

THE LEVIN “PLAN:”

A WRONG APPROACH IN AFGHANISTAN

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Executive Summary

The United States and its allies face critical challenges in Afghanistan. Most of these are self-inflicted by eight years of failing to properly resource the war. The U.S. failed to come to grips with the realities of Afghanistan and the reasons why the Taliban have re-emerged as a force that is winning a rising insurgency, and failed to make the commitment necessary to win.

The appointment of Karl Eikenberry as Ambassador, and General Stanley A. McChrystal as commander offers the US a last chance to take the initiative before the insurgency rises to levels that cannot be halted, the weakness and corruption of the Afghan government loses so much popular support that the war cannot be won, and the internal divisions and weaknesses of the NATO/ISAF and international aid effort become unfixable.

There is very little time for such action. The war is now being lost and is becoming steadily more unpopular in the US and among our allies. A failed election means that either a corrupt and incapable Karzai government must be pressured and bypassed or an inexperienced Abdullah Abdullah will somehow have to invent Afghan governance from the ground up. The national caveats and restrictions in NATO/ISAF need to be sharply reduced or NATO/ISAF cannot be effective. The civil aid effort needs to be made far more effective and less corrupt, and focused on winning the counterinsurgency rather than the illusion of longer-term development and post-conflict reconstruction in mid-war.

The odds of success are at best even, and delays in US action and the present election crisis are making them worse. The war will probably be lost over the coming year unless the US country team – Eikenberry and McChrystal – are given the authority and resources they need to decisively take the initiative.

This means implementing an integrated civil-military strategy that deals with all of the basic problems and mistakes that have empowered the Taliban, Al Qa'ida, Hekmatyar, and Haqqani over the last eight years. It also means a major and immediate increase in US civil and military spending on the war. More US troops and civilians, and a US effort that takes the lead in creating an integrated civil-military approach to the new strategy of "shape, clear, hold, and build."

What Senator Karl Levin proposed in his speech on September 11, 2009 is a narrow approach to the war that can only lose it. It is not a strategy, but rather an effort to avoid a commitment of more US troops and resources by rushing the development of Afghan forces as a substitute than can somehow solve all of the complex problems that are making us lose the war. As such it is a recipe for defeat on three critical grounds:

- First, it focuses solely on the military dimension rather than the civil and military aspects of the war, and does not address any of the crippling problems in Afghan leadership and governance, the lack of coordination in NATO/ISAF efforts, the failures in the economic aid effort and UNAMA leadership, and the lack of an integrated civil military effort. It is a one-dimensional solution to avoid sending more troops that cannot possibly reverse the present course of the war.

- Second, it focuses on the very real need to increase Afghan security forces but it does not address any of the critical problems in doing so. It does not even mention the problems in developing the Afghan National Police; it assumes that the Army can be massively increased without regard to major increases in US and NATO/ISAF advisors, mentors, and partners – an issue it also does not address. It misstates the unpopularity of the Taliban without noting the steady alienation Afghans feel towards their government and NATO/ISAF.
- Third, it speaks for voices in the Obama Administration who see domestic politics – the challenges of domestic economic recovery and the growing unpopularity of the health care debate – as reasons why the US cannot provide major increases in troops and money at this time. Coupled to military concerns over putting more pressure on US deployments, and a State Department reluctance to come to grips with a failure to staff and fund an effective civil effort – the net result may be that neither Ambassador Eikenberry or General McChrystal are ever given a proper hearing and chance to present a strategy, plan, and request for resources that might actually win. The end result may be to waste the last real chance for victory by default. The Administration may never give Ambassador Eikenberry or General McChrystal the opportunity to frankly request what they need, as distinguished from a set of partial and compromised requests.

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I. What It Really Takes to Win: The Issues a Meaningful Strategy and Plan Must Address

No strategy can be successful unless it answers the most basic question in going to war: Can we win? *The answer is yes, provided that victory is defined in realistic and practical terms.* With the proper US leadership, it is still possible to create an Afghanistan that is stable and secure enough to ensure that it cannot again become a center for international terrorism, a threat to Pakistan and other nations in the region, and a center of Jihadist operations throughout the world. This will not be a victory that achieves the level of development, mature democracy, and Western concepts of human rights called for the Afghan compact. It can, however, be a kind of victory that allows the Afghans to pursue their own destiny in relative peace.

The answer, however, is only *yes* under very demanding conditions. Years of chronic underresourcing, of letting the Taliban and other insurgents recover and seize the initiative had had their cost. So have failures by the Afghan central government, and corruption and waste on all sides. This has been compounded by a lack of effective civil-military cooperation and anything approaching a real-world unity of effort within the US team, NATO/ISAF, and UN and international agencies have had serious costs.

The Taliban, Al Qa'ida, and other insurgent groups like Hekmatyar and Haqqani, have reemerged as a major threat which influence or control something approaching a third of the country and which have de facto sanctuaries in Pakistan. At the same time, these gains are more the fault of the US and its allies, however, than the result of the strength of Jihadist insurgents. In fact, they are largely the result of US failures to provide adequate resources, decisive leadership, and implement anything approaching a coherent civil-military strategy.

The US, as leader of the NATO/ISAF alliance, has failed to commit adequate troops and civilian aid workers, as well as adequate funds. Its past lack of leadership and adequate civil-military resources has failed to create either effective Afghan governance or anything approaching the required Afghan security forces. Instead, the US has focused on Iraq, and tried to pressure its allies into assuming its responsibilities. It has treated Pakistan as any ally when Pakistan's posture has clearly been divided and covertly tolerated and encouraged the Afghan Taliban and other insurgents. The end result has been a power vacuum that a skilled and adaptive set of insurgents has exploited to seize the initiative, and wage a war of political attrition that they are now winning.

Nevertheless, the US may well be able to reverse this situation. The Taliban and other insurgents now influence or control much of the country but they are still weak and unpopular. The strategy of shape, clear, hold, and build that has had substantial successes in Iraq can be adapted to Afghanistan. Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal offer the kind of leadership that has the ability to win. A meaningful form of Afghan NATO/ISAF victory still seems possible – and even probable – *if* the US changes its strategy, commits the manpower and money needed to win, and works more effectively with the Afghans and its allies.

The US will fail, however, if the Administration and the Congress temporize and delay, put domestic politics before providing adequate troops and funds, and fail to fully

implement a new strategy focused on a realistic effort to create true Afghan partners. It is clear that Obama Administration and the US Congress can decisively waste the last opportunity for victory over the coming months by not giving the US country team in Afghanistan the authority, support, and resources needed to win. Accordingly, the question that the US and its allies must now face is whether they are willing to act decisively enough, and commit enough resources, to correct the failures of the last eight years.

The end result is that the US must now cope with war that has *six, not one*, centers of gravity. Winning this war requires effective action in dealing with all of them, and not simply with one or two key problems. Any realistic chance of victory requires the US to take the lead in:

Defeating the Insurgency by Eliminating its Control and Influence Over the Population.

The Taliban and other insurgent groups are waging a battle for control of the population and territory that is primarily a war of political attrition. The strategic outcome of clashes between insurgent and NATO/ISAF forces is not determined by who wins at the tactical level, but by which side controls or influences the population and has the best prospect of outlasting the other.

Many Afghans have reason to oppose and fear the Taliban and other insurgents – although they do have significant popular support in some Pashtun areas. The problem is that Afghans also have no reason to support a corrupt and ineffective Afghan government – particularly one that is not actually present and providing either security or services. They have no reason to support US or NATO/ISAF forces that fight in their areas and homes, but then leave the area open to the Taliban without providing security or any form of aid and governance. The insurgents can also win simply by steadily expanding their influence in areas where the Afghan government is not present and they do not face active resistance. They do not need to win battles as long as they can establish or regain influence and control.

Any meaningful form of victory requires a fundamental shift in the way the US and NATO/ISAF assess the war. Tactical outcomes will always be important, but the key is control and influence over the population and territory. Intelligence must now focus on assessing this dimension of the war. Both military and civil operations must create conditions that can “*shape*” and “*clear*” populated and key strategic areas, “*hold*” them on a lasting basis, and “*build*” at least minimal government services, justice and rule of law, and economic opportunity in each key area of the country.

Senator Levin is correct in stating that the NATO/ISAF and the US must work with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), as well as local officials, to secure the population. They must then systematically eliminate the remaining insurgent and Jihadist networks, and eliminate their ability to operate as a shadow government. They must work as partners with Afghan forces to eliminate their remaining ability to carry out significant violence over as long a period as is necessary to succeed. These are the shape, secure, and hold phases of the conflict.

At the same time, however, NATO/ISAF and the US must help the Afghans develop an effective mix of national, region, and central governance; develop economic hope and security, establish a functioning rule of law, and move towards development. Counterinsurgency cannot be won without fighting, but it also cannot be won without an integrated civil-military effort that focuses on popular perceptions and needs. As the current election crisis makes clear, much of this effort must be done at the provincial, district, and local level. It will be years before the central government can effectively perform these roles.

Creating an Effective and Well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US Response to Defeating the Insurgency and Securing the Population.

Years of inadequate troop levels focus on "post conflict reconstruction, long-term aid unrelated to a growing war, and underresourcing of aid at the local level have combined to steadily raise the price tag for any future success. This means significantly more troops, more civilians, and more money over at least the next two years to decisively take back the initiative and win the support of the Afghan people.

Years of sustained resourcing will then be required at lower levels of effort to achieve lasting security and stability. For the US, this means fully implementing plans to greatly increase the number of civilians, and increase the number of US troops and brigade combat teams. It also means adequately funding the war effort for the first time – for example, raising the budget of the US Embassy country team from some \$2.1 billion last year to some \$5 billion next year.

For other NATO/ISAF countries it means putting an end to national caveats and restrictions that have left most of Afghanistan far more vulnerable than the US areas of operation in the east, and created nearly paralytic situations where some countries would not use their troops to actively support their PRTs, were far too defensive and static to be effective, or limited their actual areas of operation to small parts of the regions and provinces they were operating in.

- *Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF and US, UN member country, and NGO and international community efforts claim a unity of effort they do not have, are wasteful and sometimes corrupt, and often pursue unrealistic and unachievable goals. They provide unintentional aid to both the insurgency and Afghan corruption and the abuses of power brokers. The time has come for the US and other Western governments to police their own efforts, demand integrated and coordinated effort, and provide transparent accountability and reporting on measures of effectiveness.*

One of the worst kept secrets of the Afghan war is the fundamental dishonesty of NATO/ISAF governments in disguising their national caveats on the use of their military forces and aid workers, and the lack of legitimate goals, accountability, and measures of effectiveness of their aid efforts. The reality is a chronic lack of integrated civil-military effort, bureaucratic stovepipes, efforts decoupled from the priorities of war and Afghan needs, and dependence on corrupt contractors and power brokers.

NATO/ISAF cannot win without self-honesty and effective integration of its civil-military efforts. There is a need to develop true unity of effort and face the reality that

Afghanistan is at war. Until NATO/ISAF and the US can provide the people with security, and the ANSF can sustain it, the military must have civilian partners. They must provide aid efforts in governance, economics, and rule of law that directly support or complement NATO/ISAF and US efforts to defeat the insurgency and create effective and legitimate levels of governance in the field.

At the same time, NATO/ISAF and the US must look longer into the future, and beyond the priorities of war. They must continue to implement longer-term development efforts to help the Afghan government and people move towards lasting security and stability.

Furthermore, NATO/ISAF must confront the weaknesses of the civil and UN aid efforts. UNAMA needs a strong coordinator who recognizes that security is needed first, that the Afghan people need direct aid before medium and long-term development, and who will openly confront the corruption, lack of coordination, lack of valid requirements, and lack of meaningful measures of effectiveness in far too much of the UN, national, and NGO aid efforts. The corruption, incompetence, and irrelevance of the international economic aid effort are scarcely unique to Afghanistan, but this scarcely makes it less of a disgrace.

Creating an Effective Ally and Afghan system of Governance.

This will be as much a challenge as creating effective US and NATO/ISAF forces. No outcome of the current election can be a good one. Regardless of the final outcome, the corruption affecting the first round has discredited both the election and Karzai. If he again becomes president for five years, he will always be seen as even more corrupt and than before. Worse, the election process is only part of the story. Every Afghan knew before the election that Karzai had already tried to rig it by selling out to warlords and power brokers – trading their ability to deliver bloc votes in return for promises of wealth and power. The worst corruption in the election began long before a single vote was cast.

The legitimacy of elections is also a petty issue compared to the legitimacy that can only be conferred by the ability to govern effectively and in ways that serve the people. If Karzai remains as incapable of governing and actually serving the most basic needs of most of the Afghan people, the United States and its allies will have to work around him at the provincial, district and local levels to implement "shape, clear, hold, and build." They not only will not be able to implement a strategy with the support of the central government, they will have to implement a strategy in spite of the central government.

If Abdullah somehow wins a second round, the question will immediately emerge as to how a man who has never managed any major organization will be able to govern the country, how he can form a government without relying on the same power brokers or having to create new ones, and why Afghanistan's grossly overcentralized structure of weak and corrupt ministries will be any more effective than under Karzai. Afghanistan's political structure is only part of the problem.

The creation of a system of government that ignores the lack of an effective civil services, puts all power and money in the central government's ministries, does not elect provincial governors and key district officials, and has no real presence at the local level in many areas is as serious a problem as Afghan politics, and critical to any strategy that seeks to both secure the population and win the support of the Afghan people at the local level that is the key focus of any effective counterinsurgency campaign.

The fault, however, scarcely lies solely with the Afghan government – many of whose problems are the direct result of the mistakes US advisors made in shaping it. This is also a war that must be won after years in which member countries, particularly the United States, failed to react to the seriousness of the emerging insurgency. They failed to provide the proper level of resources and coordination, placed serious national caveats and limits on the use of their forces and resources, and let the enemy take the initiative for more than half a decade.

- *Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.* The US, NATO/ISAF, UN, and other outside powers cannot rebuild or restructure all of Afghanistan, force unity upon it from the top, or create an effective central government that can somehow substitute for effective provincial, district, and local government. The present election crisis is at most the symptom, not the disease. Counterinsurgency is won or lost at the local level and by one population center or critical area at time. If outside powers are not willing to work at the local level to create effective local governance and security, rather than seek impossible near-term improvements in the central government, the war is lost.

This means the US and its allies must act to develop governance and government services at the local level in key populated areas – often for the first time since the Afghan civil war. Every effort should still be made to improve the quality and integrity of the Afghan central government, but success will be slow and cannot win the war. The US and its allies must also directly enable provincial, district, and local authorities to meet the basic needs of the people for government services and a functioning justice system. It means reducing perceived and real corruption and abuses by senior officials and power brokers to levels the Afghan people can accept; and it means creating a level of governance that can ensure lasting security and stability.

These efforts can be aided by the cooperation of honest officials in the Afghan central government and by implementing reform legislation that Afghans have already developed to strengthen provincial and district governments. Electing provincial governors as well as councils, and the same for district chiefs and councils, would help such reform. So would ensuring that they had discretionary funds that did not come through the central government and have some ability to raise money on their own.

For at least 2-5 years, however, NATO/ISAF will have to work directly with provincial, district, and local officials to develop their capacity, provide immediate aid for the start of the “build” phase, create jobs and alternative to dependence on the Taliban and narcotics, and ensure some form of formal or traditional justice actually functions. As areas become secure, civil aid workers can take over more of the mission, but there will not be enough civilian PRT or other aid workers to relieve the military of this function for some years – if ever.

Creating an Effective Mix of Afghan National Security Forces

This will require a new and far more effective level of partnership with Afghan forces, new training and mentoring methods, and much closer operational links in the field that allow NATO/ISAF, the US, and Afghan forces to act as true partners and do so in ways that steadily put Afghan forces more in the lead. It also means a near doubling of the

present force goals for the ANSF – which are the product of years in which NATO/ISAF and the US failed to set the kind of force goals that could give Afghanistan security.

It also means taking a far more realistic approach to creating an effective ANSF. The Afghan National Army already is a significant force and one of the most respected institutions in a country where few institutions have popular respect. It must, however, more in to the lead in the clear and hold functions at the local level as soon as possible, and be seen as taking the lead in planning and executing operations. The fighting on the ground during “shape” and “clear,” and the initial part of the “hold” phase” must be given an Afghan face as soon as possible. It must also be given the NATO/ISAF partners and aid to enable it to remain relatively free of corruption and ethnic and tribal influence.

The “hold” and “build” phases of operations, however, require an honest and effective mix of police, with enough paramilitary capabilities to keep populated areas secure once they are “clear,” and local forces where tribal conditions allow such forces to be effective. This requires major reform and improvement of the Afghan National Police, and freeing it of the level of corruption and influence by power brokers that now cripples many of its operations. It must have enough paramilitary capabilities to survive insurgent attacks, but also by supported by the expansion of the formal and informal justice systems so it can provide the full level of security against crime and tribal violence that Afghans rightly demand.

Deal With the Challenge of Pakistan and Neighboring States

The US and its allies must act as decisively as possible in dealing with a seventh center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. The actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan. The US cannot somehow force the integration of the war fighting and aid efforts, regardless of the fact that the “AfPak” theatre involves directly interrelated conflicts, sanctuaries, and cross border efforts. It must treat Afghanistan as a separate war – at least to some extent. At the same time, however, it must both work to help Pakistan achieve stability and put constant pressure on Pakistan to limit Taliban, Hekmatyer, Haqqani, and Al Qa’ida efforts in Afghanistan.

II. Provide Adequate Resources or Lose and Leave

Each of these steps requires significant US leadership and action, but providing adequate resources will be a critical condition for success. The war has been badly underresourced over the last eight years, and NATO/ISAF and the US must now seize the initiative. Any credible chance of victory will require adequate manpower and funding for at least the next four to five years. In practice, most of the new resources will have to come from the US and they will have to include substantial increases in US forces beyond those that President Obama and the Congress have so far committed.

The Need for More US Forces

Even when current reinforcement plans are fully executed, the US will need a major increase in brigade combat teams to provide the level of strength needed to seize the initiative and create the overall level of NATO/ISAF forces needed to win. At the same time, the new strategy of *shape, clear, hold, and build* involve new forms of war fighting which will reduce these force requirements.

Past troop-to-task ratios would require far higher levels of US forces than the US is currently able to deploy, but such ratios ignore the impact of technology, new tactics, a civil-military approach to war, and the role of civilian partners. They also do not take account of the ability to build up major new ANSF reinforcements over the new two years.

The end result is that the Afghan conflict does not require classic troop to task ratios but rather an adaptive and experimental approach to force requirements. It is clear, however, that more forces will be needed to support the "shape" and "hold" phases of the fighting. A substantial number of troops will also be needed to train, mentor, and *above all partner*, Afghan security forces. Other new troops will be needed for civil-military operations. There simply is no credible prospect that the US can avoid added dependence on the military by recruiting adequate numbers of civilians.

Accordingly, the US must act now to meet Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal's immediate requirements and establish the contingency conditions to rapidly deploy additional troops and civilian if required.

Added Civil Resources

Added civil resources will be equally critical. This means more funds for civilian aid in the hold and build phases, and making every effort to get more qualified civilians than is currently planned. Even today, the civil side of the US country team has less than half the budget it needs (some \$2.1 billion versus a requirement closer to \$5 billion). The number of US civilians has also been far too low to be effective. For example, there were 336 State Department Foreign Service positions in Iraq (not including USAID) in the summer of 2009. The matching total of State Department Foreign Service positions in Afghanistan (not including USAID) was 159, and is only planned to rise to 315 during the rest of the year.

What some have described as a "civilian surge" will only add some 732 new US government civilian positions from all agencies by March of 2010. Some 410 of the 732 positions will be based in Kabul, and 322 of the positions will be based in the field. These hires are not a "surge," but rather a step to correct years of understaffing. There will also be a need for substantial additional contractor and temporary staff.

Like more troops, more civilian resources need to be provided as soon as possible. Every US effort in the Afghan war is shaped by the tyranny of time and distance. It takes months to recruit and/or prepare qualified experts and personnel, create facilities on the ground that can allow them to operate at the local level, and it then takes more months to establish working relationships with the Afghans – even when military or civilians have prior experience in country. If the US fails to provide enough resources this fall and winter to credibly seize the initiative by the spring of 2010, it will at best score largely hollow tactical victories during what is becoming a year round campaign season that begin to peak each spring. The strategy of shape, clear, hold, and build will not be implemented, and the Taliban and other insurgents will gain ground in the war of political attrition they are fighting and which is the strategic core of the conflict.

Moreover, the whole US approach to civil-military operations must change – as must that of most NATO/ISAF countries. There needs to be a stronger and structured civilian presence throughout the country and a new level of civil-military unity of effort at the sub-national level. One such step involves the creation of a Senior Civilian Representative in Regional Commands (RC) East and South. These Senior Foreign Service positions are intended to create a new "fusion" of effort through the coordination and direction of work of all civilian staff under Chief of Mission authority within the region. They are supposed to tie together the political direction and developmental efforts, and serve as the civilian counterpart to the military commander in the Regional Command. In addition, at each level with civilian representation, a lead civilian will be identified to serve as the military commander's counterpart.

The Role of Our Allies

US action or failure to act will win or lose the war, but the US should not bear the entire burden in adding funds and forces. Other NATO/ISAF countries may not be able or willing to make major new military contributions, but these is an urgent requirement for these nations to maintain their current force levels. Member countries also can play a significant role in funding and providing trainers for the expansion of ANSF forces and in providing more economic and civil aid to support the hold and build phases of the campaign.

III. Creating Strong Afghan Security Forces (ANSF)

Senator Levin is correct in stating that NATO/ISAF and the US forces cannot succeed on their own. While US reinforcements are needed, the success of NATO/ISAF and the US efforts will ultimately be judged by how well and how quickly they build up a much larger and more effective ANSF first to support, then to take the lead, and eventually to replace NATO/ISAF and US forces or limit the mission of the remaining forces to an advisory role. They must make the development of fully adequate ANSF forces a much higher priority, and make them true partners, not simply an adjunct to US and NATO/ISAF operations.

Virtually all experts agree that NATO/ISAF and the US should immediately begin to support and resource NTM-A/CSTC-A plans and the baseline for further major expansions of the ANA and ANP. These plans could nearly double the ANA and ANP by 2014, possibly leading to enough success during this process to make full implementation unnecessary. Making a fully resourced start, however, will ensure that adequate ANSF forces will be available over time, and help ease the strain of maintaining and increasing NATO/ISAF and US force levels. Funding such expansion will also be far cheaper than maintaining or increasing NATO/ISAF and US forces.

The problem is, however, that the pace of past ANSF development has been so slow and erratically funded, the threat has grown so fast relative to their capabilities, and the number of trainers and mentors – much less partners – has been so limited. These data are shown in Appendix A, and are just beginning to be partially offset for the current set of force goals but currently planned US reinforcements,

Force development approaching the scale called for by Senator Levin requires massive increases in trainers, mentors, and partners as well as in funding. It requires expansion to be paced to Afghan needs and priorities, not forced at rates that will lead to failure and not success. It must be tied to major changes in the way the US and its allies partner Afghan forces that require more troops. It requires careful and well-staffed efforts to maintain the integrity of the Afghan National Army and it requires massive reforms and increases in the resources going to the Afghan National Police that must be linked to US and NATO/ISAF efforts to create more effectiveness and governance at the provincial, district, and local levels.

The key to effective force generation also occurs outside the training phase. This has been all too clear in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Pushing men through a formal training process is critical, but new units, officers, and NCOs require large numbers of embedded mentors once they go into the field. They require extensive direct support and help from US and NATO/ISAF partner units to go from becoming "fighters" to becoming effective forces. They require large numbers of "enablers" in terms of armor, artillery, intelligence, and sustainability. They require direct support from co-located NATO/ISAF forces at the regional, brigade, and district level to develop the command, control, and communications capabilities needed to systematically enable them to operate and then take the lead above the Kanak or small unit level of command.

This requires major increases in US forces even if our allies do make some increases in their contribution. It also requires most such increases to come in the forces that go into the field as mentors and partners, and not in trainers or in the size of the formal training effort – important as such increases are. This need is disguised in part in the unclassified CM training ratings for the ANA shown in Appendix A – which describe forces capabilities largely in terms of resources at the Kanak level. Far too often, these ratings are far more favourable than the classified ratings of the actual combat performance of such units.

Accordingly, what Senator Levin has proposed will not realistically address even the “shape” and “clear” portions of US and NATO/ISAF strategy, and will not begin to address even the security portions of “hold” and “build.” It focuses on rushing the training phases of efforts to expand the ANA, rather than the partnering and mentoring efforts necessary to make them effective forces. It ignores the critical role of US and NATO/ISAF forces in helping the ANP reform and develop an effective local informal justice system, and it totally ignores the need for address US and NATO/ISAF forces to carry out a major expansion of civil-military and aid tasks in the field where there is no prospect of obtaining enough civilians.

The Afghan National Army (ANA)

The ANA has already proven its value in combat. In the near-term, the ANA will play a key role in the shape and clear missions, as well as in the hold mission because the ANP is not yet strong and capable enough to perform the task. The ANA needs to be expanded and fully resourced for its de facto role in the current fight, even while more concerted efforts are made to build an effective ANP for the longer term.

- NATO/ISAF and the US must focus in the near-term on building up the ANA to carry out critical counterinsurgency tasks and to *hold* in threatened population areas. At the same time, they must improve the ANP and ANCOP forces so they can provide *hold* capabilities where there is a less serious threat but when, and only when, this is clearly within their current capacity. This effort can only succeed if adequate resources are provided, if adequate time is taken to provide force quality as well as force quantity, and if NATO/ISAF and the US are willing to support the resulting force not only during critical periods of combat, but in phasing it down to a post conflict size that GIRoA can fund and sustain.
- CSTC-A already is actively expanding ANA forces from an assigned strength of roughly 91,000 to 134,000, and from 117 fielded kandaks to 179. It is procuring improved equipment and raising the number of Commando kandaks from 6 to 8. A total of 76 of the 117 fielded units are already capable of leading operations. There are three additional areas where decisions must now be made about the future of the ANA.
 - *The first decision is to accelerate training and current force expansion goals, and to set a new goal for expansion of the ANA that will increase it from a goal of 134,000 men to 240,000 in 2014. This will mean a major expansion in funding, in training facilities and trainers, in equipment, and*

in mentors or partner units. Resources to do this well should be identified and committed concurrently. Every regional and task force commander visited or interviewed indicated that such an expansion is now needed. If NATO/ISAF and the US are more successful, then this process can be slowed and/or the force goal can be cut. Given the lead times, however, it is necessary to act now to begin this force expansion process, particularly if it is to both be done at the pace Afghans can support and to maintain the necessary force quality.

- *The second decision is to end the shortfall in NATO and ETT mentors and resources.* There are no easy ways to quantify the present shortfall, but CSTC-A reported in July 2009 that the ANA had a need for a minimum of 67 OMLTs plus US trainers in July 2009. However, it had 56 OMLTs on the ground, of which only 46 were validated. American ETTs were also under resourced in the past, though ETTs are being replaced by the "two BCT" concept of providing mentors. The requirement for OMLTs also will expand along with the ANA. It will rise to 91 by the end of CY2010, and only a maximum of 66 OMLTs will actually be on the ground. This is a deficit of 25.
- Expert analysis is needed, but it may take the equivalent of a third new brigade combat team (changing the two-BCT approach to a three-BCT one) to correct this deficiency. Expanding to 240,000 men would require substantially more OMLTs plus additional ETT mentors, many of which must be carefully chosen to help the ANA develop critical new "enablers" like artillery, engineering, C2, medical services, and logistics and sustainability.
- *The third decision is to create a full operational partnership, focused around the development of the ANA and key elements of the ANP, so that Afghans are a true partner in all NATO/ANSF and US operations and take the lead in joint operations as soon as possible.* It is not enough for NATO/ISAF and US units to partner with the ANSF. The ANSF must be made a full partner at the command level as well. Afghans should see Afghans taking the lead in the field as soon as practical, and as playing a critical role in shaping all plans and operations as well as in implementing *hold and build*. This often cannot be done immediately; it must be done as soon as possible. This can be accomplished by embedding a US brigade combat team into each ANA Corps to provide the expertise and enablers to carry out joint planning, intelligence, command and control capabilities, fire support, logistic expertise, and other capabilities that the ANA now lacks and can acquire through partnership and joint operations with the US.

The Afghan National Police (ANP)

Improving the various elements of the ANP, while somewhat less time critical in terms of combat operations, is equally urgent due to the ANP's central role in performing the *hold* function in population centers, without which COIN will not succeed. Such improvement, however, presents different challenges than improving the ANA.

The ANP currently lacks the ability to support the hold and build missions in the face of insurgent attacks, bombings, and subversion. In July 2009, the Afghan Uniformed Police had an authorized strength of 47,000 and 51,000 assigned. Strength, however, is only part of the problem. The ANP faces critical problems in winning popular support and acceptance. Unlike the ANA, which is the most respected institution in the Afghan government, there is a wide consensus that many elements of the ANP are too corrupt, and too tied to politics and power brokers, to either be effective or win/retain popular support.

As a result, NATO/ISAF and the US plan raise serious questions as to whether the *hold* function can be performed with the US, NATO/ISAF and ANSF resources available, and without a major expansion of and improvement in the ANP. Time is critical because the initial phase of the *hold* function will require a transition to proving regular policing activity and supporting the prompt administration of justice, and ANP are not yet sufficiently trained, effective, and free of corruption in this regard. At the same time, the build phase cannot be properly implemented unless the ANP has the capacity and integrity to support an effective civil rule of law by Afghan standards and custom.

There are several areas where NATO/ISAF and the US need to act to shape the future of the ANP:

- *First, reducing current levels of corruption in the ANP, and limiting the impact of political abuses and power brokers must be part of the operational plan for shape, clear, hold, and build.* NATO/ISAF and the US cannot succeed in their mission unless these problems are sharply reduced, and the ANP can carry out the political aspects of the hold mission and show that they provide real security and prompt justice. As is the case with the ANA, fighting corruption and political misuse of the ANP are as critical as expanding forces. This can only be done through great improvements in ANP leadership, facilitated by far more robust mentoring and training efforts.

The Focused District Development (FDD) program is one possible key to this process. The program is still in development, and any effort to apply it is necessarily slow, because it is time and trainer/mentor limited. The Directed District Development program may offer a possible solution to provide an additional quick reaction capability, and this will need continuing reassessment to determine what scale of effort is practical. Both programs also need to be tightly focused on ensuring that they meet the needs in the population areas most threatened by insurgent activity and where providing the hold function is most urgent.

No ANP programs can succeed, however, where political interference, corruption, and power brokers block effective ANP action or ensure it cannot be reformed. Power brokers have a clear need to disrupt this process, as it directly threatens their operations. This must be understood and be included as part of the planning for ANP improvement. The political dimension of ANP development is as critical as the military and civil dimensions.

- *Second, major efforts need to be made to increase the size and quality of the ANP. NATO/ISAF and the US should begin to expand the ANP and the other elements of the Afghan police from an authorized strength of 82,000 to 160,000. In Kabul alone, for example, the current goal for the ANP is 4,800 and commanders feel some 7,200 are needed. Current plans seem to leave the ANP underequipped for some aspects of its mission, in spite of current orders, and that additional attention is need to the quality of its leadership and facilities.*

The ANP's most urgent immediate need in order to execute this expansion, however, is for is adequate numbers of qualified trainers and mentors who have the military experience and counterinsurgency background that will be required for several years to come. These must be placed under CSTC-A and the NMA-A, not under some civil leadership or trainers. The day may come when the ANP's main mission is conventional law enforcement in a secure environment, but that day is years away and the ANP needs to focus on security.

Filling these gaps will be difficult. The ANP faces even more severe shortfalls in partnering and training than the ANA. A CSTC-A report in July 2009 stated that the ANP needed at least 98 additional POMLTs plus added US PMT trainer/mentors by the end of CY 2010, and 46 more by the end of CY 2011. It is requesting a total of 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY2011. There will be a need for added PMTs as well. However, these requirements will be substantially increased if the goal for the end strength of the police was raised to 160,000 by the end of CY 2014.

- *Third, a major reorganization is needed to strengthen several major elements within the ANP. These include elite gendarmeries or paramilitary elements to deal with counterinsurgency and key hold missions. These could build on ANCOP and police commando cadres. The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are designed to provide more capable forces that can defend themselves, perform key hold functions in urban areas, and provide a lasting police presence in less secure remote areas. Its assigned strength was 3,345 in July 2009, and it had four fielded brigade headquarters and 16 fielded battalion headquarters. It could grow to 20 battalions by the end of the year; and significant further increases could take place in 2010. Other special elements may be needed to work with the NDS and ANA to eliminate any remaining insurgent shadow government, justice systems, and networks; and to deal with the investigation of organized crime and power brokers involved in gross corruption. The majority of the Afghan police can be trained to the levels of police capability suited to meet Afghan standards and needs.*

- *Fourth, the development of the ANP must be linked to improvements in the Afghan formal and informal legal processes to provide prompt and effective justice.* The ANP cannot succeed in meeting one of the most critical demands of the Afghan people -- the need for prompt justice -- unless ANP development is linked to the creation of effective courts and the rest of the formal justice and corrections systems, or use of Afghanistan's informal justice system. The ANP's problems with corruption also cannot be corrected unless the criminal justice system is seen as less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation.

The Afghan Border Police (ABP)

The ABP already has an authorized strength of 17,600 authorized and 12,800 assigned. Afghanistan will require a competent and sufficient border police function in the future. However, border forces are notoriously difficult to create and make effective under counterinsurgency conditions. Afghanistan's geography and historical border disputes make border enforcement even more difficult than usual, and NATO/ISAF, the US, and the ANSF have higher and more urgent priorities.

Present plans to develop the ABP should be executed, and the Focused Border Development program may help to improve performance, reduce corruption, and increase government revenues. These efforts should be complemented by specific technologies, including biometrics and ISR, to the extent feasible.

Border protection, however, should not be a priority area for NATO/ISAF and US action or additional forces and capabilities. A tightly focused effort could help the Afghan government get substantial revenues from commercial vehicle traffic across the border than are now being lost through corruption. There is no prospect, however, that the ABP can seal the borders or do more in the near-term than harass the insurgency while becoming a source of casualties and more corruption. This is particularly true as long as elements of the Pakistan government and ISI covertly support key elements of the Taliban.

The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3)

Tribal and local security forces can play a useful role under carefully selected conditions. The AP3 is a tribal force designed to provide the equivalent of security guards for district-sized areas. (In Afghanistan, there are 364 districts, excluding major urban areas). This force is still in development, and Afghanistan's tribal and regional differences mean that it may not work in every area and needs to be carefully tailored to local conditions.

The best approach is to use the AP3 model only where it is clear that local Afghan commanders and officials, and local NATO/ISAF and US commanders, feel this can work. Ensure that the expansion of the AP3 is fully coordinated with Afghan provincial and district officials, local ANSF commanders, and NATO/ISAF and US regional and task force commanders to limit loyalty problems and tribal friction.

The ANA Air Corps (ANAAC)

The Afghan National Army Air Corps is already contributing to the COIN fight and further contributions – particularly lift and medevac – would relieve ISAF of some key requirements. ANAAC development plans must be tailored to Afghan needs and capabilities. There is a clear case for giving the ANSF at least the currently planned mix of air lift, battlefield, mobility, RW attack, IS&R, and multi-role capability. This would expand the ANAAC from a total of 36 aircraft and 2,500 airmen today to 139 aircraft by CY 2016.

There is a broader and more urgent role that the ANAAC can perform. It can develop the skills to support NATO in targeting and managing air operations, and take on responsibility for vetting air strikes and air operations. Such a partnership would do much to assure Afghans that Afghan forces were true partners in all air operations and played the proper role in reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage. Such a “red card” role presents obvious difficulties, but it will be applied to all NATO/ISAF and US operations, including ground operations, in time. Working to make it effective now, and a key partner and part of Afghan, US, and NATO/ISAF strategic communications could have major benefits.

National Directorate of Security (NDS)

The NDS does not fall under MoD or MOI command, but it cooperates closely with ANSF at every level. There are no indications that the present role and capabilities of the NDS need to be changed. It is clear, however, that NDS activities do need to be fully integrated with those of the ANSF, the US, and NATO/ISAF, and there have been coordination problems in the past.

Making Partnership the Core of Force Development

NATO/ISAF and the US must follow several “iron laws” for force development in carrying out all these efforts that mean relying on efforts to rush ANA expansion and training to the maximum possible rate will fail:

- First, they must pay as much attention to ANSF force quality as to increasing force quantity. Do not create units where there are inadequate mentors, partner units, facilities, equipment, and training capacity. Pay close attention to performance in the field versus formal training and quantified readiness measures.
- Second, they must properly equip and support every element of ANSF forces or not put them into harm’s way.

In practice, this means that the previous plans must be executed in ways that do more than produce more forces. They must produce motivated and effective Afghan forces than can operate in Afghan time and according to Afghan values. Some proposals that would rush Afghan training simply to get more Afghan forces in the field. The US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghanistan need force quality, loyalty, and retention more than they need force numbers. Afghan force development must also take account of Afghan perceptions and custom. This means allowing for leave time and family needs. It means

not deploying Afghan forces too long, or deploying outside familiar areas. It means ensuring proper medical care and death/disability benefits etc. It means every proposal to accelerate training, deploy on a national level, and use forces in combat needs to be quietly vetted and evaluated by Afghans – not just outside advisors.

It also is more important to create real partners than have more forces. Far too often in the past, the treatment of the ANSF has been mixed and ISAF officers at different levels have used Afghan forces, sidelined them, or thrust them into secondary roles for short-term convenience. This does not develop real partners or effective forces. It also makes a strong case for having key officers in partner roles with years of repeated service and continuity.

The focus of future NATO/ISAF operations should be on creating ANA and ANP forces that can actually take the lead and replace NATO/ISAF forces. It means creating Afghan forces, d that have reason to trust, and work with, NATO/ISAF on a sustained basis. This a top down approach to partnering that ensures that Afghan officers, NCO, and enlisted really are treated as partners, that they can count on the same support and enablers as NATO/ISAF forces, and they are listened to, play a role in operations, and become a key source of HUMINT.

The US and NATO/ISAF must never forget the civil aspects of Afghan force development that will become steadily more critical as operations shift to the hold and build phase. "Hold and build" require army and police forces that can adjust to providing security and the rule of law in civil terms. Police need to help in the clear phase, but their key function in hold and build be in providing day to day security and supporting the justice system.

This also requires a US and NATO/ISAF civil military effort that can create all of the elements of such a justice system. In some areas, this means creating or strengthening a functioning formal legal system with courts, trials, prisons, and civil law. In most of Afghanistan, it will mean working with the informal justice system to provide prompt justice and to replace the Taliban's "justice" system almost immediately after "clear." It will be a decade – if ever – before the formal justice system can do the job in all of the country. Far too much of the present rule of law effort is a top-down approach to the formal system. "Hold" and "build" can only succeed by building from the bottom up and through the informal system.

Appendix A: The Real World Current Status of Afghan Forces


Why Even the Current Effort Has Taken So Long: Years of Erratic and Inadequate Funding -I

ASFF AVAILABLE FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

ASFF FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.


ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY BUDGET ACTIVITY, FY 2005-2009
(\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of 6/30/2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.


Why Even the Current Effort Has Taken So Long: Years of Erratic and Inadequate Funding -II

STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANA INFRA-STRUCTURE, FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of 6/30/2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANA EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION, FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of June 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANP EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION, FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of June 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Just How Serious the Challenge is: The Growth of the Insurgent Threat to the Existing ANA and ANP




Notes: This data does not necessarily represent a measure of a province's security. For example, a province with no attacks could mean that the ANA experienced no attacks or that its presence and missions in the province were different than in other provinces. Multiple casualties could occur per attack.




Notes: This data does not necessarily represent a measure of a province's security. For example, a province with no attacks could mean that the ANP experienced no attacks or that its presence and missions in the province were different than in other provinces. Multiple casualties could occur per attack.

Just How Serious the Challenge Is: Rising ANA and ANP Casualties




^a Numbers as of 6/22/2009.



Note: ^a Numbers are as of 6/22/2009.

Just How Serious the Challenge Is: Inability to Complete ANP Projects in the field without Adequate force Protection




CSTC-A reported that it cancelled 28 ANP construction projects for security reasons. Of these, one contract was terminated for convenience and 27 projects were de-scoped from existing contracts. The awarded amounts on these contracts totaled \$33.53 million.¹³⁴ As illustrated, these security concerns affected projects in all regions of Afghanistan except for the northern region.

How Diverse Current ANSF Forces Really Are: Authorized and Assigned Manning in June 2009

Component	Authorized	Assigned	Date Complete
Ministry of Defense Forces			
MoD/GS	3,246	2,651	Sep 2011
Sustaining Institutions	1,519	1,259	Jun 2011
Intermediate Commands	15,484	15,048	Jun 2011
Detainee Operations	554	520	TBD
CN Infantry Kandak	854	780	TBD
ANA Combat Forces	66,406	53,417	Jun 2012
ANA Air Corps	3,412	2,562	Jun 2016
TTHS	12,000	13,284	N/A
TOTAL MoD	103,475	89,521	Jun 2012⁹
Ministry of Interior Forces			
Moi Headquarters	5,059	4,273	Mar 2010
Counternarcotics	2,519	3,572	Dec 2011
Customs Police	600	603	Dec 2008
Uniformed Police	47,384	51,406	Dec 2011
Border Police	17,621	12,792	TBD
Anti-Crime	5,103	4,013	Dec 2012
Civil Order Police	5,365	2,462	Mar 2011
Fire/Medical/Training	3,149	2,388	TBD
TOTAL Moi	81,956	81,020	Dec 2012
TOTAL	190,275¹⁰	171,030	DEC 2012

Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, June 2009, p. 26

Existing Efforts Rush ANA Development: Afghan National Army Trained and Assigned, October 2008 – May 2009



Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, June 2009, p. 28.

Afghan National Army Force Structure in June 2009

History

On December 1, 2002, Afghan President Hamid Karzai issued a decree that created the ANA. This all-volunteer army is composed of soldiers from all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups.⁹⁷

Mission

The mission of the ANA is to maintain the stability of the country, defend its sovereignty, and contribute to regional security, while maintaining its regional and ethnic balance and continuing to develop its reputation as a respected, accountable, and professional force.⁹⁸

Organization

The ANA falls under the MOD. MOD and the ANA are made up of several components, including the MOD and general staff, sustaining institutions, intermediate command staff, combat forces, and Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) personnel.⁹⁹ See Table 3.3 for descriptions of these components.

The ANA combat forces are divided into five corps. A typical corps contains one or more brigades and is organized into the structure depicted in Figure 3.23.¹⁰⁰ The ANA corps are located in different regions of Afghanistan. See Figure 3.24 for a map with the locations of the corps.

TABLE 3.3

MOD AND ANA COMPONENTS		
Component	Description	Authorized Personnel
Ministry of Defense and General Staff	MOD is responsible for developing, fielding, and ensuring the operational readiness of the ANA. MOD develops strategic plans to defend Afghanistan. The general staff implements MOD policies and guidance for the ANA.	3,246
Sustaining Institutions	Support facilities installation and management, acquisitions, logistics, communications support, regional military intelligence offices, detainee operations, medical command, ANA training and recruiting	1,519
Intermediate Command Staff	commands, military police, and the Headquarters Support and Security Brigade. ^a	15,484
Combat Forces	Conducts the ANA’s operations.	66,406
Air Corps	Supports the ANA and ANP through attack air support, medical evacuation, and presidential transport.	3,412
Other ^b	—	13,408
Total		103,475


Notes: Authorized Personnel numbers appear as reported in the June 2009 DoD report, “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.”

^a An ANA unit that performs specialist tactical and ceremonial missions.
^b “Other” includes data for Detainee Operations, CN Infantry Kandak, and TTHS.

Source: GAO, “Afghanistan Security, Further Congressional Action May Be Needed To Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan To Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces,” Report GAO-08-661, 6/2008, pp. 19, 54. DoD, “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 6/2009, p. 26.

FIGURE 3.23


ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL ANA CORPS



Note: A corps has one or more brigades. A brigade has five battalions. Actual ANA corps organizations may differ from the one presented here.


ANA Readiness is Still Low Even Using the Unrealistic CM Ratings: Afghan National Army Kanak Levels

ANA Kandak/Squadron Capability Milestone (CM) Levels, October 2008 – May 2009



ANA Unit	CM1	CM2	CM3	CM4
Kandak	29	21	28	5
Brigade HQ	9	1	5	1
Corps HQ	2	1	3	0
Other	6	0	0	2


Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, June 2009, p. 33.




Note: May not include fire support, close air support, and MEDEVAC.

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 54.

Major Shortfalls in ANA Trainers and Mentors Even for Far Smaller Force Goals
U.S. ETT Personnel Required and Assigned, October 2008 – May 2009




ISAF OMLTs, October 2008 – May 2009



Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, June 2009, pp. 30-31.

Limited Efforts to Develop the ANP – Which Are Critical to “Clear, Hold and Build:” Afghan National Police Assigned, October 2008-May 2009



Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), June 2009, p. 26.

ANP Force Structure in June 2009

History

In 2002, Germany led the effort to rebuild the ANP.¹¹⁶ In 2005, the United States took over as lead nation for reforming the ANP. In 2007, the European Union began its EUPOL mission.¹¹⁷

Goal

The international goal is to create an effective, well-organized, multi-ethnic, and professional police force that can provide a stable rule of law.¹¹⁸


Organization

The ANP falls under the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The MOI and ANP comprise several components, including the MOI, the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and the Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). See Table 3.4 and Figure 3.32 for descriptions of these components.

ANP training takes place at the Central Training Center in Kabul and at one of seven Regional Training Centers.¹¹⁹ See Figure 3.33 for the locations of these training centers.

FIGURE 3.32

ORGANIZATION OF MOI AND ANP



Note: The graphic has been simplified to illustrate the components in the table below and does not show the full organizational structure of the MOI.

^a The ANP regional commanders report to the deputy uniformed police chief.

Sources: DoD, “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2009, p. 26. GAO, “Afghanistan Security, U.S. Programs To Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,” Report GAO-09-280, 3/2009, p. 36.


TABLE 3.4

MOI AND ANP COMPONENTS		
Component	Description	Authorized Personnel
MOI	Responsible for enforcing the rule of law.	5,059
Afghan Uniformed Police	Assigned to police districts and provincial and regional commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and general policing.	47,384
Afghan Border Police	Provides broad law enforcement capability at international borders and entry points.	17,621
Afghan National Civil Order Police	Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness.	5,365
Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan	Law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan.	2,519
Other	—	8,852
Total		86,800

Note: Authorized Personnel numbers appear as reported in the June 2009 DoD report, “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.”


An ANP Effort Which is Grossly Unready – Even if One Ignores Power Brokers, Corruption, and the Lack of Any Local Justice System:

District AUP and Specialized Unit CM levels, October 2008 –May 2009



CM1	CM2	CM3	CM4
24	27	71	437


Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, June 2009, p. 40



SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 59. Capability Milestone (CM)1: capable of operating independently. CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support. CM3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces. CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions.


Critical Lack of ANP Trainers Even for the Existing Force Goals

U.S. Police Mentor Team (PMT) Personnel; Fielded and Required; June 2007-November 2008




Department of Defense, Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, p. 44

U.S. Police Mentor Team (PMT) Personnel; Fielded and Required; October 2008-May 2009



Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, June 2009, pp. 35.

Slow Progress in the FDD Effort Even if One Ignores Reports of Regression and Lack of Lasting Effectiveness: District CM levels of FDD Cycles, As of May 2009



The above figure illustrates the CM levels for district AUP units through the first six cycles of FDD, as of May 2009. Focused District Development (FDD) is a comprehensive program divided into six phases for assessing, training, and validating district AUP units. The program began in late 2007. Each phase includes units between seven and 11 AUP units. Fifty-two police districts out of a total of 365 districts in Afghanistan are currently enrolled in the Focused District Development (FDD) program. To date, selection of FDD districts has focused on districts in the south and east, near the Ring Road.¹² For the first seven cycles of FDD there were no formalized procedures for collaborating with international partners to select which districts would go through the FDD program. FDD cycle eight will incorporate a more collaborative approach to district selection. CSTC-A, through USFOR-A, approached ISAF to propose developing a more formal and integrated approach to district selection. CSTC-A, USFOR-A, ISAF, UNAMA, the ICMAG, and the MoI worked together to produce a prioritized list of FDD districts coordinated closely with the COIN strategy. This collaborative approach to district selection will be continued for future FDD cycles.

The first six cycles of FDD included only district-level AUP. However, cycle seven will consist of eight provincial police companies and four district units mentored by international PMTs (IPMTs) from Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The inclusion of provincial ANP in the FDD is the result of the lack of PMTs. The fact that provincial police have assigned mentors has eased the PMT constraint and facilitated their inclusion in FDD. It is also of significant value to the provincial police chiefs and governors to provide a trained police resource for quick response to crises and to provide flexibility within the province. At full Manning levels, the FDD program would take three years to complete. As mentioned above, there are significant shortages in PMTs and overall ANP training personnel.

Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, June 2009), pp. 36-37.

Appendix B: The Levin "Plan"

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 11, 2009

Surge the Afghan Army

Remarks prepared for delivery

Senator Carl Levin

Today we mark a solemn anniversary. Eight years ago this morning, our nation was attacked by terrorist extremists motivated by hatred and bent on destruction. It is always appropriate to remember the shock of that day, the innocent lives lost, and the efforts our nation has made since that day to ensure that Afghanistan, the nation that hosted those terrorists, cannot again become a safe haven for terrorists seeking to attack us. But today is an especially appropriate occasion to take stock of those efforts, and consider how best to continue them.

I recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan, where I was joined by my colleagues Senators Jack Reed and Ted Kaufman. The situation in Afghanistan is serious. Security has deteriorated. But if we take the right steps, we can ensure that Afghanistan does not revert to a Taliban-friendly government that could once again provide a safe haven for al Qaeda to terrorize us and the world.

The Obama administration's new strategy, focusing on securing the Afghan population's safety and partnering with the Afghan security forces in that effort, is an important start at reversing the situation in Afghanistan. The change in strategy has led our forces, in the words of General McChrystal's Counterinsurgency Guidance, to "live, eat and train together [with the Afghan security forces], plan and operate together, depend on one another, and hold each other accountable....and treat them as equal partners in success." The Guidance goes on to say that the success of the Afghan security forces "is our goal."

To achieve that goal we should increase and accelerate our efforts to support the Afghan security forces in their efforts to become self-sufficient in delivering security to their nation – before we consider whether to increase U.S. combat forces above the levels already planned for the next few months. These steps include increasing the size of the Afghan Army and police much faster than presently planned; providing more trainers for the Afghan Army and police than presently planned; providing them more equipment than presently planned; and working to separate local Taliban fighters from their leaders and attract them to the side of the government as we did in Iraq.

While the security situation in Afghanistan has worsened, we still have important advantages there. The Afghan people hate the Taliban. Public opinion polls show support for the Taliban at about 5%. In addition, the Afghan army is highly motivated and its troops are proven fighters.

Despite those advantages, we face significant challenges. General McChrystal believes, and I agree, that we need to regain the initiative and create a momentum towards success. General McChrystal worries, and rightly so, about the perception that we have lost that initiative, and the impact of that perception on the Afghan people, their government, al Qaeda and the Taliban. By contrast, if we can dispel that perception, we have a chance to convince local and lower-level Taliban fighters to lay down their arms and rejoin Afghan society.

I believe the most effective way to retake the initiative in Afghanistan is with a series of steps to ensure that Afghanistan's army and police have the manpower, equipment and support to secure their own nation.

First, we should increase troop levels for the Afghan army and police faster than currently planned. There are approximately 90,000 troops in the Afghan army now, and that number is scheduled to go up to

134,000 by October of 2010. The Afghan police are scheduled to reach a level of 82,000 by the same time. For a long time, many of us have urged the establishment of a goal of 240,000 Afghan troops and 160,000 Afghan police by 2013. The Afghan Minister of Defense has strongly supported those numbers. It now appears that our government and the Afghan government are prepared to accept those goals. But the need for additional Afghan forces is urgent. I believe it both possible and essential to advance those goals by a year, to 2012.

Our own military in Afghanistan has repeatedly pointed to a need for more Afghan forces. In one sector of Helmand province we visited last week, our Marines outnumbered Afghan soldiers by 5 to one. A Marine Company commander in Helmand province told the New York Times in July that a lack of Afghan troops "is absolutely our Achilles heel."

What do we need to do to increase the size of the Afghan army and police? According to Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, there is no lack of Afghan manpower; we've been assured it is available.

But we will need significantly more trainers. We asked General Formica, who is in charge of the American effort to train Afghan security forces, whether such an increase is possible. He indicated he would make an assessment of what would be necessary in order to meet the earlier timetable. In the meantime, we should also press our NATO allies with much greater forcefulness to provide more trainers. If our NATO allies are not going to come through with the combat forces they have pledged, at least they could provide additional trainers.

Larger Afghan security forces will also require more mid-level Afghan officers. In addition to supporting efforts to graduate more Afghan officers from army academies, we should consider the recommendation of Defense Minister Wardak that previous mid-level officers who fought the war against the Soviets return to service on an interim basis. Minister Wardak emphasized that those men are well qualified and well motivated, and while they may not be trained in the most current tactics, they nonetheless could temporarily meet the need of the enlarged army while the new group of officers is trained. A larger Afghan force will need supporting infrastructure, such a barracks. While the available infrastructure may not be the most modern, it is adequate and exists in sufficient amounts.

Larger Afghan security forces will require additional equipment. There must be a major effort to transfer a significant amount of the equipment that is coming out of Iraq to the Afghan army and police. Such a significant commitment to equip the Afghan security forces would also help demonstrate U.S. determination to take the initiative and create momentum in the right direction. There is an enormous amount of equipment coming out of Iraq; our military is calling it one of the greatest transfers of military goods in the world's history. A significant part of it could be transferred to the Afghan forces, increasing their capability without weakening our own readiness. And yet there does not seem to be that kind of a crash effort in place to do that. We need to obtain on an urgent basis a list of the basic equipment needs of the Afghan forces and a list of how those needs could be met in a major program to transfer equipment leaving Iraq.

Rapidly expanding Afghanistan's military and police forces would address one of the major problems and risks we now face there. General McChrystal told us he worries that waiting until 2013 for a larger Afghan force creates a gap in capabilities that brings significant risk of failure. But by accelerating the training and equipping of Afghan forces by a year, we address his concern. Depending on additional capability from Afghan, rather than U.S., forces, also addresses a major problem of public perception in Afghanistan. The larger our own military footprint there, the more our enemies can seek to drive a wedge between us and the Afghan population, spreading the falsehood that we seek to dominate a Muslim nation.

Finally, we should make a concerted effort to separate the local Taliban from their leaders. In Iraq, large numbers of young Iraqis who had been attacking us switched over to our side and became the "Sons of Iraq." They were drawn in part by the promise of jobs and amnesty for past attacks, and in part by the recognition that the status quo was creating horrific violence in their own communities. In their own interests and the interests of their nation, they switched sides and became a positive force.

That same prospect exists in Afghanistan. Afghan leaders and our military say that local Taliban fighters are motivated largely by the need for a job or loyalty to the local leader who pays them and not by ideology or religious zeal. They believe an effort to attract these fighters to the government's side could succeed, if

they are offered security for themselves and their families, and if there is no penalty for previous activity against us.

General McChrystal himself has emphasized the potential of such re-integration to accomplish the same result as was achieved in Iraq. Here is what General McChrystal said on July 28th:

"Most of the fighters we see in Afghanistan are Afghans, some with foreign cadre with them. But most we don't see are deeply ideological or even politically motivated; most are operating for pay; some are under a commander's charismatic leadership; some are frustrated with local leaders. So I believe there is significant potential to go after what I would call mid- and low-level Taliban fighters and leaders and offer them re-integration into Afghanistan under the constitution."

But this "game changing" possibility was apparently not factored into General McChrystal's assessment. There is no plan yet to put in place a Sons of Iraq approach in Afghanistan. It is urgent that we lay out the steps that need to be taken to involve local and national Afghan leaders in that effort. They alone can accomplish this crucial job, but first we and our Afghan allies must draft such a plan on an urgent basis. And the potential positive impact of such a plan should be taken into account as we consider the need for any additional U.S. military resources.

Afghanistan's people are grateful for our aid, but also eager to assume responsibility for their future. In a tiny village in Helmand Province, we were invited to meet with the village elders at their council meeting, their shura. One hundred or so men sat on the floor and chatted with us about their future and their country's future. When asked how long the United States should stay, one elder said: "Until the moment that you make our security forces self-sufficient. Then you will be welcome to visit us, not as soldiers but as guests."

Helping Afghanistan achieve self-sufficiency in their security is everybody's goal. On that there is little difference of opinion, in Afghanistan's village councils or in the corridors of this Capitol.

Can we help Afghanistan reach self-sufficiency in security fast enough? Can we get there in a way that regains the initiative and creates the momentum we need? Can we encourage those lower level Taliban to abandon an insurgency headed by terrorists whose fanaticism they don't share?

I believe we can, by supporting a far more rapid growth in the Afghan Army and police; by providing more trainers more quickly; by a rapid infusion to Afghan units of equipment no longer needed in Iraq; and by rapidly adopting a plan for the re-integration of lower level Taliban fighters into Afghan society. In other words, we need a surge of Afghan security forces.

Our support of their surge will show our commitment to the success of a mission that is clearly in our national security interest, without creating a bigger U.S. military footprint that provides propaganda fodder for the Taliban.

I believe that taking those steps on an urgent basis, while completing the previously planned and announced increase in U.S. combat forces, provides the best chance of success for our mission: preventing Afghanistan from again being run by a Taliban government which harbors and supports Al-Qaeda, whose goal is to inflict additional catastrophic attacks on the United States and the world. And we should implement these steps before considering an increase in U.S. ground combat forces beyond what is already planned by the end of this year.

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