and an unkempt physical appearance indicate mental illness (Corrigan, 2000) and these cues influence their judgments. For example, Matthew Schumacher, Patrick Corrigan, and Timothy DeJong (2003) asked shoppers to read one of four vignettes that described the behaviors of a male stranger on a bus or train. The man was described as more bizarre (speaking incoherently and loudly) or less so (sitting on a bench, staring at the pavement). He was also described as either unkempt or as well-groomed. Participants rated how dangerous and threatening they perceived the man to be and reported whether they would be likely to avoid him. When the man's behavior was more bizarre, he was seen as more dangerous and threatening than when his behavior was less bizarre and people wanted to avoid him more. When the behavior was less bizarre,

people reported a stronger desire to avoid the unkempt man than the well-groomed man and he was seen as more threatening, but not more dangerous, than the well-groomed man.

**The Experience of Mental Illness Discrimination.** Discrimination on the basis of mental illness is common. For example, Otto Wahl (1999) surveyed 1,301 persons with mental illness about their personal experience with stigma and discrimination, including treatment by others, hearing negative comments about mental illness, and fears and behaviors related to disclosing their mental health status. The most common mental disorders in this sample were bipolar (25 percent), schizophrenia (19 percent) and major depression (15 percent). The vast majority of respondents (78 percent) reported hearing unfavorable or offensive things about mental illness and, perhaps as a consequence, most (74 percent) reported that they sometimes avoided telling those outside the family about their mental illness. Similarly, respondents reported at least sometimes being treated as less competent by those who knew their mental health status (70 percent). However, experiences of fair treatment were also common (83 percent) as was acceptance by friends (83 percent). Reports of employment discrimination were less frequent than other types of discrimination, but 22 percent of respondents believed they had been turned down for a job because of their mental illness and 30 percent believed they had been denied health insurance on that basis. Respondents also were somewhat likely to be denied housing (19 percent) or to be excluded from volunteer or social activities (26 percent) because of their illness. Follow-up interviews with a subgroup of 100 respondents showed that most felt these experiences had a lasting impact (95 percent) and that they negatively influenced their self-esteem (57 percent). The most common coping strategies were advocacy (44 percent), confrontation (18 percent), avoidance or concealment (16 percent) and selective disclosure (13 percent). Patrick Corrigan and his colleagues (Corrigan, Thompson et al., 2003) also surveyed persons with a severe mental illness and found that they were much more likely to report that discrimination was due to their psychiatric disability (73 percent) than to their race (27 percent), gender (27 percent), sexual orientation (15 percent), age (30 percent), or economic circumstance (51 percent).

**Consequences of Mental Health Stigma.** One of the most unfortunate consequences of negative attitudes toward mental illness is that the resulting stigma decreases the chances that people who need help will seek treatment; less than 40 percent of persons with mental illness do so (Corrigan, 2004). Moreover, perhaps because of the barriers that have prevented them from seeking treatment, people with mental illness are less optimistic about the future than are people who have not experienced mental health problems (Mental Health America, 2007).

A comprehensive study by the RAND Corporation highlights the problem (Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008). The study found that about 300,000 U.S. soldiers currently suffer from major depression or post-traumatic stress disorder, but that only 53 percent have sought help, at least in part because they fear seeking care might

damage their careers. In an interview on Sound Medicine (Lewis & Bogdewic, 2008), a national public radio program, Beth Karnes of the Indiana Mental Health Memorial Foundation noted that the U.S. Veteran's Administration (VA) lacks the personnel needed to diagnose and treat these disorders. Moreover, Karnes believes that veterans and active service personnel have not been trained to know when to seek treatment and that VA administrators need to "stop looking at mental health care as a deficit ... and to start looking at it as a strength and a recovery-based activity [that helps] that person develop a resiliency." Without these changes, she notes, there will be increased numbers of suicides, homelessness, substance abuse, and job losses among service personnel who return from Iraq and Afghanistan. As we have seen, military personnel are not alone in holding stereotypic views.

Patrick Corrigan and colleagues (2000) also advocate for education and believe it is most effective when it is specifically tailored to a diagnostic category. The stereotype that the mentally ill are dangerous, for example, is generally incorrect, but if a psychotic person's symptoms change suddenly, the likelihood of danger does increase. Education can clarify this distinction. Education can also prevent "not in my backyard" responses—people's rejection of having persons with mental illness live near them (Link et al., 1999). The strategies suggested for improving communication between the nondisabled and persons with a physical disability can be applied to persons with mental illness as well.

## APPEARANCE

Many intellectuals would have us believe that beauty is  
 inconsequential. Since it explains nothing, solves nothing,  
 and teaches us nothing, it should not have a place in  
 intellectual discourse.... But there is something wrong with this  
 picture. Outside the realm of ideas, beauty rules.  
 Nobody has stopped looking at it, and no one has  
 stopped enjoying the sight.

—Nancy Etcoff (1999)

Does beauty rule, as Nancy Etcoff claims in the above quote? This question has been debated for centuries and the debate will undoubtedly continue. Reviewers of the psychological literature, however, consistently side with Etcoff. People who are physically attractive enjoy many advantages and those who are physical unattractive can experience prejudice and discrimination based solely on their appearance. In this section, we first look at who is considered physically attractive. We then describe the benefits more attractive people enjoy, including those that accompany a taller stature. We conclude this section by looking at the strong anti-fat bias that exists in the United States and other Western societies and how this bias often results in discrimination against the overweight.

## Physical Attractiveness

To some extent, cultural ideas about who is physically attractive mirror Justice Potter Stewart's famous definition of obscenity; that is, people cannot define it but know it when they see it. Yet there is more agreement on this issue than you might think. Adults and children from different cultures show a high level of agreement about which faces are more attractive than others (Langlois et al., 2000). Attractive faces are smooth-skinned, youthful, and have a pleasant expression (Rhodes, 2006). Symmetrical faces with "average" features are seen as more attractive, perhaps because less distinctive features seem more familiar (Langlois & Roggman, 1990). Research also shows that perceptions of attractiveness are influenced by body type. People with a muscular body type are stereotypically seen as more attractive, healthy, and adventuresome, whereas, as we will discuss in more detail later, overweight people are seen as sloppy, lazy, and unattractive. Thinner people are stereotypically seen as intelligent and neat, but tense and afraid (Ryckman et al., 1991).

As Alice Eagly and her colleagues (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991) note, in the U.S. culture, physical beauty is associated with good things, such as princesses, and ugliness is associated with bad things, such as wicked witches. To some extent, cultural standards of beauty change over time. For example, female models with a slender, boyish shape are now preferred over the more curvaceous models of the past (Silverstein, Perdue, Peterson, & Kelly, 1986). Moreover, judgments of attractiveness are not completely influenced by culture; as we saw in Chapter 8, infants also show a strong preference for attractive faces (Game, Carchon, & Vital-Durand, 2003). Preference for the attractive results in **lookism**, or "the positive stereotypes, prejudice, and preferential treatment accorded to physically attractive people, or more generally to people whose appearance matches cultural values" (Blaine, 2007, p. 134). Box 13.5 describes how these cultural values can lead to prejudice based on hair color.

### Box 13.5 Hair Color: An Acceptable Form of Prejudice?

In the late 1950s, advertisers for Clairol's hair care products asked the question "Is it true blondes have more fun?" As far as we know, this question has not been answered by researchers. They have, however, found that blonde jokes are perceived to be more politically correct and less offensive, but not funnier, than jokes about Blacks (Eshleman & Russell, 2008). In the United Kingdom, Charlotte Rushton photographed redheads in the United Kingdom (UK) for her project, *Ginger Snaps*. While taking her photos, she also heard stories of bullying experienced by redheads, a phenomenon she believes is particularly common in the UK. She noted that only 2 out of the 300 people she photographed did *not* report being bullied because of their hair color. She also believes redheaded men get the worst of it. The names hurled at redheads include

"carrot-top, copper-top, ginger-nut, ginger minger, bluey (among Australians), Duracell, Ronald McDonald, Simply Red, Queen Elizabeth. And so on for hours and hours of the typical redhead's life" (Fohrer, 2007).

Although few would argue that "gingerism is as bad as racism" (Fohrer, 2007), those who experience the negative comments find it far from harmless. They also note that comments based on race are both illegal and regarded as socially unacceptable, but not remarks based on hair color. Psychologist Cary Cooper (cited in Fohrer, 2007) believes that because redheads are not protected by law, they have become an easy target for bullies who are looking for a stress release. As we saw in Chapter 10, hate crimes are sometimes directed at socially acceptable targets and "gingerism" in the UK may be an example of this.

As we discussed in Chapter 3, people make snap judgments based on physical appearance cues and those judgments influence how they respond to others (Zebrowitz, 1996). In general, research shows that physically attractive people benefit from their good looks. Alice Eagly and her colleagues (Eagly et al., 1991) conducted a meta-analysis of 76 studies on the “what is beautiful is good” stereotype and found that, overall, physically attractive people were evaluated more positively than were physically unattractive people. However, physical attractiveness had the strongest influence on judgments of social competence and a weak or non-significant influence on judgments of concern for others and integrity. Hence, being physically attractive is more likely to affect people’s perceived popularity and sociability than their perceived morality. Being physically attractive has a down side, too. Eagly and colleagues found that beautiful people were seen as more vain and egotistical. However, consistent with the research we described in Chapter 4, when additional information was provided, attractiveness had a much weaker influence on judgments, suggesting that once people are better acquainted, attractiveness is less important to their evaluations.

Do physically attractive people benefit from these stereotypic beliefs? To an extent, yes. Research shows that physically attractive people have more friends, better social skills, and a more active sex life than physically unattractive people (Rhodes, Simmons, & Peters, 2005). Attractiveness does not buy happiness, however; physical beauty has only a marginal effect on well-being and life satisfaction (Diener, Wolsic, & Fujita, 1995). Moreover, as we will discuss in the next section, prejudice and discrimination based on physical appearance is most clearly seen when individuals deviate from the “average.”

## Height

In 1977, Randy Newman’s hit song “Short People” became a source of controversy. The lyrics suggest that short people have “no reason to live” and “nobody to love.” Newman intended the song as a commentary on bigotry, but some people took the message literally, resulting in public outcry and threats to the composer (Zitz, 2003). One possible reason for the backlash is that people do experience prejudice and discrimination based on their height. Although relatively little research has addressed this topic, studies show that taller people benefit from their stature whereas shorter people are viewed somewhat negatively. Taller men, for example, are more likely to get dates, taller job applicants are more likely to be hired, and taller men are seen as more competent and powerful than shorter men. They also are more likely to be CEOs of American corporations and to be chosen as sperm donors (see Etcoff, 1999, for a review). Other research suggests that taller men do not have a height advantage over men of average height, but only over short men (Jackson & Ervin, 2001) and that women find men of average height to be more desirable as dates and more likeable than either tall or short men (Graziano, Brothorn, & Berscheid, 1978). Tall women also are perceived more positively than short women, but are rated similarly to average women on measures of perceived professional status and physical attractiveness (Jackson & Ervin, 2001).



Timothy Judge and Daniel Cable (2004) conducted four studies on the relationship between height and career success, as measured by earnings. Results showed that height positively predicted earnings, even after the influences of age and gender were controlled for. As Judge and Cable note, their results suggest that “an individual who is 72 in. [183 cm.] tall would be predicted to earn almost \$166,000 more across a 30-year career than an individual who is 65 in. [165 cm.] tall” (p. 437). Judge and Cable hypothesized that taller people feel better about themselves because they realize that physical height is linked to social power; short people, in contrast, have lower self-esteem because they are insecure about their height. These differences in self-esteem lead to different job performance for tall and short workers and this, in turn, affects career success. If so, the researchers predicted that the relationship between height and earnings should be stronger in occupations where status and respect matter more, such as in sales or management, and weaker where these variables matter less, such as service or clerical jobs. Results supported their hypothesis: correlations between earnings and height were higher for jobs where status was more important. However, for all jobs studied, a relationship between height and earnings existed. Finally, the relationship between height and earnings was supported for both male and female workers. Other research suggests that the height advantage is greatest for people who have less formal education (Loh, 1993).

Judge and Cable (2004) found that controlling for intelligence did not affect the relationship between height and earnings. However, Anne Case and Christina Paxson (2006) proposed that cognitive ability does explain the relationship between height and earnings because both height and cognitive ability are affected by age-specific growth patterns, such as the uterine environment, and by environmental conditions present in childhood, such as nutrition and wellness. Using data from two British birth cohort studies, the authors found that controlling for cognitive ability significantly reduced the relationship between height and earnings. These researchers also found that taller people were more likely to select white collar jobs (which generally have higher earnings potential), which may be due to differences in cognitive abilities. If you are reacting negatively to these results, you are not alone. Box 13.6 describes the public reactions to Case and Paxson’s research findings.

## Weight

People who are overweight experience prejudice and discrimination in education, employment, and their social life and, compared to normal weight individuals, are less likely to get dates and are more likely to have low self-esteem. Negative attitudes are common both in the general population and among health professionals and even among people who are themselves overweight (see M. Jones, 2002 a review). The stigma of being overweight is not concealable and is perceived to be highly controllable; this perception is clearly related to negative attitudes toward fat people. Perhaps because heavy weight is thought to be a controllable negative characteristic, overweight people are seen as morally flawed and therefore deserving of rejection and blame (DeJong, 1993). Stereotypes about

**Box 13.6 The Napoleon Complex?**

Randy Newman's song, "Short People" seemed to hit a nerve. So did the research conducted by Anne Case and Christina Paxson, which found that "[o]n average, tall people earn more because they are smarter" (Borden, 2006, p. 40). These researchers described reactions to their study in a *New Yorker* article (Borden, 2006). Case and Paxson are economists and their fellow economists responded with accolades such as "Fascinating" and "This is great." Not so with the general public. After the Reuters news service published a story on their research, the researchers received "dozens and dozens of e-mails from outraged readers" (Borden, 2006, p. 40). The tone of the e-mails ranged from hostile to obscene. Some of the e-mail authors reported their I.Q. scores and Mensa membership, along with information about their shorter stature. Representative statements included "On a personal note, it was very nice to be reminded that I really am a loser and will never be held in 'high' esteem by society." and "I find your hypothesis insulting, prejudicial, inflammatory and bigoted" (Borden, 2006, p. 40). Both Case and Paxson were distressed by the unexpectedly harsh responses and wondered how people could think so negatively of them.

As we have discussed in this section, research shows that height does affect perceptions. History is

also replete with examples of famous short people being ridiculed. William McKinley, one of the shortest U.S. Presidents (at 5'7" or 170 cm) was labeled the "little man." His height was short, as U.S. Presidents go—as of 2009, 15 of the 44 U.S. Presidents have been 6' (183 cm) or taller and in U.S. elections, the taller candidate has historically been more likely to win. Alfred Adler (1956) coined the term "Napoleon Complex" to describe the inferiority complex he believed some shorter men experience. Yet, as Virginia Postrel (2003) noted, "It does seem ridiculous to treat otherwise healthy short people as disabled. A man who is 5-foot-3 [160 cm] or a woman who is 4-foot-11 [150 cm] is hardly in the same position as someone who can't walk or see. Still, being short does, on average, hurt a person's prospects. Short men, in particular, are paid less than tall men. The tall guy gets the girl. The taller presidential candidate almost always wins." She wrote these words in response to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's decision to allow the drug Humatrope, a biosynthesized human growth hormone, to be prescribed to extremely short children. Although the drug poses no known health risks, Postrel notes that the motivation to administer the drug stems from cultural beliefs that being short jeopardizes a child's future.

fat people include being lazy, sloppy, unattractive, unhappy, sad, and powerless (Harris, Walters, & Waschull, 1991; Ryckman, Robbins, Kaczor, & Gold, 1989). Prejudice against the overweight is learned early; even preschoolers hold negative attitudes toward overweight people (Cramer & Steinwert, 1998) and school-aged obese children are often rejected by their peers (Latner & Stunkard, 2003). In short, there is little question that the overweight fare worse than people of average weight.

Overweight women are judged more harshly than overweight men (Harris et al., 1991; Ryckman et al., 1989) and this sex difference begins in childhood. Children evaluate overweight girls more negatively than average weight girls, but evaluations of boy are not affected by their weight (Penny & Haddock, 2007). Overweight men are far from immune from prejudice, however. Both Black and White men are stigmatized for being overweight (Hebl & Turchin, 2005). There are also cultural differences in perceptions of weight. Both Mexican (Crandall & Martinez, 1996) and Ghanaian (Cogan, Bhalla, Sefa-Dedeh, & Rothblum, 1996) university students are more accepting of fat people than are their U.S. counterparts and in cultures where the food is scarce, heavier women are judged to be more attractive than thinner women (Anderson, Crawford, Nadeau, & Lindberg,

1992). Within the U.S. culture, Black men are more accepting of larger women than are White men, although Black people still stigmatize overweight women. Both Black and White people evaluate larger Black men more positively than larger White men (Hebl & Turchin, 2005).

**Why is Anti-fat Prejudice Acceptable?** As we discussed in Chapter 7, the attribution-value model (Crandall, D'Anello, Sakalli, Lazarus, Wieczorhowska, & Feather, 2001) proposes that prejudice is directed toward social groups that have characteristics that are seen as contrary to majority group values. As we noted, fat people are stereotyped as lazy and unable to control their weight and they are seen as personally responsible for these undesirable characteristics. As predicted by the attribution-value model, because people believe being fat is a choice, they derogate the overweight.

Christian Crandall (1994, Study One) developed the Antifat Attitudes Questionnaire to assess attitudes toward weight. This measure has three dimensions. The *Dislike of fat people* subscale includes items such as "I really don't like fat people much." and "Fat people make me feel somewhat uncomfortable." The *fear of fat* subscale includes items such as "I worry about becoming fat." and "I feel disgusted with myself when I gain weight." The *willpower* subscale includes items such as "Fat people tend to be fat pretty much through their own fault." and "Some people are fat because they have no willpower." As predicted by the attribution-value model, Crandall (1994, Study Two) found that the *dislike of fat people* and the *willpower* subscales were related to beliefs that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. However, these subscales scores were unrelated to people's *fear of fat* scores which assess how they feel about their own weight. In a related study, Crandall (1994, Study Four) demonstrated that people who read a persuasive message that weight was uncontrollable held less negative attitudes toward fat people and were less likely to believe being overweight was due to lack of willpower. Hence, the belief that weight is controllable strongly contributed to bias against the fat people. Crandall (1994, Study Five) also demonstrated that people are generally unconcerned about being prejudiced against the overweight, suggesting that this bias is rooted in culturally accepted values. Crandall and his colleagues (2001) have found cross-cultural support for their model. In six countries, anti-fat prejudice was correlated with negative cultural beliefs about the acceptability of being fat and with judgments of responsibility for one's weight.

Other studies also support the attribution value model. Michelle Hebl and Robert Kleck (2002), for example, asked participants to evaluate an obese job applicant. Prior to the evaluation, they learned that the applicant's weight was controllable (the applicant had overeaten and did not exercise) or uncontrollable (the applicant had a thyroid condition). When the weight was described as uncontrollable, the obese job applicant was more likely to be seen as hireable, was thought to have better job skills, and was evaluated more favorably than when the weight was uncontrollable. Other research shows that physical education students have a stronger implicit anti-fat bias than do psychology students and are more likely to believe that obese people lack will power (O'Brien, Hunter, & Banks,

2007). The researchers also found that these biases are especially strong for more advanced students and speculated that the advanced students had been socialized to believe they are physically superior to the overweight.

Although one would think that overweight people who lose weight would be perceived more favorably than those who do not, that is not always the case. Bruce Blaine and his colleagues (Blaine, DiBlasi, & Connor, 2002) found that people reported more dislike for an overweight woman who had recently lost weight and rated her as more unattractive than an overweight person who had not done so; weight loss in thin people did not result in more negative ratings. Hence, the person who lost weight but did not achieve the cultural idea of thinness was still derogated. Finally, individuals who learned that either the now-thin or the still-overweight person had lost weight were more likely to conclude that weight loss was controllable.

**The Social Consequences of Anti-fat Prejudice.** The psychological literature is replete with research documenting the negative effects of anti-fat prejudice. Perhaps not surprisingly, obese people are more likely to experience depression and low self-esteem than are thinner people (Blaine, 2007). Anti-fat bias also is linked to eating disorders and obesity. For example, Diane Neumark-Sztainer (2005) followed the development of a group of teens for five years and found that those who were teased about their weight were more likely to be overweight five years later and were more likely to engage in extreme weight control behaviors, such as taking laxatives or induced vomiting. Teasing by family members had a stronger effect than teasing by peers, although both negatively affected teens' weight.

Fatter students, especially female students, are less likely to attend college and, when overweight women do attend college, their parents are less likely to help pay for the cost of education; in contrast, weight is unrelated to how males pay for college (Crandall, 1991, 1995). Christian Crandall has argued that parents' unwillingness to pay for their overweight daughters' education stems from their negative attitudes toward overweight women. Supporting this position, Crandall (1995) found that the parents' willingness to pay for their daughters' education was unrelated to their ability to pay. It was also unrelated to the daughters' academic credentials or to their self-reported desire to attend college. Moreover, politically conservative parents were less likely to pay for an overweight daughter's education than were more liberal parents, perhaps because conservative people have stronger anti-fat attitudes (Crandall, 1994).

Discrimination against fat people shows up at the shopping mall as well. Eden King and her colleagues (King, Shapiro, Hebl, Singletary, & Turner, 2006) trained 10 female confederates to play the customer role and had observers watch them as they shopped. The confederates were of average weight; to simulate obesity, on half the shopping trips they wore a size 22 prosthesis. While shopping, their dress was either casual or professional. Raters recorded whether a store employee greeted the shopper and whether an employee recommended an item for purchase; these were measures of overt discrimination. Raters also coded the length of the interaction and the store personnels' nonverbal responses

(such as smiling and friendliness); these were measures of covert discrimination. Results showed that, regardless of weight or attire, there was no evidence of overt discrimination. However, store personnel spent less time with obese shoppers than average weight shoppers. Nonverbal responses depended on both the shopper's weight and her attire. Professionally dressed shoppers were treated similarly, regardless of their weight, but obese shoppers who were casually dressed received more negative nonverbal responses than did average weight shoppers in similar attire. King and colleagues hypothesized that when shoppers were professionally dressed, the store personnel could not justify discriminating against them, but they could justify discriminating against the casually dressed obese shoppers. In a follow-up study, King and colleagues (2006, Study Three) interviewed shoppers as they left the store and found that obese individuals reported experiencing more negative reactions from store personnel than did average weight shoppers; those who had the most negative experiences spent less money in the store.

Medical personnel (Blumberg & Mellis, 1985) and mental health professionals (Agell & Rothblum, 1991) often hold prejudicial attitudes toward the overweight. Even medical personnel who specialize in obesity treatment hold an implicit bias against the overweight, although this bias does not emerge on explicit attitudes measures (Teachman & Brownell, 2001). A possible outcome of these beliefs is that the overweight will receive less attention and more criticism in a medical setting. There also appears to be an assumption, especially among younger psychotherapists, that overweight clients will make less of an effort in therapy and that their chances of success are low, which may affect how they are treated (Davis-Coelho, Waltz, & Davis-Coelho, 2000). In other research, some very obese people report being denied health benefits because of their weight (Rothblum, Brand, Miller, & Oetjen, 1990). Hence, in the very places where the overweight turn for medical or psychological help, they experience discrimination.

Although the evidence is mixed, research shows that the overweight experience employment discrimination at least some of the time (see D. Schneider, 2000). For example, very obese people (50 percent or more above the ideal weight) were more likely to report experiencing employment discrimination than obese (20 to 50 percent above ideal weight) or average weight people (no more than 19 percent above ideal weight) and, perhaps because of this, were more likely to attempt to conceal their weight. The very obese also report that coworkers or supervisors had commented on their weight or had urged them to lose weight (Rothblum et al., 1990). Mark Roehling (1999) reviewed 29 studies of weight-based employment discrimination and found evidence of discrimination at virtually every phase of the employment process. That is, overweight people were less likely to be hired, received lower salaries, were less likely to be promoted, and were more likely to be fired than were people of average weight. Moreover, the overweight were less preferred as co-workers and overweight applicants and employees were seen as lacking in self-discipline, as being lazy, incompetent, unhealthy, and likely to have emotional problems. When a gender bias existed, it was because overweight women were more disadvantaged, but, in general, both women and men experienced weight-based discrimination

in the sample of studies Roehling reviewed. He concluded that weight-related discrimination was greater than discrimination based on sex, disability, or race.

As we saw in Chapter 11, members of many stigmatized groups sometimes attribute negative feedback to prejudice and doing so protects their self-esteem. Bruce Blaine and Zoe Williams (2004) tested whether attributional ambiguity affected overweight women's reactions to negative feedback. Participants first reviewed fact sheets that did or did not include information that weight was uncontrollable; based on their responses to this information, the experimenters categorized participants into groups based on whether or not they believed weight was controllable. Participants then wrote an essay with the goal of "convincing someone to take more interest in their health" (p. 81). The essay was ostensibly evaluated by another research participant who was either provided or not provided with a photograph of the essay author (and so knew or did not know the author was overweight). All essays received a negative evaluation. Consistent with the predictions of attributional ambiguity theory, participants were more likely to attribute negative feedback to prejudice when their evaluator knew they were overweight. In addition, participants were especially likely to attribute the negative evaluation to prejudice when they believed weight was uncontrollable. For participants who believed weight was controllable (see Figure 13.2), attributions to prejudice were similar regardless of whether or not the evaluator knew they were overweight. However, attributing negative evaluations to weight-related prejudice did not boost the

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participants' self-esteem; thus, overweight women do not psychologically benefit from attributing negative feedback to prejudice.

All told, then, bias against the overweight is pervasive and unrelenting and, in American society at least, there appear to be few social sanctions against expressing anti-fat attitudes. However, as we saw with studies of disability, researchers often study one-time interactions with the overweight and often use vignettes rather than actual people as stimulus material. We close this section by describing research looking at the real world, long-term relationships of overweight people. Carol Miller and her colleagues (Miller, Rothblum, Brand, & Felicio, 1995) asked obese and nonobese women to complete questionnaires about their social relationships, including social self-esteem, social competence, and social involvement. Respondents also provided names of friends and coworkers who then completed the same measures about their friend. Obese and nonobese women had similar scores on all social dimensions studied and, for both groups, their friends and coworkers agreed with this assessment. These findings suggest that overweight people can and do have meaningful relationships. As Miller and colleagues note, "according to reports made by obese and nonobese women and by the people who know them, prejudice against obesity does not sentence obese women to a life of poor social relationships" (p. 82). Finally, we note that the preponderance of evidence shows that the belief that weight is easily controllable is simply inaccurate. It is difficult to lose weight and many weight loss interventions are ineffective and even dangerous. Dieters often regain weight, sometimes more than they lost (Blaine et al., 2002). Hence, anti-fat bias is linked to cultural beliefs that are unfair and cause the overweight untold harm.

## SUMMARY

Ageism occurs when people are judged negatively simply because of their advanced ages. Both lay people and researchers agree that old age begins around 65, but many people have trouble accepting this label when they themselves reach that age. Age-related stereotypes have five components: intolerance, health, personality, dejection, and activity. Physical appearance provides important cues that affect evaluations of older adults; those viewed as less attractive are more readily devalued. A set of both negative and positive subtypes exist and evaluations of members of these subtypes differ.

There appears to be a double standard of aging—that is, people believe women reach middle and old age sooner than men; evidence suggests physical decline is thought to occur at a younger age for women than men, too. Yet the double standard of aging is not universal; differences in evaluations of younger and older women and men are relatively small and, for judgments of competence, it is men who are perceived to decline at a younger age. More generally, forgetfulness and aging are viewed as going hand in hand, but people are sometimes more forgiving of forgetfulness in older people. Stereotypic portrayals of older adults in the media reflect such negative beliefs. Even so, older adults are largely absent from television, print media, and advertisements.

Age-based discrimination is a significant problem for older adults. In the workplace, for example, older adults have an uphill battle, both in seeking a job and in being accepted at their current jobs. Age-based discrimination also can lead to patronizing speech or elderspeak. That is, people use different voice tones and rates of speech when talking to older people. This may have positive benefits; nevertheless, it is generally viewed as demeaning. Finally, stereotypic expectations may affect the health care older adults receive.

Approximately 18 percent of the U.S. population has a disability and the chances of being disabled increase markedly with age. Perhaps because of anxiety over the possibility of becoming disabled, disability is a stigmatized condition. However, as with other stigmas, disabilities perceived to be controllable are viewed more negatively than those perceived to be uncontrollable. Self-report data suggest that people hold fairly positive attitudes toward persons with physical disabilities, but these attitudes depend on the nature of the disability and the context in which the interaction takes place. People are less positive about the possibility of marrying PWDs than about working with them. Moreover, the actual experiences of PWDs point to less positive reactions. PWDs are often addressed with patronizing language and the nondisabled often “overhelp,” based on the assumption that PWDs need special concessions. There are a number of strategies that can improve communication between PWDs and the nondisabled. The most effective strategies involve direct and frank communication; experience also helps.

Attitudes toward persons with mental illness are generally more negative than attitudes toward persons with physical disability because mental illness is associated with danger and unpredictability. U.S. citizens have become more accepting of mental illness, but still are less comfortable with this illness than with other diseases, such as cancer and diabetes. Persons with mental illness also commonly experience discrimination based on their health status. Unfortunately, the mental health stigma prevents many from seeking effective treatment.

Research supports the idea that “what is beautiful is good.” Attractive people are judged more positively than less attractive people; however, attractive people also are seen as vain and egotistical. Attractive people have more friends and better social skills than their less attractive peers. Tall people are viewed more positively than shorter people and they also earn more money and are more likely to fill leadership positions such as U.S. President or corporate CEO. Whether tall people have an advantage over people of average height is unclear.

One of the most stigmatized groups is the overweight. People hold a number of negative stereotypes about fat people and they believe that weight should be controllable. As predicted by the attribution value model, the overweight are thought to violate important social values and, because of those values, people hold others responsible for their weight and believe it is socially acceptable to derogate them. However, when obesity is seen as uncontrollable, prejudice is less likely. Overweight people experience discrimination in many settings, including during everyday activities like shopping, in a medical setting, and in the workplace. However, overweight people can and do have meaningful social relationships.



## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Ageism

- Erber, J. T. & Prager, I. G. (1999). Age and memory: Perceptions of forgetful younger and older adults. In T. M. Hess & F. Blanchard-Fields (Eds.), *Social cognition and aging* (pp. 198–217). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
Summarizes the work of Joan Erber and her colleagues (and others) on attributions about forgetfulness in older adults.
- Hummert, M. L. (1999). A social cognitive perspective on age stereotypes. In T. M. Hess & F. Blanchard-Fields (Eds.), *Social cognition and aging* (pp. 175–196). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
Reviews Hummert's highly influential work on stereotypes about and subtypes of older adults. Also summarizes her work and others' on age-related communication, including patronizing speech.
- Nelson, T. D. (Ed.) (2002). *Ageism: Stereotyping and prejudice against older persons*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
This groundbreaking book on the social psychology of aging has chapters on many important topics, including stereotypes, terror management theory, implicit ageism, attitudes, ageism in the workplace, and ageist behavior.
- Palmore, E. B. (1999). *Ageism: Negative and positive*. New York: Springer.  
This highly readable book covers ageist attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudice and includes a discussion of institutional influences on ageism.

### Disability

- Corrigan, P. W. (2004). How stigma interferes with mental health care. *American Psychologist*, 59, 614–625.  
This article addresses the negative consequences of the mental health stigma, including its effect on people's willingness to seek treatment and on the self-esteem of persons with mental illness.
- Fine, M., & Asch, A. (1993). Disability beyond stigma: Social interaction, discrimination, and activism. In M. Nagler (Ed.), *Perspectives on disability* (2nd ed., pp. 49–62). Palo Alto, CA: Health Markets Research.  
This article addresses researchers' assumptions about the nature of disability, most of which can be readily applied to other contexts, such as the classroom.
- Gouvier, W. D. & Coon, R. C. (2002). Misconceptions, discrimination, and disabling language: Synthesis and review. *Applied Neuropsychology*, 9, 48–57.  
The authors provide an accessible review of research demonstrating discrimination against PWDs and offer strategies for overcoming its effects.
- Hebl, M. R., & Kleck, R. E. (2000). The social consequences of physical disability. In T. F. Heatherton, R. E. Kleck, M. R. Hebl, & J. G. Hull (Eds.), *The social psychology of stigma* (pp. 419–435). New York: Guilford.  
The authors address the stigma of physical disability, including both overt and more subtle responses of the nondisabled. The chapter provides an excellent review of the social psychological literature on this topic.

## Appearance

Brownell, K.D., Puhl, R. M., Schwartz, M. B., & Rudd, L. (Eds.) (2005). *Weight bias: Nature, consequences, and remedies*. New York: Guilford.

This edited volume contains 22 chapters that explore prejudice and discrimination based on weight, with sections on the nature and extent of weight bias, explanations for this bias, consequences of weight bias, and remedies for weight discrimination, including public policy and advocacy.

Etcoff, N. (1999). *Survival of the prettiest: The science of beauty*. New York: Doubleday.

In this highly readable book, Etcoff summarizes the social science literature on how physical appearance influences people's perceptions about and reactions to others. The author includes many references to current popular culture that complement her strong emphasis on the results of scientific research.

Schneider, D. J. (2004). *The psychology of stereotyping*. New York: Guilford.

The author provides comprehensive reviews of appearance-related stereotypes, including facial cues, body type, height, and weight. He also reviews the research on the stigma of mental illness.

## KEY TERMS

|            |                          |                    |
|------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| ageism     | double standard of aging | patronizing speech |
| disability | lookism                  |                    |

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What ages delineate the categories "young," "middle aged," and "old?" In what ways are researchers' and participants' definitions similar and different?
2. How does terror management theory explain ageism? Do you think this theory is more applicable for some age groups than others? Why or why not?
3. Why do you think physical appearance is such an important component of age-related stereotypes?
4. Explain the double standard of aging. On what dimensions is it most likely to emerge?
5. List the major subtypes of the category "older adults."
6. Under what circumstances might a younger person's forgetfulness lead to negative evaluations?
7. Describe a television advertisement that depicts older people in a positive light.
8. Is it important or unimportant that older adults are largely absent in the media? Explain your reasoning.
9. Give examples of age-related stereotypes that affect older people in the workplace.

10. If you were an employer interested in reducing age-related bias in your hiring practices, what training would you provide? As this same employer, what would you do to reduce ageism on the job site?
11. What is patronizing speech? Give examples. When is it likely to be used? Is it ever helpful? Explain why or why not.
12. If you were taking an older adult to a doctor's appointment, what would you do to ensure he or she was treated fairly?
13. How might a medical intake interview differ for an older and younger patient? What are the implications of those differences for treatment?
14. Who is more likely to be disabled in the United States? How is disability status determined?
15. Explain how the idea that disability is socially constructed is similar to the idea that race is a social category.
16. Explain why disability is considered a stigma. Which disabilities are more likely to be stigmatized and why?
17. Why do you think social desirability might affect self-reported attitudes toward people with physical disabilities?
18. Reread the quote by George Will at the beginning of this chapter. Based on what you know about prejudice against PWDs, is this quote accurate?
19. List three ways people infantilize PWDs. Explain why you believe this happens.
20. Recall the research on the self-fulfilling prophecy, discussed in Chapter 3. How can overhelping older adults or persons with disabilities create a self-fulfilling prophecy?
21. What two types of anxiety can emerge in interactions with PWDs?
22. How can communication between PWDs and the nondisabled be improved?
23. What stereotypes are associated with mental illness?
24. Mental illness is viewed more negatively than physical disability. State your opinion about the reasons for this difference.
25. List four areas where the mentally ill are likely to experience discrimination.
26. Nancy Etcoff has stated that "beauty rules." Do you agree or disagree? Explain your reasoning.
27. What is lookism? Do you believe it affects your interactions with attractive people? Why or why not?
28. What advantages do taller people have over shorter people?
29. If you were the parent of an extremely short child, would you allow your physician to prescribe growth hormones? Why or why not?
30. How does the attribution-value model explain anti-fat prejudice?

31. How does the belief that weight is controllable affect attitudes toward the obese?
32. Describe the types of discrimination that the overweight experience.
33. If you were to design an advertising campaign to reduce anti-fat bias, what would you include?
34. Americans are more likely to be overweight now than in the past. Do you believe the media's attention to this finding increases or decreases the anti-fat bias? Explain your reasoning.

# Chapter 14

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## Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination

The question may be posed whether a world in which prejudice has been eliminated is at all possible.... Contrary to the currently fashionable conclusion that stereotyping and even prejudice may be inevitable and universal outcomes of basic and unchangeable human cognitive processes, ... it is only the potential for prejudice that is inherently human, and this potential is realized only under particular social circumstances. No matter how depressingly common these circumstances may be today, it does create the possibility of structuring societies and circumstances in order to make tolerance rather than prejudice the norm.

— JOHN DUCKITT (1994, P. 262)

### Chapter Outline

#### Individual Level Processes

*Stereotype Suppression*

*Self-Regulation*

#### Intergroup Contact

*Conditions for Success*

*Effectiveness of Intergroup  
Contact*

*Models of the Contact Process*

#### Workplace Interventions

*Affirmative Action*

*Valuing Diversity*

*Managing Diversity*

#### What Should Be Our Goal?

**Color-Blindness versus**

**Multiculturalism**

#### What You Can Do to Reduce Prejudice

*Influencing Your Own Attitudes*

*Influencing Other People's  
Attitudes*

**Envoi**

**Summary**

**Suggested Readings**

**Key Terms**

**Questions for Review and Discussion**

As John Duckitt (1994) implied in the quotation that opened this chapter, much of the research on prejudice and discrimination paints a pessimistic picture of the situation: Because prejudice and discrimination are, in large measure, rooted in normal human psychological processes, they seem to be unavoidable. However, like Duckitt, we are optimists. We also believe that human nature only provides the potential for prejudice—it does not make prejudice unavoidable or render prejudices that already exist immutable. In this chapter, we discuss theory and research that address the question of how prejudice can be reduced. We begin with processes that operate within individuals: people's attempts to suppress stereotypes when they are activated; the self-regulation or self-control of prejudiced thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; and people's responses to the discovery of contradictions between their prejudiced behavior and their personal values and self-images as nonprejudiced people. The second part of the chapter discusses the role of intergroup contact in prejudice reduction: the conditions under which interacting with members of other groups can lead to reduced prejudice and the psychological processes triggered by contact that bring the changes about. We then look at workplace interventions designed to reduce prejudice in those settings, followed by a brief discussion of the kind of attitude that should replace prejudice. We close by presenting a list of things that you can personally do to help reduce prejudice.

An important point to bear in mind while reading this chapter is that although a number of processes can be called on to reduce prejudice, doing so is not easy. Attitudes in general tend to be very resistant to change; once an attitude is formed a number of psychological factors operate to keep it in place (see, for example, Wegener, Petty, Smoak, & Fabrigar, 2004). Prejudice may be especially resistant to change because it is often rooted in values and beliefs that are important to the person, involve the person's social and personal identities, and are reinforced and supported by the person's social network of family and friends (Goodman, 2001). Because changing prejudiced attitudes means making changes in these psychologically important systems, challenges to prejudice often arouse feelings of threat, psychological tension, and anxiety. For example, because our society defines prejudice as bad, people are likely to think that having prejudices makes them bad people, a thought that engenders a threat to the person's positive self-image. Acknowledging one's prejudices arouses psychological discomfort and anxiety; to avoid these feelings, people may find it easier not to think about their behavior and so forestall any change. As we will see, changing prejudiced attitudes takes time and persistence whether one is trying to change one's own attitudes or those of another person. However, with persistence, the factors that supported the old, prejudiced attitudes can now work to support and maintain the new, unprejudiced attitudes.

## INDIVIDUAL LEVEL PROCESSES

At the individual-level, prejudice reduction requires people to acknowledge that their behavior is, at least sometimes, based on stereotyping or prejudice. Otherwise, attitude change cannot occur. Theories of prejudice reduction at the individual level

focus on cognitive and emotional processes that result in changes in intergroup attitudes. In this section, we examine two of those processes: stereotype suppression and self-regulation.

### Stereotype Suppression

As we saw in Chapter 7, even unprejudiced people sometimes have prejudiced thoughts and feelings, such as thinking about people in terms of group stereotypes. One way for people to deal with unwanted thoughts is with suppression—trying to push the unwanted thoughts out of mind and replace them with other, more acceptable thoughts (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; Wyer, Sherman, & Stroessner, 1998). For example, someone who found her or himself thinking about another person in terms of stereotypes might try to ignore the stereotype and focus on characteristics of the person that run counter to the stereotype.

However, thought suppression can be a two-edged sword: Although it is effective while a person is focusing on suppressing an unwanted thought, the thought can return in greater strength after the person stops trying to suppress it (Wegner, 1994). For example, Daniel Wegner and his colleagues (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987) instructed research participants not to think about a white bear for a period of 5 minutes, but to ring a bell every time they did think of one. They were then given a 5-minute period during which they were allowed to think about white bears. Compared to participants in a control group who were allowed to think of white bears for the entire 10 minutes, participants in the suppression group rang their bells less often during the suppression period, showing that thought suppression is effective. However, they rang their bells more often during the free-thought period, showing that suppression leads to increased thoughts about the previously suppressed topic. In what is perhaps a more realistic example, Daniel Wegner and David Gold (1995) found that people who were instructed not suppress thoughts about a former love interest showed an increased number of thoughts about the person during the free-thought period. This enhanced return of suppressed thoughts is called the **rebound effect**.

**Stereotype rebound.** Neil Macrae and his colleagues (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994) conducted a series of experiments to see if the rebound effect occurred when people tried to suppress stereotypic thoughts. In the first experiment, participants viewed a picture of a male skinhead and wrote a brief essay about a typical day in the man's life. Before the participants began to write, the researchers told those in the stereotype suppression condition that group stereotypes could bias their essays, so they were to try as hard as they could not to think of the person they were writing about in stereotypic terms. Participants in the control condition received no instructions concerning stereotypes. When they had finished their essays, participants in both conditions viewed a picture of another male skinhead and wrote about a typical day in his life. This time, no instructions about stereotypes were given to either group. Judges counted how many skinhead stereotypes appeared in the essays. Analysis of the first essays showed that participants who had been instructed to suppress their stereotypes did so: Those essays included fewer stereotypes

than the essays written by the control group. However, in the second essay, the participants who had originally been told to suppress their stereotypes showed a rebound effect: They used stereotypes to a greater extent than did the control group participants.

In their second experiment, Macrae and his colleagues (1994) used the same stereotype suppression manipulation, but also told participants they were going to sit in a waiting room with a male skinhead. The researchers found that participants in the suppression condition sat farther away from the chair they expected the skinhead to use than did participants in the control condition. Thus, stereotype rebound can have behavioral effects as well as cognitive effects. In their third experiment, Macrae and his colleagues found that stereotypes are more accessible—that is, they come to mind more easily—after suppression, another indicator of rebound (see also Gordijn, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2004).

The stereotype rebound effect also manifests itself in other ways. For example, people who have suppressed stereotypes later show better memory for traits that are stereotypic, rather than nonstereotypic, of the target group. People also show decreased memory for individuating information that contradicts stereotypes (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Wheeler, 1996; Sherman, Stroessner, Loftus, & Deguzman, 1997). Lack of memory for individuating information is especially important because, as you will recall from Chapters 3 and 4, attention to individuating information helps people avoid applying stereotypes to others. Stereotype suppression also leads people to make greater use of stereotypes in general, including stereotypes of other groups. For instance, Ernestine Gordijn and her colleagues (Gordijn et al., 2004, Study 4) had participants write about a day in the life of a male skinhead. Half the participants were in a stereotype suppression condition and half were in a control condition. In the second part of the experiment, all the participants wrote about a day in the life of an older woman. The researchers found that participants who had earlier suppressed the skinhead stereotype made greater use of the older adult stereotype when writing their second essay.

What the research on stereotype suppression shows, then, is that people can effectively suppress stereotypes while they are focusing on doing so; however, the stereotypes come back with greater force once people stop trying to suppress them. This rebound effect increases the accessibility of stereotypes, improves memory for stereotypic information, decreases attention to individuating information, increases stereotype use, and affects behavior toward stereotyped groups. In addition, suppressing stereotypes of one group can activate stereotypes of other groups.

**Why Do Stereotypes Rebound?** Theorists have proposed several processes to explain why stereotypes rebound, including priming, control depletion, and use motivation. Wegner (1994) proposed that the suppression process itself primes suppressed thoughts such as stereotypes, making them more readily available for use when suppression is lifted. Wegner's explanation is based on his conception of how thought suppression operates, which includes two components. First, suppression involves an active, conscious attempt to find something to think about other than the suppressed thought. Second, there is a unconscious monitoring process that maintains a lookout for indications that the unwanted thought is breaking through the



suppression barrier. To keep unwanted thoughts suppressed, the unconscious process must be aware of what those thoughts are; this continual monitoring primes, or makes salient, those very thoughts. Consider Wegner and colleagues' (1987) white bear experiment. While people are consciously thinking about pink elephants, for example, to avoid thinking about white bears, the unconscious process continually focuses on white bears so that it can keep thoughts about them from reaching the conscious level. In a sense, while not thinking about white bears at the conscious level, people are continually thinking about them at the unconscious level. When the conscious suppression is released, the formerly suppressed thoughts come back with increased strength because they have been primed: What was previously unconsciously salient becomes consciously salient. Evidence for this unconscious priming comes from research showing that stereotypes come to mind more easily after suppression than if they are not suppressed (Gordijn et al., 2004; Macrae et al., 1994). Such enhanced accessibility is one effect of priming.

A second explanation for stereotype rebound focuses on the fact that suppression requires cognitive effort: People have to work to keep their suppressed thoughts under control (Gordijn et al., 2004; Macrae et al., 1994). Researchers who study self-control have found that repeated efforts at mental control use up one's ability to exert control; eventually, all of one's control resources are depleted and control fails. Mark Muraven and Roy Baumeister (2000) use the analogy of muscles: Repeated use of a muscle tires it to the point at which it can no longer function properly. In the context of stereotype suppression, when people suppress stereotypes they draw on their self-control resources; when those resources are depleted, control fails and the stereotype breaks through (Gordijn et al., 2004). However, as with a muscle, self-control resources can recuperate and regain their strength with rest (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), permitting stereotypes to be suppressed again in the future.

Nira Liberman and Jens Förster (2000) also have proposed a motivational explanation for stereotype rebound. They suggest that stereotype suppression creates a need to use the stereotype and this need is manifested in the rebound effect. Liberman and Förster hypothesized that if people are given a chance to express a stereotype after a period of suppression, that expression would reduce the motivational pressure and prevent the rebound effect. They conducted several studies that supported their hypothesis (see also Hodson & Dovidio, 2001).

Note that none of the proposed explanations contradicts any of the others, so they all could be correct. That is, priming, control depletion, and use motivation could all operate simultaneously, or different processes may affect different people differently.

**Are Rebound Effects Inevitable?** Although there is considerable evidence that stereotype suppression leads to rebound effects, Margo Monteith, Jeffrey Sherman, and Patricia Devine (1998) proposed some circumstances in which stereotype rebound might not occur. One such circumstance is when the suppressor is low in prejudice. They suggested three reasons why people who are low in prejudice might not experience stereotype rebound. First, as we noted in Chapter 4, low prejudice people are less likely to experience stereotype activation than are high-prejudice people. Without stereotype activation, there are no

stereotypes to suppress, so the stereotype suppression-rebound process might be initiated less often in low prejudice people. Second, when people low in prejudice experience stereotypical thoughts, they are highly motivated to suppress them. This strong motivation may keep stereotypes suppressed in the face of factors that usually cause rebound. Finally, low prejudice people might be able to avoid stereotype rebound because their egalitarian beliefs provide easily accessible replacements for stereotypic thoughts, such as positive beliefs about the stereotyped group. This is consistent with Wegner's (1994) thought suppression model which proposes that focusing on alternative thoughts facilitates suppression.

Social norms that proscribe certain prejudices could reduce some types of rebound effects for stereotypes associated with these prejudices (see Chapter 7 for a discussion of proscribed prejudices). For example, noting that stereotype activation does not necessarily lead to stereotype use (see Chapter 4), Monteith and her colleagues (1998) proposed that when proscribed prejudices are involved, high-prejudice people might experience stereotype rebound in terms of stereotype activation and accessibility but not in terms of application. That is, the social norm against acting in a prejudiced manner is so strong that even high-prejudice people will exert extra effort to avoid applying proscribed stereotypes.

Research supports Monteith, Sherman, and Devine's (1998) suggestions. For example, high-prejudice people, but not low-prejudice people, exhibit stereotype activation after suppression (Hodson & Dovidio, 2001; Monteith et al., 1998), suggesting that low prejudice does prevent stereotype rebound by inhibiting stereotype activation. In addition, Gordijn and colleagues (2004) and Macrae and colleagues (1998) showed that internal motivation to suppress stereotypes, a characteristic of low-prejudice people, can inhibit stereotype rebound. Margo Monteith, Clarence Spicer, and Gregory Tooman (1998) also showed that although high-prejudice people experience enhanced stereotype activation for a target of proscribed prejudice after suppression, they are no more likely than low-prejudice people to apply the stereotype. Finally, Natalie Wyer, Jeffrey Sherman, and Steven Stroesser (2000) showed that external motivation to avoid a proscribed prejudice can also inhibit rebound effects, supporting the proposition that it is the normative proscription of prejudice that inhibits stereotype application in high-prejudice people.

Although highly motivated people respond to social cues and therefore are more likely to suppress their stereotypes, research shows that these people may actually be more susceptible to rebound effects than people who are unmotivated to suppress stereotypes. Natalie Wyer (2007; Experiment 1) found that, at the thought suppression stage, people who were motivated to control prejudice could more successfully suppress their stereotypes than those who were unmotivated to control prejudice. Apparently, people unmotivated to control prejudice do not make the cognitive effort required to suppress stereotypes at that stage. Ironically, however, at the free thought stage, Wyer found that these unmotivated participants showed little evidence of stereotype rebound; indeed they were less likely to use stereotypes at this stage. However, an individual's initial level of prejudice mattered. Stereotype rebound effects were strongest for those

individuals who had highly prejudicial attitudes but were motivated to control them. In contrast, motivated people who were less prejudiced showed little evidence of stereotype rebound.

Wyer and her colleagues (2000) also demonstrated an important limitation of external motivation: It only inhibits rebound effects when people have cognitive resources available to prevent rebound. For example, in Wyer and colleagues' Experiment 2, participants who had the motivation to avoid rebound effects were unable to do so when they had to divert cognitive resources to remembering an 8-digit number. Thus, to avoid rebound effects, a person must have the cognitive capacity to carry out suppression tasks, such as searching for and focusing on distracting thoughts, as well as the motivation to avoid stereotype use.

### Self-Regulation

The research on stereotype suppression shows that people who are motivated to act in an unprejudiced manner can do so. Based in part on the results of this research, Margo Monteith (1993; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002) proposed a **self-regulation model** for the control of prejudice. This model, shown in Figure 14.1, proposes that, based on their experience of acting in a prejudiced manner, people who see themselves as unprejudiced become sensitized to environmental cues that warn them when they might respond in a prejudiced manner to a member of a stereotyped group. Forewarned by these cues, these people then suppress their prejudiced responses and replace them with appropriate nonprejudiced responses.

**Developing Cues for the Control of Prejudice.** The left side of Figure 14.1 shows the process of developing cues for the control of prejudice. When a person encounters a member of a stereotyped group, characteristics of the group member, such as skin color or facial features, activate the group stereotype in the person's mind. If this happens (recall from Chapter 4 that stereotype activation is not inevitable), and the person has not developed cues that would warn her that she might respond to the outgroup member in a prejudiced manner, she makes a prejudiced response, such as applying the group stereotype to the group member. Monteith and her colleagues illustrate this process using a hypothetical man named Pat who is grocery shopping. While trying to find a particular item, he sees a Black woman standing by a shelf; this activates Pat's stereotype that Black people are low-level employees and, because of this, he asks the woman for assistance. (As Feagin, 1991, has pointed out, Black people are often stereotypically assumed to be "the help.") However, the Black woman explains to Pat that she is a shopper, not an employee. This makes Pat aware that he has mistakenly applied a stereotype to her. He feels guilty about having acted on a prejudiced assumption and thinks about ways he can avoid doing so in the future.

As in this hypothetical example, acting in a prejudiced manner contradicts the self-image of people who see themselves as unprejudiced. If those people become aware of the contradiction between their self-images and their behavior, they feel guilty. Awareness of the contradiction is important because people do




**FIGURE 14.1** The Self-Regulation Model of Prejudice Reduction

The presence of a stimulus associated with an outgroup can activate the stereotypes of the outgroup. In people who have not developed cues for the control of prejudice, the stimulus produces a prejudiced response that contradicts their self-images as nonprejudiced people. If they become aware of the contradiction, they experience negative emotions, such as guilt. The negative emotions motivate them to think about why they responded the way they did and about how they could have responded differently. These reflections lead to the development of cues for controlling prejudice, which are activated when a similar situation arises in the future. People who have developed cues for the control for prejudice become aware of the potential for making a prejudiced response. They inhibit the prejudiced response and replace it with a nonprejudiced response. With practice, the search for and use of replacement responses becomes automatic and conscious awareness is not longer needed.

SOURCE: Adapted from Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, and Czopp (2002).

not always consciously realize that their behavior contradicts their beliefs; people are very adept at repressing such contradictions (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Awareness of the contradiction also leads people to reflect on their behavior, asking themselves what caused them to act in the way they did and how they can behave differently (that is, in an unprejudiced manner) in the future. They then use the results of this reflective process to develop cues that can warn them that they might be about to act in a prejudiced manner. Continuing Monteith and colleagues' (2002) example, one cue that Pat might develop would be to always check to see if a Black person is wearing a store name tag or some other indicator of being an employee before asking for help.

**Using Cues to Control Prejudice.** The right side of Figure 14.1 illustrates what happens after people have developed cues for controlling prejudice. In this case, the cues people have developed warn them that they might respond to the situation in a prejudiced manner. They then suppress any prejudiced responses that they become aware of and search for appropriate nonprejudiced responses to use in their place. For example, the next time Pat is looking for something in a store and also sees a Black person, he realizes he might make a prejudiced response. Pat then suppresses his impulse to ask the person for help and carries out his substitute behavior, checking for indicators that the person is, in fact, an employee. If such indicators are present, he asks the person for help; if they are not present, he looks for a store employee.

Monteith and her colleagues (2002) conducted a number of laboratory studies that support the self-regulation model. They acknowledge that one limitation of the model is that it probably works best for people who are already low in prejudice. Those are the people who are most likely to feel guilty over having acted in a prejudiced manner and are most likely to be internally motivated to change their behavior. However, Margo Monteith and Gina Walters (1998) have found that some relatively prejudiced people, especially those who place high value on equal opportunity, are motivated to try to act in an unprejudiced manner. Monteith and her colleagues (2002) also investigated the "real world" applicability of the self-regulation model by conducting interviews in which they asked people about their experiences of having acted in a prejudiced manner. Two of their examples are shown in Box 14.1.

**Automatic Control of Prejudice.** Monteith and her colleagues (Devine & Monteith, 1999; Monteith et al., 2002) also suggested that the self-regulation of prejudice becomes automatic over time. That is, once people have developed cues for controlling prejudice and have practiced them sufficiently, they no longer have to stop and think about putting replacement behaviors into action; the use of those behaviors becomes unconscious and automatic. For example, Kerry Kawakami and her colleagues (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000) gave people practice in negating stereotypes by having them respond "No" each time a stereotypic trait was presented on a computer screen along with a picture of a member of the stereotyped group. They found that negating stereotypes became easier with practice and that the procedure reduced stereotype activation.

**Box 14.1 Self-Regulation in Action**

To investigate the “real world” applicability of the self-regulation model of prejudice reduction, Margo Monteith and her colleagues (2002) conducted interviews with students. Their first question was whether the students had “had a racial experience in which they did something related to Blacks that they then thought they should not have done, either because of their own reactions or because of others’ reactions” (p. 1046). In response, an interviewee who had scored low on a measure of racial prejudice related this experience:

Me and my roommate got approached several times last year in the parking lot by some homeless people and they were Black. After the first 2 or 3 times they asked for money, whenever we would see a group of Black people near there we would automatically assume that we better go the other way because they were going to ask for money. It made me feel bad because I didn’t even give them a chance. Maybe they wanted directions to go somewhere, or wanted to know where to get some coffee or something. We just automatically assumed that they wanted money. That was being judgmental, and I really didn’t feel too good about that. (p. 1046)

Note the aspects of development of cues for control that appear in this student’s story: The student was aware of having done something—avoiding the homeless people—that contradicted his value system and the student experienced negative emotions as a result of the behavior.

Monteith and her colleagues next asked their interviewees if they had ever thought about the experience again. The interviewee quoted above related this incident:

This summer my girlfriend and I were looking at the horses downtown, and we were looking at one and this Black guy started walking toward us. Of course I figured that he was probably a homeless guy, and I immediately thought, here

comes some homeless guy—he’s going to ask us for money. But from my past experience I had in the parking lot with my roommate, I had to stop and think to myself, “Maybe he’s not homeless, maybe he’s not going to ask me for money. He might not say anything to me.” I stopped and I thought about the past experience and it made me change my decision to something I probably wouldn’t have made. (pp. 1046–1047)

Note how the student’s previous experience led him to develop a cue for controlling his behavior, in this case being approached by a homeless person. This cue led him to think about how he wanted to respond and to respond in a nonprejudiced manner by not avoiding the man.

Through their interviews, Monteith and her colleagues also found that even prejudiced people sometimes engage in self-regulation, although apparently from external rather than internal motives. This example is from a student who scored relatively high on their measure of prejudice:

My roommate’s Black and sometimes when we’re watching shows [on television] they kinda like make the Blacks look trashy, you know like on Jerry Springer.... I was laughing at it and he wasn’t really and it kind of automatically made me feel like I had done something wrong so I felt bad.... I didn’t want him to think, “Well, he looks like some kind of racist.”... [Now,] if something on the TV comes up that’s like shady you know it’s like I think about it... you know I think about it to make sure that it doesn’t happen again in case he actually was mad about it. I wouldn’t laugh out loud if I thought maybe it would be offensive to someone else. I’m just a little more careful now. (p. 1047)

Note that in this case the student does not feel upset about his behavior because it contradicts his values, but because it might upset his roommate. Nonetheless, he developed and used a cue for controlling his behavior.

However, they also found that practice affected only the stereotype of the group that the participants practiced with. For example, negation practice on racial stereotypes reduced the activation of those stereotypes but other stereotypes, such as those associated with older people, were activated just as easily as they had been before.

Training also may be less effective when decisions are more deliberative and people can more easily control their responses. In a study on hiring decisions, male job candidates were preferred over equally-qualified job female candidates, indicating gender-based discrimination, even when people had been trained to reduce their use of gender stereotypes (Kawakami, Dovidio, & Van Kamp, 2004).

**Self-regulation in Action.** How successful are people's attempts to be unprejudiced? Interestingly, researchers have just recently begun addressing this question. Nicole Shelton (2003) studied the interactions of White and Black college students. She found that White students who were motivated to avoid acting in a prejudiced manner were better liked by their Black interaction partners than were White students who were not so motivated, suggesting the White students' efforts not to appear prejudiced were successful. However, she also found that the motivated White students enjoyed the interaction less and felt more anxious than their unmotivated counterparts, perhaps because their efforts required a lot of work and they were concerned about the success of those efforts. Interestingly, in some situations, the White people who are the most biased against Black people may be more successful in interracial interactions. Shelton and her colleagues (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005) asked Black research participants to evaluate a White partner after they had discussed race relations. Whites who, during a pretest, indicated higher levels of implicit prejudice were liked better and rated as more engaged than were Whites whose pretest indicated lower levels of implicit prejudice. Shelton and her colleagues suggest that because people are motivated to appear unbiased, and because the topic was race relations, the biased White participants may have tried harder to regulate their behavior so as to appear nonprejudiced and, ironically, may have been less successful in the interaction.

Certain behaviors also may inadvertently backfire and fail to convey an unprejudiced perspective. For example, Teri Conley and her colleagues (Conley, Calhoun, Evett, & Devine, 2001) asked lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people to list the mistakes heterosexual people make when trying to appear nonprejudiced and to rate how annoying they found those mistakes to be. The four most annoying mistakes were not admitting to any discomfort they might feel when interacting with an LGB person; using subtly prejudiced language, such as talking about heterosexuality as "normal;" making stereotypic assumptions about LGB people; and ignoring gay issues, such as by acting as if sexual orientation had no effect on people's lives. Other annoying behaviors included heterosexuals' stating that they knew another gay person, as though that were a credential of their lack of prejudice; asking inappropriate questions, such as questions about sexual behavior; and pointing out how unprejudiced they are. Conley and her colleagues did not question the good intentions underlying these behaviors, but saw them as a form of overcompensation by people who felt uncomfortable in the presence of LGB people, felt guilty over their discomfort, and so tried too hard in their efforts to overcome their discomfort.

Attempting to inhibit prejudice does require effort and this effort depletes other cognitive resources. To demonstrate this, Jennifer Richeson and Sophie Trawalter (2005a; Experiment 2) reduced concerns about appearing prejudiced by giving White research participants a script to follow in their interactions with a Black confederate. Others were not given a script; therefore, these individuals were likely to be concerned about appearing prejudiced because they had to construct their own responses. Results showed that participants who could rely on a script subsequently performed better on the Stroop test, a measure of cognitive functioning, than did individuals who did not have a script, presumably because the script reduced the cognitive demands of the interracial interaction.

## INTERGROUP CONTACT

For most of World War II (as it had been for most of its history), the United States military was strictly segregated by race. In the Army, with the exception of a few all-Black units, combat formations were all White. Most Black soldiers were assigned to supply units and held jobs such as stevedore, warehouse worker, and truck driver. However, by late 1944, the Army in Europe was severely short of combat troops. This shortage led General Dwight Eisenhower, commander of Allied Forces in Europe, to approve what many senior officers saw as a radical solution to the problem: Black soldiers assigned to supply units in Europe would be allowed to volunteer for combat duty, formed into platoons led by White officers, given an accelerated combat training course, and, once trained, assigned to infantry companies that would consist of a Black platoon and three all-White platoons (Ambrose, 1997). One of the major concerns that Army authorities had was how serving with Black soldiers would affect the morale of the White soldiers, so the Army commissioned a survey to find out. White soldiers' reactions depended on who was asked. For example, when asked how they would feel about serving in a semi-integrated unit such as the ones described, 62 percent of White soldiers in segregated units said they would dislike it very much, compared to only 7 percent of the White soldiers actually serving in semi-integrated units (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949).

Results of this study and of other research conducted in the middle of the 20th century led to the development of what is known as the **contact hypothesis** or **intergroup contact theory**: "Interaction between people changes their beliefs and feelings toward each other.... Thus, if only one had the opportunity to communicate with others and appreciate their way of life, understanding and reduction of prejudice would follow" (Amir, 1976, p. 245). Stated that way, the contact hypothesis is clearly simplistic and overly optimistic, a point Amir went on to make. As we saw in the Robbers Cave studies described in Chapter 9, simply bringing two competing groups together is more likely to result in hostility than in friendship. Indeed, increased contact can, by itself, lead to



increased negative attitudes rather than positive attitudes, and negative contact leads to negative attitudes (see, for example, Eller & Abrams, 2004; Plant & Devine, 2003). Nonetheless, as we will see, some 60 years of research has found that, under the proper conditions, increased intergroup contact can lead to improved intergroup attitudes. In this section, we discuss three aspects of intergroup contact as a prejudice-reduction tool: the conditions necessary for successful intergroup contact, the effectiveness of intergroup contact, and recent theories concerning how contact brings about attitude change.

### Conditions for Success

Allport (1954) noted that although bringing members of different groups into contact did not always improve intergroup attitudes, many times it did. Based on a review of the research conducted up to that time, Allport proposed four conditions that had to be met if intergroup contact were to lead to improved intergroup attitudes (see also Brown & Hewstone, 2005):

- Members of each group must have equal status in the situation.
- The groups must work cooperatively to achieve common goals.
- The situation must allow participants to get to know each other as individuals (referred to as acquaintance potential).
- The intergroup effort must have the support of authorities, law, or custom (referred to as institutional support).

In addition to these necessary conditions, researchers have also identified what Thomas Pettigrew (1998) has referred to as facilitating conditions: factors that are not necessary for success but which, coupled with the necessary conditions, increase the likelihood of success. Some of these factors are listed in Table 14.1. Results of a comprehensive literature review shows that, indeed, contact can be successfully reduce prejudice across a variety of situations; however, since the strongest effects emerge when Allport's optimal conditions are operating (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), we will focus our attention on those factors.

**Equal Status.** One factor that is essential to the success of intergroup contact as a prejudice reduction technique is that the groups have equal status within the contact situation (Amir, 1976). Because minority groups usually have lower status in society than do majority groups, replicating those status differences in interacting groups is likely to reinforce stereotypical beliefs and prejudicial attitudes (Cohen, 1984). In contrast, establishing group equality within the contact situation works against the reinforcement of social stereotypes and can promote positive views of outgroup members.

Fletcher Blanchard, Russell Weigel, and Stuart Cook (1975) conducted a classic study of the role of equal status with U.S. Air Force enlisted men as the participants. White airmen worked cooperatively on a task with either a Black or a White confederate. The independent variable of partner status was operationally defined in terms of competence on the task: a participant's partner was

**TABLE 14.1 Factors Facilitating the Success of Intergroup Contact**

In addition to the four conditions that are necessary for intergroup contact to bring about improved intergroup attitudes, Walter Stephan (1985) has identified a number of factors that, if added to the necessary conditions, increase the likelihood of success. These include:

- Members of the interacting groups should be of equal status outside the contact situation as well as in the situation.
- Members of the interacting groups should hold similar attitudes, values, and beliefs on issues not related to relations between the groups.
- Members of the interacting groups should have equal ability on the task the groups will be working on together.
- The group interaction should result in successful completion of the task.
- There should be opportunities for group members to interact outside the immediate situation.
- Efforts should be made to ensure that group members are viewed as individuals.
- The contact should be voluntary.
- Longer-term contact is more likely to bring positive results than shorter-term contact.
- There should be opportunities for contact in a variety of situations and with a variety of both ingroup and outgroup members.
- There should be an equal number of members from each group.

portrayed as being less competent than the participant, equally competent, or more competent. (Task competence is related to individual status in a variety of situations; see, for example, Cohen, 1984.) A second independent variable was success on the task; the researchers manipulated the situation so that a pair either succeeded or failed. After completing the task, the participants rated how much they liked their partner. When the pair succeeded, White and Black confederates received equal liking ratings in all three status conditions. However, the failure condition was really the crucial one. Recall from Chapter 6 that modern forms of prejudice are most likely to be expressed when a person has an excuse to derogate a member of a minority group; task failure would provide such an excuse, allowing the participant to blame his partner for the failure. This is what happened when participants whose team had failed at the task had a lower-status partner: the Black confederate was rated lower than the White confederate. However, Black partners whose status was equal to or greater than the participants' received ratings equal to those given the White confederates in the failure conditions. Thus, having interacted with an equal or higher status Black peer counteracted the effects of the prejudice.

As we have discussed throughout this book, some groups in our society are afforded greater status than others. Is the relationship between intergroup contact and reduced prejudice stronger for these groups? Consistent with Allport's equal status hypothesis, research suggests that the answer is yes. Linda Tropp and Thomas Pettigrew (2005) reviewed the literature on this topic and found that the contact-prejudice relationship was generally weaker for groups of lower status than for groups of higher status. Moreover, these status differences emerge for both

explicit measures of prejudice, such as social distancing from other group members, and implicit measures of prejudice, such as the implicit association task (Henry & Hardin, 2006). Hence, status is more likely to function as an optimizing condition for high status than for low-status groups.

**Cooperation.** A second condition for successful intergroup contact is that the groups work cooperatively in pursuit of common goals. As Sherif's (1966) Robbers Cave study showed, cooperating to achieve common goals helps unite interacting groups by giving them a purpose to strive toward that extends beyond the boundaries of each group and encompasses both groups: It helps turn two groups into one group with a common aim. For example, Donna Desforges and her colleagues (Desforges et al., 1991) had college student research participants work with another person on a learning task that involved either individual study or working together to learn the material. The other person was a confederate who portrayed a former mental patient whom the participants initially expected to act in a stereotypic manner, although he did not, in fact, do so. After working with the person, participants in the cooperative learning condition expressed more positive attitudes toward former mental patients in general than did participants in the individual study condition.

Athletic teams provide an everyday example of cooperation in pursuit of common goals: Team members must work together to win. To see whether athletic participation affected intergroup attitudes Kendrick Brown and his colleagues (Brown, Brown, Jackson, Sellers, & Manuel, 2003) studied college athletes at 24 predominantly White colleges and universities in the United States. The researchers expected two factors would affect the White athletes' racial attitudes: the amount of contact they had with minority teammates (defined in terms of the percentage of minority players on their teams) and whether the athletes played an individual or team sport. Team sports, such as basketball and soccer, require players to work together to win; in contrast, in individual sports, such as swimming and track, winning in most events is a result of individual effort. As shown in Figure 14.2, the White athletes' racial attitudes were affected by a combination of contact and pursuit of common goals. The attitudes of athletes who competed in individual sports were unrelated to the amount of intergroup contact they experienced whereas the attitudes of athletes who competed in team sports became more positive as contact increased. Thus, contact itself had no effect on attitudes in the absence of cooperation. Brown and his colleagues pointed out that sports also tend to emphasize equal status among racial groups: Higher status within a team, such as becoming a starting player, depends on athletic performance rather than race.

**Acquaintance Potential.** Acquaintance potential is the opportunity for the members of the interacting groups to get to know one another as individuals. This process leads to individuation of outgroup members which, as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, undermines stereotypes. Getting to know one another also gives people the opportunity to see that, despite some differences, the outgroup shares many of their attitudes and values, which may help reduce intergroup anxiety and increase empathy for members of the other groups (Miller, 2002).




**FIGURE 14.2** Team Sport Participation and Prejudice

Compared to individual sports such as track or golf, team sports such as basketball and soccer tend to more fully meet the conditions that facilitate the reduction of prejudice through intergroup contact. Thus, as shown above, Brown and colleagues found that amount of intergroup contact was not related to intergroup attitudes among participants in individual sports, but that for members of team sports, attitudes became more positive as contact increased.

SOURCE: Adapted from Brown et al. (2003, Figure 1, p. 1390).

Perceptions of similarity also are an important factor in interpersonal liking and can lead to friendship formation (Berschied & Reiss, 1998). Intergroup friendships have been found to be related to lower prejudice in a number of situations, including reduced prejudice between roommates of different ethnic groups (Van Laar, Levin, Sinclair, & Sidanius, 2004), Europeans' attitudes toward immigrant groups (van Dick et al., 2004), Catholic and Protestant Northern Irelanders' attitudes toward one another (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006), Black and White American adults' attitudes toward one another (Ellison & Powers, 1994), and heterosexuals' attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (Liang & Alimo, 2005). Pettigrew (1997) also found that friendships were more strongly related to low prejudice (measured in a variety of ways) than were other kinds of interpersonal relationships, such as having outgroup members as coworkers or neighbors. These latter relationships are not unimportant, however; not surprisingly, Pettigrew found that having more outgroup members as neighbors was associated with having more intergroup friendships (see also Ellison & Powers, 1994).

Indirect friendships, where one has a friend who has a friendship with an outgroup member, also ameliorates prejudice for both White and minority college students (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Indirect friendships can

affect prejudice even in situations of extreme intergroup hostility: Stefania Paolini and her colleagues (Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 2004) found that intergroup prejudice was lower for Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland who had indirect cross-group friendships. Stephen Wright and his colleagues (1997) proposed three reasons why indirect friendships are related to lower prejudice. First, having a friend who has an outgroup friendship provides a role model for positive intergroup behavior. Second, the friendship implies that outgroup members have positive characteristics; otherwise one's own friend would not like the outgroup member. Finally, disliking someone liked by a friend creates a cognitive conflict and people prefer their likes and dislikes to be mutually consistent. One way to resolve the conflict created by having a friend who likes a member of a group that one dislikes is to change one's attitude toward the group. In addition, Norman Miller (2002) points out that the friend can provide information about the outgroup that can undermine negative stereotypes, leading to a more positive attitude toward the group. This information can be especially powerful because it is provided by a trustworthy source: one's own friend.

**Institutional Support.** The fourth condition for successful intergroup contact is institutional support: Authorities, law, or social norms must establish a clear expectation for attitude change in the direction of lower prejudice and behavior change in the direction of less discrimination. Authority figures in organizations and institutions can support (or hinder) effective intergroup contact in a number of ways (Cox, 2001; Schofield & Hausmann, 2004). For example, people behave in ways for which they are rewarded and authorities can provide reward structures that reinforce nondiscriminatory behavior. Authorities also can work to establish a climate that communicates nonprejudiced norms by clearly stating their expectations, establishing and enforcing appropriate policies, setting a good example, and providing resources to help people deal with the stresses that change always brings.

Unfortunately, not much research has been conducted on the effects of institutional support, probably because of the difficulty of disentangling its effects from the effects of other factors (Schneider, 2004). However, Marylee Taylor (1995) studied the racial attitudes of White employees in companies that did and did not practice affirmative action. She took the presence of an affirmative action program as evidence of institutional support for interracial equality. Taylor found that even after controlling for interracial contact at work, White employees of affirmative action companies held more positive racial attitudes than employees of companies without affirmative action programs.

### Effectiveness of Intergroup Contact

How effective is intergroup contact as a means of reducing prejudice? Since Allport's (1954) statement of the contact hypothesis, more than 500 studies have been conducted to try to answer that question. Based on a review of those studies, Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp (2006) concluded that, overall, contact had a

moderate effect on reducing prejudice, with an average correlation of  $r = -.21$ . Although this effect may not seem to be very large, it is about the same magnitude of the effect that psychotherapy has on the alleviation of a mental disorder (Lambert & Bergin, 1994). Pettigrew and Tropp also examined the relationship between contact and prejudice when Allport's four necessary conditions for success are met and found that, indeed, the relationship was stronger when these optimal conditions were met ( $r = -.28$ ). The authors concluded that these conditions do improve the chances that intergroup contact will reduce prejudice, but that this reduction also can occur when these conditions are not met. Pettigrew and Tropp also found that the intergroup contact effect applies to many outgroups, including those based on sexual orientation, race and ethnicity, physical disability, mental illness, nationality, and age. However, contact has a larger effect on prejudice against some groups than others. For example, the largest effects emerged for contact between heterosexuals and gays and lesbians whereas when contact was with older adults and the mentally ill, effects were smaller. Effects for contact with racial and ethnic groups fell between these two groups. It is not clear why these group differences exist, but it may be that contact has a greater effect on attitudes toward more stigmatized groups; surveys generally find that attitudes toward lesbians and gay men are more negative than attitudes toward African Americans (Sherrill, 1996).

Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) also found that contact had more effect on prejudice in some settings than in others. For example, contact was least likely to reduce prejudice in tourist settings and most likely to reduce prejudice in recreational and in laboratory settings. The relationships found in work and educational settings fell in between. Again the reasons for these differences are not clear, but laboratory and recreational settings allow a greater deal of experimental control and, therefore, may produce stronger effects than in situations where the contact is less controlled or perhaps less meaningful, such as in tourist situations. Finally, intergroup contact early in life is important. Pettigrew and Tropp found that contact was more likely to reduce prejudice for children under the age of 12, adolescents, and college students, than for adults. Intergroup contact at a younger age may have long lasting effects; research shows that adults who had more childhood contacts with African Americans had more positive racial attitudes (Wood & Sonleitner, 1996). Similarly, Tamara Towles-Schwen and Russell Fazio (2001) found that college students who had had more contact with African Americans in school had a higher motivation to control prejudiced responses. As we noted earlier, that kind of motivation can lead to self-generated prejudice reduction.

**Types of Changes Produced.** Intergroup contact appears to have its effect on prejudice by producing cognitive and emotional changes. In terms of cognitive change, intergroup contact tends to increase knowledge about the outgroup (Eller & Abrams, 2003), reduce stereotyping (Aberson & Haag, 2007), reduce expectations that intergroup interactions will have negative outcomes (Plant & Devine, 2003), reduce ingroup favoritism (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1992), and lead to perceptions of unity between the ingroup and outgroup (Eller & Abrams, 2003, 2004). Intergroup contact also has effects on intergroup emotions. Contact, including

indirect contact, reduces intergroup anxiety (Eller & Abrams, 2003, 2004; Paolini et al., 2004). Contact also improves people's ability to take the perspective of the other group (Aberson & Haag, 2007); as we saw in Chapter 5, this ability tends to be associated with less prejudice.

Intergroup contact also can lead people to engage in new behaviors, which can then lead to attitude change. Interacting with members of an outgroup may be a novel behavior for people who hold negative attitudes toward the outgroup. When people act in ways that are inconsistent with their attitudes, such as by holding a friendly conversation with members of a group they dislike, the contradiction leads to unpleasant feelings collectively referred to as cognitive dissonance. Because cognitive dissonance is unpleasant, people are motivated to reduce it. One way of reducing dissonance is to change one's attitude to be consistent with one's behavior. Thus, Donna Eisenstadt and her colleagues (Eisenstadt, Leippe, Stambush, Rauch, & Rivers, 2005) found that inducing prejudiced people to behave in nonprejudiced ways, such as by having White college students write essays in favor of increasing scholarship money for Black students, leads to more positive evaluations of Black students, even if the White students do not change their attitudes toward increasing scholarship funds for those students.

Simply imagining an interaction with an outgroup member also can improve attitudes toward its members. Rhiannon Turner, Richard Crisp, and Emily Lambert (2007; Experiment 1) asked college students to imagine meeting an elderly stranger or to imagine an outdoor scene (the control condition). They then assessed whether they would prefer to have a conversation with a younger person (an ingroup member) or an older person (an outgroup member). Results showed that students in the control group selected an ingroup member (another young person) as a conversational partner over than an outgroup member (an older person); those participants who had previously imagined an interaction with an older person showed no preference for an ingroup or outgroup member. Results of a second experiment (Turner, et al., 2007) showed that thinking about the outgroup "elderly" did not, in and of itself, improve attitudes toward that group. Instead, outgroup acceptance emerged only after the students imagined actual contact with older adults.

**Limiting Factors.** As we saw, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found that although intergroup contact does reduce prejudice, its effect is only moderate in size. Another way of looking at this finding is that intergroup contact reduces prejudice in some people but not others. For example, in a study that was carefully designed to meet all the necessary conditions for successful intergroup contact, Stuart Cook (1984) found that only 40 percent of the participants showed a meaningful reduction in prejudice. Although this number was greater than the 12 percent of participants in a no-contact control group whose attitudes changed meaningfully over the same period of time, the results still suggest that about 60 percent of people who experience intergroup contact will not show meaningful attitude change.

Several factors may inhibit attitude change in even the best-designed intergroup contact situations.

One such factor is the participants' preexisting intergroup attitudes. On the one hand, intergroup contact will probably result in very little attitude change for people who are already low in prejudice because their intergroup attitudes are already positive. On the other hand, the more prejudiced people are, the more likely they are to avoid intergroup contact. For example, Lilach Sagiv and Shalom Schwartz (1995) found that holding values related to lower prejudice, such as universalism, was positively correlated with readiness for intergroup contact among Israeli Christians, Jews, and Muslims, whereas holding value positions related to higher prejudice, such as security and conformity, was negatively correlated with readiness for intergroup contact. In addition, Oscar Ybarra and his colleagues (Ybarra, Stephan, Schaberg, & Lawrence, 2003) found that more prejudiced people required a greater amount of disconfirming evidence than less prejudiced people before they would give up an outgroup stereotype. Thus, more prejudiced people might be less likely to individuate outgroup members based on intergroup contact, reducing the impact that contact can have on their attitudes.

Another factor, related to prejudice, is intergroup anxiety. People higher in intergroup anxiety are more likely to avoid contact with members of outgroups who are the focus of their anxiety (Britt, Boniecki, Vescio, Biernat, & Brown, 1996; Plant & Devine, 2003). In contrast, White people who associate positive emotions with minority groups are more willing to engage in intergroup contact (Esses & Dovidio, 2003) and people who feel empathy for an outgroup report less anxiety about intergroup contact than those who are less empathic (Aberson & Haag, 2007). However, intergroup anxiety may be enhanced if anxious people are required to have contact with outgroup members and that enhanced anxiety may offset any benefits the contact might otherwise have (Hewstone, 1996). The quality of a person's prior experience with the outgroup also may be a factor. White people who have had negative experience with Black people tend to be higher on intergroup anxiety and to be more likely to expect the outcomes of intergroup contact to be negative, and so are more likely to avoid intergroup contact (Plant & Devine, 2003). Similarly, Linda Tropp (2003) found that members of minority groups who reported more personal experiences of discrimination had more pessimistic expectations for intergroup contact than did members of minority groups who reported fewer experiences of discrimination.

Finally, Walter and Cookie Stephan (1984) note that the normative climate outside the contact situation can have an effect on intergroup contact. They found that Anglo children whose friends had more positive attitudes toward Hispanics were more likely to have contact with Hispanic children than were Anglo children whose friends had more negative attitudes. They also found that peers' attitudes toward Hispanics had more effect on the Anglo children's intergroup contact than did their parents' attitudes. Thus, number of factors can attenuate the beneficial effects of intergroup contact, so perhaps it is not surprising that it does not have a larger impact on intergroup attitudes.



### Models of the Contact Process

In his review of research on the contact hypothesis, Pettigrew (1998) noted that after a great deal of activity during the 1950s and 1960s, research on the topic waned during the late 1970s. He attributed the decline in research to a lack of theories to explain how intergroup contact caused reductions in prejudice. That is, researchers had established that intergroup contact did, in fact, reduce prejudice and had established the conditions necessary for it to be effective, but no one had proposed any ideas about *how* it reduced prejudice. As a result, researchers felt that they had found out just about everything that they could about intergroup contact. That situation changed with the development of three models of processes by which contact reduces prejudice: Marilynn Brewer and Norman Miller's (1984) personalization model (see also Miller, 2002), Miles Hewstone and Rupert Brown's salient categorization model (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone, 1996), and Samuel Gaertner and colleagues' (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) common ingroup identity model.

All three models draw on social identity theory to explain how intergroup contact reduces prejudice. Recall from Chapter 9 that one aspect of social identity theory is that prejudice develops because people categorize others into ingroups and outgroups. Because people identify with their ingroups, they like members of those groups better than members of outgroups. Each of the models holds that intergroup contact successfully reduces prejudice by changing how people conceptualize ingroups and outgroups (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005, for a review). However, each model proposes that a different type of categorization process is responsible for that success.

**Personalization.** The **personalization model** (also called the **decategorization model**) proposes that intergroup contact reduces prejudice by leading people to see members of the outgroup as individuals rather than as members of social categories: Viewing people in personal terms rather than as members of groups then leads to liking for them and so to less prejudice toward them (Brewer & Miller, 1984; Miller, 2002). The process operates in this way: When equal status groups work cooperatively toward a common goal, the members of each group come to see the other group in complex terms rather than as a simple, stereotypic social category (hence, the term *decategorization*). After intergroup contact, people begin to identify subgroups within the overall outgroup and become aware of the unique characteristics of its individual group members. They also come to see that members of the other group have multiple social identities. For example, a White participant may come to realize that a Hispanic woman's social identity consists of more than just her ethnic identity; in addition, she is a woman, she is a member of an occupational group, she has particular hobbies and interests, she may be a mother, and so forth. Intergroup contact also may lead the White participant to think of herself in more complex terms (Roccas & Brewer, 2002) and to see similarities between aspects of her social identity (such as woman, mother, worker) and those of the Hispanic woman.

The awareness that members of both ingroup and outgroup members have complex social identities lessens the importance of group boundaries, which

come to be seen as “fuzzy” and permeable rather than distinct and impenetrable. It also makes group categories less useful as a source of information about individual group members; recall from Chapter 3 that one reason stereotypes form is that they presumably provide useful information about other people. However, as one gets to know a member of an outgroup and sees all the ways that person is similar to and different than the stereotypical member of that group, the group stereotype loses its usefulness as an information source.

An experiment conducted by Benjamin Crisp, Miles Hewstone, and Mark Rubin (2001, Experiment 2) illustrates the decategorization process. They operationally defined ingroup and outgroup in terms of competing universities in the United Kingdom. Participants in the experimental group were induced to think of outgroup members in terms of multiple social identities: not only their university affiliation, but also their gender, age, academic major, whether they lived in university housing or off-campus, and national origin (British or international student). Participants in the control group were induced to think of outgroup members solely in terms of their university affiliation. The researchers found that, compared to participants in the control group, those in the experimental group viewed the outgroup members more in terms of individual characteristics and less in terms of being members of a competing group; that is, they decategorized the outgroup. Participants in the experimental group also evaluated the outgroup more positively.

Although Crisp and his colleagues (2001) found that decategorization reduced intergroup bias, they also found that it did not completely eliminate the bias. To fully reduce prejudice, outgroup members must be personalized; relations with outgroup members must take a person-to-person rather than a group-to-group form. That is, one must think of individual group members in terms of the ways in which they are similar to and different from oneself personally rather than oneself as an ingroup member. This change in viewpoint is facilitated when the intergroup contact situation has acquaintance potential and provides the opportunity for intergroup friendships to form. As we saw earlier, such friendships increase empathy for members of the other group and reduce intergroup anxiety and prejudice. Friendships are promoted through self-disclosure, providing the other person with information about oneself and one's attitudes, values, beliefs, and so forth. Although the discovery that one shares attitudes and values with another person does promote liking and friendship, self-disclosure can be a two-edged sword: If dissimilarities are discovered, liking may not increase, and, in cases of extreme disagreement, can actually decrease (Berschied & Reiss, 1998). Intergroup contact should therefore be structured in ways that emphasize similarities between members of different groups.

One shortcoming of the personalization process is that increased liking for some outgroup members does not always generalize to liking for the outgroup in general. That is, people may come to like the specific outgroup members they have contact with, but their attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole may not change. For example, Nikki Scarberry and her colleagues (Scarberry, Ratcliff, Lord, Lanicek, & Desforges, 1997) had college students work on a cooperative task with a confederate they thought was a gay man. Before they started the task,

participants reported how much they thought they would like the gay man they would work with. Then during the task, the confederate made analogies linking information that was used in the task to other events. In one condition, the analogies involved self-disclosure, such as “Like when I got this bruise and it swelled;” in the other condition, the analogies were impersonal, such as “Like when a person bruises” (Scarberry et al., 1997, p. 1297). After the task was completed, the participants reported how much they liked the other person. The researchers found that personalization made no difference: In both conditions the participants reported that they liked the confederate better than they had expected and the amount of change was the same in both conditions. However, the researchers also found that attitudes toward gay men in general improved in the impersonal analogies condition but not in the self-disclosure condition. That is, cooperative contact improved liking for an individual gay man with and without self-disclosure on his part, but the interaction led to more liking for gay men in general only when there was no self-disclosure.

Scarberry and her colleagues (1997) suggested that the self-disclosures may have led the participants to see the confederate as not being a typical member of his group—he was “an exception to the rule” (see Chapter 3)—so the participants’ liking for him did not apply to the group as a whole. Supporting this interpretation, Nurcan Ensari and Norman Miller (2002) found that self-disclosure by outgroup members improved attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole when the disclosers were seen as a typical member of the outgroup but not when they were seen as atypical.

**Salient Categorization.** The **salient categorization model** also called intergroup contact theory (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986), proposes that generalization occurs only if group members are seen as typical of their group. Like the personalization model, the salient categorization model holds that it is essential that outgroups be differentiated—that is, the outgroup must come to be seen in nonstereotypic terms—and that intergroup cooperation under conditions of equality promotes this process. However, for group members to be seen as typical, group membership must remain salient during intergroup contact. Thus, whereas the personalization model holds that group categories must be made less salient for intergroup attitudes to improve, the salient categorization model holds that group categories must remain salient for generalization to occur.

Jan van Oudenhoven, Jan Groenewoud, and Miles Hewstone (1996) showed the importance of maintaining group salience in a study conducted in the Netherlands. Dutch high school students worked on two cooperative problem-solving tasks with a same-age confederate of Turkish descent. (Turks are a negatively stereotyped group in the Netherlands.) In the experimental condition, the confederate’s Turkish group identity was made salient by the experimenter before the students started the first task and during a break between tasks; in the control condition, the confederate’s nationality was not made salient. The researchers found that high group salience for the confederate led to more positive ratings of Turks in general than did low group salience. High group salience

has also been found to boost the positive effects of intergroup contact for adults in natural contact settings. For example, compared to low group salience, under conditions of high salience, contact results in lower intergroup anxiety and more positive attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole (Greenland & Brown, 1999; Voci & Hewstone, 2003).

The importance of the outgroup members' being seen as typical of their group while still disconfirming aspects of the group stereotype was shown in a classic study conducted by David Wilder (1984). College students interacted with a confederate who portrayed a student from a rival college; the student appeared to be either typical or atypical of students of that college on a number of characteristics. The confederate also either confirmed an additional aspect of the outgroup stereotype by acting in an unfriendly manner or disconfirmed it by acting in a friendly manner. Wilder found that friendliness resulted in more positive ratings only when the confederate was seen as typical of students from the rival college. Other researchers have confirmed that for positive attitudes to generalize from the group member to the group as a whole, a stereotype-disconfirming member must be seen as otherwise typical. These results have been replicated for artificial groups set up for laboratory research (Wilder, Simon, & Faith, 1996), political groups (Ensari & Miller, 2002; Wilder et al., 1996), religious groups (Ensari & Miller, 2002), and nationality groups (Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1999). However, perceptions of why a typical outgroup member acts in a non-stereotypic way can limit attitude change. Attitudes improve only if the behavior represents the person's true characteristics and are part of the person's normal behavior pattern. If person is perceived as making a special effort to behave in a nonstereotypic manner or if the behavior is seen as caused by situational factors (such as adherence to situation-specific norms), then there will be no change in intergroup attitudes (Wilder et al., 1996).

Hewstone and Brown (1986; Brown & Hewstone, 2005) acknowledge that their model requires intergroup contact to balance two competing processes. Although stereotypes initially define what the typical outgroup member is like, group members must come to be seen in nonstereotypical terms and, at the same time, must be perceived as typical of their group. Hewstone and Brown suggest that this balance can be achieved by structuring intergroup contact in two ways. First, the contact situation should emphasize the unique strengths of each group. This procedure allows each group to see both its own positive contributions and those made by the other group. At the same time, group categories can remain salient because each group makes a unique contribution to goal attainment. Second, although group members should act in stereotype-disconfirming ways, and thus promote decategorization, these disconfirmations should not have negative implications for the other group. Such negative implications can arouse ingroup identification. Increased ingroup identification leads to seeing outgroups in stereotypic terms (see Chapter 9), which impedes decategorization. For example, the stereotype of "they think they're better than us" is relevant to the ingroup and so bringing it to mind can have negative effects; in contrast, the stereotype of "they're lazy" has no implications for the ingroup.

**Common Ingroup Identity.** Whereas the personalization model focuses on decategorizing outgroup members and the salient categorization model focuses on salient categorization of outgroup members, the **common ingroup identity model** (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1993) focuses on inducing ingroup and outgroup members to recategorize themselves into a single group for which they share a common identity. The model proposes that the presence or absence of the four conditions necessary for successful intergroup contact affect how people view the intergroup situation (what the model calls their group representation): The members of two groups can

- recategorize themselves as belonging to one group with a common ingroup identity (the one group representation);
- recategorize themselves as belonging to one group with two subgroups in which the two subgroups retain their original identities while adding a common ingroup identity (the dual identity representation);
- retain the view that they constitute two separate groups with no common identity (the separate groups representation); or
- personalize the members of the other group and see them in individual rather than group terms (the individuals representation).

People's group representation influences their attitudes and behaviors toward members of the other group:

- a separate groups representation results in no change in attitudes and holds the potential for intergroup conflict;
- an individuals representation (personalization) leads to more positive attitudes toward the individual members of the outgroup who take part in the intergroup contact, but there is little or no generalization to the outgroup as a whole; and
- a one group or dual identity representation (development of a common ingroup viewpoint) leads to positive attitudes toward all members of the former outgroup.

Inducing members of two groups to develop a common identity as a means of reducing prejudice makes use of some of the social identity processes we discussed in Chapter 9. For example, identification with a group leads to ingroup favoritism, so recategorizing oneself and the members of another group as belonging to a single group should result in viewing them in favorable terms. In addition, people see ingroup members as sharing their attitudes, values, beliefs, and so forth, and such perceptions of similarity can lead to liking and friendship. That is, thinking of oneself and others as "we" rather than as "us and them" fosters a positive view of the others and so results in the elimination of, or at least a great reduction in, prejudice. After all, it is difficult to be prejudiced against people with whom one identifies.

Samuel Gaertner, John Dovidio, and their colleagues have conducted a great deal of laboratory research on the validity of their model. The general pattern of the research has been to form two groups, using either natural groups such as political parties (Gaertner et al., 1999) or randomly assigning participants to

artificial groups, such as by telling them they share a common personality trait (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998) or having them wear color-coded badges (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). (Recall from Chapters 3 and 9 how easy it is to create ingroups and outgroups.) The researchers then bring the members of the two groups together to work on a cooperative task and induce them to form either a one group or a separate groups representation of the intergroup situation. Group representations are manipulated by having members of the two groups sit across a table from each other versus sitting alternately around the table (Gaertner et al., 1999), dress in common clothing (such as lab coats) versus individual clothing (Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance, 1995), share a prize for successful task completion versus separate prizes for each group (Gaertner et al., 1999), or read a newspaper article about a terrorist threat to the United States (Dovidio et al., 2004). After they complete the task, participants make two sets of ratings: the extent to which they thought of themselves and the other participants as members of one group, as members of two groups, or as individuals, and the extent to which they liked the members of the two groups and thought they had positive traits such as being honest, cooperative, friendly, and so forth. These studies found that compared to a separate groups representation, perceptions of a common identity led to less bias, as did perception of the other participants as individuals (as the personalization model would predict). In addition, one group and individuals representations led to an increase in positive behaviors such as self-disclosure and helping (Dovidio et al., 1997) and to more positive attitudes toward other ethnic groups (but not other disadvantaged groups, such as older adults or persons with disabilities; Dovidio et al., 2004).

Support for the common ingroup identity model has also come from field research. In addition to assessing participants' group representations and attitudes toward the outgroup, this research also has assessed whether the conditions necessary for successful intergroup contact were present in the research setting. This research has involved managerial employees at two banks being merged (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996), nationality groups (Eller & Abrams, 2003, 2004), and children in stepfamilies (with the dependent variable in this case being stepfamily harmony (Banker & Gaertner, 1998)). These researchers have found that positive contact was related to a stronger one group representation and a weaker separate groups representation, and that a one group representation was in turn related to more positive perceptions of the outgroup members in the contact situation, less intergroup anxiety, and less prejudice toward the outgroup in general.

One situation in which group representations have not been found to be related to bias is intergroup contact in schools (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996; Wittig & Molina, 2000). In these studies, the experimental conditions were such that the common ingroup identity model should have been supported; however, results showed little or no relationship between group representations and bias. Instead, Michele Wittig and Ludwin Molina (2000) found student interest in interacting with members of other groups had the strongest relationship to bias. It is not clear why the common ingroup identity model does not fit the school situation as well as it does other situations. One possibility is that attending the same school does not provide a strong enough common identity to produce reductions in bias.

Although there is good support for the common ingroup identity model, researchers have identified two potential drawbacks to the creation of a common ingroup identity. The first is that if ingroup members define the common ingroup in terms of themselves (that is, if they assume that the outgroup will take on the ingroup identity), then intergroup bias can increase (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). For example, Sven Waldzus and Amélie Mummendey (2004) conducted an experiment in which Germans were induced to think of themselves in terms of one of two higher-level groups: Europeans, a category that included Poles, or Western Europeans, a category that excluded Poles. In each case, participants thought of the higher-order category in terms of their German nationality. The participants also expressed more bias against Poles in the European condition than in the Western European condition. Waldzus and Mummendey explained the outcome by suggesting that sharing a common ingroup identity with what, from many Germans' point of view, is a lower status subgroup (Poles) made the German-Polish ingroup-outgroup contrast more salient. This salient contrast increased the participants' German social identity, which increased their bias.

The second problem is that creation of a common ingroup identity may lead to increased bias against common outgroups, groups that the former ingroup and outgroup both view as outgroups. For example, Thomas Kessler and Amélie Mummendey (2001) surveyed people living in former East and West Germany. Prior to German reunification, residents of the two regions had looked on each other as outgroups; afterwards, some developed a strong common identity as Germans while others placed more importance on their regional identities and developed a weaker common identity. Respondents who had developed a stronger common identity expressed less bias against members of the former outgroup, as common ingroup identity theory would predict. However, they also found that a stronger identity as German was associated with greater bias against non-Germans. Kessler and Mummendey suggested that although the development of a common ingroup identity reduces the salience of former ingroup-outgroup distinctions, it increases the salience of common outgroups, leading to increased bias against them. Thus, development of a common ingroup identity can be a two-edged sword, decreasing bias against some targets while having the potential to increase bias against others.

**Pettigrew's Combined Model.** It seems at first glance that the three models of how intergroup contact reduces prejudice contradict one other: The personalization model holds that prejudice reduction derives from decategorization, the salient categorization model holds that it derives from maintaining group categories, and the common ingroup identity model holds that it derives from recategorizing the ingroup and outgroup into one common group. All have research to support them, so which is correct? Pettigrew's (1998) answer to this question is that all are correct, but that each represents a different stage of the prejudice reduction process.

Figure 14.3 shows Pettigrew's (1998) combined intergroup contact model. As do all three individual models, the combined model predicts that for intergroup

contact to reduce prejudice, it must involve groups of equal status who cooperate to attain common goals. The situation must also provide acquaintance potential and the prejudice reduction effort must have institutional support. In addition, as noted earlier, there are conditions that although not necessary for successful intergroup contact, make success more likely (see Table 14.1). Pettigrew's model also acknowledges that people bring their unique personalities and sets of experiences into the contact situation and that these factors, such as level of prejudice and ingroup anxiety, can influence their individual contact experiences. In addition,




**FIGURE 14.3** Pettigrew's Combined Intergroup Contact Model

Situational and individual factors facilitate or hinder the effectiveness of intergroup contact. Under the proper conditions, contact leads to decategorization: less stereotyping, lower intergroup anxiety, increased empathy, reappraisal of the ingroup, and behavior change. As a result, participants like the members of the outgroup they are interacting with, but this liking does not generalize to other members of the outgroup. Over time, outgroup members may come to be seen as typical of their group through salient categorization, so that their positive characteristics are attributed to their group as a whole and positive attitudes generalize to the group as a whole. Finally, the members of the old ingroup and outgroup may come to develop a common ingroup identity and see themselves as members of a single ingroup, resulting in maximum reduction of prejudice.

SOURCE: Adapted from Pettigrew (1998a), Figure 2, p. 77. Used with permission from *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 49. Copyright © 1998 by Annual Reviews. HYPERLINK "<http://www.annualreviews.org>" [www.annualreviews.org](http://www.annualreviews.org).



Pettigrew notes that every intergroup contact situation is nested within broader societal and institutional contexts that can affect both the outcome of the process and the extent to which attitudes generalize outside the contact setting.

Pettigrew (1998) proposes that, within those constraints, personalization is the most likely first outcome of intergroup contact. Personalization of outgroup members reduces stereotyping and intergroup anxiety, increases empathy for outgroup members, and leads people to rethink their concepts of the ingroup. These changes lead to liking for the outgroup members with whom people have contact, but that liking does not necessarily generalize to the outgroup as a whole. Over time, continued contact with the outgroup can lead to salient recategorization, in which the outgroup members with whom people have contact come to be seen as typical of their group as whole. This change in perception increases the likelihood that the attitudes developed in the contact situation will generalize to the outgroup as a whole. Finally, continued contact might lead to the development of a common ingroup identity in which subgroup identities are subsumed within an overreaching common identity (the dual identity representation) or in which subgroup identities are abandoned in favor of a common identity (the one group representation). Reaching this stage results in the maximum reduction of prejudice.

Pettigrew (1998) also notes that while it is conceptually useful to present the contact process as a series of discrete steps, the stages are not always distinct from one another and the processes they represent can overlap. For example, in regard to personalization and salient categorization, Hewstone (1996) and Miller (2002) have pointed out that cues that keep group membership salient often persist even as personalization takes place. As Miller (2002) noted,

Skin color, hair texture and pigmentation, and facial features make the racial/ethnic identity of Black and Anglo Americans clear to members of both categories when they interact. Linguistic cues identify northerners and southerners to each other. Secondary sex traits, such as facial hair and pitch of voice, make sexual identity manifest when males and females interact. With less consistency, habitually worn religious emblems (a cross versus a Star of David and a skull cap) identify Palestinian Christians and Jews, and modes of dress identify blue- and white-collar workers in the United States. For most groups between whom there is strife, any contact at the interpersonal level occurs in the presence of category-identifying information. (pp. 399–400)

Marilynn Brewer and Samuel Gaertner (2001) have further suggested that the order in which the processes described in the combined model take place depends on the nature of the contact situation. For example, contact that emphasizes group-to-group interactions, such as the Robbers Cave study described in Chapter 9, may initially elicit salient categorization or development of a common ingroup identity prior to personalization. In contrast, contact that emphasizes person-to-person interactions, such as among neighbors or coworkers, may initially elicit personalization. Thus, Gaertner and colleagues (2000) noted that

in the Robbers Cave study, formation of a common group identity preceded personalization. In addition, they pointed out that intergroup contact moved back and forth among the stages of the combined model, with intergroup relations sometimes regressing to hostility, albeit at a lower level, following periods of successful cooperation. Thus, the improvement of intergroup relations through intergroup contact is a complex and sometimes difficult process, but one that holds great potential for success.

## WORKPLACE INTERVENTIONS

We now leave our discussion of intergroup contact and turn to the ways in which prejudice and discrimination are addressed in the workplace. The increasing diversity of the North American workforce has led to an increased interest in the dynamics of diversity in organizations. One result of this interest has been the development of programs designed to increase the representation of women and minority group members in the workplace, to remove barriers to their career advancement, and to deal with the intergroup tensions that can accompany increased workforce diversity (see, for example, Cox, 2001; Thomas, 1991). Roosevelt Thomas (1991) identified three broad types of workplace diversity initiatives: affirmative action, valuing diversity (also called valuing differences), and managing diversity. We briefly discuss each type below. When thinking about these programs it is important to bear in mind that, unlike the educational programs we discussed in Chapter 8, workplace programs generally are not directly aimed at creating long-term, generalized attitude change. Rather, their goal is to create more diverse organizations and to help those organizations and their employees work more effectively and efficiently (Bendick, Eagan, & Lofhjelm, 2001); any effect on intergroup attitudes outside the workplace is seen as a side benefit.

### Affirmative Action

**Affirmative action** programs consist of “voluntary and mandatory efforts undertaken [by organizations] to combat discrimination and to provide equal opportunity in...employment for all” (American Psychological Association, 1996, p. 2). Although the word “mandatory” is part of the definition of affirmative action, most programs are voluntary: In the United States, only federal government agencies, federal government contractors, and a few companies under court orders are required to have affirmative action programs. Thus, in the private sector in 1995, only about 3 percent of U.S. companies were required to have affirmative action plans (Reskin, 1998). However, voluntary affirmative action programs are fairly common. For example, Barbara Reskin (1998) found that 40 percent of a sample of large corporations in the New York City area had affirmative action plans for recruiting members of minority groups. Although affirmative action originated in the United States, affirmative action policies have been established in a number of

other countries as well (Crosby, Ferdman, & Wingate, 2001). In thinking about affirmative action, it is important to bear in mind that, as noted in Box 14.2, the term *affirmative action* can mean different things to different people and that not all those meanings are correct.

Affirmative action programs are not intended to reduce prejudice or to improve intergroup relations. As Thomas (1991) noted, the goals of affirmative action are the “creation of [a] diverse work force [and] upward mobility for minorities and women” (p. 28). Affirmative action programs have generally met these goals, resulting in increased representation of and more promotions for women and minority group members in organizations with affirmative action policies (Crosby, Iyer, Calyton, & Downing, 2003). Affirmative action also can have economic benefits for companies. For example, researchers have found that, compared to companies with less diverse workforces, more diverse companies have higher stock prices, productivity, profitability, and market share, and their shareholders have a higher return on investment (Richard, 2000; Wright, Ferris, Hiller, & Kroll, 1995).

#### **Box 14.2 What Does Affirmative Action Mean?**

Most people interpret affirmative action to mean a program that gives preference to or sets quotas for hiring and promoting women and members of minority groups regardless of their qualifications as a way to make up for past societal discrimination (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1994). However, preferential affirmative action programs are legal in the United States only if they are designed to remedy past discrimination carried out by the organization using the program; they cannot be used as a remedy for general societal discrimination and they cannot involve quota systems (Stoker, 1998).

One problem is that most researchers simply ask people about affirmative action and allow them to apply their own, perhaps mistaken, meaning to the term. For example, Laura Stoker (1998) found that opposition to affirmative action among respondents to a national survey varied as a function of how the program was described: 76 percent opposed it when it was described in general terms, but opposition was reduced to 59 percent when it was described as a remedy for past discrimination by an organization. Similarly, people support diversity, but not affirmative action, as a way to achieve that goal. A recent poll, conducted for the Associated Press (2003), for example, showed that although four of five Americans said it was important for colleges to have racially diverse student bodies, many Whites (40 percent) supported abolishing affirmative action (defined in general terms). In contrast, only 7 percent of Black respondents shared

this viewpoint. This suggests that people misunderstand the role affirmative action plays in diversification of a university or organization.

Affirmative action programs can also take various forms (Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998): Equal treatment programs are designed to remove organizational barriers to members of target groups, such as women and minorities, but everyone in the organization can take advantage of these programs, even if they are not members of a targeted group. Mentoring and parental leave are examples of such programs. Differential treatment programs treat members of targeted and nontargeted groups differently, but only in limited circumstances that recognize individual merit. For example, membership in a targeted group might be used to break a tie between two equally qualified job applicants or candidates for promotion. Preferential treatment programs use group membership as a direct factor in a selection process. For example, selection for promotion might be based on points awarded for various factors such as education, work experience, and so forth. In a preferential treatment program, points toward promotion would be awarded for membership in some groups but not others. Ramona Bobocel and her colleagues (1998) found that college students were opposed to preferential treatment programs, neutral toward differential treatment programs, and in favor of equal treatment programs.

Although affirmative action programs are not designed to affect prejudice, the results of some research suggest that they can. For example, a fairly large number of laboratory studies have found that people hold more negative attitudes toward employees who may have benefited from affirmative action, seeing them as less competent and less qualified than other employees (see Crosby et al., 2003, for a summary of this research). In addition, Gregory Maio and Victoria Esses (1998) found that reading about affirmative action primed negative attitudes toward immigrants in a sample of Canadian college students. Their findings suggest that negative attitudes toward beneficiaries of affirmative action may generalize to entire outgroups.

On the plus side, however, diversity education can produce positive attitude change toward affirmative action. Christopher Aberson (2007) surveyed over 1000 college students and found White, African Americans, and Asian Americans who had participated in diversity-related events on their campus had more positive attitudes toward affirmative action, presumably because this education led to a better understanding of the goals of affirmative action. Results of field research also paint a more positive picture. For example, Christopher Parker, Boris Baltes, and Neil Christiansen (1997) found that, overall, the White male employees of a U.S. government agency did not hold negative attitudes toward coworkers who had benefited from affirmative action. In addition, as noted earlier, Taylor (1995) found that employees of companies that had affirmative action programs held more positive intergroup attitudes than employees of companies without such programs. Thus, affirmative action does not, for the most part, seem to engender prejudice among people who work in organizations that practice it, and may help to reduce it.

### Valuing Diversity

Although affirmative action does not seem to produce prejudice, increasing the representation of women and members of minority groups in organizations can cause tensions (see, for example, Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). As a result, about one-third to one-half of U.S. companies carry out programs designed to help employees work more effectively with colleagues of different backgrounds (Bendick et al., 2001). The goal of **valuing diversity** programs is the “establishment of quality interpersonal relationships [through] understanding, respecting, and valuing differences among various groups in the context of the business enterprise” (Thomas, 1991, p. 28). Valuing diversity programs take the form of diversity training, using seminars, discussions, media presentations, and so forth to achieve its goals.

How effective are such programs at reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations? It is hard to tell. Stephan and Stephan (2001, 2004); Stephan & Stephan, (2001) reviewed research on diversity training programs and found the results to be mixed: some programs were successful and others were not. McGregor (1993) found that about 30 percent of the studies of adult-targeted anti-bias education programs actually resulted in increased prejudice. Additional evidence suggests that programs are more successful with minority group rather than majority group participants (Stephan & Stephan, 2005). However, Mark Engberg (2004) reviewed

the literature on diversity training with college students and concluded that although some programs were ineffective, in general diversity workshops reduced racial bias. Moreover, in a college setting, programs were more successful with White and Asian American students than with African Americans and Latino/as.

A number of factors probably contribute to these mixed results. One may simply be the sample; college students may be more open to diversity training than people in the workforce. Another is resistance on the part of trainees. Stephan and Stephan (2001; 2004) note that, in general, people feel anxious about change and diversity training involves learning how to change attitudes and behavior. In addition, some people may feel threatened by increased diversity in their organizations. For example, Erika James and her colleagues (James, Brief, Dietz, & Cohen, 2001) found that prejudiced employees saw increased diversity as reducing their chances of promotion whereas unprejudiced employees did not. In addition, resistance can arise because people do not see diversity training as relevant. As one manager told an interviewer, “I’m not in the business of dealing with social issues. The people in my division have jobs to do, and this touchy-feely diversity stuff doesn’t help us do our jobs. I’m not wasting my people’s time trying to change the way they ‘feel’ about people who are different from them. If there’s a problem, just tell us what you want us to do. Don’t waste our time with this diversity stuff” (Paskoff, 1996, p. 43).

Another factor contributing to the failure of diversity training is that the training is sometimes poorly conducted. Box 14.3 lists some of the problems

### **Box 14.3 Potential Pitfalls in Diversity Training**

Why do diversity training, multicultural education, and anti-bias education programs sometimes fail? Michael Mobley and Tamara Payne (1992) suggest some problems, whether real or thought to exist by the trainees, that commonly afflict the implementation programs and can cause a boomerang effect:

- Trainers who have political agendas or support some groups over others.
- The training is based on a philosophy of political correctness rather than on dealing with important issues in the organization.
- The training is presented as remedial, implying that the trainees are the cause of the problems that that training is designed to solve.
- The training pressures only one group to change.
- The relevance of the training is not made clear to the trainees, such as by explaining how prejudice and discrimination undermine affected employees’ ability to work effectively and the effect these problems have on organizational performance.
- The content of the training appears to be irrelevant because it is not adapted to the trainees’ needs, skills, and expertise.
- The training uses a limited definition of whose differences should be valued, such as by ignoring the contributions of White men.
- Resource materials, such as readings, videos, and so forth, are outdated.
- The discussion of certain issues, such as reverse discrimination or the problems that can accompany increased diversity, is forbidden either explicitly or implicitly.
- The trainers themselves are not adequately familiar with the issues the training addresses or have not been properly trained to conduct discussions of sensitive issues.

one pair of experts noted in diversity training programs. As one example, in an analysis of a series of videos used in corporate diversity training, Jacqueline Layng (1993) noted that White male managers, presumably a major target audience for the videos, were portrayed as uniformly biased and incompetent in intergroup interactions. Such portrayals are likely to turn that audience off and induce resistance to the training program. Finally, the training that is given may be insufficient. For example, in a survey of 108 diversity training providers, Marc Bendick, Mary Lou Eagan, and Suzanne Lofhjelm (2001) found that the average training program lasted only 10 hours and some lasted 4 hours or less. Brief programs such as these may not provide trainees with sufficient information or give them enough opportunity to practice new skills (Stephan & Stephan, 2005).

It is important to note that, although some diversity training programs fail, properly designed and implemented programs can succeed (Engberg, 2004). In addition, valuing diversity does not have to take the form of formal training programs. As Nurcan Ensari (2001) points out, individual managers can underline the value of diversity in the context of day-to-day work. They can, for example, encourage members of different groups to get to know each other as individuals, note the contributions of individual workers (both White and minority, male and female) to work team success, and encourage the development of a common group identity. In short, they can put intergroup contact theory into practice.

### Managing Diversity

Affirmative action focuses on achieving greater representation of minority group members and women in all types of jobs and at all levels of organizations. Valuing diversity focuses on teaching people how to deal with the issues raised by a more diverse workforce. **Managing diversity** focuses on changing organizational systems to “create an environment appropriate for utilization of a diverse workforce [with an] emphasis on [organizational] culture and systems [that] includes White males” (Thomas, 1991, p. 28). That is, while diversity training might change individuals’ intergroup attitudes and behaviors, it can do nothing to change the organizational policies and procedures, such as those we discussed in Chapter 10, that impede women’s and minority group members’ feelings of acceptance by the organization and their advancement to higher levels in it. Recall, for example, the finding of Chieh-Chen Bowen, Janet Swim, and Rick Jacobs (2000) that many job performance evaluation instruments emphasize characteristics generally associated with men and that women receive lower performance ratings when such forms are used.

Diversity management programs have two main thrusts (Cox 1993, 2001). One focuses on making organizational systems more responsive to the needs of women and minority group members. This aspect of diversity management searches for and modifies policies and procedures that, intentionally or unintentionally, have adverse

effects on members of those groups, such as gender-biased performance evaluation instruments. Other examples include (Cox, 1993):

- Using recruitment procedures that target women and minority group members, such as by placing job ads in publications designed for members of those groups.
- Ensuring that women and minority group members receive training in skills needed for effective job performance and promotion.
- Establishing new benefit programs, such as child care.
- Monitoring promotions to see if any groups are being underrepresented and, if so, determining and remedying the causes.

Many of these initiatives comprise good human resources management practice (Cascio, 1998). Therefore, they do not have to be specifically targeted at women and members of minority groups; they can benefit White men as well. For example, an organization-wide program to develop skills needed for promotion would include White men as well as members of other groups and so also improve their chances of promotion. Similarly, a child-care program can benefit working fathers as well as working mothers.

The second thrust of diversity management programs is changing organizational culture to create a climate in which diversity is normative and valued, not merely tolerated. Procedures that help create and maintain a positive diversity climate include (Cox, 1993):

- Giving priority in hiring and promotion to individuals who value diversity.
- Making the organization's commitment to diversity and diversity skills training part of new employee orientation programs.
- Making diversity compliance and competence part of job performance evaluations.
- Rewarding diversity initiatives and suggestions made by employees.
- Making sure that policy-making committees have diverse representation.

Clearly, diversity management can take a long time and requires a substantial commitment of resources by the organization: Policies and procedures must be reviewed, new programs must be developed, and employees must be trained so they can work effectively under the new system. Unfortunately, there is not much published research evaluating efforts at changing organizational diversity climates, perhaps because diversity management programs are carried out by consultants who, as a group, do not have much interest in publishing research (Stephan & Stephan, 2001). The published evaluations of these programs that do exist tend to be found in books in which diversity management consultants describe their own work (for example, Thomas, 1991). The available evidence does suggest, however, that efforts to improve the diversity climate of organizations can have positive results. For example, Taylor Cox (2001) reported that improvements in the diversity climates of two manufacturing plants of a large corporation led not only to improved intergroup relations but also to increases in work productivity and quality.

## WHAT SHOULD BE OUR GOAL? COLOR-BLINDNESS VERSUS MULTICULTURALISM

When we attempt to reduce prejudice, what attitude should replace it? One answer to this question is, of course, “nonprejudice”—we want people not to be prejudiced. But that answer raises another question: What does nonprejudiced mean in practice? In the United States today, there appear to be two viewpoints on the “best” way in which to be nonprejudiced: the color-blind perspective and the multicultural perspective.

The **color-blind perspective** holds that people should ignore racial and ethnic group membership in their dealings with other people, acting as though racial and ethnic groups do not exist. Proponents of the color-blind perspective believe that acknowledging racial or ethnic group membership inevitably leads either to discrimination against minority group members or reverse discrimination in their favor (Schofield, 1986). Although, as Schofield notes, the color-blind perspective is attractive because it appeals to traditional American values of individualism and equality, it is, in many ways, a game of “let’s pretend”: If we pretend that racial and ethnic group categories do not exist then, by definition, race and ethnicity pose no social or interpersonal problems. Therefore, this viewpoint “easily leads to a misrepresentation of reality in ways which allow and sometimes even encourage discrimination against minority group members” (Schofield, 1986, p. 233).

Schofield (1986) illustrates her point about the potential negative effects of the color-blind perspective with observations she made in a desegregated school in which the faculty had turned color-blindness into a rule for conducting intergroup relations. She noted that the faculty treated even mentioning the race of another person as a possible sign of prejudice. Consequently, race became a taboo topic at the school. The establishment of this taboo had at least three effects. One was that it led to behaviors, such as those described in Box 14.4, that might otherwise appear to be bizarre. A second effect was that pretending that race did not exist made it impossible for the students and faculty to deal with real racial issues. As a result the taboo “tended to inhibit the development of positive relations between black and white students. These students were vividly aware of differences and tensions between them that were related to their group membership. Yet such issues could not be dealt with in a straightforward manner in the colorblind climate. Thus, anger sometimes festered and stereotypes built when fuller discussion of the situation might have made it easier for individuals to see each other’s perspectives” (Schofield, 1986, p. 246). Finally, pretending that racial and ethnic differences did not exist led to a lack of sensitivity to minority culture, which led to racially discriminatory behavior. Thus, the color-blind perspective led to “a predisposition to ignore or deny the possibility of cultural differences between white and black students which influenced the way they functioned in school. For example, ... black boys saw certain types of ambiguously aggressive acts as less mean and threatening and more playful and friendly than their white peers. These behaviors were ones which sometimes began conflicts between students which resulted in suspensions. Awareness of the differential meaning of such behaviors to white and black students might



### B o x 14.4 The Bizarre World of Racial/Ethnic Color-Blindness

When color-blindness becomes a dominating ideology, as it did at the school to which Janet Schofield (1986) gave the pseudonym "Wexler," the result can be apparently bizarre behavior. One behavior she noticed was teachers' assertions that they were literally blind to the race of their students and did not know who was Black and who was White. For example, "When I was arranging ... student interviews, I mentioned to Mr. Little [white] that I thought there was only one white girl in one of his classes. I asked if I was right about this and he said, 'Well, just a minute. Let me check.' After looking through the class roster in his roll book he said, 'You know, you're right. I never noticed that'" (p. 237).

The color-blind ideology also led to a reluctance to mention race even in race-neutral contexts:

Interviewer: The other day I was walking around the school and heard a sixth grade student describing a student from the seventh grade to a teacher who needed to find this student in order to return something she had lost. The sixth grader said the seventh grader was tall and thin. She described what the girl had been wearing and said her hair was dark, but she didn't say whether the girl was black or white.... Why do you think she didn't mention that?

Sylvia (black): The teacher might have got mad if she said whether she was white or black.

Interviewer: Do some of the teachers get mad about things like that?

Sylvia: Some do ... they holler....

Interviewer: Now when you talk to kids who are black, do you ever mention that someone is white or black?

Sylvia: No.

Interviewer: What about when you are talking to kids who are white?

Sylvia: Nope.

Interviewer: You never mention race? Why not?

Sylvia: They might think I'm prejudiced. (p. 240; ellipses in original)

Finally, the color-blind ideology undermined aspects of the students' education: "In a lesson on the social organization of ancient Rome, one social studies teacher discussed the various classes in Roman society, including the nobles and plebeians at length but avoided all references to slaves. Another teacher included George Washington Carver on a list of great Americans from which students could pick individuals to learn about but specifically decided not to mention he was black for fear of raising racial issues.... [In another instance a] white child was surprised to learn from a member of our research team that Martin Luther King was black, not white." As Schofield commented, "highlighting the accomplishments of black Americans and making sure that students do not assume famous figures are white is a reasonable practice" (p. 249).

have at least suggested ways of trying to reduce the disproportionate suspension of black students" (Schofield, 1986, p. 248).

The color-blind perspective on interpersonal relations is related to the **assimilationist perspective** on intergroup relations (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000). This perspective holds that minority and immigrant groups should give up their own cultures and replace them with the language, values, behavior patterns, and other aspects of the majority culture (see, for example, Berry, 2001). Advocates of assimilation believe that if everyone shares the same culture, then intergroup differences are not possible because there is only one group (Parillo, 2006). However, the assimilationist perspective effectively denies the value of any culture other than the majority group's and further assumes that ethnic groups will change to become like Whites. An implicit assumption of the color-blind perspective is that White middle-class culture is the

norm and that it is up to other ethnic groups to learn and live within that culture. This assumption is supported by research conducted by Thierry Devos and Mahzarin Banaji (2005) who found, across six studies, strong and consistent support for the idea that to be American is to be White and this association was particularly strong on implicit measures of this association. As they note, “[t]his finding ... sits in opposition to the explicit assessment that to be American is to endorse civic values such as equality and expressed commitment to egalitarian principles” (p. 463).

Another problem with the color blind perspective is that it ignores the reality of racism in the United States. As Helen Neville and her colleagues (2001) argue, “to adopt a color-blind racial perspective is to deny the existence of ideological and structural racism and to believe that race does not play a meaningful role in people’s lived experiences” (p. 270). At first glance, then, support for a color-blind perspective seems to indicate support for a society that would secure equality for everyone. Unfortunately, as Neville and her colleagues (2001) go on to explain, “we do not live in an ideal or just society. To ignore, deny, or evade this reality is the core of [color-blindness]” (p. 270). As discussed in Chapter 1, history is fraught with racism and the ideal of stepping away from this reality and achieving a society where race is irrelevant is an unattainable goal. Research shows, for example, that even those who are reluctant to admit that they categorize others on the basis of race are quite adept at doing so (Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006; Experiment 1).

In contrast to the color-blind perspective, the **multicultural perspective** emphasizes the importance of ethnic group membership. It views “ethnic identities [as] cognitively inescapable and fundamental to the self-concept; as a result, individuals are motivated to retain their cultural heritages. Rather than trying to eclipse ethnic identities, multiculturalism aims to preserve their integrity while encouraging ethnic groups to interact and coexist harmoniously” (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000, p. 145). This viewpoint is the one that multicultural education attempts to instill. As we noted in our discussion of those programs, one premise of multicultural education is that an understanding and appreciation of other groups’ cultures reduces intergroup anxiety and so reduces prejudice.

Multiculturalism has often been criticized as encouraging separation, division, and disharmony among racial and ethnic groups, in contrast to assimilation, which the critics see as a unifying process (Neville et al., 2001). However, from the perspective of psychology, multiculturalism embodies two aspects of intergroup contact theory. First, by emphasizing group membership, it encourages salient categorization, which, as we saw earlier, can undermine group stereotypes. Second, multiculturalism encourages people to view themselves simultaneously in terms of their ethnic identities and their national identities. In doing so, it embodies the dual identities variant of a common ingroup identity: People maintain their group identities along with a higher level, or superordinate, common identity (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Thus, for example, many Americans feel proud of their various ethnic heritages while simultaneously holding a common American cultural identity (Taylor & Lambert, 1996). In such a situation, identification with an ethnic group does not detract from national identity, nor does holding a common national identity

detract from ethnic group identity: The two identities are overlapping, not competing (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). For example, researchers have found that members of minority groups often see having a dual ethnic and national identity as the best way to thrive in the majority culture, a view that many majority group members share (Taylor & Lambert, 1996; van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998). As we saw earlier, as with salient categorization, holding a common group identity promotes intergroup harmony.

To return to the question we asked at the beginning of this section, which perspective is more likely to result in low prejudice? Interestingly, although the concepts of assimilation and multiculturalism (or cultural pluralism) have been around for a long time (Parillo, 2006), researchers have only just begun to investigate the relationship of the color-blind and multicultural perspectives to prejudice. The results of that research have favored multiculturalism. For example, Helen Neville and her colleagues (2000) found that people who scored higher on a measure of color-blind racial attitudes also scored higher on measures of racial prejudice. People endorsing a color-blind perspective also are less likely to support affirmative action (Awad, Cokley, & Ravitch, 2005). In addition, Jennifer Richeson and Richard Nussbaum (2004) found that priming a color-blind perspective versus a multicultural perspective in White college students led to greater pro-White bias relative to Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics (see also Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). Richeson and Nussbaum found greater pro-White bias on implicit as well as explicit attitude measures.

There are probably several reasons for this relationship. On the one hand, as we noted earlier, multiculturalism incorporates aspects of intergroup contact theory that are associated with reduced prejudice. In addition, from a social identity theory point of view (see Chapter 9), the multicultural perspective emphasizes the value and contributions of both majority and minority groups to the common culture. This validation of their respective cultures allows people to feel more secure in their group identities and therefore feel less animosity toward other groups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). On the other hand, a number of writers have suggested that the color-blind perspective, despite its appearance of egalitarianism, is actually a form of contemporary prejudice (see for example, Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Neville et al., 2001). Recall from Chapter 6 that people who experience aversive prejudice tend to see themselves as unprejudiced, but act in a prejudiced manner when their behavior can be attributed to causes other than prejudice. Schofield (1986) pointed out that the color-blind perspective, especially in situations in which it is a dominant ideology, encourages the expression of aversive prejudice. For example, she noted that in the school she studied, “to the extent that the taboo [about discussing race] ... inhibited individuals from challenging each others’ behavior as racist in outcome or intent, it removed a potential barrier to racist behavior because it minimized the probability that such behavior would pose a threat to [an unprejudiced] self-concept” (p. 247). Thus, both research and theory converge to indicate the goal in reducing prejudice should be to encourage people to adopt a multicultural, rather than a color-blind, perspective.

## WHAT YOU CAN DO TO REDUCE PREJUDICE

To close this chapter and the book, let's move from the theoretical to the personal: What you can do to reduce prejudice. Listed below are a number of steps that individuals can take to reduce prejudice in themselves and to influence others' intergroup attitudes. These suggestions are derived from the theories we have discussed in this book and from practitioners who work to help others become less prejudiced (Anti-Defamation League, 2001; Blaine, 2000; Johnson, 2006; Sue, 2003).

### Influencing Your Own Attitudes

As self-regulation theory, discussed earlier in this chapter, implies, we can each do a lot to change our own prejudices. However, such change is not an easy process. As we noted in the beginning of the chapter, attitudes are resistant to change and so the process can be a long and difficult one. Patricia Devine, Ashby Plant, and Brenda Buswell (2000) noted that, like a bad habit, our prejudices are well-learned and can rear their ugly heads when we least expect or want them to and, like a bad habit, they are difficult to change. But, given the desire to change and persistence in working on it, like a bad habit, prejudice can be changed. Some suggestions:

#### *Reflect on Your Thoughts and Behavior:*

- Acknowledge that you have prejudices. Having prejudices does not make you a bad person. Almost everyone has prejudices; they are a by-product of growing up in a society in which prejudice is still common. The first step in breaking a habit is to acknowledge its existence so that one can think about ways of getting rid of it.
- Think about the nature of your prejudices: the beliefs and emotions that they are based on. Where did those beliefs and emotions come from? Do they have a real basis or are they just things that have been accepted because "everybody knows" they are true?
- For every negative belief you have about a group, search for examples that contradict that belief.
- Pay attention to your behavior. If you find yourself acting in a prejudiced manner, think about why you reacted that way and how you could behave differently in the future. Then carry out those new behaviors.
- If someone suggests that you've acted in a biased way, don't immediately deny it. Instead, ask the person why your behavior gave that impression. What you said or did may have one meaning for you but a different meaning for a member of another group. Rather than focusing on who is right and who is wrong, examine why people may differ in how they interpret an event. See Box 14.5 for an example.
- If you find yourself thinking that a member of a group is "acting just like a typical X," think about other factors that might be influencing the person's

### Box 14.5 Prejudice and the Gold Dust Twins

Several years ago, I (B.W.), who am White, was talking with a Black colleague when I made a reference to “the gold dust twins.” She told me that she was surprised that I would use a racist term like that. I was puzzled because I did not know that the term had a racist meaning. I had learned it when I was a child. The adults in our all-White neighborhood had used the term to refer to two boys who were always in each other’s company; you almost never saw the one without the other. Because of that experience, to me, “gold dust twins” meant inseparable friends, and that is the context in which I used it when speaking with my colleague. However, my colleague explained to me that the term originated with the Gold Dust Flour Mill (which had gone out of business before I was born). The logo on their packages included the picture of two stereotypically drawn Black children, whom the company’s advertising called “the Gold Dust Twins.” So, unknown to me, the term had originated as a

reference to a racist depiction of African Americans, which rightly offended my Black colleague. I have not used the term, except to make points like this one, since my colleague explained its origins to me.

I think that there are at least two lessons to be learned from this incident. One is that if someone makes a remark or does something that appears to disparage your social group, the insult may not be intentional. The person may have learned the term or behavior in an innocent context, but differences in social group history may give it a very different meaning for your group. When such a misunderstanding occurs, discuss the different perspectives with the other person so that he or she can learn and act differently in the future. The second lesson is that if someone informs you that something you said or did had a biased meaning, don’t immediately reject the information. Ask the person why he or she saw it as biased and adjust your behavior accordingly.

behavior. For example, is anxiety over being in a new situation leading the person to act in a cool and distant rather than a warm and friendly manner?

- Resist the tendency, present in all people, to judge an entire group by the actions of one or a few of its members.
- Think about intergroup issues in intergroup terms. That is, think of them as our issues, to which we all contribute problems and solutions, not as “their” issues that someone else is responsible for dealing with.

#### *Put Intergroup Contact Theory into Practice:*

- Seek out contact with members of other groups.
- Bear in mind that, at least at first, intergroup contact may arouse some anxiety. Be ready for it and work your way through it. The anxiety will moderate as your experience with intergroup contact increases.
- When interacting with members of other groups, personalize them. For example, when interacting with a member of another race, look beyond the person’s race to other characteristics, especially those that the two of you have in common. Some examples include gender, being a student or employee (or both), common interests, and so forth.
- Invite members of other groups to social events you host and accept invitations made by members of other groups.
- Be persistent; don’t let one bad experience discourage you.
- Learn more about other groups.

- Be willing to discuss intergroup issues with members of other groups to get their perspectives. Compare those perspectives with your own and think about the reasons for any differences that exist. However, be careful not to treat the people with whom you talk as spokespersons for their groups; they will be giving you their opinions, not their group's opinions.
- Join and be active in organizations that work to improve intergroup relations.
- Read books and watch movies that realistically depict life as experienced by members of other groups. Derald Wing Sue (2003) presents a list of recommended books on pages 220 to 222 of his book and list of recommended movies on pages 226 to 228.
- Actively listen to what people from other groups have to say about their experiences and the effects those experiences have had on their lives. While doing so, be careful not to invalidate their experiences. That is, do not assume that because their viewpoint differs from yours that yours is correct and theirs is not. If something sounds too astonishing to be true, that may just mean that the event is far outside your experience. Also, if you have a different interpretation of an event, share your view as an alternative, not as a challenge to the other person.
- Attend multicultural community events such as ethnic festivals and visit museums and attend concerts that feature the art and music of other cultures.

### **Influencing Other People's Attitudes**

In addition to working to change your attitudes, you can also try to influence other people's attitudes. Doing this will not be easy: Not only are attitudes resistant to change, almost everyone is brought up to believe that it is not polite to question other people's beliefs and behavior. But, like ourselves, other people must become aware of any prejudiced beliefs they hold before they can change those beliefs. Some suggestions:

*Help People Become Aware of Their Attitudes and Behavior:*

- Tactfully let other people know when their behavior appears to reflect bias and your reasons for believing that it does.
- If a person's behavior is blatantly racist or sexist, speak out against it. This can be especially difficult if you are dealing with friends or relatives, but you may also be especially influential with them.
- If someone provides you with negative information about a group, ask about the reliability of the source of the information: How likely is it that the information is correct? Provide counterexamples to help the person see the group in more accurate terms.
- Challenge the status quo by asking pertinent questions. For example, at a school board meeting you could ask (if this is the case) why almost all

principals and administrators are White men while almost all the teachers they supervise are women and members of minority groups (Johnson, 2006).

- Write letters to companies whose advertising includes stereotypical or sexist portrayals and to the media organizations that publish or broadcast them.

*Encourage Intergroup Contact:*

- Encourage organizations you belong to (such as sororities, fraternities, clubs, and so forth) to recruit a more diverse membership and to become involved in community projects that bring them into contact with members of other groups.
- Encourage the leaders of your house of worship to invite clergy of other faiths to deliver sermons or to speak as part of religious education programs.

*Help Others Become Better Informed:*

- Investigate your cultural heritage and share it and your pride in it with others.
- Invite speakers on cultural or social issues to address your organizations.
- Invite friends of other faiths to visit a service at your place of worship.
- Encourage your local public library to periodically highlight the books, movies, and other materials it holds that provide information about the cultural groups in your community.
- Finally, and here is where you are likely to have the most influence, be a nonprejudiced role model for your children or younger siblings. Act in nonprejudiced ways so they can imitate your behavior and correct their inappropriate behavior. With older children, discuss the stereotypical portrayals they see in the media or hear from others to help them avoid acquiring stereotypical beliefs.

## **ENVOI**

Change is difficult and the obstacles to change can appear to be insurmountable, especially at the outset. But always remember the Chinese proverb: “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.” Having learned about the processes underlying stereotyping and prejudice, you have the tools you need to go forward on that journey. Now that you have this information, keep in mind this directive from the Talmud (the Jewish liturgical text): “You are not obligated to complete the work, but neither are you free to abandon it.”

## **SUMMARY**

This chapter presented a number of approaches to reducing prejudice and discrimination. The first set of approaches discussed focused on changes within

individuals. One of those approaches is trying to suppress stereotypes and other prejudiced thoughts while replacing them with nonprejudiced thoughts. Trying to suppress stereotypic thoughts will work, at least for a while. But when the suppression is released, the stereotypic thoughts return in greater force than before. This enhanced stereotyping may result from suppression's having primed the stereotype, depletion of cognitive control abilities, or suppression's causing a motivation to use the stereotype. However, rebound effects might not occur for people who are low in prejudice, and even people high in prejudice inhibit the application of socially proscribed stereotypes when they have the cognitive resources available to help them do so.

Another individual-level approach to the reduction of prejudice is self-regulation. In the self-regulation process, people learn to recognize situational cues that alert them to the possibility that they will act in a prejudiced manner in that situation. Having been alerted by these cues, people replace the prejudiced response with an appropriate nonprejudiced response. People learn the cues through experience: Having acted in a prejudiced manner, they regret doing so, think about their behavior and what caused it, and come up with ways of responding differently in the future. Over time, the process of substituting nonprejudiced responses for prejudiced responses can become automatic and the person does it without thinking about it. One problem that can arise with this process is that the behaviors that people think are unprejudiced might actually be viewed differently by members of the group to which they are directed.

One of the longest standing approaches to prejudice reduction is embodied in the contact hypothesis, or intergroup contact theory. This approach holds that, given the proper circumstances, contact between members of different groups can lead to a reduction of prejudice on both sides. For intergroup contact to reduce prejudice, four conditions must be met: members of each group must have equal status in the situation, the groups must work cooperatively to achieve common goals, the situation must allow participants to get to know each other as individuals (acquaintance potential), and the intergroup effort must have the support of authorities, law, or custom (institutional support). When properly implemented, intergroup contact is reasonably successful at reducing prejudice, although it is more successful in some situations and for some groups than others. Intergroup contact appears to have its effect on prejudice by producing cognitive changes such as increased knowledge about the outgroup, reduced stereotyping, reduced expectations that intergroup interactions will have negative outcomes, reduced ingroup favoritism, and perceptions of unity between the ingroup and outgroup; emotional changes such as reduced intergroup anxiety and increased empathy for the other group; and behavioral changes that can lead to attitude change. The extent of these changes can be limited by such factors as preexisting intergroup attitudes (people very high and very low on prejudice are likely to show the least change); intergroup anxiety, which might be exacerbated by intergroup contact; and the normative climate, which can either encourage or inhibit attitude change.

Theorists have proposed three models of how intergroup contact affects prejudice, all based on the concepts of social categorization and social identity. The personalization model proposes that intergroup contact reduces prejudice by



leading people to see members of the outgroup as individuals rather than as members of social categories: Viewing people in personal terms rather than as members of groups then leads to liking for them and so to less prejudice. One shortcoming of the personalization process is that although it increases liking for the outgroup members with whom people interact, that liking does not always generalize to liking for the outgroup in general. The salient categorization model addresses the issue of generalization by holding that generalization will occur only if group members are seen as typical of their group; for group members to be seen as typical so that generalization can occur, group membership must remain salient during intergroup contact. Thus, whereas the personalization model holds that group categories must be made less salient for intergroup attitudes to improve, the salient categorization model holds that group categories must remain salient for generalization to occur. The common ingroup identity model focuses on inducing ingroup and outgroup members to recategorize themselves into a single group for which they share a common identity; prejudice will be eliminated if people see themselves as members of a single unified group rather than as two competing groups.

These three models all have research to support them, yet they seem to contradict each other. However, Pettigrew (1998a) has reconciled them by suggesting that they represent three stages of intergroup contact that develop over time. Generally, personalization comes first, followed by salient categorization, with the process being completed with the development of a common ingroup identity. In practice, the stages of the contact process are not always distinct from one another and the processes they represent can overlap. Cues that keep group membership salient often persist even as personalization takes place. In addition, the order in which the processes described in the combined model take place depends on the nature of the contact situation. Contact that emphasizes group-to-group interactions may initially elicit salient categorization or development of a common ingroup identity whereas contact that emphasizes person-to-person interactions may initially elicit personalization.

The increasing diversity of the workforce has led to the development of programs designed to increase the representation of women and minority group members in the workplace, to remove barriers to their career advancement, and to deal with the intergroup tensions that can accompany increased workforce diversity. Affirmative action programs are designed to increase the diversity of an organization's workforce and to ensure that members of all groups are treated fairly in terms of promotions and other personnel decisions. Affirmative action programs are not designed to affect prejudice. However, the results of laboratory research have suggested that people hold negative attitudes toward individuals they believe have benefited from affirmative action, and some research suggests that these attitudes generalize to groups as a whole. On a more optimistic note, research on college campuses and field research involving employees of organizations with affirmative action programs suggest that diversity training programs may be effective in reducing prejudice.

Valuing diversity programs are the workplace equivalent of multicultural and anti-bias education. There is little research on the effectiveness of these programs,

and what there is has produced mixed results, some finding that the programs evaluated had been successful, others finding no change or even a boomerang effect. A number of factors probably contribute to these mixed results including resistance on the part of trainees, a perception that diversity training is not relevant to organization goals, training that is poorly designed and poorly conducted, and training programs that are too short to accomplish their goals effectively.

Managing diversity focuses on changing organizational systems and the organizational culture to make the organization more welcoming to a diverse workforce and to help the organization effectively utilize the talents of a diverse workforce. These programs have two main thrusts. One focuses on making organizational systems more responsive to the needs of women and minority group members by searching for and modifying policies and procedures that have adverse effects on members of those groups. The second thrust of diversity management programs is changing organizational culture to create a climate in which diversity is normative and valued, not merely tolerated. There is very little published research on the effectiveness of diversity management programs, but what there is indicates that they can be successful even though it can take a long time and requires a substantial commitment of resources by the organization.

There is some controversy about what kind of attitude should replace prejudice. The color-blind perspective holds that people should ignore racial and ethnic group membership in their dealings with other people, acting as though racial and ethnic groups do not exist. Proponents of this perspective believe that acknowledging racial or ethnic group membership inevitably leads either to discrimination against minority group members or reverse discrimination in their favor. However, color-blindness ignores the real effects that race has on people's lives and can open the door to the expression of contemporary prejudices. The color-blind perspective on interpersonal relations is related to the assimilationist perspective on intergroup relations, which holds that minority and immigrant groups should give up their own cultures and replace them with the majority culture. Advocates of assimilation believe that if everyone shares the same culture, then intergroup differences are not possible because there is only one group. However, the assimilationist perspective effectively denies the value of any culture other than the majority group's and can in that way support prejudiced attitudes.

In contrast, the multicultural perspective emphasizes the importance of ethnic group membership. Rather than trying to do away with ethnic identities, multiculturalism aims to preserve them while encouraging ethnic groups to interact and coexist harmoniously. Multiculturalism has been criticized as encouraging separation, division, and disharmony among racial and ethnic groups, in contrast to assimilation, which the critics see as a unifying process. However, multiculturalism embodies two aspects of intergroup contact theory that promote positive intergroup relations. First, by emphasizing group membership, it encourages salient categorization, which can promote the undermining of group stereotypes. Second, multiculturalism encourages people to view themselves simultaneously in terms of their ethnic identities and their national identities. In doing so, it embodies the dual identities variant of a common ingroup identity, which also leads to reduced prejudice.

The results of research that has investigated the relationship of the color-blind and multicultural perspectives to prejudice have favored multiculturalism. There are several reasons for this finding. First, multiculturalism incorporates aspects of intergroup contact theory that are associated with reduced prejudice. In addition, from a social identity theory point of view, the multicultural perspective emphasizes the value and contributions of both majority and minority groups to the common culture. This validation of their respective cultures allows people to feel more secure in their group identities and therefore feel less animosity toward other groups. In contrast, a number of writers have suggested that the color-blind perspective, despite its appearance of egalitarianism, is actually a form of contemporary prejudice in which a veneer of egalitarianism hides unacknowledged negative intergroup attitudes. Thus, researchers have found that endorsement of the color-blind perspective is correlated with endorsement of beliefs that reflect contemporary prejudices.

The chapter closed with a list of things that you can do to help reduce prejudice. You can influence your own attitudes by reflecting on your thoughts and behaviors, putting intergroup contact theory into practice, and learning more about other groups. You can influence other people's attitudes by helping them become aware of their attitudes and behavior, encouraging intergroup contact, and helping them become better informed. These tasks are not easy, but they hold the promise of a better world.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

### Stereotype Suppression

Monteith, M. J., Sherman, J. W., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Suppression as a stereotype control strategy. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 2, 63–82.

Monteith and her colleagues summarize the research literature on stereotype suppression and rebound, and provide some hypotheses (most of which have subsequently been supported) about the conditions under which rebound effects occur.

### Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Behavior

Monteith, M. J., Ashburn-Nardo, L., Voils, C. I., & Czopp, A. M. (2002). Putting the brakes on prejudice: On the development and operation of cues for control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83, 1029–1050.

This article presents a recent conceptualization on Monteith's model of the self-regulation of prejudiced behavior.

### Intergroup Contact

Amir, Y. (1976). The role of intergroup contact in the change of prejudice and ethnic relations. In P. A. Katz (Ed.), *Towards the elimination of racism* (pp. 245–308). New York: Pergamon.

- Brewer, M. B., & Miller, N. (1984). Beyond the contact hypothesis: Theoretical perspectives on desegregation. In N. Miller & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), *Groups in contact: The psychology of desegregation* (pp. 281–302). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
- Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). *Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup identity model*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
- Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Nier, J. A., Banker, B. S., Ward, C. M., Houlette, M., & Loux, S. (2000). The common ingroup identity mode for reducing intergroup bias: Progress and challenges. In D. Capozza & R. Brown (Eds.), *Social identity processes: Trends in theory and research* (pp. 134–148). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hewstone, M. (1996). Contact and categorization: Social psychological interventions to change intergroup relations. In C. N. Macrae, C. Stangor, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *Stereotypes and stereotyping* (pp. 323–368). New York: Guilford.
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, 65–85.
- Amir's chapter is a classic summary of the early research on the contact hypothesis. The chapters by Brewer and Miller, Hewstone, and Gaertner and his colleagues present their respective models; the Gaertner and Dovidio book provides a more extensive discussion of their model. Pettigrew's chapter provides a recent summary along with his model integrating the process theories proposed by Brewer and Miller, Hewstone and Brown, and Gaertner and Dovidio.

### Workplace Interventions

- Crosby, F. J., Iyer, A., Clayton, S., & Downing, R. A. (2003). Affirmative action: Psychological data and the policy debates. *American Psychologist*, 58, 93–115.
- Ensari, N. (2001). How can managers reduce intergroup conflict in the workplace? Social psychological approaches to addressing prejudice in organizations. *Psychologist-Manager Journal*, 5(2), 83–93.
- Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2001). *Improving intergroup relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Crosby and her colleagues summarize the psychological research on affirmative action. Stephan and Stephan discuss valuing diversity and managing diversity in their Chapter 4. Ensari presents some ways in which managers can carry out “on-the-job” diversity training.

### Color-Blindness versus Multiculturalism

- Neville, H. A., Worthington, R. L., & Spanierman, L. B. (2001). Race, power and multicultural counseling psychology: Understanding white privilege and color-blind racial attitudes. In J. G. Ponterotto, J. M. Casas, L. A. Suzuki & C. M. Alexander (Eds.), *Handbook of multicultural counseling* (2nd ed., pp. 257–288). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Parrillo, V. N. (2006). *Strangers to these shores* (8th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. (Chapter 2)
- Neville and her colleagues discuss the color-blind perspective in the context of White privilege and societal structure. Parrillo reviews assimilation and contrasts it to the melting pot theory, providing another perspective on color-blindness.

## What You Can Do

Anti-Defamation League. (2001). 101 ways to combat prejudice. Retrieved August 11, 2004, from <http://www.adl.org/prejudice/closethebook.pdf>.

Sue, D. W. (2003). *Overcoming our racism: The journey to liberation*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

As its title indicates, the Anti-Defamation League pamphlet presents 101 things individuals can do to combat prejudice. Sue's book includes chapters addressed to both Whites and members of minority groups that discuss what individuals can do to overcome prejudice.

## KEY TERMS

|                               |                           |                              |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| affirmative action            | decategorization model    | rebound effect               |
| assimilationist perspective   | intergroup contact theory | salient categorization model |
| color-blind perspective       | managing diversity        | self-regulation model        |
| common ingroup identity model | multicultural perspective | valuing diversity            |
| contact hypothesis            | personalization model     |                              |

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

1. What is stereotype suppression? What is the rebound effect? How does the rebound effect manifest itself?
2. Why does stereotype suppression result in rebound? Under what conditions might stereotype suppression not result in rebound? What role do cognitive resources play in the rebound effect?
3. Describe the self-regulation model of prejudice reduction. Include both the development and use of cues for control. What types of people are most likely to engage in the self-regulation of prejudice?
4. What kind of mistakes can people make when they try to act in an unprejudiced manner?
5. Think about the stereotype suppression and self-regulation of prejudice models. In what ways are they similar and in what ways are they different?
6. Have you had any experiences with suppressing stereotypes or trying to regulate prejudiced behavior? How well do your experiences match the propositions of the models? If your experiences have differed from what the models say happens, how would you change the models to account for your experiences?

7. Explain the contact hypothesis. What four conditions are necessary for intergroup contact to result in reduced prejudice? Explain how each of these conditions contributes to the reduction of prejudice. Think about this question not only in terms of the contact hypothesis itself but also in terms of the three models of how intergroup contact reduces prejudice.
8. What does the research on the contact hypothesis have to say about its effectiveness in reducing prejudice? What types of changes does intergroup contact produce? What factors limit the effectiveness of intergroup contact in reducing prejudice?
9. Describe the personalization model of intergroup contact. How does personalization differ from decategorization? What are the shortcomings of the model?
10. Describe the salient categorization model of intergroup contact. How does it address the shortcomings of the personalization model? What issues of stereotyping does the model raise? How does it deal with those issues?
11. Describe the common ingroup identity model of intergroup contact. What types of group representations does the model say can result from intergroup contact? How are those representations related to prejudice? What drawbacks might emerge from a common ingroup identity?
12. Explain how Pettigrew's (1998a) combined intergroup contact model resolves the apparent contradictions among the personalization, salient categorization, and common ingroup identity models.
13. Think about the intergroup contact experiences that you have had. To what extent were the necessary and facilitating conditions for successful contact present? To what extent did the contact process follow the stages of Pettigrew's combined model? How did these experiences affect your attitudes toward the other group?
14. Monteith and colleagues' (2002) self-regulation model of prejudice reduction focuses on individual cognitive and emotional processes whereas the contact model focuses on intergroup processes. In what ways might intergroup contact affect the self-regulation of prejudice, and in what ways might efforts at self-regulation affect what happens during intergroup contact?
15. What are the goals of affirmative action programs? What effect do these programs appear to have on prejudice?
16. What are valuing diversity programs? What are their goals? How effective are they at reducing prejudice?
17. What are some of the reasons why diversity education programs fail?
18. What are the goals of diversity management programs? What kinds of changes must organizations make to meet those goals?
19. Compare and contrast color-blindness and multiculturalism as replacements for prejudiced attitudes. Which do you think is better? What are your reasons for your opinion?
20. Describe the things you can do to reduce prejudice. What things can you think of that are not on the list we made?



# Glossary

**affirmative action** Programs within organizations designed to combat discrimination and to provide equal opportunity in employment for all members of the organization. Most affirmative action programs are voluntary (Chapter 14).

**ageism** Evaluative judgments about persons made simply due to their advanced age (Chapter 13).

**ambivalent prejudice** A form of prejudice in which people have a mixture of positive and negative beliefs about and feelings toward an outgroup, resulting in ambivalent attitudes toward members of that group (Chapter 6).

**anti-bias education** A form of education that aims to give people a heightened awareness of institutional racism and bias and to provide them with the skills to reduce racism and bias within their spheres of influence (Chapter 8).

**assimilationist perspective** The perspective that minority and immigrant groups should give up their own cultures and replace them with the language, values, behavior patterns, and other aspects of the majority culture (Chapter 14).

**attributional ambiguity** The proposition that members of stigmatized groups often find it difficult to interpret feedback from dominant group members because they do not know whether the feedback reflects their ability or stems from the evaluator's biases and prejudices (Chapter 11).

**attribution-value model** The hypothesis that prejudice results from the perception that members of minority groups

have characteristics that are contrary to majority group values. Coupled to that perception is the belief that members of those groups are responsible for their undesirable characteristics. Because people who are seen as responsible for their negative characteristics arouse negative emotions in others, prejudice results when groups are perceived to be responsible for their negative stereotypic characteristics (Chapter 7).

**authoritarian personality** A personality type that is especially susceptible to unquestioning obedience to authority (Chapter 7).

**aversive racism (or prejudice)** A form of prejudice in which people feel uncomfortable with interacting with members of minority groups and so try to ignore their existence and avoid contact with them, although they try to be polite and correct when they do have contact with members of minority groups (Chapter 6).

**basic social category** Categories such as age, race, and gender, for which perceivers have a wealth of information available in memory (Chapter 3).

**behavioral compensation** A method individuals use to prevent potential discrimination by changing their behavior in ways that disconfirm the stereotype (Chapter 11).

**benevolent prejudice** A form of prejudice that is expressed in terms of apparently positive beliefs and emotional responses to targets of prejudice (Chapter 6).

**blatant discrimination** Discrimination that consists of unequal and harmful treatment that is typically intentional, quite visible, and easily documented (Chapter 10).

**bogus pipeline research** A research method used to convince participants that the true answers to their questions can be determined by a lie detector even though they actually cannot be (Chapter 6).

**categorization** The process of simplifying our environment by creating categories on the basis of characteristics (such as hair color or athletic ability) that a particular set of people appear to have in common (Chapters 3 & 4).

**category constancy** An understanding that a person's membership in a social category, such as gender or race, does not change across time or as a matter of superficial changes in appearance (Chapter 8).

**category preference** The tendency for children to prefer to interact with members of one social category over another (Chapter 8).

**chronic identities** Social identities that are always with group members, regardless of how much the situation changes (Chapter 9).

**classism** Prejudice due to a person's social class (Chapter 1).

**cognitive developmental theories** A set of theories that emphasize the ongoing interplay between children's mental development and their environments, accounting for social-cognitive processes such as prejudice in terms of both nature and nurture (Chapter 8).

**color-blind perspective** The point of view that people should ignore racial and ethnic group membership in their dealings with other people, acting as though racial and ethnic groups do not exist (Chapter 14).

**common ingroup identity model** A theory of prejudice reduction that holds that ingroup and outgroup members can be induced to recategorize themselves into a single group that shares a common identity (Chapter 14).

**conditions of independent variable** Sets of experiences that represent different aspects of the independent variable (Chapter 2).

**contact hypothesis** A theory of prejudice reduction that holds that, under the proper conditions, interaction between ingroup and outgroup members changes their beliefs and feelings toward each other in a positive manner (Chapter 14).

**content analysis** A research method by which researchers study documents, photographs, and works of art, to identify themes that help them understand the topic being studied (Chapter 2).

**continuous measure** A measure of prejudice in which respondents are not forced to choose one of two options presented, therefore allowing researchers to measure complex attitudinal judgments and make fine-grained distinctions (Chapter 8).

**convenience sampling** A method of recruiting people to participate in research that focuses on people from whom the researchers can easily collect data (Chapter 2).

**convergent validity** The degree to which scores on a measure correlate with scores on measures of the same or related characteristics and with behaviors that are related to the characteristic being measured (Chapter 2).

**cooperative learning** A type of group learning environment that implements the necessary contact conditions thought to reduce prejudice as part of the day-to-day educational process (Chapter 8).

**correlation coefficient** A statistic that represents the relationship between two variables (Chapter 2).

**correlational research strategy** A strategy used by researchers who measure two or more variables and look for relationships among them (Chapter 2).

**covert discrimination** Unequal and harmful treatment that is hidden, purposeful, and, often, maliciously motivated and stems from conscious attempts to ensure failure (Chapter 10).

**cultural discrimination** Occurs when one group within a culture retains the power to define cultural values as well as the form those values should take. This power results in discrimination and inequality built into literature, art, music, language, morals, customs, beliefs, and ideology to such a degree that they define a generally agreed-on way of life (Chapter 1).

**cultural racism** See *everyday racism* (Chapter 9).

**culture** A unique meaning and information system, shared by a group and transmitted across generations, that allows the group to meet basic needs of survival, pursue happiness and well-being, and derive meaning from life (Chapter 1).

**decategorization model** See *personalization model* (Chapter 14).

**dependent variable** In research, the proposed effect in a hypothesized cause-and-effect relationship between two variables (Chapter 2).

**developmental intergroup theory** A theory of prejudice development in children that holds that the development of prejudice is a by-product of the normal process of cognitive development: Children's efforts to



understand the world they live in and the rules by which that world operates (Chapter 8).

**disability** A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment (Chapter 13).

**discriminant validity** Refers to the extent to which a measure does not assess characteristics that it is not supposed to assess (Chapter 2).

**discrimination** Treating a person differently from others based solely or primarily on the person's membership in a social group (Chapters 1 & 10).

**disidentification** Redefining one's self-concept so that a domain is no longer an area of self-identification (Chapter 11).

**distributive justice** The perception that outcomes are being distributed on the expected basis that people who deserve more get more, rather than on some other, unfair, basis such as ingroup favoritism (Chapter 9).

**doll technique** A measure of racial category awareness where the child is presented with two (or more) dolls and asked to identify the dolls' ethnicity (Chapter 8).

**double standard of aging** The idea that aging occurs at an earlier age and has more serious consequences for women than for men (Chapter 13).

**egalitarianism** A value system that reflects the belief that all people are equal and should be treated identically. People high on egalitarianism place a strong emphasis on the principles of equal opportunity, equal treatment for all people, and concern for others' well-being (Chapters 6 & 7).

**egoistic relative deprivation** See *personal relative deprivation* (Chapter 9).

**empathy** An other-oriented emotional response congruent with another's perceived welfare; empathic feelings include sympathy, compassion, and tenderness (Chapter 5).

**essentialism** The belief that members of a category all have similar psychological characteristics and that these characteristics are unchanging (Chapter 8).

**ethnographic research** A set of qualitative data collection techniques, including participating in events, observing behavior, and conducting interviews, that researchers use to understand how people experience and interpret events in their daily lives (Chapter 2).

**everyday racism** The assumption inherent in much of North American culture that the only correct social and cultural values are European Christian values (Chapter 9).

**experimental research strategy** A research strategy whereby researchers take control of the research situation to ensure that the criteria for determining whether one variable causes another are met. It is the only research method that can be used for determining causality. (Chapter 2).

**extraordinary racism** An organizational socialization process that occurs when the everyday racism of those who are recruited into hate groups is converted into extreme racism (Chapter 9).

**extrinsic religious orientation** The use of religion as a way to achieve nonreligious goals and thus to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification (Chapter 7).

**false consciousness** The holding of false or inaccurate beliefs that are contrary to one's own social interest and that thereby contribute to maintaining the disadvantaged position of the group (Chapter 9).

**field experiment** A research strategy wherein an independent variable is manipulated in a natural setting but as much control as possible is maintained over the research situation (Chapter 2).

**forced choice method** A methodology in which the research participant must choose one of two options presented (Chapter 8).

**fraternal relative deprivation** See *group relative deprivation* (Chapter 9).

**gender polarization** The assumption that gender-associated characteristics are bipolar and that what is masculine is not feminine and what is feminine is not masculine (Chapter 12).

**generalizability** The principle that the results of research on a hypothesis should be similar regardless of how a study is conducted. That is, the hypothesis should be supported generally, not just in one specific study. (Chapter 2).

**genocide** The attempt by members of one social or cultural group to exterminate the members of another group (Chapter 5).

**group (or fraternal) relative deprivation** The degree to which a person feels that a group he or she identifies with has been deprived of some benefit (Chapter 9).

**group privilege** An unearned favored state conferred simply because of one's race, gender, or sexual orientation (Chapter 1).

**hate crimes** Criminal offenses in which there is evidence that the victims were chosen because of their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, disability, or sexual orientation (Chapter 10).

**hate group** An organization whose central principles include hostility toward racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups (Chapter 9).

**homosociality** The tendency to interact socially only with members of one's own sex (Chapter 8).

**hostile prejudice** A traditional form of prejudice that is expressed in terms of negative beliefs about and emotional responses to targets of prejudice (Chapter 6).

**hypothesis** A proposed relationship between two variables that is tested in research (Chapter 2).

**hypothetical construct** The technical term for an abstract concept that is used in theories and studied in research (Chapter 2).

**ideologies** Sets of attitudes and beliefs that predispose people to view the world in certain ways and to respond in ways consistent with those viewpoints (Chapter 7).

**illusory correlation** Belief that incorrectly links two characteristics, such as race and a personality trait (Chapter 3).

**Implicit Association Test (IAT)** A technique for measuring prejudice that uses the principle of response competition to pit two responses (a habitual response and an opposing response) against one another. In assessing prejudice, the technique assumes that negative responses are more closely associated with outgroups than are positive responses, so prejudiced people's negative responses to stimuli associated with an outgroup will be faster than positive responses to the outgroup. (Chapter 2).

**implicit prejudices** Prejudices that people are not aware of having but that can be assessed through implicit cognition and some behavioral measures (Chapter 6).

**incidental emotions** Emotions that are not associated with a given social group but which the person brings to the intergroup situation (Chapter 5).

**independent variable** In research, the proposed cause in a hypothesized cause-and-effect relationship. In experimental research, it is also the term used for the variable the experimenter manipulates. (Chapter 2).

**individualism** A value system based on a strong emphasis on self-reliance and independence from others (Chapter 7).

**individuating information** In the context of making judgments of others, information that is specific to the person, regardless of whether it is stereotypic to the person's group (Chapter 4).

**ingroup bias** People's bias in favor of members of their own group (Chapter 9).

**inner state theories** Theories of individual differences, such as differences in personality (Chapter 8).

**institutional discrimination** Discrimination that occurs when beliefs about group superiority are sanctioned by institutions or governing bodies. It is rooted in the norms, policies, and practices associated with a social institution such as the family, religious institutions, the educational system, and the criminal justice system. (Chapter 1).

**intergroup anxiety** The feelings of discomfort many people experience when interacting with, or anticipating an interaction with, members of other groups (Chapter 5).

**intergroup contact theory** See *contact hypothesis* (Chapter 14).

**intergroup emotions** The feelings aroused when people think about or interact with members of social groups; these groups include one's ingroups (Chapter 5).

**internal consistency** The extent to which people respond in the same way to all the items on a measure; high internal consistency is a desirable feature of measures (Chapter 2).

**interpersonal discrimination** One individual's unfair treatment of another based on the other person's group membership (Chapters 1 & 10).

**intrinsic religious orientation** People with an intrinsic religious orientation truly believe in their religions' teachings and try to live their lives according to those teachings. (Chapter 7).

**Jim Crow racism** The form of overt prejudice by the White majority against members of other racial groups, often embodied in law, that was the social norm prior to World War II (Chapter 6).

**laboratory experiment** Experimental research that is carried out in a highly controlled environment (Chapter 2).

**legitimizing myths** Sets of attitudes and beliefs that people use to justify their social group's dominant position in society (Chapter 7).

**linguistic intergroup bias** The hypothesis that positive descriptions of ingroups and negative descriptions of outgroups tend to be made in abstract terms and that negative ingroup and positive outgroup actions tend to be described in concrete terms (Chapter 3).

**lookism** The positive stereotypes, emotional responses to, and better treatment given to physically attractive people in contrast to less attractive people (Chapter 13).

**managing diversity** Programs aimed at analyzing and changing organizational systems to create an environment appropriate for utilization of a diverse workforce (Chapter 14).

**minimal group paradigm** A standard set of research procedures that creates artificial ingroups and outgroups based on bogus information given to research participants about minimally important differences between groups (Chapter 3).

**modern symbolic racism (prejudice)** A form of prejudice that avoids blatant derogation of outgroups; it is rooted in abstractions, such as cultural stereotypes of outgroups and cultural values, rather than in people's direct experiences with members of those groups (Chapter 6).

**motivation to control prejudice** A desire to appear unprejudiced that reflects both the concern that others might think that one is prejudiced (concern with acting prejudiced) and the awareness that saying and doing some kinds of things would cause trouble (restraint to avoid dispute) (Chapter 5).

**multicultural education** An umbrella term that covers a variety of programs designed to teach people about ethnic, racial, religious, and other groups in society (Chapter 8).

**multicultural perspective** The viewpoint that ethnic identities are fundamental to the self-concept and that, as a result, individuals are motivated to retain their cultural heritages; holds that intergroup relations are optimized when people both retain their cultural identities and develop a higher-order identity (such as national identity) that is also held by other groups (Chapter 14).

**old-fashioned racism** Prejudice that is reflected in beliefs such as the biological superiority of Whites, support for racial segregation, and opposition to interracial marriage (Chapter 6).

**operational definition** Directly observable, concrete representation of a hypothetical construct (Chapter 2).

**organizational discrimination** The manifestation of institutional discrimination in the context of a particular organization (Chapters 1 & 10).

**outgroup homogeneity effect** The proposition that people tend to see members of their own group as very different from one another and, at the same time, tend to underestimate the differences between members of other groups (Chapter 3).

**patronizing speech** A change in conversational strategies in ways that reflect stereotypic beliefs about older adults or persons with a disability (Chapter 13).

**personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD)** The proposition that people believe their group, as a whole, is more likely to be discriminated against than they, themselves, are as individuals (Chapter 11).

**personal (or egoistic) relative deprivation** The degree to which a person feels deprived of some benefit as an individual relative to other individuals (Chapter 9).

**personalization model** The proposition that intergroup contact reduces prejudice by leading people to see members of the outgroup as individuals rather than as members of social categories (Chapter 14).

**prediction** The restatement of a hypothesis in terms of operational definitions (Chapter 2).

**prejudice** An attitude directed toward people because they are members of a specific social group (Chapter 1).

**priming** The exposure to an example of a member of a category, such as a picture of a Black person, that activates concepts associated with the category (Chapter 2).

**probability sampling** A sample of research participants that is constructed to be an accurate representation of the population of interest (Chapter 2).

**procedural justice** The fairness of the process by which rewards are distributed (Chapter 9).

**prototypicality** The extent to which a member of a social group or category fits the observer's concept of the essential features characteristic of that social group or category (Chapter 4).

**psychological disengagement** A defensive detachment of self-esteem from outcomes in a particular domain, such that feelings of self-worth are not dependent on successes or failures in that domain (Chapter 11).

**quest religious orientation** The view that religiosity is a search, or quest, for answers to questions about the meaning of life (Chapter 7).

**rebound effect** The enhanced return of suppressed thoughts that follows an attempt to suppress those thoughts (Chapter 14).

**regressive racism (prejudice)** Unintended expressions of prejudice by people who are otherwise low in prejudice (Chapter 9).

**relative deprivation** The degree to which a person feels deprived as an individual (personal relative deprivation) or as a member of a group (group relative deprivation) (Chapter 9).

**relative gratification** The perception that things are getting better (in contrast to relative deprivation, in which people perceive things to be getting worse) (Chapter 9).

**reliability** The consistency with which a measure provides essentially the same result each time it is used with the same person (Chapter 2).

**religious fundamentalism** The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contain the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity (Chapter 7).

**response amplification** A behavior toward a stigmatized person that is more extreme than behavior toward a nonstigmatized but similar person in the same type of situation (Chapter 6).

**right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)** A set of attitudes—authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism—that lead people to be prejudiced against groups that authority figures condemn and that are perceived to violate traditional values (Chapter 7).

**role congruity theory** The idea that prejudice stems from the belief that women will not be successful leaders because the role of leader requires agentic characteristics that are stereotypically associated with men (Chapter 12).

**salient categorization model** The proposition that the positive attitudes generated by contact with individual members of an outgroup will generalize to the group as a whole only if the individual outgroup members are seen as typical of their group (Chapter 14).

**scapegoating** The process of blaming (and sometimes punishing) an innocent outgroup for the misfortunes of one's ingroup (Chapter 9).

**scientific racism** The interpretation (and frequently misinterpretation) of research results to show minority groups in a negative light (Chapter 1).

**secondary victimization** The psychological effects a hate crime has on members of the victim's group (Chapter 10).

**self-enhancement** Looking down on others to make one feel better about oneself (Chapter 7).

**self-fulfilling prophecy** Occurs when Person A's stereotype of Person B's group leads Person A to behave in ways that elicit stereotype-consistent behavior from Person B (Chapter 3).

**self-protection** The tendency to look down on others when one's self-esteem is threatened in order to make one feel better about oneself, especially when doing so can directly counteract the threat (Chapter 7).

**self-regulation model** The proposal that through the experience of acting in a prejudiced manner, people who see themselves as unprejudiced become sensitized to environmental cues that warn them when they might respond in a prejudiced manner so that they can act appropriately in the future (Chapter 14).

**self-report** A research technique that relies on asking people to report their attitudes, opinions, and behaviors (Chapter 2).

**self-stereotyping** The proposition that when group members view themselves in terms of the (usually positive) stereotypes they have of their group, the self becomes one with the group and the positive view of the group is reflected in a positive view of the self (Chapter 9).

**sexual orientation hypothesis** The proposition that people are more likely to believe feminine men are gay than to believe that masculine women are lesbian (Chapter 12).

**sexual prejudice** Negative attitudes based on sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual (Chapter 12).

**sexual stigma** The negative regard, inferior status, and relative powerlessness that society collectively accords to any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community (Chapter 12).

**shifting standards model** The proposition that people are evaluated relative to the stereotypic expectations of their group, such that the same level of performance elicits higher evaluations for members of groups for which expectations are low than for members of groups for which expectations are high; conversely, a given evaluation is interpreted as reflecting lower levels of performance for members of low-expectation groups than for members of high-expectation groups (Chapters 3, 4, & 10).

**social class** A person's place in the social hierarchy as indicated by wealth, degree of power, and/or membership in particular racial, religious, or status groups (Chapter 1).

**social desirability response bias** People's tendency to act and to respond to researchers' questions in ways that make them look good (Chapter 2).

**social dominance orientation (SDO)** An individual difference variable that reflects the extent to which one desires that one's ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups (Chapter 7).

**social identity** The part of a person's self-concept that derives from membership in groups that are important to the person (Chapter 9).

**socialization** The process of learning one's culture in childhood by being directly taught what things are important and by observing and imitating adults' behaviors and attitudes (Chapter 6).

**social learning theory** The proposition that we learn social behaviors and attitudes either directly (for example, by being rewarded or punished for our actions) or vicariously (for example, by observing the consequences of others' behavior) (Chapters 3 & 8).

**social norms** Informal rules that groups develop that describe how to be a good group member (Chapters 5 & 10).

**social role theory** The proposition that when we observe others, we pay attention to the social roles they occupy and, in doing so, come to associate the characteristics of the role with the individuals who occupy it (Chapter 3).

**sociometric ratings** One of two types of sociometric procedures (the best friends procedure and the roster and rating procedure) that are used to measure peer status (Chapter 8).

**stereotype activation** The extent to which a stereotype is accessible in one's mind (Chapter 4).

**stereotype application** The extent to which one uses a stereotype to judge a member of the stereotyped group (Chapter 4).

**stereotype content model** A theory of the nature of stereotypes that classifies group stereotypes along the two broad dimensions of warmth and competence (Chapter 5).

**stereotype endorsement** The extent to which a person agrees with the social stereotype of a group (Chapter 4).

**stereotype fit hypothesis** The hypothesis that the characteristics associated with a social role (such as manager) are very similar to the cultural stereotypes of one group (such as men) and very different from the cultural stereotypes of another group (such as women). As a result, members of the first group are perceived as being more qualified for the role than members of the second group. (Chapter 10).

**stereotypes** Beliefs and opinions about the characteristics, attributes, and behaviors of members of various groups (Chapter 1).

**stereotype threat** The proposition that stigmatized group members are aware that they are stereotyped and that, especially in achievement settings, they fear confirming those stereotypes (Chapter 11).

**stigmatized** Members of groups who violate the norms established by the dominant or privileged group and, as such, are marked as deviant (Chapter 11).

**subtle discrimination** Unequal and harmful treatment of social group members that is typically less visible and obvious than blatant discrimination (Chapter 10).

**subtypes** Categories that are subordinate to the more basic categories of sex, race, and age (Chapters 3 & 12).

**survey research** A form of research where respondents self-report about their attitudes, beliefs, opinions, behaviors and personalities (Chapter 2).

**symbolic beliefs** The perception that outgroups hold different values that are substantially different than those held by one's ingroup (Chapter 7).

**symbolic racism (or prejudice)** See *modern-symbolic racism*.

**symbolic threats** The perception that outgroup values threaten the values of one's ingroup; see also symbolic beliefs. (Chapter 7).

**terror management theory** The proposition that people's desire to promote and defend their belief and value systems results in prejudice (Chapter 7).

**test-retest reliability** A method of evaluating a measure's reliability by having a group of people complete the measure at two different times and correlating the scores (Chapter 2).

**ultimate attribution error** The assumption that one's own group's negative behavior can be explained by situational processes, but similar negative actions by members of other groups are due to their internal stable characteristics (Chapter 3).

**unobtrusive measures** Subtle measures of prejudice that appear to have nothing to do with prejudice or that appear to be unrelated to the research study taking place (Chapter 2).

**validity** The accuracy of a measure, assessed in terms of how well scores on the measure correlate with scores on measures of related traits and behaviors and the extent to which scores on the measure are uncorrelated with scores on measures of unrelated traits and behaviors (Chapter 2).

**value difference hypothesis** The proposition that prejudice is based, in part, on the perception that the outgroups' value systems differ from one's own (Chapter 7).

**valuing diversity** Programs that establish quality interpersonal relationships through understanding, respecting, and valuing differences among various groups (Chapter 14).

**variable** A characteristic on which people differ and so takes on more than one value when it is measured in a group of people (Chapter 2).

**vicarious retribution** Aggression by ingroup members against outgroup members in response to perceived aggression from an outgroup even when the ingroup members have not been personally harmed (Chapter 9).



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