SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

THE UNITED STATES' "SECOND FRONT" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ANDREW T H TAN

Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific

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The United States' "Second Front" in Southeast Asia

Andrew T H Tan

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

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Andrew T H Tan
University of New South Wales
Australia
June 1, 2011

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Chapter 1

Security and Terrorism in the Malay Archipelago

The Malay Archipelago and the Global War on Terrorism

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* defines the Malay archipelago in terms of physical geography. It describes the archipelago as the largest group of islands in the world, consisting of more than 13,000 islands in Indonesia and about 7,000 islands in the Philippines. The islands of Indonesia include those of the Greater Sundas (Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and the Celebes), the Lesser Sundas, the Moluccas, and Irian Jaya (West New Guinea). The islands of the Philippines include Luzon, the Visayans, and Mindanao. Other political units in the archipelago are the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, the sultanate of Brunei, and the state of Papua New Guinea.[1] This region is also regarded as maritime Southeast Asia, as opposed to mainland Southeast Asia, which is connected by land to the rest of Asia. Although a narrow, geographical definition of the archipelago excludes West Malaysia, which is geographically part of mainland Southeast Asia, both Malaysia and Singapore are usually regarded in discussions on politics as part of the archipelago, given their close political, cultural, and social links with it. In addition, the provinces of Patani, Narathiwat, Songkhla, and Yala in southern Thailand, which used to be part of Malay sultanates and that have a large minority of Malay Muslims who share a cultural and religious affinity with Malaysia as opposed to the Thai Buddhist majority in Thailand, are also regarded as belonging

to the broader Malay archipelago. On the other hand, Papua New Guinea is usually excluded from discussions on regional politics because of its greater political and cultural affinity with Pacific Polynesia.[2]

More significantly, the Malay archipelago has assumed enormous strategic significance in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism following the seminal terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (or 9-11), as it has the world's largest population of Muslims. Indeed, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world. Islam is also the dominant religion in Malaysia and Brunei, and there are also a significant number of adherents in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and Singapore. Apart from the geographical definition of the region as somewhat distinct on account of geography, culture, and politics, a key defining feature of this region is its adherence to Islam. Thus, after 9-11, it was no surprise that the region achieved prominence in regional and global security, emerging as a strategic battleground in the context of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism (now referred to under the Obama administration as "the Long War") in which radical Islamists are trying to gain support for the global jihad.[3] In the post 9-11 context, therefore, the Malay archipelago has become synonymous with the Malay Muslim world in maritime Southeast Asia.

After 9-11, the region was designated by the Bush administration as the "Second Front" in the global war on terrorism. This tag could also be attributed in part to the existence of armed Muslim separatist rebellions throughout the Malay archipelago. Although they predated Al Qaeda and the events of 9-11, they came under much greater scrutiny in the context of the global war on terrorism, given the alleged linkages between local Muslim rebels and Al Qaeda. Indeed, Al Qaeda had been seeking to establish such linkages in the hope of co-opting disaffected local Muslims into its global jihad against the West.[4] Al Qaeda hoped to profit from the presence of fundamental political, economic, and social grievances that underlie the resort to armed rebellion by some Muslims in the region. Thus, prior to 9-11, Al Qaeda had actively sought to establish ties with various local militant and separatist groups in the Malay archipelago.[5]

The region is also important strategically because it is the location of the busiest and most important waterway in the world, namely, the Straits of Malacca, which has been the subject of growing concern in recent years over maritime security on account of the many piracy attacks taking place against commercial shipping. Following 9-11, these concerns coalesced into fears of a possible piracy-terrorism nexus that could lead to acts of maritime terrorism in the Straits,

severely disrupting global commerce. The possibility of maritime terrorist strikes is taken seriously by security agencies, given the attacks on ships carried out by Al Qaeda, for instance, in Yemen against a U.S. warship, the *USS Cole*, in 2000, which killed 17 U.S. sailors, and the bombing of a French tanker, the *Lindberg*, off the coast of Yemen, in 2002.[6] Given the rising trend in piracy attacks in the environs of the vital Straits of Malacca in the 1990s, the presence of fundamental economic problems in Indonesia that have led to the resort to piracy, and the existence of local radical Islamist as well as Muslim separatist groups, apprehensions over the safety of commercial shipping through these waters have heightened. The importance of the Straits to global commerce stems from the fact that a quarter of the world's trade, half the world's oil, and two-thirds of its natural gas trade pass through its waters.[7] Apprehensions over maritime security stem also from possible threats to U.S. navy warships traversing the region to and from the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the failed terrorist bomb plots in Singapore in late 2001, which had targeted U.S. warships at Changi Naval Base, served to highlight the emerging challenges to maritime security in the region.[8]

The heightened concerns over maritime security, in turn, have attracted the attention of the great powers. Growing concern over maritime security as a result of the threat of terrorism has led the United States to invest attention and resources in managing the problem, thus inadvertently raising its profile, role, and presence in the region. However, the United States is not the only external great power with an interest in regional security. Indeed, 70 percent of Japan's oil traverses the Straits of Malacca, as does 80 percent of China's trade, making it a waterway of great strategic importance to other great powers.[9] After 9-11, however, the enhanced security roles of the United States and its allies in the region, such as Japan and Australia, have led China to openly express concern over the ability of the United States to disrupt its access to energy supplies through the Straits of Malacca in a crisis, on which it has increasingly come to rely on to fuel its enormous economic growth. This has been dubbed China's "Malacca Dilemma."[10] China's growing assertiveness in the region's waters, as well as its diplomatic offensive to woo regional states, have meant that the region is being increasingly caught up in emerging great-power rivalries between China and the United States.

However, the growing unease in the region over maritime security and great-power rivalries have provided an impetus toward enhancing self-reliant defence capabilities that could improve maritime security against piracy and terrorism, protect maritime borders, and bolster

local capacity to thwart a greater role and presence by external great powers. The regional arms buildup has been ongoing for some years, predating the events of 9-11, and is driven by a complex mix of factors, both domestic and external, but analysts worry over signs of increasing arms racing behavior by states in the region.[11] The interactive arms buildup, coupled with existing interstate tensions amongst regional states, could lead to increasing tensions and mutual suspicions, leading ultimately to conflict, in a condition referred to in the strategic studies literature as the security dilemma.[12]

The U.S.-led global war on terrorism after 9-11 has thus intruded into an already complex security environment in the Malay archipelago. This has the potential to catalyze or unleash further dynamics that could potentially destabilize the region in the years to come. The designation of the region as a "front" in the U.S.-led global war against terrorism may not, as this book suggests, be warranted, given the complexities underlying local Muslim alienation and rebellion. More seriously, it could lead to a series of actions with the unwanted consequence of alienating local Muslims and, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, could lead to greater support for Al Qaeda's call for global jihad against the West. Extending the global war on terrorism to the maritime domain has also complicated an already highly contested arena, exacerbating great-power rivalries between a rising China on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other. The growing roles of the major powers in the region have led to tensions between them and the states in the region, as the region adopts complicated hedging strategies in an attempt to maneuver amongst these rival powers and maintain a regional balance of power. The global war on terrorism has also stimulated security sector developments, particularly accelerating the pace of military modernization to improve local security capabilities. This, in turn, has led to an upsurge in arms purchases, which could have the unwanted consequence of sparking a regional arms race as well as exacerbating existing, underlying tensions between the states in the region.

This book therefore argues that without a finer appreciation of the complexities of the Malay archipelago, the global war on terrorism in the region risks setting into motion a series of dynamics that could lead to unintended and unwanted consequences in the years to come. Indeed, it is a fallacy for the United States to examine the region primarily through the prism of global counterterrorism, as security in this pivotal region has become more complex since 9-11, with multiple, interlinked security challenges. Any strategic policy toward the region must therefore stem from a deep appreciation of

the region's dynamics, particularly the nature of its existing security complex, if external powers such as the United States do not end up exacerbating existing problems, or igniting dynamics that could lead to regional instability.

The Malay Archipelago Security Complex after 9-11

The concept of a regional security complex comprising the Malay archipelago has been conceptualized by others (discussed below), on the basis of the close political, economic, social, cultural, ethnic, and historical linkages within the region, as well as the existence of significant amity-enmity relations amongst the states in the region. This book develops and updates this concept in the light of the events of 9-11 and the subsequent designation of the region as the "second front" in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. The regional security environment after 9-11 has witnessed the emergence of a complex and interlinked set of security challenges. This study aims to explain the nature of the emerging, multifaceted, and interlinked security environment, examine the consequences stemming from the region's involvement in the global war on terrorism, and suggest how the consequences could be ameliorated or at least better managed. Given the Malay archipelago's strategic position in the global war against terrorism and the Long War following the events of 9-11, such a study is needed if the complexities of this pivotal region are to be better understood and in turn lead to better strategic management as well as policy outcomes that promote stability.

The concept of the "security complex" has been used to explain the linkages in security issues and perceptions among the states in the Malay archipelago. The general concept was developed by Barry Buzan, who defined a security complex as consisting of "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be realistically considered apart from one another."[13]

According to Buzan, geography and history compelled states to conduct their security relations in a regional rather than global context, ensuring that its region dominated a state's perceptions of security. A security complex involves intense interdependence that distinguishes a particular group of states from others, although this interdependence consists of both rivalries and shared interests. Thus, a security complex is characterized by relations revolving around amity and enmity, power relationships, and regional issues. A principal

factor defining a security complex is a sufficiently high level of threat that is felt mutually among two or more major states within the complex. Examples of security complexes include South Asia and the Persian Gulf, where amity-enmity relationships supposedly have little direct impact outside their complex even though this is a contentious assertion in today's globalized world.[14]

According to Buzan, this supposed insulation from the upheavals occurring outside the region point to the existence of distinct nodes of concentration in the pattern of security relations. Buzan also observed that in 1988, that is, in the context of the Cold War, a security complex existed in Southeast Asia. This consisted of two opposing blocs: a communist camp in Indochina supported by the Soviet Union and a noncommunist Southeast Asia supported by the United States.[15]

Building on Buzan, Muthiah Alagappa identified in 1991 a subregional Malay archipelago security complex within Southeast Asia, consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei. According to Alagappa, mutual suspicions and hostility within the Malay archipelago complex exist due to the structural characteristics of this complex. One key structural characteristic is the huge disparity in physical endowment between Indonesia and the other three.[16] Indonesia is the fourth most populous state in the world with just over 240 million people in 2009 and is the potential regional hegemon. On the other hand, Malaysia has a population of just over 25 million. Singapore and Brunei are even smaller. Singapore had a population of about 4.6 million in 2009 and Brunei had 388,000 people.[17] The three smaller states have had conflictual relations with Indonesia in the past, such as during the Confrontation from 1963 to 1965. However, political and other differences have also led to tensions between Singapore and Brunei on one hand, and the Federation of Malaysia on the other. Indeed, political differences and ethnic tensions were so severe that Singapore was expelled from the Federation in 1965. Brunei was supposed to have joined the Federation but failed to do so after Malaysia supported the Azahari revolt against the Sultan in 1962. Further, Singapore, which is dominated by ethnic Chinese, has often been described as the region's Israel, as it is a non-Malay and non-Muslim enclave in the midst of the world's largest population of Muslims. These political and geographical realities, coupled with anti-Chinese hostility in both Malaysia and Indonesia, have created a siege mentality on the part of Singapore.[18]

Furthermore, differences as well as commonality in ethnicity and religion have resulted in transnational communal linkages that in turn have intensified the security concerns of the smaller countries.[19]

Tim Huxley, the author of the definitive study of the Singapore Armed Forces, thus supported the notion of a "Malay archipelago complex," consisting of the three states plus Brunei. This complex is characterized by both competition and latent conflict on one hand and cooperation on the other.[20]

However, Alagappa's focus on traditional interstate tensions needed updating, given the post–Cold War emergence of nontraditional transnational security issues, such as terrorism and piracy. An early contribution that helped to add clarity to Muthiah's concept came from Richard Stubbs, who in 1992 identified the same four countries as constituting an emerging core in Southeast Asia. Unlike Buzan and Alagappa, he believed that the emergence of this core was due to increasing economic cooperation and integration. He also identified emerging forms of security cooperation between the three, which he attributed to growing concern in the 1980s of sea-based threats to their security. These threats included the rise of piracy, illegal migration, organized crime, and smuggling, as well as the potential interdiction and disruption of vital sea-lanes by the navies of other countries, particularly those of rising regional powers. According to Stubbs, this meant the growing need for increased intelligence sharing and cooperation over maritime security in the crowded sea-lanes traversing the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea.[21]

Similarly, Donald Emmerson argued in 1996 that there existed a regional security core within Southeast Asia that consisted of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. He defined such a core as consisting of "one or more adjacent states that display centrality, stability and activity on security matters relative to other states belonging to the same (security) regime." Emmerson argued that these three constituted core states in Southeast Asia as they supplied more than half of Southeast Asia's total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1993. More significantly, the three core states flank the Straits of Malacca, one of the world's most important waterways.[22]

After the events of 9-11, the concept of a Malay archipelago security complex comprising amity-enmity interstate relations, albeit infused with growing security cooperation to improve maritime security and thwart any intervention in vital waterways by external powers, was in clear need of refurbishment. The emergence of global radical Islamist terrorism meant that security challenges have become more complex and transnational in character. The U.S.-led designation of the region as the "second front" in its global war on terrorism highlighted the growing threat from radical Islamists seeking to enmesh the region in a global jihad against the West. Moreover, the United States was also

concerned with the potential penetration by radical Islamist terrorists of existing Muslim separatist insurgencies as well as with a possible nexus between terrorists and pirates that could lead to devastating maritime terrorist attacks. In the post 9-11 context and with the designation of the region as the "second front" in the global war on terrorism, the Malay archipelago security complex has become synonymous with the Malay Muslim world in maritime Southeast Asia.

The United States has good reason to pay special attention to the Malay Muslim world in Southeast Asia, that is, the Malay archipelago, after the events of 9-11. As Washington's leading counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategist David Kilcullen has observed, if Al Qaeda succeeds in substantially penetrating the Malay archipelago, where the world's largest population of Muslims resides, the global jihad propagated by radical Islamists might attain an unstoppable momentum.[23] Thus, after 9-11, the Malay archipelago has become a strategic battleground between the West and its local allies and the growing number of local adherents of the radical pan-Islamist ideology propagated by Al Qaeda.

The emerging perceptions on the nature of the post 9-11 regional security environment, led by the United States and embraced rather more reluctantly by the region's states, has transformed the regional security environment. The United States helped to crystallize terrorism, insurgency, and maritime security on the regional security agenda after 9-11 through the prism of global counterterrorism and the Long War. However, this has led to other unexpected complications. The increased attention and more prominent security roles played by external great powers due to these new security threats have, in turn, raised fears of the region becoming a battleground in the emerging strategic rivalry between a rising China, which has growing strategic interests in the region, and the dominant power, the United States. To add to these fears of being caught up in a great-power conflict, there have also been warnings of an emerging arms race in East Asia. The new security agenda and the growing roles of external great powers have unwittingly provided added impetus to ongoing arms modernization programs in the Malay archipelago, which in turn could be destabilizing, given the possibility of security dilemmas as a result of heightened interstate tensions and increased mutual suspicions, a situation that could ultimately lead to conflict.

The perception of the United States and its consequent counterterrorism prescriptions for the region have not only contributed to a changed regional security environment after 9-11, but have also clarified what constitutes the Malay archipelago. Alagappa had

defined the Malay archipelago security complex in terms of interstate relations and argued that it comprised the key states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei. Stubbs, Emmerson, and Huxley too have identified this as comprising the core states in Southeast Asia. However, the nature of the post 9-11 regional security environment, in part due to the rise of transnational radical Islam in the region and its spillover into other issue areas such as maritime security and in part imposed externally by the U.S.-led designation of the region as a strategic theater in its global war on terrorism, have meant that the definition of the Malay archipelago security complex needs updating.

The enduring salience of the state means that the Malay archipelago continues to require a state context, which points to the continued usefulness of Muthiah's conceptualization of a security complex consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore. However, the ongoing revolt by the Muslim Moro minority in the southern Philippines (estimated at 4 million people or 5 percent of the total population of the Philippines, which is 80 million and overwhelmingly Catholic) and the direct involvement of the U.S. armed forces, albeit in advisory roles, in the conflict with the Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff group, mean that the southern Philippines needs to be considered in the post 9-11 era as part of this archipelago and security complex.[24] Similarly, southern Thailand's minority Malay Muslims, who total about 10 percent of the population of 60 million that is overwhelmingly Buddhist should similarly be considered a part of the Malay archipelago security complex, given allegations of linkages between its Muslim insurgent separatists in the south and wider, regional pan-Islamist radicalism.

Furthermore, while Alagappa was concerned with interstate relations, the agenda has also expanded to include (building on Stubbs) terrorism, insurgency, maritime security, great-power rivalries in the region, and the ongoing regional arms buildup. Any analysis of the contemporary Malay archipelago security complex thus needs to consider the complex linkages amongst the post 9-11 transnational security challenges to better understand, in a more holistic manner, the region's complex security problems and challenges. In turn, this should lead the way toward better strategies for managing them.

The Fall and Rise of the Malay Archipelago

The Malay archipelago appeared to fall off the political radar in the United States and the West following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. The general trajectory of benign neglect appeared to be

confirmed after the end of the Cold War in 1989, which saw the rapprochement between communist Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia. Indeed, it seemed the region might be slipping further into strategic irrelevance in the post–Cold War era, with the retrenchment of the U.S. presence in the region apparently culminating in its departure from its huge basing facilities in Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1992, a development that potentially created a power vacuum in the region.

However, this period of uncertainty proved to be temporary, as interest in the Malay archipelago was reawakened following the events of 9-11. Renewed interest in the Malay archipelago has taken place in the context of the designation by the United States of this region as an important theater in its global war against terrorism, that is, the so-called "second front." With its forested terrain, an increasingly fundamentalist population, a crisis of governance in Indonesia in the post-Suharto era, and the presence of long-standing insurgencies in places such as Aceh, Patani, and Mindanao, it has been feared that Al Qaeda–linked terrorists fleeing counterterrorist action in Afghanistan and the rest of the Middle East will easily find refuge and support in the archipelago. Moreover, the region has its own militant Islamist groups, such as the Al Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiah (JI) that came to prominence as a result of the deadly Bali bombing in 2002 that killed 202 people, including many Australian and other Western tourists.[25]

However, concerns over terrorism also drew attention to the links between regional Muslim separatist insurgents and their linkages to Al Qaeda as well as their potential participation in Al Qaeda's global jihad against the West. Thus, concerns were raised following the opening of a new jihadist theater in Sulawesi and Maluku in Indonesia, during the immediate post-Suharto era, as Muslim-Christian sectarian violence began to involve radical mujahideen from outside those places. Al Qaeda's attempts at penetrating existing Muslim insurgent groups meant that greater attention had to be invested in monitoring their relationship to it. Should Al Qaeda succeed in transforming these ethnonationalist organizations into transnational pan-Islamist networks, as has occurred in Chechnya, the region's existing Muslim separatist insurgencies would be fundamentally transformed, with important implications for regional and international security. Concerns over terrorism have also spilled over to maritime security, given the fears of the United States that a maritime terrorist attack could severely disrupt the vital Straits of Malacca, the trade and energy lifeline for the booming economies of Northeast Asia. A maritime version of 9-11,

such as a chemical tanker being hijacked and then blown up in a super container hub such as Singapore, would have devastating consequences for the world economy, given the just-in-time manufacturing system that underpins the interlinked global economy.

The expanded security agenda as a result of 9-11 has also inadvertently involved growing great-power rivalries and has given impetus to ongoing arms modernization programs in the region. The emergence of China as a great power, with its voracious appetite for energy, resources, and markets, has resulted in much greater interest shown by China to secure these in the face of the established dominance of the United States and Japan. After 9-11, the United States has coordinated its security response with regional allies, such as Japan and Australia, in what has become known as the Trilateral Security Dialogue partners to better synergize efforts at countering terrorism and improving maritime security in Southeast Asia. However, China has viewed the enhanced security role of the United States in a region of growing strategic interest to China with alarm, resulting in countermoves that have caused states in the region to thread with care in their relations with both the United States and China, in an attempt to balance and hedge against them.

Apart from great-power rivalries, another unintended consequence stemming from the designation by the United States of the region as a theater in its global war against terrorism has been the impetus given to ongoing arms modernization programs by states in the region. The states in the Malay archipelago have had difficult, even conflictual, relations with each other since the end of World War II and decolonization.[26] Indonesia fought a low-level war with the Malaysian Federation (which included Singapore at the time) from 1963 to 1965 due to Sukarno's opposition to the formation of the Federation. The mutual suspicions arising from this led to the continuation of a Western-backed multilateral defence alliance in the region—the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) that groups Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia in a loose defence arrangement designed to counter any possible revival of attempts by Indonesia to impose regional hegemony.[27] After Singapore's ejection from Malaysia in 1965 due to irreconcilable political and ethnic differences, mutual suspicions between the two countries have also led to a process of interactive arms acquisitions designed to mutually deter each other.[28]

The development of regionalism under the rubric of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has, particularly since the end of the Cold War, somewhat ameliorated salient interstate tensions

among its member states through the process of multilateralism and the observance of regional norms. Nonetheless, the continued high levels of defence expenditure and the ongoing arms buildup in the region have raised fears of a regional arms race. After 9-11, the regional arms buildup has been given an impetus by the expanded security agenda in the region and the need for defence self-reliance aimed at preventing any further intrusion by extraregional powers that could affect the sovereignty of regional states. Indeed, both Indonesia and Malaysia have been very concerned with any diminution of their sovereignty over maritime territory, particularly in the environs of the Straits of Malacca, in the face of pressure from the United States and its allies to better secure those waterways in the post 9-11 environment.

The academic literature on the Malay archipelago has dealt with various aspects of these security challenges. However, the literature has been uneven and does not link together to provide a holistic picture, since it deals with specific issues and challenges. The breakthroughs in regional strategic analysis came from Buzan and Alagappa, with additional scholarship that contributed toward a definition and understanding of the Malay archipelago security complex, such as the work of Stubbs and Emmerson that was discussed above. The overwhelming bulk of the literature on Southeast Asia, however, failed to build on the strategic analysis offered by these scholars. With the end of the Cold War after 1989, attention has shifted to building a regional order based on institutions, norms, and regimes, which has led to an outpouring of constructivist work aimed at supporting the development of ASEAN regionalism.[29] Within the field of international relations, this has pushed empirical area studies and realist-oriented work to the sidelines, prompting somewhat strong protests from academics lamenting this drift into postpositivist approaches.[30]

The realist-oriented strategic analysis begun so promisingly by Buzan, Alagappa, and others was thus not followed up, until Tan borrowed Alagappa's state-centric conceptual framework in 2004 to assess the security perceptions of the Malay archipelago states.[31] The emergence of more complex post–Cold War security challenges such as terrorism and maritime security, however, did lead to the appearance of a large body of work that examined these issues, particularly after 9-11 when such issues received much greater prominence. More traditional types of security issues, such as ongoing Muslim separatist insurgencies, great-power rivalries, and the regional arms buildup, also received some attention, though realist work of this nature has been comparatively scarce.

After 9-11 and the region's designation as the "second front" in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, there has predictably been a fairly substantial amount of work on regional terrorism. The first detailed examination of the presence of Al Qaeda in the region is contained in Rohan Gunaratna's seminal work *Inside Al Qaeda*, the first detailed study of Al Qaeda to appear after 9-11.[32] Subsequently, Zachary Abuza's *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, published in 2003, provided a much more detailed study of the problem posed by pan-Islamist ideology and its resort to terrorism in the region.[33] CNN reporter Maria Reesa also weighed in with a useful journalistic account entitled *Seeds of Terror, An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*, which was also published in 2003.[34] Gunaratna has established a major terrorism research center in Singapore, where a terrorism database has been developed, with considerable research conducted on terrorism in the region through this center.[35]

Other regional analysts have also contributed to advancing knowledge regarding the phenomenon of radical Islamist terrorism in the region, such as Rommel Banlaoi, who published his *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia in 2004.*[36] In 2007 a major study entitled *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia* involved 19 leading security analysts in examining the threat from radical Islamists as well as from other forms of armed rebellion in the region.[37] In 2009 both RAND and Banlaoi took stock of the situation in the region, publishing assessments of both the threat and the counterterrorism responses thus far.[38] The most insightful analyses have come from reports by the Indonesia office of the International Crisis Group, which has published a series of excellent, in-depth studies of specific issues relating to radicalism in the region. Its reports have advanced our knowledge of the JI and other militant groups operating in the Malay archipelago.[39]

Similarly, fairly substantial work has been done on the region's Muslim insurgencies, such as those in Aceh, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines, by both the International Crisis Group and academic analysts such as Rohan Gunaratna, Duncan McCargo, Zachary Abuza, Paul Rodell, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, and others.[40] The East-West Center in the United States has also published a series of excellent monographs under its Policy Studies series on various aspects of regional insurgencies that were authored by analysts on conflict in the region, such as John Sidel, John Funston, Edward Aspinall, and Kirsten Shulze.[41] While Gunaratna, Abuza, and others have sought to establish the linkages between local Muslim

insurgencies and the threat of global radical Islamism, McCargo, Sidel, Rodell, and others have questioned these linkages with Al Qaeda and instead focused on the fundamental causes and dynamics that underlie the Muslim resort to armed rebellion.

These studies have made an important contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism in the region. However, they do not relate to the broader picture, and taken in isolation, they lead to a rather more narrow counterterrorism and counterinsurgency perspective due to the lack of an overall holistic picture that could consider a broad range of dynamics, linkages, and consequences that could inform overall strategy. The more recent spillover into maritime security has similarly prompted a flurry of works on maritime security in the region. Major edited works by Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, Swati Parashar, James Veitch, Kwa Chong Guan, and John K. Skogan, for instance, have focused on piracy, maritime terrorism, and the challenges in securing the environs of the Straits of Malacca.[42] The Sea Power Center in Australia has also published edited volumes on maritime capacity building and energy security in the region.[43] Regular contributors to regional maritime security discussions after 9-11 have included Caroline Liss, Mark Valencia, Mak Joon Nam, Rommel Banlaoi, and Catherine Zara Raymond, among others.[44] The post 9-11 apprehension over possible terrorist threats at sea that has been the focus of this research is best exemplified by Michael Richardson's sensationally titled *A Time Bomb For Global Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, published in 2004 by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore.

These works attempted to address the concerns over the possible piracy-terrorism nexus that could lead to a devastating terrorist attack in the vital waterways of the region; the challenges in improving security throughout the entire maritime logistical chain, including for instance, port and ship security; the transnational cooperative framework, including international law, regimes, and institutions governing the maritime sphere; and the evaluation of government responses to the supposedly emerging threat from maritime terrorism. Again, these studies had a specific and narrow focus on maritime security, with little discussion even of significant related issues such as the evolution of terrorist tactics and strategy as well as changes in the motivation for terrorism that might lead to such threats. The consequences of securitizing the maritime sphere along the lines of terrorism in the post 9-11 context—such as the growing roles of external great powers in ensuring maritime security and the

consequent effects on great-power rivalries in the region—have also not been the subject of analysis. Work has, of course, been done on the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China in the region, for instance, by Richard Sokolsky et al., Evelyn Goh, Sheldon W. Simon, and Ian Storey, but such work has specifically focused on the bilateral relationship and has examined the growing competition over energy supplies and resources, military competition, and economic and diplomatic rivalries.[45] This "bigger picture" narrative has not been related to the U.S.-led global war on terrorism and the implications of the post 9-11 U.S. counterterrorism role in the Malay archipelago.

The enhanced role of the United States after the designation of the region as the "second front" has also had an unwarranted impact on the ongoing arms modernization within the region, as states in the region attempt to improve their defence self-reliance to improve their bargaining positions vis-à-vis the great powers and to preempt any further enhancement of the security roles of these powers. However, this could potentially exacerbate the arms racing behavior that has been symptomatic of underlying interstate tensions in the region, a phenomenon observed by analysts such as Ball, Huxley, Ganesan, and Tan.[46] These studies are also narrowly focused on the arms modernization phenomenon or interstate tensions in the region, which raises the question as to how they are linked to other dynamics such as the global war on terrorism, maritime security after 9-11, and emerging strategic rivalries.

Security in the Malay Archipelago

This book thus examines the complex, and interlinked, security challenges facing the states in the Malay archipelago in the post–Cold War and post 9-11 era: terrorism, maritime security, Muslim separatist rebellion, great-power rivalries, and the regional arms buildup. Because there is a dynamic, interlinked relationship between these different issues—arising primarily from the region's involvement in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, the spillover into security issues other than terrorism, and the unintended consequences of the expanded security agenda—this book contends that this pivotal region should not be seen solely through the prism of U.S.-led global counterterrorism or the Long War. A holistic and in-depth understanding of the complex, interrelated security challenges in the region will help inform more sophisticated and comprehensive strategies in the management of security challenges by local states as well as by

external powers, particularly the United States, which has a major strategic stake in the Malay archipelago.

This book is organized into seven chapters. The discussion in this introductory chapter updates and clarifies the post–Cold War, post 9-11 definition of what constitutes the Malay archipelago. It also explains the complex and interrelated nature of the security challenges that the states in this region are presently facing. The second chapter that follows this explains the context of the post 9-11 interest in the Malay archipelago, following the seminal terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. In turn, this has led to the designation of the region by the United States as the "second front" in its global war on terrorism. This chapter examines the impact of 9-11 as well as the challenge of the "new" radical pan-Islamist terrorism in the region, especially the Al Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network, which has carried out a series of terrorist attacks. It examines the varying regional responses as well as the counterterrorism strategies employed by various states in the region, in particular, their emphasis on "soft" approaches that include religious rehabilitation, in marked contrast to the kinetic, military-oriented approach by the United States under the Bush administration. This chapter also demonstrates that it has been at the interstate level rather than efforts at the regional level by ASEAN that counterterrorism cooperation has been practically implemented and has been effective. It concludes that despite the apparent emergence of the "new" Al Qaeda–inspired terrorism in the region, the JI phenomenon in fact represents greater continuity than change, given the long-standing presence of fundamental grievances. This has important implications for counterterrorism strategy as it means that an effective strategy has to be holistic and comprehensive, as well as aimed at addressing the underlying fundamental political, economic, and social causes of Muslim rebellion in the region.

Chapter 3 examines how the events of 9-11 have led to greater scrutiny of the Muslim separatist insurgencies that predated not only 9-11 but also the existence of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has also made attempts to penetrate and co-opt these insurgencies. This chapter examines the factors behind the presence and endurance of armed Muslim separatist insurgencies in the Malay archipelago. These insurgencies (or the "old" terrorism, in contrast to the "new" terrorism examined in Chapter 2) stem from long-standing fundamental grievances that are political, economic, and social in nature, and reflect the failure of nation-building and territorial governance in the states of the region after decolonization. This chapter examines the veracity of the "new" post 9-11 terrorism

model as applied to the region, focusing on the Muslim separatisms in Aceh at the northern tip of Sumatra in Indonesia, the Malay Muslim provinces of southern Thailand, and in the southern Philippines.

Chapter 3 concludes that Muslim rebellion in the Malay archipelago is a complex, historical problem that predates both Al Qaeda and the events of 9-11. This calls for care in treating the region as a "second front" or a theatre in the Long War with radical Islam, and suggests that countering Muslim rebellion and alienation in the region requires a comprehensive approach encompassing political, economic, and social measures, in addition to hard security instruments. The region's use of such comprehensive approaches, to varying degrees of competence by the states involved, have in recent times also helped to inform Washington of the need for such an approach to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The region has thus unexpectedly provided a template for the revised U.S. approach to counterinsurgency in the wake of its difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan.[47] Given the presence of underlying fundamental grievances and the evident tensions between Al Qaeda's pan-Islamist religious ideology and existing ethno-nationalist sentiments among the region's Muslims, the region's designation as the "second front" in the global war against terrorism is also clearly problematic.

Chapter 4 examines how concerns over terrorism soon spilled over into maritime security, given fears of a maritime terrorist attack carried out by militants that could severely disrupt the vital Straits of Malacca, the trade and energy lifeline for the booming economies of Northeast Asia. In the context of just-in-time manufacturing processes that underpin the global interlinked economy, any maritime terrorist attack could have a serious global impact. In particular, there have been fears of a possible piracy-terrorism nexus, given the rising incidences (until recently) of piracy in the region's waterways.

This chapter explains the nature of this emerging security challenge, particularly its linkage to the threat of terrorism, and evaluates the measures that have been taken. Singapore and the Philippines, being key allies of the United States, have been strongly supportive of U.S.-led initiatives in countering terrorism and improving maritime security, but the key littoral states of Indonesia and Malaysia have been more reticent, given their concerns over the potential erosion of their sovereignty over what they regard as their maritime territorial waters. Nonetheless, the ad hoc measures by the region's states, international bodies, and external powers, have helped to substantially reduce the incidence of piracy and improve maritime security. However, the consequently enhanced security roles of the United States, Japan,

and Australia due to the securitization of the maritime sphere have had other significant consequences. For instance, they have sparked growing concern on the part of China, and may have laid the foundation for growing great-power rivalries that could yet embroil the region in new conflicts. In addition, improving maritime security requires ongoing investment in improved naval and air power capabilities, which provide impetus to the regional arms buildup, potentially exacerbating interstate tensions within the region.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that emerging security challenges after 9-11 have not replaced the traditional great-power tensions and rivalries that have affected the region in the past, for instance, during the Cold War. The emergence of China as a great power, with its voracious appetite for energy, resources, and markets, has resulted in much greater attention by China in securing its strategic interests in the face of the established dominance of the United States and Japan. After 9-11, the United States has coordinated its regional security policy with its allies in the region to better synergize responses toward terrorism and related security challenges in Southeast Asia, although an unspoken objective is the containment of China. Their increasingly active roles in counterterrorism and maritime security have, however, taken place in a manner that is likely to exacerbate the already growing U.S.-China strategic rivalry, which will have profound implications for the Malay archipelago.

Chapter 6 examines the phenomenon of the regional arms buildup, which has not abated since the end of the Cold War and which has been exacerbated by the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, in turn potentially sparking an arms race in the region. The imperative to develop defence self-reliance as well as the need to improve maritime security after 9-11 in the face of great-power interest and the threat of terrorism had provided an impetus to the regional arms buildup, with rather uncertain consequences for regional stability in the long run. Although interstate tensions in the Malay archipelago have receded with the passage of time due to the establishment of regional norms and greater economic interdependence, fears of an East Asian arms race have raised concerns over heightened mutual mistrust due to the absence of arms control regimes and active confidence-building measures. Regional arms modernization programs have included the development of counterinsurgency and rapid deployment capabilities to deal with internal security threats and the strengthening of maritime capabilities to improve maritime security, a growing area of concern after 9-11. However, the recent history of interstate tensions and the existence of mutual suspicions among states in the Malay

archipelago, coupled with the existence of improving conventional warfare capabilities that could be used when these interstate tensions lead to conflict or if domestic instability spills over into complex emergencies, mean that the implications of the regional arms buildup need to be better appreciated.

Finally, Chapter 7, which concludes the study, argues that without a finer appreciation of the Malay archipelago security complex, the global war on terrorism in the region risks setting into motion dynamics that could lead to unintended and unwanted consequences in the years to come. The chapter argues that it is a fallacy to examine the region primarily through the prism of global counterterrorism, as the security environment in this pivotal region has become more complex since 9-11, with multiple, interlinked security challenges. Any strategic policy toward the region must therefore stem instead from a deep appreciation of the region's dynamics, particularly of the nature of its existing security complex, if external powers such as the United States do not end up exacerbating existing problems or igniting dynamics that could lead to unwanted consequences in the future.

The conclusion also argues that the existence of a discrete Malay archipelago security complex, with its complex security linkages and interactive dynamics, suggests that managing security in the Malay archipelago requires a strategic, holistic approach. The simplistic, unilateral and unidimensional preemptive military strategy adopted by the United States under the Bush administration since the events of 9-11, which was based on the single-minded and narrow objective of countering global radical Islamist terrorism, needs to be replaced by a more sophisticated strategic and holistic approach toward the region that is based on a deep understanding of this pivotal region. The United States has begun to do just that, under the new Obama administration, through a more nuanced and multifaceted approach based on diplomatic engagement and the reinvigoration of bilateral relationships throughout the region. The problems and prospects of this new approach will be examined in this chapter. Finally this chapter concludes with an assessment of the challenges for regional security cooperation, and suggests where there may be opportunities for states in the region as well as how the United States could maintain influence in a region of strategic importance to it in the face of complex security challenges.

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Chapter 2

Terrorism

Defining Terrorism in Southeast Asia

The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."[1] However, defining what constitutes terrorism in the Malay archipelago is not as straightforward as this, given the diversity of armed groups within the region. The objectives of many armed groups in the Malay archipelago, which predate the events of 9-11 and Al Qaeda, reflect ethnic, nationalist, and territorial sentiments that stem from the deep alienation of minorities from the artificially constructed postcolonial state. In most cases, they consist of minority groups that have not recognised the legitimacy of the central government and that have pursued, through the use of armed rebellion, a separatist agenda.

Aside from these armed groups that are motivated by ethno-nationalist political agendas, however, there also exist religiously motivated organizations and networks that have pursued objectives inspired by the global pan-Islamist jihadist ideology perpetuated by Al Qaeda. Yet, despite the attention focused on such groups after the seminal terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, some of these groups in fact predate those events and even Al Qaeda itself.

In short, rebellion in Southeast Asia has been an enduring feature of the political landscape since the decolonization following the end of World War II. Rebellion in the region has expressed itself in two forms: terrorism and insurgency. The former refers mostly to mainly urban-type attacks that are, for the most part, selective, limited, and aimed at the infrastructure, security forces, or symbols of the state,

or, less frequently, directed against civilians of the majority. The latter term is used interchangeably with guerilla warfare, and can be defined as organized violence aimed at establishing bases that are secure from the control of the central government and that would enable the establishment of what amounts to a countergovernment. However, the distinction between terrorism and insurgency in this region is often blurred as insurgent groups have also carried out, sometimes through splinter or associated groups, more precise and selective terrorist attacks in urban areas to further their aims.

The use of terror has also not been the preserve of armed rebel groups. In East Timor during the Indonesian occupation as well as in Aceh, a key factor that sustained armed resistance to Jakarta stemmed in the first place from the excessive use of terror as a political instrument by the state against ethnic and religious minorities in order to suppress any opposition to central rule. Thus, in the Southeast Asian context, terror is understood by scholars as a means to an end, since some states within the region also employ it as an instrument of the state. "Terrorism" should therefore be regarded as a neutral term, since it is both a tool of the weak as well as one used by states against armed rebellions mounted by ethnic or religious minorities.[2]

Although Southeast Asia has been designated by the United States after 9-11 as the "second front" and an important theater in its global war on terrorism (or Long War), the region does not in fact fully share the perspectives of the United States on terrorism as these reflect U.S. national security interests. Within the region, armed Muslim rebellions stem, for the large part, from long-standing fundamental grievances that are political, economic, and social in nature, and that reflect the failure of nation-building and territorial governance in the states of the region after decolonization. Thus, Muslim separatist rebellions have taken place in Aceh, southern Thailand, and in Mindanao. In addition, armed groups that espouse an overtly religious agenda, that is, the imposition of the sharia or strict Islamic laws to govern the country, have also resorted to the use of violence to challenge governments in the region and to advance their agenda. These include the Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia in the 1950s, which cost over 25,000 lives, and more recently, the Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network, which can trace its origins from Darul Islam and has carried out several spectacular terrorist attacks, including the Bali bombing in 2002. The presence of such groups reflects the enduring divisions within the Muslim polity as to the shape and character of the postcolonial state.

It is with the above caveats in mind that this chapter examines the impact of 9-11 as well as the challenge of the "new" radical pan-Islamist

terrorism in the region. This chapter focuses on the newer radical Islamist groups and networks, leaving Chapter 3 to discuss in greater detail the older ethno-nationalist terrorism in the form of long-standing Muslim separatist insurgencies. This chapter demonstrates that terrorism remains a serious security challenge in the region. However, subsequent chapters examine how the designation by the United States of the region as a strategic theater in its global war on terrorism has been problematic. Largely unaware of the complex historical dynamics in the region, the emerging fascination with the Malay archipelago has been in the context of radical Islamist terrorism and through the prism of U.S.-led global counterterrorism and the Long War. This narrow strategic lens with which the region has been viewed by the United States may have unintended consequences that could destabilize the region.

The Emergence of the New Terrorism

The emergence of terrorist groups in the region linked to the global jihad as advanced by Al Qaeda began well before the events of 9-11. However, it is necessary to set the context in this section as to how the region became seen by the United States as the "second front" in its global war on terrorism.

9-11 was significant because it was the first major attack on U.S. soil since the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. The very audacity of the attacks shocked not just the U.S. public but also the world, as ultimately, around 3,000 people of many nationalities perished. The political, economic, social, and psychological impacts were immense, making the attacks a watershed event.[3] The attacks thus appeared to vindicate the claims of Bruce Hoffman and others, who contend that a new form of terrorism has emerged since the end of the Cold War, one that is motivated by apocalyptic religion and is distinct from the ethno-nationalist and political-ideological terrorism that had been common in the Cold War era since 1945.

According to its advocates, this "new" terrorism has a number of novel characteristics, such as being motivated by an apocalyptic form of religion, a desire to carry out mass casualty terrorist attacks (potentially involving the use of weapons of mass destruction), a transnational mode of operation that transcends national boundaries, a global presence through networked organizational structures, local strategic alliances, the multinational composition of its members, and the exploitation of the information technology (IT) revolution to reach a global audience that is much larger than the clandestine support base in the pre-Internet age. Indeed, globalisation and the IT

revolution are said to have provided the conditions for the emergence of this new form of global terrorism.[4]

Following 9-11, Al Qaeda became seen as the prototype of this "new" terrorism. Because of its global orientation and its espousal of mass casualty terrorism, it has been described as a formidable threat to the international system. Thus, Rohan Gunaratna opined that "the global fight against Al Qaeda will be the defining conflict of the early twenty-first century," as bin Laden has built an organization that can function both operationally and ideologically at local, regional, and global levels. He thus concludes that "defeating Al Qaeda and its associate groups will be the single biggest challenge in the foreseeable future."[5]

The international community swiftly condemned the 9-11 attacks, with the United Nations calling for "international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September 2001."[6] The United Nations Security Council also adopted *Resolution 1373* in September 2001, which called on states to criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists, and share information about groups planning terrorist attacks.[7] The shock and outrage over 9-11 enabled the United States to swiftly mobilize international support against Al Qaeda and other groups linked to it. Following 9-11, President George W. Bush declared a "war on terror," promising "a broad and sustained campaign to secure our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism."[8] Worldwide security action followed, as governments in Europe, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Middle East arrested and detained members of Al Qaeda as well as radical Islamists linked to it. The United States itself launched Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001, using its air force and special forces to help its allies in the Northern Alliance inside Afghanistan to depose the ruling Taliban regime and put Al Qaeda, which had been operating training camps there, to flight.

The United States also sent 660 soldiers to the southern Philippines in January 2002 to help train and support the Philippine Armed Forces in counterinsurgency operations against the Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group. This move, which followed the discovery and arrest of operatives of the Al Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiah (JI) terrorist network in Southeast Asia in late 2001, was widely seen as the opening of a second front in the U.S.-led war on global terrorism.[9]

The response of the United States to the new global terrorism was formally outlined in the *National Security Strategy* of September 2002, which advocated that the United States use its enormous power to defeat global terrorism, defuse regional conflicts, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and spread democracy.[10]

The conflation of so many different objectives indicated a lack of clarity with regards to strategic aims. This was followed in February 2003 by the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, which adopted the assumptions of the new terrorism paradigm and advocated a preemptive approach aimed at identifying and defusing terrorist threats before they reached U.S. borders.[11]

In short, the strategy of the United States in the global war on terrorism after 9-11 has emphasized the application of the overwhelming military power that the United States possesses in abundance. This unidimensional strategy, based on hard security measures, has focused on a "kill or capture" approach. In contrast, the states in the Malay archipelago utilize, to varying degrees of competence, a range of political, economic, social, and security instruments aimed at comprehensively addressing the root causes of terrorism as well as at winning the hearts and minds of the population, thus containing the challenge from radical Islamists and other rebels. The failures of the Bush administration's strategy against global terrorism is not within the scope of this book; suffice it to note that in its subsequent search for answers to redress the failure of strategy, both globally and in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters, the Bush administration turned to the comprehensive approach practiced in the Malay archipelago.[12] This will be elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 3.

The Challenge of the JI

After 9-11, Southeast Asia's designation as the second front in the global war on terror seemed prescient as the first major terrorist attack after 9-11 had been apparently planned to take place in Singapore. U.S. military operations during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan resulted in the recovery of a surveillance videotape in an Al Qaeda safe house, which revealed a major and audacious bomb plot by a hitherto unknown radical regional network, the Jemaah Islamiah (JI). The JI functioned as Al Qaeda's local logistical support for the plan to attack U.S. companies, U.S. naval vessels, U.S. military personnel, Western embassies, and local military facilities in Singapore. The plan was to use seven truck bombs and 21 tonnes of ammonium nitrate in simultaneous bomb attacks.[13] The discovery of the plot confirmed the suspicions of the Singapore authorities, who had already begun investigating possible militant activities. An initial 15 suspected militants of the group were arrested in December 2001.[14]

The arrests did not prevent the most deadly terrorist attack to take place in Southeast Asia since 9-11. This occurred at the tourist resort

of Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, when suicide bomb attacks on two popular pubs killed a total of 202 people, of whom 164 were foreign nationals. Eighty-eight of the foreign nationals were Australians. Indeed, the JI plotters waited for the start of the Australian tourist season in early October in order to maximize the death toll of Australians, who were especially targeted, given Australia's strong support for the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. The Indonesian government, which had until then denied that the country had a problem with terrorism, welcomed Australian police and forensic assistance, which led to the arrest of more than 30 suspected JI activists and operatives.[15]

Eventually, three of the Bali bombers, Amrozi Nurhasyim, Ali Gufron, and Imam Samudra were sentenced to death in 2003 and executed in November 2008. Investigations revealed that there were other key figures involved in the Bali bombing, such as Azahari Husin, the JI's top bomb-making expert who had assembled the Bali bombs; Noordin Mohammad Top, another bomb-maker and self-styled leader of the militant JI wing known as "Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago"; and electronics expert Dulmatin. Azahari was killed by Indonesian police in 2005.[16] After years on the run, Noordin was finally found and killed in a shoot-out with police in Central Java in September 2009.[17] In March 2010 Dulmatin was killed in a police raid in Jakarta, an event so significant that it was announced by President Yudhoyono.[18]

The Bali attack in 2002, with its large number of Western casualties, seemed to validate assertions that Southeast Asia had become a new front line in global terrorism.[19] The violent militancy of a small minority of local Muslims, however, should not have come as a surprise, given the context of severe economic stress, social strains, and political instability in Indonesia during the late 1990s. Moreover, the entire Malay archipelago, which has the world's largest Muslim population, has been very much part of the worldwide Islamic revival following the Iranian revolution in 1979. The main challenge posed by Islamic revivalism in the region, as elsewhere, has been its political challenge to established elites and regimes, as Islamic purists and fundamentalists want the social, political, and economic structures to reflect Islamic tenets. Islam has proven to be a potent mobilizing symbol and focal point in harnessing political opposition to unpopular governments throughout the Muslim world. The more extreme Salafist elements, however, are prepared to undertake violent jihad or holy war in order to overthrow the present regimes and replace them with an Islamic state that would be run strictly according to the sharia or Islamic laws.

The Bali attack appeared to mark a watershed in Southeast Asia, given the large number of casualties in a single terrorist attack, the high number of Western casualties, the lethality and sophistication of the bombs (including one detonated remotely by mobile phone), and the fact that it was carried out by local suicide bombers. As Adam Dolnik noted, suicide bombing in the region was not unknown, having been carried out, for instance, by the communists in Vietnam against the French in the First Indochina War and against U.S. forces during the Vietnam War. However, the modern practice of suicide bombing, as we know it today, reached the Malay archipelago through Al Qaeda's attempts to infiltrate the local struggles of the region. Al Qaeda has always regarded martyrdom as a principal tactic, and has successfully spread this tactic to its local affiliates around the world.[20] Throughout the 1990s, Al Qaeda was able to establish a following for its radical ideology in the Malay archipelago through the ex-Afghan mujahideen network. The Bali bombing, the deadliest terrorist attack since 9-11, represented a major triumph for Al Qaeda as it was carried out by a local affiliate network and by local suicide bombers.

Soon after the Bali bombing, the JI carried out another attack in August 2003, this time on the U.S.-owned Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, using a sophisticated vehicle bomb that was detonated remotely by mobile phone. Despite the tight security checks instituted since the Bali bombing, the Jakarta attack partially succeeded, proving that it is difficult to stop a suicide attack although security measures can limit the impact. The security check at the driveway of the hotel unnerved the controller of the bomb device, reputed to be Azahari Husin, who prematurely detonated the vehicle with its unfortunate suicide bomber. Had the vehicle detonated further down the driveway, many more people would have been killed. In any event, 12 people died and some 150 others were wounded. Except for one unfortunate Dutch bank expatriate who was celebrating his impending departure from Jakarta, the rest of the dead and most of the injured were ordinary Indonesians.[21] The explosion created a two-meter wide crater that penetrated through the thick concrete into the basement, and the suicide bomber's head was catapulted to the hotel's fifth floor.[22]

Another year later, in September 2004, another almost identical bombing by the JI took place at the Australian High Commission in Jakarta. The attack was organized and planned by Azahari Husin, and the vehicle bomb that detonated at the entrance of the embassy killed 10 people and injured more than 160 people.[23] Ironically, no one inside the embassy was hurt. All the dead and most of the injured were Indonesians. A year later, in October 2005, a second JI bomb attack

took place in Bali, this time carried out by three suicide bombers. In all, 23 people (including the three suicide bombers) were killed and another 135 others wounded.[24] This was followed by the spectacular bombings at the Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels in Jakarta during July 2009, which targeted a high-powered business meeting of Western business executives. Nine people were killed and more than 50 injured. The two suicide bombers had checked into the Marriott Hotel as paying guests and assembled the bombs in the hotel room.[25]

The Origins and Development of the JI Network

The JI, however, is not a new network, as its origins can be traced to the abortive Darul Islam (DI) rebellion in the 1950s, which had aimed to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. The rebellion resulted in the deaths of some 25,000 people and was suppressed with some difficulty by the government. However, remnants of the DI went underground and its ideals continued to be sustained by surviving members and their offspring. Both Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, the alleged cofounders of the JI, were openly sympathetic to the ideals of the Darul Islam. Although both were not members of the DI, they saw themselves as its ideological successors. Bashir founded a religious school, the Pondok Al Mukmin, in Ngruki, near the city of Solo in central Java in 1971, which nurtured a generation of JI activists and operatives. The Iranian revolution in 1979 produced a worldwide Islamic revival, and helped spark religious ferment in Indonesia. This was the context that explained the limited success that Bashir and Sungkar had in their advocacy of a radical religious agenda centered on the establishment of an Islamic state, which had been the objective of the DI. In 1982, both Bashir and Sungkar were tried for subversion by the Suharto regime and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. This was reduced upon appeal but they fled to Malaysia as soon as they were released in 1985, where they continued to proselytize and teach, laying the foundations of the network now known as Jemaah Islamiah or JI.[26]

The term *jemaah islamiah* simply refers to an Islamic community. Such communities living under Islamic law were seen by the previous DI movement to be an essential precursor to the eventual establishment of an Islamic state. It certainly did not originally refer to an organization with an identifiable leadership.[27] Bashir preached the setting up of such *jemaah islamiahs* while he was at Ngruki, and maintained active linkages with the Ngruki network in Indonesia after he went to Malaysia in 1985. The network he established while he was

in Malaysia also built linkages with radical organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.[28] Sungkar also went to Afghanistan as a volunteer in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and later helped send Southeast Asian Muslims to train under Al Qaeda.[29] Thus, it was through the ex-Afghan mujahideen network that Bashir and Sungkar's JI established close ties with Al Qaeda. According to the International Crisis Group, while Bashir may have been inspired by Hasan al-Banna and while he was the main architect of the idea of setting up *jemaah islamiah* as the precursor to an Islamic state, it was Sungkar who was the political driving force of the JI network.[30]

The close Al Qaeda–JI ties led to the JI receiving funding and ideological training from Al Qaeda. JI members also attended Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s. Indeed, a member of the JI who was later arrested, Yazid Sufaat, a trained biochemist, is believed by the United States to be the paymaster for Zacarias Moussaoui, the Frenchman charged with involvement in the September 11 attacks. Yazid was also believed to have hosted two of the September 11 hijackers when they visited Kuala Lumpur in 2000.[31] Although Al Qaeda was able to penetrate the JI network in Southeast Asia, the two are organizationally distinct. Indeed, for the most part, the JI operates independently of Al Qaeda and makes most of its operational decisions locally.[32] However, the two groups developed a close relationship, such as in their cooperation in establishing training camps for militants in Southeast Asia, in the planning of terrorist attacks, and with individuals having overlapping memberships. Al Qaeda also provided funding and technical expertise, with a local named Riduan Isamuddin (or Hambali) as its key coordinator.[33] Hambali's arrest in 2003 inside Thailand, however, may have curtailed Al Qaeda's direct involvement in the region, although the more significant factor has been the continued influence of its radical ideology centered on global jihad.

The JI network that Bashir and Sungkar developed is not a very centralized organization but consists, in the main, of a fairly loose network of individuals and autonomous cells united by radical ideology. It operates throughout the Malay archipelago and in Australia through ex-*mujahideen* contacts. The JI had an organizational structure though, in the form of a Regional Advisory Council, with Hambali as its chairman, and Bashir and Sungkar as spiritual advisers. There are several functional committees as well as four main operational networks: Mantiqi 1 covering Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore; Mantiqi 2 covering Indonesia; Mantiqi 3 covering the Philippines; and Mantiqi 4 covering Australia.[34] Its membership has been variously estimated to be between 500 to several thousand.[35] The difficulty in estimating the

size of its membership is due to its loose, networked structure and the fact that many individuals hold overlapping membership in other radical organizations, with which it actively cooperates. Regional leaders also apparently possess a great deal of autonomy.[36]

The JI also has few written documents, although it does have a key guiding manual, known as the *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Islamiyyah* (PUPJI) or *General Guide for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiah*. According to this manual, which is the founding document of the JI, three principles guide the network: the *Daulah Islamiyah* or Islamic state as a stepping stone to the restoration of the global Islamic caliphate; the process of preparing for the *Daulah Islamiyah* through a persistent and patient moulding of the individual, the family, and the group; and the prominence of military training and armed struggle (*Jihad Musallah*).[37] In other words, the JI aims to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate, is focused on ideological training and education, and is prepared to use force to achieve its objectives. Thus, the JI network shares the beliefs and objectives of the Al Qaeda so closely that it in fact can be described as having been penetrated and ideologically co-opted by it.

The Muslim-Christian Conflict in Sulawesi and Maluku

Apart from conducting terrorist attacks such as the Bali bombings, the JI has also been actively involved in sectarian Muslim-Christian violence in the Indonesian islands of Maluku and Sulawesi. These local conflicts have been important to the radical cause as well as to the JI, as they are perceived as useful jihadist training grounds in the same manner as the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

In Maluku and Sulawesi, a state of civil war from its outbreak in 1999 to the peace accord in 2002 resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 people. The cause of the conflict has been attributed to economic competition in the context of the Asian financial and economic crisis, which severely affected Indonesia in 1997–1998 and led to civil unrest, epitomized by attacks on the Chinese minority, and culminated in the fall of the Suharto regime. In Maluku and Sulwesi, the economic crisis worsened the resentment felt by the local people, who are predominantly Christian, toward Muslim migrants, who have proven more commercially adept and successful than the locals. In addition, there also existed much local resentment over lucrative contracts in fisheries, forestry, and mining that were held by military-backed companies.[38] Indeed, according to James Veitch, who has lived in Sulawesi, "the struggle for power between Muslim

and Christian had tilted in favour of the former, and positions in local government . . . were passing into the hands of Muslims, leaving Christians feeling disenfranchised and aggrieved." Moreover, fuelling the communal tensions was "the fear that revenue from the rich resources of the region would not be shared among the communities."[39] Thus, Indonesia's foreign minister bluntly stated in July 2000 that the conflict was "basically not a religious conflict but more an inter-communal conflict driven by local economic disparities, instigated by certain forces bent on destabilising the country."[40] The involvement of radical Islamist organisations and their militias from outside these regions, however, helped to fuel the conflict and sustain a high level of violence.

While many of the grievances were political, economic, and social in nature, religion became a central issue once violence broke out, due to ethnic identification with different religions. A drunken brawl between a Christian and a Muslim youth in the city of Poso in Sulawesi in 1999 provided the spark that led to an outbreak of violence marked by sectarian vigilante killings.[41] Although the immediate rioting died out, it flared again in April 2000 with renewed intensity. The massacre of some 100 migrant Muslims in a village by Catholic militia led by Fabianus Tibo in May 2000 was a seminal development that triggered calls by militant groups in Java for a jihad to defend Muslims.[42]

Similarly, violent rioting between Christians and Muslims in the capital of Ambon in Maluku and the outlying islands broke out in January 1999 after a dispute between a minibus driver and a passenger. This, however, was merely the spark to the anger and resentment between the two communities that had been building up in the context of the severe economic crisis at the time. The Christians feared that there were national plots in the post-Suharto era to introduce Islamic laws, while Muslims feared that there was an international conspiracy to create a Christian state in Maluku.[43]

The rioting spread to North Maluku, where communal tensions between the Muslim Makian and the Christian Kao led to violent conflict. In December 1999, the Silo Church, the largest Protestant church in Ambon, was destroyed by arson. This led to revenge attacks on Muslims in Halmahera, which resulted in the deaths of some 500 Muslims and the flight of over 10,000 refugees. Instead of maintaining order, the security forces took sides in the communal fighting. The army sided with the Muslims and fired at Christian villages, while the police sided with the Christians and fired at Muslim neighbourhoods.[44]

The deaths of Muslims in Halmehara galvanized national calls for a jihad in Maluku. In January 2000 around 300,000 Muslims marched

in Jakarta, stoked by sensational newspaper accounts about genocide against Muslims. Many vowed to join the fight in the islands and others threatened to launch a jihad or holy war in Jakarta itself.[45] In May 2000 the first of thousands of jihad volunteers began to arrive in the Malukus to assist their fellow Muslims in the civil conflict against the Christians.

The first jihadist volunteers to arrive were members of the Laskar Jihad, who alleged that the Christians were attempting to revive the Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas or RMS), for which there was an abortive separatist rebellion in the 1950s. The Laskar Jihad vowed to fight to keep Maluku within the Indonesian state. The paramilitary organization, which eventually disbanded in 2002, was believed to have strong ties with the Indonesian military and served its interests. Based in Java and led by Jaffar Umar Thalib, an ex-Afghan mujahideen, it ran a training camp in Bogor and vowed to establish Islamic law in Indonesia. Laskar Jihad soon took command of Muslim militias in Maluku, coordinating revenge attacks on Christians that led to many deaths and the flight of Christians from their villages. At its height, the Laskar Jihad had about 3,000 men in Maluku.[46] In mid-2001, some 750 members of the Laskar Jihad also arrived in Sulawesi and organized local militia attacks on Christians.[47] The Laskar Jihad was able to operate with virtual impunity, even receiving the assistance of the military on the ground, due to its perceived close links with top Muslim politicians in Jakarta.[48] Indeed, the arriving Laskar Jihad was formally welcomed by the governor of Central Sulawesi and the head of the local parliament.[49]

Apart from the Laskar Jihad and the JI, there were other groups influenced by radical ideology. They included elements of the old Darul Islam, the Mujahideen KOMPAK (*Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis* or Crisis Management / Prevention Committee, which is the military wing of a Muslim charity), the Laskar Mujahideen (the paramilitary wing of the radical umbrella organization, the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia), and the Makassar-based militia Laskar Jundullah, which has close links with Al Qaeda through its leader, Agus Dwikarna. These radical Islamists believed that the Christian community in the islands posed a threat to Muslims and that the sectarian violence provided the perfect opportunity to develop the jihadist mentality that would strengthen the momentum toward the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and beyond. Indeed, Central Sulawesi had proven to be a useful venue before the outbreak of violence for the training of regional militants by the JI and other radical groups. The training camps, which were welcomed by sections of the local Muslim political elite and military, provided the necessary training to those who later joined local militias.[50]

These radical groups have overlapping memberships as well as links with the JI and even directly with Al Qaeda. The Laskar Jundullah, for instance, drew on followers of the old Darul Islam and had contacts with Al Qaeda. Indeed, its leader, Agus Dwikarna, accompanied Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the deputy leader of Al Qaeda, on his visit to Indonesia in 2000. There is evidence that Omar Al-Faruq, a key Al Qaeda operative in the region, had also provided funding for the Laskar Jundullah in support of its activities in Poso, Central Sulawesi. A cover story in the Indonesian news magazine *Tempo* in 2003 identified Al-Faruq as the person who played a key role in the intensification of the conflict in Poso.[51] The JI also ran a terrorist training camp in the Poso area that was directed by Imam Samudra, one of the Bali bombers. The ideological material used there for the waging of jihad was made by KOMPAK. Another paramilitary outfit, the Laskar Mujahideen, was led by Abu Jibril, an alleged member of Al Qaeda and also a leader of the Malaysian radical group Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia or KMM (described later). The Laskar Mujahideen consisted of members of the Ngruki network, and was a smaller but better trained group than the Laskar Jihad. Because of the personal enmity between the leaders of the two groups, however, there were occasional clashes between them.[52]

The arrival of the Laskar Jihad and other militant groups helped to galvanize the Muslims, who soon gained the upper hand over the Christians. Indeed, the key Christian city of Tentena in Sulawesi was on the verge of being routed when the central government, led by Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Yusuf Kalla, convinced the warring parties to agree to a ceasefire in December 2001. This was followed by a peace agreement, the Malino Accord, in February 2002. The JI supported the ceasefire as it felt that peace would provide opportunities for it to proselytize and consolidate in Poso, where it already had many supporters and could thus turn Poso into a safe base within Indonesia. The peace agreement, however, was undermined by corruption that resulted in the failure to deliver the promised economic reconstruction, social assistance programs, and the resettlement of displaced persons. Moreover, the disaffected Mujahideen KOMPAK, comprising locals who had relatives or friends killed in the conflict, remained dissatisfied and continued to organize attacks against Christians.[53] In May 2005, for instance, a bomb attack killed 22 people inside a market in Tentena. However, in September 2006, the state execution of Fabianus Tibo, who had led a Christian militia, and two accomplices led to retaliatory attacks on Muslims.

The shocking beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005 forced the Yudhoyono government to act. In February 2006

the national counterterrorism force Densus 88 arrested a JI teacher and published a list of 29 suspects responsible for the continuing violence in Poso.[54] In January 2007 police raids in Poso resulted in the deaths of 17 men and the arrest of more than 20 JI leaders and operatives. The operations confirmed links between the JI in Java and the conflict in Sulawesi. Indeed, a steady stream of religious teachers had come to Poso since the sectarian conflict started to proselytize and recruit. The Poso operations also led to further arrests of JI operatives during March 2007 in Java, the seizure of explosives and weapons, as well as documents revealing plans to assassinate police officers, prosecutors, and judges. In June 2007 a key JI leader Yusron Mahbudi (or Abu Dujana) was also arrested.[55] The arrests in both Poso and Java severely degraded the JI's operational capabilities in Sulawesi and Maluku.

Counterterrorism and the JI

Since late 2001 hundreds of alleged JI operatives have been arrested throughout the region. Those arrested include its key Al Qaeda liaison and operations commander, Hambali, who was arrested in Thailand in 2003 and transferred to U.S. custody. Hambali's arrest was especially significant as he had been involved in directing a number of terrorist attacks, including the Bali bombing in 2003, and was regarded as the Southeast Asian equivalent of Osama bin Laden. Indeed, President Bush, in lauding his capture, described him as "one of the world's most lethal terrorists," as he was a key figure in Al Qaeda's global operations, while the Australian prime minister John Howard commented that "psychologically, this capture will inflict a very heavy blow on the worldwide terrorist network."[56]

These arrests significantly weakened the Al Qaeda–JI nexus in the region. Apart from Hambali, those arrested included senior Al Qaeda operatives such as Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, who was arrested in the Philippines; Jabarah Mohammad Mansour, who was arrested in Oman; and Omar Al-Faruq, who was arrested in Indonesia, all in 2002. Omar provided authorities with a detailed assessment of Al Qaeda and JI activities in the region, including planned attacks on Western embassies, U.S. navy ships, and Christian churches, as well as a plot to kill President Megawati of Indonesia, resulting in a state of heightened security throughout the region.[57] In November 2005 Indonesia's counterterrorism forces engaged in a shoot-out that killed the JI leader and bomb-maker Azahari Husin, a former Malaysian, university lecturer who was directly involved in several bombings such as the attacks on

the Marriott Hotel in 2003 and on the Australian High Commission in 2004.[58] In 2006 the head of the JI's Singapore cell, Mas Selamat Kasturi, and the mastermind of major terrorist plots there, including an audacious plot to crash a passenger airliner into Changi Airport, was arrested in Indonesia and handed over to Singapore. Although he escaped from detention in early 2008, he was recaptured in 2009 in Malaysia.[59] Indonesian counterterrorism police also located Noordin Mohammed Top, a Malaysian and key JI bomb-maker, during September 2009 in Central Java, where he was killed in a shoot-out.[60]

Thus, concerted and successful counterterrorism operations in Indonesia and throughout the region have seriously affected the JI's operational effectiveness, with many key operatives and bomb-makers either arrested or killed. There has also been a reported split within JI ranks on the strategy regarding the realization of an Islamic state, with the majority of members opposed to violent attacks on Westerners.[61] However, several factors decrease optimism. Experience has shown that there are others who can step up and replace those who have been killed or captured. There are also experienced and combat-hardened ex-Afghan mujahideen fighters who could join in the violence at any time, as well as new recruits from local conflict areas such as in Sulawesi and Maluku.

The continuing threat from the JI was demonstrated when a JI plot to bomb a café in Sumatra, Indonesia, was averted with the arrest of 10 militants led by a Singaporean and the recovery of bombs in July 2008.[62] Although the three Bali bombers, Imam Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim, and Ali Ghufron were finally executed in November 2008, there was concern that they would become martyrs for the radical Islamist cause and inspire further terrorist attacks.[63] It appeared that these fears were realized with the twin bombings of the Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels in Jakarta in July 2009 that resulted in the deaths of several prominent Australian businessmen.[64] In early 2010 raids in Aceh led to the arrest of 13 suspected militants and the recovery of weapons from a militant training camp.[65] This was followed by a shoot-out that led to the death of the key JI operational leader, Dulmatin, a development confirmed personally by President Yudhoyono.[66] The information recovered from the training camp in Aceh led to a series of counterterrorism operations throughout Java and Sumatra in 2010 that resulted in the arrests or deaths of more than 70 suspected militants. Documents recovered also pointed to possible terrorist targets in the region that the militants in Aceh had been preparing for, including a major subway train station in Singapore and Manila's international airport.[67]

The JI is also adapting to circumstances by recruiting and organizing outside JI structures. As Greg Fealy noted, jihadists from other radical groups that have fought in the Muslim-Christian conflict in Maluku and Sulawesi have emerged as an important source of recruits for terrorist operations. According to Fealy, while the JI retains the capacity to mount lethal attacks, it is no longer the central node of Indonesian terrorist networks. Terrorist networks in Indonesia are becoming more diffuse and the previous approach of directing counterterrorism efforts at the JI is therefore no longer sufficient in preventing new terrorist attacks. Increasingly, non-JI groups and individuals are keen to join terrorist operations, with growing numbers acquiring terrorist capabilities.[68] Indeed, Dolnik has observed that most suicide bombers in the region thus far have never been members of the JI itself but were recruited and indoctrinated specifically for suicide operations by father figures from the JI, such as Noordin Mohammed Top and Azahari Husin.[69]

In sum, the JI has functioned very much like a Southeast Asian version of Al Qaeda. It has provided a revolutionary vanguard that has spread radical ideology and built a regional network of militants. This work of nurturing jihad has been surprisingly effective, the result being that the terror threat has evolved beyond the JI to encompass an amorphous swathe of radical groups and cells that subscribe to violent radical ideology and are ready to carry out terrorist attacks. Instead of posing a threat through a unitary, structured organization, the JI has evolved into a much more amorphous challenge through its loose networks and linkages among radical elements. More seriously, its proselytizing activities and spread of radical ideology ensure that the challenge from radicalism will be long-term in nature.

The Threat of Radical Islam beyond the JI

The presence of radical groups other than the JI and the spread of radical teaching indicate the need for caution against any premature optimism regarding the terrorist threat. The conflict in Sulawesi and Maluku demonstrated that the JI is not the only radical terrorist threat in the Malay archipelago. The Laskar Jihad, described as a Salafist paramilitary group whose primary objective was to defend Muslims from attack by non-Muslims, had, like the JI, been inspired by radical ideology. Although it participated in sectarian violence in Sulawesi and Maluku, where it felt its use of force was justified since it was waged in the defence of Muslims, it had, however, denounced terrorism and had been critical of Al Qaeda.[70] Believed to have had

the tacit backing of military elements, the Laskar Jihad voluntarily disbanded in 2002 after the Bali bombing. However, fears have been expressed that it has in fact taken a lower profile by going underground in the wake of international and domestic counterterrorism action following 9-11 and the Bali attack in 2002.[71]

In Indonesia, the Darul Islam has continued its underground existence despite the violent crushing of its rebellion in the 1950s. Described as the "oldest jihadist organisation in Southeast Asia," it has played a key role in the emergence of a new generation of militant Muslims.[72] Founded in 1947 by S. M. Kartosoewirjo, the Darul Islam advocates the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Its ideals survived the demise of its armed rebellion through activists who evaded capture or surrendered at the time and in various religious schools established by sympathisers who have passed the ideals on to a new generation of radical activists. Indeed, Darul Islam has been a major recruiting ground for terror operatives and suicide bombers for JI terrorist attacks. JI and Darul Islam have also cooperated closely in the jihadist theaters in Sulawesi and Maluku, forging close bonds as a result.[73]

An organization that has close links with Darul Islam and the JI is the Majelis Mujahideen of Indonesia (MMI), which was established by JI's spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, upon his return to Indonesia in 1999 after the fall of the Suharto regime. The MMI's first congress was held in Yogjakarta in 2000 and was attended by 10,000 people, including the then vice president of Indonesia, Hamzah Haz. After Bashir was arrested in 2002 as the JI's alleged spiritual leader, however, the MMI was shunned by top politicians.[74] The MMI is an umbrella group bringing together various militant Muslim organizations in Indonesia.[75] The MMI has also brought together various Darul Islam groups and individuals, and is committed to the JI objective of the establishment of a *Daulah Islamiah* or Islamic state. It functions as an organization for jihadist networking as well as for the spread of radical teachings. It has four declared objectives: the establishment of a *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic state) in Indonesia, the improvement of the image of the Islamic movement in Indonesia, the struggle for the implementation of Islamic law, and the resolution of the multifaceted problems that Indonesia faces. Its activities are carried out through two councils—the legislative council and the executive council—that are assisted by functional departments. The MMI has focused on two areas: *dakwah* (proselytization) and jihad, which, the MMI has stressed, refers to the strengthening of religion (or *tamkin al-din*).

The MMI's paramilitary wing, the Laskar Mujahideen, has been involved in the sectarian conflict in Sulawesi and Maluku. Various

members of the MMI have been arrested for alleged terrorist activities. They include Abu Jibril, an alleged JI member who is also a leader of the Malaysian radical group the Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM); Agus Dwikarna, the leader of the Laskar Jundullah; and Futher Rohman Al-Ghozi, a key Al Qaeda operative. Dwikarna and Al-Ghozi have both received jail sentences in the Philippines.[76]

Apart from the MMI, Bashir also established a short-lived regional grouping of radical organizations called the Rabitatul Mujahidin in 1999. However, it met only three times and consisted of Bashir and several radicals, such as Omar Al-Faruq, Agus Dwikarna, and representatives of Muslim rebel groups from Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Aceh. The nascent grouping fell into inactivity following the arrest of several of those involved, including Al-Faruq, Agus Dwikarna, and Bashir.[77]

The jailed Bashir was reelected in absentia as the leader of the MMI at its 2003 congress, where he urged his followers, through a message sent from his jail cell while awaiting trial, “not to be afraid of being labelled as trying to overthrow (the government) or as terrorists when you are carrying out Islamic *sharia* law in full.”[78] Bashir was released in 2006 following the Indonesian Supreme Court’s ruling overturning his conviction in 2002.[79] Upon his release, he resigned from the MMI in July 2008 after losing a power struggle and established a new group known as the Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), which, like the MMI, claimed to be nonviolent.[80]

The JAT came into public prominence after a group of JAT activists denounced the execution of the Bali bombers in 2008 as murder on the grounds that the bombers were “carrying out jihad in the way of Islam.”[81] JAT has developed rapidly under Bashir although its numbers remain small. Some local communities have reacted to JAT with caution and even alarm, and have refused to allow Bashir to speak to them for fear of encouraging extremism. JAT also appears to have a complicated relationship with JI, with some members joining and others staying out. This reflects, in part, the ongoing dispute within JI over the question of whether to operate openly through legal organizations or to stay underground.[82] Despite the infighting among the militants in Indonesia, however, the long-term challenge lies in the proselytizing activities of such groups, which has led to the spread of radical ideology. The International Crisis Group thus warns of the danger of the “mujahid-producing machine” of such outreach activities and in some militant Islamic schools, which have facilitated terrorist recruitments.[83] As for Bashir, he was once again arrested in August 2010 following counterterrorism operations in Aceh that uncovered a militant training camp and evidence that the government asserted had implicated him.[84]

Militant groups also exist outside of Indonesia. In July 2000 27 members of the Al-Ma'unah extremist group raided a military armoury in Sauk in the Malaysian state of Perak. Their intention was to use the weapons for a campaign of terrorist violence that they believed would lead to the toppling of the Malaysian state and the establishment of one ruled by the *sharia* or Islamic laws. After murdering two of their non-Muslim hostages, they were overpowered by army commandoes.[85] Other members of the militant group were subsequently arrested under Malaysia's preventive detention laws (namely, the Internal Security Act) and the group was banned.

Another extremist network, the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (or KMM; later referred to as the Kampulan Militan Malaysia), was uncovered after a Malaysian was arrested in Jakarta for attempting a bomb attack on a shopping mall in 2000. The KMM was responsible for violent activities in Malaysia, such as bank robberies, the murder of a Christian State Assemblyman, as well as bombings of a church and of a Hindu temple.[86] Subsequent investigations led to the arrest of 25 members of the KMM in Malaysia in June 2001. Police also recovered instruction manuals on the handling of firearms, the setting of booby traps, the conduct of ambushes, and instructions on how to obtain intelligence on police weapons storage. The KMM's aim was to establish a pan-Islamic state, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines, by overthrowing the present governments of both Indonesia and Malaysia. Members of the KMM had attended Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and established links with extremists in Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, and elsewhere.[87]

In January 2002 a further 13 members of the KMM were arrested for having suspected links with Zacarias Moussaoui, the "twentieth hijacker" in the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the United States.[88] Investigations by the government of Malaysia revealed that the KMM had issued edicts to kill U.S. soldiers and had planned to bomb a popular shopping district in downtown Kuala Lumpur.[89] KMM and JI memberships overlapped and KMM had linkages with Al Qaeda through Hambali's coordinating role. For instance, Mohammed Iqbal Rahman (or Abu Jibril), who was arrested in June 2001, was a key JI/KMM member and was involved in coordinating the dispatch of volunteers to participate in the sectarian violence in Sulawesi and Maluku. Another JI/KMM member who was also arrested, Yazid Sufaat, had links with the 9-11 bombers in the United States.[90]

In the Philippines, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) has been the subject of counterterrorism action by the United States, which dispatched troops to the southern Philippines in 2002 to provide

logistical training and support for the Philippine army in combating it. The ASG, which operates mainly in the southern Philippines, was founded by Amilhussin Jumaani and Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani in 1991 and originally consisted of a number of ex-Afghan mujahideen. Indeed the name Abu Sayaff is a tribute to Osama bin Laden's ally Rasool Sayyaf, with whom Janjalani had fought during the anti-Soviet Afghan conflict.[91] ASG adopted a radical, uncompromising stand toward the majority Christians in the Philippines. It believes that violent action is the only solution. Despite being much smaller, the ASG is perceived to be more violent and dangerous than the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the dominant separatist movement fighting for Muslim Moro independence in the southern Philippines. The ASG's declared objectives are to strengthen the Islamic faith in the southern Philippines, to eliminate elements of oppression (of Muslims), and to establish an Islamic state run according to the *sharia*.[92]

The ASG has strong connections with Al Qaeda, which provided funding through Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, who used to live in Manila, where he ran a Muslim charity.[93] Al Qaeda also provided training, including sending Ramzi Yousef (responsible for the first World Trade Centre bombing in New York in 1993) to train ASG members in the use of explosives. A fire in his Manila flat in 1995 led to the recovery of his laptop, which revealed a plot to kill the visiting Pope as well as details of Operation Bojinka (named after a town in Bosnia) in which the JI and Al Qaeda had planned to simultaneously destroy 11 U.S. airliners in the Asia-Pacific by using liquid explosives.[94] A version of this same liquid bomb plot was later attempted in Britain in 2006, which led to permanent worldwide restrictions on the carriage of liquids on passenger aircraft.[95]

The ASG has carried out extortion, kidnapping for ransom, assassinations, and urban bombings that have brought terror to the southern Philippines. The ASG was responsible for the sensational raid on the Malaysian island resort of Sipadan Island in April 2000, when it had kidnapped 21 hostages, including 12 Western tourists.[96] It also carried out a bomb attack on the Philippine embassy in Jakarta in 2000, severely injuring the Philippine ambassador.[97] The ASG also cooperated with the JI to bomb a ferry in Manila Bay in February 2004; 116 people were killed.[98] The SuperFerry bombing was the worst terrorist attack in Southeast Asia since the Bali bombing of 2002. After 9-11, the United States sent advisers to train and provide technical and surveillance support to the Philippine army in its operations against the ASG's then estimated 2,000 members, although an estimate in 2005 identified some 250–300 hard-core members.[99]

The United States has also, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided development aid to Mindanao and Sulu, focusing on reintegrating former separatists and improving local governance and infrastructure.[100] Due to its linkages with Al Qaeda and the JI, the ASG has been designated by the United States as a terrorist organization.

In contrast, the much larger MILF, which is ethno-nationalist in orientation and has been engaged in long-running negotiations with the government, has been left off the list, given the expectation that the MILF and the government would at some stage arrive at a negotiated settlement over the MILF's essentially political demands. However, there continue to be persistent reports of operational linkages between some factions of the MILF and the ASG.[101] The ASG has also developed close operational ties with the JI. The result is that the JI has been able to find sanctuary in the southern Philippines. Indeed, it is believed that a number of key Indonesian JI leaders on the run, such as Dalmutin and Umar Patek, were hiding in the southern Philippines.[102]

In August 2006 the Philippine army launched a major operation that led to the death of ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani and the capture of ASG camps. However, Yasser Igasan, a Syrian-trained Islamic scholar with close ties to foreign radical jihadists, has taken over its leadership.[103] The ASG remains dangerous, given its expertise in urban terrorism, linkages with the JI, support from factions of the MILF, and the persistence of its NGO support network.

Apart from the ASG, Philippine authorities have also reported the emergence of another radical movement known as the Rajah Soleiman Movement, which has targeted the recruitment of Christian Catholics in the Philippines. Believed to have been founded in 2002, the group's objective is the Islamization of the Philippines. It is believed that the group has developed linkages with both the ASG and the JI, and that it has also established its own terrorist units. It has also been claimed that the group had aided the terrorist team that carried out the 9-11 attacks in the United States by providing them with initial pilot training in the Philippines. What is not in doubt, however, are the several terrorist plots planned by the group, which were foiled by the Philippine police.[104]

The amorphous threat of regional terrorism, one that has grown beyond the JI, means that the situation may be akin to that of a nascent regional insurgency. The linkages between the various radical groups and the shared radical ideology suggest that coordinated transboundary terrorist attacks are a real possibility. This leads to the conclusion that a key objective of regional counterterrorism must be

to prevent various local jihadists in local conflict zones from linking up with each other to carry out attacks throughout the region.

Regional Responses to Terrorism

Southeast Asia's response to the events of 9-11 has been mixed. The case of Indonesia reflects the gulf between the government and broader civil society, which has been strongly anti-U.S. President Megawati was the first head of state to visit the United States after 9-11, a strong symbolic gesture as Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country. Megawati condemned the attacks and pledged to support the global war against terrorism.[105] However, the response in Indonesia, led by fundamentalist and radical elements, was defensive and strongly anti-U.S. Sensational conspiracy theories were circulated to refute the allegation that Muslims had been responsible for the 9-11 attacks. For instance, 9-11 was believed by many to have been a Mossad–Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plot designed to discredit Islam.[106] This defensiveness could be attributed to the growing fundamentalism within Indonesia since the late 1970s following the worldwide Islamic revival as well as to the deep feelings of insecurity at a time of momentous domestic change and uncertainty following the Asian financial crisis and the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998.

The U.S.-led global war on terrorism after 9-11 was met with huge anti-U.S. demonstrations in Indonesia, which culminated in calls to "sweep" and expel citizens of the United States. Calls for jihad or holy war could be heard in many mosques in the country.[107] In this context, Indonesia's official response to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was predictably critical, as it was seen as an unjust attack on a Muslim country. Reflecting the strength of domestic anti-U.S. sentiments, President Megawati thus openly criticized the United States, stating that "no individual, group or government has the right to try to catch terrorist perpetrators by attacking the territory of another country."[108]

The deadly terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002, which killed 202 people, came as a shock. However, the assertions by the United States and other Western states that the attack was carried out by a shadowy organization known as the Jemaah Islamiah was initially met with widespread denial and skepticism. Many Indonesians thought that the United States was blaming Islam since the term "jemaah islamiah" simply meant a Muslim community. Indeed many Indonesians, including the educated elite, chose to believe that Bali was in fact a CIA-backed plot aimed at discrediting Islam. According

to Tatik Hafidz, there was a widely circulated conspiracy thesis that the CIA and Mossad masterminded the Bali bombings to prove that terrorist networks existed in Indonesia in order to draw Jakarta into supporting the U.S.-led global war on terrorism.[109] Given this context, it was not surprising that in September 2003, Vice President Hamzah Haz openly ridiculed suggestions that the country faced a serious terrorist threat, and instead stated that the United States was the "king of terrorists."[110]

President Megawati, however, strongly supported counterterrorism efforts in the wake of the Bali bombings, as Bali was one of her power bases and the attacks had severely disrupted Bali's tourism-dependent economy. Indonesia accepted police and forensic assistance from the Australian Federal Police to investigate the attack, which led to the arrest of a number of JI operatives. The lack of remorse shown by the Bali bombers as well as a string of other terrorist attacks in Indonesia gradually changed domestic perceptions regarding the threat emanating from radical Islamist groups. Indeed, the Bali attack was followed by a second Bali attack in 2005. Other JI attacks included the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 that killed 12 people, mostly Indonesians, and the attack on the Australian High Commission in 2004 that resulted in the deaths of 11 people, all Indonesians.[111] These attacks turned many Indonesians against the radicals, as most of the victims of terrorist attacks were Indonesian Muslims.

Malaysia was put on the defensive because of circumstantial evidence that Malaysia had been the launching pad for a number of Al Qaeda–linked terrorist plots or attacks, such as the abortive Operation Bojinka in 1995, the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, the abortive Singapore bomb plots of 2002, and the 9-11 attacks.[112] Indeed, a Malaysian trained in biochemistry, Yazid Sufaat, is believed by the United States to be the paymaster for Zacarias Moussaoui, the Frenchman charged with involvement in the 9-11 attacks. Yazid also allegedly hosted two of the 9-11 hijackers when they visited Kuala Lumpur in 2000.[113] Although Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia publicly condemned the attacks on 9-11, the main opposition party, the fundamentalist Partai Islam (PAS), reflecting anti-U.S. sentiments on the ground, openly praised Osama bin Laden.[114]

In contrast, Singapore, a key ally of the United States in the region, was unequivocal in its support. It held a memorial ceremony to the victims of 9-11 at the National Stadium on September 23, 2001 that was attended by 15,000 people, despite the fact that no Singaporean had been killed in the terrorist attacks. Significantly, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore stated at the rally that

"Singapore would stand with the US in the fight against terrorism, even though it has to manage both regional and domestic sensitivities in doing so."[115] This statement alluded to the fact that there exist strong Muslim sensitivities in the region that could complicate counterterrorism efforts by the United States in the region.

Counterterrorism Strategies

The problem of terrorism in the Malay archipelago predates the events of 9-11 and Al Qaeda. The Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia in 1948 aimed to establish a Negara Islam Indonesia, or a Muslim state ruled by the *sharia* or Islamic laws. The rebellion led to the loss of some 25,000 lives and was crushed only in 1962 following the capture of its leader, Kartoesuwirjo.[116] In Malaysia there have been a string of violent incidents involving Muslim militants since the worldwide Islamic revivalism following the Iranian revolution in 1979. In 1980 members of an extremist group attempted to launch a jihad by attacking a police station in Johore.[117] In 1985 18 people were killed in a violent confrontation with members of an extremist group at Memali.[118] In 2000, 27 members of the extremist Al-Ma'unah dressed in military fatigues raided a military armoury in Sauk in order to begin a campaign of terror attacks aimed at overthrowing the government.[119] In the same year, the ASG raided the tourist resort of Sipadan and kidnapped 21 hostages.[120] The uncovering of the extremist Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) in 2001 also raised serious concerns over the spread of radicalism, given its links to the JI and Al Qaeda. The government thus began to express concern over the many Malaysians who had studied in madrassas in Pakistan, where they could have been exposed to radical ideology.[121] In 2000 the then Malaysian defence minister Tun Najib (who is now the prime minister) in fact identified Islamic militancy as Malaysia's greatest internal security threat.[122]

The JI bomb plots in Singapore that were revealed in a surveillance videotape recovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 were ambitious and audacious. The planned coordinated attacks would have been the largest terrorist attack since 9-11. The bomb plots revealed that Singapore is a key radical Islamist target, given its non-Muslim majority, close ties with Israel, the United States, and the West, and the historically problematic ethnic relations between the ethnic Chinese and Malay Muslims in the region. Singapore's counterterrorism response has therefore been the most determined and comprehensive of the states in the region, encompassing active security as well as passive civil defence measures.

Its homeland security doctrine has become a model for homeland defence and counterterrorism, and deserves a brief summation.

Soon after the events of 9-11, Singapore swiftly adopted a new homeland security doctrine that focused on interagency cooperation in November 2001.[123] This was refined in its National Security Strategy in 2004, which is built upon the detection, prevention, and mitigation of terrorist attacks. The strategy strongly emphasized interagency cooperation, regional and international cooperation, and the strengthening of national resilience.[124]

Given its strategic location and its position as a global commercial hub, it undertook a number of measures to enhance transport security in aviation and shipping. For instance, air marshals have been deployed on board Singapore Airlines flights.[125] Singapore has also implemented enhanced security requirements under the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code and amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, which came into effect on July 1, 2004.[126] Singapore also built upon its impressive civil defence capabilities to mitigate the effect of any terrorist attack. Singapore invested heavily in counternuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) capabilities, such as by setting up NBC response teams and constructing decontamination facilities in subway train stations. It also implementing a National Security Awareness Programme.[127] In 2003 it established a Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Center, a joint U.S.-Singapore initiative, to counter any pandemic or biological attack.[128]

Singapore took advantage of the post 9-11 U.S.-led global war on terrorism to enhance its alliance with the United States—a strategic move—as it needed assistance to counter the terrorist threat as well as allies to bolster its often precarious position as a small city-state in the midst of an occasionally unstable Malay archipelago. Thus, after 9-11, Singapore openly supported all U.S.-led initiatives in the global war on terrorism, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the International Port Security Program (IPSP).[129] Singapore was also a member of the "coalition of the willing" that supported the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Singapore's contribution from 2003 to 2008 consisted of a police training team in Baghdad, five deployments of KC-135 air refuelling tankers, one deployment of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, and five deployments of an amphibious warship to help protect offshore oil facilities and patrol the coast of Iraq.[130] Singapore's support for the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has continued with its small-scale participation in the Afghanistan theatre by providing

provincial reconstruction teams, medical teams, a weapon-locating radar, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), air-tanker refuelling aircraft, and artillery trainers.[131]

However, what is truly unique about the approach to counterterrorism by Singapore and Malaysia has been their comprehensive approach. Both countries have had recent historical experience with communist insurgency, for instance, during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s. The British success in counterinsurgency during this period has been held as a model for counterinsurgency elsewhere. The strategy employed in Malaya was a comprehensive one: the military means employed were part of a broader approach that included political, economic, social, and psychological instruments, the ultimate objective being the winning of the hearts and minds of the population.[132] This contrasts with the hard security approach characterized by the kinetic application of military force that the United States followed after 9-11, until it too began to adopt a comprehensive approach in 2006 with revisions to the *United States Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual*.[133] The Malayan Emergency provided a useful template on the basis of which the United States could revise its outdated counterinsurgency strategy. In this respect, the experience of the region with terrorism and insurgency has contributed to the development of contemporary U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. The revised counterinsurgency strategy, emphasizing a comprehensive, "hearts and minds" approach, has been implemented in Iraq and more recently in Afghanistan.[134]

Given the counterterrorism legacy that it inherited from the Malayan Emergency, the Singapore approach has been to emphasize the need for a hearts and minds strategy that can counter the ideological nature of the radical Islamist threat.[135] Although it does possess draconian powers under harsh preventive detention laws dating from the Emergency, the Singapore government has been careful in the use of these laws against the alleged JI operatives arrested after the exposure of the bomb plots in 2001. Significantly, in January 2003 the Singapore government released a white paper entitled "The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism" that listed those detained, described the charges against them, and explained the nature of the terrorist threat.[136] This openness as well as a strong emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment for those detained contrasted with the hard security approach under the Bush administration, which was marked by the use of torture, secret detention camps, and years of secrecy regarding those detained.

The detainees in Singapore have been assigned officers who look after their welfare, including that of their families. They receive

regular visits from their families as well as community representatives, and have been given regular religious counseling to help reform their views. A Religious Rehabilitation Group consisting of Muslim clerics is tasked with reforming the views of the detainees by providing a counterideology to rebut the claims of radical Islam.[137] The clerics work with the families of the detainees and also help ensure that those released will obtain both jobs and financial support from the government to help reintegrate themselves into society.[138]

The open and relaxed manner in which the JI detainees were treated led to the unfortunate and embarrassing escape of the head of the JI cell in Singapore, Mas Selamat Kasturi, in 2008. He was able to make his escape from an unsecured toilet in the visitors' area of the detention center where he was held. He was recaptured in early 2009 in Malaysia, together with three other JI members.[139] However, this unfortunate incident should not obscure the general soundness of the soft approach. One important objective of this approach is to prevent any perception of gross mistreatment that could easily increase resentment in the Muslim community, which is already on the defensive over the actions of the militants. The failure to win over the Muslim community would be counterproductive as it would lead to more dissatisfied individuals joining the terrorist cause, thereby worsening the problem of terrorism. Moreover, the successful rehabilitation of detainees, involving the recantation of their radical beliefs, is a propaganda boost for the government's efforts to win over the hearts and minds of the Muslim population.

Indeed the government believes that the best way to deal with the radical Islamists is to discredit their ideology and marginalize them within the Muslim community. Reformed militants provide an invaluable tool for countering the claims of radical Islamists, bolster the legitimacy of the authorities and contribute to the winning of hearts and minds that can marginalize the militants.[140] Reformed extremists can also help convince their former militant colleagues to abandon their violent struggle for an Islamic state. The rehabilitation approach has had partial success, with more than one-third of the 70 people arrested since 2001 in Singapore being released by mid-2007. This has sparked interest in the United States, which has been faced with the problem of what to do with its own terrorist detainees.[141] A major study on deradicalization in the United States in 2010 thus noted that "individual de-radicalisation and disengagement programmes—such as the ones in Saudi-Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia, and other countries—can make a difference . . . their positive and outward-looking approach should serve as an inspiration for governments and policymakers everywhere."[142]

Malaysia, too, has embraced an approach based on rehabilitation. Swift security measures coupled with a psychological approach have been credited with ensuring that Malaysia has kept militant violence under control. The resolution of the raid by the extremist Al-Ma'unah on a military armory in 2000 demonstrated this use of a more calibrated soft approach. The 27 militants involved were pursued and surrounded by security forces after they had executed two non-Muslim hostages. The security forces, however, blasted the militants, not with weapons but with loudspeakers that broadcast songs by P. Ramli, a popular Malay singer. Their families were also brought in to speak with them. Suitably softened, unarmed commandoes then went in for talks and overpowered the militants without a shot being fired.[143]

Malaysia's prisoner-release program has also had some success. Some of the over 100 alleged militants belonging to radical groups such as the Al-Ma'unah, the KMM, and the JI who had been held under preventive detention laws have been released and reintegrated into society. Ex-militants who have recanted have proven useful in countering extremism. For instance, Wan Min Wan Mat, a former KMM and JI leader who was released in 2005, openly urged his former colleagues in the JI, such as Azahari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top, to renounce violence.[144]

In Indonesia, as noted above, the reaction of many Indonesians to the U.S.-led global war on terrorism after 9-11 was one of suspicion and hostility. Anti-U.S. sentiments increased in the wake of the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in 2001 and reached a peak after the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003. Large anti-U.S. demonstrations, which began after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, continued long after they had abated in the rest of the world.[145] However, the deadly terrorist attack in Bali in 2002 and other subsequent terrorist attacks carried out by the JI led to a growing realization that the radicals in Indonesia had to be restrained.

Thus, on October 18, 2002, six days after the Bali bombing, President Megawati issued Perpus (or Legal Act) 1/2002 and 2/2002. Perpu 1/2002 provided that an act of terrorism, or the planning or assisting of an act of terrorism, could be punished by death. Section 46 allowed for its retrospective application if that was authorized by another law. This section was contained in Perpu 2/2002. Both the laws were approved by parliament as part of Indonesia's antiterrorism law in 2003.[146] Indonesia's commitment to countering terrorism received a boost when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected in 2004. Yudhoyono is remembered for his moving eulogy to the victims of the Bali attack on its anniversary in 2003, when he denounced

the "terrorists who wanted to make a senseless demonstration of their hatred for others."[147]

Indonesia has since developed a highly regarded counterterrorism force, Densus 88 (or Detachment 88), which has been responsible for many counterterrorism successes against the JI. Up until 2009, it had arrested or killed some 450 suspected militants.[148] However, the general Indonesian approach has mirrored that of Singapore and Malaysia. Apart from hard security measures, equal or greater emphasis has been placed on police and intelligence work coupled with the rehabilitation of radical elements. Like Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia is cognizant of the ideological nature of the struggle, and has been aware of the need to create a counternarrative to JI's radical ideology.[149] The best way to do this is through the rehabilitation of militants and the winning over of the hearts and minds of the general Muslim population. As the head of Indonesia's Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Desk explained: "Because terrorism is an ideologically motivated crime, it is not possible to stop it using mere physical operations . . . based on our experience, the harder we hit them with military force, the more radical they become."[150] Thus, although a new counterterrorism coordinating agency that reports directly to the president was established in early 2010, the agency has been tasked not just with detecting terrorist cells and disrupting planned attacks, but also with preventing terrorism through an emphasis on rehabilitation.[151]

This soft approach has often been misunderstood, particularly in the West, as being complacent about the threat of terrorism. Thus, there was outrage in Australia over pictures of the police chief, General Dai Bachtiar, chatting amicably with Amrozi, a key suspect in the Bali bombing. Another incident involved another top police officer General Gorries Mere, who was seen having coffee at a Starbucks café in Jakarta in 2004 with another key suspect in the Bali bombing named Ali Imron.[152] However, Indonesian police, like the Malaysian and Singapore police, do not generally torture suspects or chain them up in harsh conditions. The approach adopted by the United States during the Bush administration, epitomized by torture at Guantanamo Bay, is seen by security services in the Malay archipelago as counterproductive as they believe that such an approach in fact generates much greater hostility and results in greater, not less, terrorism. In the two cases discussed here, the police officers were only putting the suspects at ease to gain their cooperation.

Indonesia has managed to convince a number of militants to reform and rejoin mainstream society. Up to 20 of the 50 high-ranking JI leaders arrested are said to have recanted and are assisting the

authorities.[153] The public face of the government's rehabilitation efforts is Nasir Abbas, a senior JI leader who trained many of the JI operatives who were involved in recent terrorist attacks in Indonesia. After his capture in 2003, he recanted as he felt guilty of having indirectly caused the deaths of so many innocent civilians. He also attributed his turnaround to the humane and respectful treatment that he had received at the hands of the police after his capture. Abbas has since urged his former colleagues to "return to the right path of Islamic teaching," which, he asserts, forbids the killing of innocents. Abbas has also helped Indonesian police to track down his former colleagues, including Azahari Husin, who was killed by security forces in a shoot-out in 2005.[154]

The relative success of the soft approach is reflected in the fact that the governments of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have released almost 40 percent of their JI detainees.[155] The general approach in the region thus deviates significantly from the U.S. prescription based on a "kill or capture" policy that characterized counterterrorism strategy under the Bush administration.

In contrast to its neighbours, the Philippines' response to terrorism has not been as calibrated and has been somewhat kinetic and military in orientation, despite the formal existence of a supposedly comprehensive strategy under the National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences (NPTC). Under the National Plan, poverty-reduction programs have been carried out in order to address the root cause of terrorism. However, in practical terms, the emphasis has been on hard military measures, in view of the significant security problems that the country faces, such as the Maoist insurgency in Luzon and the Muslim Moro separatism in the south, serious governance issues, and the general lack of economic resources. The Philippines has thus welcomed military assistance from the United States in combating the Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group in the southern provinces. This assistance has included transport aircraft, helicopters, patrol craft, armored personnel carriers, assault rifles, and antiterrorism training.[156] In January 2002 U.S. troops arrived to provide training and technical assistance to the Philippine Armed Forces against the ASG.[157] In addition the United States has provided development aid to the south.[158] Australia has also provided assistance in the form of 28 patrol boats and an annual grant of A$4 million in training assistance, which has helped to improve naval patrol capabilities around its southern maritime waters.[159] In return, the Philippines responded to 9-11 by providing limited, symbolic support for the occupation of Iraq by the United States in 2003. This consisted of a small team of

51 military personnel, who withdrew in 2004 in response to a demand by Iraqi insurgents holding a Filipino truck driver as a hostage.[160]

The government, however, is aware of the need for a comprehensive strategy to deal with the multifaceted security challenges posed by the insurgents. It thus replaced its previous military-oriented Fourteen Point plan to counter terrorism with a new Sixteen Point Counter-Terrorism Program in 2005, and passed the Human Security Act in 2007. These measures provide the Philippines with a comprehensive strategic approach that utilizes political, diplomatic, economic, and military instruments. The new comprehensive strategy incorporates conflict management, postconflict peace-building, economic development, and addresses the root causes of conflict. An Anti-Terrorism Council was also established to coordinate the new interagency whole-of-government approach.[161] The Council replaced the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) that had been established in 2004 after the SuperFerry terrorist attack.[162] The renewed emphasis on a comprehensive strategy is in line with the general approach favored by the other states in the Malay archipelago. However, whether the Philippines has the capacity, given serious governance issues, to implement such an approach effectively remains to be seen.

COOPERATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM

The emergence of the global radical Islamist threat that was epitomized by the 9-11 attacks was immediately recognized as a challenge that required a global response. The states in Southeast Asia which are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) thus responded to 9-11 by condemning terrorism and offering to cooperate to combat it. The ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in November 2001 pledged that it would enhance intelligence exchange, strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), and other ASEAN bodies in countering terrorism, and support the United Nations in playing a greater role in combating international terrorism.[163] ASEAN intelligence chiefs also met in January 2002 and discussed the threat to the region posed by militant Islamic groups.[164]

In May 2002 the ASEAN states agreed to an Action Plan under which cooperation in intelligence sharing would be enhanced and uniform laws in countering terrorism established. Among the concrete projects adopted under the Action Plan was training on antiterror intelligence gathering and psychological warfare to be

provided by Malaysia, a workshop on combating international terrorism to be hosted by Indonesia, and logistical support for training in bomb detection, airport, and document security by Singapore. It also agreed that each member-state would form a special antiterrorist team to act as the contact point.[165] The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2002 also agreed on additional measures to cut off terrorist funding.[166] Following the Bali attacks, the ASEAN Summit in October 2002 agreed on new measures against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and endorsed the establishment of a Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) to be located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.[167] In May 2005 the chiefs of ASEAN police forces, meeting in Bali, agreed to reinforce and facilitate regional cooperation by assigning a police liaison officer in each ASEAN country.[168] In January 2007 the leaders of ASEAN signed a convention on counterterrorism cooperation, which recognized the importance of a global legal framework to combat terrorism and agreed that terrorism offenses such as hijacking, hostage-taking, or bombing were not political offenses and that terrorists could not hide behind political justifications to evade justice. ASEAN member-states also agreed to cooperate for the prevention of terrorist attacks, the financing of terrorism, and terrorist movement across national borders, as well as to enhance intelligence cooperation.[169]

Despite the apparent enthusiasm in combating the threat of global terrorism, however, the ASEAN states have been careful to stress their legal and cooperative approach. Thus, the ASEAN states made it clear that they will conduct regional counterterrorism in accordance with relevant U.N. resolutions and international laws. In addition, "cooperative efforts in this regard should consider joint practical counter-terrorism measures in line with specific circumstances in the region and in each member country."[170] Thus, the ASEAN states have tried to take an approach that is seen to be different from U.S.-led prescriptions based on unilateralism and the emphasis on hard security measures that characterized the Bush administration's approach. Although ASEAN has been derided for being "more notable for capacity-building and confidence-building measures . . . than for taking concrete measures or acting in concert to resolve particular regional security problems," the organization's political statements are important political ones in the face of domestic political constraints and sensitivities arising from strong anti-U.S. sentiments among Muslims in the region.[171] The ASEAN states have also signed joint declarations on countering terrorism with dialogue partners, such as the United States, Australia, Japan, and the European Union.

Again, these declarations are a clear statement of intent on the part of states in the region of their commitment to working multilaterally and in cooperation with external powers to combat the threat posed by global terrorism.

Aside from regional initiatives, the states involved in combating radical Islamists have strengthened interstate cooperation. Indeed, it has been at the interstate level rather than at the level of ASEAN that counterterrorism cooperation has been practically implemented and been effective. In May 2002, for instance, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines signed a counterterrorism treaty to strengthen border controls, share airline passenger lists, establish hotlines, share intelligence, and adopt standard procedures for search and rescue.[172] Malaysia also signed a Declaration on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism with the United States in May 2002.[173] After the Bali bombing in 2002, Indonesia accepted assistance in forensic investigation from the Australian Federal Police.[174]

The governments in the Malay archipelago have also established counterterrorism training centers. SEARCCT was established in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, with training assistance provided by the United States, Australia, Japan, and the European Union. Significantly, according to its official website, SEARCCT has been "actively involved in attempting to change the mindset and paradigm of those who believe that the war on terror can only be won through military means . . . the Centre has utilized various training courses, conferences, seminars and forums to discuss and disseminate the root causes of terrorism, arguing that the campaign against terrorism requires a multi-pronged and multi-faceted approach."[175] In Indonesia, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (CLEC) was set up in Semarang with the assistance of Australia, with the objective of improving the operational expertise of regional law enforcement agencies.[176]

The Indonesian government has even established two intelligence universities to raise the professionalism of its counterterrorism forces and intelligence services. The International School of Intelligence Studies in Batam Island teaches a 14-month postgraduate master's degree course in Intelligence Art and Science, while another university in Sentul, Java runs an undergraduate program in intelligence.[177] Separately, Singapore has established a terrorism center that conducts research and training in counterterrorism and is developing a major terrorism database. This center, known as the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), is headed by Rohan Gunaratna, who is widely acknowledged as one of the world's leading experts on Al Qaeda.[178]

Terrorism in the Malay Archipelago

The reality behind the many ASEAN regional initiatives and pronouncements is that regional counterterrorism cooperation has been ad hoc and somewhat limited in nature. This is due to the declaratory nature of ASEAN pronouncements, the constraints of conflicting national interests, lingering interstate suspicions, the desire to maintain sovereignty, and domestic politics. Nonetheless, counterterrorism efforts at the level of the state, outside the ambit of ASEAN regionalism, have improved significantly. The capacity of the state to manage the terrorism problem has also shown marked improvement, as the counterterrorism successes in Indonesia and Malaysia have demonstrated.

The threat of radical Islamist terrorism in the region that emerged following the events of 9-11 and the Bali terrorist attack in 2002 appears to have diminished as a result of major counterterrorism efforts, given the overall decline in major terrorist incidents, although the hotel attacks in Jakarta in July 2009 provided a sharp reminder of the continuing threat. More generally, there has been growing acknowledgment that the threat has evolved into one that is much more diffuse, long-term, and ideological in nature. Like Al Qaeda at the global level, the JI has adapted to the very difficult security environment by recruiting and organizing outside its own structures, utilizing the linkages with radicalized individuals and other radical organizations that it has patiently built over the years. The more amorphous nature of the JI network has made it more difficult for terrorist plots to be tracked and disrupted. The threat of terrorism has thus evolved well beyond the JI, given the presence of other radical groups and the spread of radical ideology.

The JI has thus functioned very much like a Southeast Asian version of Al Qaeda, providing a revolutionary vanguard that has consolidated a regional presence for radical ideology, nurtured a cadre of militants, and helped pave the way for a long-term challenge by jihadists who will continue to agitate for a pan-Islamic caliphate encompassing the Malay archipelago and ruled by the *sharia*. Within the JI itself, there remains a hard core that is fully committed to its radical vision. The presence of ex-Afghan mujahideen in the region means that there is a ready pool of trained insurgents who could join the radical cause at any time. In addition, there is also a cadre of new recruits from local jihadist theaters such as Maluku and Sulawesi. More significantly, the threat has evolved beyond the JI to encompass an amorphous swathe of radical groups and cells that subscribe to

violent radical ideology and are prepared to carry out terrorist attacks. The spread of radical ideology through peaceful activities such as proselytizing and education not only represents a pernicious long-term threat but also means that the Malay archipelago is engaged in a long-term ideological struggle with radical Islam.

The environment for counterterrorism has improved with counterterrorism successes and the loss of popular sympathy for radical groups following a string of deadly terrorist attacks in Indonesia. However, the situation remains challenging not just for the reasons outlined above. There remains a strong defensiveness among many Muslims, deep resentment at being apparently singled out by the West, and the reluctance to crack down too hard on radical elements, particularly on their proselytizing and education activities, for fear of creating a greater backlash. This is reflected in the popularity of various conspiracy theories in Indonesia. For instance, many Indonesians, including the educated elite, continue to believe that the various terrorist attacks in Indonesia since 9-11 have been intelligence operations supported by the West aimed at discrediting Islam justifying domestic security action against Muslim political opposition and designed to force Muslim states in the region to join the U.S.-led global war on terrorism.[179]

Another factor that cautions against any undue optimism is that despite the apparent emergence of the "new" Al Qaeda–inspired terrorism in the region, the JI phenomenon in fact represents more continuity rather than change in the Malay archipelago. This is because all radical groups in the region, such as the JI, KMM, Al-Ma'unah, the ASG, Raja Soleiman Movement, and Laskar Mujahideen, are local in origin. The JI itself can trace its ideological roots to the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s. Indeed, a number of its operatives are offspring of Darul Islam families. Radicalism has clearly been boosted by external developments, such as the worldwide Islamic revivalism and the emergence of Al Qaeda. But the persistence of the idea of an Islamic state indicates the long-standing presence of fundamental political, economic, and social problems in the region, including enduring issues relating to the legitimacy and very character of the postcolonial state.

There are thus long-term underlying causes of the terrorist problem in the region. This suggests that the solution does not lie in the sole pursuit of hard security measures, since the problem is not merely a security issue. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and more recently the Philippines, have thus, to varying degrees of competence, given governance issues in some countries, pursued broader, comprehensive

strategies designed to win over the hearts and minds of their Muslim populations. This is based on the understanding in the region, given historical experience, of the need to win the ideological battle with radical Islam in order to establish and affirm the state's legitimacy. Thus, governments in the region are generally sensitive toward avoiding overt mistreatment or the perception of mistreatment that could reverberate and increase the hostility and resentment of local Muslims, thereby worsening the problem of terrorism. In particular, the rehabilitation of militants is considered an important tool in the propaganda war against the radical Islamists, as rehabilitated militants could in turn contribute to the counternarrative that could reduce recruitment for the terrorist cause.

The prospects are, however, positive, if the objective is not to "win" the "war against terrorism," but to contain, within acceptable boundaries, what has proven to be an historical social phenomenon. Because of doubts over the accuracy of the "new" terrorism paradigm in describing the terrorism phenomenon in the region, and also because of long-standing practices in dealing with Muslim rebellion, the regional response to terrorism has differed from prescriptions of the United States under the Bush administration based on a "kill or capture" strategy. Instead, the states in the Malay archipelago have adopted versions of comprehensive counterterrorism strategies that have been proven to work in the past and that are more appropriate, given the local context. Above all, the states in the region are aware of the long-term nature of the ideological battle with the radical Islamists for hearts and minds. They thus take a long-term perspective and aim to use every instrument at their disposal to win the battle for the soul of their Muslim communities. In doing so, the objective is not victory over terrorism but a more realistic one of containment.

Finally, although terrorism remains a serious security challenge in the region, it is part of the complex mix of interrelated security challenges. The following chapters explain how terrorism issues are interlinked with other security challenges, and suggest that these complexities mean that approaching the region primarily through the lens of U.S.-led global counterterrorism is not only inappropriate, given the region's specific circumstances, but also counterproductive, as it could unleash unintended consequences that could destabilize the region.

Chapter 3

Insurgencies

New Versus Old Terrorism in the Malay Archipelago

Any discussion of terrorism in the Malay archipelago must involve an examination of existing Muslim separatist insurgencies, given the alleged linkages between them. The presence and endurance of armed Muslim separatist groups in the Malay archipelago, which long predate Al Qaeda and the events of 9-11, reflect separate ethnonationalist sentiments arising from the alienation of minorities by the artificially constructed postcolonial state in Southeast Asia. Indeed Al Qaeda had been very aware of these grievances and had sought to exploit them even before 9-11. Al Qaeda had hoped that disaffected Muslims in the region would join its global jihad against the West, and had seen the Malay archipelago as a potential recruiting ground for radical Islam. Thus, prior to 9-11, it provided funding and training to various insurgent groups, such as the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in an attempt to penetrate and co-opt these groups into its global agenda.[1] Not surprisingly, the United States has paid special attention to the region after the events of 9-11. As Washington's leading counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategist David Kilcullen has observed, if Al Qaeda manages to substantially penetrate the Malay archipelago, where the world's largest population of Muslims resides, the global jihad propagated by radical Islamists might attain an unstoppable momentum.[2] Thus, after 9-11, the United States has focused attention not just on radical Islamist groups in the region but also on existing Muslim separatist movements that could potentially link up with these radical

groups and pose a strategic threat to the United States and its interests in the region.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States, President Bush declared a war on the new global terrorism. The discovery and arrest of operatives of the Al Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiah (JI) radical Islamist network in Southeast Asia in late 2001 led to Southeast Asia (or more accurately, the Malay archipelago) being designated as the "second front" in this global war. Thus, the United States sent troops to the southern Philippines in January 2002 to help train and support the Philippine Armed Forces in counterinsurgency operations against the Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group.

However, the question that arose is whether terrorism in the region is part of the "new" global terrorism led by Al Qaeda and motivated by apocalyptic religion or whether it is in fact a continuation of the preexisting ethno-nationalist insurgency (or the old terrorism). Indeed a key debate in terrorism studies has been the question of how "new" the new terrorism epitomized by Al Qaeda really is.[3] The "new" terrorism analysts, such as Bruce Hoffman, have argued that globalization and other factors have resulted in a new form of globalized, religious terrorism that is a departure from traditional, older forms of ethno-nationalist and political terrorism. This new terrorism is characterized by the apocalyptic, religious nature of its objectives, a global orientation through a networked organizational structure, the ability to reach out to a much larger audience than was possible in the past through the Internet and other opportunities afforded by the communications and IT revolution, reduced reliance on state sponsors and fixed bases due to the ability to operate in the borderless global economy, and the interest in mass casualty terrorist attacks to punish and destroy the unbelievers.[4]

On the other hand, the critics of the "new" terrorism argue that terrorism is a historical social phenomenon and that there is nothing really "new" about the current religious wave. Thomas Mockaitis, for instance, argued that "despite the oft-repeated claims of pundits that a 'new terrorism' strides the globe, Al Qaeda operations resemble those of similar organisations over the last century."[5] David Rapoport has also posited an alternative paradigm in his four waves of terrorism theory. He has argued that terrorism has come in waves: the anarchist wave from the 1880s to the 1920s, the anticolonial one from the 1920s to the 1960s, the New Left wave from the 1960s to the 1990s, and finally, the current religious wave that began in 1979 following the Iranian revolution.[6] Thus, the terrorism phenomenon continues to be characterized by a degree of historical continuity rather than change.

How "new" is the new terrorism in Southeast Asia? In what way, if any, has the new terrorism penetrated and transformed the older, preexisting ethno-nationalist insurgent movements? Given the links between some local radical Islamist groups (such as the JI) and Al Qaeda, the new terrorism can be said to have penetrated the region. However, this clearly exists in tandem with preexisting ethno-nationalist insurgencies, that is, the old terrorism. These preexisting insurgencies are symptoms of the long-standing ethnic, religious, political, economic, and social grievances that predated the events of 9-11 and Al Qaeda.

Given the events of 9-11, the impact of new forms of terrorism from outside the region, particularly the new modes of operation pioneered by Al Qaeda, obviously needs to be evaluated. However, a closer analysis reveals more continuity than change. The continuity stems from the nexus between the lack of legitimacy of the states in the region and the armed rebellions that have beset the region since decolonization after 1945. Their persistence and severity are indicative of the failure of the postcolonial state to establish its legitimacy. Thus, according to a prescient observation by Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "in post-colonial Southeast Asia, it has been conveniently forgotten by central governments that the constructing of what is more accurately a state-nation merely means that external or western imperialism had been replaced by an internalized one, which is potentially more brutal and enduring."[7]

Armed Muslim separatist rebellions have taken place in Aceh at the northern tip of Sumatra in Indonesia, the Malay Muslim provinces of southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines, centered mainly, though not exclusively, in Mindanao. These rebellions stem from long-standing fundamental grievances that are political, economic, and social in nature, and reflect the failure of nation-building and territorial governance in the states of the region after decolonization. As W. K. Che Man noted in his seminal study of Muslim separatisms in Southeast Asia, "the incorporation of the Moros of Mindanao and the Malays of Patani into the Philippine and Thai states respectively, was the end result of centuries of struggle . . . it was accidents of political history which placed the hitherto autonomous Muslim communities under alien rule."[8]

An assessment of Muslim separatist insurgencies in the Malay archipelago in this chapter indicates that although Al Qaeda has attempted to penetrate and co-opt local rebel groups into its global jihad, it has met with mixed results due to the strength of preexisting local ethno-nationalist sentiments. Indeed, the local dynamic appears to be somewhat more dominant, given that even local radical Islamist

groups, such as the JI, predate Al Qaeda and emerged in response to local grievances and conditions. Indeed the JI can trace its roots to the Darul Islam movement of the 1950s. Moreover, despite claims of Al Qaeda linkages, the exact nature of the relationship between Al Qaeda and the larger local Muslim rebel groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, has been disputed.[9] The conclusion must therefore be that the global terrorism lens with which the United States and the West have generally viewed this region has severe shortcomings, particularly in understanding and crafting responses to Muslim rebellion in this pivotal region. Much greater sophistication and depth of understanding of Muslim alienation and rebellion in the Malay archipelago are needed if appropriate strategies that can address and contain the problem are to be crafted.

More interestingly, counterinsurgency in the Southeast Asian context has recently informed U.S. strategy in its search for solutions to the many challenges in the global war on terror, particularly given the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The strategy of the United States, which after 9-11 emphasized a narrow "kill or capture" approach toward terrorists based on the application of hard security measures, has evolved in recent times to a more comprehensive approach emphasizing the winning of hearts and minds. The following sections examine each of the three Muslim separatist insurgencies in the Malay archipelago and conclude with their implications for counterterrorism, including an examination of how the lessons of Southeast Asian counterinsurgency have contributed to recent developments in U.S. counterinsurgency strategy.

Moro Muslim Separatism

The Moro Muslim rebellion centered on the southern island of Mindanao in the Philippines has been the largest and most persistent of the armed separatist movements in the Malay archipelago. The roots of the conflict can be traced historically to the arrival of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century in the Philippine islands. Spanish colonialism halted the gradual process of Islamization in the islands that had been the result of proselytizing by Arab traders. Spanish colonial rule ensured that Catholicism became well-established in the north and central parts of the Philippines. However, despite continuous attempts to subjugate the southern Moro Muslim sultanates, the Spanish were never able to succeed in doing so. The Spanish defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898 led to a change in colonial rule from that of Spain to that of the United States.[10] However, the

Moro Muslims in the south did not accept the rule of the United States and thus rose in rebellion. With its superior firepower, these uprisings were easily and brutally crushed by the United States. The subsequent U.S. policy of integrating the Moros into the Philippine State led to the dissatisfaction of the Muslim Moros and ultimately to their rejection of the Philippine State.[11]

After that, a massive influx of Catholic settlers from the north arrived to cultivate the land, establish businesses, and staff the civil bureaucracy. The Catholic settlers took over what had been ancestral Moro lands, often through outright confiscation or dubious legal transactions. This resulted in many Moros becoming landless.[12] This problem became exacerbated by the government policy of settling surrendered communist and Huk rebels in the south as a result of the Huk-communist rebellion in 1948.[13] Widespread landlessness, poverty, and unemployment among the Muslim Moros, in turn, contributed to a very deep sense of alienation. The Moro Muslims were also overwhelmed by the new Catholic settlers, becoming a minority in many parts of their traditional homeland by the 1960s. From about 76 percent in the 1900s, the percentage of Muslims in Mindanao declined sharply to 20 percent in the 1990s.[14]

The Philippine government has acknowledged that the fundamental causes of the conflict in Mindanao are: massive poverty, poor governance, injustice and abuse of power, control of political power by a few, and the lack of recognition of the ancestral domain of the Moros.[15] In addition, according to Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, the root cause also lies in "the various campaigns, military and otherwise, by Spanish, American, and Filipino Governments to subjugate, assimilate and integrate the Bangsamoro into the mainstream body politic."[16]

The fundamental political, economic, and social grievances of the Moros were reinforced by a growing sense of Muslim identity following decolonization in the Middle East as well as in nearby Indonesia and Malaysia. The Moros established contacts with Islamic organizations abroad and strengthened their separate Muslim Moro identity in the face of a Catholic-dominated central government in Manila. Given the depth of fundamental grievances, the situation was ripe for an uprising. The spark that ignited the Moro rebellion was an incident known as the Jabidah massacre. President Marcos had sponsored military training in Corregidor for an intended separatist rebellion in the Malaysian state of Sabah, which is claimed by the Philippines. However, following a mutiny, 28 Muslim recruits at Corregidor were executed in 1968, an event that enraged the Moro community and provided a strong impetus toward armed rebellion against the Philippine state.[17]

In 1969 the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was thus created with the aim of establishing an independent state in the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. Other Muslim separatist organizations were also established at around the same time: for instance, the Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations (UIFO) and the Ansar El Islam. Overseas sympathizers in the Middle East, notably Libya, established an Islamic Directorate of the Philippines to coordinate overseas assistance.[18]

The MIM's simple objective was the creation of an independent Moro homeland. According to its constitution, this objective was justified due to "the policy of isolation and dispersal of the Muslim community by the government (which) has been detrimental to the Muslims and Islam." The MIM also argued in its constitution that "Islam being a communal religion and ideology, and at the same time a way of life, must have a definite territory of its own for the exercise of its tenets and teaching, and for the observance of its *sharia* (religious) and *adat* (customary) laws."[19] The MIM also cited a list of specific reasons that drove it to fight for independence. These included the establishment of provincial and municipal governments that undermined the status of traditional leaders; the imposition of a legal system that negated the judicial functions of the village elders, thereby causing a breakdown of social order; the national education system that negated the traditional cultural values of the Moros; and the influx of settlers and "landgrabbers" into Muslim provinces that has undermined the economic base of the Moros.[20]

By the early 1970s, relations between the Catholics and the Muslims in the south had become so tense and violent that martial law had to be imposed in 1972, although it must be added that this also suited the personal ambitions of the then president Ferdinand Marcos.[21] At the same time, the MIM was dissolved in favor of a new organization known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which was led by Nur Misuari, a former student activist from the University of the Philippines. The leftist-oriented MNLF established external linkages from the outset, obtaining the support of countries such as Libya and Islamic organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC).[22] Many Moro Muslims rallied to the call to arms issued by the MNLF as it declared war on the Philippine State.

The MNLF's military arm, the Bangsa Moro Army, conducted a long and bitter guerrilla war against the Philippine State, one that eventually led to the deaths of over 100,000 people.[23] In 1976 the OIC helped to broker the Tripoli Agreement, under which 13 of Mindanao's 21 provinces were supposed to receive autonomy.[24]

The agreement broke down almost immediately due to mutual recriminations and suspicions, and fighting resumed. In 1978 a split between the left-wing nationalist and religious factions within the MNLF led to the setting up of the more overtly religious Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984.[25]

The MILF was led by Hashim Selamat, a religious scholar who had been trained at Cairo's Al-Azhar University and had originally joined the MNLF. It had an armed wing that was known as the Bangsa-Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). Through sympathizers and its support network abroad, it allegedly received periodic shipments of arms such as Russian-made RPG-2 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, and machine guns, and even U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles that were supplied to the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s. Combat-hardened Moros who had served as volunteer mujahideen in the Afghan war of resistance against the occupying Soviet forces in the 1980s also joined the MILF, providing it with valuable experience for the waging of guerilla warfare.[26] While the rival MNLF drew its support from the Tausugs in the relatively isolated island of Sulu, the MILF was able to draw on the support of the much larger Moro groups living in the main southern island of Mindanao. The MILF was also able to pick up large numbers of defectors from the MNLF, particularly after the latter signed a final peace agreement with the government in 1996, an act that more militant Moros regarded as a sellout.

The MILF thus grew rapidly, overtaking the rival MNLF as the standard-bearer for Moro aspirations for independence.[27] With the support of religious leaders, the MILF soon established control over large areas in Mindanao, becoming in effect the de facto government in a number of southern provinces. The People's Power revolution that overthrew President Ferdinand Marcos and brought Corazon Aquino to power in 1986 led to hopes that a peaceful settlement to the long-running Moro rebellion could be negotiated.[28] Although the MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, was prepared to negotiate, the problem was agreeing on the provinces that would obtain Muslim autonomy, as Muslims were now a minority in 18 of the 23 provinces in Mindanao and Sulu. The MILF, led by Hashim Selamat, refused to negotiate at all as its objective was independence, not autonomy within a Philippine State that it refused to recognize. Despite the failure to find a political solution, President Aquino proceeded to establish an Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1990, comprising four provinces and the city of Marani, where Muslims were in a majority, although clearly this fell far short of what the majority of Moros were prepared to accept.[29]

However, faced with declining strength due to defections to both the MILF and the government, as well as pressure from the OIC and Indonesia, the MNLF was forced to continue negotiations with the government and accept limited autonomy instead.[30] The result was a final peace agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government in August 1996. Under the agreement, the MNLF would establish a council to oversee development projects in Mindanao, with a Muslim autonomous region to be established after a referendum in 1999.[31] In support of the peace process, the Bishops-Ulama Conference (BUC) was also established to bring together religious leaders from the Catholic and Moro Muslim communities in an attempt to build confidence and improve the climate for peace.[32]

The MILF, however, denounced the agreement for its failure to address the Muslim demand for self-rule and described it as "an outright violation of the Tripoli agreement."[33] The MILF thus declared that it was taking over the Moro revolutionary movement.[34] The majority Catholics also refused to accept the agreement, as they opposed making concessions to the Muslims.[35] Another reason for the subsequent failure of the peace agreement and the renewal of fighting was also the inability of the MNLF to implement development programs that could improve the economic lot of the Moro Muslims. This meant that many Moros remained marginalized and alienated, prompting many to join in the continued fighting waged by the MILF. The problem of poverty and underdevelopment in Mindanao has been widely acknowledged to be one of the principal driving forces of the rebellion, with the entire region registering the highest incidences of poverty in an already poor country. Between 1991 and 1997, for instance, while the rest of the country experienced a significant decline in the incidences of poverty, the autonomous ARMM region in Mindanao experienced an increase in poverty; the number of poor people rose from an already high 50.7 percent to 57.3 percent of the population, a telling indicator of the economic marginalization of the Moro Muslims.[36]

The 1996 peace agreement thus failed to resolve the conflict, with Moro aspirations now championed by the MILF. Nur Misuari eventually brokered a unification deal with the by-now dominant MILF in 2001, rebelled against the Philippine State, and then fled to Malaysia, expecting refuge and protection. However, Malaysia handed him back to the Philippines in 2002 to face trial.[37] Misuari emerged again as a voice for peace and moderation several years later, directing his followers in 2009 to protect peace and security in the south and to extend full cooperation with the government.[38]

Violence continued after the 1996 peace agreement as the MILF continued to fight. Indeed in 1997, a year after the peace deal, the Philippine army continued to deploy four of its six divisions in Mindanao.[39] The ascension to power of President Joseph Estrada in 1998 reduced the prospects for any lasting peace agreement. Estrada, a former movie star keen to portray himself as a contemporary Clint Eastwood–type hero, vowed that "if they want war, we will give them war" and that Moro demands for independence would be met "over my dead body."[40] The OIC once again stepped in to mediate in talks between the MILF and the government. However, the negotiations collapsed in 2000; this was followed by an all-out offensive ordered by President Estrada. Although the offensive succeeded in capturing Camp Abubakar, the main MILF base, it merely dispersed the guerillas who launched a number of reprisal attacks.[41]

The Estrada government, however, did attempt to ameliorate the underlying economic conditions that are recognized as having contributed to the Moro rebellion. In 2000 the government launched a major development program funded by the World Bank and the European Union in Mindanao to develop the infrastructure as well as to rehabilitate Moros who had surrendered or who had abided by the peace accord in 1996. Separately, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also launched a program aimed at improving agriculture, consisting of postharvest facilities, credit and financing, and production support services.[42] But these programs were not effectively delivered due to corruption and the lack of security in the south. The economic and social marginalization of Moro Muslims thus remained a serious problem.

Ironically, it was the terrorist attacks on 9-11 that gave the peace process a boost. 9-11 focused unwelcome attention on the linkages that the MILF had developed with Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden had provided support to the MILF, channeling funds through his brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, who ran a Muslim charity in Manila in the 1990s.[43] Al Qaeda also provided training in terrorist skills to the MILF as well as to other regional radical elements in training camps run by the MILF in Mindanao.[44] However, despite its more overt religiosity in comparison to the left-wing MNLF and its linkages with external coreligionists and sympathizers such as Al Qaeda, the MILF has always emphasized its nationalist and territorial objectives. For instance, in an interview before the events of 9-11, Hashim Selamat declared that "we are not against Christian Filipinos . . . we are not against religion of any kind." He further stated that "we are simply against oppression . . . and to us, the worst

oppression is the long deprivation of the Bansamoro people of their inalienable rights to freedom and self-determination."[45] These sentiments did not indicate that the MILF would be willing participants in Al Qaeda's global jihad.

The events of 9-11 focused the attention of the United States on the Malay archipelago, particularly on Al Qaeda's linkages in the southern Philippines. Given the enormous military and economic resources of the United States, the MILF leadership recognized that its aspiration for a Bangsamoro or independent Moro homeland would be jeopardized if the United States threw in its lot with the central government. After all, U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan following the events of 9-11 had led to the swift ejection and flight of the Taliban regime in Kabul. Thus, the leadership pragmatically reassessed its previous links with Al Qaeda. The MILF quickly distanced itself, emphasizing instead its nationalist, rather than its religious credentials.[46] In March 2002 the MILF publicly rejected any links with global terrorism; it described itself as a "legitimate liberation organization" and stressed that it was participating in peace negotiations. The MILF also stated that it "counts on committed popular memberships who are not fanatical about their religion" and that it would not link up with "terrorism or any extremist groups using religious faith as a tool for terroristic activities."[47] In April 2002 the MILF also agreed to the joint training with the Philippine government of local ceasefire monitoring teams.[48] The Philippine government's chief peace negotiator, Jesus Dureza, was so impressed with the turnaround that he described the MILF as being "friendlier than the government" in peace negotiations, as it was the Philippine armed forces that appeared intent on using force to resolve the Moro issue.[49]

What this demonstrated is that Al Qaeda has had only partial success in penetrating the existing Moro rebellion. Although it has been able to virtually co-opt the smaller, extremist ASG, it has not been able to make major inroads into the MILF as it has not been able to overcome the deep nationalist imperative that has driven it. Another reason for its failure to deeply penetrate Moro society despite the depth of Moro alienation is the strength of local Maguindanao culture, which values traditional practices, customs, as well as moderation. As a local writer explained, "our culture is more merciful with a sense of forgiveness, in contrast to the essence of *sharia* which is retribution . . . it is rich in personal spirituality, not dogmatism."[50]

The death of Hashim Selamat due to natural causes in 2003 and his replacement as the leader of the MILF by its military commander, Murad Ebrahim, improved peace prospects as Murad is considered

relatively moderate and nationalist-oriented.[51] His personal links in Malaysia also suggested that he would be more amenable to Malaysia's moderating influence.[52] Murad and the central MILF leadership have so far consistently reiterated the MILF's nationalist and territorial objectives, keeping as far away as possible any suggestion that it might participate in Al Qaeda's global jihad or expand its objectives to encompass a pan-Islamic state in the region.

However, there are persistent reports that some MILF factions have maintained links with the Al Qaeda–linked JI, including providing refuge to JI operatives on the run from authorities in the region.[53] Some MILF commanders and members have also allegedly cooperated with the ASG in mounting attacks on the Philippine Army as well as conducted joint training with the JI.[54] These are indications that there exists within the MILF tension between radical pan-Islamism and ethno-nationalism, although clearly, the latter has been more dominant, given the moderation shown by its central leadership. On its part, the Arroyo government had been aware that it cannot seek a battlefield solution, as the MILF, with up to 35,000 combatants and strong popular support, cannot be neutralized on the battlefield. Manila has thus been anxious to continue negotiations with the moderate MILF central leadership to contain the situation in the south and hopefully arrive at a final political settlement. Indeed, the political nature of the MILF's demands opens the possibility of an eventual compromise that could marginalize the more extremist, pan-Islamist radical elements, particularly those in the smaller, Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group. Thus, despite the opening of a new "second front" against global terrorism in Southeast Asia with the arrival of over 600 troops from the United States in the southern Philippines in 2002, the MILF has not been designated by the United States as a terrorist organization, with U.S. troops instead providing technical and training assistance to help the armed forces target the more extremist ASG.[55]

The appointment in 2007 of a more amenable and enlightened military leadership in Mindanao helped to improve the climate for peace negotiations, as General Raymundo Ferrer emphasized the importance of development and education in building confidence and peace.[56] External parties also provided an external voice of moderation. For instance, Malaysia, Brunei, Libya, and Japan provided an International Monitoring Team to help maintain a ceasefire that in turn provided favorable conditions for negotiations to take place.[57] In August 2008 a comprehensive peace agreement was indeed signed, appearing to end the MILF rebellion. The proposed Muslim homeland would have had control over the exploitation of minerals and other natural

resources within its jurisdiction, and would have run its own security force. Such concessions to the Muslims, however, were strongly opposed by Catholics who rallied to block the agreement. A petition to the Philippine Supreme Court led to the unexpected blocking of its implementation on grounds that the demarcation of what constituted ancestral domains of the Moros was unconstitutional.[58]

This resulted in the breakdown of the ceasefire and the resumption of fighting, which led to a massive refugee crisis involving some 400,000 people.[59] A key MILF leader, Mohaqher Iqbal, warned in May 2009 that the violence would spread and hamper the resumption of negotiations, lamenting that any peace agreement with the Arroyo government would be unlikely as she "has no political will and . . . cannot deliver." According to Iqbal, the prospects for a lasting peace agreement after the end of Arroyo's term of presidency in 2010 would also be poor, if politicians opposed to any peace agreement were to be elected president.[60] Indeed, leading presidential aspirants, such as Senators Manuel Roxas and Panfilo Lacson, as well as the former president Joseph Estrada, opposed any ancestral land deal with the Moros. Estrada in fact openly called in 2008 for another all-out military offensive against the Moros, whom he described as untrustworthy.[61] In any event, none of these contenders made it to office in the 2010 presidential election, which was won by Benigno Aquino III, the son of the former president Corazon Aquino. In his inaugural speech, the new president stated that his government "will be sincere in dealing with all the peoples of Mindanao (and is) committed to a peaceful and just settlement of (the) conflict, inclusive of the interests of all, may they be *lumads* [natives], Bangsamoro, or Christian."[62] Aquino's election thus provided a fresh start to the stalled peace process.

However, even if a final peace agreement is signed, it will probably not mean the end of violence. The signing of a previous peace accord in 1996 had led to the MNLF laying down its arms but resulted in the defection of many of its dissatisfied members to the then more radical MILF. Any peace agreement in the current post 9/11 climate will inevitably lead to more extremist elements in the MILF defecting to more radical groups such as the ASG and the Rajah Soleiman Movement. The presence of religious extremists who are not prepared for any accommodation with the Catholic majority thus means that the violence in the south will probably continue indefinitely. Moreover, the fact is that Catholics outnumber Muslims in most provinces in Mindanao, which means that there is a large Catholic constituency that is opposed to greater Muslim autonomy. There exist a number of Catholic vigilante militias that could most certainly violently oppose

any final peace settlement that is perceived to have conceded too much to the Muslims.

The Moro Muslim problem thus demonstrates all the classic characteristics of a civil war, such as severity, duration, and persistence. Since the start of the insurgency in 1972, the Moro problem has remained as intractable as ever. The Moro problem has been the product of long-standing, historical circumstances that make compromise difficult. The conflict in the south is likely to continue in one form or another in the foreseeable future. Whether the Moro rebellion will eventually be transformed to link up with Al Qaeda's global jihad remains to be seen, suffice it to add that the nationalist impulse appears to be dominant for the time being.

Muslim Rebellion in Southern Thailand

The Muslim rebellion in southern Thailand has, to some extent, historical roots that are similar to the Moro rebellion. The southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun have predominantly Malay Muslim populations that have never really accepted the suzerainty of the Thai state. The causes of this alienation are varied, but a key factor is the historical circumstances of their incorporation into Thailand. These southern provinces were once part of the Malay kingdom of Pattani. Since 1785, Thai rulers have sought to bring the region under its indirect rule. In 1901 King Chulalongkorn launched a military campaign in the south to finally subjugate the Malays. In 1906 under a centralization program known as *thesaphiban*, the south was brought together under a single administrative unit called Monthon Patani. Siamese administrators from Bangkok were appointed to rule Monthon Patani.[63]

In 1909 amid colonial predations in Southeast Asia, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty was signed to demarcate the border between Siam and British Malaya. Thailand was forced to give up Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis to Britain but retained control of the other southern provinces and achieved recognition of its rule over the area. However, this division of Malay territory into British Malaya and Thailand was wholly arbitrary and based entirely on geostrategic calculations. The divided Pattani society on both sides of the Thailand-Malaya border shared the same Malay Muslim culture, language, social structures, customs, and values. Contiguity to the predominantly Muslim states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah in Malaysia, coupled with strong cross-border linkages and interaction, meant that the southern Malays were able to maintain their separate culture and identity, and resist

assimilation into the Thai state. The Malays have viewed the British recognition of Thai authority and sovereignty over them as arbitrary and unjust, and perceived Bangkok as an occupying colonial power.[64]

In 1903 and again in 1922, revolts led by Malay aristocrats broke out against Siamese rule, in direct response to the centralizing Thai state's attempts to impose Thai laws in the region, and its refusal to recognize traditional Malay customs and Islamic laws. In particular, Bangkok's attempt to force all Malays to attend Thai schools and to learn the Siamese language was seen as an assault on Malay culture and identity, as well as an attempt to convert them to Buddhism. This early Malay resistance to Thai integration had some support from the Malay rulers of Kelantan.[65]

The southern provinces were again united with Malaya during the Japanese Occupation from 1941 to 1945, with the end of the war raising hopes that Pattani would become part of the Malayan Federation. Instead, the British reneged on the "gentleman's agreement" that in exchange for Malay support against the Japanese, the southern Thai provinces would become part of Malaya after liberation. This was due to Britain's desire to maintain Thailand's territorial integrity in the context of the Cold War, particularly given the conflict in Indochina between the communists and the French.[66] The aspirations to secede thus continued through a Malayan-based movement called the Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR or Association of Malays of Greater Pattani) and the local, religiously led Pattani People's Movement (PPM). The PPM, led by Haji Sulong, eventually launched an armed rebellion, but this was crushed after he was arrested and killed by Thai security forces in 1954.[67]

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Thai government focused on national integration. It centralized the bureaucracy in the southern provinces, taking away the power and privileges of the traditional Malay royal and religious elite. National integration also entailed the promotion of the Thai language and secular Thai State education, contributing to a sense that Malay identity, culture, and religion were being deliberately eroded. In addition, there existed a great deal of official corruption as well as prejudicial attitudes toward Malay Muslims. The southern Malays were also economically disadvantaged, as they relied mainly on low-paid occupations such as fishing, agriculture, and plantation work. This contrasted with the visible political and economic progress that Malays had made in Malaysia since independence under policies that provided preferential treatment for the *bumiputra* or Malays. Not surprisingly, national integration has been a failure, with the Malays developing a strong sense of alienation from the Thai State.

During the 1960s and up until the end of the Vietnam War, the Thai government used force in an attempt to crush the Pattani separatists. Thus, the armed forces carried out a number of military operations from 1968 to 1975 that targeted Pattani liberation networks and underground organizations. Operation Ramkamhaeng and the so-called Special Antiterrorist Campaign lasted some seven years, resulting in 385 violent clashes between security forces and separatists. During this period, 329 alleged insurgents were killed and 1,208 were arrested. This, however, failed to solve the insurgency problem in the south as low-level separatist violence continued.[68]

The continuing cross-border linkages with ethnic kin in Malaysia have enabled the Thai Malays to maintain their identity to this day despite the repeated attempts of the Thai State to assimilate or co-opt them. Thailand has also repeatedly accused Malaysia of being a sponsor of armed separatism, and has alleged that the separatists operate out of bases in Perak and Kelantan.[69] This has a grain of truth, as the Malaysian state of Kelantan, under the opposition Partai Islam (PAS), has provided sanctuary for fleeing separatist fighters. Indeed, the PAS state government openly acknowledged providing such assistance on the grounds that Malay Muslims were facing discrimination in Thailand.[70] The Malaysian federal government, however, has always rejected any suggestion of active support for separatist elements, and there has been no evidence of any official complicity to date.[71]

The separatist movement in southern Thailand has splintered into a number of insurgent groups. One of the earliest post-1945 insurgent groups to be formed was the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP or Pattani National Liberation Front), which launched its armed rebellion in 1959. The BNPP recruited members primarily through religious teachers; some of the recruits were sent to Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan for their military training. At its peak in the 1980s, it had an estimated 200–300 fighters.[72] Its political leadership remained in Kelantan, Malaysia, as a number of its members had dual nationality. The BNPP established links with external bodies such as the Arab League and the OIC, and has been credited with publicizing the plight of the Pattani Malays in the Muslim world.[73] The BNPP was affected by the worldwide Islamic revival following the Iranian revolution in 1979—more religious elements left it in 1985 to establish a splinter group. This forced the BNPP to change its name to Barisan Islam Pembebasan Pattani (BIPP or Islamic Liberation Front of Pattani) to strengthen its Islamic credentials.[74]

Another separatist group is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which was founded in 1960 on a platform of "Islamic socialism."

The BRN developed close links with the Communist Party of Malaya and attempted to spread communist ideals among Malays. However, the eclectic mix of Islam, socialism, and nationalism, as well as cooperation with the communists, not only alienated the more conservative Malays but also led to damaging splits due to ideological tensions and disputes.[75] The confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia from 1963 to 1965 also split the group into those who supported Malaysia and those who supported Indonesia.[76] In 1968, the BRN formed its military wing known as the Angkatan Bersenjata Revolusi Pattani or ABREP. However, the various damaging splits that followed resulted in the BRN splintering into three main factions by the 1980s: the BRN Congress, the BRN Coordinate, and the BRN Uram. This factionalism resulted in a reduction of its overall effectiveness.[77]

By the early 1990s, the more moderate elements of the BRN had scaled down their demand from that for an independent Pattani state to one for greater autonomy.[78] In 1992 and again in 1995, the BRN's founder and head of one of its moderate factions the BRN Uram, Uztaz Karim Haji Hassan, signed peace agreements with the Thai Southern Military Command, but the main provisions of the agreements, which would have granted the BRN the status of a legal political party and ensured recognition of Islamic laws as well as the preservation of Malay language and customs, were not implemented by Bangkok. This was the context under which another BRN faction called the BRN Coordinate emerged as a key player in renewed violence in recent years.

The largest and most prominent of the insurgent groups is the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), which was formed in 1968 by Teungku Bira Kotanila with the objective of founding an independent state in Pattani. It occupied the middle ground between the left-wing orientation of the original BRN and the religiosity of the BNPP, with its official ideology stated to be "Religion, Race/ Nationalism, Homeland, and Humanitarianism."[79] PULO engaged in both armed insurgent violence as well as political work aimed at fostering Malay political consciousness and identity. Led by intellectuals educated in the Middle East and Pakistan, the PULO, like the MNLF in the southern Philippines, has managed to achieve some measure of external recognition. Since 1977, for instance, PULO has attended the World Muslim League Conference as an observer.[80] It has obtained support and funding from Libya and Syria, and its fighters have received training in the Middle East. It also used to have an office in Kelantan, Malaysia, where there existed unofficial sympathy for its cause.[81] It claimed a strength of 20,000 in 1981, almost certainly an inflated figure.[82]

PULO was the most active of the Pattani separatist groups. In September 1977, for instance, PULO attempted to assassinate the Thai king during his visit to Yala Province.[83] PULO continued to launch sporadic attacks in the 1980s and 1990s, targeting Thai military personnel and the sabotage of public utilities. In 1995 a split within PULO due to differences over strategy led to the emergence of New PULO, led by Arong Mooreng and Haji Abdul Rohman Bazo. This group advocated the use of violent action as the only way to attain independence and was prepared to cooperate with criminal elements in order to maximize harassment of the Thai State.[84] From 1998, however, improved border cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia deprived PULO and New PULO of its sanctuaries in Kelantan and also resulted in the detention of several of its leading members. Others fled abroad or surrendered to the government. By 2000 PULO had virtually stopped functioning as an insurgent group.[85]

In 1995 a new group called the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP or Islamic Mujahideen Movement of Pattani) emerged. Led by Nasoree Saesang with the objective of obtaining independence for Pattani, the group consists of veteran volunteer mujahideen who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It is believed that the GMIP established contacts with militant groups in the Middle East and received funding from supporters abroad.[86]

In 1997 the various separatist groups, such as PULO, New PULO, GRN, and GMIP, established an umbrella organization known as Bersatu (United Front for the Independence of Pattani) in an attempt to foster cooperation and joint action. This led to a short-lived surge of bomb attacks in 1997–1998, resulting in a huge security operation against the separatists. Security in Bangkok was significantly increased amid fears that the insurgents were planning terrorist attacks in the capital.[87] However, the alliance was never really effective, given the counterinsurgency efforts of the Thai government as well as the deep ideological differences that divided the constituent insurgent groups.

Despite the violence over the years, the Malay separatists have not been able to gain any ground. This can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, the separatists have never been united; they consist of a motley collection of fractured groups operating, for the most part, separately. Secondly, the government of Thailand adopted a comprehensive comprehensive strategy after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 as part of an attempt to win over the Malay populace and reduce its support for insurgency. The more constructive and conciliatory approach, which emphasized development, engagement, and reconciliation, was encapsulated in Prime Ministerial Order 66/23 in 1980, which stated that "political factors are

crucial to (the success of the counterinsurgency), and military operations must be conducted essentially to support and promote political goals." This more comprehensive and sophisticated strategy helped to end the communist insurgency mounted by the Communist Party of Thailand.[88] The Thai experience has been similar to Malaysia and Singapore, which had used a similar comprehensive strategy to defeat the communist revolt mounted by the Malayan Communist Party.

In the south, the new comprehensive approach led to greater respect for Malay Muslim cultural sensitivities and generous development projects aimed at improving the livelihood of the local people. Crucial to the success of the new approach was the Southern Borders Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), which was established in 1981 and that helped to build confidence among the Malay Muslim and Thai communities as well as attempted to resolve the various problems faced by the Muslims. The more enlightened approach contributed to a decrease in support for the insurgency, resulting in a decline in insurgent activities until around 2000.

Another reason why the insurgents have not had much success is due to the fact that they have received little external support despite the recognition in the wider Muslim world of their plight and the presence of ethnic coreligionists in neighboring Malaysia. Although sympathizers in Malaysia have provided sanctuary and assistance to insurgents fleeing security action in Thailand, the Malaysian government has not supported them, as Kuala Lumpur needed Thai cooperation to combat the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which maintained bases in southern Thailand until the end of the 1980s. Thus, in response to various Thai allegations of complicity, the Malaysian government declared in 1993 that it would not shelter Muslim separatists responsible for terrorism in southern Thailand.[89]

Another factor that explains the comparative lack of success of the insurgents is the general economic development in Thailand, including in the south, which has had a trickle-down effect. This, together with better and more effective governance in Thailand (compared, for instance, to the Philippines), has helped to ameliorate the underlying economic conditions that have bred dissatisfaction. Finally, the scale of the fighting has been much less severe than in the southern Philippines. This has given the Thai security forces a much greater edge in comparison to vast areas in Mindanao where the MILF is in de facto control. As a result of all these factors, the situation in southern Thailand was under control until around 2000.

The descent into a spiral of violence after 2000 was therefore all the more surprising. A key explanatory factor was the failure of the

Thai government to capitalize on the disarray and dissension within the insurgent movement. The situation worsened after the Thaksin government came to power in 2001. Thaksin took a tough, uncompromising attitude to the Muslim problem in the south. Thaksin's approach followed the lead of the United States, which had launched a global war on terrorism after 9-11. This global war on terror, however, placed heavy stress on hard security measures and was based on a "kill or capture" approach instead of a comprehensive one that, in addition to security measures, would also address the fundamental political, economic, and social causes of terrorism. In southern Thailand, the change in emphasis from the relatively successful comprehensive approach under Order 66/23 in 1980 to a unidimensional strategy focusing on the kinetic application of force to kill or capture the terrorists has had very negative consequences.

The Thaksin government also centralized control, but this led to much corruption and mismanagement in the south.[90] Crucially, the SBPAC was abolished, removing an agency that had done much to lessen the conflict over the past 20 years. Thaksin also transferred internal security responsibilities from the armed forces to the police, which did not have the necessary counterinsurgency training and had a reputation for being heavy-handed.[91]

Coincidentally, the insurgency began to pick up in late 2001. In December 2001 coordinated attacks against police posts marked the beginning of a new round of violence. After that, the number of insurgency incidents steadily rose from 50 in 2001 to over 1,000 in 2004.[92] In early 2004 a well-executed and coordinated series of attacks surprised the security forces. Over a hundred insurgents attacked an army base and seized over 400 weapons. Arson attacks on schools and police posts also took place.[93] These attacks by the insurgents had the desired effect, provoking a strong response from the state that further alienated the Muslims and helped boost the cause of the insurgents. Some violent incidents involving the security forces made headlines. For instance, in April 2004 108 machete-wielding Muslims who had attempted to overrun police posts in the south were killed by security forces; 32 of those killed had found shelter at the historic Krue Se mosque.[94] In October 2004 at Tak Bai, in what is now known as the Tak Bai incident, 85 unarmed Muslim protesters died after they suffocated inside police vans.[95]

The Thai authorities initially claimed that the insurgents were nothing more than criminals, and then alleged that they had links with Al Qaeda and therefore were participants in its global jihad. There is indeed evidence that JI and Al Qaeda operatives have found shelter

among coreligionists in Thailand. For instance, the top Al Qaeda–JI commander in the region, Hambali, was arrested in Thailand in 2003.[96] Since 2001, the coordinated nature of insurgent attacks as well as the sophisticated nature of the bombings, such as the use of remote-controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), has suggested enhanced linkages with global jihadist elements.[97] Between January 2004 and the end of August 2007, there were 7,743 insurgency incidents, mostly involving drive-by shootings and assassinations, arson, bombings, and IEDs. During this period, 2,566 people were killed and 4,187 wounded. These attacks that targeted bars, gambling establishments, Buddhist monks, and others were accompanied by a religious agenda that had not been present earlier.[98]

As in the southern Philippines, the question is whether the Muslim rebellion in southern Thailand has become part of the new terrorism that is motivated by global jihadist radical ideology and whether it should therefore be treated as a theater in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. There are some linkages with the Middle East and with various external, radical jihadist elements and organizations that have been documented by Rohan Gunaratna and others.[99] However, such assessments have been heavily criticized for attempting to link the southern insurgency with Al Qaeda's global jihad and the post 9-11 problem of global terrorism. Thus, Michael Conner dismisses the "security-driven perspective of war on terror scholarship" as serving only state-security perspectives.[100] A more balanced appraisal from Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a professor at Chulalongkorn University and a prominent political commentator, concludes that "the violence appears to emanate from longstanding ethno-nationalist grievances and identity issues, with the aims of separatism ranging from greater administrative autonomy to outright independence . . . yet, the wider regional and international jihadist networks cannot be excluded altogether from Thailand's southern morass."[101]

Within Thailand, the debate has been over the appropriate response to the southern problem. The release of the report by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in June 2006 sparked a lively debate. The NRC report argued that religion was not the cause of violence but only one factor invoked by those who wanted to legitimize their actions. The NRC recommended an "unarmed army" that could be a special unit to defuse tensions, the adoption of Malay as a working language in the south, the reestablishment of a version of the former SBPAC, the development of a regional development council, and dialogue with insurgent groups. However, the report was attacked by conservatives for being too conciliatory and for

conceding too much to the insurgents. For most government officials and the general populace, the southern problem was a security issue that had to be met with a tough legal and security approach.[102]

What has been significant about the Muslim separatist insurgency in southern Thailand is the fact that Western tourists and interests have not been specifically targeted. Outside the Muslim provinces, Western tourists continue to visit the pristine beach resorts of southern Thailand, with the deadly tsunami in 2004 proving far more lethal than the insurgents. According to Hambali, now in the custody of the United States, the southern insurgents had rebuffed Al Qaeda when approached for assistance to carry out bombings in Thailand.[103] The southern Muslim separatists have thus apparently made a deliberate decision not to participate in the global jihad promoted by Al Qaeda and the JI, and have thus avoided targeting Western interests. As a PULO spokesman pragmatically explained, "there is no interest in taking operations to Bangkok or Phuket. We do not need to be on anyone's terrorist list. Once we are on that list, it is all over."[104] Thus, the insurgency has so far remained local and nationalist in orientation and has been largely confined to the southern Muslim provinces, proving that, for the time being, the nationalist impulse continues to be stronger than the appeal of pan-Islamist radical ideology.

The military coup against the Thaksin government in September 2006 opened up the possibility of a fresh and more positive approach, especially as it was led by the army commander Sonthi Bonyaratkalin, a Muslim who had been critical of the Thaksin government's hard-line approach to the southern problem. Surayud Chulanont, the leader of the interim military-dominated administration, thus apologized to the Muslims of southern Thailand for past abuses, announced an end to the "blacklisting" of suspected insurgents and expanded efforts at reconciliation.[105]

However, the uncoordinated approach and lack of a strategic plan led to the uneven implementation of the new policy. The separatists also responded by intensifying attacks on Thai Buddhist civilians. In turn this led to vigilante action and reprisals against Muslims by Buddhists. More seriously, the political conflict in Bangkok between conservative forces and pro-Thaksin populist forces after the elections in December 2007 has resulted in the lack of a unified political approach to and a coherent strategy for the southern insurgency.

The Abhisit government that took power in 2009 has so far failed to make any concrete policy shifts in the south. This has been attributed to the continued political conflict between the supporters of the ousted Thaksin Shinawatra and the conservative forces opposed to

him, which culminated in serious civil unrest in the streets of Bangkok in 2010 and the eventual intervention of the army.[106]

In the face of this opposition, Abhisit's coalition government needs military support in order to stay in power, and this means that it has not been able to override the military in the south. Thus, its initial pledge to empower the civilian-led SBPAC and to lift the emergency decree in the south floundered in the face of the military's insistence on retaining control through its Internal Security Operations Command.[107] According to the International Crisis Group, the failure to address past abuses, such as the Tak Bai incident in 2004, has also meant that they remain powerful symbols of injustice to many Muslims.[108] The military has been cognizant of the need for a comprehensive approach and it has instituted development projects in a bid to win hearts and minds. However, the problem is the lack of a coherent, unified political approach that could only come from the central government. Given the better capacity and governance in Thailand, compared to the Philippines, there ought to be greater progress in managing and containing the problem. However, the political conflict in Bangkok, which shows no sign of abating soon, has resulted in a lack of strategic direction.

The continued failure to make progress in resolving some of the fundamental grievances of the Malay Muslims and the shocking events of 2004 at Krue Se and Tak Bai have provided opportunities for Al Qaeda and JI-linked elements to recruit alienated youth. Indeed some religious schools in the south are allegedly spreading radical ideology.[109] The long-term danger is that the violence in the south could spread beyond the Muslim provinces to the rest of Thailand and even further afield, eventually transforming the southern provinces into the region's equivalent of Chechnya. Thailand's Malay Muslim separatist problem, as in the case of the Moro Muslims in the southern Philippines, appears to be as intractable as ever, with no easy or quick solution possible, given the historical nature of the Muslim problem and the presence of deep, underlying grievances.

The Aceh Rebellion in Indonesia

The Aceh rebellion was, until recently, a long-running separatist insurgency in northern Sumatra, Indonesia. Historically, Aceh was an independent kingdom that had succeeded in resisting Dutch colonial rule until the early part of the twentieth century. This late incorporation into Indonesia, coupled with the existence of strong local pride and long-standing local traditions, has helped the Acehnese to

maintain their identity in the face of the centralizing tendencies of the Indonesian state. One key feature of Acehnese culture is its deep Islamic piety, which has proven to be a unifying factor as well as a focal point for Acehnese nationalist sentiments.

In 1953 Aceh joined the abortive Darul Islam rebellion, which aimed to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. The local Darul Islam forces were led by Aceh's most respected cleric at the time, Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureueh. After 1,000 people had been killed in the low-level insurgency, he was persuaded in 1961 by the then Indonesian commander in Aceh to end his rebellion.[110] The collapse of the rebellion, however, did not extinguish the sense of alienation that the Acehnese had developed toward Jakarta. This was because of a complex mix of grievances. There has been widespread poverty, unemployment and backwardness in Aceh despite the presence of huge gas deposits, which have been exploited by foreign oil companies. As Rizal Sukma observes, in spite of its abundant natural resources, Aceh has been among the poorest provinces in the country. Most Acehnese thus feel that instead of getting a fair share of the province's natural mineral wealth, they have had to face not just increasing poverty but also increasingly harsh military control during the Suharto era. Consequently, Sukma concludes, "many Acehnese have come to view their homeland as being plundered, exploited, and treated unjustly by Jakarta."[111]

Much of the resentment also stems from the domination, corruption, and rapaciousness of the Javanese bureaucratic elite that rules the province.[112] The Javanese governing elite has sidelined local *ulamas* and leaders as well as local institutions in the quest for centralized control. This sense of a threat to the local identity and way of life has been accentuated by the transmigration program under which Javanese from an overcrowded Java were resettled in the less crowded Outer Islands of the Indonesian archipelago. In turn this has led to greater competition for employment and business opportunities. There has thus emerged a growing resentment against migrant Javanese and toward Jakarta, with many seeing the transmigration program as merely synonymous with Javanization.[113]

The strong sense of local identity, coupled with deep resentment against Jakarta, has led to the emergence of an Acehnese independence movement. The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) was founded in 1976 with the explicit agenda of seeking independence from the Indonesian state. GAM was led by Hasan di Tiro, who is a descendant of an anti-Dutch independence leader and once served under Teungku Beureueh during the Darul Islam rebellion. GAM issued a declaration of independence in December 1976 to proclaim that its

objective was an Aceh that would be "free and independent from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the island of Java." The declaration also justified the rebellion on the grounds that "during these last thirty years the people of Aceh, Sumatra have witnessed how our fatherland has been exploited and driven into ruinous conditions by the Javanese neo-colonialists: they have stolen our properties; they have robbed us from our livelihood; they have abused the education of our children; they have put our people in chains of tyranny, poverty, and neglect."[114] Significantly, Hasan di Tiro has always espoused a left-wing nationalist position and has never mentioned the creation of an Islamic state. As Kirsten Schulze explains, GAM members saw Islam as playing an important part in Acehnese identity and culture, but not necessarily in politics. Their motivation for independence was driven not by a religious agenda but by disillusionment with Jakarta.[115]

GAM was able to attract some external support, such as from Libya, which provided military training for some Acehnese.[116] GAM began its armed rebellion in 1977 but its military actions were few and most of its activities consisted of the dissemination of propaganda and the raising of the GAM flag. The Indonesian army moved swiftly to crush the rebellion. By 1982 the rebellion appeared to have been successfully quelled, although arrests and trials of GAM members continued until 1984. Hasan di Tiro himself evaded capture and fled abroad in 1979.[117] He went to Sweden, where he and his associates continued to publicize the Acehnese independence cause.

The brutality of the Indonesian army's response, with widespread allegations of atrocities, contributed to increased resentment. Coupled with unresolved fundamental issues, the armed rebellion thus reemerged in 1989, this time posing a far more serious security threat to the authorities. Attacks were launched on police posts, military installations, and members of the civil authorities, particularly in the Lhokseumawe area. Javanese settlers were also targeted, leading to an exodus of settlers, some from Aceh altogether.[118]

The Indonesian armed forces reacted swiftly to crush the reactivated rebellion. The dreaded special forces troops called Kopassus were brought in. The armed forces used a campaign of terror to dissuade the population from supporting the separatists. Methods included arbitrary arrest, torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings.[119] In late 1990 headless bodies of suspected rebels also appeared in prominent places of Aceh as part of this strategy. The army also destroyed homes and executed all those suspected of aiding the rebels.[120] The Indonesian government refused access to the International Red Cross

despite international concern over the harsh crackdown that began from 1989.[121] Many Acehnese fled the province for Malaysia as a result of the harsh security measures. Malaysia refused to surrender those who were accused by the Indonesian government of rebellion, and this led to a strain in bilateral relations. However, as in the case of southern Thailand, there is no evidence of any official complicity on the part of the Malaysian government, although unofficial sympathy toward the plight of the Acehnese did exist.[122]

As a result of the harsh crackdown, the rebellion appeared to have subsided by late 1990, although counterinsurgency operations continued until 1993.[123] However, the Acehnese remained bitter and alienated as no attempt was subsequently made to address the fundamental grievances that existed in the province. As Rizal Sukma notes, "instead, the military maintained its presence in the province and continued to terrorize the people through its security operations."[124] In August 1998, for instance, Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission reported that 781 people in Aceh had been victims of military atrocities since 1991.[125] Thus the brutality of the armed forces was a significant factor that helped to keep separatist sentiments alive.

The emergence of a more democratic political environment following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 as a result of the Asian financial crisis led to calls for an end to military repression in Aceh. In August 1998 the military commander-in-chief, General Wiranto, ended Aceh's status as a military operations zone and apologized for past human rights abuses in the province.[126] The end of the Suharto regime, however, also emboldened the advocates of Acehnese independence. In late August 1989 withdrawing Indonesian troops were pelted with stones and widespread rioting broke out, leading to a reversal of the troop withdrawal. The government responded by launching a number of security operations against GAM, which were marked by the usual clumsy brutality and excessive use of force. Demonstrators were fired upon and those arrested were tortured or killed, in an attempt to cow the populace into submission.[127] Thus, from 1999 to 2002, it was estimated that 3,266 extrajudicial killings took place, with some 4,024 instances of torture and 728 cases of "forced disappearance."[128] Those who were killed included humanitarian workers, activists, and academics, including two university rectors.[129]

In response, GAM stepped up attacks against security personnel, using tactics such as assassinations, bombings, and arson. In July 1999 di Tiro stated that "there would be no solution until and unless the Javanese occupation army leaves Aceh."[130] Di Tiro claimed that his movement had 5,000 armed fighters, with Acehnese supporters

in Thailand and Malaysia reportedly providing financial support.[131] There was also evidence that Acehnese activists and supporters were involved in operating an arms conduit to Aceh, using weapons purchased on the Cambodian black market in arms and smuggled through northern Malaysia.[132]

A new approach to Aceh appeared to be possible under President Abdurahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) who, upon taking office in October 1999, ordered the military to scale down its forces in Aceh and began inquiries into alleged military abuses.[133] However, this failed to satisfy the Acehnese, as they were heartened by the referendum in East Timor in August 1999 that resulted in an overwhelming vote for independence. In October 1999 amid heightened expectations of independence, the local government in Aceh was shut down in response to a call for a general strike by GAM.[134] In November 1999 rallies for independence were attended by up to half a million people and the state parliament was torched and destroyed.[135] Alarmed by the events in Aceh, the Indonesian parliament rejected the president's proposal for a referendum on autonomy, and the armed forces publicly called for martial law in the province.[136]

The impasse was partially broken by Hasan di Tiro himself, who reversed his earlier position and agreed to negotiations with the government. This led to a ceasefire agreement that was signed in May 2000.[137] However, no final peace agreement was possible, given the impasse in national politics that was firmly against the notion of Acehnese independence. This was not surprising, given fears of the breakup of Indonesia if this occurred, as it would have galvanized secessionists in other parts of the archipelago. Moreover, the province has major natural resources, such as natural gas and oil. The military, which perceived its role as being the guardian of Indonesia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, also openly pressured the Gus Dur government to declare martial law in Aceh and resolve the separatist problem by force.[138]

The climate for peace negotiations took a turn for the worse with the ascension of Megawati Sukarnoputri to the presidency of Indonesia in late 2001. The 9-11 terrorist attacks in the United States provided the context for new counterterrorism legislation that, according to critics' charges, was aimed at secessionists in Aceh and Papua rather than at radical Islamists. Riding a wave of nationalist sentiments following a period of economic and political instability, President Megawati took a hard-line but popular nationalist position with respect to all secessionists, including GAM.

The Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement was signed in December 2002 between GAM and the Indonesian government, but

it appeared to have boosted expectations of independence, when, in fact, the government was only prepared to offer limited autonomy.[139] GAM's insistence on independence led to the ultimatum issued in April 2003 by the then coordinating minister for politics and security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (later the president), that the government would launch a full-scale military offensive in Aceh.[140] Negotiations for a peace settlement in Tokyo between GAM and the Indonesian government finally collapsed in May 2003 when GAM rejected the government's ultimatum to give up the goal of independence and to lay down its arms.[141]

President Megawati then authorized the imposition of martial law in May 2003 in the province, giving the armed forces what it had lobbied so hard for. Full-scale conflict therefore resumed. The Indonesian armed forces mounted Operasi Terpadu (Integrated Operation), which was modeled upon the strategy of "shock and awe" employed by the United States in its invasion of Iraq. The air force bombed GAM targets using aging propeller-driven Bronco aircraft, Indonesian paratroopers staged a dramatic drop into Aceh, and armored vehicles entered the province. As in Iraq, local journalists were also "embedded" in Indonesian units. An estimated 50,000 troops poured into the province to begin a new offensive against GAM.[142] The operation was heavily focused on the application of kinetic military force, not on winning the hearts and minds of the local population, with the criteria for success being the number of GAM fighters killed or captured.[143] According to a human rights report, the first six months of martial law saw the usual military abuses, such as extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detention, and a few cases of rape. Some of the targets were not GAM fighters but human rights activists.[144]

Links between GAM and Al Qaeda have been suggested in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks in the United States, which is not surprising, given the evident Muslim piety in the province.[145] However, as elsewhere in the region, such as in the southern Philippines and in southern Thailand, Al Qaeda's attempt to build links and co-opt local Muslim insurgent groups have had to contend with the preexisting nationalist imperative that has remained dominant. In Aceh, GAM opposed attempts by Indonesian radical groups, such as the Java-based Laskar Jihad, to establish a presence in Aceh in the aftermath of the fall of the Suharto regime. Al Qaeda's deputy chief, Al Zawahiri, visited the province in 2000 and was suitably impressed by the piety of the people. However, Al Qaeda was rebuffed by GAM. This can be explained by the fact that GAM adheres to left-wing nationalist ideology. Indeed, after the events of 9-11, the then GAM commander,

Abdullah Syafiah, who was later killed by Indonesian security forces, was among the first to send a message of condolence to the U.S. ambassador in Jakarta.[146] Although Islamist splinter groups such as the Front Mujahideen Islam Aceh led by Fauzi Hasbi and the Republik Islam Aceh have appeared in the province, they were bitterly opposed by GAM, which believed that they were created by Indonesian intelligence to discredit GAM. Indeed, GAM believed that Fauzi Hasbi had betrayed the movement by cooperating with the intelligence services.[147]

The resolution of the Aceh conflict came as a result of an unexpected event. A huge earthquake and massive tsunami in December 2004 destroyed the province's capital, Bandar Aceh. The death toll in the province of Aceh alone was estimated at 168,000.[148] Civilians, security personnel, and GAM supporters alike were among its victims. The infrastructure was devastated and hundreds of thousands of people were left homeless and in desperate need of aid and rebuilding. This unexpected intervention from nature galvanized the peace process as it was evident to both sides that the main priorities were now disaster relief and rebuilding. In August 2005 a final peace agreement was thus signed in Helsinki, under which GAM would disarm and take part in the political process. The Indonesian government agreed to release political prisoners and offer farmland to former combatants to help them reintegrate into civilian life. A human rights court as well as a truth and reconciliation commission was also to be established. The government also promised to withdraw all nonlocal Indonesian troops and police from Aceh and to provide the province with a high degree of self-government.[149]

The subsequent local elections in December 2006 were, however, marked by the open split within GAM between the official GAM leadership, led by Hasan di Tiro and Malik Mahmud, who had been in exile in Sweden, and the younger leaders who had fought on the ground in Aceh. Due to the bitter infighting, GAM did not stand for the elections as a unified organization. Instead, the exiled old guard leadership was represented by a quasi GAM–United Development Party (PPP, a national Muslim party) alliance centered around Hasbi Abdullah. Local GAM guerillas and their commanders, however, refused to submit to Hasbi Abdullah's leadership, as they felt he had contributed little to the struggle for independence. Instead they supported the joint ticket of Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar, ensuring the victory of this team.[150]

Questions, however, have been raised over GAM's ability to govern, given the subsequent chaotic disbursement of funds for

reconstruction and reintegration through the Aceh Reintegration Board (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh or KPA) and the rise in violent crime. The political infighting has also prevented GAM from developing a coherent strategy for its political future. Moreover, the high expectations of many GAM supporters for true self-government stand in contrast to those of the central government and the armed forces who are prepared to provide only minimal autonomy. Aceh-Jakarta relations are also vital to a lasting peace. However, concerns have been raised over the provisions of the Law on Governing Aceh that was passed in June 2006 and that reserved all security issues for the central government and also weakened some provisions on the provincial government's authority. This is perceived as having undermined the Helsinki agreement.[151] Indeed tensions rose in 2009 in the run-up to the general elections, due to the mutual suspicions between GAM and the armed forces. The latter believe that GAM has not abandoned its goal of independence, while GAM blamed isolated cases of violence on the military, although there has also been intense political infighting within GAM.[152]

Thus, the Helsinki peace agreement cannot be seen as the final resolution to the Aceh problem, but should be seen as only the beginning of a process of dealing with the fundamental grievances that exist in the province. However, given the continued failure to resolve these fundamental political and economic grievances, a return to violence by disaffected Acehnese cannot be ruled out. The danger is that if the nationalists in GAM are perceived by the population as having failed to deliver, the door could be open to more extreme alternatives, such as pan-Islamist radicalism.

Implications for Counterterrorism

After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the United States declared a Global War on Terror (GWOT). However, the GWOT soon became a simplistic catchall construct that tended to conflate every Muslim rebellion with a monolithic threat influenced or directed by Al Qaeda. It was also heavily weighted toward a hard security approach (a "kill or capture" policy) based on the premise that killing and capturing the key operators would solve the problem of global terrorism.

It is, however, evident from the preceding discussion that Muslim rebellion in the Malay archipelago is a complex, historical problem that predated both Al Qaeda and the events of 9-11. Local Muslims in Mindanao, Pattani, and Aceh have long-standing and home-grown political, economic, and social grievances that have been key factors

in explaining their alienation and resort to armed rebellion. The fundamental grievances include discrimination, mismanagement, corruption, and insensitive policies made by the central government. Added to these has been a strong historical sense of local identity that is sustained by a deep adherence to Islam. However, while Al Qaeda has attempted to co-opt local Muslim rebels into its global jihad, it has had to contend with the preexisting ethno-nationalism that has so far proved to be more enduring and dominant. The more complex variables at work in the region have meant that many Muslim rebels have not perceived their struggle to be part of the global jihad that Al Qaeda has been waging or inspiring elsewhere.

This raises interesting questions over the wisdom of treating the Malay archipelago as a "second front" in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. The fallaciousness of the U.S.-led prescriptions and its incorporation of the region into the global war on terrorism after 9-11 are reflected in the response of all the major separatist movements in the Malay archipelago, which have distanced themselves from Al Qaeda. Moreover, the presence of long-standing fundamental political, economic, and social grievances suggests that Muslim separatist insurgencies in the region cannot be countered solely through the use of force. The failure to understand the historical complexities of the region has inhibited the crafting of appropriate strategies in managing the region's multifaceted security challenges, including that of terrorism.

Instead the region's approach to countering terrorism and insurgency has helped to inform U.S. strategy in its search for solutions to the many challenges in the global war on terror, particularly in the light of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan following U.S.-led intervention. U.S. strategy, which after 9-11 had emphasized a narrow "kill or capture" approach toward terrorists that was based on the use of hard security measures, has evolved in recent times to a more comprehensive approach that has the objective of winning hearts and minds.

Mention has been made in Chapter 2 of the comprehensive approach adopted by states in the region, the objective of which is the winning of hearts and minds to counter the challenge of radical Islam. Essentially, the comprehensive approach rejects a purely military security approach in favor of a more balanced use of a range of kinetic as well as nonkinetic instruments, such as development, political mobilization, psychological warfare, and political negotiations. For instance, Thailand adopted a comprehensive strategy after 1977 in order to defeat the communist insurgency as well as to counter the Muslim separatists in the south. This comprehensive strategy is contained in Prime Ministerial Order 66/23 of 1980, which stated that "political

factors are crucial to (the success of the counterinsurgency), and military operations must be conducted essentially to support and promote political goals." The greater emphasis on economic development, social measures, and political dialogue is credited with having helped to win over the hearts and minds of the population and ending the insurgency mounted by the Communist Party of Thailand, as well as containing the Muslim insurgency in the south, at least until around 2000.[153]

However, it was the success of British counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in countering an earlier insurgency—namely, the communist insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s—that led to its closer scrutiny for its possible application to the present-day insurgencies that the United States has been facing in Iraq and Afghanistan following its intervention in these two countries after 9-11. The advocacy of a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism based on classical counterinsurgency as a replacement for the GWOT was an inevitable line of enquiry, given the British success in Malaya. This British success has been attributed by Richard Stubbs to "the abandonment of a coercion and enforcement approach in favor of a hearts and minds approach" that ultimately paved the way for an end to the fighting.[154] As Chapter 2 has noted, the comprehensive approach based on winning hearts and minds has been the strategy favored by governments of the Malay archipelago in dealing with the ideological and terrorist challenges posed by radical Islamism, although clearly, the governments in the region have demonstrated varying degrees of competence in implementing such a strategy, depending on the availability of resources, the effectiveness of governance structures, and strategic political direction. The Thaksin government in Thailand, the Philippine approach in the south until very recently, and the flawed strategy in Aceh followed by the Suharto regime in Indonesia and continued by his democratic successors are examples of failure in counterinsurgency. However, the relative success of Malaysia and Singapore in containing the threat of radical Islamist terrorism, particularly through the use of rehabilitation, a tried-and-tested method dating from the Malayan Emergency, has led to interest in the Malayan Emergency model and its modern-day manifestation.

Thus, British COIN lessons, particularly in Malaya, and the mistakes made by the United States in counterinsurgency since its invasion of Iraq in 2003 were closely studied by General David Petraeus and his team of military advisers, most of whom are military officers with PhDs. This resulted in the publication of the revised *United States Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual* in December 2006. The new U.S. strategy attempts to move U.S. counterinsurgency strategy

away from its focus on the use of military force to a more comprehensive approach designed to win hearts and minds, and ultimately drain the insurgents of their popular support. The new doctrine stated that "COIN is fought among the populace" and that "counterinsurgents take upon themselves responsibility for the people's well-being in all its manifestations," such as the provision of basic economic needs and essential services such as water, electricity, and medical care, and the sustenance of key social and cultural institutions.[155] The *Manual* also especially highlights the lessons of the Malayan Emergency, noting approvingly the British strategy of reforming and retraining the entire Malaya Police Force, first by removing corrupt and incompetent officers, and then by systematically training officers at all levels, with the best sent to Britain for further training. Better security forces had led to improved relations with the population as well as to better intelligence. The British had thus been able to progressively hand over the war to the locals.[156] This sounded like a usable template for U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The mixed results in Iraq, however, have raised questions over the new strategy. As Milton Osborne has noted, British success in Malaya could be attributed to a set of unique circumstances that favored the British. These included the narrow ethnic Chinese base of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), Malaya's geographic isolation that meant that external support was practically nonexistent, the presence of a competent and long-established colonial administration, and the overwhelming superiority of the British in terms of the ratio of security forces to insurgents.[157] Crucially, Britain encouraged the move toward independence by Malaya, thus undermining the cause of the insurgents. It is thus not surprising that Osborne concluded that "the closer one examines how this victory was achieved, the clearer it becomes that it came about in circumstances that were particular, indeed unique, to Malaya," and that "there is little to suggest that the way in which the Malayan Emergency was managed offers any lessons for Iraq."[158]

Better COIN strategy and even victory in Iraq and Afghanistan would not, however, remove the threat of global terrorism. To counter the new global insurgency mounted by Al Qaeda, the U.S. historian Thomas Mockaitis proposed the adoption of a grand strategy based on a comprehensive approach that would have as its objective the winning of hearts and minds, a strategy that had proven successful in the Malayan Emergency.[159] Such a strategy would have to combine conventional and unconventional operations, the carefully focused use of force that would not alienate the general populace as well as a campaign to win over hearts and minds.[160] Mockaitis argued that

"the counterinsurgency (COIN) model, particularly as developed by the British over the last century, commends itself as a better model for addressing the terrorist threat." He also argued that although COIN and counterterrorism are not identical, they have a great deal in common, since "COIN requires a comprehensive strategy to address the economic, social and political causes of terrorist violence."[161] In effect, Mockaitis was thus calling for a global COIN strategy based on the Malayan Emergency model, albeit writ large on a global scale as the basis for a new U.S. grand strategy that could better deal with the threat of global terrorism.

The successful Malayan Emergency model and its modern-day manifestation in the form of comprehensive strategies practiced in the Malay archipelago have thus provided the practical and intellectual inputs for contemporary U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy, a theme more fully explored in other recent work.[162]

The comprehensive strategy that has been promoted in U.S. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism programs, however, is no panacea, and has become a default model in the absence of better alternatives. As this chapter has shown, the Malay archipelago has had to live with insurgency and terrorism for a very long time and will have to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. This is because the causes of Muslim rebellion and alienation within the region are deep-seated and defy easy resolution. What the region has taught is simply that "victory" is not possible, but that a more comprehensive strategy based on political dialogue, economic development, and social measures would stand a better chance of meeting a more limited objective of containing insurgent and terrorist violence within acceptable boundaries.

What chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate is that the GWOT-lens with which the Malay archipelago has been treated by the United States after 9-11 has been genuinely problematic, given the complexities in the region, and therefore inappropriate. The GWOT-lens has been the product of a simplistic, unidimensional strategy that was followed by the Bush administration in its response to the challenge posed by Al Qaeda after the events of 9-11, and has not been informed by a deep understanding of the complexities of Muslim rebellion in this pivotal region. Indeed the appearance of a more sophisticated, comprehensive strategy in dealing with insurgencies and global terrorism following the revision of the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency strategy that was overseen by General Petreaus in 2006 and that draws on experience in the Malay archipelago demonstrated the doctrinal deficit in U.S. strategy on countering terrorism and insurgency that had

existed. More seriously, as the following chapters will show, the U.S.-led war on global terrorism in the Malay archipelago has had unintended consequences that have spilled over to the maritime sphere and catalyzed great power rivalries with an emerging China, and also provided greater impetus to the ongoing regional arms buildup; these are developments that could ironically lead to the long-term destabilization of the region.

Chapter 4

Maritime Security

Terrorism and Maritime Security in the Malay Archipelago

The U.S.-led global war on terrorism following the events of 9-11 did not merely involve countering global terrorism in theaters such as the Malay archipelago. As discussed in Chapter 3, it also involved much closer scrutiny of preexisting Muslim separatist rebellions in the region due to allegations of their linkages with Al Qaeda and the fear that should local Muslim insurgents join Al Qaeda's global jihad, Al Qaeda's war against the West and its supporters, such as various regimes in the Malay archipelago, would receive a strong boost and might even acquire unstoppable momentum.

In the Malay archipelago, however, another security concern that was raised soon after 9-11 was the security of the vital and strategic sea-lanes of the region, particularly of the Straits of Malacca. This was an understandable concern, given the fear that terrorists fleeing worldwide security action after 9-11 could easily find refuge in the Malay archipelago, which has the world's largest population of Muslims. In turn, these terrorists could look for new, vulnerable targets in the region, in collaboration with local radical elements, Muslim insurgents, or people in existing organised crime networks, such as those involved in numerous piracy attacks in the region. Moreover, this concern has also been seen as being closely linked to the emerging threat from radical terrorism within the region, especially in the wake of the Bali bombing in 2002.

The context of the post 9-11 concern over maritime security stemmed from the fact that the devastating terrorist attacks on 9-11

had exploited the vulnerability of the aviation industry. By comparison, the maritime industry, upon which global commerce depends, was much less well regulated and much less secure at the time. Unlike commercial aircraft, there was, for instance, little scrutiny in the maritime industry in terms of the certification of shipping crew, and ships were not tracked in real time. The trend toward linkages between transnational organized crime and terrorism also raised concerns over the security of high-value shipping, such as cruise ships and chemical tankers, which could become tempting terrorist targets in the context of lax maritime security and the absence of protection at sea. Moreover, shipping containers could also conceivably be used to smuggle terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.

Peter Chalk has summarised the five key factors that have raised concerns over the threat of maritime terrorism since 9-11. Firstly, many of the vulnerabilities that have led to pirate attacks also apply to terrorism, including inadequate coastal surveillance, lax port security, a profusion of targets, the overwhelming dependence of maritime trade on congested choke points, and a reduction in the number of ship crew. Secondly, the necessary training and equipment for carrying out maritime attacks exist in the commercial industry. Thirdly, maritime attacks offer an additional means of causing economic disruption, particularly in view of the overwhelming dependence on seaborne trade. Fourthly, maritime terrorists could inflict mass casualties by attacking cruise ships or passenger ferries. Finally, the global container shipping industry offers a logistical channel for the covert movement of terrorists and their weapons.[1]

A scenario that has been speculated about as a possibility is the hijack of a chemical tanker and its use as a floating bomb to destroy a major port in a maritime version of 9-11.[2] Given the global economy's overwhelming dependence on seaborne trade and just-in-time manufacturing processes, any major disruption of this seaborne trade in the form of a maritime terrorist attack on a super container hub, such as Singapore, would have a severe regional and global economic impact. Such a scenario is not considered implausible, given Al Qaeda's interest in maritime terrorist attacks—it had attacked the *USS Cole* in Yemen in 2000 and had bombed a French tanker, the *Lindberg*, in 2002, also off the coast of Yemen.[3]

Concerns were therefore raised after 9-11 over the vulnerability of the narrow Straits of Malacca, long recognized to be one of the world's most strategic waterways and choke points. The Straits is very narrow, being only 800 meters wide at its narrowest point, and is highly congested with hundreds of large ships traversing it every day. One quarter

of the world's trade, half the world's oil, and two-thirds of its natural gas trade pass through its waters.[4] Oil flows through the Straits are three times higher than through the Suez Canal, and fifteen times greater than the Panama Canal. Aside from the Straits of Malacca, other important sea-lanes also can be found in the Malay archipelago; these include the Straits of Lombok and the Makassar Straits, which continues into the Philippine Sea. Although these waterways are not used as extensively as the Straits of Malacca, some oil traffic, carried by Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), does pass through them.

Piracy in the Straits of Malacca and in Indonesian waters reached crisis levels in the 1990s as the region recorded the world's highest incidences of piracy at the time.[5] In view of the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups in the Malay archipelago, there were fears after the events of 9-11 of a possible linkage between terrorists and pirates, particularly given the context of the global phenomenon of an emerging nexus between organized crime and terrorism. Pirates, with their vast maritime knowledge, could be tapped by terrorist groups to carry out a devastating maritime attack on a ship or a port. Any disruption of the vital seaborne trade traversing the region's vital waterways, however, would have a huge global impact.

These concerns over maritime security were heightened following the Bali attacks in 2002, which highlighted the growing challenge of terrorism within the region. Maritime security has therefore become part and parcel of the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. No discussion of terrorism in the region can be made without reference to the maritime security dimension, in view of the close attention paid to this area, whether justified or not, by regional governments and external Great Power stakeholders. This chapter therefore examines the terrorism-maritime security nexus in the Malay archipelago in the light of the events of 9-11 and the context of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism.

Maritime Security, Energy, and Interstate Rivalries

Extending the U.S.-led global war on terrorism into the maritime realm within the region, however, has further complicated an area that is already becoming highly contested for the region as well as for external players with a strategic interest in the region's waterways. The rise in post 9-11 concern over maritime security has taken place in the context of historical interstate rivalries and mutual suspicions, which have limited a cohesive regional response to regional security

challenges. More seriously, maritime insecurity in the region has also attracted the attention of external powers with a stake in the security of the vital waterways. But this external involvement has raised the prospects that the region could get caught up in growing strategic rivalries. Thus, measures by the United States and its allies in recent years to improve maritime security in the region have been met with concern expressed by China over the ability of the United States to disrupt China's access to energy resources.[6]

Energy security has been on the agenda of the states comprising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the late 1990s. In 1999 a five-year ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation was launched and the ASEAN Center for Energy (ACE) was established in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Plan of Action focused on the following: an ASEAN power grid, a trans-ASEAN gas pipeline, coal and clean coal technology promotion, energy efficiency and conservation promotion, new and renewable energy development, and energy policy and environmental analysis.[7] A key reason for this growing concern is the fact that the ASEAN states are vulnerable to disruption of energy supplies. The generally rapid economic growth in the ASEAN economies has led to an increase in the demand for energy. According to the *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007,* primary energy consumption in Indonesia and the Philippines doubled from 52.3 and 13 million tonnes of oil equivalent respectively in 1990 to 114.3 and 25.2 million tonnes of oil equivalent respectively in 2006. In the case of Singapore, it increased two and a half times, from 20.3 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 1990 to 50 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 2006. In the case of Malaysia, consumption tripled from 28.8 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 1990 to 86.1 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 2006.[8]

Given that oil is still the main source of energy for the region, these figures suggest that dependence on oil is growing. There are several large oil producers in the region such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, which produced 51.9, 33.8, and 10.8 million tonnes of oil in 2006 respectively.[9] Although Indonesia is the region's largest oil producer, the growth in energy consumption has meant that it has become a net importer of oil. Malaysia will also become a net importer of oil in due course as a result of the growth of its economy and the accompanying rise in energy use. The problem is the security of these energy supplies, especially given recent volatility as well as high oil prices.[10] The fact that two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Persian Gulf area means that the region's dependence on imported Middle Eastern oil will rise. However, these

supplies are vulnerable to political developments in the Middle East that could have an enormous impact on oil and gas.[11]

In a broader context, Asia's growing dependence on oil is led by the economic powerhouses of Asia, such as China, India, South Korea, and Japan. Energy security in the Asia-Pacific is therefore bound up with the policies and responses of Great Powers such as China and Japan. Indeed, Ji Guoxing made the prescient point in 1998 that "Asian Pacific energy security is inseparable from China's security."[12] China's rapid economic growth and growing dependence on external energy sources is thus driving its strategic foreign, defence, and maritime policies. The emerging resource and strategic competition between China and the established powers in the region, such as the United States and Japan, has set the stage for Southeast Asia's increasingly becoming a battleground in this rivalry, given the presence of oil and gas deposits, as well as strategic waterways and sea-lines of communication (SLOCs) in the region. Moreover, the competition to secure energy supplies has raised the stakes in maritime territorial disputes, such as those involving maritime boundaries and overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). In this respect, the dispute in the potentially oil-rich South China Sea involving several ASEAN states and China has been a major security issue.

Growing attention over energy security has, in turn, led to heightened concerns over maritime security, given long and vulnerable SLOCs that stretch from the Gulf of Hormuz to Northeast Asia and traverse strategic waterways in Southeast Asia. It is noteworthy that 70 percent of Japan's oil traverses the Straits of Malacca as does 80 percent of China's trade, making it a waterway of great strategic importance to both Japan and China.[13] The Straits of Malacca is thus a vital economic lifeline for the Northeast Asian economies such as China and Japan. In addition, almost all the shipping that passes through the Straits of Malacca, and to a lesser extent, through the nearby Sunda Straits, must also pass near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.[14] Thus, the waters of the South China Sea, off the Philippines and near the Spratlys, are also part of the long SLOCs between northeast and southeast Asia.

The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in the Malay Archipelago

The key question is how credible the threat from maritime terrorism in the region really is. After all, maritime terrorist attacks worldwide have constituted only 2 percent of all terrorist attacks in the last three

decades.[15] The possibility of a piracy-terrorism nexus has also been questioned on grounds of the basic incompatibility of the two sets of actors. Pirates, by definition, eschew attention and aim for financial gain, while terrorists are motivated by political goals, will court publicity, and aim to inflict as much damage as possible.[16] Some analysts have also pointed out that so far, pirates have mainly been fishermen who live in poverty-stricken coastal villages and attack ships for cash.[17] Peter Chalk has argued that the threat of a maritime terrorist attack in the Straits of Malacca is low, on the grounds that the waterway is well-guarded, that there is presently no evidence that Al Qaeda is working with local militants to carry out such attacks, and that there are other more conducive targets elsewhere.[18]

However, there is evidence that Al Qaeda has been aware of maritime vulnerabilities and that it has sought to exploit these weaknesses. It has carried out several maritime terrorist attacks that indicate its awareness of the potential impact of such strikes. In 2000, for instance, an explosive-laden boat rammed into the U.S. navy Aegis-class destroyer *USS Cole*, as it was docked in Yemen. Seventeen sailors were killed and 38 wounded, with the ship sustaining major damage.[19] In 2002 another explosive-laden boat struck a French oil tanker, the *Lindberg*, off the coast of Yemen, killing a crew member.[20] These growing concerns over maritime terrorism coincided with the crisis of governance in Indonesia following the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 amid the Asian financial crisis, political instability, and civil unrest. The new democratic environment that emerged has enabled various fundamentalist groups to openly champion their cause of an Islamic state ruled by the sharia or Islamic laws. Such ideological predispositions can be traced to the Darul Islam (DI) movement that launched a revolt in 1948 with the aim of establishing a Muslim state. Although it was eventually crushed by the state in 1962 at a loss of 25,000 lives, its ideals survived and were kept alive, albeit underground, by activists who evaded capture or surrendered at the time. Through various religious schools, DI ideals were also transmitted to a new generation of activists.

The majority of fundamentalist, Islamist groups in the post-Suharto era have chosen to work through the democratic political process. However, the ideals of DI have also contributed to the development of a new generation of radical Islamists prepared to use violence for overthrowing the current order and achieving their objective of establishing a Muslim state ruled by the sharia or Islamic laws.[21] The political and economic context has been a major factor in the spread of radical Islam and the emergence of violent militant

networks in Indonesia. The crisis of governance in Indonesia in the aftermath of the economic and political crises in 1998 led to real fears of the breakup of Indonesia, given the ethnic and sectarian conflicts, mass unemployment, and political uncertainty in Jakarta. This provided the radical Islamists with the opportunity to proselytize and make inroads among disaffected and alienated youths. Thus, the Al Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiah (JI) has been able to build an effective network comprising not just ex-Afghan mujahideen who have returned to Southeast Asia but also new adherents to radical ideology. The JI, as discussed in Chapter 2, has been responsible for a string of deadly terrorist attacks in the region since 2002, for instance, the two Bali bombings, the two Marriott hotel attacks, and the attack on the Australian High Commission.[22]

The presence of violent militant groups has increased the possibility of maritime terrorism in the region. There are already indications of interest in carrying out maritime terrorist attacks in the Malay archipelago. For instance, the Iran-backed Hezbollah recruited five people in Singapore as part of an abortive plan to attack U.S. warships passing through the Straits of Singapore in 1995.[23] A senior Al Qaeda operative captured by the United States in 2002 revealed that the masterminds of the *USS Cole* attack had planned to attack another U.S. warship visiting Malaysia.[24] The JI had also planned to attack U.S. naval vessels in late 2001. Fairly advanced plans were made by local members of the JI, and presented to the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan, to carry out a seaborne bomb attack using a small vessel against United States warships which use Singapore as a logistics stopover. This putative maritime attack was part of the audacious series of terrorist bombings planned by the JI in Singapore after 9-11. The plan was thwarted following the arrest of an initial 13 members of the network by Singapore authorities in December 2001.[25]

The Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) in the Philippines has, however, been more successful in carrying out several seaborne terrorist attacks. In 2000 it gained international notoriety after kidnapping 21 hostages, including Western tourists, at the Malaysian diving resort of Sipadan.[26] In 2004 the ASG carried out a joint attack with the JI on a passenger ferry in Manila Bay in which over 100 people were killed.[27] In addition, it is believed that the Acehnese separatist rebels in northern Sumatra had engaged in acts of piracy in the Straits of Malacca prior to the final peace agreement in 2005.[28] The separatist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) has admitted to carrying out an attack in 2002 on a vessel chartered by Exxon Mobil, which operates oil and gas facilities in Aceh. GAM may have also

been responsible for several kidnap-for-ransom attacks on vessels in Indonesian waters.[29]

In March 2003 the apparent boarding of the ship *Dewi Madrim* in the Straits of Malacca led to extensive media coverage around the world and significantly raised fears of maritime terrorism. Ten hijackers armed with automatic weapons boarded the ship and reportedly spent an hour apparently learning how to sail the ship. They then apparently disappeared with the first mate and captain with no ransom demand being made. *The Economist*, quoting a report by a security consultancy, thus reported that "the temporary hijacking of the *Dewi Madrim* was by terrorists learning to drive a ship, and the kidnapping (without any attempt to ransom the officers) was aimed at acquiring expertise to help the terrorists mount a maritime attack." *The Economist* therefore concluded that this appeared to be "the equivalent of the al-Qaeda hijackers, who perpetrated the September 11 attacks going to flying school in Florida."[30] However, this report was later discounted as further investigation revealed that no one was kidnapped, that the attackers had not attempted to learn to sail the vessel, and that no terrorists had in fact been involved.[31]

A more credible alert was issued in March 2010 by the Singapore navy regarding possible attacks on oil tankers, citing information it had received from its liaison partners. The alert appeared to be linked with ongoing investigations into a militant training camp in Aceh that was uncovered by Indonesian counterterrorism police.[32] Raids not only resulted in the capture or killing of over 70 militants, it also uncovered documents that pointed to terrorist plans throughout the region.[33]

As a result of recent incidents and intelligence pointing to terrorist plots at sea, the possibility of a devastating maritime terrorist strike is being taken seriously by security agencies in the region. Indeed a recent study by RAND has noted the worldwide spike in high-profile terrorist incidents at sea between 2000 and 2006 and has drawn attention to the fact that several significant maritime terrorist plots were preempted before execution.[34] Significantly, the waters around Indonesia, until recently, had suffered from the world's highest incidence of piracy.[35] Indeed there was a dramatic increase in such cases after the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia in 1998. Between 2000 and 2006, 21 percent of all acts of piracy worldwide occurred in waters around the Malay archipelago.[36]

Apart from heightened concerns over the security of the Straits of Malacca, the maritime triborder area between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines has also attracted the attention of security analysts in recent years. It is believed that this area has become a logistical

corridor for militant elements in the Malay archipelago as a result of operational linkages between the ASG, the insurgent Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the JI.[37] Sulawesi has also become an important base of operations for the JI in the aftermath of sectarian Christian-Muslim violence that has provided the conditions for the spread of militant jihadist ideology as well as for the recruitment of terrorists. Moreover, JI members have allegedly found refuge in MILF-held territory in the southern Philippines. The comparatively poorly patrolled waters in the Straits of Makassar make it much easier to carry out a maritime terrorist attack on the Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) that are increasingly using the waterway due to the comparatively shallow waters of the Straits of Malacca. Moreover, the potential for a piracy-terrorism nexus in these waters exists because of the presence of various illegal maritime activities, such as piracy and smuggling, in the waters off Sulu and Celebes.[38] More significantly, there are radical Islamist and moderate Muslim separatist groups operating in the vicinity, namely, in the southern Philippines as well as in the Indonesian islands of Maluku and Sulawesi.

The high rates of piracy, the threat of terrorist activity, and the presence of Al Qaeda–linked militant groups in the region, thus combined to heighten fears over maritime security in the Malay archipelago after 9-11. Cumulatively, these developments after 9-11 led to a rise in shipping insurance premiums. In June 2005, the Straits of Malacca was classified by Lloyd's Market Association's Joint War Committee as an area in danger of wars and related perils, a classification justified on the ground that the modus operandi of pirates there is now similar to that of modern-day terrorists.[39]

These developments so alarmed the littoral states as well as external stakeholders that a flurry of initiatives was undertaken to address obvious vulnerabilities and to improve maritime security in the region. However, the challenges are significant, as the entire logistical chain, including ships, ports, and containers, has to be better secured. Moreover, the sea-lanes and their littorals will require regular patrol and monitoring in order to reduce attacks at sea. This will involve significant investment in maritime patrol capabilities by the littoral states if they are to become self-reliant and prevent more intrusive action by external great power stakeholders. However, the impetus this could provide to ongoing military modernization programs in the region could result in the exacerbation of regional tensions amid an arms race that could possibly lead to instability and conflict in the long run. The implications of this regional arms buildup will be further examined in Chapter 6.

The states in the Malay archipelago, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, have undertaken unilateral as well as cooperative, multilateral measures to improve maritime security. In addition, external powers that have a stake in the security of the region's sea-lanes have also intervened to improve maritime security. These external stakeholders include Japan and the United States. Australia, on account of its fears over the threat of terrorism from the region, has also been active in measures designed to counter terrorism as well as to improve maritime security. China too is a key stakeholder as 80 percent of its trade, including its energy supplies from the Middle East, passes through the Straits of Malacca. However, in the context of the growing Sino-U.S. strategic rivalry, the enhanced role of the United States and its allies, namely, Japan and Australia, in regional maritime security has raised fears of great power rivalry and competition in the Malay archipelago.

The following sections examine the responses to the emerging challenges to maritime security at three levels: unilateral measures by states in the region, regional multilateral efforts at cooperation, and extraregional efforts, such as the initiatives and roles of external powers and global measures that have had an impact on the region.

Responses by the Malay Archipelago States

Since the events of 9-11 and in the context of the growing concern over maritime security, the states in the Malay archipelago have adopted a number of unilateral measures to improve maritime security. The motivation to do so has come from not just the threat of maritime terrorism but also from the hope that security measures will be a means of limiting any enhanced maritime role of the external great power stakeholders, a development that could erode the maritime sovereignty of the littoral states.

Indonesia has a key role in regional maritime security, given the high rates of piracy in its waters until recently and the fact that it is one of the key littoral states responsible for the security of the Straits of Malacca, which it regards as part of its territorial waters. The crisis of governance after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 was marked by riots, political instability, and a severe economic crisis. In the context of weak institutions and economic underdevelopment, these problems were accompanied by the outbreak of ethnic and religious conflict throughout the Indonesian archipelago, such as in Aceh, Kalimantan, West Papua, Maluku, and Sulawesi, raising fears over the possible breakup of the Indonesian state. This was the environment

in which radical Islamist groups such as the JI—which has carried out a number of high-profile terrorist attacks—emerged.

Indonesia faces significant challenges in improving maritime security, given its size and geographical spread. It has some 17,500 islands and about 5.8 million sq. km of territorial waters.[40] There are significant challenges in maintaining interisland communications as well as in ensuring their security. Three important and strategic waterways, the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Makassar, traverse the archipelago. These facts of geography mean that maritime security is of critical importance in maintaining the very integrity of the Indonesian state. However, there is a comparative lack of resources to patrol Indonesia's vast archipelagic waters. Indeed Indonesia suffers from resource, capacity, and governance issues that make the task of improving maritime security a significant long-term challenge.

The impetus to improve maritime security in response to the events of 9-11 was also slow in coming. This can be attributed to Indonesia's reluctance to even acknowledge that it had a terrorist problem until the Bali bombing in 2002. Since then, however, Indonesia has acknowledged the threat of piracy, smuggling, and terrorism, and has taken active measures in collaboration with external partners to better improve its capacity in countering terrorism. Although its economic stake in the Straits of Malacca is much smaller in comparison to Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia has recognized that the Straits is strategically important due to the interests of major external powers. It is also apprehensive over the possible loss of sovereignty in these waters due to external intervention aimed at improving maritime security, which could potentially have an adverse impact on the territorial integrity of the rest of the Indonesian archipelago.

Indonesia's perspective on maritime security is conditioned by geography and long-held defense doctrine, the objective of which is to keep the far-flung archipelago together in one unitary state. Maritime security is thus aimed at countering the potential for low-intensity attacks or piecemeal intervention by foreign powers and at containing security problems arising from smuggling, piracy, and encroachment into its fishing and other resource-rich seas. Indonesia thus adopted the doctrine of *Wawasan Nusantara* (or Archipelagic Outlook), which was first formulated in the 1950s in response to regional rebellions. The doctrine is aimed at ensuring the geographical unity of the archipelago as well as the unity of the people. Under this doctrine, all the seas within the Indonesian archipelago belong to Indonesia, in contrast to international law that limits the territorial waters of islands and treats the seas outside them as part of

international waters. Indonesia has consistently adhered to the doctrine of the Archipelagic Outlook. It thus rejected a proposal by Japan in 1971 to have the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca brought under the control of an international body on the grounds that the Straits are Indonesian territorial waters.[41]

The fear of external intervention that could adversely affect Indonesia's territorial sovereignty and therefore the unity of the Indonesian state has thus compelled it to make efforts to improve its capacity to better secure the Straits of Malacca. In recent years, its Western Fleet has stepped up regular patrols and this has improved security in Indonesian waters around the Straits. Indonesia has also formed Navy Control Command Centers (Puskodal) in Batam and Belawan that have been provided with naval commandoes to deal with armed hijacking or piracy incidents in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.[42]

Apart from naval activities, the government has also taken other nonmilitary initiatives. The Ministry of Home Affairs has put into place denial programs in 16 regencies bordering important waterways, including the Straits of Malacca. These programs are aimed at increasing local awareness of laws and regulations, strengthening local monitoring and control mechanisms, improving early warning systems, and at alleviating poverty, which is recognized to be the root cause of piracy.[43] Such a strategy is consistent with the comprehensive approach that governments in the region take in dealing with security issues or problems. It is an approach that acknowledges the presence of fundamental causes and attempts to deal with them.

However, Indonesia has suffered from the lack of a unified approach to managing maritime security. Some thirteen separate agencies claim jurisdiction over the sea, including the navy, the marine police, and the Sea Communications Guard and Rescue Directorate (KPLP). Local authorities also have maritime security responsibilities, with provinces having jurisdiction up to 12 nautical miles of their coastal waters and regencies up to three nautical miles. This has led to difficulties for other countries and international institutions in working with Indonesia to improve maritime security in the Straits of Malacca.[44] Indonesia has recognized the problem and has started the process of integrating maritime security into one coast guard agency, Bakorkamla.[45] This process has not been smooth and led to the lament of the navy chief in February 2009 that the various agencies had focused only on their own interests, and not on the national interest.[46] In June 2010 President Yudhoyono finally appointed a political, law, and security minister to lead the plan regarding the

establishment of an independent coast guard, an indication of the very slow pace of development.[47]

Indonesia has also acknowledged that its present fleet of naval and patrol vessels is insufficient. In 2005, for instance, it had 129 patrol vessels, compared to the estimated 302 vessels needed to adequately patrol its territorial waters. Indonesia thus plans to acquire 60 new vessels from 2006 to 2015, with the long-term objective of deploying 274 vessels by 2024.[48] More generally, ongoing military modernization has placed emphasis on the development of rapid reaction forces that could respond to any crisis or emergency anywhere in the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia was badly affected by the economic crisis in 1998, which had a very negative impact on defence spending and procurement. However, although it has recovered from the crisis, its naval patrol capabilities currently remain inadequate for the massive task of ensuring security in the far-flung archipelago.

Indonesia's economic recovery and the resumption of steady economic development after the traumatic political and economic crises in 1998 have enabled it to gradually improve its capacity in ensuring maritime security. However, a former top Indonesian naval commander has also noted that "neither Indonesia nor other littoral states, on their own, have the resources or the expertise to explore the undersea wealth or the means to preserve the marine environment." Thus, cooperation with others in maritime security is recognized to be essential.[49] Indonesia has pragmatically accepted assistance from external powers that have a stake in the security of the vital Straits of Malacca, with the proviso that they respect Indonesia's sovereignty over those waters. The United States and Japan have provided valuable assistance in maritime capacity building, which is aimed at improving the ability of Indonesia to secure its maritime territory. The United States has helped to establish an integrated maritime surveillance system in the Straits of Malacca and the Singapore Straits that consists of 12 coastal surveillance stations equipped with radar, ship-identification systems, long-range cameras, and communication systems.[50] The United States has also restored the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program that had been suspended due to human rights violations by the Suharto regime and has enhanced operational exercises, such as the annual Cooperation Afloat, Readiness, and Training (CARAT) exercises conducted by both the navies. In addition to this, the United States has provided training funds to Indonesia's marine police and has undertaken counterterrorism training exercises with its navy.[51] It also contributed 15 patrol boats to the Indonesian Police for antipiracy patrols in the Straits of Malacca.[52]

Japan has provided training and equipment in the areas of immigration control, aviation security, customs cooperation, export control, law enforcement cooperation, and measures against terrorism financing.[53] It has also funded the installation and maintenance of navigational aides and buoy-tenders, provided technical assistance to upgrade marine safety data management systems, and conducted hydrographical surveys.[54] In December 2007 Japan gave three patrol boats to the Indonesian Marine Police to help patrol the Straits of Malacca.[55]

However, while Indonesia has accepted external assistance, it has also clarified that it will not tolerate the presence of foreign troops or vessels in its waters, nor will it accept any loss of its sovereignty over what it regards as its own territorial waters. Thus, the then navy chief Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh said in 2004 that Indonesia was open to assistance and cooperation offered by others, as long as this did not lead to the internationalization of the management of the Malacca Straits and as long as Indonesia's sovereign rights as a coastal state were respected.[56] Indonesia declined to join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), since it potentially involved the interdiction by foreign navies of vessels passing through Indonesian territorial waters.[57] Consistent with this stand, Indonesia also rejected a U.S. proposal for authorization by the United Nations to pursue pirates ashore in Somalia following the dramatic upsurge in pirate attacks off Somalia waters in 2008, due to its possible implications for Indonesia.[58] As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, Indonesia has also developed close ties with China in an effort to hedge against its rise. A closer Indonesia-China relationship will also help Indonesia to maintain a balance among the great powers in the region and to better deflect pressure from the United States and its allies. However, Indonesia risks getting caught up in the increasingly tense Sino-U.S. strategic rivalry in the region.

Like Indonesia, Malaysia is a key player in regional maritime security as it is a littoral state along the Straits of Malacca. Like Indonesia, Malaysia is also a maritime state. East and West Malaysia are separated by the South China Sea, by a distance of about 600 km at its closest point. Malaysia also has a 4,675 km-long coastline. These geographical features mean that the patrolling of large maritime territories and sea-lanes of communication between the two halves of the country has posed daunting challenges. These challenges have also been complicated by the presence of offshore oil deposits and maritime boundary disputes with a number of countries, as well as by disagreement over disputed territory in the South China Sea. Increasing incidents of piracy in the Straits of Malacca (through which the bulk of its trade

flows), the South China Sea, and the triborder area with Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as the inflow of illegal migrants and refugees from Indonesia and the Philippines, have led to an increased emphasis on improving naval patrol capabilities to better ensure maritime security.[59] The high-profile Sipadan kidnap and ransom incident related to the ASG in 2000 also dramatically highlighted to the Malaysian government the need for better maritime security.

Malaysia too has a problem with radical Islamist terrorism. However, unlike Indonesia, it has always been prepared, and was so well before the events of 9-11, to take tough measures, such as deploying security forces and using preventive detention laws to quickly contain any militant threat to security. Malaysia has experienced a number of violent incidents involving Muslim militants since 1978.[60] It thus did not need any external prompting to take measures to improve maritime security, especially in the light of the Sipadan incident, though regional and international concerns over a possible piracy-terrorism nexus in the aftermath of 9-11 provided an added impetus. Thus, after the Sipadan hostage crisis in 2000, Malaysia established an antipiracy task force with 24 craft and a tactical response unit of marine police officers. Since 2005 it has also placed armed police officers on board selected tugboats and barges that use the Straits of Malacca.[61]

In 2006 Malaysia established the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), which amalgamated five existing agencies into one. The MMEA received some 70 patrol craft from the navy and other agencies, and also purchased 38 Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats from a local shipbuilder to augment its fleet. It is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring the maritime security of Malaysian waters in peacetime, and engages in activities such as search and rescue, intelligence, patrol, and antipiracy operations. However, with an operational footprint that covers 600,000 sq. km, it has acknowledged that it will have to focus on areas where there has been a concentration of illegal activities. It will also have to rely on intelligence and information sharing to make better use of its limited resources.[62] In addition to the MMEA, Malaysia has also established various new security systems to improve the monitoring and surveillance of marine traffic, particularly in the Straits of Malacca. These include the Malaysian Sea Surveillance System and the Malaysian Vessels Traffic System and Mandatory Ship Reporting System (STRAITREP). A number of radar tracking stations along the Straits have been built as part of these ongoing efforts to improve maritime security.[63]

Malaysia has also made significant efforts to modernize and expand its navy; it deployed 16 missile-armed warships in 2009.[64] The

centerpiece of its naval modernization is the acquisition of German-designed MEKO 100 patrol corvettes for the purpose of offshore patrol. The first two of the six ships that were ordered were built in Germany and delivered in 2006, with the rest built in Malaysia and delivered by the end of 2009. The plan is to eventually acquire up to 27 of these vessels, though this will have to be done in stages in accordance with the availability of funding.[65] MEKO patrol vessels have low radar signatures, are highly automated, and are economical to operate. They are also very capable combat vessels that are equipped with naval guns, advanced electronics, and the ability to deploy a naval helicopter. Their modular design also enables future upgrades, such as antimissile defences and Exocet antiship missiles.[66] The MEKO program represents a significant investment in Malaysia's offshore patrol capability, given the purported size of the program and the capability of these modern ships. However, as will be examined in Chapter 6, the military modernization programs in both Malaysia and Singapore have interactive elements that reflect residual mutual suspicion and that have the potential to spark an arms race. In this context, it is thus no coincidence that in tandem with Malaysia's naval modernization, Singapore has also built a very modern, capable, and impressive navy.

The expansion and modernization of its maritime patrol capabilities has improved Malaysia's capacity to defend its long coastlines and extensive maritime territories. Despite having a relatively sophisticated navy and marine police, however, Malaysia has acknowledged that it needs to supplement its own efforts by cooperating with external stakeholders to improve security in the Straits of Malacca. Like Indonesia, Malaysia has welcomed the assistance and role of external powers such as Japan and the United States. Indeed, Japan has funded the installation of navigation aids, provided technical assistance to upgrade marine safety data management systems, and conducted hydrographical surveys.[67] It has also provided equipment to improve surveillance of the Straits of Malacca and given technical assistance in maritime law enforcement. In addition, Japan has provided speedboats, rigid hull inflatable boats, and night vision equipment to Malaysian customs and marine police.[68]

Malaysia has also improved maritime cooperation with the United States through the MMEA, which has cohosted regional training seminars conducted by the U.S. government on topics such as the legal aspects of border security and engaged in community relations exercises with the U.S. Coast Guard.[69] MMEA personnel have also been trained by the U.S. Coast Guard.[70] In 2009 the MMEA

proposed an exchange program with the U.S. Coast Guard as a means of improving cooperation and raising technical standards.[71]

In addition, Malaysia is part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Since 2005 FPDA multilateral military exercises have focused on maritime security, particularly in countering terrorist threats.[72] The FPDA, a loose defence arrangement that does not involve binding security obligations, has proved its usefulness by paving the way for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in maritime security in the Straits of Malacca. The FPDA has also been the vehicle for Australia's stationing of P3C maritime patrol aircraft at Malaysia's Butterworth Air Base from which Australia has conducted maritime reconnaissance over the environs of the Straits of Malacca. In recent years, the FPDA has come of age, with joint all-services exercises carried out every year, an indication of its maturity and potential for a range of missions and political objectives. For the time being, its chief utility lies in facilitating military cooperation between Malaysia on the one hand and Singapore and Australia on the other. Analysts have also acknowledged that one of the main obstacles to its effectiveness and further development lies in the existence of bilateral tensions between Singapore and Malaysia. In this context, the FPDA plays a confidence-building role between Singapore and Malaysia.[73] This role is especially crucial, given what analysts believe are signs of a nascent arms race between the two countries.[74]

Despite stepping up cooperation with the United States and its allies, Malaysia has also been treading a fine line, and has tried to be careful not to be seen as responding to pressure from the United States after 9-11. This is due to the strong domestic anti-U.S. sentiments prevailing in the country. Malaysia also shares with Indonesia strong apprehensions over the potential loss of sovereignty over its maritime waters, should external powers become involved. Thus, like Indonesia, Malaysia has rejected all suggestions that foreign powers such as the United States or Japan should help patrol the Straits of Malacca, as this could potentially lead to the internationalization of a waterway that it regards as part of its maritime territory. The United States Pacific Command's Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), which was broached in March 2004 to counter transnational maritime threats in the Asia-Pacific, met with strong objections from both Malaysia and Indonesia, in view of the suggestion that U.S. forces might be directly involved in securing the Straits of Malacca.[75] Similarly, in 2005, Japan's proposal for multinational antipiracy patrols in territorial waters was rejected by both Indonesia

and Malaysia.[76] Indeed Malaysian analysts have dismissed the linkage between regional piracy and maritime terrorism as an attempt to exaggerate the threat to maritime security and thus justify an external role that could have the effect of eroding Malaysia's sovereignty.[77]

Nonetheless, regional and international concerns over maritime security in the aftermath of 9-11 have had the effect of galvanizing Malaysia to step up its own efforts to improve maritime security, which had been an area of growing concern before 9-11. Thus, Malaysia has not only taken unilateral measures to improve its maritime security capabilities but has also welcomed assistance in capacity building.[78] Compared to Indonesia, Malaysia is also more comfortable with multilateral security cooperation, given its long-standing links with Western powers, for instance, through the FPDA. Given the transnational nature of modern-day piracy and terrorism, Malaysia is aware of the need for a multilateral approach, as long as this does not compromise its sovereignty. Therefore in 2007, the deputy prime minister Najib acknowledged the need for greater intelligence cooperation to combat both piracy and possible maritime terrorism.[79]

Apart from Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore is also a key littoral state. Although it does not claim sovereignty over the Straits of Malacca, it is strategically located at its southern entrance and shipping that traverses the Straits of Malacca passes through the Straits of Singapore as well. Singapore not only occupies a key strategic location in these vital waterways but also has one of the world's largest container ports. Any maritime terrorist strike, for instance, on its port facilities would have a severe regional and global impact as Singapore is a megacontainer hub in the intricate just-in-time global manufacturing system upon which global commerce depends. Given its heavy dependence on external trade, Singapore itself will be seriously affected, should there be any major disruption of seaborne trade as a result of a terrorist attack.

Singapore is acutely aware of its vulnerabilities as well as of the fact that it is a prime target for radical Islamist terrorists on account of its position as a logistical base for the U.S. navy, its serving as host to the regional offices of thousands of Western multinational corporations, its close ties with the West including the United States, and its close security links with Israel. For instance, Hezbollah had planned an ultimately abortive attack on U.S. warships passing through Singapore in 1995.[80] The JI had also planned to attack U.S. military personnel and naval vessels in Singapore as part of its audacious post 9-11 bomb plots in late 2001. Other targets included Western embassies, U.S. corporations, and local military facilities. The planned operation,

which would have been the largest terrorist attack since 9-11, was averted with the arrest of the members of the local JI cell in Singapore in December 2001.[81]

Given these circumstances, Singapore's response to the threat of terrorism has been the most active of the states in the region. Apart from comprehensive measures designed to improve coordination, intelligence, and operational capabilities for countering terrorism, Singapore has also invested heavily in passive homeland security measures.[82] Its efforts to ensure maritime security are coordinated through a Maritime Security Task Force, which links three maritime agencies, namely, the navy, the police, the coast guard, and the port authority. A number of measures have been put into place since 9-11, including intensified coast guard and navy patrols, and the escort of high-risk commercial vessels such as oil tankers, LNG tankers, and cruise ships through the Straits of Singapore. Given the crowded harbor and waters around Singapore, it has enacted laws to prevent unauthorized sea traffic near strategic installations such as petrochemical plants. Restrictions also govern the movement of ships and boats at night.[83] Shipping routes have been redesignated to minimize the convergence of small craft with high-risk commercial vessels.[84]

Singapore's strong support for all relevant international maritime safety and security regimes is unlike the sometimes lukewarm response of Indonesia and Malaysia, both of which have been concerned over the issue of sovereignty. Singapore is a signatory to all relevant agreements such as the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (otherwise known as the SUA Convention) and the more intrusive additional protocols of 2005, which Indonesia and Malaysia have not acceded to. Singapore has also worked closely with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in implementing the requirements of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code of 2002 and the amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention that came into effect in 2004. These regulations mandated improved ship and port security measures that are aimed at improving maritime security.[85]

Singapore also enacted measures in addition to these international protocols. For instance, it has regulations that require all ships of 500 tonnes and above to comply with prearrival notification procedures, which include information on whether the vessel is in possession of a valid International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC), the current security level of the ship, the last 10 ports of call, and whether any additional security measures were taken during any ship-to-port or ship-to-ship interface. Ships that arrive from non-ISPS compliant

ports are also subject to an IMO checklist on additional security measures.[86]

In addition, Singapore also supported the initiative by the United States in 2005 to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, as this would enable it to better deal with maritime threats.[87] It thus established an integrated surveillance and information network for tracking and investigating suspicious movements.[88] It also established a satellite-based ship tracking system as well as ship-to-shore alert systems.[89] This approach is in line with its military defence doctrine built around IKC2, which stands for Integrated Knowledge-based, Command, and Control, and is Singapore's version of the much vaunted process of military transformation led by the United States known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Singapore's sustained military modernization and buildup program since independence in 1965 has in recent years focused on the development of a fairly substantial, multitasked navy, reportedly the strongest and most technologically advanced in Southeast Asia. In 2009 the navy deployed 12 modern missile-armed frigates and corvettes, four submarines (two more on order), four mine-hunters, and 23 patrol vessels. Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft as well as a fleet of five modern F-50 maritime patrol aircraft supplement this significant capability in maritime surveillance and patrol.[90] Singapore has used its naval assets for contributing to global and regional efforts in improving maritime security. Thus, Singapore contributed a landing ship with 200 personnel and two helicopters to international antipiracy patrols off Somalia in early 2009.[91]

As a small and vulnerable city-state that is surrounded by much larger, potentially hostile Muslim neighbors, Singapore feels that it needs the support and assistance of external great powers. It has thus actively searched for ways to keep the United States militarily engaged in the region, efforts that have been openly acknowledged by the United States.[92] In 2000 Singapore opened a new naval base at Changi with facilities designed to accommodate the U.S. Pacific Fleet, including its aircraft carriers.[93] Singapore actively cooperates with the United States in a broad range of areas, including military, security, intelligence, counterterrorism, maritime security, bioterror and health, and defence technology. Despite the absence of a formal mutual defence treaty, Singapore is in effect the key U.S. partner in the region. Apart from collaborating with the United States, Singapore has also encouraged the less contentious regional security roles of Japan and Australia.

Singapore has proven to be a strong and reliable ally of the United States, having supported, since 9-11, all U.S.-led counterterrorism and

maritime security initiatives, incurring some displeasure from its two large neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia. In 2002 Singapore joined the Container Security Initiative (CSI) that is designed to screen containers and cargo bound for U.S. ports.[94] In 2004 Singapore also joined the U.S. Coast Guard–led IPSP, under which the U.S. Coast Guard could inspect Singapore's port facilities and verify its implementation of the ISPS code.[95] In March 2004 Singapore also welcomed the RMSI, which was broached by the U.S. Pacific Command in March 2004 to deal with transnational maritime threats in the Asia-Pacific. However, the plan met with strong objections from Indonesia and Malaysia as it appeared to pave the way for U.S. forces to become directly involved in maritime security and counterterrorism in the environs of the Straits of Malacca.[96] Similarly, while Singapore is an active participant in the U.S.-led PSI, which involves the interdiction of ships that are suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction on the high seas, both Indonesia and Malaysia have viewed this initiative as posing a potential violation of their sovereign rights.[97]

Singapore's strong support for initiatives by the United States that could give the United States a greater presence and security role has not been welcomed by both its neighbors. As a Malaysian analyst has charged, Singapore's discourse since 9-11 appears to have been designed to pave the way for external powers to play a role in managing security threats in the region and has been perceived as an attempt to internationalize the Straits of Malacca.[98] In contrast, both Indonesia and Malaysia are more concerned with maintaining their sovereignty over their own maritime domains.

The divergence in interests suggests that the incorporation of the Malay archipelago into the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has had the unintended consequence of exacerbating already complex regional dynamics with regard to maritime security and geopolitics, with uncertain consequences for regional stability. In establishing a quasi-alliance and a strategic relationship with Singapore, the United States has unwittingly complicated preexisting tensions between Singapore and its Muslim neighbors, which perceive Singapore as the regional stalking horse of the United States. Moreover, it has invited countermeasures by Malaysia and Indonesia to balance off the enhanced security role of the United States in the region. This has enabled China to rapidly develop its ties with Malaysia and Indonesia, thus enhancing China's role and presence in the same contested region. In the long run, the enhanced roles of the two great powers engaged in strategic rivalry could potentially lead to greater tensions and conflict in the region, as had happened in Southeast Asia during

the Cold War between the United States and the then Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The growing strategic rivalry between China and the United States in the Malay archipelago, which has involved the states in the region, is explored in greater detail in the next chapter.

Finally, the Philippines has emerged as another key player in regional maritime security, though not on the same scale as the three littoral states of the Straits of Malacca. The Philippines lies astride the sea-lines of communication that connect Northeast and Southeast Asia. In recent years, the triborder maritime area with East Malaysia and Indonesia has emerged as an area of increasing security concerns as it has become a logistical corridor for militants and the Moro separatists operating in the southern Philippines. The seas around the Sulu island in the Philippines and the Celebes Sea in Indonesia have also become notorious for illegal maritime activities, such as smuggling and piracy.[99] Concerns over the vulnerability of supertankers transiting near the Makassar Straits have increased, given the incidents of piracy in the waters of the triborder maritime area.

However, the Philippines is facing serious problems with governance, which are the result of weak institutions, economic underdevelopment, and political instability. Due to a lack of resources, it has struggled in dealing with the many challenges in its maritime territory, such as illegal fishing, smuggling, and piracy. Like Indonesia, it has extensive archipelagic waters, with some 7,000 islands and 17,000 km of coastline. Unlike Indonesia, however, it has even fewer resources to secure its maritime domain due to a plethora of security challenges emanating from communist insurgency, Muslim separatism, and radical Islamist groups. The persistence and severity of insurgencies have meant that scarce resources have been diverted to the greater priority of meeting the threats on land.

During the Cold War, the Philippines was a valuable ally of the United States, which maintained large air and naval facilities at Clark and Subic Bay respectively, thus taking care of its external defence. However, the emergence of nationalistic "People Power" in the Philippines that led to the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986 also resulted in opposition to the continued military presence of the United States. In 1992 the United States withdrew from Subic Bay, leaving the Philippines with the enormous task of having to provide for its own external security. The 1997 Asian economic crisis dealt another blow to efforts at self-reliant military modernization. Planned military modernization programs in the Philippines have been repeatedly postponed or cut back due to the lack of funding.

The agencies responsible for maritime security, namely, the navy, the coast guard, and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, have therefore been significantly underresourced. In 2010 the navy deployed 62 patrol vessels as well as a frigate, while the coast guard had 51 patrol vessels. Most naval assets, however, are antiquated and poorly armed, and none of the vessels are armed with missiles. The air force has no fighter aircraft, although it does have 15 aging OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency aircraft and virtually no modern maritime patrol aircraft.[100] Procuring modern naval vessels and maritime patrol aircraft has proven difficult due to the lack of funds and the priority accorded to the army, which is battling major insurgencies.

The lack of resources has meant that foreign assistance has assumed much greater importance in the Philippines, compared to Indonesia or Malaysia. The much better relations with the United States during the Arroyo presidency resulted in some tangible benefits for the Philippines. Following the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999, the Philippines resumed large-scale military exercises with the United States. It has been able to obtain surplus or refurbished equipment under the U.S. Excess Defence Articles (EDA) program. The United States has carried out regular training exercises with the Philippines, such as the Balikatan exercises as well as the CARAT exercises, and has also provided training grants through IMET.[101] It has provided assistance in combating the Moro rebellion through the provision of equipment such as transport aircraft, helicopters, patrol craft, armored personnel carriers, and assault rifles, and through antiterrorism training.[102] Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, U.S. troops, including Special Forces, arrived in the Philippines in January 2002 to help provide training and logistical support to the Philippine Armed Forces against the Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group.[103]

Other countries have also provided assistance. Australia, for instance, has provided assistance in the form of 28 patrol boats and an annual grant of A$4 million for training.[104] This has helped to improve the capacity of the Philippine navy and coast guard in patrolling its southern maritime borders. Although its primary focus has been the Straits of Malacca, Japan has also provided some assistance to the Philippines in the form of grants, technical assistance, and training and equipment in the areas of police investigation, law enforcement, and coast guard operations.[105] Of much greater significance has been Japan's economic and humanitarian assistance under its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy, which has amounted to almost 10 billion yen from 1960 to 2002, making the

Philippines the third largest recipient of Japan's overseas aid after China and Indonesia.[106] However, its contribution toward ameliorating the underlying conditions of poverty and alienation that have led to insurgency and transnational criminality, such as piracy, has been difficult to measure.

The Philippines has supported as many initiatives by the United States and international regimes as possible. It is a signatory to the SUA Convention of 1988 and the additional protocols of 2005 and is also an active participant in the U.S.-led PSI. The problem is a serious lack of capacity compared to the enormity of the task of adequately patrolling and securing the vast archipelagic waters of the Philippines; this cannot be redressed by piecemeal security aid and the occasional training assistance. Despite its closer relationship with the United States in recent years, the Philippines has, like Indonesia and Malaysia, also developed close ties with China. This has occurred in spite of the lack of resolution of conflicting claims with China to maritime territory in the South China Sea, and can be explained as a pragmatic measure designed to hedge against the rise of China as well as to access its greater resources in meeting the challenges that are facing the Philippines. This, however, has facilitated the increased role and presence of China in a region that is increasingly becoming an arena for great power rivalry between the United States and China. The danger of being caught up in this rivalry was demonstrated by the naval confrontation between the two great powers in an incident involving the *USNS Impeccable* in 2009, which occurred in the South China Sea, off the coast of the Philippines.[107]

Regional Cooperation

The heightened interest and growing roles since 9-11 of external powers with a stake in regional security have provided the impetus to states in the Malay Archipelago region to undertake unilateral as well as bilateral and multilateral, cooperative measures to improve maritime security. By being proactive instead of reacting to the prodding and initiatives of external powers, the states in the region will have a better chance of remaining in the driver's seat and will thus be able to better preserve their interests, including the maintenance of sovereignty over their own maritime domains.

The states in the region have long recognized the need for and benefits of interstate security cooperation. Indeed various bilateral naval exercises as well as joint naval patrols and other forms of naval cooperation have taken place. Singapore and Indonesia have forged

close naval cooperation since 1974, which includes coordinated patrols, a joint exercise to eradicate World War II mines, and also sociocivic programmes such as the Surya Bhaskara Jaya in Indonesia.[108] Both countries also cooperated to set up an information-sharing mechanism under Project SURPIC in 2005 that helped to establish a common maritime operating system.[109] Currently, coordinated patrols are carried out four times a year under Indosin Corpat.[110]

Relations between Singapore and Malaysia have had a chequered history since Singapore's independence in 1965. However, bilateral security exercises and naval cooperation have increased in recent years. Since 1984 Singapore and Malaysia have held bilateral naval exercises under the Malapura series in the Straits of Malacca.[111] Both countries have also developed military cooperation under the auspices of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) that groups Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia. From 2005 FPDA multilateral military exercises have focused on maritime security, particularly on countering terrorist threats.[112] The FPDA holds a major naval exercise every year but its real value lies in being a confidence-building mechanism between Singapore and Malaysia, in view of the historical tensions between the two states.[113]

Malaysia and Indonesia have also developed naval cooperation through a coordinated patrol that is conducted four times a year under the code name Malindo Corpat and a combined exercise involving all maritime institutions that is conducted three times a year under Optima Malindo Corpat.[114] The Philippines conducts regular naval training exercises with Malaysia under the Maphi-Laut series.[115] Both countries also conduct two coordinated patrols every year. The Philippines and Indonesia conduct coordinated patrols four times a year. These exercises are not sufficient to stem the arms trafficking and other illegal activities in the triborder maritime area off the southern Philippines, as the main problem has been the lack of capacity on the part of the Philippine navy.[116]

What has been novel in the post 9-11 era is the emergence of trilateral naval cooperation among the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca. Since 2004 Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have carried out coordinated year-round patrols that are linked by communication hotlines.[117] The Malacca Straits Patrols are multilateral in nature but are restricted in scope to avoid sovereignty issues. Thus, the patrols are coordinated instead of joint, with a handing off procedure and without the right of hot pursuit.

This has been complemented by the "Eye in the Sky" combined maritime air patrol that was inaugurated in September 2005, with

the first flight carried out from Subang in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Under the initiative, the three countries as well as Thailand will each conduct up to two air patrols per week along the Malacca and Singapore Straits, with each flight carrying a combined mission patrol team consisting of personnel from the participating states.[118] These aircraft can overfly each other's territory. To ensure transparency and as a confidence-building measure, an officer of the country over which a patrol flies will also be present on board.[119] To enhance the effectiveness of joint air patrols, both Indonesia and Malaysia agreed in late 2008 to allow the limited use of each other's air space without prior diplomatic permission.[120]

Thailand joined the Malacca Straits Patrol in 2009, giving the naval patrols added capacity on account of its capable navy.[121] A Joint Coordinating Committee and an Information Exchange Group comprising naval intelligence agencies of the four countries helps to coordinate the naval and air patrols. To improve coordination and timely response, the littoral states have also developed an information-sharing system known as the Malacca Straits Patrol Information System.[122]

Apart from bilateral and multilateral naval cooperation, the states in the region have also taken regional political and security initiatives to improve maritime security and to counter security challenges such as piracy, organized crime, and terrorism. The Bali Accord II signed by the states comprising the ASEAN in 2003 envisaged the establishment of an ASEAN community comprising three elements: a regional security community, an economic community, and a sociocultural community. The same Bali Accord II also acknowledged that maritime issues are transnational in character and therefore had to be addressed regionally and also in a comprehensive manner.[123] The Action Plan for the ASEAN Security Community included the improvement of cooperation on combating transnational crime, such as money laundering, illegal migration, smuggling, and the trafficking of drugs and persons. It also aimed to strengthen law enforcement cooperation as well as to promote ASEAN maritime security cooperation. Significantly, the Action Plan also stated the desire of the ASEAN states to "strengthen efforts in maintaining respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of member countries."[124] This reflected a key objective—that of limiting the role of external powers in regional security. However, the unilateral actions of individual states in forging security ties with one or more of the great powers, despite concerns over sovereignty, have set the stage for great power rivalry within the region, a theme explored in the next chapter.

In terms of concrete regional action, a workshop of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on Maritime Security in Kuala Lumpur in September 2004 led to a general consensus among participating countries on the reality of threats to maritime security and the need to undertake collective efforts to address maritime threats. They also agreed on the need to implement and develop international and national standards on the safety of navigation, as well as to develop surveillance and information systems that would ensure the safe movement of people and goods through regional waters. The subsequent Singapore-U.S. workshop on regional cooperation in maritime security in March 2005 took discussions further with proposals on multilateral cooperation as well as on operational and technological solutions for maritime security, shipping, and port security. Ideas that were put forth included the fostering of information sharing, the establishment of maritime domain awareness, the initiation of joint maritime security exercises, cooperation in consequence management, and the sustenance of capacity building initiatives.[125] All these were to be gradually implemented by the littoral states with the participation of extraregional powers and international organizations, albeit in a piecemeal and evolutionary manner.

In addition, the semiofficial network linking government officials, policy analysts, and academics known as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has also held discussions on improving maritime security. Its short-lived Study Group on Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation issued a special memorandum after its Jakarta meeting in December 2007 that acknowledged that maritime knowledge and awareness are the basic foundations of maritime security in the Asia-Pacific. It also recommended steps to enhance them by better institutional arrangements for regional cooperation, coordination between maritime security forces, the encouragement of public and private sector partnerships on maritime security, legal workshops, multiagency training at the national and regional levels, and other measures.[126] The Study Group's report after its meeting in Seoul, South Korea, in April 2008 also reiterated the importance of institutional arrangements for maritime security, but realistically noted that disputes over sovereignty had hampered regional cooperation.[127]

Private industry has also contributed to dealing with the problem of piracy, a long-standing problem that predates 9-11. The failure of the littoral states to take effective action, or even to acknowledge the growing problem of piracy in the 1990s, led to an initiative by private industry that resulted in the establishment of a Piracy Reporting

Center in 1992. Operated by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the center is located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It is supported by voluntary contributions from industry and was initially opposed by authorities in the region, particularly Indonesia, which feared that it could affect business confidence by drawing attention to the growing problem of piracy.[128] The center is the first point of contact for shipmasters to report an actual or attempted attack, and any suspicious ship movements. It then alerts other ships and law enforcement agencies in the region. The center issues regular status reports of piracy and armed robbery, and collates and analyzes the information received. Consolidated reports are then distributed to all interested bodies, including the IMO, which has come to rely on the center's statistics.[129] However, although there have been improvements in reporting, particularly after 9-11, the Piracy Reporting Center's statistics and information have been the subject of criticism from government officials and regional security analysts. For instance, some of the cases reported by the center as acts of piracy appear to be nothing more than petty theft.[130] Nonetheless, the center has played an important role in raising awareness of the growing problem of piracy within the shipping industry, and complements state, regional, and global efforts to improve maritime security in the Malay archipelago.

Extraregional Roles in Maritime Security

Although the states in the Malay archipelago have undertaken unilateral state-level initiatives and improved interstate cooperation in maritime security, various other nonstate actors such as regional and international organizations have also sought to implement regional institutional arrangements, regimes, and norms. The efforts at the ASEAN regional level have been complemented by more general global initiatives, particularly those initiated by the IMO, to improve maritime security. Ports in the region have gradually implemented the requirements of the IMO's ISPS code of December 2002 and amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention that took effect in July 2004. Under these new regulations, ships and ports are required to implement enhanced security measures to ensure better control and monitoring of the movement of people and cargo. Ships are required to have permanent identity markings, automatic identification systems, and a ship-to-shore alert system. Ports are required to have security assessments, plans and officers, as well as measures to control access.[131]

In October 2005 new protocols were added to the 1988 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the

Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA). These protocols established the basis for boarding and inspecting ships in international waters as well as for the prosecution of individuals found to be engaged in terrorist activities or the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.[132] Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines have signed the 1988 SUA Convention, but both Indonesia and Malaysia have not acceded to the 2005 Protocols due to concerns over sovereignty.

The IMO has played a direct role in improving maritime safety and security in the Straits of Malacca. IMO initiatives have led to amendments of the existing traffic-separation schemes as well as a mandatory ship-reporting system in the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Singapore. IMO projects have included the provision of electronic navigational charts for the area, the supply of real-time navigational information, and Automatic Identification System (AIS) shore stations.[133]

Apart from international conventions and organizations, extra-regional powers have also emerged as active players after 9-11. Countries such as the United States and Japan are stakeholders in the security of the vital and strategic waterways in the region. However, while they provide capacities and resources that the states in the region lack, their growing security roles have been problematic for two reasons. Firstly, their eagerness to be involved in regional security has led to fears by some of the littoral states, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, that their sovereignty over their own maritime domains could be eroded as a result of foreign intervention and measures that force them to share sovereignty over maritime security in waters that they consider to be under their ownership. Secondly, the involvement of the great powers poses the danger of turning the region into an arena for great power rivalries. Since 9-11, the United States and its regional allies, Japan and Australia, have coordinated their regional approaches through the Trilateral Security Dialogue process. The three partners share a common interest in securing the vital waterways of the region and in containing the threat of radical Islamist terrorism. The Trilateral Dialogue process has also been perceived as an evolving alliance of major Asia-Pacific democracies that could be used to contain an emerging China. Indeed China has perceived the whole trilateral dialogue process to be directed against it.[134]

Since 9-11 the United States has taken a number of initiatives to improve maritime security. U.S. Customs, for instance, has established the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which focuses on measures designed to improve the security of the

supply chain.[135] It also established the Container Security Initiative (CSI), under which U.S.-bound containers would be inspected at source by U.S. Customs.[136] The U.S. Coast Guard also has a separate International Port Security Program, under which the Coast Guard's inspectors are permitted to inspect foreign port facilities and verify their implementation of the ISPS code.[137] Another initiative by the United States is the PSI, which involves the interception of ships on the high seas that are suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction. In 2004 the United States floated the RMSI, which was aimed at countering transnational maritime threats in the Asia-Pacific. Allies of the United States in the region, such as Singapore and the Philippines, have embraced all these U.S.-led initiatives, while Indonesia and Malaysia have been reluctant to participate. For instance, while Singapore and the Philippines are participants in the PSI, Indonesia and Malaysia have not embraced the initiative. As Charles Wolf has commented, the reluctance of both to affiliate with the PSI "is abetted by sensitivities regarding sovereignty over their territorial waters, which they do not want compromised."[138]

Although both Indonesia and Malaysia have cooperated with the United States on countering radical Islamist terrorism since 9-11, an active regional security role and presence by the United States have proven sensitive, given strong anti-U.S. sentiments in both the Muslim-majority countries. Instead, it is Japan that has increasingly played a role in enhancing the capacity of the littoral states in maritime security. As a surrogate of the United States on account of its political and security relationship with it, Japan's more benign and aid-focused role has become more acceptable in the region as memories of Japanese aggression during World War II fade with time. As Yoichiro Sato has noted, "Japan's aid has not been strongly tied to human rights issues, and Indonesia's experience of aid suspensions from Western countries during the East Timor crisis from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s makes Japan a source of diversified assistance."[139]

Japan itself has needed little prompting, given its huge stake in the security of the Straits of Malacca, its oil and economic lifeline. An unspoken factor has also been the rise of China, which has challenged Japan's position in the region. A gradual shift away from pacifism in Japanese politics—even though a greater external security role remains controversial—has also enabled Japan to become more involved in regional security. A more visible regional security role by Japan was already evident before 9-11. In 2000, for instance,

following the political and economic crises in Indonesia, Japan obtained Singapore's approval to use its excellent military facilities for regional emergencies, such as for the evacuation of its citizens abroad and for participation in regional peacekeeping operations.[140] Aware of domestic and regional sensitivities, Japan has been careful to build upon its credentials as a leading provider of ODA, and its approach has been to emphasize local capacity building and governance. As such, states in the region, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have welcomed Japan's assistance as it contributes to enhancing their objective of self-reliant defence.

Japan's concern over maritime security in the region was heightened after the abduction of the Japanese crew of a tugboat in the Straits of Malacca in March 2005.[141] This rising concern led to a proposal by Japan in 2005 for multinational antipiracy patrols in both territorial and international waters, a proposal that was swiftly rejected by Indonesia and Malaysia.[142] Instead Japan has found it more practical to focus on providing assistance in regional capacity building. Thus, Japan has provided patrol boats to Indonesia to help it better secure the Straits of Malacca.[143] Japan has also provided training and equipment related to the areas of immigration control, aviation security, customs cooperation, export control, law enforcement cooperation, and measures against terrorism financing.[144] Besides this, Japan has funded the installation and maintenance of navigational aides and buoy-tenders, provided technical assistance to upgrade marine safety data management systems, and conducted hydrographical surveys.[145] In addition, the Japanese Coast Guard has conducted joint counterterrorism training exercises with a number of regional states. Increasingly, its powerful navy has also been more visible. For instance, Japan has participated in the multinational U.S.-led Cobra Gold military exercises in Southeast Asia, which have taken on a counterterrorism and peace enforcement focus after 9-11.

In 2001 Japan also sponsored a regional initiative that led to the signing of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in 2004. Sixteen countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia, were signatories to the agreement. ReCAAP is built around the pillars of information sharing, capacity building, and cooperative arrangements. The agreement thus established cooperative mechanisms and the antipiracy obligations of member countries, and also focused on capacity building initiatives. For instance, it established an Information Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore to support the exchange of information between ReCAAP member countries. However,

both Indonesia and Malaysia subsequently failed to ratify ReCAAP, although both Singapore and the Philippines did.[146] As explained by Yoichiro Sato, the reasons for Indonesia's reluctance to accede to the ReCAAP agreement included dissatisfaction with the location of the headquarters in Singapore, the lack of perceived benefits for Indonesia, ReCAAP's unclear relations with the existing international framework of information sharing under the IMO, and the inability to designate a focal point of contact due to jurisdictional fights among numerous agencies within Indonesia. In addition, Indonesia feared that ReCAAP could set a precedent for the application of a similar model under an IMO framework to other waterways within its maritime domain.[147]

Nonetheless, ReCAAP has resulted in a number of positive benefits. It has helped to foster better interagency cooperation within member countries as it requires each member country to provide a single focal point of contact for dealing with maritime issues such as piracy. Cooperative agreements with government agencies, NGOs, commercial interests, and international organizations have helped to improve the coordination of regional capacity building and information sharing. In addition, capacity building activities, which have focused on training exercises, workshops that share best practices, and technical assistance programs, have contributed to improving regional capacity in maritime security.[148]

Apart from the United States and Japan, Australia has also provided some assistance, such as for the establishment of the Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation in Jakarta.[149] Australia also signed the Lombak Treaty in 2006 to establish a framework for cooperation in the areas of defence, law enforcement, counterterrorism, maritime security, and disaster response. In 2008 the armed forces of Australia and Indonesia also signed an agreement to improve intelligence, maritime, and counterterrorism cooperation.[150] Australia has also provided assistance to the Philippines, such as 28 patrol boats and an annual grant of A$4 million for training, which has contributed to an improvement of maritime security in the porous triborder area of the south.[151] Although Australia is not a major source of aid compared to Japan, its assistance has, like Japan's, been welcomed by Indonesia and Malaysia as both countries are not considered potential hegemons, unlike the United States. This suits the Trilateral Security partners, as it conveniently maximizes their resources through a form of division of labor. However, China has not perceived the assistance as benign, fearing the potential interdiction of its vital sea-lanes of communication in the Straits of Malacca by the United States and

its allies in the event of conflict, a situation referred to as China's "Malacca Dilemma."[152]

Conclusion

After 9-11 and the Bali attacks in 2002, concerns over maritime security heightened due to the fear of possible maritime terrorist attacks in the environs of the Malay archipelago that could severely affect global trade. These concerns stemmed from the obvious vulnerabilities of the maritime industry, the growing problem of piracy in the region, and the presence of radical terrorist groups that could conceivably link up with pirates to carry out devastating maritime terrorist attacks, particularly in the strategic and vulnerable Straits of Malacca. Any discussion of the terrorism problem in the region thus had to include the maritime dimension. In other words, the U.S.-led global war on terrorism in the Malay archipelago extended into maritime security.

By 2004 the piracy problem in the region had become so severe that it could not be ignored. The fear of external intervention that could affect the sovereignty of regional states over their own maritime domain also provided a strong impetus toward action. This led to a new spirit of cooperation among regional states to better manage the emerging transnational security threats such as piracy and terrorism. Thus, according to a Malaysian navy officer, all the littoral states had the same objective, which was "to paint the picture to the world that the Straits (of Malacca) is not really a war-risk zone."[153]

As a result of the confusing web of ad-hoc efforts and agreements emerging from unilateral state-level, multilateral regional, and extraregional as well as global measures, maritime security in the environs of the Straits of Malacca has dramatically improved. In the first quarter of 2008, for instance, there were 11 recorded cases of piracy, the lowest in five years.[154] The number of piracy incidents reported during the period January-September 2009 also declined compared to the same periods in the previous four years. Indeed, the drop in the number of incidents has been most apparent in the ports and anchorages of Indonesia.[155] From the Straits of Malacca, piracy concerns worldwide have shifted to the waters off Somalia, where a spike in piracy cases prompted the dispatch of multilateral patrols in 2008, including patrols by China's navy.[156] Within Southeast Asia, increased naval patrols in the Straits of Malacca have forced pirates to move their operations to the South China Sea, where the number of attacks on ships rose to a five-year high by late 2009.[157] By the first

half of 2010, there were 13 actual or attempted piracy attacks in the South China Sea, the highest recorded.[158]

Singapore has clearly been at the forefront of efforts at multilateralism, and has encouraged and facilitated the involvement of external powers such as the United States and Japan in playing a regional security role. This is consistent with its balance-of-power strategy of involving extraregional powers that can enhance its own survivability and bargaining power vis-à-vis these powers as well as its much larger neighbors; this is a classic small-state survival strategy. The Philippines has also welcomed the assistance of the United States, despite the strength of anti-U.S. nationalism that accompanied the ouster of the Marcos regime in 1986, given its evident lack of resources and capacity to deal with the many security challenges that it faces. Concerns over sovereignty, however, have been paramount for Indonesia and Malaysia, as both claim the Straits of Malacca as their territorial waters, and are apprehensive of any move that could internationalize the Straits or lead to external intervention in their vast maritime domains. The United States, however, has insisted that the Straits of Malacca is an international waterway and has been concerned with ensuring that the right of innocent passage through them is not constrained by any undue exercise of sovereignty by the littoral states.

Not surprisingly therefore, the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, who met in August 2005 in Batam, Indonesia, to discuss the safety of navigation, environmental protection, and maritime security in the Straits of Malacca, reiterated in their Joint Statement that the primary responsibility for the safety of navigation, environmental protection, and maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore should lie with the littoral states.[159] While the success of antipiracy measures since 9-11 and the concomitant shift of attention to piracy off Somalia in 2008 have diverted public attention away from maritime security in the region, there remain two areas of concern. The first is the fact that challenges emanating from terrorism remain extant, given the continuing threat posed by radical Islamist groups in the region. Although a piracy-terrorism nexus has never been convincingly demonstrated, its potential is undoubted, given the obvious vulnerabilities of the maritime industry and the presence of terrorist groups that could conceivably carry out deadly maritime terrorist attacks.

The second is the growing concern over the potential of the region's waterways to become the arena of great power rivalries. This has been an inadvertent consequence of the intrusive presence

of great powers with a stake in the security of the region's strategic waterways. In this way, the U.S.-led war on global terrorism in the region, by intruding into the maritime dimension, has also inadvertently sparked great power rivalries. The enhanced security role of the United States and its allies, such as Japan and Australia, in the region's security after 9-11 has raised China's concerns over the ability of the United States to disrupt its access to energy supplies. Whether the region likes it or not, China has a growing stake in regional security as it increasingly relies on oil from the Middle East to sustain its economic growth, and this oil transits through the Straits of Malacca or via the Lombok and Makassar Straits. China, however, feels that the United States and its allies, such as Japan, have used piracy and terrorism as pretexts to expand their security presence in the Malay archipelago to the possible detriment of China's interests.[160] On the other hand, China's rise as a political, economic, and military power is threatening the dominant position of the United States and Japan's interests in the region.

The tensions in China-U.S. relations were amply demonstrated in the naval confrontation in the South China Sea between the two countries in March 2009, when five Chinese ships harassed an unarmed U.S. navy surveillance vessel, the *USNS Impeccable*, leading to the dispatch of a U.S. navy destroyer to protect the vessel.[161] The incident highlighted the growing danger from great power rivalries in the region, an indirect and unintended consequence of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism.

The growing rivalry between China and the United States will have significant security implications for the region. It could involve the region in new great power rivalries similar to that which bedeviled the region during the Cold War standoff between the United States and the then USSR and led to the region's involvement in conflicts, such as those epitomized by the Vietnam War and the subsequent conflict between ASEAN and Vietnam over Kampuchea. In addition to great power rivalries, the pressure to improve maritime security after 9-11 has also given added impetus to ongoing military modernization programs within the region, as states in the region attempt to improve their self-reliant defence capabilities to contain the growing security roles of external great powers. However, these efforts have the potential of exacerbating existing interstate tensions by sparking an arms race among the states in the region.

Thus, the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has not only sparked great power rivalries in the region, but has also the potential of

exacerbating intraregional tensions as a result of the acceleration of the regional arms buildup. In other words, the intrusion of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism into the Malay archipelago has the potential to unleash further dynamics that could yet destabilize the region. These unintended consequences, namely, great power rivalries and the regional arms buildup, are linked to each other within the Malay archipelago security complex, and are explored in greater detail in the next two chapters.

Chapter 5

Great Power Rivalries

The Great Powers in the Region

Southeast Asia, including the Malay archipelago, has traditionally been the arena of great power interventions, beginning with colonialism and then various wars after the end of World War II, such as the three Indochina conflicts involving France, the United States, and China.[1] With the drawdown in the military presence of the United States after the end of the Cold War, it seemed that the region could at last be free from great power rivalries, especially given the slow but steady development of regionalism under the aegis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

However, post–Cold War challenges from global terrorism, fears over a growing nexus between local armed separatism and global terrorism, as well as heightened concerns over maritime security arising from terrorist threats in the region have once again attracted the attention of external powers with deep economic and strategic interests in the region. Since 9-11, the United States and its regional allies, Japan and Australia, have coordinated their regional approaches through the Trilateral Security Dialogue process. The three partners share a common interest in securing the vital waterways of the region and containing the threat of radical Islamist terrorism. Their increasingly active roles in counterterrorism and maritime security have, however, taken place in a manner that is likely to exacerbate the already growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, which will have profound implications for the Malay archipelago. This has been an unintended consequence of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, which has intruded into an already complex regional security environment.

Globally, the emergence of China as a great power, with its voracious appetite for energy, resources, and markets, has resulted in China's increased desire to secure its strategic interests in the face of the established dominance of the United States and its key ally in East Asia, Japan. After 9-11 the enhanced security roles of the United States and its allies in the region have led China to openly express concern over the ability of the United States to disrupt its access to energy supplies through the Straits of Malacca on which it has increasingly come to rely for fueling its enormous economic growth. This has been dubbed China's "Malacca Dilemma."[2] China has reacted by enhancing its political and security roles in the region in addition to its already growing economic presence. It has done this by launching a diplomatic offensive to woo regional states, while becoming more assertive in pressing its claims to disputed maritime territory in the South China Sea, one that led to the naval confrontation between China and the United States in the *Impeccable* incident in 2009.[3]

The growing rivalry between China and the United States has significant implications for the region. It could involve the region in new great power rivalries similar to the one that bedevilled the region during the Cold War standoff between the United States and the then USSR, which led to the region's involvement in conflicts, such as the Vietnam War and the subsequent conflict between ASEAN and Vietnam over Kampuchea. Thus, the intrusion of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism into the Malay archipelago has the potential to unleash further dynamics that could yet destabilize the region and potentially lead to the region becoming an arena for conflicts.

This chapter examines the growing roles of the key extraregional powers in the Malay archipelago, namely, the United States, Japan, Australia, and China. Their growing roles have taken place in the context of the emergence of China as a global power and signs of the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China that will have profound implications for the Malay archipelago.

The United States' Regional Security Engagement after 9-11

Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the United States designated Southeast Asia, or more specifically the Malay archipelago, as the "second front" in the global war on terrorism. The region is regarded as an important theater in this global "war," as it has the world's largest Muslim population. According to the leading expert in the United States on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen, it

is Southeast Asia, not the Middle East, that is crucial to the future of the global jihad. He has asserted that "if Southeast Asia is allowed to 'go critical' . . . it is possible that the global jihad as an overall system may attain almost unstoppable momentum."[4] Fears of radical Islamist terrorist threats were realized after the Bali attacks in 2002 and other terrorist attacks carried out by the Al Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiah (JI). The emerging terrorist threat has also heightened fears over possible maritime terrorism, given the obvious vulnerability of the maritime industry, and the potentially devastating impact of a maritime terrorist attack in the busy and strategic Straits of Malacca.

The Straits of Malacca has been an important passageway for the movement of the air and naval forces of the United States from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Within its environs, Singapore hosts a U.S. Seventh Fleet naval logistics facility that supports these movements. About 150 U.S. military personnel are based permanently at the facility, which was established in Singapore in July 1992. The U.S. logistics group at Singapore plans the supply of food, ordnance, fuel, and parts for U.S. navy vessels deployed to the Seventh Fleet Area of Operations, which stretches from the mid-Pacific to the east coast of Africa and from the Kurile Islands in the north to the Antarctic in the south. It also manages the repair of U.S. navy vessels throughout Asia.[5] In March 2001 Singapore completed, at its own cost, a deep-draft pier at its Changi naval base, which supports U.S. navy aircraft carriers, to facilitate the continued military presence of the United States in the region, one that was thrown into doubt after the closure of major U.S. naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1992. Every year, more than a hundred U.S. navy vessels call at Changi and U.S. military aircraft regularly transit Singapore's Paya Lebar Air Base. After 9-11 the military facilities in Singapore were used to facilitate and support the deployment of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.[6]

The abortive JI bomb plots in Singapore in late 2001 that targeted U.S. navy vessels at the Changi naval base, U.S. military personnel, as well as the U.S. embassy and commercial interests, underlined to the United States the emerging threat from radical Islamists in the region following the events of 9-11. The United States thus took active steps to improve regional counterterrorism and maritime security.

However, although the United States paid much greater attention to the Malay archipelago after 9-11, its interest in the region has in fact been enduring, despite a period of apparent retrenchment from Southeast Asia following the end of the Vietnam War. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific region was built

upon the "hub and spokes" model, in which the United States acted as the hub surrounded by the spokes, which consisted of key allies of the United States in Asia, such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. This model helped the United States to maintain a position of preponderance in the Asia-Pacific as its presence and power were strengthened by such key regional allies.[7]

Despite the closure of its huge Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines in 1992, the United States did take steps to ensure that it continued to maintain a presence in the region. In this respect, Singapore emerged as a key ally, since the United States maintains a vital logistics group there and has unimpeded access to the Changi naval base. The continued military presence of the United States coincided with growing concerns over maritime security in the environs of the Straits of Malacca, given increasing incidences of piracy in the 1990s. The concern over maritime security became considerably heightened following 9-11, on account of growing fears over a possible terrorism-piracy nexus that could lead to a devastating maritime terrorist attack.

At the same time, the rise of China became evident. The emergence of China as a great power has posed a significant challenge to the dominant position of the United States in Asia. More significantly, China's rise has been accompanied by its growing interest in the sealanes that traverse the Malay archipelago, which are becoming vital to China's energy and economic security. In turn, this has also provided an impetus to the United States to pay greater attention to the region.

After the events of 9-11, the emerging threat from radical Islamists in the region led the United States to dispatch 660 troops to the southern Philippines in January 2002 to help train and support the Philippine armed forces in counterinsurgency operations against the Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group. This move, following the disruption of the JI bomb plots in Singapore in late 2001, was widely seen as the opening of a second front in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism.[8] The Philippines has received military assistance from the United States, such as transport aircraft, helicopters, patrol craft, armored personnel carriers, assault rifles, and antiterrorism training.[9] Although not representative of cutting-edge technology, the military equipment provided has been vital in helping the Philippines maintain its counterinsurgency capabilities in the context of a severe lack of economic resources. The Philippines reciprocated by providing symbolic support for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. This consisted of a small team of 51 military personnel that was withdrawn in 2004 in response to a demand by Iraqi insurgents who were holding a Filipino truck driver as hostage.[10]

The bilateral relationship was further strengthened by President Bush's visit to the Philippines in October 2003, the first by a U.S. president in over 30 years. Bush addressed a joint session of the Philippine Congress, where he praised the efforts of the Philippines in the global war on terrorism.[11] The United States also provided development aid to the troubled southern provinces. In September 2007, for instance, the United States agreed to fund a development program in Mindanao worth US$190 million over a five-year period, focusing on schools, infrastructure, and the reintegration of insurgent fighters into civilian society.[12]

Apart from counterterrorism cooperation, the United States and the Philippines have held bilateral military exercises under the framework of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) of 1999. The annual military exercises, code-named *Balikatan,* took on a greater counterterrorism focus after 2001. Balikatan is an important symbol of continued U.S.-Philippines military cooperation and helps to improve combined planning and interoperability. Another measure of close U.S.-Philippines relations is the separate *Sagip* crisis response exercise that parallels Balikatan and tests the joint response of the two countries to natural disasters. There exist plans to expand this into a mechanism for multinational disaster relief, with the possible future participation of other states in the region.[13] In addition, the Philippines also sends observers to the Cobra Gold series of exercises that originally began as bilateral exercises between the United States and Thailand and that have expanded to include Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, and South Korea.[14]

The United States has also moved to improve ties with Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country and a key battleground in the global war on terror. The United States was concerned that the vast archipelago's porous borders and crisis of governance following the end of the Suharto regime in 1998 would make it an ideal hiding place and a base for terrorist networks. Moreover, Indonesia is a key littoral state along the strategic Straits of Malacca.

President Megawati was the first head of state to visit the United States after 9-11; she condemned the terrorist attack and pledged to support the United States. However, the primary focus by the United States on the issue of terrorism was seen by many in the region as too narrow, and the public distaste over subsequent U.S. actions, such as military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, led to difficulties in gaining the full support of countries in the region that have Muslim majorities.[15] Thus, the attack by the United States on Afghanistan led to large anti-U.S. demonstrations in Indonesia that continued for a long

time.[16] Indonesia subsequently distanced itself from the United States and was openly critical of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.[17] In 2003 Vice-President Hamzah Haz even described the United States as the "king of terrorists."[18] On its part, the United States continued to pressure Indonesia to boost its counterterrorism efforts, although it refrained from publicly criticizing it for its slowness in acknowledging terrorism problems in the country. In 2002 the United States lifted restrictions on Indonesian military participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which had been imposed due to human rights abuses in East Timor.[19] The United States also pledged US$50 million to improve the ability of Indonesia's security forces to counter terrorism.[20]

Indonesia's initial reservations changed after the deadly Bali bombing in October 2002 that killed 202 people. The Bali attack was followed by other deadly terrorist attacks in Indonesia, such as the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, a bomb attack on the Australian High Commission in Jakarta in 2004, and the second Bali attack in October 2005.[21] Although anti-U.S. sentiments remained strong in Indonesia, popular sentiments were blunted, given clear evidence of the domestic radical terrorist threat. The ascent of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency in 2004 also led to considerably strengthened bilateral security cooperation as well as to much improved U.S.-Indonesia relations, given Yudhoyono's strong commitment to dealing with the problem of radical Islamist terrorism.

To support Indonesia, the United States agreed in 2004 to provide assistance worth some US$486 million over five years for improving basic education, access to water, nutrition, and the protection of the environment.[22] The United States also scored a public relations coup after the deadly Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami that devastated Aceh in December 2004. A U.S. navy carrier strike group, the vanguard of Operation Unified Assistance, was among the first to arrive in Sumatra to carry out disaster relief.[23] Counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation between Indonesia and the United States, as well as with Indonesia's neighbors, have improved considerably since 9-11. With the assistance of the United States, Indonesia has improved its own counterterrorism capabilities, epitomized by the establishment of a counterterrorism force, Densus 88 (or Detachment 88), which has been responsible for many counterterrorism successes against JI operatives in recent years.

Military relations have also improved. In 2005 the United States resumed Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Indonesia with the objective of helping to modernize the security forces and to improve

its capabilities in the areas of counterterrorism, maritime security, and disaster relief.[24] This has led to the supply of spare parts for Indonesia's F-5 and F-16 jet fighters, new avionics for the F-16s, and retrofits for its C-130 transport aircraft.[25] The two countries have stepped up intelligence cooperation and the United States has also provided training for Indonesian military and security forces.[26] In 2006 Indonesia also joined the annual U.S.-led Cobra Gold multilateral exercises, together with Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Thailand.[27] In April 2007 the inaugural *Garuda Shield 2007* joint exercise signified the resumption of brigade-level, army-to-army exercises that had been terminated following widespread human rights abuses in East Timor.[28] In 2008 alone, the United States provided some US$152 million in economic and security assistance to Indonesia.[29]

The United States also moved to improve relations with another key littoral Muslim state, namely, Malaysia, which had to battle religious militants before 9-11. Since 1980, following the worldwide Islamic revival as a result of the Iranian revolution, Malaysia has suffered a string of militant attacks from various "deviant" groups.[30] A more recent outrage took place in July 2000, when members of the Al-Ma'unah raided a military armory in Sauk, in the Malaysian state of Perak. The group was subsequently banned.[31] Another extremist network, the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM; later referred to as the Kampulan Militan Malaysia) was responsible for violent activities in Malaysia, such as bank robberies, assassinations, and bombings.[32] After 9-11, circumstantial evidence surfaced that Malaysia had been used as a launching pad for several Al Qaeda–linked terrorist plots or attacks around the world, such as the abortive Operation Bojinka in 1995, the attack on the *USS Cole* in Yemen in 2000, the abortive Singapore bomb plots of 2002, and the 9-11 attacks.[33]

Thus, before the events of 9-11, the then defense minister Tun Najib (now the prime minister) had already identified Islamic militancy as Malaysia's greatest internal security threat, warning that "we must be on guard as any wrong teaching of Islam, or any inflammatory instigation by certain elements that can wreak havoc on our internal stability."[34] He also called on the armed forces to be able to deal with a full spectrum of threats that include low-intensity conflict and urban warfare that could be mounted by militants.[35]

After 9-11, Malaysia supported the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, despite anti-U.S. sentiments in the country among fundamentalists, although this support was carefully nuanced. Three days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Prime Minister Mahathir visited the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur and signed a book of

condolence for the lives that had been lost. However, while voicing support for the United States, Mahathir stated that the fight against terrorism must also include ending oppression in places such as Palestine and Chechnya.[36] Although Malaysia agreed to freeze the accounts of any suspected terrorist, it also criticized military action by the United States in Afghanistan. The foreign minister Syed Hamid Albar stated that "while Malaysia fully backed efforts to combat terrorism, it opposed any form of military strikes as war would not defuse terrorism but only bring further miseries to innocent people."[37]

Although Malaysia cooperated closely with the United States and its neighbors in counterterrorism, it also emphasized self-reliance in dealing with its own militants.[38] While it accepted counterterrorism assistance from the United States, this was minimal, totalling just US$3.27 million in 2007 in IMET and other forms of assistance.[39] Malaysia also made clear that assistance could not include the presence of U.S. security forces in the country.[40] It, however, was far more proactive compared to the initially tardy response of Indonesia to the threat from extremist elements, as it was prepared, well before the events of 9-11, to arrest and detain under preventive detention laws anyone it thought posed a threat to national security and unity. The authorities thus banned the Al-Ma'unah and the KMM and also arrested and detained all alleged JI operatives in the country. In May 2002 Malaysia also signed an agreement with Indonesia and the Philippines to counter regional terrorism.[41] In the same month, Malaysia signed a Declaration on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, under which both the United States and Malaysia agreed to enhance cooperation in defense, intelligence, border control, transportation, and law enforcement.[42] An initiative by the United States also led to the establishment of a Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur in 2003. The centre provides training in counterterrorism for officials from around the region.[43]

Malaysia, however, condemned the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.[44] It also rejected the U.S. Pacific Command's Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), which was broached in March 2004 to counter maritime threats in the Asia-Pacific, as it was suggested that U.S. forces might be directly involved in securing the Straits of Malacca, a course of action that Malaysia regarded as a breach of its sovereignty.[45] However, despite these hiccups in the bilateral relationship, security cooperation with the United States was not unduly affected. Indeed, Malaysia and the United States agreed in 2004 to share intelligence and to hold joint exercises as part of measures to improve maritime security in the Straits.[46] Malaysia also joined the U.S.-led Container Security

Initiative (CSI) in 2004, under which U.S.-bound containers would be screened in Malaysia by U.S. Customs.[47]

Relations also improved after Abdullah Badawi became the prime minister in 2003. He paid a much-publicized visit to Washington in 2004, where he met President Bush, indicating that despite differences, Malaysia wished to continue its security and political relationship with the United States, given the shared threat of radical Islamist terrorism. During his visit, Badawi emphasized the strength of bilateral relations and offered to send a large medical team to Iraq.[48]

Malaysia has also taken proactive measures to improve maritime security, particularly in the Straits of Malacca. Like Indonesia, Malaysia is apprehensive over the possible loss of sovereignty over its maritime waters, should external powers become involved in regional maritime security and counterterrorism. Thus, it has worked with Indonesia, in particular, to ensure that it will be in the driving seat for improving maritime security in order to preempt a greater regional security role by external powers. Although it declined to participate in the Japan-led Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which has an information sharing center in Singapore, it has hosted, since 1992, a Piracy Reporting Center that is operated by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).[49] In 2004 Malaysia agreed with Indonesia and Singapore, the other two littoral states of the Straits, to carry out coordinated year-round patrols.[50] The Malacca Straits Patrols have since been joined by Thailand. These patrols have been complemented by the "Eye in the Sky" combined maritime air patrol that began in 2005.[51] The intelligence is shared under a Malacca Straits Patrol Information System.[52] In 2006 the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was also established, bringing together existing maritime enforcement agencies in order to better ensure maritime security, such as in dealing with piracy.[53] However, it should be noted that, without the significant prompting and the prospect of a more direct security role by the United States, it is doubtful if such comprehensive measures by the littoral states could have been adopted.

Apart from counterterrorism cooperation, U.S.-Malaysia defense ties have continued to be strong. Despite public criticism of military action by the United States in Afghanistan following 9-11, Malaysia continued to allow United States military overflights.[54] U.S. forces enjoy access to port and airfield facilities in Malaysia, and regular joint exercises of the air forces have been held. U.S. Special Forces also train in Malaysia's excellent Jungle Warfare Training School, and U.S. Navy Seals train in Malaysia twice a year.[55] Malaysia also participates in bilateral military

exercises, such as CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), which has been carried out since 1996.[56] In 2007 the U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates praised Malaysia, stating that it had proven its capability in safeguarding the Straits of Malacca and in the fight against piracy and terrorism. Gates also stated that military relations between the two countries were good and that the United States wanted to further enhance bilateral cooperation.[57] Thus, despite domestic sensitivities on account of anti-U.S. sentiments expressed by fundamentalist Muslims, Malaysia has maintained and even strengthened its security relationship with the United States, while walking an adroit tightrope in not being seen publicly as being too overtly pro-U.S.

Finally, the United States has maintained and deepened relations with Singapore, which has consistently supported a strong military presence by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, a presence it views as essential in underpinning regional security. In 1990 the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that allowed the United States to access air and naval base facilities in Singapore. The MOU was amended in 1999 to permit U.S. navy vessels to berth at the Changi naval base, which was completed in early 2001. In July 2005 the two countries also signed a Strategic Framework Agreement to expand cooperation in defense and security.[58] The comprehensive agreement cemented U.S.-Singapore relations by expanding the scope of cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, counterproliferation, joint military exercises and training, policy dialogues, and defense technology. With the agreement, Singapore became a "major security cooperation partner."[59]

Singapore is a key littoral state as it is located at the southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca and has one of the world's largest container ports. Any maritime terrorist attack could severely affect Singapore, given its heavy dependence on external trade. More seriously, as the abortive JI terrorist plots demonstrated in late 2001, Singapore is a prime target for radical Islamists in the region, on account of its close ties with the United States as well as its importance as a hub and regional center for thousands of Western multinational corporations. Singapore's response to the threat of terrorism following the events of 9-11 has therefore been the most active of the states in the region. Apart from comprehensive measures designed to improve coordination, intelligence, and operational capabilities to counter terrorism, Singapore has also invested heavily in passive homeland security measures.[60]

Singapore also took steps to enhance its alliance with the United States. This has been due to very real concerns over the terrorist threat,

but Singapore's move to strengthen its connection with the United States has also been a strategic move as it needs great power allies in order to bolster its often precarious position as a small city-state in the midst of an often unstable Malay archipelago that is surrounded by much larger Muslim neighbors. Although no Singaporean had been killed, the country held a large memorial ceremony on September 23, 2001, for the victims of 9-11 that was led by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the National Stadium. At the ceremony, Goh stated that "Singapore stands with America and the rest of the civilised world in this struggle against terrorism . . . we will have regional and domestic sensitivities to manage, (but) we must accept risks for the sake of a better world."[61]

Singapore has supported all relevant international maritime safety and security regimes; this is unlike the sometimes lukewarm response of Indonesia and Malaysia. For instance, Singapore has implemented the enhanced security requirements under the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code and the amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, which came into effect on July 1, 2004.[62] The country has also supported all U.S.-led initiatives in the global war on terrorism, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the International Port Security Program (IPSP).[63] Singapore has welcomed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), an initiative by the United States Pacific Command in 2004 to enhance maritime security in the Asia-Pacific, which met with strong objections from Malaysia and Indonesia. It has also supported the initiative by the United States in 2005 on achieving Maritime Domain Awareness, as this could enable it to better deal with maritime threats.[64] It has established an integrated surveillance and information network for tracking and investigating suspicious movements. Singapore has also established a satellite-based ship tracking system as well as ship-to-shore alert systems.[65]

Singapore supported U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan following the events of 9-11, and has been a member of the "coalition of the willing" in support of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq in 2003. It permitted the United States to use its military bases, such as the Paya Lebar airbase and the Changi naval base, for aircraft and ships of the United States transiting to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf for operations. Singapore has sent medical and reconstruction teams to the Bamiyan province in Afghanistan. It has also sent police trainers, C-130 transport aircraft, KC-135 air tankers, and landing ships to patrol the coast of Iraq.[66] In 2009 it announced that it would send an artillery-locating radar system to Afghanistan as its contribution to U.S.-led efforts there. The radar system, which can detect enemy artillery,

rocket, and mortar attacks and direct counterbattery fire, would help NATO forces there better deal with escalating insurgent attacks.[67]

The two countries also work closely on counterterrorism and intelligence. For instance, the joint Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Center in Singapore brings together U.S. and Singapore expertise in research and training and in the surveillance of emerging infectious diseases and counterbioterrorism. It is also an important symbol of close bilateral security cooperation.[68]

The armed forces of the two countries have developed strong military ties. Singapore regularly participates in the Cobra Gold, Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), and Cope Tiger military exercises. Singapore joined the U.S.-led Cobra Gold multilateral exercises in 2000, which took on a counterterrorism and peace-enforcement focus in the aftermath of 9-11.[69] CARAT has been conducted bilaterally since 1995, and is aimed at strengthening the interoperability of both navies in anti–air warfare, anti–surface warfare, anti–submarine warfare, and maritime air operations.[70] Cope Tiger is a trilateral air exercise between Singapore, Thailand, and the United States that has been held since 1994.[71] In 2008 the Singapore navy also began participating in the U.S.-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific)naval exercises in the West Pacific, a significant development as RIMPAC is not only the largest naval exercise in the world but is conducted among U.S. allies. In 2008 Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Peru, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the United States were participants.[72] In 2010 Malaysia and Thailand also joined the exercises,[73] which are held to enhance the combined operations capabilities among the countries around the rim of the Pacific Ocean so that they can ensure the safety of major sea-lines of communication and improve their combined response capabilities in the event of conflict at sea.[74] As a major exercise led by the United States and comprising its allies, it is also a demonstration of the dominance by the United States of the Pacific Ocean.

More significantly, Singapore's military defense doctrine emulates the much vaunted process of military transformation that has been dubbed the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the United States. This has led to the purchase of large numbers of expensive weapons systems, such as F-16 C/D Falcon combat aircraft, F-15 Strike Eagle air superiority combat aircraft, E2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, KC-135 air refuelling tankers, AH-64D Apache helicopter gunships, and Chinook heavy helicopters from the United States.[75] Singapore's air force also maintains F-16 and Chinook training detachments in Arizona and Texas in the United States.

In sum Singapore has been an invaluable regional partner in the U.S.-led war on global terrorism, and has done all it can to assist the United States in enhancing its security role in the region, much to the irritation of Malaysia and particularly Indonesia, both of which are wary of the presence of external great powers as they could lead to a diminution of their sovereignties, especially over maritime territory. However, from the Singaporean perspective, the close U.S.-Singapore security relationship facilitates the presence of the United States in the region and its role in maintaining regional stability. Singapore's close relationship with the United States has paid dividends. In 2003 the United States agreed to a bilateral Free Trade Agreement that made Singapore the first Asian state and the sixth country to have a free trade agreement with the United States, after Chile, Canada, Mexico, Israel, and Jordan.[76]

Japan's Growing Security Role in the Region

Japan has a major stake in the security of the Straits of Malacca, through which 70 percent of its oil supply traverses. As the Straits are its oil and economic lifeline, any disruption due to terrorism or regional instability would have a serious impact on Japan's economic security. Another concern that has increasingly preoccupied Japan has been China's evident rise as a great power, a development that will challenge Japan's position and interests in the region.

Despite its pacifist constitution adopted after the end of World War II, Japan has built East Asia's most advanced military capability, with a quarter of a million military service personnel. From deep mistrust of the military, the Japanese public has gradually come to accept a greater role for it. Indeed, as a recent study noted, Japan's security capacity is expanding and its policy makers are now willing to use military force in defense of national interests more than at any time since 1945. However, the study also noted that this "resembles countries such as France, Britain and Germany, and bears no resemblance to pre-war militarist Japan."[77] It is in this context that Japan's security role and presence in Southeast Asia has gradually increased over the past two decades. In 1998 Japan dispatched transport planes and patrol ships to Singapore for the possible evacuation of Japanese citizens in Indonesia during the riots and instability that accompanied the end of the Suharto regime. In 2000 Singapore agreed to permit Japan the use of its military bases for any regional emergency, such as the evacuation of Japanese citizens and the provision of assistance to United Nations peacekeeping operations in the region. For Japan, access to Singapore

bases would give it greater ability to protect its vital sea-lines of communication in the environs of the Straits of Malacca.[78]

After 9-11, Japan's concern over terrorism threats and maritime security in the region significantly heightened, given fears of a possible maritime terrorist attack that could severely disrupt the vital waterways in the Straits. Moreover, Japan's support for the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, and its dispatch of troops to Iraq to support the U.S.-led occupation there, had led to Al Qaeda's threat in 2004 to attack Japan.[79] Japan thus took steps to counter the threat of terrorism and to address the very real vulnerabilities in the maritime supply chain that traverses the Straits, such as the threat of piracy and the potential of a piracy-terrorism nexus that could pave the way for a maritime terrorist strike. The unfortunate abduction of the Japanese crew of a tugboat in the Straits of Malacca in March 2005 served to underline these security challenges.[80]

Although regional mistrust of Japan on account of its invasion of the region during World War II had largely dissipated by this time, there still remained constitutional and domestic political constraints on the deployment of its military forces outside of Japan. A proposal in 2005 for multinational patrols that would include Japan in both territorial and international waters as a counterpiracy measure also elicited a negative response from Malaysia and Indonesia, which did not welcome any initiative that could reduce their sovereignty over the Straits of Malacca.[81]

Given such constraints and regional sensitivities, Japan has adopted an approach that respects and emphasizes the sovereignty of the littoral states. Its capacity building approach has focused on providing training and equipment in the areas of immigration control, aviation security, customs cooperation, export control, law enforcement cooperation, and measures against terrorism financing.[82] In these respects, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has funded training seminars carried out by the Japanese Coast Guard for regional maritime authorities.[83] The Japanese Coast Guard has also conducted joint counterterrorism training exercises with a number states in the region.[84]

In addition, Japan has funded the installation and maintenance of navigational aides and buoy-tenders, provided technical assistance to upgrade marine safety data management systems, and conducted hydrographical surveys.[85] Japan also provided patrol boats to both Indonesia and Malaysia for antipiracy missions.[86] Japan's assistance in capacity building has made an important contribution to improving local maritime patrol capacity in Indonesia and the Philippines, where the need has been the greatest.

Japan has also emphasized enhancing linkages among regional maritime authorities to better manage the problems of piracy and possible terrorist threats. It took the lead in establishing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which was signed by 16 countries in 2004 and entered into force in September 2006. ReCAAP established the obligations of member countries in preventing piracy, and also set up an institutional mechanism for multilateral cooperation. It established an Information Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore to support the sharing of information and intelligence between member countries and has carried out capacity building initiatives such as the organization of training seminars.[87] However, the initiative cannot be said to have been successful as both Malaysia and Indonesia have not ratified the treaty due to concerns over sovereignty.

The gradual normalization of Japanese defense and security policy in the last two decades has resulted in a more proactive regional security role for Japan. However, this has not been overly intrusive, as Japan's population remains largely pacifist, and there are therefore political constraints against a more active external security role for Japan. In the Malay archipelago, Japan's role has generally been to emphasize the building of capacity and multilateral linkages—an approach that respects the sensitivities over sovereignty in the states of the region, and has therefore been largely welcomed, in particular, by Indonesia and Malaysia. In pursuing its defense and security policies, Japan has worked closely with its principal ally, the United States, which has encouraged Japan to assume greater security responsibilities as part of burden-sharing. However, the elections in 2009, which ended the monopoly on power enjoyed by the Liberal Democratic Party since the end of World War II and resulted in the ascension to power of the left-of-centre Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Yukio Hatoyama, threw into question the Japan-U.S. security partnership that has been the foundation for East Asian security for much of the post-1945 period. Indeed, Hatoyama asserted in a much-publicized Op-Ed in the *New York Times* that the era of U.S. globalism was coming to an end, and that the only way Japan could preserve its own interests in the context of China-U.S. strategic rivalry was by helping to create an East Asian political and economic community using a common currency, a prescription that suggested potentially negative implications for the close alliance between Japan and the United States.[88]

However, the reality has been that any ruling party in Japan has had to concentrate on pressing domestic economic issues. While Japan wants a more equitable relationship with the United States, the

problem is how it can deal with North Korea and China on its own. There continues to be unease in Japan over China's perceptible rise and over bilateral issues such as territorial disputes, lack of respect for Japan, and China's ongoing military modernization. This has been accentuated by historical animosities and strategic competition between the two countries.[89] Indeed, the most senior figure in the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro, had warned China in 2002 that Japan had the option of acquiring nuclear weapons if China became too assertive.[90] In the face of geostrategic realities, Hatoyama was thus unable to carry out his election promise to move the contentious U.S. military base in Okinawa. This suggests that, notwithstanding any possible change in the Japan-U.S. security relationship, an enduring concern will remain the rise of China and the threat it poses to Japan's position in the region.

Japan, Australia, and the Trilateral Security Dialogue

The strategic concern over a rising China, the emergence of terrorism, and maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia, and the initial reluctance of littoral states in the region to coordinate their counterterrorism strategies provided impetus for a more coordinated approach among the United States and its allies in the region. The result was the evolution, particularly after the events of 9-11, toward a U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral security nexus.

The idea of a Trilateral Security Dialogue was first mooted in 2001 as a forum for the security officials of Japan, Australia, and the United States to discuss security issues in Asia. Such a development should not come as a surprise, as both Japan and Australia have close alliances with the United States. In 2005 the discussions were elevated to the level of the foreign ministers of Japan and Australia and the U.S. secretary of state.[91] In January 2006 officials of the three countries met again in Canberra, Australia. Although the main concerns were over maritime security and the challenges posed by terrorism, there was unstated unease in the three countries over China's emergence. China's rise is increasingly seen by the United States as a challenge to its dominant position in the region. Japan's unease has been accentuated by poor relations with China that are partly the result of historical animosities emanating from its predation of China and its invasion of that country in 1937 and partly due to the increasing strategic competition between the two countries. Australia, which has benefited from China's growing demand for resources, has been more concerned about countering terrorism, given the fact that its

citizens bore the brunt of the Bali bombing in 2002. It has therefore been keen to encourage both the United States and Japan to commit more resources to fighting terrorism in the region.[92]

In 2007 the last leg of the trilateral structure fell into place when Japan and Australia signed a security cooperation agreement that would enhance cooperation on border security, counterterrorism, and disaster relief.[93] This was later followed by a defense logistics agreement signed in May 2010.[94] An advantage of the three allies' taking a more coordinated approach is the possibility of rationalizing resources through a division of labor on the basis of common security interests. Japan and Australia are clearly more acceptable in the Muslim world of the region, given strong anti-U.S. sentiments in the wake of U.S. military action in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9-11. Japan, in particular, has built up much goodwill through its generous Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funding for many years. Both Japan and Australia have thus provided funding, training, and other capacity building assistance that have been welcomed by states in the Malay archipelago. The trilateral nexus has also received the strong support of Singapore, which has done much to facilitate their growing regional security roles. Indeed Singapore has worked closely with the three external powers on a range of regional security initiatives, including the broadening of participation by Asia in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative.[95]

Although Australia is no longer a substantial regional power as the military capabilities of other major Asian states are expanding, it has played a significant role in countering terrorism in the region. The Bali attack in 2002 and the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004 amply demonstrated the fact that Australia is a prime target for radical Islamists in the region. After the Bali bombings, Indonesia accepted forensic and other forms of police assistance from Australia; the latter also helped to establish the Center for Law Enforcement Co-operation in Jakarta. In 2006 both Australia and Indonesia signed the Lombak Treaty, which established a framework for cooperation in the areas of defense, law enforcement, counterterrorism, maritime security, and disaster response. In 2008 the armed forces of both countries also signed an agreement to improve intelligence, maritime, and counterterrorism cooperation.[96] Apart from Indonesia, Australia has also given assistance to the Philippines, such as through the provision of 28 patrol boats and an annual grant of A$4 million for training, which has helped to improve the capacity of the Philippine navy and coast guard in patrolling its southern maritime borders.[97] Australia and ASEAN also signed a Joint Declaration

for Co-operation to Combat International Terrorism in 2004, in which both sides pledged to exchange intelligence, strengthen capacity building, curb document and identity fraud, and terminate terrorism financing, among other measures.[98]

The evolving security nexus, however, has been perceived by China to be directed against it. Indeed, conservatives in the United States have promoted the idea of a concert of democracies comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India that will be directed at containing China.[99] China has thus expressed concern over the ability of the United States and its allies to disrupt its access to energy supplies through the Straits of Malacca, in what has been dubbed China's "Malacca Dilemma."[100] China has taken countermeasures to reduce its vulnerability in the Straits, such as by building an oil pipeline that will run from Sittwe in Myanmar to Kunming in southern China.[101]

Given India's own problematic relations with China and its warming toward the United States in recent years, there appeared to be momentum toward a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue involving India as well. The United States and India entered a watershed when they agreed to establish a strategic relationship under the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Relationship in June 2006.[102] This was followed by the expansion of the U.S.-India Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean in September 2007 to include Japan and Australia. Singapore, a junior ally of the three powers, also participated.[103] The evolving security quad led to China voicing its displeasure at what it perceived to be an exercise aimed at containing it, especially given the fact that defense papers issued by the members of the quad have specifically suggested that China is a potential threat.[104]

Indeed the United States has openly named China as a strategic competitor as well as a potential security threat on account of its military modernization. Thus, according to its *Quadrennial Defense Review* in 2006, China's transformation of its mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries means that it "has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages."[105] As the Pentagon (the U.S. Department of Defense) stated in its 2008 report to Congress on China's military power, "the lack of transparency in China's military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation . . . this situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown."[106] In September 2008 fears

were voiced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates that China could undermine the military power of the United States in the Asia-Pacific—citing its increasing ability to disrupt the freedom of movement of the forces of the United States—and thus narrow U.S. strategic options through its development of cyber and anti–satellite warfare, anti–air and anti–ship weapons systems, and ballistic missiles.[107]

However, the putative security quad has not materialized due to domestic developments in Japan and Australia. In Japan the ascension of a more pacifist government led by Yasuo Fukuda in September 2007 that replaced the more nationalist Shinzo Abe cabinet led to an emphasis on cooperation and engagement, not confrontation and containment. In Australia the ascension of the Labour Party led by the Chinese-speaking Kevin Rudd in 2007 appeared to herald a new phase in Australia-China relations, given the obvious complementary economic relationship between the two countries. Indeed the rise in China's demand for resources, a result of its rapid economic development, resulted in China's becoming Australia's largest trading partner in 2007. The Rudd government backtracked on the evolving Trilateral Security Dialogue process and was initially very careful not to upset China, going to the extent of reassuring China that it would not be party to any grouping designed to contain China.[108] Thus, after Rudd's ascension to the prime ministerial position, Australia took the decision not to participate further in the quadrilateral dialogue that was evolving between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.[109]

However, the tight balancing act through which Rudd hoped to preserve close security relations with the United States while appeasing China, backfired with the publication of the surprisingly hawkish *Defence White Paper* in 2009, which appeared to point to an emerging military threat from China. According to the white paper, in language borrowed from conservative circles in the United States, "the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans." If China failed to do more to build confidence, "there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernisation appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan."[110]

The white paper thus advocated an expansion of Australia's conventional capabilities, including the acquisition of up to 12 new submarines, new surface warships, and some 100 advanced Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) combat aircraft.[111] The rise of China's naval

reach has been watched with anxiety in Australia. An article in *The Australian* in August 2008, for instance, was sensationally entitled "Menace of the Growing Red Fleet."[112] The failure of China's state-owned Chinalco to acquire the mining company, Rio Tinto, in June 2009, due partly to fears in Australia over the strategic consequences of giving China control over natural resources in the country, also contributed to a worsening of bilateral relations.[113] Thus, despite the apparently moribund nature of the Trilateral Security Dialogue process, fears of China's rise in the United States and its allies will continue. The resulting strategic competition and rivalry in the region will invariably involve the states in the Malay archipelago.

The Rise of China and Its Regional Role

China's rise as a global power has been a significant challenge to the international system. Given its size and comparatively higher rate of economic growth, China surpassed Japan in 2010 as the world's second biggest economy, and is likely to surpass the United States by 2025.[114] However, can the post-1945 international system accommodate the rise of China when there is already a dominant power, namely, the United States?

China's rise has prompted a debate as to whether it constitutes a threat or an opportunity. China's ongoing military modernization and buildup have drawn attention in the United States. In 2008 China announced a 17.6 percent rise in defence spending for the year, to total about US$59 billion. The U.S. Department of Defense, however, disagreed with this figure, arguing that China has under-reported its real defense spending. Furthermore, it argued that the lack of transparency and the concern over its real intentions mean that China's defense buildup could pose risks for stability.[115] In 2009 news that China was in the process of developing its first aircraft carrier, the ex-Russian *Varyag*, provoked a sensation even though its interest was already well-known.[116] The appearance of Chinese navy aircraft carriers is likely to transform the regional strategic environment, particularly as they will enable China's navy to provide vital air cover in the disputed South China Sea. This will also be of major symbolic significance, as possession of major aircraft carriers is a sign of great power status.

In Southeast Asia, China has been in conflict with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam over the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The area is important in the context of China's voracious demand for energy on account of its rapid economic growth. China has reportedly found more than 200 oil and gas

bearing blocks and 180 oil and gas fields in the South China Sea, and is keen to eventually exploit these resources.[117]

In 1992 China passed a Law on Territorial Waters to assert its claims to the South China Sea as well as to reserve the right to use military force to enforce its claims to what it considers its historical territory. China has not hesitated to use force in the past to do so—its seizure of the Paracel Islands from the then South Vietnam in 1974 and its use of unilateral measures in its dispute with the Philippines over Mischief Reef in 1995 were achieved by the use of force. Thus, there have been fears that the Spratly Islands are a potential regional flash point. This has so far not occurred due to a change in China's foreign policy strategy. Instead of viewing multilateral forums as being potentially anti-China, the country decided to embrace and co-opt multilateralism. Thus, in 2002, China signed the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, affirming that it would use only peaceful means to resolve the dispute.[118]

The fruits of this new policy could be seen in the subsequent deepening of relations with countries in the region. China's diplomacy has elicited a pragmatic response from Southeast Asian states, which have also come to the conclusion that China's rise is inevitable and cannot be thwarted. Moreover, China is a power in propinquity to the region and will be physically present long after the eventual decline of the power of the United States. China's rapid development also opens up many potential economic benefits for the region. States in the region have therefore opted for engagement with China, not confrontation against it in concert with the United States, despite ongoing concerns over China's claim to disputed maritime territory in the South China Sea.

China has thus steadily improved relations and built linkages throughout the region, including in the Malay archipelago states of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore. Indeed both Malaysia and Indonesia view relations with China as a means of balancing against the established powers in the region, such as the United States and Japan. On its part, China has sought to expand relations with the ASEAN states, with a view to containing the influence of the United States and preventing the emergence of any anti-China alliance in Southeast Asia.

Malaysia was one of the first countries in the region to recognize the emergence of China as a regional great power as well as the potential benefits of its rapid economic development. This was despite the recent history of mistrust stemming from China's support of the Maoist Malayan Communist Party's insurgency in the 1950s and 1960s. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir, Malaysia took active steps to deepen political and economic relations with China

throughout the 1990s. The close relationship was epitomized by the currency swap agreement of October 2002, which allowed Malaysia to borrow up to US$1.5 billion in the event of payment difficulties in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.[119] Then Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi also led a large business delegation in a high-profile visit to China in September 2003, where he stated his confidence in China playing a constructive role in Asia.[120] In July 2004 Malaysia went so far as to bar all ministers from visiting Taiwan, a move aimed at appeasing China. In 2005 both countries also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation, which covered activities such as military training, exchange of personnel, and regular dialogue.[121] China has been keen to court Malaysia, recognizing its position of influence within ASEAN and the fact that it is a key littoral state of the Straits of Malacca, an important consideration in view of China's growing dependence on the Straits for its energy imports.

Indonesia, too, has come a long way from the days when China supported the Partai Kommunist Indonesia (PKI) in the 1950s and 1960s. Like Malaysia, Indonesia no longer sees China as a threat, recognizing the many changes in China, particularly its departure from orthodox Maoism and its embrace of capitalism and economic development. Indonesia has also recognized the reality of China's rise as a major power as well as the potentially substantial economic benefits of its development. In 1989 Indonesia announced that it would normalize relations with China. In 2001 China's premier Zhu Rongi paid a landmark visit to Indonesia—both countries agreed to the opening of a branch of the Bank of China in Indonesia, a symbolic gesture of the normalization of relations. In addition, several agreements were signed, covering cooperation in agriculture, tourism, banking, and economic and technical areas.[122] In 2002 China and Indonesia signed a massive natural gas contract worth US$8.5 billion during the first Indonesia-China Energy Forum in Bali. The two countries also signed other memoranda of understanding covering hundreds of millions of dollars of oil, mining, and power-sector deals.[123] Indonesia was also clearly looking to diversify its foreign relations at a time when the United States was putting pressure on it to participate in its global war on terrorism after the events of 9-11.

In 2005 on the occasion of President Hu Jintao's visit to Jakarta, both countries agreed to establish a "strategic relationship" that would enhance cooperation in three major areas: economics, politics and security, and sociocultural activities. In the same year, both Indonesia and China also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation, under which China would provide assistance

for military production, such as that of small arms, ammunition, and missiles.[124] Significantly, China has established such strategic relationships with only three other countries, namely, the United States, Russia, and India. China recognizes Indonesia to be important as it is a key member of ASEAN, a major littoral state of the strategic Straits of Malacca, and an emerging source of energy to meet the demands of the rapidly developing Chinese economy.

Initially, the Philippines shared with the United States a common perception of China's rise as a threat. This was because of China's use of force over disputed maritime territory in the South China Sea. In 1995 China unilaterally asserted its ownership over Mischief Reef, which is claimed by the Philippines. Significantly, the Philippines failed to win any support from ASEAN, which shied away from confronting China. The obsolescent state of its armed forces, particularly its lack of modern naval and air defense capabilities, meant that it was unable to respond effectively.[125] The Mischief Reef episode provided the impetus for an improvement in the Philippines-U.S. political and military relationship, epitomized by the resumption of security ties after the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999 and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in 2002. The Philippines evidently hoped that the presence of the United States would deter any Chinese tendency toward regional hegemony.

However, the Arroyo government in the Philippines has also recognized the reality of China's rise and the need to engage with it. Although a Philippine-China Framework for Bilateral Cooperation in the 21st Century was signed in May 2000, the real breakthrough came after China signed the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. China soon became a major source of financing for development projects in the Philippines. In 2003 China's development assistance to the country was about three times the amount of assistance provided by the United States.[126]

This was followed by the landmark visit to China by the Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in September 2004, when a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) was signed. The JMSU was described by Arroyo as a "historic diplomatic breakthrough for peace and security in the region," while China lauded the agreement as the first step toward implementing Deng Xiaoping's 1988 proposal to shelve the sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea in favor of joint exploration and the extraction of resources. The JMSU was subsequently expanded to include Vietnam.[127] This agreement was immediately followed by a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation in November 2004, which covered military

exchanges, consultations, cooperation against terrorism and other internal security threats, and joint military exercises.[128]

In April 2005, on the occasion of President Hu Jintao's visit to the Philippines, the two countries signed a series of agreements under which China would provide development aid to the Philippines and invest in a massive nickel mining plant in the economically depressed Mindanao region. China also agreed to provide a US$542 million concessional loan for the upgrade of the North Luzon railway project from Manila to the Clark Special Economic Zone, as well as other additional grants. In May 2005 the first annual China-Philippines defense talks were held in Manila, under which China agreed to donate engineering equipment to the Philippine armed forces, provide training for Philippine officers in China, and to hold joint naval exercises.[129]

Thus, all the major states in the Malay archipelago have adopted a policy of engagement with China in order to hedge against its expected emergence as a regional and global power. Surprisingly, it is relations between Singapore and China that have been somewhat problematic at times, despite the affinity of ethnicity. This can be attributed to Singapore's taking active steps to establish a close alliance with the United States, as epitomized by its development of naval port facilities at the vast Changi naval base that can accommodate U.S. navy aircraft carriers. Singapore has actively promoted an enhanced security role for the United States in the region, particularly after the events of 9-11, and has played a key role in facilitating this.

Singapore is aware that a rising China creates both opportunities and challenges. Given regional suspicions regarding China as a result of its previous support for communist insurgencies, Singapore did not want to complicate its relations with its neighbors by being overly enthusiastic about China's emergence as a great power. However, Indonesia's normalization of relations with China in 1989 paved the way for Singapore to develop both political and economic ties. Singapore has been quick to use its cultural links to tap the potential of the emerging China market. Indeed there has been a dramatic seven-fold growth in China-Singapore trade from 1994 to 2004, from S$7.6 billion to S$53.3 billion. China is today Singapore's fourth largest trading partner, after Malaysia, the European Union, and the United States. Since 1997 China has also been Singapore's top foreign investment destination. Foreign investment reached S$52.98 billion in 2005, making Singapore China's seventh largest investor. The number of Chinese firms in Singapore also grew from 509 in 1999 to 1,161 in 2003.[130] These figures demonstrate the rapid

development of bilateral economic relations that have benefited both countries.

Despite the growing economic ties and the apparent economic bandwagoning, security ties have been limited as Singapore's priority has been to build security relations with the United States. Singapore's active championing of the security role of the United States in the region, through its support of U.S.-led initiatives to counter terrorism and improve maritime security after 9-11, has not gone down well with Beijing. Due to its strong security ties with the United States and its historical links with Taiwan, Singapore has also maintained defense relations with Taiwan, which have included the use of Taiwan for major military exercises since 1975, despite Singapore's official adherence to a one-China policy.[131] Singapore's leaders have also continued to visit Taiwan, albeit on private instead of official visits.

However, the private visit of the then deputy prime minister Lee Hsien Loong in July 2004, when he also met with President Chen Shui-Bian to discuss cross-strait relations as well as bilateral cooperation between Singapore and Taiwan, sparked strong protests by China, which warned that the visit had damaged relations between Singapore and China. To show its displeasure, it cancelled a scheduled trip to Singapore by the governor of China's Central Bank. In response, Singapore reiterated that it supported the one-China policy and did not support Taiwan's independence.[132] Lee Hsien Loong later defended his stance, disclosing that China had tried to stop him from proceeding with the trip. However, according to him, "to call off the trip at China's request would have undermined our right to make independent decisions and damaged our international standing."[133] Later, at the National Day Rally in August 2004, Lee clarified that "if war breaks out across the (Taiwan) straits, we will be forced to choose between the two sides. As a friend of both sides, any decision is going to be painful, but if the conflict is provoked by Taiwan, then Singapore cannot support Taiwan."[134]

What was unsaid though was how Singapore would respond if Taiwan was attacked by China as part of forcible reunification. Although it is inconceivable that Singapore will enter into conflict with China, Singapore's carefully nuanced balancing act assures the United States that it will be a reliable and consistent ally of the United States. However, in the post 9-11 context in which Singapore has made a strategic decision to deepen political and security relations with the United States, it has proven to be a difficult balancing act to perform, given the context of emerging U.S.-China strategic rivalry.

China, the South China Sea, and Rivalry with the United States

U.S.-China relations continue to be affected by mutual suspicions inherent in great power rivalry. China has been displeased at various actions by the United States that it deems to be interference in its domestic matters—these include the sale of advanced weapons systems to Taiwan. In March 2009 a particularly serious incident highlighted the danger to regional security arising from tensions between these two powers. Chinese ships harassed an unarmed U.S. navy surveillance vessel, the *Impeccable*, in the South China Sea, in waters that China claimed to be territorial waters. The United States protested that the ship had the right of innocent passage in what it regarded as international waters and responded by sending a destroyer to accompany the vessel.[135] The incident highlighted China's growing confidence and assertiveness as a result of its growing naval capabilities, which have seen its navy making port calls around the world as well as building ports, bases, and surveillance facilities to patrol and defend its Sea-Line of Communication (SLOCs) and safeguard access to energy resources in the Middle East. In 2008 piracy attacks off Somalia led to China dispatching a small naval force of two destroyers and a supply ship to the Gulf of Aden.[136] This not only demonstrated China's emerging blue-water capabilities but reflected its navy's new mission to go beyond core sovereignty issues such as Taiwan to protect China's rapidly expanding global economic interests, particularly in the western Pacific and Indian oceans.[137]

However, no dominant power will willingly cede its position to a rising power, as illustrated by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's vow in 2009 that the United States "is not ceding the Pacific to anyone," and that it was in fact looking for ways to enhance cooperation with its allies on regional security.[138] The opportunity presented itself when China appeared to be on a collision course with several regional claimants to disputed territory in the South China Sea, which came to a head as a result of increasing assertiveness on the part of China in pressing its claims. In late 2009 both Vietnam and China verbally clashed over China's decision to establish local governing bodies in the Paracels, which is claimed by Vietnam. In January 2010 Vietnam took over the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN and used the forum to garner regional support to collectively counter China on the issue and to get it to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea that had been signed in 2002.

The annual ASEAN Summit in April 2010, however, concluded without reaching any agreement, due to differences within ASEAN on how to respond to China over the issue. While Vietnam and Malaysia have submitted a joint declaration of their claims to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Philippines has been reluctant to confront China openly. None of the other ASEAN states, including Indonesia, are prepared to support the key ASEAN protagonists in this case. Indeed Juwono Sudarsono, who served as the defense minister in the Yudhoyono government from 2004 to 2009, opined in July 2010 that China's rise would be peaceful and that China would not be militarily assertive abroad, since its priority is the preservation of internal stability.[139] Moreover, sensing attempts by some states to gather regional support and deal with China collectively and multilaterally on the issue, China expressed a preference instead to deal with the issue bilaterally.[140]

In July 2010 China raised the stakes further when it declared that it now considered the South China Sea to be part of the core interests that concern its sovereignty and territorial integrity, putting the issue on par with Tibet and Taiwan.[141] Given these developments, some of the ASEAN states fear that China's rise will not be quite so benign, despite diplomatic assurances by China since 2002.[142] The South China Sea issue was again raised at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010, together with concerns over China's military buildup, particularly over the modernization of its navy; this prompted a strong response from China.[143] At the same forum, the United States, sensing regional unease over China's rise, supported a "collaborative diplomatic process" to resolve the issue, stating that it would "oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant."[144] Furthermore, the United States stated that it saw the South China Sea as pivotal to regional security and freedom of national security, describing these as part of the national interest of the United States.[145] This contrasted with China's position that it opposed the internationalization of the South China Sea issue and that the seas constituted part of its core territorial interests. The United States has also backed up its position with the continuation of major naval exercises in the western Pacific, such as RIMPAC, and the visible shift of naval resources from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans. Collectively, both diplomatic and military measures are designed to signal the U.S. willingness to act as a balancer in the region and to counter any attempt by China to dominate the Asia-Pacific.[146] Given this context, the U.S.-China strategic rivalry is bound to increase in the coming years. The question for the states in the Malay archipelago is how to maneuver between the two great powers.

The Malay Archipelago States and Great Power Rivalry

This chapter has demonstrated that the intrusion of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism into the Malay archipelago has the potential to unleash further dynamics that could yet destabilize the region and potentially lead to its becoming an arena for conflicts. More specifically, the U.S.-led global war on terrorism in the region has complicated how external great powers view the region, and in turn how the states in the region view these external great powers. The increasingly active roles of the United States and its allies in counterterrorism and maritime security are being enacted in a manner that is likely to exacerbate the already growing U.S.-China strategic rivalry, which will have profound implications for the Malay archipelago. This has been an unintended consequence of the events of 9-11 and the response of the United States to it in this region, illustrating how security issues are complex and interlinked, with one seemingly independent issue, namely terrorism, being linked to others.

The growing roles of the major powers in the region have led to a complicated relationship between them and the states in the region, as the region adopts complex hedging strategies in an attempt to maneuver among these rival powers, maintain a regional balance of power, and prevent the region from becoming embroiled in a new Cold War. The problem is that China's core interests in the region, such as in the South China Sea, are opposed by the United States. While there continues to be concern over radical Islamist terrorist challenges, an emerging challenge has also been China's rise as a great power, which has led to growing strategic competition in the region with the dominant power in the region, namely, the United States, as well as with its allies such as Japan. China's evident rise has prompted a debate over whether China constitutes a threat or an opportunity. However, the states in the Malay archipelago appear to have concluded that China's rise is inevitable and that they cannot thwart this development. Moreover, there are potentially huge economic benefits arising from China's rapid development. Although China is seen as an economic competitor by some in Indonesia, especially in the competition for foreign direct investment, China has also emerged as a major buyer of resources. In the case of the Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, China's diplomatic offensive has paid dividends, evidenced in the warmth of recent political, economic, and security ties, although there remain issues over China's claim to disputed territory in the South China Sea. Competition between the great powers is no

bad thing, as it means that China, Japan, and the United States have to pay special attention to cultivating the states in the region and to offering various incentives to do so.

On the other hand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore have also developed closer security cooperation with the United States and its allies, such as Japan and Australia. All these extraregional players have, in the aftermath of the events of 9-11, taken steps to enhance their security presence and roles in the Malay archipelago. Overall, therefore, it can be concluded that the states in the Malay archipelago have engaged in hedging behavior by developing a broad range of relations that include security ties with both the United States and China. As a Philippines strategic analyst noted, in the case of the Philippines, "the challenge . . . is how to get the best of both worlds without necessarily offending either of them."[147] However, Singapore's case illustrates the danger of the region being caught up in growing great power rivalries. Singapore has been a strong advocate of the security role of the United States in Southeast Asia and has facilitated its presence in the region. Its efforts at security hedging have, however, complicated its attempts at bandwagoning economically with China.

More seriously for regional security, China's growing military capability is steadily eroding Taiwan's ability to defend itself. According to the *U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress* on China's military power in 2009, "the balance of forces continue . . . to shift in the mainland's favour."[148] This raises the possibility that the United States and its allies, such as Japan, could be drawn into the defense of Taiwan, should China resort to the use of forceful reunification. If this happened, it would lead to a major foreign policy crisis for Singapore and Australia, both key allies of the United States in East Asia but also ones that have strong economic ties with China. The prospects of this occurring have receded, at least for the time being, due to Ma Ying-Jeou's victory in the elections held in Taiwan during 2008. Ma promptly reversed the pro-independence agenda of the previous Chen Shui-Bian government, thus reassuring China and reducing tensions in the Taiwan Straits. However, the Taiwan issue has been replaced by new tensions in the South China Sea that were epitomised by the incident involving the *USN Impeccable* in 2009, which raised fears of a potential clash between the United States and China in the disputed area.

The growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China means that the states in the Malay archipelago will have to be very adroit in managing their relations with both, and not allow these

rivalries to embroil the region in a new Cold War. Although rivalry between the United States and China was already evident before 9-11, the enhanced security role and presence of the United States in the region after those events, in the context of countering terrorism and improving maritime security, have exacerbated these latent and growing tensions. In turn, however, concerns over maritime security that revolve around terrorism, piracy, territorial disputes, and the enhanced presence and growing rivalry among external great powers, have provided impetus to the ongoing military modernization programs in the Malay archipelago, as states in the region attempt to improve not just their ability to counter terrorists and pirates, but also their bargaining power vis-à-vis the great powers. This is yet another unintended consequence of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism and is a subject that will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 6

The Regional Arms Buildup

Arms and the Malay Archipelago

The previous chapters have demonstrated how the U.S.-led global war on terrorism after 9-11 has intruded into an already complex security environment in the Malay archipelago, catalyzing further dynamics that could be destabilizing. Extending the global war on terrorism to the maritime domain has complicated an already highly contested arena, exacerbating great power rivalries between a rising China on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other. The growing roles of the major powers in the region have led to tensions among them and also between the states in the region, as the region adopts complicated hedging strategies in an attempt to maneuver among these rival powers and maintain a regional balance of power.

In turn, however, the global war on terrorism has also stimulated security sector developments, particularly through the acceleration of the pace of military modernization to improve local security capabilities. Such improved capabilities are needed to better meet a number of security challenges after 9-11, namely, to counter internal security challenges such as terrorism and insurgencies, to enhance maritime security, and to better thwart the increased security roles and presence by external great powers. These imperatives have led to an upsurge in arms purchases that, in turn, could have the unwanted consequence of sparking a regional arms race as well as exacerbating existing, underlying tensions between the states in the region.

The regional arms buildup predates the events of 9-11, and has been driven by a complex mix of factors, both domestic and external, but analysts worry over signs of increasing arms racing behavior by

states in the region.[1] The interactive arms buildup, it is feared, could lead to increasing tensions and mutual suspicions, leading ultimately to conflict, referred to in the strategic studies literature as the security dilemma.[2] After 9-11, however, the growing unease over maritime security and great power rivalries, coupled with existing threats from terrorism and insurgency, as well as continued underlying tensions between states in the region, have led to a greater impetus for enhancing self-reliant defense capabilities. Improved local capabilities could enhance maritime security against piracy and terrorism, secure maritime borders, and bolster local capacity to thwart a greater role for and presence by external great powers. Thus, the accelerated pace of the regional arms buildup can be partially linked to the complex set of interlinked security challenges that have emerged following the events of 9-11 and the designation of the region as the "second front" in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism.

Globally, arms expenditure and procurement have increased since the end of the Cold War, helping to sustain the global arms trade. In Asia and Oceania, military expenditure increased from US$132 billion in 1998 to US$200 billion in 2007, making it an important market for arms.[3] Regional analysts have thus spoken of a military buildup in the region after the end of the Cold War.[4] Given the trends, concerns have also been raised over its implications, with *The Economist* describing the regional arms buildup in 1993 as an "arms race."[5]

In Southeast Asia, there has been an upward trend in arms spending and procurement since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, a development that forced the states in the region toward greater defence self-reliance, although the impetus also came from a number of other factors, such as the withdrawal of the presence of the United States in the region, corruption, prestige, supply-side economics, the need for EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) surveillance and protection, and arms race dynamics. However, Desmond Ball argued in 1993 that "military and geostrategic factors, such as threat perceptions or arms race dynamics, have generally been less determinate than other considerations." In other words, it would be misleading to describe the arms buildup in Asia as an arms race. Instead, the phenomenon could be better explained in terms of defense modernization and the new requirements for defense self-reliance in the region.[6] The steady increase in real military spending and the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems was briefly interrupted by the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998, and again picked up momentum during the economic recovery and growth that followed. In 2010 Ball thus argued that his earlier thesis warranted a reexamination, warning that there was now a real danger of an arms race.[7]

In the Malay archipelago, the picture has been somewhat mixed. The states in the region, namely, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore have, to varying degrees, been participants in the regional arms buildup. There are a complex set of factors that explain the level of participation of these states, but key factors have been the maintenance of internal security capabilities, the growing importance of maritime security, the availability of resources due to economic growth, the easy availability of arms after the end of the Cold War, interstate tensions within the region, and corruption.[8] This chapter examines the trends and features of the regional arms buildup before and after the events of 9-11, and assesses the key factors driving it. It concludes with an evaluation of the impact of 9-11 on the regional arms buildup and assesses whether there is an arms race in the region.

The Regional Arms Buildup

The regional arms buildup predates the events of 9-11, although those seminal events have led to a number of security developments that have provided greater impetus toward defense modernization. An analysis of defense spending trends from 1999 to 2008 (Table 6.1) indicates a general upward trend despite the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998, except for the case of Brunei. Table 6.1 demonstrates that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have steadily increased military expenditure in real terms while this rose slightly in the case of the Philippines and held steady in the case of Brunei. Indonesia was worst affected by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 that led to riots and the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. The sharp fall in the value of the currency, the rupiah, in the context of steep economic decline and severe economic difficulties, led to defense expenditure falling sharply in 1999. However, by 2000, the worst was clearly over and defense expenditure rose once more. In the cases of Malaysia and Singapore, there has been a gradual and discernible rise in real defense expenditure. This is partly attributed to the availability

Table 6.1 Military expenditure in the Malay Archipelago states (US$) (1999–2008)*

Country	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Brunei	269	254	234	249	260	205	249	260	268	266
Indonesia	1710	2242	2367	2486	3319	3653	3571	3802	4131	3824
Malaysia	1847	1677	2086	2307	3022	2917	3120	3054	3409	3479
Philippines	807	853	794	833	920	857	865	880	1034	920
Singapore	4788	4631	4741	4999	5048	5143	5464	5670	5806	5831

*Figures in constant US$ million using 2005 prices and exchange rates for 1999–2008.
See *SIPRI Yearbook 2009* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009), 233.

Table 6.2 Military assets of the Malay Archipelago states (1990)

Country	Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers	155mm Howitzers	Anti–Ship Missile-Armed Warships	Submarines	Combat Aircraft
Brunei	16	24	0	3	0	0
Indonesia	171	631	0	10	2	54
Malaysia	26	1063	9	10	0	51
Philippines	41	455	0	0	0	17
Singapore	350	1000	62	9	0	151

The Military Balance 1990–1991 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1990).

Table 6.3 Military assets of the Malay Archipelago states (2009)

Country	Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers	155mm Howitzers & MRLS*	Anti–Ship Missile-Armed Warships	Submarines	Combat Aircraft
Brunei	20	39	0	3	0	0
Indonesia	405	664	5	18	2	96
Malaysia	74	1193	52	16	2	74
Philippines	65	605	12	0	0	30
Singapore	546	1574	106	12	6	104

*MRLS denotes multiple-rocket launching systems
The Military Balance 2010 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2010).

of economic resources in the context of steady economic development. However, as the discussion later shows, one key factor has been the emerging arms dynamic between the two countries.

A closer examination of the numbers of key weapons systems also reveals a quantitative increase over the years. Table 6.2 shows the key military assets of the Malay archipelago states in 1990 at the end of the Cold War. It shows that, on paper, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore possessed quite substantial conventional military capabilities at the end of the Cold War. All three possessed fairly significant numbers of major weapons systems, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, warships armed with anti–ship missiles, and combat aircraft. The figures also indicate that despite the asymmetry in geographical and population size between Singapore, a small city-state, and its two much larger neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore's armed forces have more armor, heavy artillery, and combat aircraft than the country's neighbors. In other words, Singapore has virtually evolved into an armed citadel in the region.

Table 6.3 provides data on the military assets held by the states in the Malay archipelago in 2009. It shows a marked increase in the

Table 6.4 Military manpower of the Malay Archipelago states (1990 and 2009)*

Country	Military Manpower (1990)	Military Reserves (1990)	Military Manpower (2009)	Military Reserves (2009)
Brunei	4,000	1,000	7,000	700
Indonesia	283,000	800,000	302,000	400,000
Malaysia	130,000	47,000	109,000	52,000
Philippines	109,000	128,000	120,000	131,000
Singapore	56,000	182,000	73,000	313,000

*Rounded to the nearest thousand
The Military Balance 1990–1991 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1990); and *The Military Balance 2010* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2010).

holdings of key weapons systems, such as armor, artillery, warships armed with anti–ship missiles, submarines, and combat aircraft. The number of tanks and armored personnel carriers increased from 3,777 in 1990 to 5,185 in 2009. The number of heavy artillery pieces increased from 71 to 175 over the same period. The number of major naval combatants armed with anti–ship missiles increased from 32 in 1990 to 49 in 2009. The number of submarines increased from 2 to 10 over the same period. The number of combat aircraft increased slightly from 273 in 1990 to 304 in 2009. However, the technological sophistication of combat aircraft has substantially increased. For instance, a smaller number of more sophisticated F16C/D Fighting Falcon have replaced large numbers of outdated Skyhawk and Hunter fighter-bombers in Singapore's air force over this period.

Finally, Table 6.4 shows a comparison of military manpower between 1990 and 2009. The number of permanent military personnel totaled 582,000 in 1990, compared to 611,000 in 2009, a slight increase. The size of permanent, standing armed forces increased in the cases of Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore, but decreased in the case of Malaysia. The number of military reserves held steady for Malaysia and the Philippines, and dramatically decreased for Indonesia. The figure of 313,000 for Singapore in 2009, as compared to 182,000 in 1990 is the result of the maturing of its system of lifelong national service. Singapore practices Israeli-style conscription followed by lifelong reservist military duties, with reservists trained for frontline roles as in the case of Israel. Despite its small size, with a population of 4.6 million in 2009, Singapore is thus able to call upon 386,000 frontline troops at short notice for any contingency.[9]

As the above brief analysis showed, the regional arms buildup is a phenomenon that predates 9-11. Since the events of 9-11, however, terrorism, piracy, maritime territorial disputes, the growing presence and

security roles of external great powers in the region, and the resultant great power rivalries have provided a strong impetus toward developing air defense, maritime security, and rapid-deployment land forces. They indicate growing concerns over defending maritime territory and ensuring territorial integrity, concerns that have heightened in the post 9-11 regional security environment. The following sections examine the post–Cold War and post 9-11 trends in defense procurement in the key Malay archipelago states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Brunei, because of the minuscule size of its armed forces, is left out.

Arms Modernization in Southeast Asia

Indonesia, Southeast Asia's largest state and the largest Muslim country in the world, had a population of 237 million in 2008. Given this size, it is not surprising that Indonesia maintains fairly substantial armed forces that totaled 302,000 military personnel, of which 233,000 are in the army, 45,000 in the navy, and 24,000 in the air force, in addition to 400,000 military reservists.[10] The sheer size of the armed forces suggests that Indonesia is the potential or putative regional power in Southeast Asia and should, on paper, possess dominant military power in the Malay archipelago. However, its military potential has been diminished by outdated equipment and the challenge of maintaining internal security, given the vast geographic spread of the Indonesian archipelago.

The experience of revolt and political instability in various parts of the vast Indonesian archipelago since independence in 1949 resulted in a primary emphasis on maintaining the integrity of the unitary Indonesian state. Under the doctrine of *Wawasan Nusantara* (or Archipelagic Outlook), Indonesia thus claims sovereignty over all waters within its archipelago. This is in contrast to international law that limits each island's territorial waters and treats all else as part of international waters.[11] Thus, Indonesia has been sensitive to any move that could internationalize the Straits of Malacca, such as any joint responsibility with other external states for its security, or the presence of foreign military forces that could impinge upon its sovereignty. Although Indonesia has cooperated with regional states and the United States, and accepted security assistance from the United States, Japan, and Australia, it has insisted on relying primarily on its own capabilities in dealing with security challenges such as terrorism, insurgency, and maritime security.

Although the economic crisis of 1997–1998 had a negative impact on defense spending and procurement, this recovered by 2000. After that, there has been a steady upward trend in defense spending, which

rose from US$2,242 million in 2000 to US$3,824 million in 2008, measured in 2005 prices (Table 6.1). Despite this, the cost of modern weapons systems and the scale of modernization programs for such a large armed force have forced Indonesia to prioritize. The declaration of EEZs in the 1980s, heightened concerns over maritime security in the aftermath of the events of 9-11, and the Bali bombings by local militants in 2002 provided the impetus to improve maritime capabilities that could better secure Indonesia's maritime territories as well as patrol the strategic waterways within its jurisdiction, such as the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar. Much of the procurement has thus focused on the navy and rapid-deployment forces, with some limited funding for the modernization of the air force.

Indonesia's navy does possess credible conventional warfighting capabilities. The mainstay of its navy consists of six ex-Netherlands Navy Van Speijk class frigates built in the 1960s but modernized as the Ahmad Yani class for Indonesia. Each frigate is equipped with Harpoon anti–ship missiles, Mistral anti–aircraft missiles, anti–submarine warfare torpedoes, and a 76mm gun, with provisions for a helicopter.[12] A new class of four Sigma missile frigates was delivered between 2007 and 2009. Designed and built in Holland, these vessels are armed with Mistral surface-to-air missiles, MM40 Exocet anti–ship missiles, anti–submarine warfare torpedoes, and a 76mm gun, with the additional provision of space for a helicopter on each vessel.[13] Other, older, naval assets include an assortment of 23 corvettes and boats armed with missiles and torpedoes.[14]

Complementing the fleet of surface combatants are two German-built Type 209 submarines, 11 mine warfare vessels and 29 major landing vessels consisting of three Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) and 26 Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs).[15] Indonesia appears to have also identified a need to acquire more submarines, as Indonesia's US$1 billion arms deal with Russia in 2007 also included 2 Kilo-class submarines.[16] In 2009, however, the government decided to postpone any submarine acquisition until 2011; this means that new submarines would not become operational until around 2014.[17]

Despite the impressive conventional warfare capabilities of its navy, an important priority has been the procurement of sufficient numbers of vessels that can patrol the vast archipelagic waters, an important requirement in the post 9-11 era of heightened concerns over maritime security on account of potential terrorist threats to shipping. Indonesia has acknowledged that its present fleet of naval and patrol vessels is insufficient for the task of patrolling the country's waters. In 2005, for instance, it had 129 patrol vessels, compared to the estimated 302

vessels needed to adequately patrol its territorial waters. Indonesia thus announced plans to acquire 60 new vessels from 2006 to 2015, with the long-term objective of deploying 274 vessels by 2024.[18] Indonesia's maritime patrol capabilities have also been supplemented by 24 maritime patrol aircraft of various makes operated by the navy.[19]

Indonesia's land forces are organized along territorial lines, with the bulk allocated to provincial and district commands; the objective is to use the country's size and strategic depth to frustrate and repel any external invader. This is in line with the doctrine of *Hankamrata* or "total people's defense," under which Indonesia aims to make up for its lack of resources by relying on the unity of the people and the armed forces.[20] Territorial defense units are, however, supplemented by special rapid-deployment forces, such as the commando special forces (KOPASSUS) that number some 5,000, the Marines that are made up of 20,000 personnel, and the Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) that has 40,000 military personnel.[21] These forces have been given special attention, given the context of the vast geographical spread of the Indonesian archipelago and the contemporary history of internal unrest and rebellion, which has necessitated the maintenance of rapid-deployment capabilities that can react quickly to any security contingency.

These special forces are supported by 84 transport aircraft of various makes in the air force and navy, as well as by a substantial amphibious capability. Indeed, an important naval priority has been the acquisition of modern amphibious capabilities to supplement older LSTs. In all, Indonesia deploys 29 large landing vessels of various makes that have been recently supplemented by the purchase of four new LPDs from South Korea.[22]

The problem is that the army as a whole is poorly equipped, with mostly outdated weapons systems. For instance, its PT-76 amphibious light tanks first entered service in the Soviet Union in 1951.[23] The AMX-13 is another light tank of 1950s vintage, with production beginning in 1953 and ending in 1987.[24] The lack of funding has forced the army to purchase surplus Soviet-era equipment from Eastern Europe in the 1990s at very low prices to supplement existing Soviet-era military assets in the army, such as BTR-50 APCs from Ukraine and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and RM-70 122mm multiple-rocket launchers from the Czech Republic.[25] Nonetheless, the careful use of limited military funding has led to the development of credible elite forces and the naval and air transport capabilities to deploy them. Together with a growing capacity to patrol its waters, Indonesia can be said to have reasonable credible internal security capabilities in meeting any internal security challenge that might arise.

Indonesia's very limited modernization of its air force has focused on improving outdated air transport capabilities to support its rapid-deployment forces, enhancing maritime air patrol to improve maritime security, and, reflecting its desire not to be left behind the technology curve on account of the military modernization programs carried out by neighboring states, the procurement of limited numbers of air-superiority combat aircraft.

In 1997 an agreement to purchase 12 SU-30K fighter-bombers and eight Mi-17 helicopters was signed with Russia, but the deal was cancelled soon after due to the Asian financial crisis. In 2003 Indonesia agreed to purchase two SU-27 and two SU-30 combat aircraft and two Mi-35 attack helicopters as the first steps toward the modernization of its air force, with the bulk of the payment made on the basis of countertrade with commodities.[26] In 2005 six Mi-17B helicopters from Russia were also purchased.[27] In August 2007 Indonesia placed orders for a further three SU-27 and three SU-30 combat aircraft.[28] Finally, under a US$1 billion arms deal in September 2007, another 17 Mi-17 helicopters and six Mi-35 attack helicopters were also to be delivered as part of a total package that included submarines and advanced armor.[29]

The acquisition of limited numbers of sophisticated SU-27 and SU-30 combat aircraft and the stated objective of acquiring modern Kilo-class submarines suggest the desire to keep up in terms of technology. After all, neighboring Malaysia has acquired a squadron of SU30 multirole combat aircraft and has purchased two French-made Scorpene submarines, while Singapore has similarly procured one squadron of F15 Strike Eagles from the United States and deploys six modernized ex-Swedish submarines.

The focused and limited nature of Indonesia's defense modernization is an indication of the lack of funding relative to the size of the armed forces and the size and spread of the country. Indeed, the International Institute of Strategic Studies concluded in 2009 that "low serviceability and limited procurement budgets continue to limit the capabilities of Indonesia's armed forces."[30] Indonesia appears to be focusing on improving naval patrol capabilities and the ability to meet internal security threats. The former has led to the procurement of more naval vessels to better secure its own waterways and strengthen its ability to reject any move by external powers that would internationalize the security of waters it regards as its own, particularly the various strategic waterways in its archipelago such as the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar. The acquisition of more helicopters and modern LPDs from South Korea also indicates a desire to sustain a rapid-deployment capability throughout its own

territory, since the most likely threats to its security could emanate from internal unrest. However, its desire to develop at least some commensurate military capability compared to its two immediate neighbors, reflected in its acquisition of air-superiority combat aircraft and desire to acquire modern submarines, indicates the presence of an interactive element.

The security challenges that Malaysia faces are to some degree similar to those faced by Indonesia. With substantial maritime borders and territory, and long sea-lanes of communication between West and East Malaysia, ensuring maritime security has been complicated by maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea and the presence of important offshore oilfields. In recent years, there has been increased concern over refugee and illegal migrant inflows, notably from Indonesia and the Philippines. The increase in piracy in the environs of the Straits of Malacca and the heightened concerns over possible maritime terrorism carried out by militants in the region after the events of 9-11 have also focused attention on the need to improve maritime security.[31]

The growing recognition of the maritime nature of the country, which was boosted by the events of 9-11 and the general heightened concerns over maritime security after that, has led to an increased emphasis on developing maritime capabilities as well as on the ability to rapidly deploy ground forces in response to any security contingency. In addition, like Indonesia, an important consideration for Malaysia has been the need to develop self-reliant defense capabilities, particularly in patrolling and ensuring the security of its maritime territorial waters, in order to preempt moves by the United States and other external powers to take a direct role in regional maritime security. Like Indonesia, Malaysia views such a prospect with alarm, as it will have the effect of eroding Malaysia's sovereignty over its own maritime territorial waters.

Malaysia's military modernization program that began in 1979 has been relatively organized and sustained. Malaysia's spending on defense was affected by the Asian financial crisis, but recovered by 2001. This is reflected in the rise in defense spending from US$1,677 million in 2000 to US$2086 million in 2001, measured in 2005 prices. By 2008 defense expenditure had risen to US$3,479 million (Table 6.1). The real increase in defense expenditure has enabled it to engage in a steady process of acquiring better weapons systems to equip its armed forces in all three services, namely, land, air, and navy. Malaysia's defense buildup until 2020 and beyond is guided by its Fourth Dimension Malaysian Armed Forces (4-D MAF) Plan, which focuses on joint force integration and operations, information superiority, and multidimensional capabilities, including information warfare.[32] This military modernization plan

appears to mirror that of Singapore's, although Singapore is much further ahead in its process of military transformation. Indeed, analysts have warned of a process of competitive arms acquisitions by both states, reflecting a posture of mutual deterrence.[33]

However, Malaysia's desire for military transformation is an expensive exercise and a shortage of funding has delayed the start of the implementation of the 4-D MAF plan. Some modernization of the land forces has taken place; this includes the purchase of 48 T-91M main battle tanks from Poland in 2002.[34] Malaysia has also acquired quite capable artillery in recent years, stemming from the conclusion in 2000 of deals for 18 Astros II Multiple-Rocket Launching Systems (MRLs) from Brazil and 22 Denel G5 155mm howitzers from South Africa.[35]

The navy has been given greater priority in view of the post 9-11 environment of heightened concerns over maritime security. In 2009 the navy deployed a fleet of 16 conventional warfare surface vessels armed with anti–ship missiles.[36] Malaysia has stated that ideally, it will field 18 modern conventional warships "to make the armada competitive to others in the region."[37] More significant in the context of improving maritime security against terrorism and piracy, however, has been the acquisition of modern offshore patrol vessels. In 2006 two German-built MEKO frigates (designated the Kedah class in Malaysia) were delivered, followed by another four vessels built in Malaysia and delivered in 2009. The plan is to eventually acquire up to 27 of these vessels, although this will have to be done in stages and in accordance with the availability of funding.[38] The MEKO vessels are very capable offshore patrol vessels that can be upgraded with conventional warfare capabilities. They have low radar signatures, are highly automated, and possess advanced electronics and the ability to each deploy a naval helicopter.[39] Malaysia's maritime patrol capabilities have been supplemented by modern maritime patrol aircraft, such as four Beech 200T maritime patrol aircraft operated by its air force.[40]

Apart from offshore patrol vessels, the navy also has plans that include the acquisition of modern Jebat-class frigates from Britain, with a letter of intent signed for two vessels to be delivered in 2015. There are also plans to acquire three modern LPDs, which could improve the navy's amphibious capability and the ability to deploy rapid-reaction forces in response to any security emergency.[41] The navy's desire to set up a submarine arm has led to the purchase of two modern Scorpene submarines from France in June 2002, the first of which was delivered in 2008.[42]

Apart from the evident development of its navy, Malaysia has also, like Indonesia, invested in air-superiority combat aircraft as well as in

the improvement of its airlift capability in support of rapid-deployment forces. Eighteen Sukhoi SU-30MKM multirole combat aircraft were ordered in 2003 to replace the air force's squadron of MiG-29 Fulcrum combat aircraft.[43] Malaysia has also modernized its helicopter fleet. In 2003 10 Mi-8 Hip helicopters were ordered from Russia, with the first delivered in 2005.[44] In 2007 tenders were invited for 36 medium-lift helicopters to replace the outdated fleet of S-61 Nuri helicopters. In 2008 Malaysia placed an order for 12 EC725 Couger search-and-rescue helicopters.[45] Apart from more helicopters, Malaysia also acquired midair refueling capability in the form of two KC-130 air tankers, and it purchased transport aircraft in order to increase the mobility of its rapid-deployment brigade. In 2009 it deployed 32 fixed-wing transport aircraft, including 12 C-130 Hercules.[46]

Thus, the priorities in Malaysia's military modernization have to some degree mirrored those of Indonesia. The development of maritime patrol capabilities and supporting amphibious and airlift capabilities for the deployment of rapid-reaction forces have been priority areas in the post 9-11 regional security environment. Over the years, Malaysia's steady economic development has provided it with enhanced maritime security and power-projection capabilities that will help it to better manage the challenges of patrolling and securing the long coastlines and extensive maritime territories. However, Malaysia clearly does not want to fall from the technology curve, as its acquisition of air-superiority combat aircraft, submarines, and main battle tanks indicate. Indeed another major factor that has provided an impetus to its defense modernization is the need to maintain a balance with Singapore's impressive conventional capabilities.[47]

Singapore's military modernization has been steady and impressive. After independence from Malaysia in 1965, the insecure city-state has engaged in a steady military buildup, made possible by rapid economic growth that has seen its per capita GDP reach US$38,973 in 2008, or US$51,500 in purchasing power parity, one of the world's highest.[48] Its armed forces are modeled on Israel's defense forces, with its preemptive defense doctrine centered on armor, airpower, and land forces built around compulsory lifelong military service for all able-bodied males. Since the end of the Cold War and the U.S.-led victory in the first Gulf War, Singapore has also taken notice of the process of military transformation in the United States known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA focuses on adopting and welding together the new information, sensing, precision attack, stealth, aerial warfare, and other technologies that were first widely employed in the first Gulf War in a new form of warfare. Singapore has since pursued

its own version of the RMA, as encapsulated in its defense doctrine of IKC2 or Integrated Knowledge-Based Command and Control.

The objective is the evolution of the so-called Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces (3G SAF). The key to the 3G SAF is the networking of sensors and firepower across all military branches.[49] This objective has been made possible due to its economic resources, technical capabilities, sophisticated information technology, skilled manpower, a technologically sophisticated defense industry that has produced cutting-edge weapons systems in armor and artillery, and its close relationship with the United States. Thus, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, "Singapore has stood out more than ever in Southeast Asia in terms of its efforts to develop its armed forces."[50] Indeed, Singapore's defense expenditure is the highest in the region, at US$5,831 million (in 2005 prices) in 2008, more than Indonesia, a much larger country (Table 6.1). This reflects Singapore's basic insecurity as it is a small city-state, lacks strategic depth, and is highly dependent on external trade. Moreover, it is dominated by ethnic Chinese who have been much resented in the region and is uncomfortably situated in the midst of the world's largest population of Muslims in a potentially unstable Malay archipelago.

Thus, Singapore has been a key driver and participant in the regional arms buildup. After the events of 9-11, Singapore has been able to forge an ever closer security relationship with the United States. It has also been a leading advocate of a greater security role for the United States in the region, and has backed this strategic policy by building a naval base at Changi that can accommodate the largest U.S. navy vessels such as aircraft carriers. It has also supported U.S.-led initiatives in the global war on terrorism, much to the annoyance of its Muslim neighbors, who perceive many of these initiatives as potentially infringing on their maritime sovereignties.

Singapore's excellent armed forces are well-equipped and are considered the best conventional military body in the region. In 2009 the army deployed 546 tanks, including Leopard II main battle tanks, and 1,574 APCs, including its own indigenously designed Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and Terrex Infantry Combat Vehicles.[51] Another locally made armored vehicle, the Warthog, made the headlines in 2009 when Britain began taking delivery of a hundred of the Singapore-made vehicles for combat operations in Afghanistan.[52] The army's artillery arm is particularly modern as it deploys indigenously developed equipment, such as the FH2000, the air-portable Pegasus, and the self-propelled 52-calibre SSPH1 Primus.[53] In 2007 the army also placed orders for 18 of the latest

M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) from the United States; this gives Singapore significant precision-strike capabilities.[54] Singapore's preemptive defense doctrine led to the establishment of a rapid-deployment division in 1991. This division is deployable by helicopters and amphibious ships.[55] This explains the acquisition in 2000 of four very capable LPDs and heavy Chinook helicopters in the air force. The U.S.-made Chinook CH-47D are very modern and capable heavy transport helicopters that can lift 44 troops and have a range of 1,207 km.[56]

Singapore's air force is acknowledged to be the best in Southeast Asia. In 2009 its fixed-wing combat fleet consisted of 60 F16/D Fighting Falcon and 37 F5S Tiger multirole combat aircraft. In 2009 Singapore began to take delivery of 24 of the latest version of the F15 Strike Eagle combat aircraft, the current mainstay of the U.S. air force.[57] The air force also deploys four Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, nine KC-130 and KC135 air tankers, as well as five modern F50 maritime patrol aircraft that can be equipped with anti–submarine torpedoes and Harpoon anti–ship missiles. Its helicopter fleet totals 64, including 16 U.S.-made Chinook heavy helicopters and a fleet of Apache helicopter gunships, of which 20 were ordered.[58] The air force also deploys an effective force of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), consisting of 40 Israeli-made Searchers and an unspecified number of Israeli-made Hermes 450s.[59]

Departing from the Israeli model, with its emphasis on airpower and armor for defense, Singapore has also paid special attention to its navy. This became evident in the decade after 2000 in the context of rising concern over maritime security due to terrorism, piracy, and the evident efforts of neighboring states to develop their naval capabilities. As a city-state dependent on external trade, Singapore perceived the need to defend the sea-lines of communication and ensure the unimpeded access of commerce through the strategic waterways of the Malay archipelago, particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

In 2009 Singapore thus deployed quite impressive naval capabilities. They include six modern Lafayette stealth frigates equipped with Harpoon anti–ship missiles, Aster-15 surface-to-air missiles, anti–submarine warfare torpedoes, and a S70B Sea Hawk anti–submarine warfare helicopter each.[60] The navy has another six Victory-class missile corvettes, 23 patrol vessels, and four Challenger submarines, with a further two refurbished ex–Swedish navy A17 Vastergotland-class submarines on order.[61]

The impressive state of Singapore's armed forces contrasts sharply with those of the Philippines. After the events of 9-11, the Philippines also emerged as another key player in regional maritime security, though not on the same scale as the three littoral states of the Straits of Malacca. The Philippines lies astride the sea-lanes of communication

that connect Northeast and Southeast Asia. Moreover, the triborder maritime area with East Malaysia and Indonesia has emerged as an area of increasing security concern as it has become a logistical corridor for militants and the Moro separatists operating in the southern Philippines. The seas around Sulu Island in the Philippines and the Celebes Sea in Indonesia have also become notorious for illegal maritime activities such as smuggling and piracy.[62] Concerns over the vulnerability of super tankers transiting near the Makassar Straits have increased, given the incidences of piracy in waters of the triborder maritime area.

During the Cold War, the Philippines was able to rely on the United States for protection from external attack through the Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1951. This was bolstered by the presence of a massive U.S. navy base at Subic Bay.[63] The armed forces concentrated on dealing with the severe internal security challenges emanating from the communist insurgency and the Muslim armed separatism in the south. After the end of the Cold War, rising anti-U.S. nationalism in the Philippines coincided with the loss of a rationale for maintaining the facilities at Subic Bay. The result was the closure of the U.S. navy base in 1992, which meant that the Philippines had to become self-reliant in defense, a huge challenge given the size and spread of the archipelagic state and the lack of economic development. Moreover, the Philippines is a claimant to disputed territory in the South China Sea, and also has to deal with problems such as piracy and smuggling by sea.

A planned military modernization program was shelved following the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In 1999 the Philippines ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and resumed large-scale military exercises with the United States. This opened the way for the Philippines to purchase surplus equipment, such as Vietnam War–era UH1H helicopters and coastal patrol vessels, under the U.S. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program.[64] After the events of 9-11, however, military modernization received a welcome boost, as the opening of a new front in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism in the southern Philippines against the Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) led to the arrival of U.S. forces to provide logistical support and training for improving Philippine counterterrorism capabilities. U.S. military assistance also resumed, with the provision of some secondhand helicopters, transport aircraft, patrol craft, armored personnel carriers, and assault rifles.[65]

The Philippine navy and air force have been in poor shape, in view of the pressing priority of dealing with the various insurgencies that continue to bedevil the country. In 2009 the navy did not operate a single vessel equipped with anti–ship missiles, deploying instead an assortment of 62 patrol vessels armed with guns and seven landing ships. Its coast guard had an additional 51 patrol vessels.[66] This is

clearly inadequate to patrol the vast maritime boundaries and territorial waters. The air force also failed to replace the F5 fighter jets it had previously had and could only deploy 30 combat aircraft in 2009, including 15 obsolescent OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency aircraft. It also had 106 helicopters of various makes, with the largest type being Vietnam War–era UH1H helicopters.[67]

However, efforts have been made to redress the deficiencies in airlift capabilities for the rapid deployment of forces. In 2008 tenders for new helicopters and additional C-130 transport aircraft were called for. In addition 20 UH1H helicopters were refurbished in the United States.[68] Naval deficiencies have also been the subject of attention. Thus, Australia provided naval assistance in the form of 28 patrol boats and an annual grant of A$4 million for training to improve the capacity of the Philippine navy and coast guard in patrolling its southern maritime borders.[69] Japan has also provided some assistance to the Philippines, such as grant aid, technical assistance, training and equipment in the areas of police investigation, law enforcement, and coast guard operations.[70]

The assistance of external powers (namely, the United States, Australia, and Japan), and the acquisition of mostly secondhand equipment has helped to maintain and also modestly improve current maritime security and rapid-deployment capabilities. Compared to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, the lack of funding as a result of the country's general lack of economic development and the continued emphasis on counterinsurgency operations against communist insurgents and Muslim separatists have meant that military modernization in the Philippines has been modest thus far. Thus, it can also be concluded that, unlike the other three countries in the Malay archipelago, the Philippines is not an active participant in the regional arms buildup.

Factors Explaining the Regional Arms Buildup

The issue of maritime security had been of growing importance to states in the region since the 1980s. The emergence of 200 nautical-mile EEZs following the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 had generated requirements for surveillance and power-projection capabilities regarding valuable seabed minerals and fishery resources that now fell within the sovereignty of coastal states.[71] Moreover, maritime boundary disputes and overlapping claims have led to tensions between states in the region, for instance, between Malaysia and Singapore in the case of Pedra Branca, Malaysia and Indonesia over Sipadan, and more recently, the Ambalat area, and

between Malaysia and Brunei over the offshore Kikeh oil field. In the context of the limited multilateral framework for security in the Asia-Pacific and the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1992, states in the region have also felt compelled to expand and modernize their navies, particularly in the areas of coastal and offshore patrol and surveillance.

As the above discussion shows, the post 9-11 era has seen a renewed emphasis on improving maritime capabilities, given heightened concerns over potential maritime terrorist threats. These concerns have centered over actual incidences of terrorist attacks at sea in the region, such as the Sipadan hostage crisis in 2000 carried out by the Al Qaeda–linked Abu Sayaff Group and the bombing of the *Superferry* in Manila Bay in the Philippines in 2004 that killed over 100 people.[72] A key consideration for Indonesia and Malaysia therefore has been the determination of ways to deal with potential maritime terrorist threats and the problem of piracy. In addition, these countries want to ensure that they can adequately patrol and secure the strategic waterways in the region, such as the Straits of Malacca, to thwart any security intervention by major external powers that could result in internationalizing what have been regarded by the littoral states as territorial, sovereign waters. This has been a quite daunting challenge, given the long coastlines and the sizes of their maritime territories.

Apart from heightened concerns over maritime security, there are also other factors that explain the regional arms buildup. For instance, states in the region have been keen to maintain internal security capabilities, in view of the recent historical experience of armed rebellion and domestic political instability in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Malaysia underwent the throes of the Emergency from 1948 to 1960, although the insurgency mounted by the Malayan Communist Party continued and ended only in 1989 with its disbandment. Indonesia has experienced armed insurgencies in Aceh, East Timor, and West Papua. After the end of the Suharto regime in 1998, political instability was marked by anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta and sectarian violence in Maluku and Sulawesi in 1999–2002, briefly raising questions over the very integrity of the sprawling Indonesian state. The Philippines has, for decades, battled communist insurgency and Moro Muslim armed separatism.[73]

A primary focus of the region's armed forces has thus been on internal security, particularly on the ability to undertake counterinsurgency. The very limited modernization of land forces in Indonesia and the Philippines is aimed at maintaining these capabilities. Although Malaysia has been developing a conventional warfare capability, the

emergence of security threats emanating from radical Islam led to the then defense minister Tun Najib's call to the armed forces in 2001 to be prepared to handle a full spectrum of conflicts, including low-intensity conflict as a result of militant Islam.[74] This has taken on a greater urgency following the events of 9-11 and the emergence of the radical pan-Islamist terrorist challenge in the region. The development of rapid-deployment forces, and of the air and sealift capabilities required to deploy such forces, has taken on a greater urgency and priority in the post 9-11 context, especially in view of the fact that Indonesia and the Philippines are far-flung archipelagic states and as Malaysia is a large maritime country separated into two halves.

Another key factor in the regional arms buildup appears to be the continued salience of interstate tensions within the region. Scholars have noted the potential for conflict over maritime boundaries, disputed territory, fisheries, border conflict over refugees, and alleged support for domestic rebellion. Moreover, there are mutual suspicions due to recent conflict and ethnic animosities.[75] The Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between Singapore, Malaysia, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand that came into effect in 1971 was the result of lingering fears over Indonesian expansionism, given the experience of Malaysia and Singapore with Confrontation from 1963 to 1965, when President Sukarno launched an armed challenge against the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. The presence of British Commonwealth troops helped to contain the low-level infiltration from Indonesia. Although friendly relations were restored following the demise of the Sukarno era and the consolidation of the Suharto regime, Indonesia remained suspicious of the FPDA, which it perceived as being directed against it. Despite questions over its relevance due to better relations with Indonesia, the FPDA has, however, grown from strength to strength, being used today for conducting multilateral exercises involving air, naval, and land forces of all the member-states due to the efforts of the defense ministries involved.[76]

In spite of the formal alliance through the FPDA, however, relations between Singapore and Malaysia have been problematic for years. Singapore's independence in 1965 as a result of its expulsion from the Federation of Malaysia following irreconcilable political and ethnic differences laid the foundations for mutual suspicions that have endured.[77] Singapore was in an exceedingly vulnerable position upon its unexpected independence in 1965, as it had no hinterland, was dependent on Malaysia for water and food supplies, lacked strategic depth, and had no defense capability of its own. This provided a strong impetus to the subsequent development of the Singapore

Armed Forces (SAF), which are modeled after the Israel Defence Forces. The mutual suspicions have been sustained by a long series of bilateral issues between the two countries that involve sovereignty, territory, water, Singapore's security relationship with Israel, and perceived slights.[78] Thus, Tim Huxley concluded in 1991 that "the SAF's order of battle appears to be designed for the possibility of war with Malaysia." However, this has led to countermeasures from Malaysia and a process of competitive arms acquisition by both states.[79] This is reflected in the interactive nature of the arms buildup, with Malaysia and Singapore acquiring similar weapons systems apparently in response to each other, suggesting a mutual deterrent posture by both states, although regional multilateral cooperation through the auspices of ASEAN and the FPDA have built some measure of trust and ameliorated mutual tensions over time.

On the other hand, Singapore enjoyed excellent relations with Indonesia under the Suharto regime. Since 1998, however, relations have sometimes also been fraught with tensions. Given Singapore's previous closeness to the deposed Suharto regime, there has existed suspicion of Singapore by post-Suharto political figures who suffered or were marginalized under Suharto. The brutal anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in 1998 shocked Singapore, which is dominated by the ethnic Chinese. The instability there also led to fears of the possible balkanization of Indonesia. According to Huxley, the possibility of large-scale complex emergencies such as interethnic violence and large-scale refugee outflows, particularly in the islands south of Singapore, vindicated Singapore's approach toward building up its maritime, amphibious, and rapid-deployment capabilities.[80] Conversely, Indonesia too has long developed contingency plans against Singapore, which falls within its security zone.[81] Nonetheless, despite political tensions that have surfaced from time to time, as epitomized by President Habibie's dismissive description of Singapore as the "little red dot" in 1998, military relations have remained good, as Singapore has sought to build enduring ties with the Indonesian armed forces, perceiving them to be a force for stability in Indonesia.[82] Thus, the Indonesian armed forces have permitted Singapore to build a modern Air Combat Maneuvering Range in Pekan Bahru in Sumatra, which helps Singapore maintain the proficiency of its air force.[83]

Indonesia-Malaysia relations have been problematic. Apart from memories of the Confrontation era, a number of bilateral issues such as boundary and maritime territorial disputes over Sipadan and Ambalat, disputes over land boundaries in Borneo, the haze problem in Malaysia as a result of the burning of forests in Indonesian Borneo,

and Malaysia's alleged support for Acehnese rebels.[84] Sipadan and Ligitan, off the Sabah coast, were claimed by both the countries, but this dispute was resolved in 2002 following a ruling in Malaysia's favor by the International Court of Justice, a ruling that led to resentment and a sense of humiliation in Indonesia. In 2009 relations between the two countries deteriorated after a series of naval confrontations over the potentially oil-rich Ambalat area. Other more recent issues include the treatment of Indonesian workers and illegal migrants, as well as the alleged theft of Indonesian cultural property (specifically, the *pendet* dance); these issues have led to demonstrations against Malaysia in Indonesia, resulting in "sweeps" against Malaysians by mobs in Jakarta in 2009.[85] In August 2010 Indonesian maritime officers who had detained Malaysian fishermen allegedly fishing in Indonesian territorial waters off Riau Islands were themselves arrested by Malaysian marine police who contended that the fishermen were in Malaysian waters. This incident led to tensions between the two countries, as Indonesians felt that Malaysia had humiliated Indonesia.[86]

The mutual suspicions among the states in the Malay archipelago have thus led to an interactive dimension in their military modernization programs. Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia are developing similar capabilities, often in response to each other's acquisition of such capabilities. The interactive dimension is seen in the acquisition of air-superiority combat aircraft, with Indonesia and Malaysia acquiring Su-27 and Su-30 and Singapore acquiring F15 Strike Eagles; the purchase of submarines, with Singapore deploying six ex–Swedish navy submarines and both Malaysia and Indonesia deploying or acquiring new submarines; and the development of amphibious capabilities, with Singapore's four excellent Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) apparently prompting Indonesia and Malaysia to also acquire similar capabilities. Within their land forces, all three have also developed rapid-deployment forces and the air and sealift capabilities to deploy them. Both Malaysia and Singapore have also acquired main battle tanks and multiple-rocket launching systems.

9-11 and the Regional Arms Race

This chapter has evaluated the phenomenon of the regional arms buildup, which had begun before 9-11 but which has been given impetus by the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, in turn potentially sparking an arms race in the region. Apart from internal security challenges emanating from terrorism and insurgencies, growing unease in the region over maritime security and great power rivalries, coupled with existing interstate tensions between states in the region, have

provided the impetus to improve self-reliant defense capabilities that could enhance maritime security against piracy and terrorism, secure maritime borders, and bolster local capacity to thwart the greater role and presence of external great powers. In addition, they also serve as a hedge against neighboring states acquiring any form of military superiority that could affect the subregional balance of power.

Although interstate tensions in the Malay archipelago have receded with the passage of time due to the establishment of regional norms and greater economic interdependence, fears of a wider East Asian arms race have raised concerns over heightened mutual mistrust due to the absence of arms control regimes and active confidence-building measures. Thus, Ball warned of the problem of action-reaction generating its own momentum, leading to a full-blown arms race.[87] The extension of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism to the Malay archipelago after 9-11, however, has also stimulated security sector developments, particularly boosting the process of military modernization.

As this chapter has shown, military modernization has not just involved the improvement of coast guard patrol capabilities but has also included improving naval warfare capabilities since modern warships possess multifunctional capabilities to deal with piracy, enforce maritime boundaries, and deter foreign naval intrusions. In addition, states in the region have also invested in rapid-deployment capabilities that can better respond to any security emergency throughout their vast territories. This has led to the acquisition of amphibious warfare vessels and the development of rapid-deployment land forces. In turn, the new naval assets require investment in air capabilities that can complement them. Thus, air forces in the region have also invested in fixed-wing and helicopter transport capabilities. In addition, they have also invested in maritime patrol aircraft that can patrol vast areas of ocean more economically than slow-moving naval vessels. The naval warships and amphibious vessels, however, require combat air cover, should they be needed to confront another state; this has led to the acquisition of air-superiority combat aircraft. The region has also begun to invest in submarines, which are effective antiaccess weapons systems that can be used to counter any intrusion by foreign navies.

States in the region have become participants in the process of military transformation known in the United States as the RMA. Singapore has perceived the RMA to be the key that offsets its inherent limitations, such as its comparatively small size and lack of strategic depth. Through its Integrated Knowledge, Command, and Control (IKC2) doctrine, Singapore is determined to forge ahead with its own RMA and appears willing to invest heavily in expensive defense technology to do so. This determination has been driven by its own vulnerabilities

and deep sense of insecurity. As Huxley has concluded, "without the deterrent provided by the SAF (Singapore Armed Forces), Singapore would have been at the mercy of its neighbors, particularly Malaysia, to a far greater extent."[88] Malaysia, too, has demonstrated a desire to stay on the learning curve and be able to deploy RMA-type technologies to meet the varied and complex security challenges that it faces. Its long-term goal is a 4-D MAF, a doctrinal concept that mirrors Singapore's much vaunted objective of a 3G SAF. It indicates its desire not to be in a position of military inferiority to Singapore. While both Indonesia and the Philippines do not have the resources to pursue a military transformation along the lines of the RMA, the information collection and surveillance capabilities that are the hallmark of modern RMA technologies may be relevant for countering illegal migration or piracy, and improving maritime security. Indonesia, in particular, has made selective investments to ensure that it cannot only improve its maritime security but also keep up with its neighbors in crucial capabilities, such as air-superiority combat aircraft, conventional missile-armed warships, amphibious landing ships, submarines, and rapid-deployment forces.

According to Colin Gray, arms races are characterized by several features: two or more parties conscious of their antagonism; the structuring of their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in comparison with other arms race participants; competition in terms of quantity and quality; and rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality.[89] While the arms buildup in the Malay archipelago does not constitute a regional arms race, as measured according to the Gray definition, the heightened security concerns over terrorism, maritime security, and great power rivalries following the events of 9-11 have provided a boost to regional military modernization. More seriously, the recent history of interstate tensions and the existence of mutual suspicions among states in the Malay archipelago, coupled with the existence of conventional warfare capabilities that could be used when these interstate tensions lead to conflict or if domestic instability spills over into complex emergencies, warns of the potential implications of the ongoing arms buildup.

This chapter illustrates how, without a finer appreciation of the deeper dynamics at work in the Malay archipelago security complex, the actions and policies of external powers, framed in the pursuit of the global war on terrorism after 9-11, could provide an impetus to local dynamics, namely, the action-reaction dimension in the regional arms buildup that in turn could lead to heightened regional tensions and, in the long run, affect regional stability. This is yet another unintended consequence of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism in the Malay archipelago.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Complex Security Linkages in the Malay Archipelago

After the events of 9-11, the Malay archipelago assumed enormous strategic significance in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. As Kilcullen has observed, the global jihad propagated by radical Islamists might attain an unstoppable momentum if Al Qaeda manages to substantially penetrate the Malay archipelago, where the world's largest population of Muslims resides.[1] Thus, the region has emerged as a strategic battleground between radical Islamists and the West.

However, the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has intruded into an already complex security environment in the Malay archipelago that has the potential to catalyze or unleash further dynamics that could destabilize the region. The designation of the region as a "front" in the U.S.-led global war against terrorism may not, as this book suggests, be warranted, given the complexities underlying local Muslim alienation and rebellion. Indeed, while some disaffected locals have been susceptible to pan-Islamist radical ideology, all the main Muslim insurgent groups have in fact rejected Al Qaeda and made a strategic decision to desist from participating in its global jihad, instead reaffirming the ethno-nationalist and territorial objectives underlying their separatisms. The designation of the region as a "second front" could thus lead to a series of unwarranted actions that could have the unwanted consequence of alienating local Muslims, and, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, lead to greater support for Al Qaeda's global jihad against the West.

The fears of a possible terrorism-piracy nexus, as we have seen, has also led to the extension of the global war on terrorism to the maritime

domain. However, this has had the unwarranted consequence of complicating an already highly contested arena, exacerbating great power rivalries between a rising China on the one hand and the United States on the other. The response of the region to the enhanced security roles of the United States and its allies in counterterrorism and maritime security after 9-11 has been to adopt complicated hedging strategies in an attempt to maneuver among the two rival powers for the purpose of maintaining their own independence of action and to ensure a regional balance of power. However, the growing presence of both competing powers risks engulfing the region in their wider global strategic rivalry, thus increasing the risk of conflict.

The global war on terrorism in the region has also stimulated security sector developments, particularly by accelerating the pace of military modernization aimed at improving local security capabilities, particularly in the area of maritime security. The littoral states aim to enhance their own self-reliant security capabilities in order to better secure their maritime territory against possible terrorism and other security threats as well as to thwart a greater security role and presence by the external great powers. This, in turn, has led to an upsurge in arms purchases, which, analysts have warned, could spark a regional arms race through the interactive action-reaction phenomenon. In turn, this could heighten underlying interstate tensions and ultimately lead to conflict between the states in the region.

The academic literature on the Malay archipelago has dealt with various aspects of these security challenges. However, the literature has dealt only with specific issues and challenges, without linking interrelated security issues together to provide a holistic picture. Despite the breakthroughs in regional strategic analysis by Buzan and Alagappa, who developed the concept of a Malay archipelago security complex, the post–Cold War literature on Southeast Asia has failed to build on their strategic analysis. While the post 9-11 literature has made an important contribution to our understanding of the terrorism phenomenon in the region, it has also led to a rather more narrow counterterrorism and counterinsurgency perspective due to the lack of an overall holistic picture that could consider a broad range of dynamics, linkages, and consequences that could inform the overall strategy toward the region by the United States.

This book has argued that there is a dynamic, interlinked relationship among a number of security issues that have arisen as the unintended consequence of the region's involvement in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. More seriously, without a finer appreciation of the complexities of the Malay archipelago security complex,

the global war on terrorism in the region risks setting into motion a series of dynamics that could yet lead to unintended and unwanted consequences in the years to come. Indeed it is a fallacy for the United States to examine the region primarily through the prism of global counterterrorism, as the emerging security *problematique* in this pivotal region has become more complex since 9-11, with multiple, interlinked security challenges. Any strategic policy toward the region must therefore stem from a deep appreciation of the region's dynamics, particularly of the nature of its existing security complex, if external powers such as the United States do not end up exacerbating existing problems, or igniting dynamics that could lead to instability.

THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO SECURITY COMPLEX: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

Given the existence of a discrete Malay archipelago security complex, with its complex security linkages and interactive dynamics, managing security in the Malay archipelago requires a strategic, holistic approach, instead of the simplistic, unilateral and unidimensional, preemptive, military-oriented, counterterrorism strategy adopted by the United States under the Bush administration after the events of 9-11. Such an understanding of the regional security complex can also help inform better strategic decision-making by policy-makers within the region.

The Obama administration that took office in January 2009 has pursued an approach to the global war on terrorism that is different from that of the previous Bush administration. In his inauguration speech, Obama sought to address the widespread perception in the Muslim world that the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has been a war against Islam, and laid out his new approach to countering terrorism that would be based on American values, greater use of soft power, and a global, multilateral approach.[2] He pledged to the Muslim world that "we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect." Significantly, he rejected the "false choice between our safety and our ideals," as well as reiterated that "our power grows through its prudent use . . . our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint." Obama also asserted that meeting new threats demanded "even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations."[3] Obama followed this up with an important speech in Cairo, Egypt, in June 2009, in which he pledged to seek "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect."[4]

This was followed by his much-awaited visit in November 2010 to Indonesia, where he had spent part of his childhood. In the context of the fight against radical Islamism, this was an important visit, as Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country, and also a country where Obama's inauguration as the president in 2009 immediately transformed its negative impression of the United States. The improvement of relations with Indonesia is an important step toward refurbishing the image of the United States in the Muslim world and contributes to the overall hearts-and-minds approach that the United States has now adopted as a key to winning the "global war on terrorism," a term that the Obama administration now refuses to even use. A democratic and moderate Indonesia is also a useful template and model for Muslim reform and a counterweight to the claims of radical Islamist ideology. Moreover, raising Indonesia's profile benefits the United States as it could help to maintain a balance among the leading powers in Asia, namely, China, India, and Japan, especially crucial in the context of China's rise and Indonesia's importance as a littoral state next to the vital and strategic Straits of Malacca. Thus, both countries sought to establish a Comprehensive Partnership that rode on popular sentiments in Indonesia, which now saw the United States in a positive light.[5] This can be attributed to Obama's own Muslim heritage, as although he is Christian, his father was a Muslim, as well as the immense pride felt by many Indonesians that Obama had grown up partially in Indonesia. As one Indonesian writer commented, "a lot of Indonesians are really in love with him and care about Obama, so we feel very close to him."[6]

According to authoritative opinion polls, the global image of the United States has improved markedly since Obama's inauguration. According to Pew, there are signs of improvement in the Muslim world as well, with the most notable increase occurring in Indonesia, where favourable ratings of the United States have almost doubled, from 37 percent in 2008 (the last year of the Bush administration) to 63 percent in 2009. Significantly, however, the same Pew report has noted that "for the most part, opinions of the U.S. among Muslims in the Middle East remain largely unfavourable," and that "animosity toward the U.S. . . . continues to run deep and unabated" in some Muslim countries.[7]

This suggests that despite early signs of progress under the Obama administration, the global war against terrorism remains problematic for the United States. This study suggests that in the pivotal Malay archipelago, there are several lessons to learn that could help the United States to improve its overall strategy toward the region. One

key lesson is the need to resist framing security issues solely through the prism of terrorism. The counterterrorism efforts throughout the region that have achieved relative success in containing radical Islamist terrorism need to be juxtaposed with the ethno-political nationalism that is still the dominant force in Muslim separatist insurgencies throughout the region. The need for cultural ethnography, a call issued by none other than Kilcullen himself as the basis of a revised strategy by the United States against counterinsurgency, is, in other words, a call for a deep empiricism (instead of broad presumptions) that could inform policy-makers of the complexities and diversity in Muslim societies as well as within the seemingly inchoate ranks of Muslim rebels. While the Al Qaeda–linked pan-Islamist radicals do not want anything less than a pan-Islamist regional caliphate ruled strictly through the *sharia*, to be achieved by no less than the violent overthrow of the secular state, the separatist insurgents have made clear the essentially political nature of their rather more limited irredentist aims. While the state is in no mood to grant the insurgents their ultimate objectives, limited political objectives do lend themselves to some form of eventually negotiated compromise settlement, though this might be a very long-drawn-out process and might involve confidence-building. After 9-11, however, these complexities have been in real danger of being lost in the grand, sweeping, rhetorical brush of the global war on terrorism, a perspective that could exacerbate existing alienation and eventually simply drive more into the arms of radical Islamists. Changing preconceived notions of the region will take longer than a change in presidency, as it will take time and effort to develop the necessary deep knowledge of the region that could lead to a more sophisticated strategy, one that is able to take into account the region's deep complexities.

Another consequence of a deeper appreciation of the Malay archipelago security complex is that it could lead to the realization by policy-makers that they need to consider the wider strategic implications of any policy response to a single security issue, in recognition of the dynamic interaction that does exist between disparate security issues. Thus, an overly kinetic, security-oriented response to the threat posed by radical Islamist terrorism and to separatist insurgencies poses the risk of alienating disaffected Muslims and making them more susceptible to Al Qaeda's call for a global jihad. Should separatist insurgents make common cause with the radical Islamists, the nature of Muslim rebellion in the Malay archipelago will be fundamentally transformed into a much more deadly, transnational security challenge. Thus, if the separatists in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines

enter into a strategic alliance with radical Islamists, or worse, become co-opted by them, those separatist theaters will be transformed into the region's Chechnyas, with the consequence of much more widespread, destabilizing, transnational violence throughout the region.

Any upsurge in radical terrorist activity could well include maritime terrorist strikes. Since piracy already exists, a potential nexus between terrorists and pirates leading to devastating terrorist attacks could occur, particularly if counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts on land falter in the future. Thus, states in the region, with prodding by the United States and its allies, have undertaken measures to improve maritime security. However, there have been two unintended consequences arising from this. First, the enhanced regional security roles of the United States and its allies, such as Japan and to some degree, Australia, have been seen by China as threatening in the context of its growing strategic rivalry with the United States, its growing dependence on imported energy sources, and its reliance on the strategic waterways of the region to sustain its rapid economic growth. This has led to a curious diplomatic dance with the littoral states in the region, which have adopted complicated hedging strategies toward the two great powers with the aim of maximizing room to maneuver. However, there is no denying that the region has the potential to become caught up in the evidently growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China. This could lead to regional instability amid a new era of great power rivalry, as had occurred during the Cold War. This danger was epitomized by the *USN Impeccable* incident in the South China Sea in 2009.

Second, the implications of these developments, namely, the possibility of maritime terrorist attacks, the enhanced security roles of the great powers, and the potential of entanglement in their strategic rivalries, have given impetus to improving local military, especially naval, capabilities. The development of defense self-reliance improves the ability to better secure maritime territory as well as thwart the growth of any regional security role by external powers.

However, this has not just involved the improvement of coast guard patrol capabilities but has also included improving naval warfare capabilities since modern warships possess multifunctional capabilities for dealing with piracy, enforcing maritime boundaries, and deterring foreign naval intrusions. In addition, states in the region have also invested in rapid-deployment capabilities that can better respond to any security emergency emanating from terrorism, insurgency, or civil unrest throughout their vast territories. This has led to the acquisition of amphibious warfare vessels. In turn, the new naval assets require

investment in air capabilities that can complement them. Thus, air forces have invested in fixed-wing and helicopter transport capabilities. In addition, they have also invested in maritime patrol aircraft that can patrol vast areas of ocean more economically than slow-moving naval vessels. The naval warships and amphibious vessels, in turn, require combat air cover to confront another state, which has meant the acquisition of air-superiority combat aircraft. The region has also begun to invest in submarines, which are effective antiaccess weapons systems that can be used to counter any intrusion by foreign navies.

The regional military buildup, however, has the potential to trigger a regional arms race through the action-reaction phenomenon, leading to a security dilemma and ultimately conflict. An understanding of the Malay archipelago security complex enables a greater appreciation of the consequences of this, and points to the need for accompanying confidence-building measures and improved regional security cooperation, if the security dilemma is to be avoided.

Thus, a third consequence of a deeper appreciation of the Malay archipelago security complex stems from the awareness of the complex security linkages in the region. This provides the impetus for improving regional cooperation in a number of areas, such as in regional dialogue, confidence-building, transparency, security cooperation, and in taking a common approach to regional security challenges. Only in doing so will the states in the region be able to craft the holistic approach to managing the complex, interlinked security challenges in the Malay archipelago. A more holistic, comprehensive approach, by definition, requires enhanced regional cooperation. This enhanced regional cooperation, however, is not founded on any unrealistic constructivist notion of building regional norms that could reduce the role of the state and enhance regionalism. If it is to be practical, it has instead to be based on realist, state-centric calculations of the national interest. Regional security cooperation over a broader spectrum of security issues has a number of benefits. It enables the region to avoid, or at least better manage, the unwanted consequences of unilateral actions in any one security area affecting other security areas. It provides the region as a whole with greater room to maneuver among the external great powers. It also builds regional stability by promoting transparency and trust.

Challenges for Regional Security Cooperation

Improving regional security cooperation has been an objective of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional body

representing the ten ASEAN states in Southeast Asia. Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, ASEAN issued a Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in November 2001, pledging to enhance intelligence exchange, strengthen existing regional security cooperation, and support the United Nations in playing a greater role in combating international terrorism.[8] In May 2002 the ASEAN states also agreed to an Action Plan, under which cooperation in intelligence sharing would be enhanced and uniform laws in countering terrorism established. Following the Bali attack in 2002, the ASEAN states endorsed the establishment of a Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia.[9] The Bali Accord II in 2003 envisaged the establishment of an ASEAN community, comprising three elements: a regional security community, an economic community, and a sociocultural community. The Accord acknowledged that maritime issues are transnational in character and therefore have to be addressed regionally and in a comprehensive manner.[10] In January 2007 the leaders of ASEAN signed a convention on counterterrorism cooperation, under which they agreed to enhance cooperation to prevent terrorist attacks, the financing of terrorism, and terrorist movement across national borders, as well as to improve intelligence cooperation.[11]

However, it has been at the interstate level rather than at the level of ASEAN that counterterrorism cooperation with each other and with external powers has been practically implemented and effective. The states in the region have long recognized the need for and benefits of interstate security cooperation. For instance, Singapore and Indonesia have been engaged in close naval cooperation since 1974. Similarly, bilateral naval and other forms of security cooperation have also taken place between Malaysia and Indonesia, Indonesia and the Philippines, Malaysia and the Philippines, and Malaysia and Singapore. After the events of 9-11, the states in the region responded to the threat of regional radical Islamist terrorism by enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In May 2002, for instance, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines signed a counterterrorism treaty to strengthen border controls, share airline passenger lists, establish hotlines, share intelligence, and adopt standard procedures for search and rescue.[12] The littoral states of the Straits of Malacca have also carried out trilateral naval cooperation, involving coordinated year-round patrols through the "Eye in the Sky" combined maritime air patrol.[13] The states in the region have also improved security cooperation with external powers. Thus, Malaysia signed a Declaration on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism with the United States in May 2002.[14] After the Bali bombing in 2002, Indonesia accepted assistance in forensic investigation from the Australian Federal Police.[15]

Despite all these cooperative measures, significant challenges remain. Cooperation at the level of ASEAN has remained declaratory in nature, with little institutionalization in relation to formal mechanisms and extraregional bodies as in the case of the European Union. Indeed regional cooperation has been designed explicitly on the principle of maintaining, even enhancing, the sovereign rights and interests of the states involved, and not in developing a truly regional approach toward security.

The situation is perhaps better in the Malay archipelago, where shared security interests have been recognized, for instance, in the areas of counterterrorism and maritime security, leading to quite effective cooperation in the area of counterterrorism. The decline in piracy in the Straits of Malacca has also been attributed to the effective maritime cooperation among the littoral states. However, the Malacca Straits Patrols have limited potential as they have been designed for a specific purpose, that of countering piracy and improving maritime security in the Straits, as well as ensuring that external powers do not find an excuse to play a greater security role in these waters. While the patrols are multilateral in nature, they have been restricted in scope to avoid sovereignty issues. The patrols are coordinated instead of joint, with a handing off procedure and without the right of hot pursuit. The joint air patrols do allow aircraft to overfly each other's territory but an officer of the country over which a patrol flies has to be present on board.[16]

This points to the biggest barrier in regional security cooperation—the mutual mistrust that still exists. The continued presence of interstate tensions has been discussed in the last chapter; suffice it to add that the tensions between the various states in the Malay archipelago are the product of historical developments and events, clashes in national interests, ethnic conflicts, and territorial disputes. Regional cooperation has thus in practice been ad hoc, limited in scope, and restricted to specific objectives. Wider, comprehensive, and institutionalized multilateral security cooperation among the states in the Malay archipelago is missing, severely limiting their effective response and management of increasingly transnational security challenges in the areas of terrorism, insurgency, maritime security, great power rivalries, and the regional arms buildup.

In the absence of a concerted regional approach, the region risks becoming divided and co-opted by the rival great powers that have been competing for regional influence and dominance. Thus, following China's assent to the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, when it affirmed that it would use

only peaceful means to resolve the dispute, China mounted a sophisticated diplomatic offensive involving the building of comprehensive political, security, economic, and cultural ties with all the littoral states in the Malay archipelago that guard China's vital sea-lines of communication in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea.

As this book has demonstrated, China's diplomacy has elicited a pragmatic response from these states, which have also come to the conclusion that China's rise is inevitable and cannot be thwarted. Moreover, China is a power in propinquity to the region and will be physically present long after the eventual decline of the power of the United States. China's rapid development also opens up many potential economic benefits for the region. States in the region have therefore opted for engagement with China, not confrontation against it in concert with the United States, despite ongoing concerns over China's claim to disputed maritime territory in the South China Sea as well as signs of its increasing assertiveness.

The United States, however, has deep strategic interests in the region and will not willingly cede its dominant position to a rising China. The United States has attempted to rally on the side of an ASEAN increasingly worried over China's assertiveness in pressing its claims in the South China Sea. But the annual ASEAN Summit in April 2010 concluded without reaching any agreement, due to differences within ASEAN over how to deal with China regarding the issue. While Vietnam wanted to rally ASEAN to counter China and press for it to resolve the issue peacefully and in consultation with the other claimants, other ASEAN states, particularly the key littoral states in the Malay archipelago, are not keen to confront China. Sensibly, China has opted to deal with each state individually in an attempt at "divide and rule." This has been a successful strategy for the most part. Both the Philippines and Indonesia are keen to maintain good relations with China. Malaysia has been more ambivalent but does enjoy excellent relations with China as well. Although it has tried to also improve relations with the United States, it has been constrained by domestic anti-U.S. sentiments as well as its own concerns over any diminution of its maritime sovereignty if the United States and its allies take on an enhanced regional security role. Singapore established a strategic relationship with the United States even before the events of 9-11, but since then, has helped to facilitate the presence and role of the United States and its allies in the region. In addition, the sustained push by Singapore, and to a lesser extent, Malaysia, toward military modernization along the lines of the military transformation taking place in the United States has been a dynamic in the

regional action-reaction phenomenon that analysts have warned risks fueling an arms race.

Prospects and Opportunities

There are clearly many complex, interrelated security challenges facing the states of the Malay archipelago, which have been exacerbated by the intrusion of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism in the region after 9-11. However, there are also opportunities for regional security cooperation. A key to overcoming mutual suspicions and improving regional cooperation is the building of a common consensus over security challenges. In this respect, the threat of transnational pan-Islamist radical terrorism provides an opportunity to do so, although clearly, the states in the region need to go beyond the currently limited and ad hoc counterterrorism cooperation by linking together related security challenges and expanding the scope of security cooperation.

Thus, terrorism issues cannot be divorced from the threat of a wider conflagration involving local Muslim insurgents in internal conflict zones such as in Mindanao, given the struggle between ethno-nationalism and radical Islam within those Muslim communities. The linkages of maritime security with terrorism, great power rivalry and arms races should also be recognized, given their mutual linkages, implications, and impacts. By linking issues together, states can see the bigger regional security picture, which in turn can catalyze a different approach to regional security cooperation, namely, a more comprehensive, holistic, and strategic regional approach.

In improving regional security, the littoral states should build upon subregional cooperation in the Malay archipelago. ASEAN has not been effective in meeting the key security challenges confronting the region as it has been too large and unwieldy, and unable to reach a consensus regarding effective regional action on any key challenge. On the other hand, the existence of a distinct subregional security complex in the Malay archipelago potentially provides the opportunities for security cooperation among the littoral states of the region due to the existence of complex security linkages at this level.

Within the region, there already exists a model of regional security cooperation that can be either built upon, or whose aspects can be emulated. This is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) that comprises Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, a combination of local littoral states and benign external powers. A loose defense arrangement that falls short of binding security obligations, the FPDA has facilitated cooperation in maritime security in

the Straits of Malacca, particularly between Malaysia and Singapore. Given the existence of historical bilateral tensions as well as evidence of a nascent arms race between the two countries, the FPDA also plays an important confidence-building role between these two countries. The FPDA has also proven to be enduring, evolving over the years to become able to carry out multilateral joint-services operations if the need arises, such as in countering terrorism, in peacekeeping, and in responding to complex emergencies.[17] Only the lack of political will has prevented its further use as an instrument in regional security.

The development of the FPDA is no small achievement, given the history of tensions between Malaysia and Singapore. The FPDA model of a security arrangement, with local littoral states and friendly external powers, albeit not the great powers engaged in strategic rivalry, namely the United States and China, could serve as the basis of expanded military cooperation that could also serve as a conduit toward confidence-building, the improvement of transparency, and the facilitation of security dialogue, and pave the way for other forms of security cooperation.

The ultimate objective, however, must be to achieve a regional consensus within the Malay archipelago on common and interlinked security challenges and on the way by which the littoral states could work together in managing them. Thus far, the management of regional security has been ad hoc and lacking in strategic direction. Given the complex interlinked security challenges, there is clearly a need for much greater cooperation that could well entail the development of the necessary institutions and regimes (that is, more intrusive instruments to help improve transparency and build confidence) to ensure that states have the necessary infrastructure to deal with them in a more strategic manner. Achieving this would lead to better management of the threat of terrorism and insurgency, an improvement in maritime security, a better ability at staying out of great power rivalries, and the amelioration of interstate tensions, thus reducing the likelihood of conflict at all levels.

The key to a more comprehensive, strategic form of security cooperation among the littoral states in the Malay archipelago lies in understanding the existence of a distinct Malay archipelago security complex within Southeast Asia. The U.S.-led global war on terrorism has intruded into an already complex security environment in this region, potentially catalyzing dynamics that could destabilize the region. This book has examined how this might happen or already is happening. It has argued that the security challenges in the region go beyond terrorism and are complex and interlinked, and therefore

should not be seen solely or primarily through the prism of global counterterrorism. Most importantly, this book has attempted to build upon Buzan and Alagappa in understanding the nature and characteristics of the Malay archipelago security complex, which has important implications for the management of security in this pivotal region, both by states in the region and by external powers.

For the West and for the United States, managing the complex and interlinked security issues in the Malay archipelago requires a more comprehensive approach based on a far more sophisticated understanding of local dynamics. However, since 9-11, it is the Malay archipelago, not the whole of Southeast Asia, that has emerged as a strategic theater in the global war on terrorism on account of its vast Muslim population (the largest in the world) and the presence of vital and strategic waterways. To more successfully meet the multifaceted challenges, the West, especially the United States, will need to make a much greater investment in developing a partnership with local states, albeit based on careful respect for their sensitivities over their sovereign rights, particularly over maritime territory.

While there are signs that the current U.S. administration is emphasizing just such a change, clarity, depth, and sophistication in its strategic approach to the region rests on a keen understanding of the Malay archipelago security complex, with its enmity-amity relationships and complex, interlinked security issues. Engagement with the region based on a deeply informed, strategic approach is important if progress is to be made in ensuring stability in a region that is strategically important to the West. A holistic and strategic approach based on an understanding of the Malay archipelago security complex, melded with a security partnership fronted by allies of the United States regarded as benign in the region, such as Japan, Australia, and Britain, could make a very positive contribution to the maintenance of stability as well as to the containment of China's attempts to build a position of influence in the region. This may be the only way for the United States to retain its influence in the region in the face of China's rise and the concern within the region over potential entanglement in their strategic rivalry.

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Notes

Chapter 1

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CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4

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CHAPTER 5

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CHAPTER 6

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