

ALEXEI D. VOSKRESSENSKI

NON-WESTERN THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Conceptualizing World Regional Studies



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Book Abstract This book deals with the problem of elaboration and appraisal of a non-Western phenomenon, particularly in the sphere of non-Western International Relations (IR) theory. The author explores the core agenda of European and American Studies and identifies the problem of bias in West-centric and East-centric approaches. Attesting the non-Western agenda in international literature, the author compares Russian and Chinese conceptualizations of a non-Western reality. He explains the rationale of the world system's evolution and identifies a new evolving stage resulting from the non-Western dynamics gaining momentum. After analyzing core hypotheses on the link between economic and political modernization, the author highlights the importance of social-political access for explaining the evolution of the political map of the contemporary world. The author puts forward an idea that Western IR theories missed 'space' as a dimension, which is the core of analyzing theoretical-applied aspects in World Regional Studies, and proposes it as a potential framework for explaining and appraising non-Western IR theories. The author stresses the fact that regionalization implies an appearance of different types of regions and shows the correlation between theoretical and practical aspects of regional transformations.

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Introduction

Politicians and academics have long been using the notion of world politics and the term ‘international relations’ as a generalized category for a single world of international political relationships. However, the international relations system and the space of international affairs are in fact far from homogeneous. Because of the rising popularity of globalization, the homogeneity of the world system has markedly risen. This is notwithstanding the increase in IR actors, the different models of regionalism and an obvious regionalization trend, which, in their turn, are calling for new methods of global governance and regulation instead of outcries that our world is falling apart and we need a new set of non-Western theories as a substitute for Western IR theories to understand that. A new global scenario does not necessarily mean that the world system is splitting into separate parts or that *bellum omnium contra omnes* is breaking out with all that it implies. Heterogeneity in the converging world political-economic

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space suggests that across various spatial world segments, each having their own forms of evolving internal structure, all of these processes have their own pace and shape and thus affect the regional structure in different ways, determining the distinctiveness of the international relations regional subsystems within a single international system. The development whereof is predicated upon universal laws and global trends (Mahbubani 2013). The ability to take advantage of regional integration and adapt to global processes predetermines, ultimately, the option for successful development models of the nation-states under the current global interconnectedness, facilitating or inhibiting their ascent or wane, eventually pointing out the nature of the IR system, the contingency of its constituent parts and the route forward, influencing the processes of international and global society formation.

The recognition of unique features in the regional form of global processes poses a challenge to politicians and academics as it requires mastery of analysis methodology of the global and regional tier, and also of global and local processes simultaneously. Even if they are related to cultural patterns and different kinds of cultural and historical [land]scapes (Appadurai 1996), they are caused by the allocation and redistribution of power in the world system and international governance structures, geopolitical, political and economic rising and nation-states' wane, nature and methods, which govern the world processes. In other words, the exploration of such processes pertains to the sphere of international political and political-economic analysis, with its own particular traits, which relate to the research subject specificity: the anarchized international phenomena (that is, going on in the absence of the global sovereign, rather than full anarchy and turmoil), structured and organized in a special way through historically changing forms of international order, transforming spatial-temporal interaction of the sovereign nation-states and other world political actors in terms of international affairs, enrooted in their regional domain. Even fifteen to twenty years ago the new quality of the regional and later trans-regional tiers in international relations was not reflected in IR theory because the regional relations tier was reputed to have been playing a small part, whereas the process logic at this level had been subverted by the pattern of world politics and completely determined by it.

Enhancing interstate cooperation at the regional and macro-regional levels as the tangible global development trend, economic and political modernization, open regionalism, regionalization and emergence of macro-regional and transregional cooperation (transregionalism), as well

as cross-regional cooperation geopolitics and the global politics logic determines not only the economic but also political, social-cultural and civilizational factors (Acharia 2013) because in every regional segment there exists a unique membership of nation-states with different social order types, as well as non-state actors with their own cooperation/partnership rules. Therefore, at a specific historical stage of development, the transition of the world system to a real polycentric structure with a compound intercourse configuration among its constituents is likely. This rests on intensifying political-economic integration inside the regions, the incipience of controversies, pertaining to the need of national states with various social order types for competition and cooperation in the spatially adjacent regional segments (Coleman and Underhill 1998). Simultaneously, there would be cross-regional cooperation, forming a national political space, but a different degree of depth, a specific kind of globalization in a new environment; development of global hubs (including new ones) with different competitiveness and, at the same time, a manifestation of controversies among them—the cultural, economic, political and so on. In the course of addressing these controversies and given the availability of a deft global governance system (Sinclair 2012), further formation of the single global space of the world system proceeds within the evolution and transformation of the world order up until the transition of the international system into a new supra- and transnational quality and gradual completion of the global politics as a new phenomenon in international relations.

Although all the aforementioned processes are gaining momentum, the degree of their interpretation by the world's analytical and political communities is not very high. The existing education system of the global, regional and national processes as well as specific traits in their behavior are studied separately within the fields of World Politics, International Relations, International Political Economy, Political Science, Geopolitics and Area Studies. And the latter discipline is undergoing a clear methodological decay. The notion of "area" in theoretical or applied research helps to set boundaries, geographically and to a lesser extent functionally, within which commonalities can be investigated with a manageable loss of competence in practical knowledge and concepts used by academic disciplines. Nevertheless, the notion of area is too vague and thus not satisfactory in terms of conceptualization on a global level. Appadurai's notion of "scapes" is useful for understanding the differences within the common functional spheres of "ethnoscapes," "mediascapes," "technoscapes," "financescapes" and "ideoscapes" (Appadurai 1996, 33) and he

rightly argues that modernity is experienced differently over space and time. However, modernities can be different also in terms of their internal structures. Thus, multiple modernities can be formatted through structural differences as well as different historical/cultural experiences. The understanding is that we are living through multiple modernities and thus to seek the universal applicability of Western or non-Western theories is an illusion. However, a framework conceptualization to address these multiple modernities may help us understand how the unique combination of general settings and regional and national factors forms the contemporary world of these multiple modernities. Appadurai shows that different cultural landscapes exist, but they are different not only because the reality is socially constructed—intentionally or unintentionally as Appadurai argues—but also, as I argue, because the socially constructed differentiation is based on the existing objective structural differentiation between societies of different types (Western/non-Western). To explain the regional specifics of heterogenization/homogenization, a researcher needs to explain the differences enrooted in the existing objective differentiation of social structures as well as those that are socially constructed. In IR, a politician, diplomat, practitioner or researcher needs to theoretically and practically deal with differentiations of both kinds, inside and outside of nation-states. This creates the possibility of a nonconflictual future for the development of social conditions for human beings.

In IR, the notion of “a region” in all senses is much more satisfactory than “an area” since there are no difficulties in distinguishing the regional level from the unit level (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 27–30). The development of regions and their transformation into international regions and also the further formation of global regions as possible new actors in IR, though separated by certain economic, political, military, cultural and civilizational boundaries, enable researchers and politicians to distinguish a regional dimension from a global whole. The current world development is marked by regionalization and regionalism to a much larger extent than before as well as the theoretical explanations of such phenomena (Ieda and Uyama 2006; Buzan and Wæver 2003).

So, in addressing current international developments we must admit the following:

1. The phenomenon of a segmentation/differentiation within a generally converging world (Mahbubani 2013), though it exists on a common sense level, is explained inadequately both methodologically

and practically. The consequence of which is the decay of Area Studies as an academic discipline. A parallel skepticism is developing around disciplinary studies as a tool to understand simultaneously existing multiple modernities of a different structural character with universal theories;

2. Current international development and practice suggest that the notion of “area” is transforming into the notion of “region,” which is more satisfactory in practical and methodological analyses. Both have geographical as well as economic, political and cultural connotations, but the latter better explains commonalities and homogenization as well as irregularities, heterogenizations, disorders and differences;
3. The regional dimension of IR is now much more theoretically conceptualized than ten years ago due to the new development trends in our world. Following these newly developed concepts, regionalization as well as regionalism do not necessarily mean that the world is diverging though such a possibility exists;
4. We are witnessing an increase in regional-level theoretical IR concepts such as the Regional Subsystem (Thompson 1973), Regional Security Complex (Buzan and Wæver 2003) and Meso-Area/Mega-Area concepts and approaches (Ieda and Uyama 2006). These help us to understand the regional specifics within IR commonalities, which constitute by themselves a basis for a common framework of analysis.

The impact degree of globalization, polycentricism and regionalization on world processes is increasing gradually. The emergence of true polycentrism and intensifying regionalization at a specific historical phase could even slow down globalization, trigger conflicts, destabilize world processes or bring on crises (Colaresi et al. 2007). Even if interpreted as fostering a possibility of world divergence, this does not necessarily imply increasing rift inside the global system, fraught with warfare, as it is considered to be among realism theory advocates—although such an option cannot be fully ruled out. On the contrary, it can testify to the acceleration of the interdependence and homogenization of different kinds of landscapes outside and within the nation-states that influence policies inside the macro-regional complexes. This will be followed by a new twist of cross-regional cooperation and a streamlining of the global governance system consisting of different civilizational and cultural landscapes already

on the basis of the developed macro-regional and transregional unions of various degree. This new level of cross-regional cooperation will be based on a new level of competitiveness and adaptability to the global tendencies, for sure, if not to spur the world on the military stand-off (Osterhammel and Petersson 2003; Mahbubani 2013 among others). Within the conceptual and analytical, rather than normative-ideological interpretation, the macro-regional complexes (for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] and the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP], the European Union [EU], the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the Eurasian Economic Union [EAEU]) can be viewed as new prototypes of centers in the new polycentric world system, resting upon the pre-eminence of the regional models with globally coordinating cooperation trends such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), Trans-Pacific Partnership, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the group consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). This fosters new world centers inside the new inter-regional affairs. In other words, it facilitates a leveling off of the global space by means of a new type of cross-regional cooperation, whereas the regional tier theories are elaborated across different regional segments of the world. If substantially extended, and possibly supplemented, the existing theories of IR and world politics can be a new stimulating foundation, dreaming up reasons for consolidation of the global governance system with different models by the members of the international community—those formatting and adjusting it to their regional and national needs, relying on an elaborated international consensus.

There are three consequences of this development on a theoretical and disciplinary level. The first denies the possibility of the existence of non-Western IR theories arguing that:

1. Western IR theories discovered the right path to understanding IR and so there is no need for non-Western IR theories;
2. And that partially because of this Western IR theories acquired a hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 16–18).

The second proposes and even insists on the appearance of non-Western IR theories as a reflection of multiple co-existing modernities because:

1. Non-Western IR theories exist, but are hidden because we cannot read all these languages in which they are written, or they may exist somehow in an oral form being circulated within a narrow circle of people;
2. They exist but they are hidden because of certain reasons of the non-Western states (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 18–22).

The third position, which is explained in this book, argues that the framework for debate should be broadened and we need the establishment of a de-Westernized (or non-culturally/historically biased) framework of IR analyses. This approach will help to encompass structural as well as cultural/historical differences between regions and national states as their main constituent parts as well as other IR actors instead of specifically constructing a body of non-Western IR theories (but not completely rejecting such a possibility). This would breed a hope that a de-Westernized framework of IR analyses may better explain constantly changing and more and more complex and intertwined international phenomena.

I will argue that the ongoing global transformations, including globalization, modernization, integration/disintegration and regionalization trends, have particularly highlighted the uneven nature of international political and economic space. Indeed, the world is not so flat, as Thomas Friedman argues (2006), and this phenomenon must be addressed both conceptually as well as methodologically. On the one hand, various regional segments of this global space generate their own ways of coping with world transformations and living through them. On the other hand, regions themselves and their structural organization are becoming factors shaping the development of the world. The increasingly complex nature of the international system and the emergence of new actors contribute to the fact that the conceptual framing within the classical disciplines of IR, Political Theory, International Political Economy or Comparative Politics taken separately can no longer explain in full a number of processes originating from a tighter and more intricate nexus between local, regional and global dimensions. To assess and fill this lacunae, World Regional Studies emerged as a tool and framework for analysis to bridge the gap between IR theory, Comparative Politics, Development Studies, Comparative Macro-History, Critical Geopolitics and Comparative International Political Economy and to address both Western as well as non-Western theories and explanations. Thus, the aim of World Regional Studies as a sub-field of IR and as a conceptual framework is to explain the emergence of the

new regional tier phenomena and new actors in IR and world politics on a regional and predominantly non-Western regional level. These phenomena include Regional Security Complexes, regional complexes, regional subsystems of international relations and, finally, international and global regions. These phenomena are at the same time in conformity with the existing body of IR theories thus stimulating methodological interdisciplinarity by addressing regional regularities and disorders through a set of internationally (and not only nationally) approved theories that gives researchers a tool to address complexities of coexisting landscapes of multiple modernities united by their functional overlappings, sameness and irregularities through spatially fragmented time.

The regional complex idea originated from the theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSC) put forward by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) as a structural phenomenon broader than the regional security area and at the same time rooted in geographic regions. A regional subsystem concept is one step forward and based on the literature of the 1980s (though it appeared earlier) (Thompson 1973), and later (Kaplan 2012; et al.), on Buzan and Wæver's work and also on Russian IR literature. The understanding of regional subsystems is important for explaining the differences between and within the core countries, the world periphery and semi-periphery and also the specifics of the processes that take place outside the core of the world system. The global region is a new phenomenon of the interconnected world and/or another new integrated actor of transforming international relations compared to the macro-region and regions that have a predominantly geographical meaning. Though the academic literature already started to reflect the development of these new phenomena, it does so mostly in the realm of Political and Human Geography and not in the realm of IR. World Regional Studies, as explained in this book, may be considered a sub-field of IR (or a regional version of IR, or even a regional version of a non-Western IR) in a non-Western world that emerged in the wake of Area Studies, fusing International Relations, Comparative Politics, Critical Geopolitics and Global Political Economy.

The formulation of a third position about the need for alignment in regional and national economic and political modernization issues was articulated within the framework of World Regional Studies as a possible sub-field of IR (Voskressenski 2006), along with its already existing sub-disciplines: History (known in IR also as Diplomatic Studies) and Theory of International Relations, World Politics, International Political Economy and the evolving sub-discipline of Global Political Economy (O'Brien

and Williams 2010). Political Geography, which merged with Critical Geopolitics, addressed regions inside nation-states as well as the national state as the region itself. World Regional Studies is a framework of analysis, particularly of a non-Western regional IR phenomena, emphasizing the spatial-temporal dimension of IR and evolution of the international society in the developing world regional segments by means of cross-regional political analysis. It is based on the interdisciplinary synthesis of classical International Relations, Regional Studies (formerly Area Studies and its specific state/regional component), International/Global Political Economy, Political and Human Geography, Critical Geopolitics, Cultural Anthropology, Regional Sociology and Comparative Political Science.

If Development Studies has been explaining how to develop a reliance on the experience of Western countries (Törnquist 1999; Rist 2008), World Regional Studies' distinctiveness boils down to the synthesis of spatial, temporal and structural approaches into a multidimensional understanding of the generalized and simultaneously geographically/functionally segmented regionally distinct features in the course of the international society development, allowing to strike the most favorable ways for this development, combining imperatives and trends of the global, regional and local (glocal).

Therefore, the pivotal issues for World Regional Studies as a social science discipline and an IR sub-field whittle down to the methodology, nature, ways and methods aimed at governing the global space (Sinclair 2012) and trimming spatial aspects in the world political processes. In other words, they control the leveling off or differentiation of the global political, economic, social and cultural-civilizational space (Payne 2005), segmented by the geographic and/or functional regions and temporal stages of development, as well as the revelation and forecasting of these processes.

Appropriate adjustment of global experience to its application in the regional segments of the world directly correlates with the methodological debates around the subject field of World Regional Studies—the comprehensive, political-economic and social discipline—an IR sub-field, looking into the tendencies of building up and functioning of the social-economic and social-political systems and regional subsystems with regard for the particular historical, demographic, national, religious, cultural-anthropological, environmental, political and legal traits, positions and roles in the international division of labor and the IR system (Voskressenski 2006, 2014a, b). Such an understanding marks out

the internal constituent parts of World Regional Studies (i.e., via the complex analysis encompassing all regions) in another already existing terminology—Global/International Regional Studies, International Area Studies or Interdisciplinary International Studies as it evolved gradually during the last two decades in the English-speaking world, or *Qiyü Yanjiu* in the Chinese-speaking world and *Mirovoye Kompleksnoye Regionovedeniye* in the Russian-speaking world, which consists of the mixing and overlapping of formal and substantive analytical and educational blocs. These are: International/World Regional Studies, analyzing the global/international/transregional/cross-boundary regions and a conglomerate of the “internal” or “national” regions loosely integrated for study and research in Area Studies, Political Geography, Human Geography and Critical Geopolitics. In other words, the disciplines that analyze the regions inside nation-states and “adjoin” two or three nation-states as part of it (intra-state regions, countries, “small-sized” transboundary regions, “triangles of growth,” etc). World Regional Studies has been evolving “inside” IR for a long time and by the early twenty-first century it broke completely with Area Studies after a merge with a segment of Comparative Political Science and turned it into a full-fledged but still “unofficial” constituent part (a sub-discipline) of IR on par with its history and theory, World Politics and International Political Economy under the guise of a conglomerate of intertwined disciplines as Geopolitics of Development (Nayar 2005; Nayar 2013), Global Politics of Unequal Development (Payne 2005), Regionalization de la Globalization, Geographies of Development (Chant and McIlwaine 2009), Human Geography (Knox and Martson 2013), Reformed Development Studies (Haque 1999), Reshaped Economic Geography (World Bank 2009) or Development and Geography (Krugman 1997). The research of ‘internal’ regions within former Area Studies, according to various national traditions, has been developing inside different “paradigmatically approved” academic disciplines and/or interdisciplinary fields of research: International Studies, Regional Studies, Economic Geography, Regional Science, Spatial Economy, Human Geography, Geo-Economics, Political Geography, etc., depending on which of the region’s study aspects are paid closer attention to and what the hallmark is in the national research and educational schools. Clear attempts to answer the need for a new interdisciplinary approach in IR and to reshape the conglomerate of educationally incoherent but internally intertwined disciplines into a more or less coherent view for educational purposes was undertaken by Sheldon Anderson, Jeanny A.K. Hey, Mark Allen Peterson, Stanly W. Toops and Charles Stevens in

their book *International Studies. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Global Issues* (2008) and also by Harm de Blij in *The Power of Place* (2009) and *Why Geography Matters* (2005). It is also reflected in the discussion on the need for spatial analysis in Social Sciences that can integrate qualitative, quantitative and cartographic approaches in interdisciplinary mixed-methods research (Thierbach et al. 2014). It seems that these attempts went largely unnoticed, buried by a fruitful discussion on the ideological consequences of China rising, the appearance of BRICS, the future of power politics, etc. (Lihmann 1979; Yoshihara and Sylva 2012) and the possibility for non-Western IR theories to emerge and solve all rising IR questions; in other words, within a predominantly realist traditional IR agenda.

A school of comprehensive “economy-oriented” Area Studies (and predominantly in Asian Studies) as a sub-field within Economic Geography and International Economic Relations has been evolving in Russia since the 1920s at Moscow State University (MSU), as well as in the institutes system of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)—the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute of Oriental Studies (IV RAN). Afterwards, it gradually transformed into a methodologically synthetic educational discipline (that is, with its own comprehensive “economy-oriented” methodology and methods for studying regions with an increased focus on the comparative analyses) of a more or less holistic essence. As a relatively self-sustained, methodologically synthetic discipline with emphasis on the comprehensive study of, first and foremost, international-political regions of the world (International Regional Studies as a part of Comprehensive Regional Studies), it was finally built up administratively by a decision of the Russian Ministry of Education in the mid- and late 1990s as an educational track and as a sub-field within IR. In the early 2000s a decision was made to separate it from IR, establishing educational and administrative equivalency with IR as well as other Social Science disciplines and the Humanities: Political Science, Sociology, History, Cultural Studies, etc.

Methodologically, International Regional Studies (*Zarubezhnoye Regionovedeniye* or “foreign regional studies” as it was called by the Russian Ministry of Education) was developing on the basis of International Relations, Comparative Political Science and economic and political clusters of the classical Area Studies in the IMEMO (Russian Academy of Science) and MGIMO University and Diplomatic Academy, both under the auspices of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently, World Regional Studies—its conceptual core—is valiantly developing at Moscow State

Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which was recently renamed MGIMO University, as a methodologically synthetic Social Science discipline. It exists both in Russia's various universities and think tanks under different names (as Regional Political Science, Regional Economic Geography, Political Geography, Geo-Economics, Regional Politics), in the USA and Europe (as Regional Science, Economic Geography, Political Geography, Human Geography, Development Studies, Critical Geopolitics), and also in Japan, China, the Republic of Korea and some other countries.

Fifteen years of teaching this discipline has shown me that understanding the constituent parts in World Regional Studies, that give the possibility to analyze regionally segmented world political entities proceeding from the global entirety phenomenon, adapted to the regional specificity of large geographic and/or functional regions of the world, brings on perplexity, as it requires conceiving of a vast volume of disparate information, which is cross-cultural and interdisciplinary in nature. Thus, the aim of this evolving IR sub-field and a framework for IR analysis is to bridge the gap between traditional Area Studies and the basic pillars of knowledge for training in World Regional Studies as a subfield within IR and Comparative Political Science programs that defines the structure of this monograph.

On having acquired knowledge laid down in this book, the reader will obtain a basic understanding of the subject matter of World Regional Studies and find out:

- What the global regionalization trends in modern World Politics are, what are its principal subjects and possible implications for the international system;
- What are the arguments for a transformation of “areas” into “regions” and why “regions” are becoming new actors in international relations overlapping with, and also substantiating and competing with, main traditional IR actors—nation-states;
- What are the key responses of the regions to the transformation of the IR system;
- How one should view the debate on the need for constructing a non-Western IR theory as reflecting the world transformations;
- How to attest a phenomena of non-Western IR theories;
- What are the contents of World Regional Studies as an alternative approach to International Relations and Global Politics, tackling the necessity of extending the methodological frameworks of studying contemporary de-Westernized international relations;

- What are the contents of the main conceptual construct in World Regional Studies, and, in particular, meanings of such notions as “glocality,” “international region,” “global region,” “regional complex,” “regional subsystem” and “regional order”;
- What is the correlation between these notions and their practical implication in World Politics and International Relations;
- How peoples, places and patterns, that is, geography in international affairs, are intertwined with evolving interdisciplinary approaches to regional and international topics; how historically developing “North-South”/“East-West” politics influence the central issues facing contemporary world order;
- What the interlink between the social orders in various states is, how this interlink impacts the leveling off or differentiation of space in our converging world;
- What may be other types of differentiation of the world space related to the politics of unequal development and the answer to this challenge by different nation-states through different models of regionalism and competing regional orders, what may be the consequences of this differentiation in general and how may it influence social engineering processes in all three tiers: local, regional and global;
- What may be the concrete subject field of World Regional Studies as a sub-field within IR and also a framework to address non-Western specifics; why we need a new sub-field and a framework that may help to incorporate existing IR theories while adapting to a globalization-regionalization trend instead of constructing a new set of International Relations theories of a non-Western nature;
- What are the main practical contents of the aforementioned terms of reference, that is, how in essence one should format knowledge on the international and regional processes to such an extent that the internal politics would facilitate successful development of nation-states and the relationship between states, consensual solution of controversial issues and decrease world and regional conflict potential and not nurture interstate, regional or even global stand-offs, which waste time, resources and capacities, and frequently cost human lives.

I believe that to address all these newly evolving global/regional trends and glocal topics through a coherent set of already existing and also methodologically correct evolving transformed rules of academic research and analytical prognostications, which are adapting to reflect a constantly changing reality,

would be a better option. It may help us to answer all new challenges to better prepare for the future while formatting it in a favorable way. Elaborating a new set of IR theories, labeled non-Western, may symbolize a total disruption with existing practices of academic research and analytical traditions, and without guaranteeing a solution to the rising acute questions and challenges to traditional IR. World Regional Studies as a methodological framework can help to attest non-Western IR theories and explanations, but it is also possible to look at World Regional Studies as a national version of IR or even a non-Western framework for analyzing international relations in a non-Western world.

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Challenges to the Existing IR System and How They Are Viewed in the IR Literature in the Western and Non-Western Segments of the World

2.1 CORE AGENDA OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES

Global politics as a phenomenon of international relations can be discussed in certain terms from the late nineteenth century, when the international society began taking a real shape (Watson 1992). Before that, different national communities within macrocivilizational worlds existed, but these macrocivilizational worlds were not tied into a single international system and they were organized according to different structural principles. It was only by the mid-twentieth century that the colonial and dependent politico-economic condition of Eastern (formerly called Oriental) countries gave way to the search for their own path of development. Eastern countries joined the international system, which was based on European principles and international law, only in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, making the majority of countries in the world system they were before mainly its accessory and dependent parts. After the countries of the East gained independence, some substantial shifts gradually took place there, with firmly established relationships between agrarian and industrial sectors and the prevalence of the latter in the most advanced of such countries. As for their traditional system of societal and economic life, it started to undergo a transformation into a type of enclave-conglomeration system, featuring complex relationships between traditionally dependent

groups as well as a growing and self-modernizing political elite, plus the synthesis of Western and Eastern civilizational and economic components depending on the Eastern societies' domestic talent for modernization and transformation (Osterhammel and Petersson 2003; Roach 2009; Payne 2005; Spero and Hart 2010). Generally, this process first took place within the frameworks of the colonial development model, then within the “catch-up development” model of economic and political modernization. Until the late twentieth century it was accompanied by dependent and/or co-subordinate foreign policy development (Nayar 2005).

In contemporary theory of international development (Payne 2005; Haque 1999; Rist 2008; O'Brien and Williams 2010) four major structural factors have been identified that cause strengthening of nation-states and national communities in the system of global relations: globalization, modernization, integration and regionalization. In IR theory, however, these factors were represented unevenly within existing Western development theories. As the global politico-economic space is quite heterogeneous—different spatial segments of the world have their own forms of evolving inner organization (Easterly 2007)—each of these processes proceeds in its own form and at its own pace, influencing the regional structure differently, thus predetermining the distinctiveness of the regional subsystems within the single international system. Using the advantages of regional integration and adapting to global processes predetermines the ultimate choice of development models made by some nation-states in the contemporary conditions of global interconnectedness (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2013). This contributes to or hampers their rise or fall, and in the end determines the nature of the global system, the contingency of its parts and the development vector. It also exerts influence on the processes of global society formation.

In Europe, with its progressive economic, social and political development over the last 200 years, modernization and integration have been and continue to be the most important factors and drivers of domestic development. In no other continent of the world do the integration processes proceed so rapidly and reach such magnitude and profoundness as in Europe. Even the global financial and economic crisis could not slow down these processes. European countries only accelerated the work through the models of integration on the basis of uniform budget policy and, as some argue, for the transformation of the European Union (EU) from a monetary into fiscal union, including or excluding some unstable elements from such processes. The latter doubtlessly influence the development of North America. Initially, the USA moved ahead to become the indisputable leader of global economic development, which for some time offered the

standard for the resolution of economic and political problems (Stubbs and Underhill 1994; Gill and Law 1998). Further on, the formation of the EU triggered the appearance of more competitive models of integration such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and then the evolving Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), both centered around the US economy and offering conditions for institutional cooperation even more transparent than those in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO, with its fifty-year periods of transition required for a number of states, enables these states to gain all advantages of cooperation within the WTO and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) without opening their own economies at the same level to other participants of the world economy. As for regionalization, it helps to reduce regional disproportions, to narrow the gap between the development rates and levels across the regions and to create prerequisites for the further intensification of the integration processes—in particular, by developing cross-border triangles of growth as well as cross-border and cross-regional cooperation, and by providing national communities/nation-states with additional incentives for development.

This agenda, when applied to Europe and North America, the two macro-regions of the West, makes up the core of the unified complex of research and learning disciplines known as European Studies and American Studies. These subject fields represent comprehensive politico-economic analysis of regional development models being applied by the two largest and most closely tied spatial segments of the single West, and of their influence on the rest. In general, such analysis has been reflected in the study of global transformations through the prism of the maximally objective West-centric analysis of global processes (Held et al. 1999). Accordingly, the analysis of the processes taking place in the Western world and their influence on global transformation was the major subject of the Political Science and Global Politics disciplines. Beginning from the twenty-first century, the emphasis of political studies shifted. Today, the central agenda for the coming decades of global political development is comprised of such issues as: Would the regional segments of the non-Western world be able to build their democratic systems of open social and political access? Which major non-Western countries would be able to de-monopolize the paths of transition to such a system and to offer their national versions of such a system? And, which non-Western countries would be doomed to undergo the cycles of mobilizations/stabilizations, periodically occurring systemic political crises and circular development without attaining a new sociopolitical and technological level of competitive development, but with the invariable need to defend their besieged fortresses against

the internal and external challenges in order to explain to their degrading population why it lives worse than people in other countries?

The central agenda of European Studies in existing IR literature usually includes the processes of European integration as well as its internal, external, economic and political implications for EU nation-states (Anderson et al. 2008, 133–178). American Studies, however, are focused on the comprehensive role the USA plays in forming belts and spheres of the preferential global and regional policy (Spero and Hart 2010, 12–62). Unified by the macro-regional cross-Atlantic history based on common values and world perception, the agenda of these two macro-regions reflects:

- (a) the nature of macro-regional processes that came to the fore at a certain historical stage of global development, and hence,
- (b) the view of the world from the macro-region of the future Euro-Atlantic community.

As all these processes are connected with the distribution/redistribution of power and influence in the global system and in the international governance structure, with geopolitical, political and economic rise and fall of national states, as well as with the nature and methods of governance of world processes, the research of such kind of processes, in terms of its type, is associated with the sphere of international political and politico-economic analysis (Anderson et al. 2008, 15–16). The latter features its own methodological specifics of problem-posing and problem-solving, connected with the specifics of the subject being researched, such as: the phenomena of anarchical international society (that is, occurring in the absence of a global sovereign), but the streamlined, transforming substantial and spatially time-bound interaction of sovereign states and other actors of global politics in the form of international life, rooted in the regional sphere (Bull 1977; Held et al. 1999).

2.2 WEST-CENTRIC AND EAST-CENTRIC APPROACHES

The study by André Gunder Frank (1998) was a pioneering book that called for the revision of the West-centric approach to global processes and international political economy, and that paved the way for some of the most important applied theoretical research by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003), Peter Katzenstein (2000), as well as Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2010). Due to these authors, the need to articulate new analytical interpretations of global and regional processes was fixed more solidly

in English-language IR research literature. The latter work analyzed and assessed the probability of the appearance of non-Western theories of IR and Politics in East Asia, where the pace of integration and economic modernization is much faster than in other non-Western regions of the world, and where in the twentieth century some countries were able to proceed from the natural to open social order, albeit marked by their national specifics (India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan). Some others are proceeding from the natural social order of a transitional type (hybrid or transitional) to an open one (Singapore, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Malaysia).

It should be noted that such ideas had appeared before. However, the need for theorized reflection in the sphere of international development cannot be understood properly in non-modernized societies, which did not master the global Political Theory of International Relations and International Political Economy in their contemporary forms (Chan 1994, 248). Understanding this fact may accompany, but cannot precede, modernization (Chan 1994, 248). The appearance of such studies signaled the simultaneous entry of the more profound and unbiased scholarly conceptualization of the given agenda in the English-language research tradition. Although, a number of works (see, for example, A.G. Frank 1998) quite amply reveal their orientation to polemics with classical West-centric analysts (McNeil 1982; Landes 1998), A. Acharya and B. Buzan (2010) express rather reserved assessments of the prospects for the construction of such theories. In 2010, the Western and Eastern interpretations of world history—the synthetic political economy of the latter in terms of arising center-periphery relations was disclosed and researched deeply by Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) and Prasannan Parthasarathi (2011)—were summarized in the study by Ian Morris (2010), who showed that in view of forecasting the trends of the future synthetic paradigm of human development (the principal outlines of this paradigm are just now starting to take shape), the West-centric and East-centric visions of history were historically limited (Morris 2010, 583–620). At the same time, such posing of the problem did not cancel the need to analyze the dichotomy of global macro-regions (in particular, the problems of the East/West dichotomy (Curtin 2000; Dagorn and Gabriel-Oyhamburu 2008) in their differences of economic, political and social structures) in view of understanding the specifics marking the course of sociopolitical processes and construction of the social order at particular historical stages of human development in regional segments of the world—despite understanding of the fact that dichotomous constructions a priori suggest a methodological reduction.

Gradually, it became clear for at least some of the most advanced and not paradigm-blinded researchers that the growth of interstate interaction at the regional and macro-regional levels as a significant trend of global development, plus economic and political modernization, open regionalism, regionalization and the appearance of such a phenomenon as macro-regional and cross-regional cooperation (cross-regionalism), determine not only economic but also political, socio-cultural and civilizational factors, as each regional segment hosts its own unique composition of nation-states with a different combination of different types of social order (social and political access system). Exactly these new global trends are associated (like in the case of Western countries at different stages of development) with the actual growth of the Eastern countries in the world processes. In this connection, at a certain historical stage of development the global system actually can experience a transition to a real polycentric structure with a complex configuration of East-West and North-South interaction. Such configuration would be based on stronger in-region politico-economic integration and different intensity of transregional relations because of contradictions connected with the fact that states with different types of social orders would need to compete and cooperate in the spatially adjacent regional segments. At the same time, these states would need to also develop transregional cooperation, which, like the formation of a supra-national political space acquiring a global nature, but at a different degree of profoundness, in the new conditions is a specific form of globalization: the formation, on this basis, of world centers (including the new ones) with different competitiveness and, at the same time, manifestation of their cultural, economic, political and other contradictions. In the course of the resolution of these contradictions—provided that the skillful global-governance system is available—the single global space of the world system would undergo further development within the framework of evolution and transformation of global orders through to transition of the international system into a new supra- and transnational quality. However, the existing IR literature lacks much of the ability to envisage these challenges. There is a trend to look at economic interconnectedness (O'Brien and Williams 2010; Spero and Hart 2010; Roach 2009 among others), a different kind of power balancing (Nguyen 2006; Emmott 2009; Friedberg 2011; Nye 2011; Yoshihara and Sylva 2012 among others), and incoherent writings on global governance and the restoration of international economic balance in the world (Temin and David Vines 2013 among others).

Posing the question in such a way suggests a revision of the global leadership problem and evolution and/or transformation of its nature from the military-economic to the structural-political, including the option of

collective cross-regional leadership and global regulating (as in the Group of Twenty [G-20])—similar, but not congruent either in structural form or content to the Concert of Europe (of the Great Powers) in the nineteenth century. The reason is that the transformed leadership would be based mainly on the strengthening of the new trend of supra-national and transnational cooperative interaction within the shape-taking global spatial and time-bound field of interconnection and interaction. Another option is the military balancing of various states and national communities as well as informal consultations of “power centers” that used to take place in the time of the Vienna Congress.

Contemporary official paradigms of IR, within the frameworks of specialized government institutions (foreign ministries), do recognize the need for cooperation because otherwise their existence/funding would be put in doubt. However, so far these paradigms interpret such processes mainly within the frames of revised realism and neo-realism reflecting the existing differences in the social access system composition. And weakly, if ever, link the world development process of the cooperative type, requiring the articulation of new ways and methods to protect one’s own national and state interests, with external and internal aspects of the agenda pertaining to economic and political modernization. The actual politico-economic contents of this process, as it was made clear in the course of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, is more complex and multidimensional. The struggle for cooperation and development (even with the intent to strengthen and secure national sovereignty against external dangers; Booth and Wheeler (2008)) appears to be a prevailing trend of the twenty-first century, and the world terrorist attacks not only failed to undermine the given trend, but made it even stronger.

Interstate conflicts in this field can be connected with the fact that protective trends and the need for state development being at different phases of development and with different systems of social access may be in conflict. Any alleged or actual failure in the sphere of national security can be easily pointed out and then punished, while missed development opportunities, which eventually can result in national security failures, must first be formulated and then their implications explained. Quite often, this can only be done after several decades and only if highly qualified specialists are available. In many cases, it is the succeeding generation that would undergo the process of rethinking, when they are able to point to historical errors fearlessly, but when it is too late to correct something because the time is gone sometimes forever.

Understanding and forecasting the missed opportunities requires a new level of education and intellect, neither of which can be sustained in a closed society being structured on the basis of coercion and violence. This is confirmed by biological regularities of degeneration of closed populations as well as by simple logic; for example, it is impossible to order somebody to make a scientific discovery, or to appoint a Nobel Prize winner, but a country may raise a Nobel Prize nominee by creating, sustaining and developing an open and internationally competitive scientific environment.

2.3 NON-WESTERN AGENDA IN INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE

A special note should be made of some works issued in the last decades because of the given case they represent, which is the vector of political-economy studies analyzing the new economic role of the East. For example, A. G. Frank in his work, *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (1998), written in the informal polemics with William McNeil (1982) and some other West-centric authors, is focused mainly on the analysis of the global economy structure and dynamics through the prism of the entire system (including the Asian subsystem) rather than just its European segment. In another interesting group of studies, the role of the East in international relations is addressed through the prism of an international-historical approach (Easterly 2007). In this connection I should also mention the works by C. Bayly, B. Buzan and R. Little who conclude that the history of international relations should be decentralized rather than reoriented from the West to East (Bayly 2004; Buzan and Little 2000). A further idea was put forward in the book edited by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2010) that non-Western IR may indeed somehow exist. They also envisaged the possibility of the appearance of non-Western IR theory as a new phenomenon of truly international IR.

While the aforementioned studies certainly do not encompass the whole variety of works that analyze the changing role and position of the East and the West as world macro-regions in contemporary international political and socio-economic relations, they do, however, serve as sufficient ground for an unambiguous conclusion: eventually, the positions of those who insisted on including the non-Western agenda into the political and political-economic analysis of international relations gained credence. These authors disregarded the repulsion their stance could cause in the classical West-centric or East-centric Social Sciences. If we are taking this proposition as a basic one for further exploration, we must note at the

same time, as evidenced by the preceding analysis, that up until now the studies of the East and of global policy were never linked directly in the mainstream IR theory except the theories of modernization, development and dependency or (to a lesser extent) world-systems analysis. In this connection, at the current stage it appears reasonable to identify the two vectors of newly conceptualized world or global studies.

The first vector represents the probability of appearance and development of non-Western concepts of international relations, global politics or comparative politics created, among others, by researchers of Eastern countries (or with their direct participation) and based on such non-Western concepts as Chinese global order, Mandala state, Buddhist world order and Eurasian world order, but not necessarily on the emergence of non-Western theories (Acharya and Buzan 2010).

The second vector would focus attention on the extension of other than just West-centric constructivist approaches within theoretical constructions of the global and regional levels positioned between the universal and exclusively area/country-related approaches. This vector focuses on the comparative analysis of practical aspects of constructing the harmonious international relations of a harmonious world (*hexie shijie* in Chinese IR literature) through expanding the field of interaction between states and also of transregional relations up to the formation of international and global regions as new, highly integrated actors in world politics. Within this vector, a segment of Russian experts in international politics conduct research analyzing the problems of the East and, in particular, East Asia in the context of, and with due regard to, the dynamics of such phenomenon as global policy (see Voskressenski 2014a, b, 2015a, b). Another subdivision of researchers within this vector in Russia, as well as in China, concentrate on a constructivist attempt to create alternative visions aimed to fundamentally reshape the global configuration (Aleksieva 2014), even using forceful coercion and violence (Dugin 2012, 2014).

In Europe, as noted, modernization and integration have been and continue to be the most important factors of internal development. In no other continent of the world do the integration processes have such high rates, impressive scope and profoundness as they do in Europe. The cross-influence of processes taking place in Europe and North America raises no doubts that it will be deepened. Since the early twentieth century the USA has been proceeding gradually from a hegemonic position to the indisputable and later the structural leader, and for a long time used to offer its model for the resolution of economic and political problems to other states. The formation of the European Union (EU) generated the appearance of

competitive integration models in North America—such as NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), both centered around the US economy and offering more transparent and competitive terms of cooperation. With regard to the two macro-regions of the consolidated West—Europe and North America—this agenda is in the core of the aggregate set of research vectors and learning disciplines defined as European Studies and American Studies, where the actual subject matter is to conduct comprehensive political and economic analysis of regional development models offered by the two major and closely interconnected geo-spatial segments of the integrated Western world, and to measure their influence on the rest of the world. Today we actually are faced with the emergence of a single Western macro-regional complex—a global region bound by economic, political, military, value-oriented, cultural, political and historical links. An analysis of the structural processes in the evolution of this macro-regional complex in the most generalized form is presented in the study of global transformations through the prism of objective West-centric analysis of global processes (Held et al. 1999). The prevailing view, although being actively debated in the Political Science discipline until the end of the twentieth century, was that the major subject of Political Science and Global Policy is the analysis of the processes taking place in the Western world and their influence on global transformation. Thus, the nature of research was identified to study the peripheral part of the world—the East, formerly the Orient—as a number of traditionalist non-modernized or slowly modernizing societies, primarily through the prism of understanding its ethnographic peculiarities and the specifics of the West-centric view of the other world in the academic discipline of Oriental Studies best described by Edward Said in his book *Orientalism* (1977).

In the second half of the twentieth century, the agenda of Oriental Studies was extended to include economic and then political subjects (economic as well as political development and modernization). Oriental Studies, connoted with ideological instruments of Western domination during the colonial period, were transformed into Asian and African Studies and, together with European, American and Latin American Studies, formed the discipline of Area Studies within which areas were understood as loosely bound geographic and ethnographic regions consisting of economically less developed, mostly traditionalist states compared to the core areas of the world system—the EU and the North America. In some national disciplinary segments, as the trends of regionalization and/or regionalism were growing (e.g., in International Political Economy and Economics, and especially in Regional Studies in the USA), the need

was realized even more clearly to modernize the agenda and substantially transform Area Studies into the discipline entitled Regional Studies with a context often completely different than that of Area Studies. Regional Studies constitutes now a distinct set of literature pertaining mostly to urban and human geography and analyzing globalization (Sokol 2011), development (Chant 2008), urbanization and urban economics (Kresl and Sorbino 2013), economic geography including evolutionary economic geography (Bochma and Martin 2010), regional development on the basis of proximity relations (Torre and Wallet 2013), regional impacts on national policies (Baer 2012) and spatial scenarios for different regions (Camagni and Capello 2011), regional integration and global governance (Voltz 2011), and global change and territorial resilience (Cooke et al. 2012). International Relations as an academic discipline address some of these issues but as peripheral to the core subject of the discipline.

In the twenty-first century the emphasis of international political studies has changed. Now, a pivot for future decades of world political and economic development as well as for global policy is seen in the questions related to social engineering such as: Would the regional segments of the non-Western world be able to build their democratic systems of open sociopolitical access based on the models of a self-regulating and/or regulated market economy of the new type? Who among the non-Western states in particular would be able to do so? What major non-Western countries would be capable of demonopolizing the paths of transitions to such a system, first discovered by Western countries, and offering their own national versions of the given system, thus influencing the parameters of the evolving new global order? To explain the nature of influence caused by internal processes in the Western as well as non-Western countries on formation of the global-policy space and on the nature of states (comprehensive glocalism as a new phenomenon in international relations), World Regional Studies is the most important political and research framework of this agenda at present.

The central subjects of European studies usually include the processes of European integration and its internal and external, as well as economic and political implications for nation-states seceding from the EU. American studies are focused on the comprehensive role of the USA in the formation of different belts and spheres of preferential-type global and regional policy, centered around this global and regional leader. Linked by the trans-Atlantic unity of common values and perception of the world, the agenda of these two global regions reflects the nature of the processes that came to the fore at a certain historical stage of world development and, correspond-

ingly, the West-centric view of the world from the given forefront-positioned united macro-regional complex and a global region. All these processes are connected with distribution and redistribution of power and influence in the global system and in the international-governance structures. That is, they are connected with geopolitical, political and economic rise and fall of nation-states, as well as with specifics of national methods for governance of world processes. The research of these kinds of processes by its type falls in the category of international political analysis within the disciplines of IR and Global Political Economy. Although a consistent part of this category, it is more as its consistent part but broadly understood than international economics or International Political Economy (IPE), which are bound by the structural role of the hegemony of the international arena. The IR discipline features its own specifics in the problem-posing and problem-solving methodology connected with the specifics of the subject under study: the phenomena of the anarchical (in other words, taking place in the absence of the global sovereign) but somehow organized and transforming through substantial and spatial-temporal geopolitical interaction of sovereign national states and other actors of global policy in the form of international life rooted in the regional sphere (Bull 1977; Held et al. 1999). However, the broader understanding of IPE does not limit the functioning of the global economy system only to the existence of the world hegemon or world leader (O'Brien and Williams 2010; Spero and Hart 2010). It also explores other possible variants of the global political and economic sphere including the possibility of polycentrism. This is the reason for the number of authors raising the question of how to write a decentralized world regional history (Lewis and Wigen 1997; Gunn 2011, 5). Geoffrey C. Gunn argued "that the sense of world region is preferable as a unit of analysis to that of continents and civilizations" (Gunn 2011, 5), while Lewis and Wigen (1997, 157) noted that "world regions... are large sociospatial groupings delimited largely on the ground of shared culture and history." Thus, academics, in their opinion, based on a permeability, connectedness, flexibility and openness of spatial and temporal boundaries and borders, must "decenter" a nation-state in the framing of the world region, assessing or elevating "nations" to world regions status (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 157) compared to past attempts "to center" analysis in World Politics or Area Studies on different regions, areas or even countries (Cohen 2000; Armstrong et al. 2006) thus enabling a cumulative unbiased understanding of international relations and world politics. One of the most successful historical attempts of this kind was made by Warren I. Cohen to a group of his Chinese PhD students at the University of Maryland (both campuses). He also briefly mentioned it in the preface and acknowledgments

sections to his book *East Asia at the Center* (Cohen 2000, xiii–xviii). However, Cohen’s penetrating, well-thought and clear-cut historical description of the “uncentered” and “centered” East-Asian historical development highlighted the tension between historical description and theoretical explanation of different “areas” transforming into “world regions” and also their role and place in world politics. These tensions between “the West and the Rest” as Gunnar Skirbekk observed, “have caused a renewed concern for questions about ‘multiple Modernities,’ situated along the dimension between universality and plurality” (Skirbekk 2014, 1). Thus in the philosophical and methodological sense, the challenge of the interplay between universality and plurality and between universality and multiplicity is reflected in the universality/specifics dilemma within the juxtaposition of subjectivism/objectivism in the disciplinary discussions of History/IR/Political Science and also within the disciplines in such concepts as a higher form of civilizations, multiple modernities and multiple democracies, which are inherent in the universality/plurality of the study of Agents and Institutions (Gunn 2011, 6; Skirbekk 2014, 179, 185; Sachsenmaier and Riedel 2002). Indeed, one does not know if theories tested in Western cases have real explanatory power in non-Western cases, so the discussion is on the need for IR research to incorporate non-Western regions in a methodological grid broad enough to incorporate both a Western as well as a non-Western reality. Thus, we might not need specific theories to solely explain phenomena in non-Western regions. As Johannes Vüllers observes (Vüllers 2014, 21), “the main methodological problem with the low representation of non-Western cases is that one cannot draw any empirical conclusions about non-Western cases if the theories and the empirical studies of IR ignore these regions.”

As a result of political and socio-economic transformations of the late twentieth to early twenty-first centuries, the modern world has entered the phase of its evolution when—unlike the case of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—the Western countries are not at all the only ones that set the parameters of such evolution and the frameworks for its understanding (Nayar 2005; Nayar 2013). Is the existing academic literature sufficient for promoting the non-West-centric or East-centric view of the world? Is it sufficient to promote Western or non-Western IR as the only correct one for all actors? To what extent is posing the question in such a way correct in general? Does entering the new phase of global political and economic development serve as sufficient ground for viewing the global macro-regions as a self-sufficient object of study? How, and in what disciplinary framework, should the global regions of the world in their relationship to each other and also to the existing system of national states be studied? The timeliness of these questions

today is more or less universally understood, but no methodologically plausible answer based on universally accepted theory has been provided until today. However, as shown by the analysis in the previous sections of this book, using the examples of A. G. Frank, W. McNeil, B. Buzan, and A. Acharya's writings, the rise of new IR actors and new international developments may be analyzed within internationally approved frameworks of analysis that may not necessarily be called Western or non-Western.

2.4 ATTESTING THE RUSSIAN FINDINGS

A number of Russian Eastern Studies experts in the 1960s–1980s (such as Leonid Vasiliev, Oleg Nepomnin, Leonid Alayev and Robert Landa) elaborated a view, based on the exploration of the so-called Asiatic mode of production within a Marxist paradigm, of the fundamental structural differences between societies of the Western and non-Western type. This view later helped to develop the academic literature, which specifically concentrated on explaining structural differences between societies of the Western and non-Western type that in its turn became a basis for discussing the correlation between internal structural societal factors and their influence on the formation of the specifics of foreign policy behavior of the nation-states of certain structural types. According to this view, the pre-antiquity Western and Eastern political structures were identical. Beginning with antiquity, a division of the political structures into two types occurred: Western and Eastern. In societies of the Western type:

- market and private relations possess a structuring character and influence;
- manufacture of goods is a predominant concern;
- centralized power is absent; and
- correspondingly, a tradition of democratic self-governance of society that existed from the very beginning subsequently expanded into a structure that in today's Western societies has been given the name of "civic society."

According to this conception, a Western society was quite rapidly subjected to structural modification, which brought forth its rapid evolution to a highly competitive type of society, as viewed from the perspective of the functioning of the political and administrative system (Vasiliev 1998, 2013).

In societies of the second type—Eastern—private property played no dominant part, but instead social and governmental property fulfilled this

function. Power was the equivalent of property and vice versa. At the same time as in societies of the Western type, since the time of the Venetian Republic, a division occurred between money and power, which could “simply” be purchased, and the main function of the latter became that of the administration. In Eastern societies, where there was no norm of rights that defended private-property relations (Roman law), the government-social form of land management predominated, and as a result the state (government) was dominant over society and not the other way around. Moreover, even though society did create alternative structures standing in juxtaposition to government/power (e.g., family, clan, commune, caste, guild, sect, fraternity/association, etc.), in their determining part these were all inscribed into the system of government: the caste membership within the governing institutions in India; clan or association in China, the leaders of which were tightly bound up with the government system, or who simply represented its lowest rung—civil servants of a special kind. In societies of this type, as a result of the features just indicated, political structure always tended toward seeking domestic stability or conservative stability and in them only that which corresponded to the norms of corporate/social ethics became consolidated. Hence, they always reproduced political structures of a single type. In the West, the engine of innovation, political innovation included, was the individual, who was a citizen-owner; in the East, it was the community, which accepted only that which corresponded to the norms of corporate/social ethics or tradition, the collective, and not to the individual/individualistic experience. In accordance with explanations of this sort, it becomes palpably clear why Eastern societies do not become democracies of the Western type, and what must be done so that they do become them. According to these conceptual hypotheses, modernization (i.e., the approach of modernity) is defined as Westernization—the inevitable progression of all government institutions through the natural-historical path toward the Western model of development.

However, in the past ten years, in Eastern Studies and within World Regional Studies in Russia, an alternative explanation of the features of Eastern societies has emerged (Istoriya Vostoka 1999, 2005, 2006, 2008). According to this conception, the particulars of social structure in the East are determined by the following parameters:

- the rights individuals in the East existed and were protected only in their relationship to each other, and an individual’s rights in relationships with the state/government were non-existent;

- property as land ownership in the East was divided into two parts: property ownership of a territory with its subordinate population (ownership for taxation), belonging to the ruling elite, which simultaneously comprised the administrative apparatus of the state/government; and ownership of land as the object of agricultural management, belonging to land owners and tax payers (to farmers and estate owners simultaneously).

Such a situation defined the presence of two prevailing classes, with all the political consequences that result from this. Based on these conditions, the features of societies of the *Eastern type* may be defined in the following way:

- In Eastern societies, for the structural reasons previously outlined, there exists a complex and persistent hierarchy that accompanies the entire process of historical development.
- They will always experience longer periods of intermission between times of formation.
- In them will always be an apparent conflict of “cultures of half-civilization” (in the terminology of F. Braudel), that is, civilizational heterogeneity, where civilization is understood to be a stage in the development of culture that is part and parcel of an historically determined system of relations, and that represents in itself a formational character that, as a result, subsequently accumulates a cultural-political content.
- Eastern societies, as a result of their ethical and cultural/civilizational heterogeneity, need to resort to mechanisms of compensation for the racial diversity of the society and the economic underdevelopment of the minority population. Correspondingly, government and religion play a hypertrophied role in them in comparison to societies of other types—their functions playing a centralizing, cementing, and unifying role in society.
- Furthermore, in societies of this type, a product of both domestic and external factors, capitalism possessed a heterogeneous and localized character (Landa 1999, 15–28), which determined both the economic and political features of development of these societies (Voskressenski 2015a, b).

An important assumption on the basis of these concepts can be made that structural differences within the societies of a certain kind may influence the historical formation of the views of “itself” and “others” and thus format the specifics of inter-state and international interaction. This

may influence the process of foreign policy formation within structurally different societies. A book and an extensive article (Miasnikov 1985, 1996) were dedicated to the analysis of the relationship between structurally different civilizations: Western and non-Western (Chinese). Later, another two books were written to explain the specifics of historical interaction between structurally different civilizations and states (Voskressenski 1996) and also the relationship between structurally different societies and nation-states over the whole history of their political interaction as a part of IR (Voskressenski 2003). This research stressed how different historically evolving social and political structures organized in the form of the state interacted through history when continuity and change in their foreign policy developed at a different pace.

In more recent years, due to the resurgence of Russian nationalism, the focus has been on the contemporary structural transformation of international order in connection to the societal structural differentiation, as well as on the international debate of the existence of non-Western IR theory and the possibility of Russian IR theory playing a non-Western role. These new publications may be grouped in four categories according to the intellectual positions of their authors.

The first position is represented by Andrei Makarychev and Viacheslav Morozov (2013, 328–350). The authors argue that the idea of “non-Western” theoretical explanation of reality originates from the false assumption that the infinite diversity of collective experiences throughout the world can only be understood on the basis of epistemological pluralism. They traced this assumption to the idea that all knowledge is rooted in a particular culture, and a constructivist debate over this assumption in Russia, with the idea that national schools of IR are possible, and so the Russian IR school (and maybe some other national versions) will emerge together with the emergence of a Russian or some other nationalism, notwithstanding its constructive/destructive nature or intellectual/structural preconditions. They also correctly noted that there is a tendency everywhere to assign a certain value to any national IR school even before a contribution of this school to any global debate is assessed by the international community of researchers (Makarychev and Morozov 2013, 328–330). Another consequence of this latent debate in Russia, as correctly noted by Makarychev and Morozov, is an idea that Russia or Asia are different from the West and this automatically proves that Western theory, including Western IR theory, is incapable of accounting for Russian or Asian uniqueness or specifics (Ibid, 330–331). Another indirect assumption that is made from this is that a possible change of an international system's basic characteristics from structural unipolarity

(there is always a trend in any non-Western IR tradition to see a structural hegemony as equal to unilateralism) to multi-polarity means an automatic emergence of a new pattern of IR that should be attested only by national IR schools notwithstanding their intellectual capabilities to do so. This, in turn, is dependent on a position that as soon as a political decision to help the emergence of a new international order is made and the deconstruction of an existing international system begins, scholars on a national level will present a suitable ad hoc explanation that will be accepted by the international academic community as a new suitable theoretical tool. This constructivist position was similar to the Marxist-Leninist idea of the world revolution in that as soon as it started it would necessarily lead to the construction of the communist state and society, which would later be somehow explained by official scholarship. Makarichev and Morozov (Ibid, 333–335) are correctly arguing that instead of concentrating on understanding the possible evolution of a structure and order in the international society, some Russian politicians have openly challenged a unipolar order seeking to achieve equality with Western powers without any robust theoretical explanation on how successful maybe the possibility to achieve the needed equality in reality. Makarychev and Morozov argues that this position is based (Ibid, 332) on a little constructive engagement with Western “bourgeois” theory in a Soviet as well as post-Soviet period.

Makarychev and Morozov’s conclusion on an emergence of a Russian IR school is very critical. They argue that: “As we see it, the existence of ‘the Russian school’ of IR, as, arguably, of many others, does not go beyond declarations about the alleged need to create it. What this discourse demonstrates very clearly is that its driving forces are not academic (a distinct research agenda inspired by the local context), but political. It is a counter-hegemonic practice whose *raison d’être* is to challenge Western hegemony in the academic field—in the same way as the political discourse of multi-polarity challenges Western hegemony in the political domain” (Ibid, 336). And the basis of this assumption is a belief by any conservative Russian thinker that the West has always been intentionally inimical to any Russia, regardless of its domestic regime (Ibid, 342) and that Russia must create a theory that would explain how Russia may find its place in the core of the world system notwithstanding its place in world economy as the Soviet Union allegedly did based on Marxism-Leninism and also earlier based on the Stalinist version of predominantly nuclear bipolarity.

The second position in Russia is best represented by an essay by Tatiana Alekseeva (2014). After allowing the influence of identity on the outcome of the security dilemma, she used the Western constructivist approach to

make identity a dependable variable. Thus, identity acquires not an abstract nature, but becomes a variable that may be extended and changed by concrete people who have their own system of values and persuasions. Since in this analysis the individual level is mated with the state, identity becomes a product of a national reaction to what is going on in the international arena: other countries can be both the models for imitation and “the strangers,” with whom the enemy may be associated. For Russian constructivists like Alekseeva, a similar correlation is intermediated by the historically prevailing systems of knowledge, ideas, standards and values, accepted not by the international community but by a concrete nation-state (Alekseeva 2014, 15–18). In other words, if constructivism as an international theoretical approach proceeds from the fact that the international community possesses significant influence on national identities, Russian constructivists (as represented by Alekseeva) in the IR sphere proceeds from the reverse: national identity can be constructed and its constructed version must be accepted by the international community in this constructed form on the basis of the concrete practice of intergovernmental interaction (Alekseeva 2014, 20). Thus, Russian constructivists believe that the state can receive a guarantee of a favorable solution to the security dilemma. That is, if from the point of view of international constructivism the international community can “format” potential aggressors, thus decreasing the probability of conflicts, then from the point of view of Russian constructivism the reverse position is allowed. This reverse position is based on an argument that the internal factors of identity formation may be stronger than impulses from outside. The following is an indirect conclusion from this position: stable identity, in most cases, must be ensured by sufficiently rigid control of the criteria within the correlation: “its” and “strangers,” by the limitation of the number of influential leaders, by coercion of estimation, and also by the strict policy towards mass media (Ibid, 18–19). Identity under the contemporary conditions is to one degree or another the object of construction. The applied aspects of this idea are new possibilities for the control “of the sphere of ideas” inside the country or the application of “soft power” in international policy. It is clear that this intellectual position includes the possibility of the construction of a national IR theory on the basis of the constructed identity and on the concrete experience of international relations by concrete governments or even political leaders. However, this possibility does not exclude conclusions made by Makarychev and Morozov on the possibility that the theoretical validity and robustness of these possible “theories” as attested by national standards of validation will be contested by an international academic community as sufficient to argue for a contribution to international IR theory.

At least some of the theories that have emerged in Russia in recent years may meet Alekseeva's and even Acharia's standards as non-Western. However, some of their premises may not be proven by any internationally approved methods of validation as a new contribution to a theory. For example, Dugin argued (2012, 2014) that Russians are inclined to resolve all international disputes through war. Sergei Glaziev argues (2014) that unjust for Russia pro-Western international order and its financial structure must be changed forcefully by Russia notwithstanding consequences for a Russian population who will be glad by the final allegedly benign result of this overturn. It must be mentioned in this connection that not only are Russian constructivists following the described way of creating theories and practices, but so are, as some argue, the so-called Khalifatists in the Middle East. Khalifatists may be considered to be constructing a new reality through the synthesis of a radical vision (in the case of Khalifatists—Islamic) of the world merged with the application of mass culture concepts. These attempts are structurally similar but different in content to the previously mentioned Russian versions.

The third position is best represented by the writings of the group of authors in *Mirovoye Kompleksnoye Regionovedeniye* (World Regional Studies) (Voskressenski 2014a, b) and some other writings (Voskressenski 2006). The first impulse to think about regional phenomena was developed with an argument that a non-historical explanation would reduce the relationship (between certain types of states, particularly Russia and China) to a single dimension, such as power politics or economics, or address it from one angle (realist, liberal and so forth) but fail to look at the whole history of Russian-Chinese contacts linking past and present. The possibility of viewing the subject from one angle usually can be undertaken within a short space of time, and so approaches of the second type are in most cases ahistorical and static. They automatically raise the question of the extent to which short fluctuations within a certain period of time reflect significant historical changes (Voskressenski 2003; see also Rozov 2005, 2009). In order to answer these shortcomings, an attempt was made to answer a challenge of multidisciplinary by adopting a metatheoretical framework and a qualitative middle-range approach in order to explain continuity and change in IR, particularly in its regional tier. Notwithstanding how to attest these attempts, especially in terms of successfully implementing the fusion of a metatheoretical framework with a qualitative middle-range approach (George 1993; George and Bennet 2005), similar attempts were made recently by two influential academics in the realm of International Relations and Global Political Economy (Anderson et al. 2008; O'Brien and Williams 2010) and also proposed within evolving Spatial Analysis (Thierbach et al. 2014).

The fourth position is best represented by an article and book by Andrei Tsygankov (2013) and an article written jointly by Pavel and Andrei Tsygankov (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010). They put forward two premises on which they based their understanding of the possible ways of developing Russian IR as a branch of non-Western IR. These two premises are: (1) IR scholarship was and is always grounded in certain social conditions and thus reflects cultural preferences; and (2) IR always reflects political, ideological or epistemological biases: Western generally, American particularly, or peripheral non-Western—Asian, East European, Latin American, etc. (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010, 6375–6387).

According to these premises, Western as well as Russian IR are nationally specific. Western IR reflects Western theorists' ideological perceptions (though "the West" is not a single nation) and Russian IR is grounded by three Russian main ideological traditions identified as Westernism, Statism and Civilizationism (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010, 6376–6377). Later, Andrei Tsygankov reinterpreted the third tradition as *Tretyemyrstvo*—of those who see Russia as representing the "other"—non-Western and also non-Eastern, that is the Third World—*Tretyi Myr* in Russian—as the West being the core and the developing countries as the periphery not necessarily united within one civilization.

According to these perceptions, the Western approach is marked by the West-centric bias and overreliance on Western theories and West-centric explanations thus negating any possibility for the appearance of non-Western IR theory. Statists, according to Pavel and Andrei Tsygankov, first of all will emphasize the state's ability to govern and preserve the social and political order. They are not inherently pro- or anti-Western, but they are always biased by realists' assumptions of power maximization in international relations. At the same time, they borrowed many Western and particularly American conceptual tools, especially the balance of power or the correlation of forces (Ibid, 6378).

Civilizationalists, in their turn, always position Russian values as different from those in the West. They are also realists, but emphasize the irreconcilable struggle of different cultures and civilizations that must be in concert and the dialogue or the struggle and conflict with each other.

In marking these three inherent Russian intellectual traditions, Pavel and Andrei Tsygankov are not arguing necessarily for the emergence of a non-Western IR theory but are insisting that the local intellectual impulses meet global reception and engagement. They are also arguing that the need to overcome this circumstance in the national tradition will be understood—probably, following the attempt to formulate the specifics of the national

theory of international relations. In Russia, for example, this would be done by better understanding the traditions of the Russian political thought that transformed the world knowledge into the regional version before the revolution of 1917, the year that disrupted the traditional course of Russian history and oriented it to the biased inclination to a radical internationalist agenda. It is clear that all these considerations and discussions about non-Western IR theory, Russian history and the Russian identity have a clear correlation to Russian foreign policy decision making (Koldunova 2015).

2.5 COMPARING RUSSIAN AND CHINESE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF A NON-WESTERN REALITY

The aim of this section is to compare Russian and Chinese conceptualizations of a non-Western reality and to evaluate consequences of these findings for the evolution of the international debate on possible theorizing of Eurasian and East Asian IR.

The title of the interdisciplinary framework for IR analysis and the new distinctive IR sub-field, with its new subject content to analyze phenomenon that is not addressed by Russian (as well as international) IR, was fixed in Russia for the first time in the five-volume methodological and education compendium published by the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO or MGIMO University). It contained a detailed organizational description of the educational process from regional aspects of international relations at the bachelor's and master's level (*Mirovyye Kompleksnoye Regionovedeniye* 2002–2004). The evolutionary description of these programs was also published internationally (Voskressenski 2006). These attempts to conceptualize IR regional specifics in World Regional Studies as a distinct educational discipline, a framework of IR analysis and a branch within IR broadly defined have been underway at MGIMO University for the last fifteen years. MGIMO University was the first university—at least, in the post-Soviet space—to build the master's program with a concentration on the regional tier of international relations and centered around its core discipline of World Regional Studies instead of IR history or World Politics as did some other programs in Russia according to a traditional (and also Western) view. The problem with the Western and non-Western discourse and the structural differentiation of the West and the non-West as global regions with their own visions of global political interaction and hence, influence on domestic political agenda, is also highlighted in the book edited by MGIMO professor Aleksey Bogaturov (2009) who pioneered the substantial structuring of this problem field within contemporary

Russian World Politics. Inter alia, such a methodological understanding puts the Russian school closer to the Chinese in order to prevent it from directly borrowing (in the Gramscian sense of hegemonic knowledge that is borrowed in the absence of adequate theories) from the Americanized and Europeanized concepts based on social engineering applied to a different regional reality (Li Xing and Liu Zun 2011).

Therefore, the objective of comparative, comprehensive global political and regional studies, based on the methodology of comparative political analysis (Hay 2002) and non-biased cross-regional political analysis, is to understand historical events. In order to do this a researcher need to integrate approaches of analysis of socio-economic and cultural-political spaces that fix the distances and differentiations (borrowing terminology from “Western” sociologists Giddens and Luckaç) in formation, functioning and development of global political relations. Such an approach helps to use the maximally necessary number of variables that cause influence on the causal parameters connected to the historical result. At this point, however, it is necessary to understand that the maximally necessary number of variables may be limited by the means of formalized or non-formalized factor analysis as compared to the construction of classical statistical samplings in Political Science, Sociology or Economics (George 1993; George and Bennet 2005). That is, in the given subject field the focus is made on the strategy of cross-disciplinary study in academic disciplines with the correctly described methodological specifics of applying the qualitative and quantitative methods, in which hypotheses are verified by means of explanations operated by historians, while the construction of scientific hypotheses shall be structured on the basis of social science methods (George 1993; George and Bennet 2005). So, seeking to identify the causal value of the correlation between the independent and dependent variables, a researcher in the given sphere would subject the singular case, in which such correlation would appear, to the more meticulous structural verification than a historian would. Doing this helps to identify the presence of the process affecting such a correlation—that is, the causal connection between independent and dependent parameters—and, hence, would construct open theories of the mid-term prospect, so that the given theories would be modified after the appearance of new structural arguments (George 1993; George and Bennet 2005). Such methodological approach transforms the comprehensive regional studies into an integral field of research, which suggests using the methods of cross-regional comparative political and economic analysis in the exploration of regularities inherent in such a process as the formation and functioning of the political and economic system of the world regions with due account of their

historical, demographic, national, religious, ecological, political-legal and natural-resource specifics, as well as their positions and roles in the international division of labor and in the IR system (subsystems).

Such a definition of the discipline's subject field focuses attention on the non-West-centric—the objectivist vision of the global processes—and suggests the presence of three vectors in the evolution of theoretical approaches to the given sphere of IR.

The first vector represents the further improvement, evolution and extension of the currently existing principal body of IR theory based on more than one hundred years of development of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of theorizing in the given sphere. As yet, there is no other national tradition of studying and conceptualizing IR that is comparable to the Anglo-Saxon one in terms of the breadth and in-depth coverage of international problems (Acharya and Buzan 2010). The aforementioned regional version of IR theory was perceived de facto as a global, in other words, international theory. Understanding of the specific and global role of this regional version of IR theory requires learning and mastering all basic theoretical approaches offered in the given research tradition and the given research vector. Otherwise, any talk on the internationally recognized level of the higher education and learning of international knowledge would be futile and would have no prospect. Russian academics announced that the goal of learning world IR theory and the theory of development has been accomplished, borrowing arguments by Marina Lebedeva (2003). Translation of less than a hundred popular books on International Politics and one (but very large) compendium of Western IR articles (Sovremennaya Nauka 2015) was considered enough to come to this strategic conclusion.

The Chinese have another approach to learning through translation (Yaqing Qin 2010, 26–50). The Chinese IR school built a fundamental basis for IR studies by translating all basic theoretical and theoretical-practical works published in Europe and the USA and making them equally available for all lecturers, researchers and students. Following an eighty-year period of ideological myopia, in the past twenty years the Russian academic school has translated about ten to twenty Western books on International Politics with no translation of scholarly books on IR theory at all. Between 1990 and 2000, Russian IR academics produced five to six good textbooks that offer a synopsis of the Russian understanding of Western knowledge of IR theory and global politics, plus one good anthology, which, however, does not claim to have comprehensive or complete coverage of IR theoretical matters (Tsygankov 2002, 2014; Lebedeva 2003; Bogaturov 2009; Konyshev and

Sergunin 2013; Torkunov and Mal'gin 2014; *Sovremennaya Nauka* 2015). All other learning manuals, regardless of their high level of quality, provide knowledge mainly on separate and sometimes even not systematized segments of knowledge and on specific problems in IR or Global Politics based particularly on a Russian vision of it. Another point to be noted, as previously mentioned, is that no translation was ever made of any theoretical work in IR or any specialized international work on the theory and methodology of IR, Regional Studies or World Regional Geography. Meanwhile, the translated literature includes mainly the high-grade but practically oriented and popular bestsellers by celebrities of policy making, international relations and diplomacy (Zbignev Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and others). Such books were not meant to build up systematic knowledge in the IR sphere but interpretations (sometimes revealing) of some important issues all while providing publishers with massive runs and sales unlike the research works written by professional researchers and educators oriented to learning and developing a system of new knowledge. Such an approach makes IR and Politics in Russia (as well as in other countries of Eurasia and in some Asian countries where English language is not well spread as an educational and research tool) strongly dependent on how complete theoretical problems of international relations have been highlighted in Russian research monographs. These are neither accessible nor adequate for education and thus are presented in reinterpretations by the professorial body in many cases trained in other than IR disciplines during 1970s or 1980s. Such a level of learning—at least, in connection with a short period of ideology-free understanding of international reality—is evidently insufficient. With such an approach, the logic of building up theoretical knowledge in the Social Sciences becomes least understandable, while the applied interpretations provided by policy makers and diplomats come to be withdrawn from the context of the general theoretical thought in the given discipline. Hence the misunderstanding and rejections of concepts in a different regional reality and/or appearance of the mirror-like and oppositely oriented concepts destroying any chances of a compromise in both the Western and non-Western IR. In such a situation the horizon of thinking through the problems is changing since the logic of arguments is not understood in all complexity. Thus there is maybe no chance to build profound theoretical constructions in the sphere of IR that might claim to serve a national contribution to international Social Sciences.

As noted previously, in the Chinese IR school generalization of its own national vision of theoretical problems related to international relations and global policy was started by the full translation of all major Western

works (particularly research monographs) on IR theory (Wang Yidan and Yuan Zhengqing 2005; Yaqing Qin 2010, 30–31). No anthology of national works or any compendium of translated articles—even the fullest one—can compensate for the lack of depth in learning international knowledge in conditions where world theoretical IR works are not widely available and thus cannot be studied as primary sources starting, at least, from master’s-level programs at leading national universities. The translations created a basis for a national vocabulary of IR and IR theory terminology that did not exist in Chinese and some other national languages. This helped to form the IR discourse in the Chinese society of researchers.

The second vector outlines a theoretical possibility for the *appearance of non-Western concepts/theories* of IR developed, among others, by or with direct participation of researchers from Eastern/non-Western countries (the idea of A. Acharya and B. Buzan) based on a non-Western reality. Quite evidently, any intellectually original concepts, including non-Western, cannot appear without a profound understanding of the currently existing international IR theory. Along this vector, so far we do not have any significant theoretical attainments that would be recognized by the international (or even national) community as independent and competitive intellectual breakthroughs comparable to Western ones. However, in ancient times, approaches to entirely autochthonous theorizing in comprehending the mutual relations with the outside world were outlined in the Indian and Chinese traditions. Specifics of the national political thought and its influence on international relations were addressed in some other very strong national traditions too, including in Russia (Gubin and Srelkov 2013; Tsygankov 2013). In China, this generated interesting attempts for synthesis in the future, when the internationally recognized level of knowledge is explored and mastered (Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin 2008).

The third vector is focused on the *extension of non-Western (non-West-centric) objectified (unbiased) approaches* within the theoretical constructions of the interim (regional) level that are positioned between the universal and exceptionally national approaches. Theorizing at this level is at the very initial stage and even in the most advanced schools of international studies it is just starting to take shape conceptually. This is due to the fact that such methodological constructions must be verified continuously by the rather rapidly changing regional reality, and to realize this requirement is objectively quite difficult in isolation from the given regional reality. The international regional reality allows a rather high degree of constructivism, which in turn is limited by universal/global regularities as well as by sovereignty of policy conducted by the states forming the

given regional reality. With this, the international-regional reality is less vulnerable to forceful transformations of a subjectivist nature that might be conducted within a national state by some segments of its political elite in the circumstances of limited sociopolitical access, and therefore such a reality presents the imperatives of global regularities more saliently. At the same time the subjectivist transformation (subjective social constructivism) of global regions is limited by virtue of their larger geographic territory, diversified internal and external interests and huge financial spending for such a transformation. That is, unless the latter consumes national and transnational material and intangible resources, spontaneously and willingly released and activated through market instruments. In the next ten years, the real practice of international relations and global political interaction may demonstrate the relevance of the development strategies selected.

In Russia, this third vector of practice-oriented theorizing in the regional field of International Relations and World Politics as well as World Regional Studies is based on the synthesis of the most significant, intellectually distinct and methodologically innovative conceptual and theoretical subjects such as the following:

- intellectual achievements of the school of systemic/structural and comparative political analysis of IR that laid the foundation for the new academic school of comparative world politics and the study of global political interaction (Anatoly Torkunov, Aleksei Bogaturov, Mark Khrustalev, Pavel Tsygankov, Marina Lebedeva, Tatiana Shakleina, etc.);
- analysis of methodology and category instruments of comparative political science and practically oriented analysis of global policy (Andrei Melville, Mikhail Il'yn, Oksana Gaman-Golutvina, etc.);
- comprehensive Regional Studies and comparative Asian Studies (Aleksei Bogaturov, Vyacheslav Belokrenytsky, Sergei Lounev, etc.).

The Chinese school of World Regional Studies, while having introduced the notion of Regional Studies (*Qiyúxue*) into the item-list of international research, develops it so far in the classical mainstream of studies pertaining to historical or economic problems of Asian countries (Wang Yidan and Yuan Zhengqing 2005; Shi Yinhong 2006; Wang Jisi 2007). The notion of “international architectonics” (*shìjiè gējū*), introduced by Chinese scholars, is understood by them as the world structure, within which the major states or groups of countries pooled in coalitions or in integrated global/world/macro-regions, proceeding from the interests of strategic security

and economic benefit, forming the relatively stable correlation of forces in the world and maintaining mutual relations (Li Yutan 2001), thus borrowing the concept of the correlation of forces developed in the 1980s–1990s (Shihan 1996). In the Chinese school, the global order is construed as a reflection of the correlation of forces in the world architectonics—that is, in the historically established current world structure where states of different classes (superpowers, power centers, leading states, as well as major and medium-size states) compete and cooperate with one another. This reflection of the force correlation can be expressed in various specific models, such as globalization, confrontation-free competition and cooperation, interdependence without subordination, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, multi-polarity in the conditions of uni-power leadership, balance and coordinated action, competition and chaos, co-development, harmonious world, etc., depending on the view of specific policy makers or researchers Ye Zicheng et al. (2003) and others).

The Chinese school addresses both the traditional agenda of geopolitical interconnections (Wei Lihua 2008) and the entirely new group of global political problems. Recently, the Chinese as well as the European (including Russian) and American schools have developed the theory and practice of “soft power,” rendered by domestic political processes on international relations and in the global political sphere at large (Li Xing and Liu Zun 2011). Later on, the Chinese research community put forward another two distinct concepts: that of an “evolution of political relationships” (Qing Yaqing 2015, 4–10) and “moral realism” as a Chinese modification of Western realism theory (Yan Xuetong 2014). It is clear that other attempts will follow. In the Chinese school of thought, the sphere of International Regional Studies/World Regional Studies (*Qiyiyixue*) is viewed as innovative and methodological, but less distinct than in Russia.

The last twenty years has seen the most dynamic development of the Chinese school. Having translated the whole mass of basic academic literature on the theory of IR published in the USA and Europe, Chinese publishers now translate and publish all works of the world IR literature with only a three-month lag after their first edition in the USA or Europe. Chinese publishers even made contracts with the most esteemed European and American authors on writing of such literature without its first edition in US or European countries. The written texts are immediately translated and published in China, becoming a part of Chinese IR discourse (Qing Yaqin 2010, 26–50). In this way, Chinese universities and research institutes mastered the basic international level “through translation” and now have started working

on theoretical and practical problems that are of primary importance first and foremost for their country and in surrounding regions. This approach makes the core of the “scientific development” concept fixed in the materials of the Communist Party of China (CCP) 17th and 18th congresses. The set tasks generated the appearance of comprehensive forecasts for world development in government think tanks (for instance, forecasts by the Chinese institutes of contemporary international relations, government institutes of international relations, different centers for development, etc.) and public institutions (universities and institutes of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), as well as authorial forecasts by outstanding Chinese researchers and analysts in their personal capacities. This tradition is diminishing in Russia.

At the present time, the Chinese school is faced with another goal—to find the indigenous Chinese perceptions of the world and interstate relations that existed prior to the period of the centralized Qin Empire. In other words, before the prevalence of the *legist* (*fajia*) theory on the “full absorption” of the society by the state, on society subordination to the state and on the principles of mutual relations with other countries in the mature period of Imperial China’s development (prior to the period of the Manchu invasion in 1644 and infiltration of Western countries in China). This is important because it is different from the Sino-centric concepts of the centralized state period and the Manchu-Chinese concepts of the Qing Dynasty period that brought China to collapse under the pressure of foreign influence emanating from Western states and Czarist Russia (Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin 2008). This task is similar to finding the world perception of the Russian *Myr* system that ceased in 1917. Though attempts to structure Russian approaches through the hundred-year-old ideological debate of Westernizers, Statists and Civilizationists still persists.

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There is a recent wave of international academic literature that rightly address the challenges that we are facing, including a literature that tries to look at these challenges in a methodologically coherent way (see, for example, Done 2012). However, the contemporary body of IR literature is still quite incoherent and explains these changes through different perspectives—predominantly realist (Yoshihara and Sylva 2012 among others) with a focus on power transformation (Nye 2011); predominantly economic but with different explanations (Temin and David Vines 2013; O’Brien and Williams 2010); accentuating Asia’s (Roach 2009) or China’s (Hu Angang 2011 among many others) rise; the BRICS rise as a new economic

phenomenon or the need for development restructuring (Haque 1999); and economic rebalancing (Pettis 2013). The Russian contribution to this literature, which is viewed still rather skeptically in the West, (see Przeworski 2015) is inclined to stress the structural differences between the East and West as a factor that must be taken into consideration (Voskressenski 2015a, b). Another wave of Russian literature, seeing Russian as well as non-Western specifics, is generally following Appadurai's arguments (1996) of different "scapes" (mediascapes, historical landscapes, etc.) that evolved through different historical and social experiences in the societies with social structures which are seen as an independent variable. Chinese literature, compared to Russian literature, to a lesser extent stresses the structural differences of societies. It accentuates different historical experiences and also proposes its own explanations of today's IR structures based more on the concepts within Marxism "with Chinese characteristics" (for example, the world architectonics) or on a modification of Western ideas (Moral Realism). At the same time, Chinese IR literature shows arguably a much more detailed and deeper knowledge of Western IR theories than Russian literature. However, in order to address the newly evolving global reality we should at first have a suitable methodological framework that can encompass these new international and national developments. Not necessarily a particular or specific non-Western or Western IR, though the debate on the origins and the explanations of the East/West and North/South is ongoing in the academic community, particularly in the non-Western segment of the world. Another wave of international literature transformed the East/West, North/South debate into a broader agenda that explained "why geography matters" and how "the power of place" is important to understand in international relations and globalized political studies of the world (Blij 2007, 2009). This was following changes that are also reflected in a non-Western hemisphere though still with a lesser theoretical fore. The debate is reflected in evolving Russian and Chinese literature on a possibility/impossibility of a non-Western theory as a tool to explain non-western phenomena.

However, most important is that the structural transformation of the international system and the global strategic balance is happening and the literature, regardless of how inconsistent or incoherent it may be, reflects what is going on in real life: in an international arena or in the relationships between major powers. Though "systemic studies of non-Western perspectives of the other and self-other relations are urgently needed" as noted by Wang Mingming (2014, 1), "to contrast East and West is not to separate one from the other" (Ibid 1). This implies first and foremost a suitable

tool for space/time analyses of possible East and West divergence and convergence. But this tool must be internationally approved as suitable to attest this new phenomenon and thus not necessarily of Western or non-Western character.

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From the Hegemonic Unipolar to the Multipolar World: Structural Transformation of the International System and Global Strategic Balance, Plus Its Consequences for the Future

3.1 RATIONAL OF THE WORLD SYSTEM EVOLUTION

While the general intellectual conceptualization of the world and its historical evolution have been available for a long time, the integrated world policy and integrated world system (as such terms are understood today) did not exist until the nineteenth century. Rather, there was coexistence of several disintegrated but partially crisscrossing regional-civilizational world systems (proto-European, Islamic, Chinese) (O'Brien and Williams 2010, 53–81). Among those, the European system, after the Westphalia Treaty, was the most universal and open by virtue of its universality and openness for other states. It also happened to become the most attractive for all actors on the international scene. The European system was attractive because it rested upon a rapidly developing economic model that served as the basis for the modern way of life. The concept of the modern, integrated and universally open world society of equal states started taking shape in the European tradition by the beginning of the nineteenth century (Watson 1992). Later on, by the mid-twentieth century, it was supplemented by the idea of these states converging and evolving at different rates toward a system of fair and full participation of the people in governance of a welfare state (democratic state of open socio-political

access and a social support system) as well as to a modernization based on purposefully developed mass science-tech innovations; that is, commercialized scientific discoveries changing the global technological tenor (Watson 1992, 214–251). These concepts formed the social image of contemporary humanity. In that period of history, the European system was the only one that was open for the admission of all willing states that accepted the given system of coordinates and were prepared to comply with certain rules that were defined as international law, which happened to be the only tool of world convergence at the time. That was sufficient for the system to attract a gradual influx of new participants—peripheral and *de jure* independent states that were equal within the system, such as Asian and African countries, which earlier had existed within other, non-European hierarchical systems (Islamic, Chinese) and which revealed their inferior competitiveness, or which earlier had been included in the European system initially on the basis of subordination in their colonial or semi-colonial capacity. The fact to be emphasized here is that all previous non-European international proto-systems *de jure* never recognized the equal rights of other states. They were led by the basic principles of hierarchy and forceful subordination, while the degree of dependence within any such system varied depending on the historical situation and geopolitical considerations, civilizational and confessional guidelines, as well as specific circumstances (see Voskressenski 2003 and also Watson 1992, 120–135).

So the economic and political divergence of East and West (Pomeranz 2000; Parthasarathi 2011) was substantiated by an evolving convergence of its most dynamic segment. First, it was based on the Westphalia principles and later on substantiated by an intensive search for more universalist, or more competitive, principles of economic and political development (Nayyar 2013, 69–73; Mahbubani 2013).

After World War II, Asia, while modernizing at the stage of decolonization, had to choose between the two versions of the globally proliferated European model of modernization and development—one based on the idea of linear economic development that will lead to a democratic governance and the other an authoritarian planning model based on the ideology of cyclical rotation of forceful mobilization (Arnason et al. 2005). Stabilization after forceful mobilization, well known by Asians before that, would enable them to catch up economically with the economic leaders. A democratic market model was based on opposite principles: economic decentralization, market self-organization, modernization and economic

and political competition, invented by axial civilizations and eventually as well on the system of open socio-political access as a political answer to an economically decentralized system (Smith 1996). It was in confrontation of these trends, following to some degree a convergence between them in authoritarian models of decentralized economy or democratic models with planned economic characteristics, that the contemporary authoritarian and anti-authoritarian models as well as anti-authoritarian post-industrial development model were formed. Meanwhile, the East entered the phase of political modernization equipping society with a tool for an economic catch-up (Nayyar 2013) lasting until today. However, as pointed out by Deepak Nayyar (2013, 124–125),

[T]his industrialization was most uneven between regions. Asia led the process in terms of structural change, share in industrial production, rising manufactured exports and changing patterns of trade, while Latin America witnessed relatively little change and Africa made almost no progress. The role of the State in evolving trade and industrial policies, developing institutions and making strategic interventions, whether as a catalyst or a leader, was central to this process.

At this stage, some non-Western countries, such as India, Japan, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, managed to build an open socio-political access system enabling them to evade systemic crises and catch up with Western countries (though different countries in different spheres). They also were able to sustain their cultural and national specifics, while some others could not withdraw from recurring cycles of mobilization, stabilization, stagnation (political freezing and political thaw) and systemic crisis.

The cyclical model was actually exhausted by the end of the twentieth century. Hence, other non-Western countries that adopted the Western market development and competition model, tinted, however, by their national specifics (particularly cultural), elaborated their own modernization versions and by some economic and social parameters started to catch up with the leaders of the world system (“catch-up” development model). Some non-Western countries, having constructed the regional versions of the open-access system, even sought to dethrone the Western post-industrial development model through changes by having injected their cultural parameters and their specifics (Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan). Some countries formed a model of authoritarian regulation of a partially decentralized economy with partially limited (for different reasons

and in different ways) socio-political access (Taiwan, Republic of Korea, Singapore). Such a model proved successful at a certain stage of history, but then some countries (Taiwan, Republic of Korea) managed to depart from it and proceed to building consolidated democratic societies with open socio-political access. A bit later, the same model, also realized at the initial stage and in limited segments of economic and social life, gave rise to Communist China under Deng Xiaoping and a limited number of authoritarian countries (Vietnam, Cuba under Fidel and Raul Castro). In these cases, however, the model's successful existence was as well placed in doubt because of the inevitable question: what would be the next stage of development in these societies?

Other countries, which failed to form at least some national model of modernization and/or form coalitions that would help to strengthen an external or regional factor of modernization, lagged in their development. This triggered an impulse to formulate new rules for the functioning of the world system that would have to take effect before the transition to a new economic and technological structure. Countries at the post-transition stage would receive a chance to reformulate the world system rules in compliance with their own interests rather than with the interests of all, to say nothing of those lagging behind. Some players and their political elites that could not be proud with their successful development felt like breaking the existing system or archaizing its organizational principles by illegitimate use of force. This intention was especially strong for those states that did not fit into the new model or even into the existing politico-economic structure (countries resulting from a "failing state" development model).

When the older tech-economic structure was fading and the new one was in formation, the prototypes of new models for configuration of the global politico-economic space started to appear, and the world somehow "hovered" between an evolutionary period of transition and a new politico-economic order and new science-tech structure.

3.2 EVOLVING NEW STAGE OF THE WORLD EVOLUTION AND THE NON-WESTERN DYNAMICS

After the political and socio-economic transformation in the early twentieth to early twenty-first century, the contemporary world entered the new stage of its evolution. Unlike the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, other countries, rather than solely Western countries, started to set

the parameters of such an evolution and the scientific frameworks for its understanding (Zheng Mingxin 2011). Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, the “gap” between global-level policy and foreign policies pursued by national states started to be filled by the rapidly expanding spaces of regional and macro-regional/cross-regional interaction, which gradually changed the established parameters of global interaction—for Western countries first, and then for Eastern ones. Quite naturally, these new phenomena are reflected quite well both at the level of theoretical conceptualization and in the practice of global policy and international political interaction in the existing IR literature (Elman and Elman 2003). At present, nobody doubts the fact that any explanation of contemporary international political and economic processes should not be deemed as complete unless the analysis extends to non-Western regions of the world, being the home territories for the majority of the international system members; that is, non-Western nation-states being members of the international society (Anderson et al. 2008, 53–75). Such a view does not necessarily mean that in other macro-regions of the world the population lives better or worse—rather, such a view states the fact that the external and internal organization of life in other macro-regions and their parts (nation-states) may be done in a different way. As the economic role of these macro-regions grows, their political role also strengthens. This is an important subject in the analysis of complex global political processes as a whole. At the same time, the nature of the processes taking place in non-Western macro-regional segments of the world is less known and actually not presented integrally in the global space of Social Science (Vüllers 2014). A deep inclusion of an objective knowledge pertaining to non-Western segments of the world into educational curricula was for too long considered a subject of secondary importance for the West. However, today no explanation of the phenomena pertaining to global policy, international relations or international political economy can be seen as a relevant reflection of global realities unless it includes analysis of the aforementioned agenda (O’Brien and Williams 2010, 424–449).

The reason is that for a rather long time, the theoretical conceptualization of Asian and African regional specifics in terms of comparative political perspective tangibly lagged behind the examination of similar processes in the Western world. The role of the East in global policy was neglected or actually ignored. It was considered of secondary importance, especially in terms of its influence on global politics—made by great colonial and then great nuclear powers. At that time, there was only one nuclear power in

the East, The People's Republic of China (PRC). It was a demographically giant state that had very little economic influence on the global system. As a result, theoretical approaches based on Western economic realities and the logic of bipolar confrontation between the great nuclear powers, and then on the lopsided logic of "Cold War winners" were seen often as automatically applicable to all the other parts of the globe with very insignificant, if any, modification. The "Cold War winners," whether intentionally or otherwise (this is still to be determined by history) neglected the fact of voluntary conscious dismantlement of the uncompetitive political system of the USSR. This, for some historically very short term, provided the West with substantial political, economic and financial advantages used by the "winners" in quite a mercantile way to strengthen their national communities—by all evidence, first and foremost for evading the appearance of any potential threats in the future. In the end, such a policy started to grow constructive as well as deconstructive, and even aggressive nationalism in non-Western segments of the world—impulses to "return to history," or socially reconstruct history as a tool to mobilize national communities or rebuff the outside world through national archaization. There were also considerable distortions in the Western understanding of political developments in non-Western world regions. Some were considered "backward" and doomed to willingly follow their leaders forever. Such an interpretation brought a respective psychological and material counteraction through military modernization programs. The misunderstanding produced not just the West-centrism / Europe-centrism / East-centrism/Sinocentrism, "Western snobbism" or "anti-West radicalism" (the terminology is borrowed from the existing non-Western literature on the subject cited in Voskressenski 2014a, b, 2015a, b among others), but has shown major miscalculations and problems at the level of practical international interaction. For example, the latent and unflagging confrontation between Russia and NATO related to NATO's eastward expansion and development of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems; the 9/11 terrorist attacks; complexities in Iraq and Afghanistan; problems of trade, financial and economic imbalances connected with the growth of China and Asia; different assessments made within the global community with regard to consequences in the Libyan and Syrian events; and conflict over the destiny of Ukraine, etc. This issue has also shown itself at the level of domestic policy within the Western countries (reaction to the 9/11 events; war with Al-Qaeda; unrest in Paris and London; "Islamization"

and “Asianization” of Europe; appearance of “parties of the genuine Europeans”; the Breivik case; and the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre, etc.).

The importance of the historical experience accumulated by the USSR/Russia in the late 1800s to the early 2000s is laid out in the fact that Russia—with its multinational population, opening new and sometimes hardly feasible historical horizons of life for the entire global community (the idea of communism as a version of a converging global future and some kind of globalization version for the first half of the twentieth century)—could have a substantial influence on the course of world history. Acting alone, Russia was unable to change it completely (whether intellectually, economically, politically or demographically). As for the considerable influence rendered by Russia on the course of global history, it was based on the concept of a “besieged fortress,” “inevitability of world revolution” and “civilizational/inter-confessional nationalism” in their different historical forms, while correcting (by its own positive or negative example) the course and vector of the international society development. This policy at the same time caused foreign-policy confrontation with the economically, technologically and politically most advanced world regions and their central nation-states and resulted for Russia in overstrain, neglect of its population’s quality of life, irreplaceable demographic losses and, ultimately, in nothing else but weakening of Russia itself.

The appearance of the previously outlined agenda in the study of global Social Sciences helps raise the question of the role and prospects of international World Regional Studies as an evolving new sub-field of IR based on the methods of politico-economic analysis of regional subsystems and global regions in connection with spatial and time-bound factors of the world development and, respectively, on the conceptualization of such processes within a new cross-disciplinary study.

3.3 CORE HYPOTHESES ON THE LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MODERNIZATION

The worldwide discourse on the link between economic and political modernization as well as on the influence of these processes on global development and global policy proceeds around two core hypotheses.

The first one is that economic growth from a certain point in time would as well support the appearance of sustainable democratic forms of a modernized political system (Lipset 1994). Economic growth, based on

the ever wider field of economic interaction and interconnection, would be strengthened by unity of modernizing political systems (O’Neil 2010; O’Neil et al. 2010; Hague and Harrop 2010; Clark et al. 2009). The concept of national sovereignty would be transformed into an idea that control must be effectuated over the most significant parameters rather than all economic, political and social practices. Nation-states would become more open and the world, too, would be more open while its progressive development would be based on the growing openness. This hypothesis is confirmed by qualitative statistical calculations made in a series of studies by economists and political scientists such as Przeworski, Alvarez, Chebub, Acemoğlu, Robinson, et al., as well as by empirical examples. This view corresponds to the slogan “economy precedes policy,” as voiced in different theoretical and practical versions by political scientists (Lipset, Przeworski, et al.) and political leaders (Deng Xiaoping, Bill Clinton, Vladimir Putin).

By the second hypothesis, prompted by the reality and spontaneously voiced first by political leaders (Vaclav Havel, Lech Walensa) and then, at different points of time, political figures, economists and political scientists (Boris Yeltsin, Yegor Gaidar), there exists the reverse causative connection. For some transforming communities, “politics may precede economy,” as first it is necessary to modernize political institutes purposefully and at accelerated pace, notwithstanding the concomitant forced transformation of national sovereignty, and then as a result, economy would grow invariably at the higher rates. According to this assumption, “democracy may start in economically weak societies” (Melville 1999, 35), but the ever stronger political unity, based on a shared understanding of the nature and direction of the global political processes, should lead to economic prosperity as well. Stronger political unity should reduce national competition and thus, ultimately, would harmonize the national sovereignties being transformed. This hypothesis, based on theoretical assumptions, is also confirmed in part empirically by the experience of some “smaller countries” of Africa and East Europe. At the same time, it is discussed and disputed intensively, for instance, in “big countries,” such as Russia and China, thus evidencing indirectly the role of the regional specifics in “big countries” (especially in connection with the problems of sovereignty transformation) (Ziegler 2012, 3–14). Thus far, this factor has not had a relevant context in this discussion and has been discarded as least significant.

Therefore, the central place is being taken by the agenda related to the perfect (the most competitive) model of economic and political organization, the ways to bring the existing models closer to the perfect one and the degree of admissible regional/national variability of key parameters. It is also clear that these theoretical discussions are connected directly with the practice of in-country transformations (“fostering” vs. “stabilization”) and that they influence international relations, global policy and practical diplomacy. At the same time, however, the previously outlined agenda is not a special subject of research either in International Relations nor in World/Global Policy Studies because the study of contemporary IR is based on the unidimensional display of international relations among the major actors (still first and foremost, national states), while World Politics as an IR sub-field is interested in structure-forming factors—that is, for these disciplines, factors of economic and domestic political development of countries are less important as the interactions between national states or as well as the emergence of new actors that form or influence global interaction. Therefore, the course and results of the most important discussion on the correlation of the general and specifics as well as external and internal factors are reflected mainly indirectly and in the form of normative or/and subjective statements. At the same time, no special study has been conducted on such a general subject as the theory of domestic political influence on foreign policy. This circumstance makes it more difficult to draw foreign-policy recommendations of a practical nature especially in the non-Western world where foreign and domestic relationships are intertwined differently than in the West.

The Russian school of Social Sciences (Comparative Political Science, Comparative World Politics) is one of the first national schools that not just saw but started to study purposefully the new trend of Eastern countries role in global processes, though with certain clear political and ideological reasons (Tolz 2011; Bassin 1991, 1–17, 2003, 257–267; Etkind 2011; et al.), despite never having been translated in foreign languages. In explanation of this phenomenon, the Russian school combined the world theories of IR and the autochthonous tradition of Social Science studies. Based initially on the Newton-Descartes scientific vision of the world, this tradition, however, is not hobbled by regional or country-related biases by virtue of the special historical place of Russia, which is located geographically, historically, demographically, economically and politically between the East and West. In this process, a special role was played by the national world-class tradition of “Oriental Studies” (*vostokovedenye*), which long

ago focused on the role of structural factors that explained the differences in the inner organization of the West and East (Przeworski 2015)—the two major and structurally different macro-regions of the world comprised of different numbers of structurally homogenous and structurally heterogeneous national states with different social orders. The conceptualization of these phenomena was underway in the course of the discussion on Oriental feudalism and the Asian mode of production first run in Russia within the Marxist frameworks. But by the end of the twentieth century, the idea had extended beyond the frames of just one discipline of Social Sciences. Indeed, these ideas once paved the way for Edward Said's concept of Orientalism as well as later Western literature on the "great economic divergence" (Pomeranz 2000; Parthasarathi 2011). On the whole, however, structural research in the international sphere of Regional Studies, Comparative Oriental Studies (in Russia) and Comparative World Politics—all of which received additional attention in Russia after the disintegration of the USSR—for a rather long time were regarded as local exotics that could be neglected in global analyses as it was believed that the destiny of the world was decided by the structural politics in the West. It was thought that Western theories most relevantly explained global policy, international relations and politico-economic realities. Such view of the world was either fully supported or fully contended, and the contestation was regarded first and foremost as a sign of retrogression. As a result, first it was proposed to blindly copy the Western model. Later, when the proposal was confronted with economic and domestic political difficulties it was proposed lately in the same way to copy the Eastern development model (initial explanations of Russia's political "pivot to the East" after the establishment of the sanctions policy by the EU and the USA) with no regard for the implications that either model would cause if/when applied to different regional or national realities and specifics. Such specifics were either negated entirely or held to be very important, and depending on that dynamic the respective analysis was interpreted inside Russia as either progressive or traditionalist helping the deepening of divergences between Russia and the West.

However, in the early twenty-first century the global situation changed drastically: the globalizing world seemed to start shrinking, while the problems moving to the fore were those of the closer interdependence between nature and human beings as biological species, between people, national communities, nations and countries undergoing the process of

sustainable progressive development, because without resolution of such problems the very existence of humanity could be in danger.

In this connection, Western intellectuals and politicians started first to note and then to explain the new trend for the growth of Eastern countries in global policy. They tried to offer a new holistic explanation of the specifics taking place in different regions of the world (O'Brien and Williams 2010; Spero and Hart 2010; Roach 2009 among many others). Thus the global discourse started within the interconnected parts of the Western political and intellectual community, open for discussion of new trends, and the most open and advanced segment of their Eastern counterparts: Edward Said, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, André Gunder Frank, William McNill, David Landes, Yegor Gaidar, Rajiv Kapur, Mohammad Mahathir, Kishori Mahbubani, Mohammad Hatami, William Easterly, Nial Fergusson, Richard Nisbett, Paul Krugman, and others. This discourse was focused on the role of regional factors in the economic and political development of the world, although the term of regional factors as such, at the least at the initial stage of the discussion, was not applied. Later on, the realities of the new century (the 9/11 terrorist act and the global financial and economic crisis) demanded a revision of some of the paradigm-type theses of applied Social Sciences other than West-centric, objectivist explanations of global political and economic processes (Pomeranz 2000, among others). These were yet represented in International Relations in the form of holistic and logically contradiction-free explanations or undeveloped as research programs in a Lakatosian way. According to this new trend, explained in the study by North, Wallis and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (2009), there are three types of social (more precisely, socio-political) order: primitive, natural (in other terminology—limited) and open. The primitive social order as a whole is not competitive today and the sphere of its influence is shrinking and migrating to the ever narrower, more depressive and lagging regional segments (rather, fragments) of the world. The natural (limited) social order is also undergoing certain time-bound phases such as fragile natural state, basic natural state and mature natural state. In the system of arguments by North, Wallis and Weingast, singling out any other special structural and time-bound stages is not required. However, structural subtypes of the natural social order exist as well, evidently, at the stage of the mature natural state—such as archaized and traditionalist, enclave-type, enclave-conglomerate, hybrid and transitional. These subtypes correspond to

different time-bound stages of national communities' evolutionary development. They have a sufficient amount of distinctiveness, thus a distinctive effect on the modes and forms of configuring the internal and external spheres of the life of society. There are also different subtypes of states with an open social access system (open social order). It would not be unreasonable to discuss the European and American models. However, for various practical reasons (the need to consolidate countries with open social access), this question has not been considered in political theory in detail—simply because the transition to a new, more advanced social model has been more important than the fixation upon differences within such a model. I argue in this connection that a simplistic understanding of social order types may lead to miscalculations in explaining transition process from one type of social order to another.

Today, about half of all existing states are those with a natural social order, practicing limited social and political access. Twenty-five states have created, actively supported and developed the socio-political order of open access. The number of states with an open-access system has been growing gradually and now approaches 100. The most significant multiplication of states with this type of social-access order was recorded in the period following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. States with natural and open social orders actively compete with one another on the international scene, while the form and modes of such competitions are decided by around forty to sixty states: Twenty-five to thirty states with an open social order and twenty to thirty states with the natural social order of protective nature. As mankind and the technologies for annihilation or prolongation of life undergo evolutionary development, the forms of such competition are shifting from military (leading to incalculable human and catastrophic economic losses) to non-military ones requiring ever larger amounts of intellectual resources to develop strategies for consensus-based, evolutionary and emulative development. To some extent, the other states either use the open-access order by importing the respective institutes, or fail to build it because of domestic issues. While more states have a natural order (socio-political order of natural access), open order (socio-political order of the open access) has created a higher living standard, protected it with the most powerful military-political bloc based on a highly integrated economy, more efficiently reacts to unforeseen political and economic circumstances and is expanding rapidly.

3.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL ACCESS CONCEPT

An open socio-political order is generally more competitive and more legitimate because it is based on democratic governance, implying direct participation of the people in the governance through the system of open and transparent elections. It also has a regular rotation of political and economic executive officials, which is strictly specified in governing rules and procedures (Przeworski 2015). Such a system makes it possible to attract those who are considered by the majority in society as professionally the most competent for a term, during which their competencies can be used most rationally but without applying a system of violence, coercion or direct/indirect economic tampering. This social and political order more efficiently neutralizes negative external and internal impulses, sees a lesser depth of downfalls and regression in times of economic crises, creates a political safety lock against systemic crises, and therefore is developing more stably, intensively and rapidly—though not without difficulties. More favorable living conditions have been created for the population, at least in the last 200-plus years, through the mass introduction of intellectual innovations (both social and technological) being brought, *inter alia*, through emigration of qualified specialists that cannot find a proper niche of creative work and the full realization of their talents in their home countries (Fergusson 2011).

Today, as far as providing for economic and political human rights is concerned, states with an open social access system formally or informally have come to be considered a kind of ideal model, although these states, too, may have quite a few of their own specific problems in the economic, political and social spheres. On the whole, this current way of life was created by countries, which, after all, devised the system of open social access first for themselves and then offered it as a social innovation for others.

Gravitating to the states with open socio-political access (the core of which is rather compactly located in Europe and North America), there is a diversified group of transitional states moving to building the system of open social access, but that are at different historical stages of this process. In qualitative terms, a group of states with open socio-political access and states that are non-consolidated or transitional account for about a half of the world community member states. The given group includes the most active members of the global community that form the scattered but historically stronger system of multilateral institutes for global governance.

The number of states with the system of limited socio-political access is diminishing gradually. This is mainly because no real and persuasive alternative to the social order of open access has been offered so far, and disagreement with such order is addressed to some parameters of the system, which, for historical, cultural or economic considerations are unacceptable for limited segments of the political elite in a number of states. I do not believe that “Sistema” (Ledeneva 2013) in modern times may be modernized based on such archaic principles as a new “*orda*” (a social organization similar to Golden Horde), an “*oprichina*” (a political/social organization like an inner circle of young supporters of a Russian tsar, recruited from poor uneducated families like at the time of Ivan the Terrible) (Sorokin 2007) etc. However, someone in Russia still believes that it is possible.

By one assumption, the world political convergence (i.e., transition from the natural to open social order in national communities) would take place automatically and spontaneously, on par with economic development and growth of economic wealth. It looks like a historical regularity like the case in the more distant past, when it had been understood and substantiated that all countries would proceed inevitably from capitalism to socialism and then to communism throughout the world. Encountering the non-willingness of some to join a prescribed democratic future, as in the recent past others did not want to join communism prescribed by the Soviet ideologists, some American and European researchers and politicians started to believe that building a system of open social access is a sort of spontaneous anomaly of social evolution in Western countries only, and that it cannot be realized by all for the reason of their intellectual and socio-political unpreparedness for such an undertaking. Later, it was explained that the actual transition of some states to the open-access system had its intrinsic strict logic—that is, the imperative of economic growth based on the formation of a market space wider than the national state territory. This was required to transform national sovereignty to control only the key parameters. Otherwise it would be impossible to receive active foreign investment, financial and trade flows and to access foreign/international markets (O’Brien and Williams 2010; Spero and Hart 2010; et al.). Understanding this imperative required transforming and developing theories of national and international security. So, the world convergence that is going on following globalization cannot proceed further without social engineering and further conceptual transformations. The need to sustain a high level of technological development and the use of external migration flows as a means for resolution of demographic

problems and the influx of brains demands open international access to highly competitive national systems of education and to have transparent mechanisms for funding this process. As a result of years of migration, the appearance of major foreign ethnic components and the need to incorporate the diasporas into ethnically different societies on equal-rights terms contributed to the conceptualization of the given process (theories of the “melting pot,” “multiculturalism,” etc.) and the adoption of the open social access system. So the political evolution to the system of open social access was not an anomaly but rather a response to the resolution of the system crisis as a result of the change in demographic parameters and ethnic component of the complex social system, which for some reasons limits social access on the basis of racial, ethnic, religious /confessional, social or some other criteria. In simpler terms, the system of open social access (democratic governance) offers the possibility for all citizens to participate in governance with transparent terms, understandable for the entire society and approved thereby in consensus. At the same time, however, it does not mean that all and everyone would have easy access to governance because this system, too, has its security instruments. However, the latter do not a priori include any ethnic, confessional or social criteria. Apart from building a self-regulating social system of open access, there are other mechanisms to ensure security of the system. However, with any such mechanism the criteria of socio-political access are transparent and rational, as well as approved and supported by the entire society—in particular, by means of open discussion and contest of political programs. The open-access system is not at all anarchic (as its name might suggest). Rather, based on strict but open and transparent criteria recognized by the society in consensus, people are given access to the state governance who are seen by their societies as the most talented and best trained. This is disregarding their racial, ethnic or confessional affiliation or political beliefs unless the latter are extremist and risk undermining the existing constitutional system. Also, it makes it possible to exercise governance within a term, acceptable in the sense of biologically reasonable conditions for non-coercive concentration of efforts being taken by a specific individual in the respective sphere of his/her intensive governing activities (five to ten years depending on the sphere of activity).

The studies in economic statistics, and, in particular, those by Przeworski, Acemoğlu, Robinson, as well as a finance company, Renaissance Capital, assessing the modifications in political systems and the per capita GDP level for 1950–2009 in 150 countries, evidence that with the annual per

capita gross income less than \$5000 USD, building a sustainable democracy is least if ever probable because with such income the logic of survival will continue to prevail (detailed data in: O'Neil 2010; O'Neil et al. 2010; Hague and Harrop 2010; Clark et al. 2009). The chance to build democracy appears with the annual gross income of \$6000 USD per capita. Democracies with higher-level per capita GDP (more than \$10,000 USD) form a sustainable type of social order (sustainable open-access social order), thus enabling such societies to proceed along a path of sustainable and relatively stable development. If the per capita income exceeds \$19,000 USD, while there is no consensus on the need of transition to the open social access order, then the probability of building the social order of open access in a state with the natural social order would be least probable. This is because all such states form such income usually through a high natural-resource rent, which makes it possible to conserve the society and to keep its social development within the frames of a certain, let it even be traditionalist or archaic order, and to resolve all other tasks by simple means of buying the necessary numbers of guest workers giving them only a subordinate position in the society and not incorporating them and their children on an equal basis with an aboriginal population (Lipset 1959, 75; Przeworski et al. 2000, 80; evolution of figures in details see also in: Clark et al. 2009, 170–205).

Given the main trends of human development and the principal scarcity of natural resources, it appears logical to assume that in the ever more complex external and internal conditions and with the existence of nuclear weapons, for the purposes of their further foreign and domestic policy making, states would not need to rely mainly on the use of force (limited by the weapons for mass destruction), but rather to have the skill of negotiating and making compromise with others—i.e., to reach the ever fuller social consensus and at the same time to streamline their domestic situations. Otherwise, systemic crises and the bloody wars that may eliminate *Homo sapiens* as a biological species would become inevitable (statistics on war see, Mahbubani 2013). So, in the process of transforming the social order of national communities, a key role should be played not only by the naturally existing factors (the level of economic, political, social and legal development), but also by the factors formed or being formed such as: a certain economic model, understanding of the exhaustion of the cyclic development model, consciousness between the political elites and society with regard to the need in modernization and evolutionary transformation of the social order and the law enforcement system that guarantee

the evolutionary but stable, secure and progressive transformation and development of the society without systemic crises. Such a model would be instrumental in building modern and sustainable political and social institutes. Without them, it would be impossible to pursue further economic modernization, and without the economic modernization it would be impossible to build a trouble-free, strong and free state. The following comprehensive approach helps:

- (a) to understand the inner connection between the forms of social order and the political systems—i.e., the role of domestic political factors in the development and formation of a global space, and
- (b) to treat the problem as the influence, caused by domestic structural processes in different types of states on the nature of international relations and the process of global development. In other words, to analyze and forecast the influence of different-type social orders on interstate relations in the international sphere. This would help to understand why various theories exist (realism, idealism, pragmatism, constructivism, etc.) to explain the international realities as well as West-centric and other than West-centric (for example, East-centric) approaches to international relations and global politics. Posing this problem requires the application of comprehensive, integral approaches to the analysis of the global and regional realities and thus contributes to the consolidation of the given agenda in comprehensive regional approaches or in World Regional Studies as a sub-field of International Relations.

3.5 EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORDER

The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by a cardinal change in the world situation: the globalizing world appeared to shrink. The problems coming to the fore were those of the new, closer interdependence between nature and man, as well as between humans, national communities, nations and countries in the process of sustainable progressive development. Without resolving these problems, the very existence of mankind was in danger. With this connection in mind, Western researchers and policy makers started first to note and then to explain a growth trend in Eastern countries regarding global policy. They tried

to offer a new holistic explanation of the specifics of processes taking place in different regions of the world. That was how the global discourse started within the interconnected parts of the Western political and intellectual communities and the most open and advanced segment of their Eastern counterparts. Such discourse was focused more and more on the role of regional factors in the economic and political development of the world, although the term “regional factor” as such, at least at the initial stage of the discussion, was not applied. Later on, the realities of the new century (the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the global financial and economic crisis) demanded a revision of some of the paradigm-type theses (earlier perceived as unshakable) and a turn to other than West-centric, objectivist explanations of global political and economic processes. According to this new trend, explained in a study by North, Wallis and Weingast, there are three different types of social (more precisely, socio-political) order: primitive, natural (in other terminology—limited) and open. However, by all evidence, the structural subtypes of the natural social order exist as well—at the stage of a mature natural state. These subtypes correspond to different time-bound stages of the evolutionary development of national communities and have a sufficient amount of distinctiveness. Thus, they have a sufficient effect on the modes and forms of configuring the internal and external spheres of the given communities’ life. There are also different subtypes of open social order states (at least the European and American models). However, for various practical reasons (mostly the need to consolidate countries with open social access), this question was not considered in political history and thus in political science in detail—simply because the transition to a new, more advanced and perfect social model was more important than the fixation on differences within such a model.

Today, about half of all existing states are those with the natural social order and that practice limited social and political access. Besides, twenty-five states created, actively support and develop the socio-political order of open access. The number of states with the open-access system is growing gradually and now approaches 100. States with the natural and open social orders actively compete with one another on the international scene, while the form and modes of such competition are decided by around forty to sixty states: twenty-five to thirty states with the open social order and twenty to thirty states with the natural social order of protective nature. The rest of the states either to some extent or another use the open-access

order by having imported the respective institutes, or failed to build it for reasons mainly domestic in nature. Such social and political order more efficiently neutralizes negative external and internal impulses, records less downfalls and regression and has created political “safety locks” against arising systemic crises (Fergusson 2011).

To put it briefly, the system of open socio-political access (democratic governance) allows all citizens the opportunity to participate in governance on the basis of transparent conditions, understandable for the whole society and approved by it on the basis of consensus. At the same time, it does not mean that everybody and everyone can have easy access to governance because this system, too, contains its barring mechanisms and strict principles of selection.

The system of open and equal access is not anarchic as it might seem by its name—rather, it opens the possibility to apply social engineering methods on the basis of strict but open and transparent criteria recognized by the society in consensus and thus to promote those people to the state governance who are most talented and best trained, without regard for their racial, ethnic or confessional affiliations or political beliefs, unless the latter are extremist and may undermine the existing constitutional system. That is, the open-access system is effectuated through a hard but at the same time flexible grid of political, economic and societal institutes/social regulations plaited in the socium so that within each cell free development is admitted that would be directed by the given institutes and limited only by the frameworks of the constitution.

Considering the major trends in human development and the fundamental limitedness of natural resources, it seems logical to assume that in the ever more complicated external and internal context of progressive development in the presence of nuclear weapons, elaboration of further foreign and domestic policy by states would not need to rely mainly on methods of force (e.g., weapons of mass destruction that can result in annihilation of all mankind), but rather on the skill of reaching agreements with others—that is, to reach fuller social consensus and at the same domestic regularization. Otherwise systemic crises and blood-shedding wars of the past would be inevitable and we shall be constrained to state that mankind does not learn anything in the process of its historical development and, even having invented the weapons for annihilating itself as a species, does not consider the experience of history. While the view on the possibility to admit unleashing of the third world nuclear war is as well voiced today, it is connected mainly with the shortcomings

of relaying the experience of history through the systems of education, or, ultimately, with low competitiveness of the systems of education of science—i.e., other than hereditary systems for producing and transmission of knowledge.

If we proceed from the understanding that with an attained level of economic growth the control of socio-political access would be weakened inevitably and this would contribute to the accelerated economic development through the maximal possible voluntary and conscious mobilization of masses on the basis of shared cultural-value identity rather than direct or indirect coercion, then, sooner or later, we would have the question: why are representatives of the political elite not concerned about how to enact democratic governance? Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, about 120 countries of the world (more than 60 % of all countries) had chosen to have political regimes of election-based democracy. This fact served as the basis for the concept of “the third-wave of democratization” written by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1992). However, the late 1990s were also marked by political roll-back and hence no expansion of the democratization process. Was this connected with some failures or possible limitations of such a process? The answer to these questions is not at all trivial and not very simple. First of all, it is connected with the estimation or over-estimation of the political sciences’ prognostic power as well as with the need to strengthen the method of political analysis by incorporating cross-regional analytic methodologies, and generally with the possibility of correctly interpreting and forecasting the nature and course of global political processes together with its regional and domestic-political components.

Quite many phenomena that appeared by the end of the twentieth century did not let a number of societies complete the process of modernization and hence caused a slowdown in the process of transition from the modernization to the post-modernization phase for those societies, which attained the level of economic growth that in principle enabled them to embark on such transition (Clark et al. 2009).

First of all, the countries that started to transition from the modernization to the post-modernization phase and from the stage of natural socio-political access to building the open-access system, for many reasons in the course of transition somehow hovered in the grey zone of non-authoritarian but at the same time non-democratic states. Having enacted elections, these countries, being apprehensive of political instability that could be caused by changes in the political system, failed or for some

reasons (including domestic political) did not choose to move further in building a system of open socio-political access. This required a radical revision of all major provisions of the new, shape-taking vector of political science as transition studies. Such revision, in turn, helped form such concepts as “non-liberal democracy” (Fareed Zakaria) and “hybrid” political regimes.

The next problem was a comparison between the actual efficiency of governance under democratic and authoritarian regimes. Under the earlier formulated and generally correct theoretical provisions, democratic governance on the whole is more efficient than authoritarian. Therefore, authoritarianism would slowly become extinct, to be replaced, theoretically, by universal democratization (Archibugi et al. 2012). However, having appeared by the end of the twentieth century, a number of populist regimes (Venezuela, Bolivia) started to successfully exploit the inability of some countries with a non-consolidated democracy to resolve the problems of poverty, social justice and economic impoverishment of some societal segments or even whole social classes trying to disprove Western-type political systems. Moreover, the ability of some authoritarian regimes to self-reform and to enhance domestic competitiveness was generally underestimated. The “Arab spring” and “colored revolutions” events generally confirmed the predicted trend with some of the most notorious and inefficient versions of authoritarian governance. However, authoritarianism survived the total collapse of the model. Thus, at a certain historical stage many policy makers and political scientists were faced with the unforeseen problem of peculiar competition of development models—not only between democracies and autocracies, but also between competitive authoritarian or hybrid political regimes (for example, socialism with Chinese specifics in the PRC, etc.) and embezzling regimes of different types, such as brutal personalized or ideological/clerical authoritarianism (Libya, etc.) and irresponsible non-consolidated democracies (some African and Asian states). Some longer-standing democracies (India) upon closer inspection also turned out to be susceptible to vices, which were supposed to be exterminated or minimized in the context of democratic development. Poverty and corruption were not removed from these countries, while stratification continued to aggravate the society notwithstanding the economic growth and evident successes in new segments of their economies (electronics, high-tech, pharmaceuticals, software engineering, etc.). There are also problems within the political systems of advanced democracies (Gore 2014, xxv–xxviii).

As it turned out, while global capitalism generally provided unprecedented rates of economic development (from the 1970s the world economy grew at least four-fold), nobody ever succeeded in building a model for market development without periodic economic crises and the need for internal redistribution of wealth and rebalancing (Piketty 2014). The most modern version of the economic system—global financial capitalism—happened to be conjugated with the new phenomenon of strong financial volatility. While the causes of all these new phenomena have been explained already in academic literature (Piketty 2014; Pettys 2014, among others), nation-states and the entire global community failed to create a reliable mechanism for the prevention of worldwide financial or economic crises. Some political regimes saw this as a warning about the impacts it might have on their domestic developments—including, among others, the possibility of destabilization of domestic political order from the outside (Fukuyama 2012).

The absolutely new phenomena of politico-economic nature arose in the USA, the leader state of the world system: the hegemon state started to transform gradually into a dominant state and leader state while world leadership was vulnerable to changes (Little and Smith 1993; Strange 1993, 434–443). Such turns were facilitated by both external and internal reasons in the world system, which moved ahead along the path of globalization but failed to be globalized fully. Some states tried to accelerate the erosion of the US global leadership or undermine it with military-terrorist methods (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and later in various other countries). This scared the civic population and forced the authorities, faced with military-political and economic instability, to resort to tough order-consolidation measures. All this resulted in the securitization of such a problem as the path for political and economic development when the USA, under a republican president, interfered militarily in the affairs of many states and regions to take revenge for acts of terrorism committed against the USA. Still, however, a decisive role in the transformation of the global leadership was played by domestic fiscal and financial factors.

In reality, the transition to a system of open socio-political access in the contemporary economic and political conditions turned out to be pre-conditioned by the need to sustain strict political order in all segments of the global space. In some cases, this even meant enacting additional security measures—especially in the periods of worldwide financial and economic turbulence and danger of terrorism. It is clear that there is the

need for hardening of the political order when terrorists are endangering human lives. It is also clear that this limited trend may be globally strengthened when the non-elected elites of countries with socio-political order of limited and, especially, of archaic form act in conjunction with global hardening of political order. Thus the process of democratization has been bogging down, and in some regional segments of the world even the slide-back in this process has become evident.

The political order is connected with the three social institutes: state, system of law order and system of effective state governance. All of these started to transform because of globalization, but such a transformation turned out incomplete, while the very model transformation happened to be strongly vulnerable to different sorts of external impacts (Fukuyama 2012). Therefore, political development was found to be a complex and multi-structural process. But by all evidence, in different societies it represents a different degree of balance among those components of the societal system that provide open socio-political access and at the same time support the political order. Political modernization is not merely a process of linear movement up the ladder of the socio-political access system—from the stages of limited access (natural access) to the more open stages (open access). It is also a process of certain correlation and equilibrium of factors, providing the socio-political access and its wider or narrower openness, and political order-securing institutes in various countries depending on their cultural or historical specifics. Such an understanding may help to explain global political dynamics in all its complex entirety, as well as socio-political dynamics.

The transition from a natural to open socio-political order can be made automatically and spontaneously, on par with economic development and economic welfare growth. The main issue is to understand and realize this historical regularity—like when some states understood and substantiated the inevitable transition of all countries from capitalism to socialism and then from socialism to communism. However, these hypotheses so far have not been fully confirmed by the practice of social development. Later, they were supplemented by the need for hegemony, then of structural hegemony (Strange 1993), and even later by the concept of leadership (Ikenberry et al. 2013)—that is, the existence of the leading power or coalition of leading powers, which provides and fixes the expansion of the open socio-political access system throughout the world as well as a guarantees the elimination of chances for slide-back and reverse archaizing of the global system or its key segments. Later on, a few American

and European researchers and political figures came to share the view that building the system of open socio-political access is a sort of spontaneous abnormality of social evolution and therefore cannot be performed by all countries because of their intellectual and socio-political unpreparedness for such an undertaking. Later it was made clear that the transition, made by a few states to the open-access system, had its own hard logic: the imperative of economic development based on the creation of a market space that would be wider than the national territory, with the proliferation of it throughout the entire global community. There would also be transformation of national sovereignty everywhere in order to provide control of the key parameters as otherwise it would be impossible to actively receive foreign investment, finance, trade and migration flows. It would also be difficult to realize any given state's own economic infiltration into the foreign markets. Understanding this imperative required the transformation and development of national and international security theories. This would be done by adapting those to the imperative of transforming the parameters of national sovereignty and by providing for the relevant correspondence of these parameters to the strategic idea of providing for development (Ziegler 2012). The need to sustain a high level of technological development and the use of migration flows from the outside as a means of resolving demographic problems and to attract a "brain influx" required the application of new methods of social engineering. The appearance of sizable foreign ethnic components as a result of multiyear migration and the need to incorporate diasporas in the ethnically different society on the equal-right terms contributed to conceptualization of the given process (the concepts of "the melting pot," "multiculturalism," etc.) and adoption of the open socio-political access system. Such was a response to resolution of the systemic crisis issue as a result of the changes in demographic parameters and the ethnic component of the complex social system, which for some reasons limits the socio-political access on the basis of national, ethno-confessional, social or any other criteria.

Understanding the specific features of historical developments of particular states with systems of natural (limited) socio-political access, we, however, must singularize systemic crises arising periodically in such societies as both one of their specific as well as general features. Differing in nature and forms of manifestation, such crises used to make the realization of the legitimate forms of securing the formerly toughened legal order much less efficient, while the enhancement of efficiency was seen as being in line with the law. In societies with limited socio-political access, the

problem of cyclic systemic crises (legitimacy crises) cannot be resolved exclusively by legal and law means, and this circumstance leaves no room for any alternative for enacting social and political orders of open access because the latter would reduce the probability of socio-political crises. In other words, it would contribute to the transition of the entire global system to a more stable condition by reducing the instability of its segments as regions and national states. However, posing the given issue in this way does not exclude, but rather suggests the need to include the special and time-bound specifics in the given process.

Open competition of interests and co-subordination based on a system of transparent regulations through the attainment of national consensus suggests building a socio-political system of open access. However, although this postulate is theoretically correct, countries with a mature system of limited social access, while constructing a system of open social access, may easily be trapped by the contradiction between the tendency for stabilization and equilibrium, on the one hand, and tendency for further changes and transformation, on the other. Often the willingness of a ruler to hold an irremovable or life tenure is masked by the idea that they are securing legal order and stabilizing the country. A willingness to implement changes is often presented as undermining the legal order. The opposite cases also occur when the opposition serves as a disguise for illegitimate or violent coups. In these situations, the possibility for realizing the cyclic model of mobilization/stabilization is fully exhausted and societal development does not take place. By virtue of domestic socio-psychological and cultural-historical reasons, no exit from such a blind alley appears to be available. Such a policy may cause revolutionary changes, but the possible radical change of elites in the course of the process would invariably reduce civil society's efficiency in standing by its interests (Alagappa 2004). It often leads to the entire deconstruction of the fragile civil society and/or to slide-back in social, political and, partially, economic development. That is, further changes, the transformation and modernization of societies with the sustained domestic order regulating the changes along the track of enhancing their positive and constructive nature rather than hampering such changes, and without strengthening the destructive element of the given changes—this seems to be the main task at the next stage in the political development of countries moving toward building a socio-political order of open access.

However, the need for democratic organization in other countries might not come to fruition in the same way as in countries of the West,

where the development of free society and market-type economic relations was accompanied and followed by the formation of democratic institutes and universal electoral rights. For example, in the post-Soviet space, the democratic impulse of the majority—expressed by a minority and targeted against the ruling communist party’s monopoly for power—appeared before the formation of democratic values and private property. As a result, the new political system in those countries hovered at the initial steps of political and economic transformations, while the government authorities, political elite and society could not change the centuries-long style of their relations. This resulted in the formation of authoritarian systems with economies of the state socialism, archaic autocracies or hybrid political regimes.

In every state, the modes to formulate and constitutionally fix personal human rights and freedoms are different by virtue of such factors as different levels of economic and political development as well as different political and legal systems and traditions of countries (Inglehart 1997). The reason for different approaches is seen in the level of political and legal culture connected with different national perceptions of international law norms. State regulation of the sphere of human rights reveals strong diversity, but at the current stage we may record the process of approximation of legal systems and the establishment of similar standards for human rights and freedoms in national laws of different states. The existing systems of regional normative levels supplement the universal provisions, and in some cases even set the stricter requirements for protection and efficiency in the realization of human rights and freedoms. Therefore, the problem is seeing the comparison of the degree of actual protection and efficiency in the realization of human rights and freedoms in different political systems and then the corresponding systems to secure domestic order, or in the similar-type political systems being at different historical stages of their development. This problem can evolve, in particular, into the problem of “double standards” and different concepts of human-rights protection, and serve as an instrument to regulate interstate relations or format the international order.

If we recognize the influence of cultural and socio-psychological specifics, predetermined by the country-bound specifics of political culture, national psychology and national character (Inglehart 1997; Przeworski 2015), then we must as well recognize that depending on the nature and intensity of influence, these factors can form the peculiarity of societies as one and the same type of social order. It can as well determine the specif-

ics of particular stages in development of social order; they may complicate or hamper transition from one to another type of social order, and return societies with transitional subtypes of social order to a track of cyclic development.

3.6 POLITICAL MAP OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: FORMATION AND EVOLUTION

In the course of national communities transforming their social orders, a key role is played by naturally existing factors (the level of economic, political, social and legal development of any particular society), but also the factors formed or being formed by means of social engineering, such as: certain level of economy and thereto corresponding social structure; understanding of exhaustion of the cyclic development model; and, conscious consensus between the political elites and society about the need for modernization and an evolutionary transformation of the socio-political order and the system securing the legal order. All types of factors guarantee evolutionary but stable, secure and progressive transformation of the society without systemic crises. This model makes it possible to build modern sustainable political and social institutes that are vitally needed for further economic modernization, without which it would be impossible to build a strong, safe and free nation-state. Such a comprehensive approach helps us to understand the inner connection between the social-order forms and the political systems—the role of domestic political factors in the development and formation of a global politico-economic space, as well as the application of a new approach to the problems of influence caused by internal structural processes in different states on the nature of international relations and the process of global development. In other words, to analyze and forecast the influence rendered by different-type social orders on interstate relations in the international sphere.

So, from the mid-twentieth century the political system of the world, while starting to acquire the features of globalism, was structured from different-type states with different-type orders for socio-political access such as:

- states with socio-political access of the natural (limited) type. Such states are oriented to the Westphalia-type interstate relations, as well as recognize and stand by the principle of national sovereignty,

- mainly in the categories of rigid realism in international relations. Depending on how mature the type of limited socio-political access is and the specific domestic political organization of the government, these states admit warfare as a means to resolve problems of domestic and international policy. However, at the mature stage in development of the given-type social access, actual hostilities as a means of conducting international relations was coded by the provisions of the international law and the UN system. It was preconditioned by the invariable need to rebuff aggression on the part of another state/ other states, while the use of force was subject either to consensus among permanent members of the UN Security Council or to adopt a respective resolution giving the UN the right (a UN mandate) to externally interfere and/or use force. Meanwhile, the use of military force was allowed only when all diplomatic methods of conflict resolution had been exhausted and the international community in principle accepted the force option. States with socio-political access of limited type are also called “Modern States” or “Westphalian States”;
- states with an open-type socio-political access. These states, in the course of the integration process, to a considerable extent, redistribute their sovereignty within the framework of supranational and intra-national institutes. Such states regulate their relations with one another using various instruments of cooperation, such as liberal institutionalism, cooperative hegemony or the democratic world. While in relation to states with another type of socio-political access, they may apply the full arsenal of international instruments including, in certain circumstances, tough realism, sanctions, humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement and even military intervention. These states are called “post-Modern States” or “post-Westphalian States.” Although, all such definitions only partially reflect the features of the contemporary IR system. States of this category are led by international law and at the same time by the need to defend (with different means, including military) the open-type socio-political access system as structurally more vulnerable to external threats (the military in these countries are controlled by civilians, and the control of violence is transparent (North et al. 2009)) while specific figures in political power in such countries are often reproached for the application of “double standards” abuses or some self-interest considerations. This would be invariably followed by the replacement of those representing the particular political regime/authority/party

at the next election through popular vote or as a result of a no-confidence vote procedure (impeachment);

- states with a primitive or archaic type of socio-political access. In most cases, states of traditional culture are oriented to autarchy and build relations on the domestic scene and with other members of the international community largely on the pre-Westphalian stage (family, tribal, clan, archaic social segments, etc.). Many of such nation-states have a colonial past. Some of them did not have their own statehood and did not act autonomously on the international scene. States of such type are defined as “pre-Modern States” or “pre-Westphalian States.” In domestic political life, such states are led not even by law, but by the system of traditional, tribal or clan norms and the respective system of social institutes. These states may unofficially abide by traditional norms, relations and hierarchies of the past in contemporary international relations, too, but by virtue of their usually weak economic position and their dependence on the outside world, they, being members of the UN, proceed from the norms of international law.

Along with these three major groups of states, a salient position is taken by the might-have-been states, and non-recognized or partially recognized states. These were “sliding down” from the global political scene, but nevertheless exist on certain territories and have their population. In a number of cases and for different reasons these states or state formations may choose not at all to abide by the norms of law, including international norms.

The existence of different-type states (albeit not in the same proportions as in the past and linked by global ties stronger than before) predetermines the continuing of old-type conflicts and, at the same time, transition to the new-type conflicts in the world and the existence of special transitional structures of current international relations. This features the specifics of the contemporary historical stage in human development. The contemporary official paradigms of international relations within specialized state institutes—especially in states with different types of socio-political access—are based on an understanding and explanation of these processes, but so far mainly within the framework of revised realism, neorealism or pragmatism. They are not well linked to the global-development of the collectivist type, requiring working out new ways and methods to protect their state interests using methods other than force, with the external and

internal aspects of the economic and political modernization agenda and with existence of diversified actors in international relations—not necessarily states and, probably, in most cases other than states. However, the real politico-economic contents of this process, as revealed in the course of the global financial and economic crisis, are more complex and multi-dimensional. The attempt for cooperation and development at different levels and among states with different types of socio-political access, even when they intend to consolidate and secure their sovereignty against external dangers, is transformed into the prevailing trend of the early twenty-first century—a trend, which not only was not undermined, but was even strengthened by terrorist acts that occurred throughout the world.

The complexity of the current period of international relations is connected with the fact that states, due to their development stages, are in collision along the line of their protective trends and needs in development.

The global leadership is provided not only by the current level of economic, technological and political development, but also by the ability to produce social innovation by opening new avenues of socio-political and technological development for the whole of mankind. Competition on the road to the new, more perfect technological and social structure requires producing social, economic and political innovations to serve as the basis for technological innovations. Those who have been able to produce technological and social innovations can confirm their existing status or will become new global leaders. We are faced with the new questions of comparative political nature, connected with transformation and reformatting the global political space: To what extent are the new, non-Western or Eastern forms of democracy and integration alternative to the existing ones? What are their economic and political prospects? Can they somehow influence or somehow correct the global development vector and/or have an influence on the foreign-policy strategies of states?

The fact is that states with the open-access order exercise a monopoly control of legitimate use of violence by subordinating the armed forces to control on the part of a political system that guarantees the change of power in case such control is abused (North et al. 2009). This ability is based on the support of impersonal relations both within the state and on a broader scale. For the physical protection of their population, the economically most developed states with open social access have created NATO, the most powerful military-political bloc in the world. The military force of this bloc politically reinforces support for the proliferation of the system of impersonal relations on a broader scale and at the

same time guarantees the protection of the open social access system from without. In states with a different type of socio-political access or in transitional-type states—for domestic political reasons—this may be considered a threat. The proliferation of impersonal relations and impersonal international institutes of cooperative development is generally helpful in cutting down the dangers of confrontation, especially between states with open social access (according to the theory of democratic peace, democracies do not make war). At the same time, under certain conditions, it helps between states with different social-access systems, as states do not disarm themselves and go on building up their military force. As shown by the practice of global political interaction, military confrontations at the current stage of global development no longer help to resolve security challenges constructively. By posing the problem in such a way it becomes possible, based on pragmatism, (1) to build constructive-type foreign-policy partnerships, including those between states with open and natural types of social access; and (2) to construct depersonalized concepts of foreign-policy interaction and theories of state foreign-policy activities. This should prescinding from the factor of ideology in global policy, and with pragmatic orientation, first and foremost, to cooperative policy of those states, which, by virtue of the type of their socio-political order, conduct the maximally predictable foreign policy, and in which the level of social and technological innovations enables other states, too, to take the road of modernization.

However, agreements and mutual understanding between states with the open- and limited-type social access, especially in periods of global crises and socio-economic turbulence, would be reached with more difficulties, require larger efforts, be less solid and depend more on the political conjuncture. The worst damage to mutual understanding is caused by sudden and unmotivated changes of the political course, such as: on the domestic scene—breach of informal partnerships, abrupt departure from the construction of an open socio-political access system, rejection of the modern republicanism principles and society based on the rule of law, plus reliance on archaism, and in the foreign policy—spontaneous transition to the aggressive type of autarchy, reliance on all sorts of confrontations including war preparations, announcement of the necessity to resolve interstate contradictions by means of World War III, as well as any double standards, interference in domestic affairs of others under self-interest pretexts, snobbism in resolution of global problems, etc. All this would only serve to undermine mutual confidence and destroy mutual under-

standing. However, both states with open access and the absolute majority of states with natural (limited) access see the biggest danger in the rupture of written agreements. When informal agreements are breached, the affected party cannot reproach anybody but itself for the lack of foresight. Alternatively, a breach may be explained by changing circumstances, while a rupture of signed agreements can undermine international law as the basis of international consensus, and bears the threat of war of “all against all.”

As for states of the pre-Westphalian type, they can make problems not only for their citizens (civil wars, collapsed economy, etc.), but for others, too. On their territories, they usually host terrorist training camps as well as form a hotbed for drug production and illegal arms trade. In many cases, floods of refugees flee these countries because of the inveterate diseases that appear there by virtue of their low-level economic and technological development. Such is the track of formation of specific “grey zones” of the global policy on the territories, where the operation of central authorities is quite limited, and where the international community feels it difficult to take any measures to help.

Another group is formed by states that have their sovereignty but position themselves counter to the global community. In such states institutes of power do operate, but the states hardly fit in the contemporary system of rules for international interaction. In most cases, these states, being strictly authoritarian and having strong ideological or religious orientation, apply violent forms of mobilization and social organization to their population.

As it became clear at the dawn of the twenty-first century, after terrorist actions, the mode of political and economic development was securitized. That is, the intention to undermine the evolutionary path of the world system transformation, to slow down or forcefully and violently interrupt the formation of an open socio-political access system, to check for validity the statement that “democracies do not make war” (although democracies do not make war mainly with one another), and/or the attempts of some religious autocracies to undermine by means of terrorist acts, the worldwide trend of global democratization started to be perceived as an attempt to reverse the world development and to undermine global stability, for which a dear price of millions of human lives had been paid during World War II—i.e., started to be construed as a national security problem of the same magnitude as any illegitimate foreign interference in domestic affairs of any sovereign state. This, ultimately, led to the wars in Kuwait,

Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, as well as served as the basis for some current regional conflicts.

At the present stage of global development, the earlier system of balance and evolutionary development of states with different socio-political access was undermined substantially by efforts of irresponsible political players in different countries. However, all basic parameters of the contractual system, inherent in the existing balance, are still sustained. In the recent past, the balance and peaceful coexistence of the two systems was supported by the nuclear and military parity between the two centers of bipolarity (USSR and USA). It was also supported by the two types of socio-political access in the international system of the European type, the logic of which subordinated all other interests to sustaining of this parity in the system of deterrence, because otherwise there would have been a nuclear war. After the collapse of the bipolar system, the Yalta-Potsdam order underwent a slow evolutionary transformation to a new quality, based on the understanding that the gradual evolutionary transition made by the growing number of national states to the system of open socio-political access and gradual global political formatting of the next stage of the global order in the form of the global democracy regime would actually eliminate the basis for old-type conflicts—first and foremost, of the military nature (wars for territories, forceful annexation of territory rather than expansion of the space of interaction, etc.).

In the last forty years, in the course of global development, the suzerain rule and the political elite of *de facto* states lost both the moral and legal rights to treat the population of their country at their own discretion. In the past, the suzerain had total command of the destinies of his country's population ("kill or grant pardon as I wish"). Then, by the end of the twentieth century, mass repression, purges, genocide or unprovoked acts of aggression became unacceptable (Ziegler 2012). Hence, the concepts of "humanitarian intervention" and all sorts of "peace enforcement" from the world community came to be. These concepts aimed to substantiate the right for the world community to undertake "coercive correction" of such acts for the protection of civilian populations. The ability of national political elites to govern their jurisdictional territories was also made subject to meticulous assessment due to an attempt of some political clans in some countries to "privatize a state" as a national political and economic institution. A new, modified system of global/regional regulation and sustaining of world stability became necessary to control key parameters that would help maintain stability and at the same time would not hamper

development. As interdependence of the world became all-pervading, the ability or inability of national political elites to govern the respective national territories efficiently began to affect not only the political elite and population of any given country, but all other countries with partnerships relations with the latter. In the end, this circumstance facilitated the appearance of policy globalization, on the one hand, and of the apprehensions regarding external illegitimate subversion of the national political order-securing system. It also saw the application of “double standards” and illegitimate interference in domestic affairs of other states under some superficial or, probably, self-interest pretexts, on the other hand.

Though the global order has gone sufficiently far, it is clear that new, non-state actors and the current evolution of the national sovereignty category is perceived rather sensitively in all regional segments of the world (in the EU—in connection with the budget deficit in Greece, Italy, Portugal, France and the clear need for a single monetary policy, as well as with establishment of foreign-policy and military agencies; in Russia and China—in connection with apprehensions of external illegitimate “fostering” of political evolution, a fear that “colored revolutions” may undermine ruling authoritarian regimes, and the double-standards policy; in Iran and North Korea—in connection with the Iraqi, Libyan and Syrian events and the existence of strictly closed confessional or ideological regimes actually having no constructive foreign-policy partners, etc.). At the same time, this process is far from completion. Meanwhile, evolutionary transformation (rather than proclaiming its forceful destruction: Glaziev 2010; Dugin 2014) is agreeable for almost all major participants of the global process because it enables them, while sustaining the existing national level of economic growth and without putting at risk lives of their population, to exercise competition of development models; that is, to use a combination of national, regional, supranational and transnational factors for the search of the most favorable place, corresponding to their national interests, in the international system. Then, having taken such a favorable position, they would be able to participate in the global transformation in a constructive mode. It would be the most favorable position for their respective nation, and they could consolidate their efforts for the re-articulation and correction of the global system rules. This option would be preferable to the costly or currently even deleterious dangers incurred in the use of mass destruction weapons in view of domestic economic development and demographic potential, as well as often also costly and generally least efficient (in terms of resolution of long-term tasks)

military-force methods of problem resolution. The fact that such competition revealed models of not only “catch-up” but also “non-achieving” development is a different matter. Political elites of such states must explain to their populations why they lag behind. In most cases, however, rather than explanations and identification of internal reasons for lagging, we see a reorientation to autarchy and a search for external and/or internal enemies.

Besides, the discourse in the past couple of decades has been about building the orders of open socio-political access in different regional realities and with the different extent of the influence caused by national historical or cultural specifics (for example, democracy in Russia and China). There is a strong need to discuss the variability of parameters and characteristics that feature in some political regimes as the ones that helped build successful open socio-political order. However, there is a monopolization on this discussion connected to (1) the relatively small number of states with mature open socio-political access (consolidated democracies); and (2) the existence of close defense and political relations within the military-political bloc of NATO and a number of their bilateral alliances. The need for intellectual de-monopolization of the variability in building open-access orders (“sovereign democracy,” “non-Western democracy”) is connected with the transition of the global system to polycentrism. At the same time, the transition from unipolarity to multi-polarity poses the question about whether competition is possible among regional versions of the open socio-political access order (and more so, the ways of building such an order) with the preserved shared understanding of its basic characteristics and without invariable strengthening of military and political confrontation among global regions or weakening of the open-access system as such. It also deals with the understanding of the need to form new international partnerships of a constructive rather than destructive type.

With institutes of open social order proliferating, the West has opened the epoch for the exploration of these institutes by other national (including Eastern) states. These states have the opportunity to compete with the West in building better adapted and thus more competitive regional versions of such an order within the closely entangled, interdependent and overlapping space of global policy, economy and security. The most ample case in point is found in China, a country that evolved into a hybrid political regime and successfully shifted to the legitimization of various forms of ownership through the “three represents” system (*sange daibiao*); the incorporation of all progressive political forces into the evolving

“one-and-a-half party” political system; the regular rotation and collegial decision making by top leadership under the personal responsibility of the supreme leader in compliance with the relatively transparent legally fixed regulations; the legislated principles of peaceful coexistence; and juridical codification of use of military force against Taiwan as a historic and geographic part of China. China is one civilization and has one ethnos, but is comprised of two geographic parts, being governed de facto by different political regimes with different types of socio-political access.

At its Central Committee 4th Plenum of the 18th convocation, the Chinese Communist Party announced its path to building a state of law and reliance on law—that is, it moved ahead in the practical realization of the earlier proclaimed course—building a harmonious society in China. The most recent social innovation in China is accentuating “socialist consultative democracy” as a step ahead in the process of political modernization and narrowing the gap between modes of social access in two geographic parts of China.

At the present time, building a system of open socio-political access in an “isolated mode”—without a single and closely entangled space of policy, economy, law norms and security—is hardly possible. The mode of exclusive self-reliance is a priori economically more costly than domestic transformations based on the consolidation and expansion of the global space of collective security and international law, as well as shared political and economic perceptions. Progressing along the road of building a national version of an open socio-political access order would enable all countries to resolve the issues of their national development and modernization without excessive budget expenditures for armaments but not without forgetting to take proper care of their defense capacity. This offers the opportunity for any given country to evade illegitimate violence toward its citizens, to use supranational/transnational sources for the purposes of investments, to use technological and institutional modernization to raise the level and quality of life for its population, and to orient all countries to the future rather than to the present or even to the past.

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Appraising the Theory of Non-Western IR and the Other Options Available

As a result of political and socio-economic transformations of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the modern world entered a new phase of its evolution in which Western countries were not at all the only ones that set the parameters of this evolution and the frameworks of its conceptualization. More recently, this phase has been associated with an attempt to challenge, indirectly or directly, the concept of post-industrial development put forward by the discipline of Social Sciences in the West and later substantiated by the disciplines of Western Social Sciences and International Relations (IR). Notwithstanding the extremely sensitive perception of such attempts in the West, this fact quite soon was addressed in the contemporary, including Western, academic analysis. Such a discourse makes it possible to follow the rather clear line of transformation in the role and place of the East in the global context and also Russian Social and Political Science. At first we need to assess the prospects of success for these attempts.

4.1 ATTEMPTS TO FURTHER CONCEPTUALIZE A NON- WESTERN REALITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Existing until the last quarter of the twentieth century, the gap between global policy and foreign policies of nation-states started to be filled by the rapidly expanding space of regional and macro-regional/transregional

interaction, which gradually changed the established parameters of global interaction first for Western, and then for Eastern countries, too. These new phenomena are reflected at the level of theoretical conceptualization and in the practice of global policy and foreign policy interaction. At the present time, any explanation of contemporary political and economic processes would be considered incomplete without an analysis of their specifics in non-Western regions of the world, because these countries are home to most of the international system members—nation-states being the members of the international community. However, a comparative analysis of the nature of such processes and their influence on the foreign-policy field of global interaction has not made remarkable progress so far. Such a view of the world states that the external and internal organization of life in other macro-regional complexes and their constituents (macro-regions and nation-states) may proceed in a different way and the difference may affect not only the peoples' quality of life, but the specifics of their global political activity. The growth of the economic role of the world macro-regions or global regions would strengthen their political role and enhance their ability to reach consensus on the most important issues of global development. This is becoming an important subject for the analysis of global political processes on the whole. At the same time, the nature of the processes unfolding in non-Western macro-regional segments of the world gets little attention in the global academic and educational space because it has been considered for a long time a secondary factor in global development. However, without the analysis of these subjects today, any explanation regarding the phenomena of global policy, global governance in international relations or international political economy should not be deemed a relevant picture of global realities.

However, a “non-West” (i.e., “what is not the West”) as a political and philosophic notion is more complex and broader than the East and is not limited by the East. Studies of the East, including the original research tradition of Oriental studies in Russia, for example, have historically very deep roots in the international scholarship in many countries. The notion of a “non-West” applies not only to countries of the macro-region—defined traditionally as the East proper in terms of geography and in terms of different organization of all economic, social, political and civilization-cultural spheres of their life (as the Orient by E. Said, as an example—but it also applied to all other countries, which for some reasons (historical, cultural, sociopolitical, etc.) sustain their own, other than Western, specifics in the organization of some spheres of their life, particularly political and eco-

nom. The problem of the non-West being irreducible to the East radically changes the methodology for the resolution of many practical issues of the world political organization and global policy. So far, the question of what disciplines should be selected for addressing these problems remains open. In Russia, the given agenda is being researched mainly within the framework of International Politics and World Regional Studies, while in Europe and America the same is done within the frames of World Political Geography, World Regional Geography, Critical Geopolitics, Comparative Political Science and the evolving discipline of Global Political Economy. This problem is connected with the broader range of problems than the mere disciplinary organization of contemporary Social Sciences—that is, with the notions of cross-disciplinary and post-disciplinary analysis in the modern Social Science.

A noteworthy point is that understanding the need for a theory addressing the influence of different types of sociopolitical access on the nature of foreign-policy interaction and, hence, international development, and then the generalization of such a theory on the basis of cross-regional analysis, is not possible in non-modernized societies that have not mastered the global political theory of IR and economic political science in their modern forms. Understanding this can accompany but cannot precede modernization (Chan 1994, 248). The appearance of these new areas of study signaled the simultaneous start of the profound and unbiased scholarly understanding of the given problems in the English-language research tradition, although some works (for example by André Gunder Frank) reveal in part their orientation to polemics where the classical West-centric analysis is exemplified by such authors as William McNeil (1982) or David Landes (1998). Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2010), although sharpening the problem of appearing non-Western IR theory, on the whole express quite reserved assessments of the prospects for the construction of such theories completely aside from the Western reservoir of knowledge. In 2010, the Western and Eastern interpretations of world history—of which the synthetic political economy was shown through the prism of origination of global center-periphery relations by Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) and Prasanna Parthasarathi (2011)—were summarized in the study by Ian Morris (2010). He showed the historical limitations of the West-centric or East-centric politico-economic vision of world history in terms of forecasting the trends of the future synthetic paradigm of humanity's development, the basic outlines of which are just starting to appear. At the same time, such posing of the problem did not cancel the need to

analyze the dichotomy of global macro-regions (in particular, the dichotomy problems within the East/West discourse) in view of understanding the specifics of the course of sociopolitical processes and the structure of the social access at concrete stages of development of international history in different macro-regional segments of the world. It has become necessary to study the influence of these processes on global political problems and the processes of global policy formation, despite the fact that dichotomous contra-positions a priori suggest a methodological reduction.

The international research community already feels the needs for a broad framework for analyzing global phenomena outside the dichotomy of the Western/non-Western approach. This type of approach must be able to incorporate a non-Western agenda and even non-Western theories when and if they appear within an international theoretical framework that is above the simplified dichotomy of the West and non-West, or Western/non-Western IR theory.

4.2 METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES

Constructivist theorizing at the regional level would make it possible to resolve the issues pertaining if not to the harmonization of relations between states than to better global governance. This might help eliminate conflicts around different sociopolitical access or being at different stages in development of a certain type of sociopolitical access. This task more amply highlights the need to redirect attention to structural approaches and methodologies helping to synthesize the analysis of external and internal factors in a comprehensive understating of the regional problems. Exactly these tasks are put on the agenda in the course of overcoming the global financial and economic crisis as well as during the transformation of the international political system into a global one and thereto related process of national states domestic transformation. Today these tasks gradually form the principle agenda of World/Global Politics.

In traditional literature on the history of IR (including the field of regional phenomena), different explanations and interpretations of facts seem to suggest implicitly the need to apply a comprehensive, systemically structured, interdisciplinary approach (Anderson et al. 2008). To this end, it would be required to provide a new, more refined scholarly generalization of facts and data, on the one hand, and a higher level of conceptual analysis, on the other hand. The minor self-reflection in the countries of Eurasia and East Asia in terms of constructivist social-science analysis as

related to the agenda of global debates on methodological foundations for Social Sciences, plus conduct of research mainly within the framework of traditional and modified Marxism, and then a local discourse-based combination of radical-type religious ideas and theories—all these developments resulted in insufficient consideration (if not neglect) of structural concepts and approaches offered by international regionally unbiased Political Science and IR theories with regard to local communities of Eurasia and East Asia. Political Science and IR theory were officially admitted in Russia and other countries of the post-Soviet space around the 1990s. Because of the limited time for ideology-free and non-biased development, these studies are incapable of mastering the entire international experience at once and adapting it to the conditions of Russia, Eurasia and East Asia—and at the same time, of reaching the phase of independent theoretical comprehension of non-Western and Russian agendas. These theories were “accused” in Eurasia and in a part of Eastern Asia of being “West-centric” or having West-centric orientation. But, independent and significant scholarly generalizations require a good deal of time, intellectual effort, without politically pressed or politically motivated “intellectual breakthroughs.” Therefore, when the “West-centric” theories, supported by a mass of high-class academic literature in foreign languages that explained the world reality through the prism of Western theories of development, were rejected in the late 2000s as ideologically unfit for the explanation of the “phenomena of Russia” or the “phenomena of Eurasia/Asia,” no other theories appeared that would be equally valuable and methodologically correct in terms of an adequate understating of the global reality. The national models for the formation and understanding of the global reality, whether in the West proper or in the non-Western regions of the world, were methodologically limited by the experience of comprehending their respective regional segments of the global space—even if they claimed that analysis was done on the basis of generally “correct” methodology.

In Social Sciences, many spheres of research are usually believed to be of cross-disciplinary nature, but some spheres, however, can be not only cross-disciplinary but also comprehensive or integral. In other words, they are at the stage when they start to offer their own comprehensive or integral methodological approaches of the synthetic type. This may be illustrated by Eric Hobsbaum’s once provocative answer to the question of one of his students (as I remember from the time of his teaching at the New School) who complained that complex non-Western reality does not

fit his methodological framework. Eric's answer was simple: "You should broaden your methodology."

The problem of relevance in adapting the world experience to its complexity is directly connected with methodological debates in classical Area Studies, which today have been visibly converted to a basic component of World Regional Studies (in Russia) or World Regional Geography (in the USA)—a comprehensive politico-economic and social discipline studying the regularities of processes such as: formation and functioning of socio-economic and sociopolitical systems of the world's regions and global regions with due account of their historical, demographic, economic, religious, cultural and anthropological, ecological, political-legal and natural-resource specifics. Understanding these factors helps to preserve all the wealth of classical Area Studies and International Relations while interpreting the same in the mainstream of the contemporary modernized rather than archaist context of international social science thought. It also identifies the internal components of the comprehensive World Regional Studies discipline (i.e., comprehensively analyzing all regions of the world (Wang Yidan and Yuan Zhengqin 2005, 370–371)).

As mentioned earlier, "internal" regional studies developed and continue to develop within various traditional disciplines and/or cross-disciplinary research vectors, such as: International Studies, Regional Studies, Macro-Historical Sociology, Human History, Economic Geography, Regional Science, Spatial Economy, Human Geography, Geo-Economy, International Political Economy, Political Geography, Regional Political Science, Political Regional Studies, etc. How the field develops depends on the aspect of regional studies at the main focus of research and on the specifics of national research schools.

So, the main problem with the non-Western IR theory debate is the locality of traditional disciplines of which the main focus of analysis is "internal" regions of the nation-state and where methodological approaches may not be rigorous enough to explain or fit within broader regional phenomena.

Indeed, we have different local disciplines that are sometimes called by the same names but that, in practice, have different or nationally/internationally contradictory content. These local disciplines rarely apply the newest social science theories or historical macro-sociology. They rarely apply structural approaches but insist on interpretative, sometimes purely historical, analysis of a non-Western character that may counterbalance the lack of local structurally adequate theories that may not be compet-

ing with Western theories per se but with international theories biased to benefit the Global West. The existing non-Western concepts may have a different explanation of a regional, local reality according to Western theories but in reality cannot be incorporated—only rejected—by such global disciplines as IR or World Politics. This is not because of their non-Western character but because of their theoretical inadequacy. However, if IR does not take into theoretical consideration certain segments of the local, national, regional reality by various reasons (because methodology is too general or too narrow or because of political bias, etc.) this policy is transformed into the appeal to create non-Western IR theory, the domain and methodological base of which was theoretically never strictly defined.

4.3 CONTEXT OF AN EVOLVING AGENDA OF WORLD REGIONAL STUDIES

The recently arising polycentrism and stronger regionalization may somehow slow down globalization, but this does not necessarily lead to the aggravation of war-bearing contradictions within the world system as argued, for example, by all representatives of theoretical realism. On the contrary, this evidences the accelerated growth of interdependence and homogenization of nation-states within macro-regional complexes though at different speed and in different forms to be followed by the new spiral of cross-regional cooperation and enhancement of the global-governance system—at that point of time, on the basis of already formed macro-regional and cross-regional associations with different degrees of their competitiveness and adaptability to global realities, unless the world is pushed directly toward military confrontation.

The national communities and their political elites, which do not understand these world trends, “fall out” from the mainstream of global development and are pushed out to the periphery. In correspondence with Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “cultural hegemony,” they subordinate their existence to the borrowed more perfect and more universal concepts of global development, or are constrained to spend ever larger (but limited rather than unlimited) amounts of national resources in order “to keep up with the course of history,” to realize the “catch-up type of modernization and development” and not “to slide into the ditch” of the worldwide historical process. Within the frames of conceptual-scientific, rather than normative-ideological explanation, the macro-regional complexes

(e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], EU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], etc.) may serve as prototypes of new centers in the polycentric world system based on the prevalence of globally coordinated cooperative trends. The cross-regional formations (Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP], the Asia-Europe Meeting [ASEM] and the group consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa [BRICS]) contribute to the rise of new world centers within the frameworks of new transregional ties—for example, by facilitating alignment of the global space through transregional cooperation of the new type. Meanwhile, the regional-level theories (Buzan and Waever 2003; Beckoushe 2008; Voskressenski 2014a, b) being developed in different regional segments of the world might help out the currently existing IR and Global Policy theories by serving as a new motivating basis that would form reasons for the consolidation of the global-governance system by the participants of the international society that format such a system and adapt it to their regional and national needs on the platform of attaining international consensus.

Thus, the need to link international problems with the issues of regional and national economic and political modernization was articulated, in particular, within the new cross-disciplinary field within Social Science and International Relations named World Regional Studies. It was formalized in the 1990s as a line of educational and academic research, using the methods of cross-regional political and sociological analysis for the study of the spatial and time-bound projection of international relations and the evolution of the global community in the evolving regional segments of the world. Such studies are based on the synthesis of classical International Relations, Regional/Area Studies, Cultural Anthropology, Sociology and Comparative Political Science. While the theories of development in the 1980s and the late 1990s explained what had to be done in order to develop on the basis of Western countries' experience, the specifics of World Regional Studies is laid in the fact that this cross-disciplinary and integral school synthesizes spatial, time-bound and structural approaches into the comprehensive multidimensional understanding of the generalized and, at the same time, geographically segmented regional specifics in the processes of globalization. Regional specifics in focus are those that are instrumental in the search for the most favorable paths of development on the platform of combined imperatives of global and regional regularities.

The evolving core agenda of World Regional Studies is comprised of the issues pertaining to methodology, nature, modes and methods of leveling up or differentiating the development of the global political, economic, social and cultural-civilizational space as segmented by regions and by time-bound stages, as well as the identification and forecasting of such processes. The latter are connected with the redistribution of states' influence in the world, as well as with its rise and decline. The understanding of such processes is based on the methods of political and politico-economic analysis. This removes the possible contradiction among methodologies of disciplinary approaches, which by virtue of subjective reasons is hard to resolve at certain stages of particular states' national development.

Having shaken the world, the economic crisis, however, did not generate the threat of a new worldwide military conflict or the destruction of the existing world order. Rather, it compelled interested parties to consolidate international cooperation in order to overcome the crisis phenomena in economic life and to evolutionally enhance by slowly change the regulations of the global system. Having proceeded from an economic to sociopolitical phase, the global crisis served as an impulse to search for explanations for uneven development in the globalizing world, to overcome such trends and set forth economic theories, other than West-centric, explaining the root causes of the global rise and long-lasting stable development of countries in the West (Reinert 2008; Fergusson 2011; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2013). This understanding was synthesized by Chinese professor He Chuanqi (2010). His theory of a two-phase process for worldwide modernization explained the technology and the specifics laid out in the processes of modernization, particularly in China, as they fit within the parameters of global development.

It is worth noting that the existing transitional modification of the global order is sufficiently elastic and in terms of its type and structure is more modern and flexible than the preceding counterparts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (the Westphalia, Vienna, Versailles and early Yalta-Potsdam arrangements, all within the Westphalia system, that in the twentieth century brought two world wars and the disintegration of the system comprised of the Warsaw Treaty countries and the USSR). Despite a whole series of military-political and financial-economic crises, the latest modification of the global order has withstood power conflicts. At the same time, the evolutionary transformation of the global order toward its new, more converged stage has continued—in particular, through politico-economic modernization of states, different-vector and

different-pace macro-regional and cross-regional integration, including the new forms of “soft integration” as well as through the formation of supranational political space, regionalization and open regionalism, redistribution of influence among macro-regions, cross-regional cooperation and the search of new politico-economic development models. All the afore-listed processes pursued the goal of providing the sort of development that would not be based on military violence, but rather on the understanding of politico-economic regularities and socio-cultural specifics in overcoming economic heterogeneity that finally caused the global finance and economic crisis. Such an approach, with the correct understanding of universal regularities of the world development, enables countries to use all advantages of and to derive maximal benefits from their interconnectedness (i.e., the fact that they fit in the world)—to influence and to reformat the global system in a non-confrontational way, to reach global consensus and also to intensify the development of each nation state.

One of the amplest cases in point is served by China’s recent development. It has been reforming in compliance with the Deng Xiaoping course and has described its current period as the “epoch of peace and development.” Such policy maximally benefits China. So far, there have been no reasons to believe that forceful destruction of the existing global order is in view. Its skillful evolutionary transformation into a new, more fair quality would reduce socio-economic differentiation and would provide China, Russia and other national communities with more autonomy and benefits rather than miseries, difficulties in development, potential armed confrontations and national degradation in the circumstances of aggravating demographic problems.

In this context, it becomes most timely to address such questions as: What politico-economic principles currently determine the functioning of individual non-Western/Eastern societies and of the Eastern region as an organic whole? Does the non-West or/and the East as a single entity exist? And if it exists, what may bring together the non-Western/Eastern nation-states with different access systems, vis-à-vis the West? How would these Eastern or non-Western societies react to global political processes, and what factors ultimately determine the trends of economic and political modernization in Asian and African countries? How do the Asian and African countries perceive the US political model of extra-liberal democracy promoted by the USA under George W. Bush and then substantially revised and modified by President Barack Obama in the course of the

US adaptation to the new economic and political realities? And how do the same Asian and African countries perceive different versions of liberal democracies as interpreted in different European countries? What alternative models of political and economic development are being constructed (forms of democracy and integration, civilizational or ethnic nationalism)? And, in particular, models of non-liberal democracy, hybrid regimes and the newest attempts to construct non-Western democracy (if possible) in the East, which, too, certainly tries to modernize and integrate?

That is, all these questions pertain to the process of global regions formation influencing the space and time factors of global regions and the international relations system. This could determine the direction of global development and the evolution of the global society to a new stage of globalization. Western countries, when acting on their own, setting the general course of world motion, would no longer be able to decide the destiny of the whole planet—perhaps even if they attain a new level of innovational and technological development.

In one of his books, *The Civilization: The West and the Rest*, Nial Fergusson (2011) aptly shows that at the beginning of the fifteenth century the West was able to gain the lead on the road of development as it offered six innovative concepts that were missing in other civilizations—competition, modern science, rule of law, modern medicine, economic consumption and work ethics. Today the nation-states that have not mastered these concepts efficiently are doomed invariably to lag behind. All other successful civilizations have mastered these six concepts by having started to compete in building an open-access social order, paths to its enhancement and, probably, national versions of such an order that serve as the basis for a competitive march toward the next, higher and more advanced technological and social pattern. The epoch, when these social innovations were mastered by all communities that adapted, although to different extents, to Modernity is completed. And the nature and forms of new global leadership (or the prolongation of the existing) will be generated by the competition in building the more advanced versions of the open-access social order.

Global leadership is provided not only by the current level of economic, technological and political development, but also by the ability to produce social innovation. Competition on the road of progress toward a new, more advanced technological and social pattern requires the production of social, economic and political innovations. Those nation-states or international/global regions that are able to provide for the production of

both technological and social innovations will confirm their current status of, or will become, new global leaders. However, leadership in producing technological and social innovations is hardly attainable through an attempt to lead states with natural social access in their opposition to states with open social access—at least, because some would be unwilling to join such a coalition, some (whether acting on their own or with international assistance) would be making a successful transition from the system of limited or half-closed social access to the system of open social access. And, the number of states with an open social access system will grow (simply, because this system is more open and fair) if the world arrangement is not archaized because of some global catastrophe that could not be foreseen or prevented.

This will be the course of the agenda that prevailed in World Politics in the 1990s and 2000s—the extension of that IR sub-field, the further intellectualization of argumentation and incorporation of the new agenda pertaining to the appearance of regional subsystems of international relations and the new regional realities.

We see a series of new questions related to comparative politics (Chilcote 1994) and connected with the transformation and reformatting of the global political space, such as: To what extent would the new forms of Eastern democracy and integration be alternative to the existing ones? What is the economic and political future of such new forms? Can they influence the vector of global development?

By Weber's admission, states with open access order have monopolized the control over the legitimate use of violence and do so by putting the armed forces under the control of a political system that guarantees a change of power if control is abused. This capacity rests on the support of impersonal relations within the state and on a broader scale (North et al. 2009, 71–72, cited by the Russian edition, 2011). To protect their populations, the economically most developed states with open social access established the most powerful military-political bloc in the world—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the world is not free from skeptics who doubt the bloc's political abilities to repel a real threat. At the same time, the military force of NATO politically reinforces the support for proliferation of impersonal relations on a broader scale and meanwhile guarantees the protection of the open social access system from without. Proliferation of impersonal relations and impersonal international institutes of cooperative development generally helps to reduce the dangers of confrontation—first and foremost, between states with open social

access (democracies do not make war with one another, but at the same time and, *inter alia*, under certain conditions), as well as between states with different systems of social access, as generally states do not disarm and go on supporting their military force (Dynkin and Ivanova 2011). This, as some argue in Russia, may offer a chance to construct depersonalized concepts of foreign policy interaction and theories of the given state's foreign political activities with maximal abstraction from the ideological factor in global policy (Kondratov 2010). But, to reach agreements and mutual understanding between states with an open type of social access and between states with open and natural types of social access is more difficult and takes more effort, while such agreements are less solid. This may be explained by the differences in state organization within these systems of social and political access. However, assumptions such as these need further empirical verification.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, after terrorist attacks in capital cities of leading states with open social access systems and their retaliatory military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, the earlier existing system of balance between states with different social orders ceased to exist. Before that, the system of balance was supported by the nuclear and military parity of the USSR and USA in the European-type international system. The logic of this system subordinated all other interests to sustain this parity because otherwise the situation would result in a nuclear war. After the collapse of the bipolar system, the peace conferences at Yalta-Potsdam order transformed as there arose the need to have a new, modified system of world regulation and to sustain global stability on the basis of control over the key parameters that help to sustain stability and meanwhile do not hamper development.

The process of transformation as a whole went sufficiently far to become evident in the connection with the appearance of new non-state actors of global policy and the ongoing evolution of national sovereignty. However, this process of evolution is too far from its accomplishment. At the same time, the evolutionary transformation in the direction of consensual convergence of the global order, rather than the forceful destruction of it for the benefit of not catching up, is beneficial for almost all major actors of the global process. It enables them to exercise competition of development models while preserving the existing national level of economic growth, the national system of social access and without putting the lives of their respective population at risk—i.e., to use combinations of national, regional, supranational and transnational factors in order to

search for a more favorable position, corresponding to their national interests, in the international system. Having taken such a position, they would be able to participate in the evolutionary transformation of the given system by the global society in the way that would be most favorable for their respective nation. They would do this by spending efforts mainly for the re-articulation and correction of the world system and functioning rules rather than for devising and applying military-force methods of problem resolution that incur large costs in the context of domestic economic and demographic potential, and quite often are too expensive but least effective in terms of resolving the long-term agenda and goals.

The last decades saw the discourse on the paths to building the open social access orders in different regional realities and with different amounts of influence rendered by national and historical specifics (the discourse on democracy in Russia and China). The need for the monopolized consolidation of definitions pertaining to the variability of parameters and characteristics of some or other political regimes as those that successfully built the open social access order is connected with the fact that the number of states with mature openness of social access (the consolidated democracy regimes) is quite modest and that they are bound by close military-political relations with NATO and a number of bilateral military-political alliances. The need for intellectual de-monopolizing variability in building the open social access orders is connected with the transition to polycentrism. At the same time, the logic of transition from unipolarity (under which the leader of the world system invariably had to weaken all other competing centers of force and influence) to multi-polarity, which has shifted the emphasis toward the need for the leader to build a system of maximally friendly relations with other centers of force and influence in the world system, sets forth the question as to whether competition is possible among regional versions of the open social-access order (and, even more so, methods of its construction) with the preservation of general understanding of basic features of such order and without invariable strengthening of military-political confrontation between global regions and centers of power. Methodological instruments and practical analysis of these processes in the most important regional segments of the world are the major subject of study in World Regional IR Studies as a Social Science IR sub-field.

For countries of the East, today the political and economic vectors of modernization are connected mainly with the search for socio-economic and political development (whether imported or autochthonous) that

would be relevant to the global rules and help modernize their social orders. Their modernization will progress through stages, which compared to those in Western countries, are generally similar in terms of structural parameters but at the same time differ in terms of time sequence and concrete content. Some national communities in Eastern countries actively experiment with social order transformation. All of them are busy searching for developments that would elevate the level of security, political stability and wealth for their national communities. They want to preserve their cultural identity and self-identification in the globalizing world, build up their reputation and hence position themselves in the remaining informal hierarchized structure of the world system formed by *de jure* equal sovereign states. They want to enhance and transform their domestic social orders and the existing global order without rearranging the world radically and/or undermining the existing world system. Some radical movements and even some countries seek to undertake the latter, although without success.

The West elaborated a system of institutes of open social order and disseminated it, and thus opened the epoch for other national states to master this system, including Eastern states. They now have the opportunity to compete with the West in constructing better adapted and hence more competitive regional versions of such order within the single, tightly entangled, interconnected and mutually overlying space of policy, economy and security. To build such a system “in isolation”—i.e., without a single and closely entangled space of policy, economy, law norms and security—would be hardly, if ever, possible. In economic terms, following only the self-reliance road is *a priori* costlier than domestic transformations based on the consolidation and expansion of the space of collective security, international law and shared political perceptions. Building national versions of open social access enables non-Western countries to resolve the issues of national development and modernization without excessive spending of their budget for arms procurement, but as well without neglecting the agenda of their defense capacity. This allows the use of supranational sources for investments as well as for technological and institutional modernization of the nation, thus raising the quality of life for the national population in the territory of the home country rather than expelling the most talented and active people into internal or external emigration. It also orients the country to the future rather than to the present or past.

The particular historical development of the macro-regional segments of the world, the structure of the national social order and therewith connected civilizational specifics of economic systems, the type of national political systems and regimes as well as the specifics of political culture at the particular development stages of macro-regional segments—these are the factors that determine the general nature of any given historical stage and at the same time the development vector of the international society. A comparative analysis of the world's political systems and an adequate understanding of the political culture of non-Western/Eastern societies create favorable conditions for the actual establishment of mutually beneficial interstate and intersocietal relations, and enables nation-states of a different type to find their proper place in the global system, to raise the level of general involvement in the global policy, to enhance self-assessment and friendly perception and meanwhile not to lose the prospects of general development. All of the reasons mentioned predetermine the importance of such analysis for policymakers and diplomats.

All these factors and circumstances reflect the practical value of the given research and education vector for future policymakers, political managers, diplomats and foreign-policy analysts, whose task is to be able to provide a relevant and unbiased explanation, as well to forecast the course of global, regional and national processes. The goals of their activity is to find the niches of the most favorable development for their respective countries, rather than (whether unintentionally or intentionally) to contribute to undermining of the existing models of global and regional stability as well as to aggravate confrontation and stand-offs. As shown in the historical experience of the twentieth century, confrontations and stand-offs lead to calamities, tragedies, and political and economic catastrophes. Wars and demographic changes put enormous strain on national communities. In this connection, the practical task of politicians and political scientists is to explain why some national communities were able to find their way to stable economic and political development, while others cannot escape the recurrent cycles of deadlock, military balancing and reproduction of the already existing, invariable or least modifiable political and economic institutions, which guarantee nothing but periodic catastrophic shocks. Once in a while these shocks force policymakers to face the practical task of “restoration,” “reiterated normalizations” or periodic “rebooting”/restarting of relations. All of these actions could succeed, but they also risk failure. They could even deteriorate relations with particular nation-states and thus cause a direct impact on economic ties and economic partner-

ships. When a systemic domestic political crisis occurs in some states, these shocks and moves may “purge” the political tier of foreign-policy staff and the danger of least measured “foreign political reorientation,” which in the long term may lead to overstrain of forces, demographic losses and weakening or even collapse of the given national state.

In this respect, a political scientist or expert in IR, who has mastered World Regional Studies, has been “comprehensively trained” (i.e., received comprehensive interdisciplinary methodological and practical training) and mastered the methodology of cross-regional political analysis. He/she would be able to produce a unique theoretical or practical “intellectual product” synthesizing the global rules (global policy and global processes), regional regularities and regional specifics and regional problems (through cross-regional political analysis and comprehensive analysis of world regions), as well as profound understanding of by-country and local specifics (comparative Area Studies (Ariel 2011)). World Regional Studies as an IR sub-field is oriented to train exactly such kind of specialists—that is, to provide students majoring in International Relations, World History and Comparative Political Science with a generalized structural picture of the current role of macro-regions in global processes, world policy and international relations including the non-Western macro-regions. The main task of World Regional Studies is to elaborate a conceptual framework for an objective vision of contemporary intertwined global, regional and national processes; that is, the understanding of not just the West-centric but also other than West-centric views of the world that generally reflect the global development and, as much as possible, mirror its comprehensive and interconnected nature. Such an understanding of global, regional and national processes suggests:

- The existence, at particular historical stages of development, of various types of social order such as primitive, natural and open.
- Natural social order at different time phases of its development acts as a fragile natural order, basic natural order and mature natural order with identified different structural subtypes of the mature natural order: archaic, traditional, enclave-type, enclave-conglomerating, conglomerating, hybrid and transitional.
- A researcher may differentiate the following types of society, which correspond to the different types of social order: primitive, archaic, traditional, enclave, conglomerating, enclave-conglomerating, hybrid, transitional and homogenized/pluralistic, cross-cultural and

synthetic. This differentiation helps to better explain the possibility/impossibility of transitioning from one type of social order to another within societies of different types. The different explanations of the nature of domestic development in different types of societies and their interactions and worldwide trends can be modified with regard to specific time-bound (historical) and spatial (regional/political/geographic) realities in connection with peculiarities of intra-regional factors;

- The existence of cultural and socio-psychological specifics (i.e., political culture, national psychology, national character, peculiarity of national economy and management, all preconditioned by the national specifics and the type of social order) is connected with the special role of transforming but not fully eliminating time and space factors, which do not supersede/reject global regularities and trends, but in most cases determine the nature, sequence, pace, time length and specifics of the stages of worldwide processes at regional and national-historical stages of modernization and development;
- The existence of various archetypes of modernization correlates with various subtypes of societies, time phases of their development and the national specifics;
- The existence of various models and regularities of economic and political development, which are predetermined by differences of economic and sociopolitical structures in particular countries, are “inscribed” within global politico-economic regularities of the world development.

In this new and at the same time old (because of the existence of Area Studies in the past) IR sub-field, the analysis of general problems pertaining to global policy and international relations is combined organically with a vision of the world through the prism of World Regional Studies. The major methodological base for the analysis of historical and political processes is formed by the principles of cross-regional political analysis based on methodology and methods applied in the development of structural Social Science theories and Political Science in particular. These provisions rest on the fact that the last decade in International Political Science was marked by the ever more fruitful convergence of classical Area Studies and disciplinary (especially, political and politico-economic) studies (Global Policy, Comparative Political Science, International/Global Political Economy, Economics and Spatial Economy, etc.). These relied

first and foremost on the methodology of Comparative Political Science (O'Neil 2010; O'Neil et al. 2010; Hague and Harrop 2010; Clark et al. 2009 among others). Such scientific synthesis is based on the principles of structural-spatial, temporal and cross-regional political analysis. These works make it possible to identify the comparative perspective in the specifics and temporal dynamics of sociopolitical processes unfolding in the world and in the East, the latter having the stronger influence on the general trends of global development. At the same time, they help clarify what and how national models of modernization and development can be corrected. This may be done in order to accelerate modernization processes rationally. One of the ways to do this is by shortcutting the road where it can be done on the basis of scientifically correct theoretical understanding of global processes and accumulated global experience. At the same time, it can be done without forcing the given country's population in case the development potential laid in the model of rotating mobilization/stabilization stages is fully exhausted, with an understanding of historical inevitability to undergo the development phases, already underwent by some other states of the world and to be undergone by the follower states.

Thus, World Regional Studies as a new, culturally unbiased interdisciplinary framework for analyzing international relations highlights the following new and important issues in the practice of interstate and international relations:

- What are the major trends of contemporary studies pertaining to the role of the world regions in global process, and what makes them valuable and important for a proper understanding of global development problems;
- What was the course of formation and what makes the essence of the logic for comprehensive analysis of regional agendas in international relations;
- What marks the principal difference between Western and Eastern societies and the inherent subtypes of the social order at particular historical stages; what is the course of identifying the specifics of sociopolitical processes in the West and East; what is the main value and practical implications of such an analysis; in what way is the synthesis of various cultural traditions that provides for cultural and civilizational variety as well as cross-cultural approach serving the foundation for multidimensional advanced social development;

- What are the major archetypes of modernization in the East in reference to the development stages of the world and countries of the Western area; what is the course of transition from the modernization stage in the colonial period to the stage of agrarian-market and authoritarian development of the de-colonizing East; what is the impact of such a transition on the foreign-policy dimension; the later formation course of anti-authoritarian/post-authoritarian, industrial and post-industrial development models—with reference to the fact that the only available regional form of the latter model (the Western model of post-industrial development) started to be disputed actively at the Eastern states' stage of political modernization that coincided with the global financial crisis and the obvious need to reformulate the regional Western model, which earlier had been considered the only correct one, as no alternative and/or competing models of equal value were available in states with open social access (Karoui 2010) that it should be stressed here additionally that the absence of such competing models probably can be explained by the need for consolidated development with the system of open social access. That is, the numerical growth of states with an open social access system probably will allow posing the question about the existence of various regional models of such a system (Western and non-Western democracies);
- What is the essence of such phenomena as macro-regionalism and cross-regionalism/cross-regional cooperation, and how does the relevant understanding of the nature of the given processes enable some particular countries to retain their leadership, while other countries narrow the gap between themselves and their leaders, and some others join the group of leaders by having corrected their paths of global development;
- What makes the formation of regional systems of international relations in the East, and what makes the agenda of regional subsystems important for understanding the general regularities of international relations;
- How is the global trend of macro-regionalization/cross-regionalism being manifested in regions of the East; how can the experience of these countries be applied by others, in particular, Russia;
- What role is the East playing in contemporary global processes and why exactly (and also by whom) the East started to be perceived as the alternative to the West; what is the course of discussion on

global leadership in the last decades and what makes it important; how do the new world centers of power and influence take shape in the global system;

- What is the meaning of the Eastern and, more generally, regional dimension of global development, and what is the influence of this dimension on the vectors, pace and nature of global processes and on our understanding of global regularities?

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the trend for the growing comprehensiveness in understanding different states and regions was taking shape within the mainstream of the traditional discipline of Area Studies, previously differentiated by the fields of disciplinary knowledge (History, Politics, Economics, and Military Geopolitics of a certain country) but not on the basis of cross-country or cross-regional commonalities. Having taken shape by the late nineteenth to early twentieth century, several major national traditions of Area Studies were featured with remarkable originality. In Europe, there are major independent, national and academic schools including the German, French, British, Swedish and Russian schools. Beyond Europe, the American and Australian schools gained relevance, along with the new, rapidly developing Chinese school. The end of the twentieth century was marked by two trends: the understanding of the methodological limitations of traditional Area Studies and at the same time of the inadequacy of IR, International Political Economy (IPE) and Political Science in explaining the reality outside the Western-centered theories. Thus the search for interdisciplinarity by traditional disciplines started and sought to answer the inadequacy of both specifics-centered Area Studies and global/Western-centered IR, IPE and Political Science. With IR acting as a branch of Social Sciences—World Regional Studies, World Regional Geography, Global Political Economy—as well as within the framework of different but intellectually interconnected national traditions, I see the more profound understanding of Social Science principles being applied in order to identify a correlation between general (general political) and specific (regional) regularities, and in the mainstream of comparative analysis of Global Politics as being interconnected with regional/local political problems. Hence, it becomes possible to substantiate the applied principles of a methodologically and culturally unbiased, non-West-centric vision of the world and to promote the further development of the theoretical foundations of International Relations. In order to address the new global reality, we should have a suitable methodological framework

that can encompass these new international and national developments and not necessarily a particular non-Western or Western IR. However, it is also clear that there will be some attempts beyond that—to further conceptualize the non-Western reality through the tool allegedly pretending to be a specific non-Western theory aside of regional level mid-range concepts of theories that are explaining regional specifics along the global rules within the emerging discipline of World Regional Studies. The hardest problem will be to find consent among the international research and academic community—to consider them both methodologically rigorous, original and coherent enough to be called a non-Western IR theory.

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What Is Missing in the Western IR Theories: Space as a Core Dimension in World Regional Studies

5.1 THEORETICAL-APPLIED ASPECTS WITHIN THE IR REGIONAL DIMENSION

One of the most prolific macro-theoretical approaches to regional segments of International Relations (IR) is the systemic/structural approach. Some argue that it is too general. Some appraise it for its comprehensiveness because it absorbs the bulk of events and phenomena that take place in other approaches discretely. Yet, principally it allows us to figure out the regional tier consisting of regional complexes and regional subsystems as self-sustained analytical research objects (Thompson 1973; Buzan and Wæver 2003). Apart from that, this approach serves both theoretical and quite practical applied goals: it helps to single out and compare the key macro-regions of the world, and afterwards, on the regional level, it allows us to scrutinize how common (universal) tendencies are adapted to the macro-regional and regional geographic/historical/historical-cultural/civilizational entities, various regional organizations that are larger than national states, as well as those pertaining to the intrastate regions. Separation of the regional tier of analysis as a theoretical and practical issue makes it possible to come down to the issue of the region/area/country specificity more appropriately and concisely at once, as it puts the latter into the context of regional trends—i.e., modified with respect to a specific group of objects bound by certain common grounds, rather than

intuitive informal historiosophic ratiocinations that are cross-cultural in nature.

The regional and sub-regional subsystem issues are debated by the global scholarly communities. These discussions include up-to-date trends in contemporary international affairs—globalization, regionalization and fragmentation, as well as the very notion of the region itself and particular regional decomposition of the world. What the world will look like in the nearest future depends, ultimately, on the practical outcomes of these discussions, as the range of the regional tier issues directly correlates with the practical experience in international relations and diplomacy. There are two types of factors at play here: objective and subjective. Objective factors include things like insufficient funds to run education centers in compliance with global standards, financial restraints and visa revocations, impeding science-analytical activity and fruitless in-depth research into a paternalist state of a resource type. Subjective factors include the absence of demand for scientific prognostications that may perform the role of predictions, archaism and low quality science and educational systems, irrelevance of the pluralistically educated people in power structures in certain countries, removal from discussions, etc. The outcome of this discourse decreases or increases the price on future formatting to a certain country because it calls for using other approaches, at times much more expensive, or alternatively, deprives a country from participation in its self-sustained future layout in general, coercing it to import or borrow concepts because its own end up useless and uncompetitive.

When the world was viewed from a bipolar interaction angle, the subordinate nature of the regional and sub-regional subsystem issues did not raise doubts because it had been explained by the global systemic issues of bipolar stand-off logic. Following collapse of the bipolar relations structure, the situation was exacerbated further and numerous questions cropped up, which still cannot be answered unequivocally.

If the bipolar system had vanished and afterwards was replaced by a polycentric world, then is it correct to claim that the world got broken down into relatively close-knit territorial-economic regions and sub-regions, corresponding to any center of the international system. Does this mean that there are no and will be no common/global tendencies—only a combination of mega-regional or sub-regional levels of cooperation/competition? Or are we able to assert a completely new quality of regional processes that influence the global relations? If the latter is true,

then what exactly is this completely new nature of regional influence on the global level of relations?

What are the criteria for the differentiation/segmentation of the global space under this new environment and do we need this? And if we do, then what are the ways that could assist in tracing a link between internal structures of national states and their behavior in the world arena?

In this sense, more specific questions arise:

How is it methodologically correct to discern boundaries between a region (and a regional subsystem) and sub-regions (sub-regional subsystems)?

What are the interrelationships among the macro-regions from the perspective of emerging regional subsystems and sub-regional intercourses and stand-offs, rather than in a geographic sense? Consider areas such as the Asia-Pacific region and Eastern, Southern, Northeastern and Southeastern Asia, or inside the Pan-American relations subsystem between the Latin American and North American regional complexes. What is the link between the common vector of domestic politics in the macro-regions and their foreign-economic/foreign-political conduct?

What are the expansion principles and how far do the frontiers of the macro-regions stretch? Consider the EU or Greater Europe, Greater Eastern Asia, Greater Middle East or Greater Central Asia.

Do borders of macro-regions align with the regional subsystems?

How do the regional subsystems/civilizational worlds/civilizations and social access types correlate conceptually and geographically? Or, how do systems of international-regional, cultural-anthropological and social-political differentiation match up?

What is the ratio between globalization and regionalization, and does the regionalization process reflect the fact that the global international system broke down into macro-regional subsystems with intricate interaction between each other—each one a virtually independent system? Or, is it merely a subsystem—are there modifications of commonalities relating to the political-geographic, historical-economic and cultural-civilizational specific traits?

Or is fragmentation a side effect and shaded area of globalization and regionalization? Conversely, does it facilitate retraction of the dropped-out fragments if not into the global, then at least into regional constellations, improving their competitive power?

How should fragmentation of the world or its parts in the adjacent territories be addressed? How should a country be prevented from falling out of world development on objective or subjective accounts?

These issues spark lively discussions because the macro-regionalization and transregionalism trends in the Eastern Hemisphere (Dent and Dosch 2012), unlike in the Western one, are still in their youth. How they will affect global evolution is not completely clear. These concerns have both theoretical and applied implications and, simultaneously, highlight a need for political analysis of the regional processes precisely in the East. Nevertheless, they require their theoretical conceptualization in general, rather than in light of a necessity for a particular non-Western theories elaboration.

After the collapse of the bipolar model amid the evolving world order apart, and aside from the Western coalition of states (NATO and the EU-USA Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) (Rosecrance 2013), the new centers of power and influence started to emerge: China, India and Russia returned to world politics through an informal alliance. Later, the more formalized one was launched—BRIC—which later on grew into BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (Pimentel 2013). The impact of these new power centers, the New Great Powers, and their unions or competition on the contemporary IR system is evident (Emmott 2009), but their ideology, in the new world and/or regional order context, is still vague (Yoshihara and Sylva 2012). Their social order type is also unclear though the interim character of it is obvious. This will eventually be established in some of these states with each one endeavoring to modernize themselves to an extent, first and foremost on an individual basis.

Depending on foreign and domestic factors, these states may place emphasis on both military brinkmanship—fraught with a new twist of the world military stand-off—and cross-border cooperation within BRICS—depending on which trend is prevalent or will subjectively seem to them as dominant in the world. South Africa and Brazil, as new emerging states, are unlikely to have their own vision of reconstructing the old and building up a new world order, but are crucial new nascent centers of power in the context of re-designing the old and building up a new cooperation model that would guide the world order. This is because they have progressed farther than the other BRICS nations (except for India) in creating the open social access system.

The contours of the new regional configuration models of political-economic space and new world order have begun evolving. They have

not been given their finishing touches yet. Against this background in the USA, a contentious political discourse on the US position in the world, its policy with regards to China, Russia, the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East has been raging. Similar discussions have been taking place in Russia, China and India, because the global space has been de facto differentiated—split up into macro-regions, regional sub-systems and evolving *global regions of the world*—macro-regional segments and regional subsystems with competing regional models and their prevalent ways of social-political access, having preserved the equilibrium in the global relations system. The new global regions of the world are as follows:

- The macro-regional subsystem and evolving global region known as the West or North. That is, in political-economic terms, —open-type market economies with democratic rule. In military-political terms, this refers to NATO, and structurally, this refers to states with an open social access system. That is, a strongly integrated coalition of states, consisting of two regional segments like the EU and NAFTA and states adjacent to them unified by common values, a single system of an open-type social order and tight political-economic interaction;
- Loosely integrated Latin American regional subsystem of states with predominantly natural social access and also open-type social access, with the social system of a conglomerated, hybrid, transitional and open type combined with the two macro-integrational projects: twined by the USA and the weaker but gradually burgeoning Latin American integrational project itself, advanced by the Latin American states that are powerful in economic and military-political terms;
- The Greater Middle East, torn apart by political controversies and economically heterogeneous, bound up by the confessional-civilizational unity and the geographic factor of being a go-between among Europe, Russia, up-and-coming China and India along with Sub-Saharan Africa. This macro-region incorporates states with the traditional, archaized social access and states with the natural social-political access at different historical stages of its development;
- The Greater Eastern Asia, being geographically tighter than the Asian-Pacific region, and playing the role of the chief geopolitical region in the world and, at the same time, the main industrial and, possibly, technological development region in the world for decades to come. This macro-regional subsystem consists of states with natu-

ral social-political access, as well as open-type social-political access or that are going through a transitional phase of their development.

In terms of the pace of integration and globalization, the West has stepped farther and carried out deeper initiatives. However, global integration and globalization rates depend more on to what extent and how these global tendencies will encompass the world and, in particular, Russia and the Eastern countries. These nations are sending out impetuses of partially stiff resistance to these processes, though they vary through time. The systemic-structural approach combined with the other approaches empowers a researcher with a rich theoretical and methodological apparatus, so as to search for appropriate responses to these concerns from the perspective of deepening and extending the theoretical foundation for understanding international affairs. It does not necessarily call for devising special, non-Western theories of IR.

The systemic/structural approach has been gaining momentum since the mid-1950s. Also, the majority of provisions in the theory of IR, which do not pertain to the systemic approach, were elaborated previously. However, systemic ideas became especially widespread after the publication of the classic works by the political scientists Talkott Parsons (1951) and David Easton (1953, 1965, 1990). They viewed the political system as a systemic totality of relations, being in uninterrupted intercourse with its outer environment via the “ins” and “outs” mechanisms in compliance with the basic ideas of cybernetics. According to this philosophy, domestic politics were not given much consideration. Internal politics mechanisms were handled as a “black box.” This approach at once revealed the methodological narrowness of its implementation. Simultaneously, scholars pointed out that international relations had its own specific traits: first and foremost, they are social relations in their essence, thus, international systems (Buzan 2000) and subsystems belong to the social systems type. This means that they should be regarded as complex, adapting systems, and not equivalent to the mechanical systems models. This circumstance provided a theoretical opportunity for viewing what is going on inside “the black box” from the angle of how these processes are influencing foreign policies.

The IR systems, as a rule, belong to the open and loosely organized type systems that develop through history (Buzan 2000). In such systems, it is arduous to draw a distinct line and therefore scrutinize the system in isolation from the environment, and, vice versa. The spatial limits

of such systems have a conditional nature. Although the subsystems (for example, the EU or the Asia-Pacific region) differ in the nature of their relations with their environment, not only do they really exist, but they also have some spatial limits. Frequently these limits change and overlap one another and are conditional. To an extent, this touches upon all the regional systems and subsystems. They feature particular and complex networks between the existing social communities, interaction whereof has the definite signs of systemic-spatial organization, the internal structure of which should influence their foreign-relations system as well, rather than several analytical objects.

Another distinct trait of the IR system and components of its regional subsystems relates to the fact that their fundamental constituents are represented by social entities (including individuals). They are social systems of a particular type with a low degree of elements integration alongside significant elements autonomy. The next characteristic manifests itself in the circumstance that international affairs are basically political relations, the principal elements whereof are interstate relations. Even if the number of actors expands, relations between them and a state will mainly retain political or political-economic nature, whereas in order of influence strategic issues a state as a political institution remains the clear winner in comparison to the other actors.

In Social Sciences there are various approaches to International Relations as a system (in this sense, we intentionally said that the systemic approach appears to be absorbing the main contents of what is often interpreted in other approaches), the most known whereof are:

- *traditional-historical*, the international system features diplomatic relations between states within a historical period;
- *historical-sociological*, promoting the idea of social determinateness of a specific historical IR system;
- *structural-historical*, historical systems within the IR system are figured out, whereby they rely on the differences of a historically pre-determined structure;
- *world-political*, various historical types of regional and world systems, as well as historical types of structurally different world orders are highlighted;
- *empirical-regional* or *socio-natural*, certain geographical regions act as (sub)systems within international economic, political and other relations;

- *structural-diplomatic*, understanding presumptions, skills, forms of response, rules, norms and procedures, drawn up, accepted and used by actors while achieving their various individual goals within concerted diplomatic endeavors;
- *realist*, different balance of power models or power balance—the presence of an international system without the political subsystems and consisting of two to five players, as well as clear sets of rules, to which these actors abide;
- *idealist* or *structurally cooperative*, different models of regional sub-systems, interaction and integration, identified by the complex structural analysis of a regional profile of international relations and the macro-regional tier of world politics.

The most important in all of these approaches is the extraction of the global international relations system. In other words, a kind of a self-sustained systemic world political totality, allowing the description and analysis of international relations in general, but at the same time, defining rational division principles into certain sub-systemic segments, enrooted in the spatial-regional and functional structure of global links, internal organization whereof exerts pressure on foreign interaction (Thompson 1973; Buzan and Wæver 2003).

In the 1990s, several IR academics proclaimed the compelling need for distinguishing between general/universal and particular/specific challenges in the IR systems and singling out the regional tier of international relations as a self-sufficient analysis level. This was because of nascent tendencies towards globalization, on the one hand, and regionalization, on the other. Scholars asserted that a range of international interactions, outside of the global tier interactions, enjoy sufficient autonomy and need to be given conceptualized explanations. They paid attention to the fact that there are instant tendencies, attributed to the specificity of the international system constituents' performance (spatial-temporal, spatial-geographic, territorial-economic, cultural-civilizational, ethno-psychological, ethno-confessional, etc.). These narrower (particular) trends depict the performance of regional and sub-regional systems—aggregations of specific international interactions, at the heart of which lies common geographic and cultural-civilizational, or spatial and temporal (in a broad sense) affiliation (Harrison and Huntington 2000; Stout 2004). Trends of the recent decades have allowed the claims that:

- At present, a drastically new essence of regional processes is emerging that influences the global tier of international affairs;
- The global agenda is being reformatted and realized in different ways within various subsystems and respective regional complexes;
- The regional processes may claim to be global or alternative to global ones or the regional processes may exert sway or rearrange the global ones;
- The hierarchy of global concerns and challenges varies across different regional subsystems;
- Different elements in the regional subsystems or various combinations of the regional tier actors influence the global tier following no single pattern: they may bolster the global order, facilitate its radical breakdown, or participate in its evolutionary transformation;
- Relative separation of the international relations regional tier (regionalization) makes it feasible to raise a question on the readjustment of the reigning theoretical approaches to international affairs, fitting out the general theory with due account for the regional tier (more radical suggestion) or building up a non-Western IR theory (more precisely, probably—non-West-centric) in concordance with the particular patterns of the largest segments within the macro-regional level;
- Relative separation of the international relations regional tier (regionalization) helped to restore an analytical salience of the space category in the international political-economic analysis and is leading to the emergence of sub-disciplinary fields at the confluence of International Relations/World Politics and Political Science: International/Comprehensive/World Regional Studies, Comparative World Politics and Critical Geopolitics, in which the space-time category is becoming central, whereas internal interaction processes are changing the nature of foreign relations.
- A decisive influence is played by the regional power redistribution processes, new configurations of macro-regional unions and blocs, which will eventually shape contours of a new regional order of the second quarter of the twenty-first century.
- The world system transformation involving internal political-economic processes in the new integrated elements of world politics—the global regions. It must be noted in this connection that nowadays, these innate political-economic processes are more similar than the

network and/or transregional cooperation, as they ultimately do shape contours of a new regional order, as well as regional / transregional links types. That is, to render it possible to practice international-political analysis and forecasting.

- Present debates on the conceptual-philosophical foundations of the contemporary world order are directly associated with the set of issues at the regional tier, where colligation of internal processes, their implications and nature of foreign interactions is possible. This happens because of the new non-Western world powers taking off, Asia's rising, discussion of the West's role and the East's positioning, ways of transforming the global leadership and re-interpretation of the pillars of Western civilization, the aftermath of power redistribution among the regions of the world, a likelihood of the non-Western world order nascence and the non-Western theory substantiating this world order, a role for Islamic, Chinese, and Indian factors in world politics, a role for BRICS, opportunities for the onset of the non-Western forms of democracy, and others.
- Incorrect or inappropriate analysis of the global or regional tendencies and ventures originates from too many inadequacies, including incommensurate interpretation of the domestic policy transformations and inaptitude to properly conceptualize the competitive regional model of modernization and development, adjusted according to the global patterns, albeit successfully adapted to the regional specificity. All this augments price on the foreign political miscalculation, exacerbates backwardness of the countries and regions, and brings on partial fragmentation of the global space and emergence of failed, underprivileged, stagnating or autarchic states and depressive regions. Furthermore, exit from this state of affairs via a catching-up development strategy and/or mobilizational leaps only becomes more arduous and less feasible.

In the 2000s, an attempt was undertaken to substantiate the systemic approach by introducing the notion of the network interaction. However, the weak theoretical conceptualization of the network approach, as well as basing it on the logical-intuitive interpretation of international environment, eventually stopped the trend towards the addition of the systemic approach by means of structural allotment (systemic-structural approach). An opportunity for using up network interaction more precisely explains the additional, previously unknown or non-existing mechanisms of

centripetal constringency of the regional subsystems into the global system. This process is turning the macro-regions that are unified by geo-spatial commonality into global regions—new highly integrated glocal actors in world politics that format the regional tier and at the same time influence the processes on a global level.

5.2 “MULTILAYERNESS” OF THE SPACE-TIME CATEGORY IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Within the International Studies discourse the modern world can be depicted as a multilayered or multistoried system, consisting of a multitude of different-sized actors, interactions, cooperation fields between them and subsystems. Simultaneously, the modern world is a complex integrated system, whereby the intercourse between its internal and external elements are differentiated, functionally consistent and changeable and possess a spatial-temporal dimension.

“Space” should be taken in the philosophic sense as a universal form of existence, materiality and time; a physical property of reality, manifesting itself in a sequence of alternating events. As Reinhart Koselleck once conveniently observed in his lectures at the New School of Social Research and also in his writings: “Any historical space constitutes itself by virtue of the time by which it can be traversed, the time that makes it politically or economically controllable. Temporal and spatial questions are always intertwined with each other, even if metaphorical power of all images of time initially stems from experience of space” (cited in Osterhammel 2014, 77; see also Koselleck 2004).

Geographic space is a totality of relations and interactions between the geographic objects located on a specific territory and evolving through time, three-dimensionally, whereas territory is two-dimensional. That is, territory features a circumscribed part of material objects’ “flat” location (Agnew et al. 2008). In Area Studies, territory is a generalizing resource, as it unifies all kinds of natural resources, population, manufacturing capacities, cultural and intellectual potential (Mashbits 1998, 93; Mironenko 2001; Gladkiy 2002). In World Regional Studies, three-dimensional spatial-temporal space of regionally segmented world political interaction is a generalizing source—cooperation space has fixed or variable distances and differences between the interconnected global regions of the world, constituting a single spatial-temporal dimension of interactions in world politics.

Spatial and temporal dimensions in the international affairs discourse can be viewed from both theoretical and applied perspectives (Agnew 1997). From the theoretical standpoint, spatial and temporal dimensions of the modern world as a system are included in the classical theoretical research in the sphere of International Relations and World Politics (spatial essence within the classical International Relations domain; spatial and temporal in the classical field of World Politics), as well as in disciplines like Sociology, Ethnology and Cultural Studies. And, even if it is included in analysis, then it is not structure-forming for these disciplines. As conveniently observed (Baur et al. 2014, 8): “although there have been many *theoretical debates* and *empirical studies* within the above fields of research about the meaning and relevance of space, even today the debate is surprisingly un-integrated: debates remain fixed within their respective fields. Interdisciplinary discussion is still the exception and so far has not resulted in a common cohesive analytical framework.”

Certainly, it does not imply that space and time categories are renounced. Not only are physical-geographic aspects of space-territory as objects of foreign political interests explored, but so are their other forms: cyberspace and informational space. The time category facilitates a comprehension of the upstream and downstream of the process, its duration and stages. It is a different matter that the emergence of new kinds of space may hinder research of traditional forms of space. As such, specific traits of cyberspace cast doubts on the space-time category validity. In the network environment, space is deprived of univocal geographic definitude, whereas the time concept is not constrained to any time belt. However, new kinds of space can be studied via research on the new properties of space. An essential trait of cyberspace is its transboundary nature. It can be construed via the consideration of transboundary and supranational phenomena as a new manifestation of traditional forms of space. At the same time, various kinds of space exist side by side, and their coexistence may foster the evolution of a contemporary world order. Cross-border Internet space does not acknowledge state boundaries, whereas the traditional state sovereignty does not easily cope with cyberspace. The coexistence of traditional state sovereignty and the Internet in concurrent spaces is a manifestation of the evolution of state sovereignty as a reflection of the current world order modification—whittling mankind down to a new technological level at a specific stage of its historical development.

Because of the complexity of their interaction, the comprehensibility of spatial and temporal dimensions as autonomous categories usually is not

studied in the classical research of IR or World Politics. These issues have vague criteria for the delineation of temporal and spatial intervals for conceiving of history—the phenomena invariability/volatility within the time span under review and space fluctuation under historical development. The point is that spatial and temporal dimensions appear within the academic discourse of international studies as a spatiality property (territoriality) and temporality that is imminent in all phenomena. For this reason, a paradox appears: without being a subject matter or featuring a structure-directing notion, spatial and temporal dimensions are simultaneously inherent in any international study from the applied perspective within the subject field of almost any humanitarian and social discipline, dealing with international affairs to any extent. However, space and time are finite or infinite depending on the standpoint and location of the scholar. The “globalization of modernity” (a term borrowed from Antony Giddens, 1984, 1985, 1999), focusing our attention on the complex of relations between local engagement (co-presence circumstances) and interaction at a distance (presence or absence links), rests on spatial-temporal distantiation, “out-stretch of space” and “compression of time.” Social relations, built in local contexts in traditional societies, in the modern community, are globalized in such a way that local relations are shaped by events and existence that are thousands of kilometers away from them. Communication modes between various social contexts and regions are being stretched across the entire surface of the earth. This process is dialectic in nature because it has a backside as well: regional/local relations can evolve in opposition to global relations.

There is a widespread radical viewpoint on space dissolution. It implies an evanescence of time or the “phasing out” of space and time into one point-line. In the global world, it progresses from one evolution point to another, and the exodus of humanity from the spatial/temporal differentiation (Thomas Friedman (2006) and his theory of the “flat world”), virtually rests on Giddens’s theory of “discontinuative interpretation” of the contemporary social development. A critical viewpoint on the social evolutionism concept comes up to this vision on the release of the social systems from the space-time influence (Giddens 1984, 1985, 1999). Social relations are forced out from the local contexts of interaction and are reconstructed in an unrestrained spatial-temporal scope according to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of International Relations and World Politics. More moderate and realist international relations experts have a critical attitude to this radical thesis, although they also underline the fact that

space differentiation, including such categories as the geographic layout and geographic proximity/remoteness and time (recurrence/stages of development) are losing their significance as the pace of globalization speeds up.

Such a stance is not bereft of the earnest basics. Space of quite an urbanized part of the modern world, structurally located at one of the time spans, is called post-industrial or developed, i.e., that which has built up an open social access and converted its competitive advantages into a qualitatively more sophisticated level of economic development. Or, it is possible to regard this part of the world and urbanized hubs of non-urbanized space and impose restraints on studies, or constructing material for theories and concepts by only this part of the world. They consider it a backbone of the world system, whereas the periphery either will always remain a periphery because of the world system's centralized profile, or will be gradually reorganized, adapted and incorporated as a constituent part of the urbanized centers (Sassen 2012). But the space compression notion comes under two guises: compression as communicational rapprochement—greater cohesion, accessibility and space pervasiveness, which is perceived positively—and locational compression—constriction of the developed space, which could engender concentration grading into polarization. When resources for development become scarce, even for the periphery, that is certainly perceived negatively, or if a global cataclysm or world catastrophe occurs (natural or man-made).

Yet, alongside the “flat” contemporary domain of the world there still exists a traditional component as well—a “spherical” one, albeit due to globalization and related technologies the “spherical” part of the world is quite rapidly (first and foremost, *technically* and *infrastructurally*) but erratically (*technologically* and *meaningfully*) “flattening.” Life is full of contrasts between the “flat” and “spherical” parts of the world (city agglomerations of New York, London, Tokyo, Moscow, New Delhi, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Mumbai, Shanghai, Chongqing and their suburbs or/and residence places of tribal social organizations in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Africa, Australia, Caucasus, etc.) and the transition from one part to another presents severe difficulties. Having moved by rapid transport (a jet, turbojet, Japanese “Shinkansen”/French TGV/or Russian “Sapsan”) at the velocity of 300–900 km/h to another urbanized point of a country or world, you go farther at the maximal speed of 5–90 km/h and this transportation can be restricted and/or complicated by the spatial (geographic) factor. The distances are not so important, as is the ways of

covering them; that is, space's "accessibility," which is indirectly defined by the transport isochronal lines (social, technological and other kinds of accessibilities). Mobile phones and the Internet shorten the distance and "flatten" the world, but still cannot physically transfer an individual to any location in the world and/or at once modify the world outlook of an individual or a group of individuals (for example, in local traditional societies). Apart from that, the application of state-of-the-art transport and communication technologies can be limited by physical-geographic conditions.

Say, cellular network availability areas in Moscow/Rio de Janeiro and the vicinities of Moscow/Rio de Janeiro are highly variable when compared to with the Tomsk region in Siberia or the Amazon River jungles. By and large, cellular network availability maps in various regions quite vividly illustrate the issue of communication accessibility as a means of space integration.

Different types of time correspond to different types of space; different types of space reflect the structural difference within societies; time-space structural differentiation is reflected in a different kind of differentiation within world space, each of which is described differently by a distinctive academic discipline (Economy, History, Political Science, International Relations and World Politics, etc.).

The development of space:

- is inertial and depends highly on the inherited factors;
- is frequently uneven because of both the geographic factors and erratic economic development, as a result of differences in the pace of competitiveness (economic and political);
- is the correlation of various types of spaces (flat, interim, spherical) and it changes in fits and starts, bringing on issues that require their conceptualization and solution;
- has its own institutionalization types, which may conglomerate, albeit not synthesize in practice.

It must be noted that each kind of space has its own type of time.

The framework of spatial analyses that must be somehow incorporated in the future of International Studies—of a Western as well as of a non-Western character—must comprise or reflect, as conveniently summarized by Baur et al. (2014, 14), a framework for spatial analysis with such positions as: (1) imagining space; (2) creating space; (3) experiencing and

appropriating space; (4) interaction in space; (5) relations and movements between spaces.

In real life, the two main types of space (spherical and flat) and the third—an interim between the two mentioned—have two dimensions: absolute and relational (physical and socially constructed), and respective main and subordinate types of time (cyclical and linear, and interim including cyclical-helical, spiral, progressively reciprocating, regressively reciprocating, etc.), which are typical to structurally different types of societies. Each has its own reaction rate and even overlaps the other, setting up a single and structurally differentiated “multilayered” spatial field of International Relations and World Politics co-existing in time, but located at various temporal stages of their development. Their correlation, however, does not lean on the “spherical” that in effect testifies “compression” of time and “extension” (“flattening”) of space, minimization (“defiance”) of the spatial factor and, obviously, more tangible influence by the temporal factor (increase in time “value”) as mankind evolves.

Progress forecasts, associated with the “oscillation” of time-space, depend on which time and space scale is chosen for the analysis of a spatial-temporal streak of events. The space development scheme is multi-specific and multi-wave. The stage of space development can be construed as expansion, but at a specific moment in time innovations suddenly fade away and a concentration process begins, whereby previously developed spaces gradually vanish. Such an interpretation does not exclude both “revanche” of the traditional time-space and an attempt by the traditional time-space at “engulfing” more contemporary essence in the hope for the return of the cognitive image of the traditional societies from the past. The converse is also true: deft development of space speeds up time flow and accelerates development, “encompassing” the traditional space-time and marginalizing the space occupied by it.

The very fact frequently ignored is that in primitive and traditional societies people do not need a clock or watch, as time is determined by the sun, and manufacturing activity does not call for more precise time measurement. In contemporary societies clocks are unnecessary because time surrounds us everywhere: on displays of laptops, mobile phones, GPS systems, automobile computers, on the radio and on air and even on displays of microwave ovens. Simultaneously, time is gaining in value, at least because of the fact that computerization allows us more opportunity to fulfill greater numbers of tasks in its standardized intervals. The time transformation process in historical development is reflected in

the scholarly literature and historical works (Christen 2011). However, studying the time notion in light of human evolution is a task assigned not only to history.

It is worth mentioning that the up-to-date cultural neuroscience surveys illustrate that linguistic affiliation boils down to the different mentality types (the theory of linguistic relativism) and dissimilar world outlooks. As Russian neurologist Professor Yuri Aleksandrov once noted, the space within a time metaphor is envisaged by people depending on which language they speak and how they write: if you ask a Russian, English, Jewish, Arabian and Japanese person to lay two apples—one whole and another nibbled—on the table so as to depict the sequence of the nibbling process, then the Russian and English person would place the whole apple to the left and the nibbled to the right. The Hebrew and Arabic speaking people would do just the opposite, and the Japanese would put them vertically. Such a placement of things and construction of logic chains correlates with text construction: horizontally from left to right and from right to left, or alternatively, vertically from left to right and from right to left. Intriguingly, the Chinese had been using *wenyan* (the classical written language) up until the middle of the twentieth century, which was written at first from right to left and from top to bottom (traditional texts), and then from left to right; first, from top to bottom and then finally horizontally. Up to now, the Chinese from Eastern Asia (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore) can write from left to right vertically (top to bottom), as well as from right to left horizontally, or even from right to left vertically. A new direction in scientific research—cultural neuroscience—explains the brain’s neuron specialization process with regards to specific behavioral acts. It puts together the emergence of spatial and temporal differentiations (including a political space) along with psychological preferences of such differentiations depending on the social and cultural environment. It interprets spatial-temporal differentiation terms of reference in the comprehensive regional studies (Blij 2005; Cresswell 2013). However, this ought not to be used as a foundation for racial or civilizational nationalism, like certain theories by Russian or Chinese scholars (examples see in Lukin 2011, 3–19), because it contradicts the latest research based on deciphering a human genome, which have not confirmed the presence of separate Chinese or African cradles of civilizations by scientific means (Morris 2010).

At the same time, the local issues appear to be typical of the “spherical” part of the global space and are related to the fact that these parts of the

world remain at another stage of development and can enter the global arena, albeit sometimes in quite a bizarre way. The recent list of local spaces that became part of global politics because of various reasons are: Tajikistan, Rwanda, Darfur, Xinjiang, Tibet, Chechnya, the ‘piracy space’ near the Somalian seashore, Afghanistan and Iraq, China’s environmental degradation that in border areas concerns its neighbors in terms of the “greenhouse effect,” politically unstable local place due to removability of the political regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya that creates the crises zone in the Middle East, etc. This illustrates the dialectical connection between local and global impact, while simultaneously creates the misperception of an opportunity for the spatial-temporal “revanche” of the “spherical” world. In particular, the notions of societies-conglomerates, societies with an enclave-conglomerated structure, hybrid societies, being “alloyed” from the “traditional” or “archaized” constituents (the spherical world, the order of natural social-political access) and “modern” ones (the “flat” world, an open social-political order) that are based on the idea of societies with various types of spatial-temporal and structural organizational co-existence. Consequently, it is necessary to take into account these structural factors while elaborating theories of social, political and world political interactions.

Acknowledging substantial contrasts of both space-time types, the optimists (A. Giddens, T. Friedman, etc.) hypothesize that it is the “flat” world that is an inevitable future for the “spherical” world development. Such an issue formulation means the “transformation” and regression of spatiality as a factor in international relations and restrains its analysis within the frameworks of the political-economic regionalist concepts, which was built in the global system of world politics, regionalization and transregionalism as, first and foremost, economic processes in the world economy (integration and transregionalism/regional integration/regionalism/regionalization). A row of theoreticians-skeptics (I. Wallerstein, A. Frank, S. Sanderson, de Blij and others), however, doubt the convertibility of the world compression into a single “platitude-space” and keep on analyzing spatial and temporal factors in world politics as baseline theories (the theories of center/periphery, world-systems, various types of civilizations, impact of “place”) (Cresswell 2013). Though it is commonly assumed that ordering and governing space is an old responsibility of the state (Osterhammel 2014, 104), in reality different spaces are ordered and governed in real life by governments within the same real time-span but at different historical stages of development because of their different social

orders, and cultural or historical patterns. A structural inequality and a functional differentiation of the world system elements and interlinks between them, as it is reputed among the representatives of the second viewpoint, is its existence and development pledge.

Meanwhile, a succession of esteemed scholars takes up this conceptual stance until they consider working out a “non-Western” (more exactly, a non-West-centric) IR theory—substantiating the world relying on the visualizations that reign in the peripheral (non-Western) regions of the world of the “differentiated” (not “flat”) space or from the respective regional angle (Acharya and Buzan 2010 and others).

The third range of scholars, adhering to the pragmatic and constructivist views (Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne, Luc van Lagenhove, Marina Strezhneva, Nikolai Kosolapov and others) insist on the need for studying the new qualities of space—transnationality and supranationality—with the end of their more complete and appropriate use in spontaneously or purposefully constructed reality (Farrell et al. 2005). Whereas their constructivist opponents (for instance, Harm de Blij) persist in the necessity for additional and more thorough analysis of the “power of place” phenomenon and global space differentiation induced by it (Blij 2009). Such a statement allows for a possibility of intellectual deconstruction according to the problem-analytical criterion, rather than a geographic one.

Understanding space-time as an integral category makes it feasible to analytically divide it into subspaces/categories of space: economic, political, social, cultural, physical and other associated disciplines, with each one specializing in studying every type of space separately by means of special methods and tools, intrinsic to merely these disciplines. The incongruence of different types of space “proper time” change is a fundamental tendency of life: economic space is more dynamic than social space, whereas political-geographic space transforms much more slowly than either, but more rapidly than cultural-civilizational space. Overlapping of various types of space, evolving at unequal paces and complying with their own trends, in fact, engenders their differentiation related to temporal and regional specifics, oppositional with differentiation of every subtype and space category. World Regional Studies as a Social Science discipline and an IR sub-field deals with the comprehension of historical evolution and modern stage, governance and forecasting the process of differentiation and simultaneous integration of various types of spaces segmented according to the geographic and temporal signs and simultaneously integrated into the single global space. This agenda constitutes the subject of

this academic discipline, which has stridden over the educational-synthetic stage and is actively developing at the scientific-synthetic stage with its evolving methodology as an IR sub-field or sub-discipline.

These conceptual thoughts in discussion between sociologists and political scientists have still not been reflected in the mainstream of International Relations and World Politics—not only in the Anglo-Saxon, general West, but also the non-Western academic tradition. Coincidentally, they are drivers of theoretical conceptualization of the current reality in World Regional Studies or any of its historical components (for instance, Oriental Studies in Russia, and European Studies, American Studies and Area Studies everywhere). This boils down to the practical orientation of regional analysis. And the practical international dimension of these processes is scrutinized not only in World Regional Studies, but also in Comparative World Politics. It would be notable to point out a contradiction in the contemporary West-centric IR theory. If until recently the modern Western theories of international relations in general have been challenging the need for structural influence of space and time on the regional segments of international relations or, at least, have skeptical attitudes toward these ideas (Kaplan 2012; Brotton 2012) for an obvious reason—an impending jeopardy of any regional subsystems “ossifying” at the autarchic stages because of the political elite’s inability to provide development in adherence with the advanced global standards experience. Whereas in the English-speaking segment of “internal” Regional Studies (studying the segmentation processes inside a national state) in Europe and the USA—in such disciplines as Economic Geography, Political and Human Geography, Spatial Economy and Regional Science—these ideas have not only recently been elaborated effectively (Fujita et al. 2001; Boldizzioni 2011; Agnew 1997; Agnew et al. 2008), but are also bringing into existence the interregional and regional analysis special methodology (Izard, Iwen, Drennan, Miller, Saltzman, for citations see Thörnbeke 1998 among others).

Paul Krugman devoted The Ohlin Lectures in the Stockholm School of Economics precisely to the issue of the “return” of space to economic theory. This can be perceived as the incorporation of the political element into the economic one, or as the “reincarnation” of Political Economy, which had been shoved aside after the 1990s by the overall triumph of the econometric element in the economic theory (Boldizzioni 2011). Krugman illustrated how the spatial factor had firstly been incorporated into the German economic theory of the 1930s and 1940s (the works

by Christaller 1966; Lusch 1954). In the 1960s, it was incorporated into American Regional Science by Izard (1956), and then it was fully ignored for political accounts by the West-centric ultraliberal economic theories that dominated at that period and eventually brought the world to the financial-economic crisis.

Apart from that, the “economized” version of the concept by North, Wallis and Weingast on various types of social-political access can also have a spatial-temporal interpretation. This agenda got reflected in IR in its international academic dimension in its most advanced Anglo-Saxon version, but practically not digested by any other national traditions, including the Russian, Indian and Chinese ones.

The abstract discussions of working out a theory, methodology and their interpretations by Tomas Kuhn, Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos turned out to have specific consequences in the form of incorrectly depicted global processes and ill-forecasted social and economic crises, like the financial-economic crisis of 2008. The analysis of spatial factors in economics remained only in the domain of Political and Human Geography. It had been marginalized in the world science in comparison to the ultraliberal economic and political theories by J. Sachs and the early works of F. Fukuyama and others that emerged during the triumph of “global ultraliberal economy” theories. Describing the connection principles between geographical and economic space, the reciprocal impact and tools of this interaction analysis, economist Krugman noted, similar to historian Alexander George (1993; George and Bennett 2005), that he used the pivotal ideas, which had a crucial essence in light of the recent analysis, but had been unacceptable to the modern mainstream. Not in all cases were they able to be molded (Krugman 1993, 1997, 37).

Intriguingly, the unity of time and space (time-space coordinates) in a peculiar shape has been mirrored in colloquial communication forms: people say and will carry on saying “let’s meet around Thursday” or “let’s meet around eleven.” They combine the categories of time and space in colloquial language. Such linguistic combinations are available in different languages, and therefore, are natural to the human consciousness, reflecting the ubiquitousness of spatial-temporal interconnectedness. However, in Social Sciences it is an arduous task to pinpoint and explain this connection correctly. Synthesis within the whole spatial-temporal approach of the structural regional segments of the world is weakly elaborated in general in global IR theory, regardless of the regional version of this theory that we use.

The theories of IR regional tiers, as it were, bridge gaps in world politics concepts, based on the “flat” world pre-eminence, which denies the necessity to take into account the “spherical” world, and in some of the most advanced of these concepts an endeavor is undertaken to present a “non-Western” (non-West-centric) vision or “synthetic,” complex, objective vision of the entire global process. Consequently, advocates of each outlook believe that through research one can abstract from the pervading division of the world the “flat” and “spherical” ones, emphasizing only on the “flat” (here, the “geographic” source of the “West-centrism” is erroneously associated in the non-West with the liberal approaches) or merely the “spherical” segments (here, the source of analysis prevalence is based on realism and traditionalist concepts and, therefore, anti-Western attitude and East-centrism). But the case at hand can be viewed, in particular, in terms of the transformations of objects into a new state of each of them and as an issue of a “merger” into specific conglomerates either hybrids, or “synthesis” into a new complex synthetic theoretical vision. Such a definition adds momentum to the discussion about building up a “non-Western IR theory” and tackling a “democratic transit” issue by conceptualizing a “non-Western democracy” notion based on the idea of various types of spatial-temporal factors impact in the regional segments of the world, as well as various types of sway by segments of the regional tier on the global one and analysis of these processes from the practical stance. Such an understanding affords, without rejecting the general IR theory and universal political streams, to extend the theory, developing those realms of theoretical knowledge which feature greater value to any regional segment of the world than in general facilitates more objective understanding of the world in its entirety. It also explains different interpretations of current events and processes in world politics from various perspectives, inherent to different regional segments of the world that advance at unequal stages of their temporal development.

The differentiation and synthesis of the space-time category—the outer component whereof is contrast and unity of different parts of a single world—would not have been that urgent in scientific discourses if it was not reflected in the short- and long-term political processes, which need to be scrutinized by experts in international relations—diplomats and international-political analysts. The number of these goals is growing. For instance: how to evaluate China’s growth, its nature and duration? How to analyze Asia’s rise and the role of “newly emerging markets” (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Iran) and the particular implications of this

process for international relations? How to take into account the longevity of their role and perspectives of the “new power centers”? How to account for the BRICS perspectives as nascent power centers? What is the role of the new formal and informal regional entities and organizations? The list of such organizations is long now and includes at least: the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the South American Common Market (MERCOSUR) and its sub-variants (like the Union of South American Nations [UNASUR]), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the League of Arab States (LAS), the Arab Social-Economic Council (ASEC), the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG), the United Council of the Persian Gulf countries, the Arab Union of Maghreb countries, the Arab Council of Economic cooperation, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri-Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan), the “Dialogue Forum of India—Brazil—South Africa,” the Eurasian Economic Union, the East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), the Pacific Bloc Economic Cooperation (PBEC), The Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), the Council for cooperation and defense of the Asia-Pacific Region, the CIS and others. Recently, even more have been added, including BRICS, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Eurasian Union and Common Eurasian Economic Space.

How to forecast the role and significance of the political constituents in a regional economic processes, the role and significance of economic impetuses on formatting the political component of the regional processes? How to evaluate competitiveness of various models of modernization, political systems and political development models, perspectives for the use of foreign political-economic experience, the aftermath of backwardness and the “breakthrough” price?

Noteworthy is the fact that there are plenty of action-oriented research works, attempting to find a solution for these concerns using the interpretational or logical-subjectivist approach. However, the amount of theoretical elaborations—providing clues to the structural interpretation of new challenges and forecasting new phenomena and processes based on the historical reality-structured explanation—are few and far between, whatever regional version of IR theory used.

It is clear that the space-time category keeps on exerting sway on the international and internal policy phenomena and is transforming the universal trends into the specific (regional and local), that is, experience-

related agenda. This should be dealt with by specialists in security, diplomacy, economy and policy. Transregionalism, macro-regionalization and differentiation of space are tangible phenomena, and, thus, the analysis of their spatial and temporal dimensions may significantly impact the applied, including forward-looking, studies in international relations.

Therefore, globalization, regardless of the definition given, is identified via the spatial and temporal properties in their various aspects and, in particular, via the transregionalism process, regionalization (regional differentiation) and the degree of fragmentation across the different spatial segments of the world. These factors develop at their various temporal tiers, but experience formidable institutional pressure from modernity. These concepts can be specified even further to define the spheres (functional subsystems) to which they belong—policy, economy, culture or ecology. Globalization can be viewed in a complex manner as a phenomenon of dramatic interdependence between functional subsystems. However, even then there is the question of between which functional subsystems is there interdependence, and how significant is that interdependence?

As soon as the case at hand touches upon the specifics of globalization, stances drastically diverge. Across the various realms (functional subsystems), globalization is being implemented in different forms at an unequal pace and with far-reaching consequences. Important also is the historical time (origin and development) of globalization and its ideological essence, etc. Ultimately, the vision of globalization is blurred to the extent that in the scholarly discourse only the consensus of universality/inclusiveness of this phenomenon is left. This brings about alienation of space-time in the study of the globalizing regions (macro-regions/world regions/global regions) and transregional agenda. This phenomenon called into existence a provocative statement by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver that world politics in fact did not exist, it was merely an academic abstraction (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 28).

As this stance put it, having once been articulated by Buzan and Wæver (2003, 28–30), globalization is perceived as a challenge or menace not because it disseminates up-to-date institutions, but because in the research literature and mass media at a certain period of time it can be interpreted as a synonym to the unipolarity and be materialized in many ways at the local and regional tiers. In other words, the alienation of globalization proceeds on account of the superficial, an insufficient understanding of this process, the inaptitude to find the corresponding regional and local form, or that it is one of the most advanced regional forms of globaliza-

tion (its Americanized and West-centric version) is passed off as the only role model without due account for regional traits, whereas several successful regional models (Japanese, Singaporean, Indian and Malaysian) are interpreted as the Westernized ones. Others, like the Chinese models, are perceived as confrontational.

In this sense, globalization in China does boil down to success in striking a prospective Sinicized form of synthesizing globalized institutions and national specific features (a national model of globalization), having adapted its local institutions to the global environment and tailoring their new globalized national form to the regional level in order to gain top ranks in the world hierarchy. Up until recently, China has succeeded in skillful adaptation of global rules to the regional and even local level, because as a developing nation, once it parted from the Soviet-type world socialist system, it obtained unlimited access to the world markets. At the same time, nobody obliged it to fully open its economy up to international competition, although it was expected. China's rise was achieved mainly due to exclusive trade-offs that were temporarily gained from the world community, having thus split the Soviet-type world socialist system with its virtually one-sided walk-out from it. Russia was not afforded such concessions and likely could not have been granted them, mainly because of its global military potential (China never possessed this) and immature internal-policy consensus over the need for reforms. Also, amid worldwide attempts at intensifying international consensus, Russia had always latently resisted this to a larger extent than China on account of its spatial and demographic factors. As China grew, it did not need to break down or transform the status quo in the world order, as Soviet Russia once had to, because it went the course charted by Russia under the New Economic Policy (NEP), ruled out by the majority of the Soviet elite in the 1930s and again in the 1960s (Lane 1996). China has been trying to influence the world system evolution from inside, directing it to the expedient side as an ever more integral part. In other words, having established its own globalized version of national institutions, which managed to adapt to the modernity (assuming there are multiple modernities, including a Sinicized one (Ooi Kee Beng 2015, 141–212)), China spread their Sinicized form to weaker societies with historical/vassal relations with China or with powerful Chinese communities (*huaqiao*). China defended the historical and national essence of these institutions and regulated the necessity for their further political modernization under foreign pressure, thus formatting them in the most favorable way. The Chinese funneled the evolution

of world order to most benefit themselves. This was used as a reversion to the past in a new twist of historical development—to the model of power balance or bipolarity based on benign realism theories under the name of Moral Realism (Yan Xuetong 2014), and possibly as a degree increase in the refinement of the global relations system, more openness, depending on the political situation both in the world and in China.

An economically stronger China will not necessarily pose a threat to the world community because it will be more open, dependent and integrated with the outer world; however, an economically stronger China may bolster militarily. Given a certain turn of domestic policy circumstances, this might feature a challenge or hazard to the regional or world society, including Russia. Such a vision implies a return to the discussion of the 1970s and 1980s in Chinese Studies. The issue was whether the contemporary Chinese foreign-policy doctrine was a descendent of the China-centric model of emperor diplomacy or if modern Chinese diplomacy had fully moved out from the historical past and acknowledged the Western Westphalia concept based on the idea of states equality, albeit in its universal-communist option—or is it a Western option? (Voskressenski 1995, Qing Yaqing 2015). Contemporary interpretations of Chinese foreign-policy analysts are making it possible to construe the international life ambiguously, sparking off concerns by the world society, as the states equality idea had been introduced by the European and, additionally, the European universalist communist tradition, whereas nascent nationalism and a turn to growing China's historical heritage and emergence of the foreign-policy concepts by the modern Celestial Empire expanding fundamental interests of the cultural superpower makes feasible analogues with the China-centric concepts of imperial China from the period of the Tang, Song and Ming dynasties' prosperity and partially the Qing period. Thus China desovietized (i.e., abolished its Universalist communist ideas gleaned from the Soviet model implementation period in the Chinese history) and, simultaneously, enabled a restoration of the authentic (desovietized) nationalism.

Complex and deep understanding of China's role in the global evolution brings forward the issue of the Chinese modernization model and the application of China's experience in Russia. Both countries are conducting an intensive search for a national model that would combine globalization, an open type but controlled regionalization and transregionalism, in the same way that such models were found in Europe, the USA, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, China and some

others. This would be preferable to repeating China's model, which in effect maximally used Russia's experience (Lane 1996): the Political Consultative Council of China (PC CC), like the Constituent Conference in Russia, which was abolished very early in the twentieth century; the Russian NEP (New Economic Policy) adapted to the Deng Xiaoping concept—"it doesn't matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice"—and transformations of the Marxist-Leninist type Chinese Communist Party at its 18th congress into the party of the entire Chinese nation similar to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union conversion into the all-peoples party in the 1980s.

Buzan and Wæver also fairly note that the majority of issues considered to be going global (global warming, transnational crime, international terrorism) have a regional (geographic) nature. They are indissolubly tied with the territorial (spatial) dynamics; that is, they enjoy a regional-territorial base (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 29).

The issue with the regional level of conceptualization—the exploration of globalization—is much more complicated. Regionalization is not necessarily construed as the opposite term to globalization; however, regionalization may be positioned as the antagonist of globalization, disseminating fragmentation in the world. Regionalization may feature a relatively local (restricted) phenomenon, and may act as a tool in steering (restricting or speeding up) globalization. Regionalization is a slightly more definite and specific notion than globalization. It is distinct in its regional notion: it is one of the taxonomic units in the hierarchical space differentiation, while at the same time the very notion of region is polysemantic. One of the definitions of region implies that it is a geographic and functional grouping of states, areas and societies, which can be classified by their common features and their way, typical of the whole grouping, of interacting with the outer world (see also Cresswell 2013, 59–76).

However, regionalization in its expansionist sense—macro-regionalization (greater interdependence between the traditional regions)—is simultaneously a transregional cooperation (transregionalism) in its narrow understanding. Transregional cooperation in its broad sense—a connection between the macro-regions—is a sign of globalization and is very frequently perceived as such in practice and in the research literature, as well as in real life. This interpretation gives a new direction and additional impulse to conduct substantial research into the regional implications of globalization. It is also instrumental in conceiving the ways to surmount the unequal aftermath of globalization for different countries and regions.

Thus, globalization and its two phases can be pinpointed not only in a philosophic-sociological sense as a new degree in the inevitable space-time distantiation, but also in an international-practical way. As the new, permanently contemporized world system of social and economic institutions emerges, it boils down to a merger of national economies into a single internationalized system. This system is based on a new stage of goods and capitals flow liberalization, the dissemination of the up-to-date and more efficient open social institutions, new international information transparency, technological revolution, telecommunicational rapprochement of countries and regions, emergence of international social movements and internationalization of education. This is then accompanied by the standardization of global governance, political interests, culture and values, manifesting itself in restricted social access systems transforming into open social access systems and forming ever more open informational and communicational flows. Regionalization also plays a part—a search for the regional forms of adaptability to the global processes, regional forms of open social access and by-processes. Fragmentation also features in this process. The actors that lag behind globalization, even in its regionally watered-down versions, “fall out” from the single world space. With such an understanding of globalization, regionalization appears to be an alliance of states and societies, bound together functionally and/or geographically. In other words, regionalization may come as a way of defragmentation.

Regionalization beyond the boundaries of traditional regions (macro-regionalization) tightens the space of adjacent regions and builds up macro-regions (macro-regional complexes). This is called the transregional cooperation phenomenon in strict terms. Both regionalization and macro-regionalization (transregionalism—exceeding boundaries of the traditional regions) features in the process of enhancement/attenuation of interdependence across various spheres of human activity (politics, economy, power generation, environmental protection, culture), as well as the elaboration of a common identity, typical of the region in question. Transregionalism notably may come under the guise of regional macro-regionalization. It facilitates the development of the macro-regions—larger regions as well as in the form of interregional relationships between global regions (transregionalism in broad sense or transregional cooperation as a specific form of globalization).

Such an interpretation of globalization requires the definition of the regionalism to be a concept of interdependence of national states and

interests of the sub-national entities exceeding their boundaries, albeit within the national frames; or (the “economized” definition) as the creation of economic communities formed from the closely spaced states by means of the preferential types of trade agreements.

Thus, regional integration represents a global phenomenon of strengthening interlinks inside regional subsystems, based on closer interaction between its components and the formation of new relationships/organizations, co-existing with the traditional interrelationships/organizations set up by states at the national level.

If to construe the international relations system as one of the functional subsystems within the general social system (according to Lihmann (1979)), then an enquiry into the spatial dimension can be used merely from the perspective of globalization and regionalization as a communicational, appositional and functional differentiation, rather than territorial differentiation. A comprehensive exploration and description of the spatial dimension is impossible given the absence of the temporal dimension, but the notions of globalization and regionalization can be analyzed as new systemic differentiations—appositional as well as antagonistic to each other and to the space differentiated by them.

Such a comprehension of the space-time role provides for a methodological opportunity to introduce this category as the foundation and highlight of the regional tier of international relations, as relatively independent for practical-theoretical analysis (the regional aspects of international affairs), and as a core in such disciplines as World Regional Studies, Cross-regional Political Analysis, Comparative Political Science, Regional Politics and Political Geography. Also important is to use regionalization as a relatively independent phenomenon, appositional to globalization and, simultaneously, a crucial constituent.

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Transformation of Space (1): Macro-Regionalization and New Spatial Actors of International Relations

6.1 MACROREGIONALIZATION AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF REGIONS IN WORLD REGIONAL STUDIES

Regionalization in its current mode is a relatively new phenomenon. The notion of “region” has still not been elaborated and there are many variants for the applied classification of the world decomposition into regions. It pertains to both the scales of regions and the affiliation of separate countries to any geographic/political/civilization region. In addition, the word “region” is polysemantic (Fawn 2009, 5–15; Cresswell 2013, 58–76).

Firstly, this term may concern both the intrastate space segmentation (the administrative-legal interpretation of a region, which is partially synonymic to the “district” notion), and the decomposition of the global space (the international-political or political interpretation of a region).

Secondly, a region can be determined according to the group of hallmarks or a basic function, which is fundamental in any research (geographic, economic, socio-cultural regions). Therefore, regional decomposition as a means of selection and studying the spatial combinations of complicated complexes and phenomena, as a rule, will depend on the set of goals and will be a social construct in nature.

As an analytical construct, the regional segmentation of the world possesses features of figurative representation as well: the region may feature

a political-geographic figure of a certain territory and thereby demonstrate specific traits and trends in its development. In the Russian Social Science discipline's analysis of regional levels, the notion of specificities has manifested itself in the idea of the "international-political region," which is viewed as a relatively self-sufficient specific subsystem of historically evolving interstate relations, unified by the commonality of certain, inherent political/historical issues and respective relations in precisely this region (Voskressenski 2002, 2014a, b; Torkunov and Mal'gin, 2014). This definition, in its turn, rests on pinpointing the political regionalism. Relationships inside geographic groups of adjacent nation-states, which have a series of common political features, close cooperation and institutionalized cooperation, are built on formal multilateral ties (Held et al. 1999).

The efforts to analytically emphasize separate spaces/regions/regional subsystems have been promoted for several reasons.

Firstly, the analysis of a succession of the international processes in the context of the major conflict axis of bipolarity does not provide us with a complete picture, whereas the processes themselves are either generated by the cooperation of superpowers or are related to this cooperation indirectly. In this regard, a model of the international policy analysis was suggested (O. Young) that aims at ascertaining the factors (*congruence* or *discontinuity*) in the global and regional essence that dominate the issue.

Secondly, the analysis of interactions within any region extends the limits of classical Area Studies and allows wider opportunities for comparative studies, including the interregional one already within International Relations, World Politics, Global/World/Comprehensive Regional Studies, and Cross-Regional Political Analysis.

Thirdly, the correlation between the global, regional and local-national level gives new opportunities for viewing any issue within the international system.

Such an interpretation means a historically evolving territorial community, which contains a physical essence, socio-economic, political and cultural environment, as well as spatial structure, distinct from the other regions and regional-territorial units.

Regionalization involves the tightest possible political, economic and culturological interdependence of the neighboring countries within the region. Three substantially different phenomena are meant by the term "regionalization" in literature and life:

- restoration/increase of the regional powers and the establishment of preferential regional orders by global or regional powers or imposing the regional order of any prevailing type (non-formalized realistic interpretation of regionalization in world politics);
- formation of regional integrational groupings including ones of the preferential type (the classical political-economic definition of regionalization, based on the entire liberal-pragmatic vision of economic processes);
- the political foundation, motives, impulses and driving forces of regionalism and/or regionalization in the first and second meaning of this notion (setting the tone in International Political Economy and Comprehensive Regional Studies relying upon the constructivist interpretation of this process).

Thus, the concepts of regionalism and regionalization may sometimes appear to be synonyms, emphasizing the interdependence of countries and the extension of intrastate issues beyond the boundaries of nation-states. However, at the regional tier these concepts can be merely partially coincident notions (in particular, in the economic and international-political domains). In this case, international regionalism (macro-regionalism/transregionalism or mini-globalization) comes as implementation of national interests at the new, higher than local or national states level, but within the regional, or more exactly—macro-regional frames.

In the bipolar period, regional powers sprang up in those regions where a conflict of interdependence pervaded and integration progressed far too slowly (for example, in East Asia). Another situation was the case in the regions, where complimentary interdependence considerably outweighed a conflictual one. Here, valiant integrational processes took their roots (for example, in Europe, see: McCormick 2007), at the heart of which laid the following:

1. The rise in economic interdependence and economic interests' rapprochement;
2. The availability of a common foreign policy adversary;
3. The absence of a dominating center—pre-dominant or consisting of several states.

Following the breakdown of the socialist system, a stand-off between the two regional processes faded into the background.

Thus, globalization and regionalization are interconnected, complementary and, at the same time, to a certain extent, resistant to other trends, as all countries are both objects and subjects of globalization and regionalization. Globalization processes are evoked by unlimited competition and require economic subjects to streamline all types of operations, and that is why it infringes upon the interests of less developed countries. Actions within regionalization to a larger extent accord with the interests of separate countries (or groups of them) not only for economic, but also political, social, cultural and other reasons. At the same time, we can view regionalization as the final cause at this specific point in time. In other words, under certain circumstances it can be a hurdle on the way to further globalization rather than an interim stage. Regionalization can foster defragmentation of homogenizing segments of the regional space, which prevents globalization in a certain moment and in a regional segment. So, regionalization can oppose both fragmentation and globalization but in different ways: fragmentation on a regional level and globalization on a global level. Consequently, in this case as well, regionalization may not exclude globalization in present time (but not always) and in the future. By means of regional space homogenization, it globalizes the regions.

The intermediary, and thus quite possibly a version of further globalization, is solidifying the old regions into macro-regional complexes (*macro-regionalization* and/or *transregional cooperation*), the initial stage of which is regional integration. Economic and political integration come later. This process empowers different countries to:

- participate in globalization in a “soft mode,” without being under pressure from the entire global economy;
- steer the less developed economies into macro-regions, giving them preferences and investing in them;
- help less developed territories inside a nation-state by creating “triangles of growth”;
- improve the business communities by expanding the geographic zones of economic activity in some privileged forms; and
- strengthen geopolitical positions, as markets scales enlarge and the integrational grouping is better able to collectively protect its members from foreign competition.

Taking into account the regional level theories, the macro-regional complex constructed by regional and transregional relations appears to

be a prototype of one of the centers in the emerging global polycentric system. The focus of such a polycentric system is not necessarily a power balancing among the new centers, but the larger stability of the system by means of cooperative modification of the common tendencies and/or the prevalent world order pertaining to the specific spatial and/or temporal parameters in the regional segments of the global space. This argument refocuses our attention from the realist paradigm of the cyclical stand-off to the constructivist-cooperational theories and their consensual explanatory and transformational potential.

Europe has already gone through this, establishing the European Union (EU). Asia has done it while putting together the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Latin American countries created the MERCOSUR sub-regional bloc. The USA created the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and is currently initiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Intriguingly, both the EU and USA have entered a new phase of this process: the EU is experimenting with “flexible integration” and the expansion of the supranational space implying improvements in economic competitiveness and tighter coordination of budget parameters (i.e., further defiance of the traditional symbols of sovereignty) and also partial desintegration (Brexit), whereas the USA is beginning to launch a wider integrational economic grouping than NAFTA—Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic Partnerships. China is also trying to build cooperation in a similar way with Greater China through the New Silk Road, the Maritime Silk Road and the Arctic Economic Belt. These ideas rest on the centuries-old mass emigration of ethnic Chinese and a new quality of the political-economic dependence of the peripheral space on a new metropole as well as via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and possible economic integration of North Korea with China’s southern provinces. It also encompasses the transregional cooperation with the African authoritarian regimes—rich in raw materials, but economically poor, trying to become, if not a single leading state in East Asia, then at least drastically assert its influence by enforcing economic, cultural and political control over the surrounding or dependent segments of the regional space.

The Greater Middle East, as a macro-region, is a loosely organized, unstable macro-regional complex. It was formed on the grounds of civilizational-confessional unity of the Arab world and geographic remoteness from the other regions. An intense integration in this region based on archaic anti-Western elements met with considerable resistance from the USA and the West in general. The massive international terrorist attacks,

aimed at subverting the West from inside, initiated a forceful US policy in the region aimed to counter these trends. Despite the fact that the geography of this macro-region and the countries inside it are not distinctly defined, *de facto*, it is drawing itself from the EU, Russia, rising China and India, and in the South—from the Sub-Saharan Africa and is unified by the civilizational-confessional commonality. These objective factors are primary, but the policy conducted by the USA and its allies in the region, who could analytically detect these factors earlier than other states, is secondary. The US policy under George W. Bush's presidency can be perceived belligerently by some of the political regimes inside and outside the region, as it demands extra efforts to back up the monopolistic competitiveness of the authoritarian regimes, which could find this task a dead lift. The USA in this period coercively contemporized the archaic social orders in the region and created a perimeter of the secular states predominantly Muslim. But additional attempts at bolstering monopolistic competitiveness decrease the likelihood of projecting malicious influence on the outside (for example, terrorist attacks), which would neutralize the jeopardy for the USA.

Obviously, in light of the global discussion of East Asia's rising it would be justified to mention the further transformation of the macro-region or macro-regional complex of the Greater East Asia (Northeast and Southeast Asia, Central and South Asia), first and foremost, in economic and cultural-civilizational terms (Voskressenski 2010). In the same vein, the discussions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) revival, structuring Central-East Eurasia, the development of the Eurasian Union and the Eurasian Economic Space, are crowned with much less practical success. It could be that the political, economic, and military integration efforts are not able to live up to the spontaneous regional or even global political-economic trends in some of their parts; and for some of these reasons meet their explicit resistance that calls for additional, ever rising political, economic or military costs on integration without visible progress.

The positive factors bolstering regional integration and strengthen transformation of regions into regional complexes, international-political or global regions are as follows:

1. Full or partial economic complementarity in the macro-region, whereby complementary interdependence outweighs the likelihood

- of conflict—if there is economic interdependence and complementarity, and economic interests converge;
2. The launch and further evolution of the integrational economic processes, when the trade transactions volume inside the region exceeds half of the overall commercial interaction. All regional organizations (from the ASEAN+ format to the East-Asian community) have set the target to gradually cut tariffs for intraregional trade and lift restrictions on import operations—up to the Free Trade Area establishment (NAFTA and the EU developed common markets long ago).
 3. Movement towards monetary-financial integration. The US dollar features as such in NAFTA. The EU introduced the euro in 1999 which later would fulfill limited functions of a stand-by world currency. The Asian currency unit (ACU) case was actively negotiated on the basis of the *yen* and *yuan*; however, it was never put into practice. Instead the *yuan* began to play the role of a new *de facto* competitor to *yen* as the Asian regional currency. The other macro-regions are no longer contemplating such issues, although the opportunity for the introduction of the golden *dinars* as a regional currency in the Middle East countries has also been given consideration by pundits.
 4. New types and forms of regional cooperation (strategic, privileged partnerships, new regional organizations etc.).
 5. The largest states in the macro-region advocating for the extension of economic cooperation within the macro-region (MERCOSUR, BRICS, SCO, ASEAN+, etc.).
 6. Definite cultural-civilizational proximity of the countries in the region and their distinction from other macro-regions. In civilizational field, whereby various regions are developing from individualism, a backbone of the Western society, to collectivism, typical of the traditional Eastern society, along with the existence of a broad variety of the intermediate variants.
 7. The emergence of the theoretical substantiation for the development specifics of the macro-region states as a single whole, e.g., the EU has a single economic policy (but not yet a fiscal union), a common understanding of the domestic policy basics and single foreign and military policy.
 8. The spontaneous formation and purposeful design of a regional identity. The Europeans built it up long ago, across other macro-regions it is going through different phases.

Therefore, we can draw up a hierarchy of regions in order of their globality rate, consisting of regions, macro-regions, international-political regions, regional complexes, regional subsystems and global regions, whereby the global regions—new vibrant inherently integrated glocal actors—will be on top of this pyramid.

Consequently, the macro-region is a predominantly geographic space, which is structured in reliance on traditional factors (geographic, historical, civilizational and cultural), whereas the global region is a new dynamic, globally integrated not only and not so much on the traditional factors, as exclusively by the non-state factors governing the processes of global restructuring of political-economic and social spaces through new sophisticated network, communication and information grid, etc.

A detailed understanding of the new world political tendencies allows the discovery of *three groups of issues*, which are scrutinized by World Regional Studies in an integrated pattern separately and in their joint intercourse as follows:

1. *Issues universal in nature and touching on all countries of the world.*

They are studied in the disciplines of International/Global Political Economy, Political Science and its world political essence—World Politics. World Regional Studies, contrary to the aforementioned disciplines, is interested not so much in these issues by themselves, but rather in how they are refracted and modified across various global regions and other spatial-temporal segments of the world.

2. *Issues that are similar to countries of a certain type.*

Discretely, this term of reference is studied by several academic disciplines, with each one focusing on its own methods of space differentiation fundamental to their discipline, proceeding from heterogeneity or similarity of units in a certain type of space (economic, political, cultural, etc.). World Regional Studies looks into these differentiations in the context of how they determine regionalization types, influencing specific configurations of the global space within specific time spans (historical epochs) in such a way that regions, macro-regions and global regions get established, resulting from the interaction among definite types into the single regional and world political space.

3. *Distinct or unique, typical of specific states, cross-boundary regions, or regions constituting of several states or certain territories within separate nation states.*

The traditional discipline of Area Studies explores only the latest bundle of issues in the restricted profile. The third group of issues in the context of interpretative historical dynamics of separate states development is also scrutinized by History and Political Science, which explores the political perspective of the first and third groups of issues, whereas the Economics discipline looks at their economic profile, International Relations describes and analyses the first set of concerns (World Politics) and the third one (traditional International Relations). World Regional Studies uses a range of methods and deals with the holistic analysis of all three groups, which allows carrying out compound multifactor analysis.

6.4 CORRELATION BETWEEN THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF REGIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Direct correlation between the global challenges of international relations and new trends is quite evident. It is preconditioned by the transformational regional processes, which to a significant extent affect, and in certain cases, may even reformat the global level of relations. That is why, in the contemporary world a region may become a guide in the national identity and integrational policy, or the national (nationalist) policy and disintegration policy and anti-globalist moves. In other words, a region may spring up as a specific spatial-temporal construct within the definite regional aspect of the world order, whereas the variants for substantiation of the regional space (including geopolitical, geoeconomic and ethno-confessional) are kept in the concepts of sovereignty, security, intensification or attenuation of ethnic issues and preaching or taking down the religious exclusiveness. Nowadays, the contents and orientation of the evolution of these ideas are briskly (and at times bitterly) discussed in IR.

A region as a space fragment in the global socium possesses an ability to integrate, delineate, disseminate, organize and transform. That is, it can fill the abstract constructs of global interdependence with real contents. Thus, the interaction between the macro-regions of East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Oceania, both Americas and Europe maintains the presence of the global tier; however, the same process vividly points out

forfeiture by separate subjects of international relations of the monopolistic function, allowing them to shape the world order. This circumstance foreordained the political interest in both territories and spatial relations, conceptualized in different projects of locality, national sovereignty, supra-nationality and transregionalism.

The rising variability of the macro-regional (and, thus, the world) political-geographic space made this space change in the world. Its configuration is modifying—the degree in spatial-temporal “curvature”—because of the “flat world” expansion and the compression of the “spherical world,” as well as within the macro-regions boundaries, in particular (homogenization of the regional space inside the macro-regions and differentiation of regions). The variation of the regional geopolitical and geoeconomic space is a result from the global leadership transformation and new regional fluctuations evoked by this process, including the intraregional political processes. At the same time, the focus and contents of the regional transformations may both facilitate dissolution of the obsolete world leader—the “decline of Europe,” the “decline of the West” along with coming into existence of the new one (for the recent century various contenders the USSR, Germany, Japan, China). There is also the reverse process of reformatting the previous global leadership and filling it with new content (structural leadership, re-interpretation of the Western values leadership in building up the world trade regimes, etc.) (Ikenberry et al. 2011). At present, the new macro-regional space is more likely to be determined by the geopolitical, civilizational, cultural, ethno-confessional and ethno-political parameters, which do not always imply direct opposition to the physical-geographic borders of states like it was in nineteenth or twentieth centuries. In other words, geographic and physical boundaries become relative, economic space rapidly homogenizes, political space flattens (the number of viable variants of the political systems and types of political regimes decreases), whereas geopolitical, civilizational, cultural, ethno-confessional and ethno-political homogenization is absent, or the divergence of macro-regions increases. Furthermore, divergence is guided by other tendencies, which need to be more profoundly conceptualized and considered (Mahbubani 2013, 145–190).

Thus, currently the notion of physical and political boundaries is assuming a touch of relativity, although these boundaries still exist. Between some of the geopolitical areas (e.g., between the Western and non-Western world or between separate international regions) they can even get entrenched on account of ethno-political, ethno-confessional,

civilizational differences or conflicts. From here follows a political objective of discouraging closed regionalism—the restoration of “closed states” following the Fichtean models in the nineteenth century or the Soviet-style “closed political-economic system.” This helps further gradual transformation of physical and political boundaries both within the macro-regions limits (the Greater Europe, the Greater East Asia) and between the macro-regions (the Trans-Atlantic union, Europe from the Atlantics to Vladivostok, BRICS). This bridges the technological gaps and spatial-temporal curvature of the global space and enlarges segments in the flat world, which go through the stage of temporal development due to a fast-track opportunity or owing to evolutionary leaps over the phases on account of support by the fore-runners in world development, and thus, as a whole, accelerates globalization pace. Some examples include: the possible abolition of the visa regime between Russia and the EU, the introduction of multiannual visas between Russia and the USA, etc. The converse or fencing process guarantees a controllable degree in the curvature of the global space in compliance with the internal requests of both “flat” and “spherical” parts of the world. Opposite examples of this process include: clamping down on visa regimes, setting exorbitantly high prices for visas, “special” passports with a visa waiver program with simultaneous hardening of general visa regimes, stricter emigration rules, tightening the immigration legislation, bureaucratic hurdles, etc. This process sends the world back to the closed chapters in human history, which is fraught with a conflict environment and impediments to technological development. The aftermath of such cases is exacerbated by the inability of a technological breakthrough for “isolated” nation-states. Relying on one’s own nickel and the self-reliance policy has already proven its inconsistency and restricted adaptability in the USSR and China.

Simultaneously, humanity has come up with new forms of space control: indirect soft surveillance forms over disputed or contested territories and impact on spatial areas via or in defiance of the state boundaries. Regions and states interdependence has risen and economic relations (economic integration, transregional unions) have been playing an important role as more than just a foundation for military power. However, globalization, in any case, in its current form (late nineteenth—early twenty-first centuries) failed to completely downplay the significance of ethno-confessional and cultural-civilizational factors inside the macro-regions and between them, although the overall homogenization degree of the global space is augmented.

It is necessary to be aware that present criteria for evaluating state power and the structure of political might has been transformed. The notions of boundaries and sovereignty have not blurred as several analysts had forecasted—for instance, in the early works by F. Fukuyama, claiming the “end of history,”—but they have been transformed into a new poorly explored quality. This new quality, associated with the interdependence of sovereignty, places emphasis on the necessity of control over the key parameters. These parameters are indispensable to the state for performing its functions and the transfer of control over several parameters that earlier had been solely within the realm of national control. Sometimes this requires even supranational jurisdictions, should the new nascent interdependence relations demand this (Krasner 1999; Jackson 2007; Ziegler 2012). Regionalization, in this regard, is a form of national sovereignty protection. In other words, it is a defensive trend, to cordon off a range of countries from the adverse implications of globalization. However, it features the regionally transformed globalization, which increases the refinement of the countries within the region into the global system.

The global space is segmented, and at times fragmented. In other words, it is still not fully homogenized, although the overall degree of its globality/homogeneity, especially economically and institutionally, is mounting. In this sense, regionalization may signify and, subsequently be interpreted as a temporal/permanent process of differentiating the world, and alternatively, as a homogenization of the regional level, which is followed by the new stage of globalization.

If we analyze a link between the new correlations and the traditional geographic and political-geographic regions, then the geographic ones fade away. Accordingly, “multi-formatness” and “interrelatedness” of the international and regional relations agenda under a new geopolitical and geo-economic environment call for analyzing regional evolutionary trends alongside the opposition of territories. This is on a par with the new, more sophisticated and refined system of geo-economic, ethno-confessional axiological-civilizational and other factors, simultaneously in the construct state with the global level of relations. As a consequence, the new geo-economic and geopolitical concepts are entering the political discourse (Acharia 2013 among others)—for example, the Greater Middle East, the Greater East Asia, the Greater China, the Greater Central Asia. This agenda is also reflected in discussions on the expansion limits of the EU, accountability spheres of NATO, EU, creation of the Eurasian Union, the Eurasian Economic Space, the New Silk Road, the Maritime Silk Road, the Arctic Economic Belt, “Indianization” of Southeast Asia, etc.

To conclude, the processes that today advance within one state are indirectly linked with the macro-regional development agenda. They are also tied to the global agenda, whereas the regional-geographic, geo-civilizational and ethno-confessional factors play a vital role, notwithstanding economic and political globalization.

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Transformation of the Space (2): Differentiation Within the World Space and Its Consequences for Conceptualizing a De-Westernized IR

7.1 STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE WORLD SPACE

Classifications and typologies represent horizontal and vertical ways of differentiating space/territory according to quantitative and qualitative criteria. Classifications (as a conditional, horizontal way of territory classification) and typologies (as a conditional, vertical way) in international research pertain mainly to the differentiation of national states—the primary subjects in the international political process—on spatial-geographic/civilizational-geographic grounds or any other criterion (for instance, the political, social-political, political-economic, economic and others; or the comprehensive structural and/or spatial-temporal benchmark). One of the main methodological problems with research on the differentiation of the world space up until now is that it has been investigated in different academic disciplines separately according to different methods and rules that are particularly intrinsic to each particular academic discipline. In other words, in some disciplines the study is predominantly based on quantitative methods and in others it is based on qualitative methods.

In Social-Economic Geography, three groups of nation-states are pointed out: economically developed, averagely developed and economically underprivileged (developing), the presence whereof testifies to the differentiation of social-economic and social-geographic space. In the

group of developed nations there are: major states, economically vibrant small states of Western Europe and “migratory” capitalist states. The averagely developed states group includes averagely developed nation-states of Western and Central-Eastern Europe. The group of economically underprivileged (developing) nation-states encompasses: key states, nation-states with relatively mature capitalism, migration states, national states of large-enclave capitalism, states of foreign-oriented opportunistic development, small states with dependable plantation economies, small-sized countries with concessional economies, small- and tiny-sized states (with economic specialization in finance or tourism), agricultural small-sized nation-states and large oil exporters. And in the subgroup within the third group - of young liberated nation-states - are large low-income states and post-socialist states. Despite relying upon the structural-economic approach, the typology, as well as its contents, has evidently become outdated because of new complex trends of the world economy (Knox and Martson 2013), but no other, more suitable classification has been introduced yet (for other classifications see also Rosefelde 2008).

During the last twenty years, in the array of social-economic disciplines, International Political Economy has been developing dynamically followed by Global Political Economy (O’Brien and Williams 2010). These academic disciplines highlight the following groups of states, reflecting differentiation in the international political-economic space: democratic states with advanced market economies, new industrial states with developing or transitional economies, failed states and “rogue states.” There are also vertical groupings of affiliation for the First, Second and Third World (echelons of development, modernization) with variable content in every category. Lines between these categories in such classifications and typologies are quite blurred and sometimes, despite the availability of quantitative characteristics, are subjective. Although at the heart of these typologies, for instance, may lie the application of mathematical approaches for quantitative criteria analysis.

As a rule, but not universally, in typologies and classifications (especially within one region) greater attention is paid to geographic/historical proximity or the degree of intensity of the selected criterion within the existing state boundaries.

Among the evident cases of structural social-economic typologies, apart from the aforementioned, one can mark out the differentiation of states (as well as political-administrative units existing inside them) and international regions according to their *social-economic progress level* (as it is

referred to in the disciplines of World Economy or Economic Geography): for instance, based on GDP per capita, the manufacturing industry shares in the aggregate industrial volume, education level, life expectancy; political development level, analysis whereof uses up qualitative and/or quantitative indices, etc. Recently, relying on such typologies and classifications, many researchers have been emphasizing those development indices, which directly affect states' competitiveness (Porter 1990; Subbotin 2012 among others). These indices help differentiate states according to *competitiveness and governance efficiency* rates, but also, economic ones. In other words, the qualitative comparative analysis of key figures in the development of countries and the comparison of the regions' and countries' competitiveness indices in compliance with the various (national and international) comparative methods affords the creation of applied classifications of countries in the context of assessing governance efficiency and their ability to make a technological breakthrough or innovational development. These classifications are based on the competitiveness indices system, which consists of the following:

- Historically determined figures: number and national composition of population, territory size and geographic layout, natural resources, historical experience in international relations and commodity exchange;
- Social indices: living standards and social security, social cohesion and activity of the population, human capital, national set of tools in social governance, the level of national and overall culture;
- Economic maturity indices: basic macroeconomic figures, degree in economy balance, priority industries development (defining the competitiveness of a country), transnational business activity, stock market maturity, competitive number of billionaires and global companies;
- Quality level of state governance: presence of a multi-purpose system of education, competitively oriented science and research development, economically independent elite oriented to their own country, belief in the principle that the state exists for the sake of enabling people doing business and the ability to counter an aggressor, balance between sovereign development and global integration, qualitative management of dynamics and fostering competitiveness. Notwithstanding the authorial nature of such a classification, it allows ranking/differentiation of states according to classes and

groups depending on competitiveness and governance efficiency (different see in Porter 1990; Subbotin 2012, 31–42; 45–46, among others).

The disciplines of Political Science and Comparative Political Science use various analytical classifications based on the differentiation of the political field (Wilson 1996; Peters 1998; O’Neil 2010; O’Neil et al. 2010; Hague and Harrop 2010; Clark et al. 2009). According to systematism, political systems can be divided into a few classifications: *evolutionary and morphological* (based on the analysis of a political system’s construction), in their turn, diverging into *linear*, *binary* and *cross-bar* categories. According to *the forms of political rule*, one can highlight authoritarian-totalitarian and democratic political systems or authoritarian, pluralistic and totalitarian types of political systems. According to *political culture* (classification by Almond and Bingham Powell (1978)), there is the Anglo-Saxon, European-continental, pre-industrial and partially industrial as well as totalitarian political cultures, which materialize in different political systems including peoples, tribal-bureaucratic, authoritarian, conciliatory (competitive oligarchies and pluralistic democracies), mobilizational (populist and elitist) and so on.

The classification by J. D. and J. Derbyshires (1996, 1999) takes into account *all sets of governance tools, political culture types and other factors*. They highlight unitary and federal states (depending on the principle of division or convergence of the three main state institutions; the unitary states with decentralization streaks can be denoted into a separate subtype). According to the ideological platform (political regime), there exists liberal democracy, young democracy, communist states, national-socialistic states, authoritarian-nationalistic states, military-authoritarian states, Islamist-nationalist states and absolute monarchies. Alternatively, states can be classified according to the executive power authorities such as parliamentary, limited-presidential, dualist, communist, unlimited-presidential, militarist and absolute. Although such classification “according to various principles” (for example, liberal democracy and young democracy, authoritarian-nationalistic state and Islamist-nationalist state) is quite complicated, it allows for the description of the whole variety of political systems and specific forms of the political process organization in countries. However, there is a weakness to this type of classification as well—complicated classification inhibits typology. Very often it is hard to

make any practical conclusions on a basis that would be beneficial to real political projection.

Given the immense complexity of classifying different political systems, *form of rule and state structure classification* is intuitively simpler and more consistent. Relying on objective criteria, it highlights theocratic states as well as totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic states. The political systems are divided according to both objective and subjective parameters that add to this classification the “dual standards” issue.

In general, this multitude of world political systems and political regimes can be categorized/differentiated under six main types of basic ideology of state governance and the political structure projection, as well as the political order parameters. These are as follows:

- instable (non-consolidated) democracies
- democracies (extra-liberal, liberal, non-Western, non-liberal)
- constitutional monarchies
- absolute monarchies
- military dictatorships
- military-authoritarian, authoritarian-communist and authoritarian republics

The elementary *structural-geographic* and/or *structural/civilizational* typologies have gained great significance in the field of International Relations, and are based on the binary oppositions of West/East and North/South as well as triads (Center/Semi-Periphery/Periphery) (Wallerstein 1974, 347–357; for an explanation of the spatiality of social relations see, Palumbo-Liu et al. 2011; Brenner 2011). These differentiations come from structural reasons: stable or uneven development of states in the world system is evoked by internal (different phases of development) or external reasons (the need for a center, tightening the global system into an entire whole—the absence whereof could spark off centrifugal trends), revolving in dialectical unity (Wallerstein 1974, Amin 1976, 1997).

The fundamental principle of this typology is the world-system concept by Wallerstein. It outlines three reciprocally harmonized parts of global space, geographically differentiated by their functions but interconnected by means of a structurally hierarchized system of trade relations: the center, semi-periphery and periphery. Economic activity is typical of each of the world-system components. In the center countries, there is a focus

on industry and complex agriculture. In the semi-periphery and periphery countries, there is a focus on monoculture. Each country has its own form of workforce management (freelance workers and farmers at the center, farmers-lodgers on the semi-periphery and dependent workers on the periphery) and its own degree of state influence (a powerful state in the center, but weak on the periphery). Therefore, the center is able to capitalize on the periphery's disproportionately larger share of economic surplus. Inequality of economic and military power strengthens this structure of world relations (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989).

The world can be divided into a core and levels of cover to explore global differentiation. The core of the global system is the focal point of global intellectual and material resources. The core functions to create and diffuse innovations—commercializing key knowledge and technologies and establishing new manufacturing facilities and markets, allowing the center to maintain its role as a center. In this analysis, the “axial” country in the core is still undoubtedly the USA. Other crucial components are the EU countries and Japan. The cover of the world core is the first-order semi-periphery. This is formed by the global factories in China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, India and parts of Brazil. Their functions in the world system are to create supporting technologies and mass produce science-intensive products.

The next level in the cover is the second-order semi-periphery. It assembles complete knock-down (CKD) kits and carries out less sophisticated production—in particular, in the consumer goods industry. The periphery plays the role of a resource supplier and net consumer of science-intensive products as well as luxury goods. The modern stage of this system is characterized by transferring all the supplementary functions in production and technologies beyond the limits of the world system core that provides for dynamics of the world order amid relative absence of conflicts. Simultaneously, mechanisms for science-technical cooperation are established, which enhance interdependence of the key countries in the core of the world system and the number of contenders trying to join the core or contenders attempting to create a new core. The emergence of a new interdependence mechanism between the core and contenders brings about a leveling off. It mitigates differentiation of the world space as a guarantor of any efforts to violently redistribute global wealth. This should be followed by (Amin 2001) a national and peoples' revolution and, ultimately, a new world order. Though, it is clearly different compared to how it was understood soon after the collapse of the USSR (see, Bennis

and Moushabeek 1993, and compare with contemporary understandings), rather than a global socialist revolution (Amin 2001, 429–461).

However, contrary to these theories part of the semi-periphery managed to build up an open social access system (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea) or limited open social access system (Singapore). With other purposefully launched factors of the external and internal order, this enabled these semi-periphery countries to join the core. China, for example, was an authoritarian country with a decentralized (market) economic system that managed to turn itself from the periphery to the semi-periphery. Then, it joined the world system as a new secondary economic pole in an attempt to ensure a geographical shift in economic power. This sequence of events revived the discussion of the bipolar structure as of the most stable form of the world structure.

Intellectual imperfections in the world-systemic approach soon required amendments to its theoretical foundations by the author (Wallerstein 1979, 2003). One his adherents, S. Sunderson, successfully added a cultural-anthropological (civilizational) dimension to the world-systemic approach (Sunderson 1995) that at a later stage led to research of space differentiation of the world system, its scope and cultural dimensions (Palumbo-Liu et al. 2011).

In the disciplines of World Politics and International Relations there are also different analytical classifications/differentiations of a structural type. These were formed by the ongoing discussion about the stratification of the global space because of the transforming global leadership notion and ways of global governance, which will be given further consideration later. Apart from that, one can highlight the typologies and differentiations related to *taxonomies*, and, first and foremost, based on the use of a regional taxon—the *regional and sub-regional classification* (spatial pattern).

Nowadays, it is more or less clear that the hegemony epoch in the world system has gone. Globalization has turned out to be a much more complicated process, including both regionalization and fragmentation of the world. The essence of the hegemony concept has been added to with much more refined contents and terminology (Ikenberry et al. 2011). A change in the hegemony notion entails the transformation of the differentiation principles within the field of international cooperation. Now, by hegemon we mean a state with power in military force as well as the constructive potential for shaping the world system in conformity with its own interests. Another crucial trait of a hegemon was defined in the twentieth

century—the state should be a superpower. After the collapse of the USSR, the notion of a dominant state came into being. These processes reflected a structural transformation in which a powerful military, without a constructive potential and support from the international society, was not given the right to conduct any policy beyond the borders of its nation-state. Thus hegemony was transformed into structural leadership. In its original sense, the hegemony seemed to be edged out to the periphery of IR into the domain of realistic balancing of states with the natural (limited) type of social access.

A dominant state (a state that dominates within a world system) is unable to structure the global relations system in isolation. It has to lean on the key players in the world system and/or formal or informal military-political and diplomatic coalitions and can put significant pressure on the macro-regional segments of the world. The radical departure of a “dominant state” from a “hegemon state” (a hegemon) lies with the fact that a “dominant state” is bereft of an opportunity to determine the parameters of extended reproduction and military build-up by the large regional industrial or industrializing powers. However, it has the opportunity to make military-technological breakthroughs on its own. It is possible for a hegemon to transition to a dominant state as well as for a dominant state to transition back to a hegemon at the same time the “great powers” are losing their ability to achieve a self-sustained technological breakthrough.

In the contemporary literature on international relations and world politics, instead of “hegemon” and “dominant state,” sometimes the synonymic concept of “world leader” is used. But the leadership notion (and respectively, the leader-state/leading state) is structurally distinct from the “hegemon” or “dominant state” idea. The leader-state has a desire (more precisely, part of its political elite must have this desire) and enjoys conscious support from the international society for formatting the world, diminishing or increasing differentiation of the global space in the course of its policy. To become a global hegemon/dominant/leader, a state should meet the following five requirements:

- possess an effective economic mechanism based on cutting-edge production technologies;
- dominate and/or lay down the financial rules and the global currency system;
- control large-scale transnational assembly lines and supply chains;

- enjoy a prevailing position within the world trade and control the major stake of the super-large multinational corporations or transnational corporations (TNCs); and
- possess global scale power capabilities, steer powerful military unions and carry out an efficient military policy.

A dominant/leader-state should establish an appealing society, based on an open, competent, forward-looking leadership and considerable social beneficence. In other words, it should be ready to give up material and non-material resources for the sake of global leadership; have a competitive universal ideology; represent and simultaneously be perceived as a center for global education and science; and have an energetic (“passionate”) population. The availability of these factors increases the degree of homogeneity in international cooperation based on certain principles and unifying around other nation-states.

Transformations in the nature of leadership parameters and the emergence of super-large regional states as contending players on the global tier calls for the justification of the constructive and innovational features in the global leadership in those spheres—on which hinges mankind’s survival and further evolution. Changes in the nature of leadership may bring about the transformation and/or the enhancement of such an intercourse due to the rising accountability and/or collective leadership of the other participants of this space unified on any principles, rather than the dilution of interconnectedness of the international cooperation unified by it. However, in the scholarly community there are also other viewpoints on this matter (see, Lennon and Kozłowski 2008; Yoshihara and Sylva 2012; Rosecrance 2013, among others).

The “regional powers” do not “aspire” to the standards of the leaders across all five parameters listed previously, but they have a definite constructive potential (larger or smaller depending on which state the case at hand is). They give compulsory support to the group of other states, or a leader, or part of the peripheral states, as well as its own capacities (economic and military) to steer or correct global evolution, first and foremost, in that region, wherein they are located geographically or across which their historical/geopolitical/economic interests stretch. Some experts call this group the “large regional states” or “great regional powers” (sometimes they are called also “large semi-peripheral states”), renouncing such a formalized factor as the desire for its own constant participation in world politics.

By all indications, this group is heterogeneous. Inside it, there are states that are able to assume responsibility of regional dominants, mainly, of course, upon the consent of the global leader—acquiescence or the one stipulated by various agreements and unions (in particular, informal), and states, which are able to resist the world-system's leader under certain conditions and even enforce some decisions, which run counter to the policy of the latter.

Anti-dominants (destructive dominants) are dogged by issues with transforming their demolishing impulse into constructive behavior. Under no circumstance are they able to replace the leader. Furthermore, their efforts of balancing behavior inevitably stumble onto the leader's counteraction that is directly proportional to balancing behavior intensification. Under a definite environment, the anti-dominant may pretend regional *anti-leadership*. In other words, they will start carrying out the regional policy in the world system and running counter to the leader's position. However, the latter cannot see these attempts neutrally because regional anti-leadership may open up a way to the "counter-leader" position—a state challenging the reigning global leader, the world order created by him and capable of taking over from his position. In world history during the transition from world-empires to world-economies these were, respectively, imperial China, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Britain, the USA and a "self-strained" counter-hegemon—the USSR. Or it can try to dilute leadership that relinquishes and undermines the existing world order. That is why in the USA, a national security strategy provision was stipulated, under which one of the vital US interests is to prevent the regional dominant from emerging in vast regions or lengths of seas that are hostile to the USA or its closest allies. And if such states spring up, their efforts to "dilute" the existing world or regional order must be suppressed by force. The *anti-leader* is distinguished from the *counter-leader* by their fundamental inability to turn into a leader of the world system (however, given rapid militarization, it may become a new global hegemon sooner or later): firstly, a new constructive regional order should be suggested, which could become or could seem to be more favorable than the current one, as well as secure unequivocal support in the region and tacit neutrality by the minority. An interesting point for discussion is a new possibility for an anti-leader and counter-leader to unite against the current world leader to deconstruct the existing world order or foster the evolution of the existing world order into a new quality or even a new one.

Apart from that, in the world system there are “non-dominants” or states that under no circumstances are able to become dominants. They generally accept the leadership structure of international relations.

Moreover, there is a simpler classification, which outlines:

- *Great powers*—in another terminology, the *great countries*, *great nation-states*—the latest term draws attention to transformation of the great power concept without a binding accent on their military might and domination as a traditional symbol of the super-power status, contrary to super-powers and/or states-dominants, do not necessarily possess exclusive possibilities across all domains of international activity. However, they are distinct in the fact that their economic, military and political capacities are sufficient to pretend on the state-dominant status or re-format the world order in the short- or mid-run. The great countries are actively engaged in the process of articulating the military agenda and can act across several regions of the world, at the same time representing regional leaders at least within one region. In other words, they are up-and-coming in formatting the macro-regional tier (for discussion see: Lennon and Kozłowski 2008; Ikenberry et al. 2011; Yoshihara and Sylva 2012; Rosecrance 2013; Temin and Vines 2013). The difference in terminology is related to a divergent understanding and different grades of this category by the scholars from different countries: the Chinese use the term “great” (literally, “*da go*”—large) states/countries, contrary to “*qiang go*”—great powers, whereby the hieroglyph “qiang” (power, might) accentuates, first and foremost, military power.

Apart from that, Chinese International Relations highlights the notion of “global super powers” (*shijie dago*), which are determined by the following parameters: size of territory, population, economy capacity, intensive political activity and military power, a permanent membership in the UN Security Council, potential possession nuclear and extraterrestrial technologies. In addition, they should be included in the new phase of the global scientific and technological revolution, processes of globalization, informatization, economic liberalization and integration (Wang Yidan and Yuan Zhengqing 2005).

The “great power” term is used by several Russian researchers similarly with the English term “the great powers,” which is also used by the Americans, who, in their turn, underscore “the great powers”—“old great

powers,” i.e., the countries of the West (the USA, France, Germany, Japan and Great Britain) and the “aspiring powers”—the new “great emerging powers,” which strive to change the status quo in the international system: China, Russia, India, Iran and Brazil. The great powers/great countries rise either on account of some countries upgrading their status in the international hierarchy and/or due to the wane of former super powers.

Transregional cooperation is another way of boosting status within the international system, going through countries of various calibers: the USA, different European nations at different historical consequence, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and recently, being actively mastered by China. It is essential to note that if very powerful states with various social access types or state entities (USA, EU, China) it is precisely transregionalism coupled with the other factors that enabled the USA to become the leader state; the EU to institutionally lead a grouping of nation-states, integrated into a political-economic (monetary but not fiscal) union, and; China to create in a time span of thirty to forty years the second-largest economy in the world from virtually nothing.

- *Regional powers*, which possess considerable capacities to act within their macro-regions, outline regional polarity parameters, dominates within a region, however, as a rule, do not enter onto the global level. They rarely take part in formatting and re-formatting the world order and cannot in all cases successfully act across several regions, although at times they try, even quite successfully—for instance, Britain’s war against Argentina for the Falkland Islands. In the national literature there are also other more or less successful classifications, based on, as a rule, realism-bound structural principles.

At this moment, there are at least four approaches to understand how contemporary international relations and development of international cooperation are run. They are as follows:

1. The mono-polar world concept, relying on the USA’s complete supremacy across most parameters;
2. Combination of mono-polarity and polycentricity (the pluralist mono-polarity);
3. Non-polarity or a-polarity;
4. Polycentricity or “pluralist” mono-polarity and various concepts of “balancing” inside this system;
5. The harmonious world (*hexie shijie*)—a new world entente.

Main approaches to governing modern international relations (Temnikov 2011, 7–9; Voskressenski 2014a, b) within the field of international cooperation are being transformed into the five concepts of global governance organization over the world political and economic space:

1. Global government as a replica of the national government structure on a global scale;
2. Global governance implemented by influential international organizations and institutions (the United Nations [UN], the International Monetary Fund [IMF], World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], the Group of 7 [G7], the Group of Twenty [G20]);
3. Global governance guaranteed by the economy and military force of the most influential nation-state in the world arena (global governance on mono-polar grounds guaranteed by a world hegemon or a world leader);
4. Polycentric global governance based on the state bodies and institutions, as well as non-state actors;
5. Transnational global governance by non-state actors as regulating mechanisms.

7.2 CONSEQUENCES OF STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION

Thus, in the academic world different concepts compete with each other construing further development of the IR system and ways of transforming the international interaction field. None of them give a clear answer because of the incomplete transformation of the Westphalia system international order. In this regard, the significance of exploring the global governance issues rise.

Another opportunity is featured by colligation of the internal structural arrangement of the state agenda with its foreign policy interaction, which, in its turn, affects the essence of the format of global political space. Such an opportunity is presented by differentiating the social-political access type, allowing a combination of the state internal arrangement and a model of its foreign interaction with various social-political access states. In other work, to bind up the internal-political organization type of the state with the international cooperation field formation or formatting opportunities. In compliance with this differentiation, laid down in the research by North et al. (2009), there are three types of social access:

primitive, natural (in another terminology—restricted or limited) and an open type. Today primitive social access is non-competitive in general, and its expansion range is shrinking, being present in ever more narrowing, depressive and backward regional segments (more precisely, fragments) of the world. The existence of natural/restricted/limited social access and the corresponding types of social/political order (according to the reasoning by North, Wallis and Weingast, it does not need extraction of special structural-temporal differentiated stages), in its turn, goes through certain temporal/structural stages: fragile natural access, basic natural access and mature natural access. However, there are also structural-temporal subtypes of natural social access order, obviously, at the mature natural access stage: archaic/archaized and traditionalist, enclave, enclave-conglomerated, conglomerated, hybrid and transitional. These subtypes live up to the different phases of national communities' evolutionary development. They possess a significant degree of distinctness that puts considerable pressure on configuring internal and external spheres of these communities, reflecting, ultimately, on their world political conduct. Obviously, there are various subtypes of states with the open social-political access type. We can probably argue for the existence at least two models: the European and American, but this issue for various practical reasons (the need for consolidation of states with the open social access type) in the political theory has not been given meticulous consideration so far. This is because the transition to a new, more advanced social model was more important than spotting differences in this model.

Nowadays, approximately half of all states belong to a natural social-political order, adhering to restricted social and political access. Apart from that, there is also a social order of an open type, which was set up, bolstered and developed by twenty-five states. The range of states with the open access system is gradually extending and today they total 100. Precisely this fact is gradually changing the essence of the global system of political relations. The stage of the largest expansion of states' structural interaction field characterized by this type of social order happened after the collapse of the USSR. States with natural and open social orders are actively competing against each other in the international arena, and the ways and forms of this competition are shaped by approximately forty-five to sixty states: twenty-five to thirty states with an open social order and twenty to thirty states with natural social order of the conservative type. As mankind evolves—along with life termination and prolongation technologies—forms of this competition shift from the military, bringing

on incalculable human fatalities and catastrophic economic losses, to the non-military technologies, requiring ever wider intellectual resources for the elaboration of strategies for consensual, evolutionary and competitive development. Other states either use an open access system, importing the respective institutions, or are unable to build it up on many accounts, but mostly, internal ones. More states belong to a natural access order, but the open one has been fostering higher living standards, protected with a powerful military-political bloc, resting on a highly integrated economic foundation, more swiftly responding to unanticipated political-economic circumstances and is actively expanding. This social access system and corresponding social/political order is, in general, more competitive and legitimate, as it is based on democratic rule, implying political control over possible violence. Its viability rests on peoples' direct involvement in running the country through open and transparent election systems and periodic rotation of political and economic managers strictly specified by terms and rotational procedures, allowing the society to employ individuals reputed to be the most competent and talented by the majority of the country for the tenure. During this limited tenure, their competencies can be used as highly rationally as possible; however, without resorting to violence, coercion or direct/indirect economic bribery on account of the other citizens/taxpayers. Such a social and political order better tackles negative outer and inner impulses. Under economic crises, it shows less of an economy's setback. It creates political preventers against possible systemic crises and by this virtue develops, in general, more intensively and rapidly. It creates for the population more favorable life conditions, based on, at least, 200 years of intellectual innovations (social and technological). This is especially true for highly skilled immigrants, who are often unable to carve an appropriate niche for their creativity and their full potential in countries with a natural type of social access.

Nowadays, in the context of economic and political human rights protection, states with an open social access system have come to be formally or informally viewed as a kind of gold standard. However, there are specific issues in the economic, political and social spheres that can be quite significant in these states. As, in general, our current way of life was created by countries, which had, ultimately, invented the open social access system, initially for themselves, and then suggested it to others as a social innovation. Then they hold themselves as role models for other countries with limited and opaque social order systems that triggers tension between the political elites and has the potential to unleash various ideological stand-offs (Morris 2010, Done 2012).

A geographically heterogeneous group of transitional states that are moving towards building an open social-political access system, albeit at various rates, placing them at different historical phases of the process, is adjacent to the group of open social access states whose core is tightly located in Europe and North America. In quantitative terms, open and transitional social access groups of states comprise nearly half of the entire number of states in the world society. These are the most proactive players, actively shaping a still disparate but strengthening system of multilateral global governance institutions. The number of states with a restricted or limited social access system is constantly contracting, mainly due to the fact that no viable alternative to the open social access system has been suggested so far.

Previously, the transition from a natural social order to an open one within a nation was reputed to happen spontaneously, commensurate with economic development and an increase in overall welfare. It was argued by many that the main thing is only to understand and realize this historical tendency, in the same way as others previously argued that all countries would inevitably transition from capitalism to socialism and then to communism. Currently, many European and American researchers and politicians have come to believe that the construction of an open social access system is a kind of spontaneous abnormality of social evolution, impossible to replicate or construct by all countries because of their intellectual and social-political ill-preparedness for this transformation. Simultaneously, a more constructive explanation emerged, according to which the transition of states to the open access system had its own strict logic: the imperative for economic development, based on the creation of extending a market space, wider than the territory of a nation-state, called for a transformation of national sovereignty in a way that could provide control over only key parameters, but for which both active absorption of investment, financial, trade and migrational flows from outside as well as their own expanding entrance into foreign markets (Ziegler 2012). Interpretation of this imperative demanded a transformation and the elaboration of a national and international security theory, which would mix these parameters with the strategic idea of sustainable development. The need to support a higher level of technological development and use migrational flows from outside as a way out of the demographic troughs and “influx of brains” required open access to the highly competitive national systems of education, science and transparent mechanisms providing financial support to this process. Large foreign-ethnic components as a consequence of years-long migration and the need for

incorporation of diasporas into ethnically alien society imply an acceptance of the open access social system as a response to the systemic crisis issue in the wake of drifts in demographic parameters and ethnic components in this compound social system. In this system it is impossible to restrict social access on ethno-national, ethno-confessional, social or any other criterion. In more conventional terms, one can state that the open social access system (democratic rule) allows all citizens to participate in running the nation on transparent grounds, understandable to the whole society and, consensually approved by it, but at the same time does not allow plain access to the governance process by everyone. This system also is fraught with its own preventing mechanisms and rigid selection principles based first of all on meritocracy, professionalism and experience (Makarov 2010). However, these preventing mechanisms and selection principles do not a priori include the ethnic, confessional, social and ideological criteria. The second crucial parameter of this system rests on transparency, guiding political control over the use of force including its implementation outside the national state.

Apart from building up a self-regulating open type social system, there are also other social engineering mechanisms inside it as mentioned before (Makarov 2010). Nevertheless, whatever this mechanism could be, the criteria for the social access in this system are transparent, rational, supported and approved by the whole society. The system of open and equal access is not anarchic, as it could be judged by its title, due to robust but open and transparent criteria, consensually acknowledged by the society. It allows putting forward to the governance process the most talented and skilled, regardless of their race, ethnicity, confession, gender, age or political creeds as long as they are not extremist and do not undermine the incumbent constitutional system. It also enables the society to carry out the governance process during an acceptable term in the context of biologically justified conditions created for non-violent attempts of concentration by a certain individual at their intensive governance activity. In other words, the open access system is a strict but simultaneously flexible grid of political, economic and public institutions, interlaced into the *socium* to such an extent that inside every cell free development, guided by these institutions and restricted only by the constitutional frameworks, is permitted. Resorting to force (or even the threat of violence) is controlled politically and regulated relying on transparent and consensually recognized political rules.

According to Weber's assumption, because states with open social access monopolistically control legitimate use of force/violence by subordinating the military to the political system, which guarantees a shift in

power if there is political power abuse, their ability rests on the support of impersonal relations inside the state as well as on a broader scale. The military power of NATO politically reinforces support for the dissemination of impersonal relations on a broader scale and, at the same time, guarantees the protection of this open social-political access system from outside. The spread of impersonal relations and impersonal international cooperation institutions, in general, mitigates risks of clashes between states, first and foremost, with open social access (“democracies do not fight against each other”), but simultaneously and *inter alia* provides a range of conditions and states with different social access systems. After all, the states do not dismantle their military forces and installations, but continue stockpiling armaments. However, the forceful spread of this social order in reliance on military force, as the US experience has illustrated, evokes reactions and brings only partial success. This issue emphasizes the “depersonalized” concepts of political interactions between states and state foreign-policy theories, completely abstracting from the ideological factor in world politics and orienting toward a collaborative environment, rather than a failure policy. But securing settlements and mutual understandings between states with open social access and between states with open and natural social access, especially in the period of global crises and social-economic turbulence, requires enormous efforts and is prone to tumbling down.

Such an approach allows conceiving of an internal link between forms of social access and political systems. In other words, the role of the inner/internal political factors in developing and shaping the global space, and in a new light tackle the issue of internal structural processes influence in various states on nature of international relations, trends in world politics and the global evolution process. It gives us an opportunity to analyze and forecast impact by different types of social/political access systems on states’ relationships in international affairs. This is why different theories exist, explaining international reality (realism, idealism, pragmatism, constructivism, etc.), as well as West-centric and non-West-centric approaches to international relations and world politics. At the same time, such a statement calls for the application of comprehensive, integral comparative-political approaches to the analysis of the global and regional reality.

As it became known in the early twenty-first century—after terrorist attacks in capitals of the developed market democracies with open social-political access and their retaliatory military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya—at the current stage of global evolution, the previously existing balance system of states with different social-political orders vanished.

Earlier, the balance system was guaranteed by the nuclear and military parity of the two non-European bipolar centers (USSR and USA), whose logic was subduing all other interests of this parity, as alternatively, nuclear war would break out. After the collapse of the bipolar system, the Yalta-Potsdam order transformed the world into a new phase. First and foremost, the governor-suzerain and the political elite of the state de facto forfeited not only the moral but also legitimate right to treat their population in any manner they choose. If previously the suzerain had been administering the fate of their country, by the late twentieth century mass repressions/purges and genocide against their own population became unacceptable. This engendered the “humanitarian intervention” and “peace enforcement” concepts by the world society, aimed at the substantiation of the right to “power correction” of such acts in order to defend the common population. The aptitude of the political elite to manage their catchment areas effectively started to be equally meticulously evaluated. A need for a new modified system of global regulation and global stability maintenance relying on control over the key parameters arose to keep up stability, but at the same time encourage development (Ziegler 2012). In so far as interdependence of the world has been tightening, the ability or inability of the national political elites to govern their national territories effectively fell out of their “sovereign right” and touched upon only the political elite and population in a certain country, but also all the other countries with which they embarked on partnership relations. The transformation process of the existing world order is well under way so as to become obvious in relation to the emergence of new non-state actors in world politics and the ongoing evolution of the national sovereignty category. This has been perceived quite painfully in all regional segments of the world—in the EU there was the uncontrolled budget deficit of Greece, Italy, Portugal and France; in Russia and China there were fears of boosting this evolution from outside; in Iran and North Korea because of the Iraqi, Libyan and Syrian events and availability of tightly closed confessional or ideological regime, etc. Simultaneously, this transformation is too far from its completion. Evolutionary transformation of the world order, rather than its violent breakthrough, suits almost all primary parties to the world process. It allows them to not risk lives of their population and preserve the incumbent national level of economic development, keeping up competition among the development models. In other words, they can use combinations of national, regional, supranational and transnational factors to look for the most favorable and congruent conditions for their

national interests. And when having occupied a more favorable position, they will take part in the transformation of this system with the world community for their benefit. They will go through the efforts of articulating and correcting the world system rules as well as their own national systems, rather than military solutions, which are often costly in terms of internal economic development and demographic potential and very often ineffective in terms of the long-run priorities. Certainly, when qualifications and skills of the national political elite are insufficient, and the state runs out of political control, resorting to violence and the opaque use of financial resource with the end of enhancing military potential, also raises the temptation of the use of military force by the society. They would do this to preserve or even up the ranking status of their country in the formal/ or informal world hierarchy as a way of addressing foreign and internal economic and/or political issues.

The extraction of various types of social access allows us to focus on the structural typology of partnerships in the modern world in a new way which highlights:

Partnerships between the states hallmarked with an open social-political access: partnerships and coalitions unified by common values and, thus, equal states regardless of their sizes, economic, military or demographic parameters, oriented toward protecting common interests or solving specific foreign policy issues which address the principle that “democracies do not fight against each other.”

Partnerships between states with a non-consolidated open access system or transitional states and the states with natural type of social-political access: partnerships and coalitions of different options, “catching up” with the open social access system, or preventing this process, various coalitions for tackling foreign political, economic and security issues.

Partnerships between states belonging to both, open and natural, types of social-political access: partnerships/coalitions of “catching up” with the open social access system, assistance in the arrangement of public and state institutions, as well as coalitions for achieving specific political or foreign political objectives following the principle: “although he is a rascal, he is our rascal.”

Partnerships between states with a natural social-political access: equal/ unequal realist partnerships to strengthen or support their own political elites/partner political elites in light of internal and foreign stand-offs, in particular political stand-off and the (artificial or natural) dissemination of open social-political access, along with attaining specific foreign political and

political targets; partnerships for development, when partners go through various stages of natural social access, but move in the same or divergent directions along the evolutionary development path.

Partnerships between states with a natural social-political access system and a primitive type of social-political access system: partnerships for the sake of obtaining certain foreign political imperatives, as a rule, in a colonialist or neocolonialist nature (even if not described in these terms), or any other political goals.

Partnerships between states with a primitive type of social-political access: partnerships to solve specific political/international political issues or to resist states with an open/natural type of social-political access, including science and technology partnerships, generally, military or military-political in nature.

However, we envisage not only the transformation of the current form of international order but also take into account the possible move beyond the Westphalia system. This would be because of developing polycentrism, strengthening of the democratic quality of existing confederal arrangements and/or contributing to global democracy by expanding the domestic franchise in line with cosmopolitan principles (Archibugi et al. 2012, 14). We may envisage the global transformation to “intergovernmental democratic multilateralism,” “world government” or “world federation” or “global stakeholder democracy” (for authors of the concepts and descriptions see, Archibugi et al. 2012, 7–8). The arguments for and against such international evolution and the different reasons and empirical evidence for autocratic as well as democratic states are explained by Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti (Archibugi 2012, 11–12).

7.3 DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN GEO-SPATIAL DIMENSIONS

The issue of differentiation of the geo-spatial dimension itself begins with distinguishing the environment from the social system, or the physical-geographic space from the social system as a whole. In every case of distinguishing the environment from the system, they overlap each other. Therefore, with every distinction there takes place a reduction in the complexity, which requires viewing spatiality not only in abstract (theoretical) terms but also from a specific angle: a certain practical issue should be

tackled—how to divide the global space into parts, if the answer differs both on the criteria system (only the multi-criteria approach fits in modernity), and where it should be put.

Traditional spatial (spatial or two-dimensional) segmentation of the world space comes out of the intrinsic cultural-civilizational or political-geographic logic of development. In other words, it comes from the definition of the international-political macro-region as pegged to the territorial-economic and national-cultural complex (resting on specific homogeneity of geographic, natural, economic, social-historical, political and national-cultural conditions, giving occasion to its segmentation) of a regional row of phenomena, unified by a common structure and logic to an extent that the logic and historical-geographic coordinates of its existence are interdependent. Such a definition of the international-political region correlates to the fundamental universalized definition of the region notion in the discipline of World Regional Studies and, simultaneously, the auxiliary definition in International Relations, which is in accordance with the ideas that *the region is meant as a space/territory, marked by a certain presence of intensive, numerous and interconnected phenomena that distinguish it from other spaces/regions/environments.*

An expansive, and at the same time a “geographized,” vision of the region enables us to hold on to the information within a certain spatial (two-dimensional) coordinate system. This regional/sub-regional classification is based on various types of world regionalization in accordance with common geographic, cultural-historical and ethno-confessional criteria of regions extraction. The pivotal thrust of this classification lies with the fact that cultural-geographic, as well as cultural-historical traits are less mobile than the ideological, political and economic characteristics. And they rest on the criteria/factors that are not taken into account in synthetic social-economic typologies and structural-analytical approaches.

If to advance from the *geographic parameters*, geographic macro-regions and meso-regions (middle regions), as well as separate regions and sub-regions can be highlighted judging by their physical-geographic features. In a broad geographic sense, “region” will be meant as a certain territory, representing a compound territorial-economic and national-cultural complex, which can be confined by the presence of intensive, numerous and interdependent phenomena, manifesting themselves in specific homogeneity of geographic, natural, economic, social-historical and national-cultural prerequisites, justifying segmentation of this territory.

Such a determination of the region correlates with its broad interpretation, according to which, “region” means space (territory) marked by the presence of intensive, numerous and interdependent phenomena.

The “international-political region” is a regional array of phenomena, unified by a common structure and logic to such an extent that this logic and the historical-geographic coordinates of its existence are interdependent; this complex is pegged to the territorial-economic and national-cultural complex (relying on specific homogeneity of geographic, natural, economic, social-political, historical, political and national-cultural frameworks, which highlight this region as a segment).

The fundamental methodological weakness in the determination of the international-political region involves pegging it to an already existing reality or reality of the historical past that methodologically constricts the task of forecasting and modeling the international processes.

Historical-cultural parameters or historical-cultural regions can be extracted: the Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Indian, Indo-Iranian, Turkic, Arabian, Russian, European, North American, Latin American and African regions unify in a respective regional commonality on such parameters as the geopolitical tradition (the affiliation to a single-state entity), the modern trend towards integration (interstate cooperation) and ethno-linguistic or ethno-psychological unity. The Confucian-Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Orthodox, West-Christian complexes are often referred to as “cultural-religious macro-regions.”

Geopolitical parameters make it possible to divide Asia into the Central, Southern, Southeastern and Eastern (or Far East), the Middle East and Central East. The issue of “boundary”/“buffer”/“insulator” states frequently comes up because they do not fully belong to any region or belong to several geopolitical regions at a time. Some analysts suppose that Afghanistan belongs to South Asia, rather than Central Asia, as the country is a member of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). By the same token, the countries of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) consists of ten nations within certain historical and geo-economic parameters: Brunei, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. They all belong to the Southeast Asia region; at the same time they exclude “neighboring” states like Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste. Some experts believe that countries in Central Asia can be considered Middle Eastern, whereas while describing the political development of Mongolia, belonging to Central Asia, in terms of civilizational traits it would be more

expedient to regard it together with the nations of East Asia (see examples in Voskressenski 2010, 2015a, b).

The variant of regional/sub-regional *spatial-analytical classification* is an extraction of the cultural-civilizational regions in compliance with the civilizational, cultural-historical and ethno-confessional criteria. A specific combination of such criteria can be quite subjective, which leads to the extraction of different amounts of specific civilizational regions (for instance, in the works by Arnold Toynbee and Samuel Huntington (1997) or Palumbo-Liu et al. 2011). Usually the following regions are highlighted: the Chinese-Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Black-African (Sub-Saharan Africa), Trans-Atlantic or Western (European and North American), Latin American and Orthodox. The civilizational regions directly correlate with the geo-cultural images (Wallerstein 2004, 97–119)—the mental images of the civilization, whose primary methodological concerns in the formalization and practical use of foreign policy and diplomacy lie with their mainly psycho-emotional and subjectivist nature, impeding the application in practical analysis and activity.

There are also other criteria and approaches for the differentiation of the global space, as a result of *the spatial-geographic factor priority as a category in structural differentiation* (Blij 2005) and taking into account linguistic differentiation given the global communication language, enhancing mutual understanding and linguistic convergence that, at least, positively affects macro-regional economic complementary dependence (the English-speaking, Francophone, Hispanic, Chinese, Arabian “world”). However, the availability of a global communication language gives incentive to further globalize the world and make the world more “flat” (Blij 2009). Subsequent region’s “falling out” of the global linguistic convergence sphere (fragmentation of the linguistic space) can exacerbate its economic/technical/cultural backwardness. Religious-confessional affiliation has almost always been associated with any “place” (region, dissemination space) and can enhance the solidarity of one confession advocates that, in its turn, may step up the differentiation on confessional or religious traits. Civilizational or confessional nationalism may push the region out of the global civilizational cooperation field and dialogue. Such a role can also be played by the differentiation of regions in the context of the modern healthcare systems coverage/absence of area geography: the regions, exposed to a pandemic malignance or disease (AIDS, Ebola); regions with varying life expectancy for the male/female population, unequal popula-

tion aging rate, migrational influxes of the qualified and young population, and different standards of living and; regions with elevated risk or risky economic activity (tsunamis, earthquakes, river overflows, inundations, volcanic eruption zones, tornados, perpetually frozen soil areas, etc.), shaping a special life attitude or even national character traits (fatalism, depressions, alcohol abuse, etc.), affecting economic activity and others. Such differentiations allow the reaction rates forecasting process inside a region, and how it will influence differentiation depth between the regions, influencing the regional subsystem performance features. In other words, we deal with the original classification of the global challenges (world space differentiation) proceeding from the factor of their spatial-functional/spatial-geographic structure. Methodological originality and the practical relevance of such a classification for international organizations (the UN and its subsidiaries) and ministries of foreign affairs do not raise any doubts.

7.4 DIFFERENTIATING REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Within the systemic approach to international affairs the opportunity to view parts within a system as subsystems was envisaged, including the regional subsystems with their own interaction patterns. The expert outlooks on the functions of the regional subsystems are represented by the following partially colliding academic stances:

1. Parameters for international political dynamics are universal. Regional subsystems set the tone for international interactions of a lower level, which is completely or partially identical to its features in the global system;
2. Regions are unique. However, studying the parameters of one regional subsystem's performance may have limited value in understanding the other regional subsystems' performance;
3. Regions are viewed as a separate analysis level. Understanding the structure and performance features may assist in conceiving other regions and the international system as a whole, even if these processes within their frameworks assume various shapes (Koldunova and Voskressenski in Voskressenski 2014a, b).

A fourth stance can be added:

4. Regions can be regarded as a separate, sub-systemic tier of analysis, but may constitute larger entities as well: macro-regions, regional subsystems and global regions, the performance patterns of which may consist of both what is common to all of the subsystems and global regions as well as to what is individual to each and every region.

Pursuant to these reflections, and based on the fourth stance just defined, today, to an extent, one can define Western and Eastern European systems as parts inside the European subsystem (and specific traits in these sub-regional subsystems are fading away before our eyes), North American and South American (or Latin American) regions as constituents inside the Pan-American (Inter-American) subsystem, and Middle or Central Eastern, Central Asian, South Asian and Southeast Asian regions as parts of the Asian (or, in a series of cases, Asian-Pacific) IR subsystem.

While extracting the regional subsystems, it is worth bearing in mind the following:

1. The existence of security regions—historical/cultural/civilizational/-economic regions— contributes to the formation of regional subsystems on their platform.
2. In the regional subsystem, economic cooperation, historical links and relationships in the security domain are intrinsic.
3. States are either afraid of their neighbors and unite on this ground with the other regional actors, or collaborate economically so they do not lag behind.
4. The regional complexes can either fully coincide with the regional subsystems or appear as the core of the regional subsystem.
5. The boundaries between the regional complexes are either defined by the geographic parameters or relate to the geographic factors to a varying extent.
6. The borders between the regional subsystems/regional complexes are tepid cooperation zones or insulation areas.
7. The insulation zone or an insulator state is either oriented to the two different subsystems/regional complexes/regional security complexes, or is too weak to combine the two subsystems into one (defined on the basis of Buzan and Wæver 2003, 41,48).

Thus, the regional subsystem features a “sub-systemic part” of the international system, characterized by the relative intensity of internal relations (social-political, economic, security related, historical or cultural intercourse, etc.) and simultaneously the structural indifference or weaker structural collaboration with its international actors.

The “regional subsystem of international relations” is a combination of specific regional political-economic, cultural-civilizational, historical-social and social-cultural interactions within the spatial cluster in the IR system. In other words, the regional subsystem of international relations is an array of specific interactions in the sub-systemic type. At the heart of which lies common regional-geographic, social-historical, cultural-civilizational, political-economic affiliations and sometimes some common functional characteristics.

Thus, the “regional complex” is a group of states, united by a high degree of functional and geographic comprehensive interconnectedness, which distinguishes it from other regions and establishes it as a determining type of regional complex. In other words, the regional complex is a multi-dimensional segment at the regional level, which stands out due to the functions of a relatively stable system of regional relations, interdependences of the structural-spatial type (political, economic, cultural-historical) and a variable degree in intensiveness, allowing emphasis to be placed on the sub-systemic union with a variable degree in purposefulness with regards to international environment.

The regional complex notion is analytically narrower than the regional subsystem concept, but it can be viewed as a crucial element in the mature regional subsystem.

The “regional order” is a formal/informal way (principles) of organizing the internal structure of the regional subsystem and/or regional complex.

Differentiation based on the revelation of the networking interaction among the actors in a macro-regional space stands alone within the global space differentiation typology. One of the vivid examples (but by far not the only one) depicting such a differentiation is the concept of Saskia Sassen (2012). In it, a trend toward the formation of an international business-hub network is discernible, which has shown a new effect of the networking hubs in the world and macro-regional space. With the expansion of the global financial markets and specialized services, the necessity for creating transnational service corridors blurs the role of governments in running international economic activity. The expansion of the global markets and

corporate hubs helps establish strategic alliances between highly urbanized centers. According to Sassen's concept, the new multinational business hubs are filling in new contents in the traditional geographic notion of centrality. The imperatives of the "new centrality" strengthen the old and create new interlinks between the international financial and business centers of New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Sydney, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Seoul, Taipei, Sao Pãolo, Mexico City and Buenos Aires. They also enhance the enforcement of cooperation between the existing financial markets there. They help the service and investment platforms and, simultaneously, build more profound inequality in the allocation of strategic resources between these mega-centers and cities in each country (Sassen 2012).

7.5 DIFFERENTIATION AND FRAGMENTATION

Differentiation of the world space is attributed to its fragmentation. By and large, the global space fragmentation processes as world differentiation phenomena are poorly explored. One of the well-known principles is a voluntary or coercive economic and/or political autarchy, implemented in various forms and for different historical/political/foreign political reasons (the USSR, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, etc.). Apart from that, splitting the economic and political space can be implemented through the illegal conquest of power and its shift over to the governance of rebellious structures. Recently, the fragmentation of the world space has boiled down to atomization of the political world map and state boundaries transformation under the pressure of centrifugal forces. Therefore, at least in the economic and political geography exists a discipline, deeming it necessary to handle the disintegration processes of the world space fragmentation as an instrumental constituent in the scientific conception of global processes. They also form a crucial, although specific, share in the world differentiation processes. Based on these approaches, the geographic secessionism map as a political-geographic form of the world space fragmentation has been elaborated (Popov 2012). As specific forms of such fragmentation of the global space may emerge from uncontrollable territories, stateless territories, stateless zones, stateless space, weak or deficient statehood zones, opaque activity zones, disputed statehood zones, imperfect statehood zones, imperfect statehood regions, devolved statehood regions, grey zones, social strata activity zones which defy legal rule, transit statehood spots, insurgent states, pirate republics,

districts with unstable borders, quasi-states, pseudo-states, de facto states, para-states, partially recognized states, self-proclaimed states, failed states, collapsing states, degraded regions, stateless regions, etc.

The fragmentation of the global space is partially accountable to the “North-South” concept (first proposed by Jean-Claude Rufin; Knox and Martson 2013, 319–320). It is a model of dividing the world space into the two polar strategic macro-regions, similar to the “West-East” dichotomy—the South embodies destructive forces, threatening the security of the developed countries of the North. Thus, the localization of the rich, industrially advanced nation-states in the North (USA, EU, Japan) on one end of the spectrum, and countries with unstable political and business environments, authoritarian political regimes, wide-scale crime, spread of diseases and famine on the other, allows us to reconsider a bipolar picture of the world.

The elements in the geopolitical macro-poles of West-East were sovereign states, whereas the structure of the “Deep South” (a term by contemporary Russian philosopher Alexander Neklessa) as a spatial quintessence and back-side of the Third World is represented by the pseudo-state entities of various geneses, existing in a de facto, rather than de jure space.

It is clear that separate national states can be, according to different parameters, part of one, or even two or three intertwining regional clusters. This creates a multilayer *cross-link* of spaces, especially, if we combine spatial and synthetic social-economic, social-political or structural-analytical factors. Apart from that, other cultural-geographic agglomerations of states are also coming to the forefront. They can be built up under the principle of economic cooperation and joint security systems and/or be “fixed” with historical conflicts, disputed issues and traditional feuds, i.e., the division of the world into geo-economic and geopolitical regions. Furthermore, several historical regions have recently been assuming quite clear geo-economic traits. These intertwining principles of structural-analytical and civilizational-spatial division, allowing us to highlight “core” and “central” regions, provides the background for the determination of the most important international-political macro-regions. Within the boundaries of these macro-regions it is sensible to draw parallels, as well as dream up comparisons (including global ones) and contrasts (Bayly 2004). Such comparisons could pave the way for wider cross-regional comparative models of a universal nature. Simultaneously, they serve as a basis for the traditional historical-diplomatic and structural political-economic analysis and are used by the ministries for foreign affairs while administering their diplomatic performance.

Common geographic and civilizational-spatial (spatial/two-dimensional) differentiations are as conventional and subjective as contested groupings of countries (classification versus typology). However, the analytical model does not draw attention to the affinity of historical/civilizational/political evolution of nation-states. It does not allow conceiving civilizational affinity and at the same time specific traits of countries' social-economic or political processes within the region to the full extent. Multi-criteria synthetic social-economic approaches do not take into account the fact that the productive forces do not perform beyond the certain productive relations system, which, in their turn, directly and in a roundabout way are determined by the social-historical and cultural-civilizational factors influencing the agility of economic structures; countries may possess equal production volumes, but simultaneously these equal volumes can be achieved with different social-economic patterns, "working" at a various degrees of efficiency; the economic potential is influenced by "non-economic" factors (population size, natural resources potential, territory size); one and the same GDP per capita may come up to several types of social-economic structures; economic growth does not amount to development, etc. Apart from that, notwithstanding their analytical finesse, these typologies at times are ill-adapted to practical training of the specialist in regional/country affairs as they have an eye for general patterns, for instance, economic processes or political systems of a certain type of states (for example, nomadic), but at the same time in real life the states of such a type (say, Mongolia, some Middle Eastern states or some Arabian peninsula states) are located so far geographically, linguistically and civilizationally apart that obtained "general knowledge" cannot be applied in real life. Therefore, their practical value may be put under question. Another case of the two principles contraposition is illustrated by the discussion about universality/uniqueness of democracy principles (the discussion about extra-liberal, liberal, non-western and non-liberal models of democracy).

The spatial principle of contested material presentation helps us trace the regional dynamics of international-political development, the destiny of local and imported political institutions, the emergence of possible "political rifts" and political conflicts in the regions. These have common civilizational/historical roots and similar principles of political culture evolution, similar responses to the events in international affairs but to a lesser extent their economic performance. Such a methodological approach is more practice-oriented and, in a certain sense, more utilitarian. However,

in the real political life and international relations, while carrying out the applied international-political analysis, the method frequently yields quite weighty and realistic results in terms of feasibility.

At the same time, there are also strong points in the structural-analytical differentiations. They show common traits or trace tendencies, often hidden behind the spatial or “country” features. They swiftly suggest practical solutions based on the situations in structurally similar but geographically different regions of the world. In World Regional Studies, the use of the compound (multi-dimensional) spatial-analytical differentiation principles appears to be productive, which also combines elements of spatial analysis with the synthetic and analytical/typology building principles. The comprehensive spatial-analytical classifications and/or typologies represent a distinct feature of nation-state classification in World Regional Studies in comparison to Economics, Economic Geography, Political Science and other traditional academic disciplines.

The study of spatial-temporal differentiations is relevant in itself as a process of exploring the essence and the global space transformation trajectory. Apart from that, an exploration of the global space differentiation enables us to run the process of various types of space horizontally, “extending” it without augmentation of its conflict potential “for the territory” of the state, without intruding on state boundaries. Running the vertical dimension of space-time is much more complicated and requires further development of Social Science methods in this knowledge realm. Meanwhile, a higher elasticity of space-time interaction in a vertical direction may entail a considerable increase in the cooperation field between the states even just in their traditional physical interpretation.

Furthermore, space differentiations engender *a spectral platform of regionalization*. In other words, the study of kinds of space differentiation helps define global regionalization, which, in their turn, glean a more complete interpretation of this process. Currently, the following areas of global regionalization can be highlighted: civilizational, geopolitical, multi-polar, macro-economic, world-systemic, macro-geographic, global regionalization in the context of transcontinental cooperation of states, global regionalization in the context of “corporate empires” evolution, global regionalization in the context of the global society, global regionalization in the context of world-economic interactions and global regionalization in the context of organized crime. By matching the differentiation of the global space with the global regionalization forms, not only can these sophisticatedly structured processes of the contemporary global

socium—political, economic, social and cultural—evolution be affected, but also governed.

Thus, the concept of regional subsystems or regional complexes, in contrast to the notion of a global region, is still primarily distinct in the neo-realist approach to territoriality, which is regarded together with security issues. The constructivist interpretation of security is laid on, as the emphasis within the regional complex (regional security complex). Importance is attached to any phenomenon by the parties of the regional complex in terms of security. Consequently, according to the traditional state-centric interpretation of the regional complex, all non-state actors and economic and transnational processes are expelled from the agenda; under its predominantly economic interpretation of the security terms of reference, traditional security, especially, is designed out of the agenda. This methodological problem objectively perplexes the process of working out a comprehensive theory of regional complexes and regional subsystems and their transformation into international/global regions as a part of World Regional Studies within the global IR system, and also not specifically Western or non-Western.

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Integration of the Space in a Complex Glocality

8.1 THE NOTIONS OF LOCALITY AND LOCATION

In this chapter, I discuss the link between the external and internal factors in World Regional Studies. Such fundamental notions as “territory,” “space” and “region” were derived from Political Geography by World Regional Studies (Agnew et al. 2008). To a larger extent, the notion of space is associated with a world political profile—or more functional than geographic—in World Regional Studies. The concepts of territory and region are related to world political aspects (states and international regions as actors in world politics) and internal factors, as well as constitutional ones. Yet, there is one more notion, which is used in comprehensive regional studies pertaining to more specific, localized territories, normally, but not necessarily within a state: it is the concept of “place” (*locus—a local place, a locality*) (Knox and Martson 2013; Cresswell 2013). The “place” notion allows all social-political disciplines to apply elements of knowledge and geography-related theories to World Regional Studies, Political Geography, Human Geography, Geopolitics, etc. This substantiates and explains the essence of internal dynamics of the space notion from its abstract interpretation to a specific and localized one. Thus, at the state level, a primary actor in world politics, the fundamental notions are space and territory. At the international region level, the fundamentals are region, space and place. The “place” concept implies a specific combination of geographic parameters. It possesses unique physical-geographic,

social and cultural traits. If to define a specific locality via the “place” term, the “region” can be determined as a geographic complex, consisting of numerous places, the parameters and attributes of which constitute this specific geographic complex and set it apart from any other place or geographic complex. The definition of the region concept as a territory via the “place” concept is crucial to unraveling the methodological elaboration logic of World Regional Studies as an academic discipline, which scrutinizes simultaneously the world political features of regions such as international-political regions and cross-border regions (regions beyond state boundaries) and their local characteristics—regions inside states and constituent parts of intrastate regions (districts). (For an exploration of any kind of space of temporal borders see, for example, Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, Chap. 5).

Many scholarly disciplines deal with the spatial-geographic aspects of various types of human activity: economic, political, business, cultural, religious and others. For instance, Human Geography considers the spatial arrangement of human activity and human relations with the environment to be political geography. It examines the political features of human activity within geographic space (Knox and Martson 2013). But it is precisely World Regional Studies, consisting of the two interrelated components of social science knowledge—on the international aspects of mankind’s regional activity and a complex understanding of human activity in certain regions, as well as international implications of such an activity—that differentiates itself from other disciplines, exploring spatial-geographic factors in relationship with human interaction. The interpretation of different social science academic/practical knowledge domains, being articulated on those foundations, does pinpoint both an object field that is specific to World Regional Studies as an academic discipline itself, as well as the need to carry out surveys in other academic disciplines. Surveys would focus on certain aspects of human activity in functional regions, which are determined proceeding from the hallmarks of this activity.

Virtually, the real contents of the “place” notion and its attributes undergo continuous dynamic change. Boundaries are uncertain and depend on ever changing dynamics of interrelation between factors of human activity and outer environment. The specific connotation of the “place” notion determines pace and sets the trend in changes within the *socium* (Knox and Martson 2013, 4–5). The concept of place as a definite space institutionalizes daily life and social/cultural relations. It outlines the interactional pattern between family members, relations between people in industries and office, social life, outside work, on vacation, in political

activity, etc. (Knox and Martson 2013, 6). A place where human life goes on significantly impacts on an individual's well-being, mode of life, strategies of approach to life, opportunities for self-fulfillment, etc. A place also shapes folk-memory and may become a powerful emotional and cultural symbol. Apart from that, a place might bring a particular sense of self for each person: a birthplace, a place of study and others. The notion of the "multi-layered" nature of a place means that it can be socially constructed and "branded." In other words, within the place notion various senses and meanings can be attributed to different groups of people with the end of achieving numerous aims. Such an applied component of World Regional Studies as branding territories rests ultimately on the notional "multi-layered" nature that has since recently been sought after as a tool in the spatial solution of economic issues by increasing financial-economic, as well as the political/cultural potential of an international or intrastate region. In the contemporary economic space, specific localities—"places"—compete against each other by appealing to various (political, cultural, etc.) senses, whereby each of them may well have similar economic implications (Agnew et al. 2008). Marketing of a "place" calls upon different cultural senses, which enhance the potential of the place for a particular group of people (Bassin 1991, 2003). Eventually, the marketing and cultural branding of a place bear on regionally entrenched traditions, a way of life, local handicrafts, the state-of-the-art, or, conversely, artisan production. As a place plays such a crucial role in human life, it may influence and, even in some cases, determine the identity of an individual or groups of people. Moreover, a place in reality can mesmerize innovative approaches, best practices and changes and, at the same time, endure conflicts and inhibit development. Therefore, the place notion as a part of the concept of space and territory:

- *texturizes* the daily economic and social life of mankind;
- offers *opportunities and restraints* to the long-term well-being of an individual or groups of people;
- provides *context for dreaming up basic life beliefs*, being induced by common sense;
- affords *contextual frameworks* for life experience accumulation;
- *sets up institutions and enforces rules* of socialization; and
- *builds up space for competition* among social norms and institutions and, ultimately, *substantiates* international norms and institutions by means of certain geo-historical experience (see, Knox and Martson 2013, 6).

The place notion as a local part of territory or space, as a backbone element in World Regional Studies, forces this discipline to correlate its object field with all other academic disciplines that study space and spatial factors across various aspects of human activity. Because the object field of World Regional Studies stems from issues that are specific particularly to this discipline—unveiling international aspects and consequences of human regional activity, as well as complex understanding of multi-faceted and multi-format human activity in certain regions, issues that are touched upon by object fields of other disciplines adjacent to World Regional Studies—then a major set of issues can be articulated that are within the interest range of World Regional Studies, albeit separately or due to specific methodological techniques and modes applied in other neighboring disciplines as well. The following are the primary issues:

- The understanding of how *the global economic, political and civilizational entity of mankind* evolves via a synthesis of commonality of regional-geographic and local understanding of the global civilizational history, which features a unique, well-structured historical interdependence of places and regions within a single global temporal flow, as the development of humanity and the concept of statehood through it takes place and what may be structural; and geopolitical principles of relations between these evolving states in the international arena;
- The understanding of the *demographic structure of humanity and the diffusion of certain demographic groups*, determining the geographic distribution of human activity in general and institutions of this activity in particular;
- The comprehension of *internal state forms and political structure evolution*; ascertainment of what exactly falls under global principles, determines regional variability and is predicated upon regional variability;
- insight into the *principles and theoretical foundations for interrelationships* between states and non-state international and regional actors; ways of developing international economic and financial hubs: within nation-states, trade blocs, organizations or metropolitan areas;
- The conception of *contemporary basics of global economic growth*, the function of the world finance system, structural principles

of world centers formation (global financial hubs, trade blocs, regional international and regional interstate trade alliances, networks of metropolitan areas) and global peripheries; the detection of patterns of their formation processes, historical paths and modern instruments in re-allocation of global wealth from the center to the periphery;

- The *availability of peoples' places of residence*, public places, and how to locate public facilities (clinics, social centers, first aid points, etc.) to the most effective extent; the identification of principles fostering the most rational arrangement of such centers, the determination of any opportunity for regional specificities in this matter, or signs of deterioration in governance efficiency and maintenance of these centers induced by excessive reliance on regional specific traits.
- The *routes and ways of building up transport arteries* and transport corridors, cross-border and national commercial, economic, financial, informational and other flows; an efficiency analysis methods of these arteries, corridors and flows; forecasting of their effective development, mitigation of organizational, managerial and economic deficiencies and their consequences;
- The surveillance and *elaboration of the most rational location principles for manufacturing and non-manufacturing facilities* (enterprises, factories, stores, offices, public eating places); the detection of methods aimed at analyzing regional supply and demand in regional geography, the efficiency of regional deliveries, etc.
- The nature of *regional-geographic specific* methods in resolving world social and environmental issues; the submission of recommendations for drawing up national and regional legislation so everyone would be granted equal access to water and other resources; mapping out construction sites for state and/or public/social destination places so that risks of material losses would be mitigated and insured perils against floods, earthquakes, environmental pollutions and other natural disasters could be offset.
- The search for *scientific ways of delineating boundaries* between districts, areas, autonomies and other administrative-political units (including national states); the elaboration of the respective legislation so that equal representation of population could be gained irrespective of racial, national and political composition of the population, even if considerable migration pervades or the

population changes its structure within administrative-political units.

- The analysis and forecasting of *social and spatial consequences* of human diseases at international, regional and national levels, so as to clarify the reasons for the increased rate of morbidity, economic, social and humanitarian implications of excess incidence (in particular, epidemics), control measures over vectors of human diseases, etc.
- The *maintenance and improvement in human quality of life* under urban, suburban, rural, regional or national areas, or the planning of any other urban areas.
- The determination of *principles and analysis methods to correlate local and regional distinguishing features and global trends in economic development*; the detection of a specific local interplay of economic, spatial, political and cultural factors in regional and district development; the elaboration and drafting of a successful strategy aimed at local, national and regional economic development that blends with strategies and tendencies of global development.
- The comprehension of *local and regional process intricacies*; the revelation of weak and strong points in regions and the enhancement of their security and economic competitive power; the understanding of inter-linkages between a local place and/or region and their position in the global system of international relations, so that the security measures under discussion would facilitate vibrant economic activity rather than prevent its growth.

Partially, these issues are studied by the history and theory of International Relations, International/Global Political Economy, Political Geography, Human Geography, Geo-Economics, Regional Science and some other sociopolitical and socio-economic disciplines. However, in this array of issues and tasks, one can pinpoint central objectives pertaining precisely to World Regional Studies and important (or peripheral) to a different degree for the adjacent disciplines, namely:

1. The *analysis of historical paths of the contemporary world-system and its trends of evolution*, including tendencies in interrelations between states, economic interdependence of the world, regional options for economic activity and ways of attaining economic prosperity, geographic distinctness of global financial-economic activity, geopolitical

- trends in cross-border cooperation, regional hallmarks of center-regions relations, etc.;
2. The elucidation of *specific patterns in relationships between the environment and an individual* including from the geographic and regional perspective;
 3. The clarification of *regional ins-and-outs within cultural-civilizational systems and the formation of regional cultural complexes*, regional implications of *humanitarian systems and landscapes* evolution;
 4. The outline of primary *routes for political-geographic development* and prospective regional options, ruling out dead-end models, and conceptualizing regional particularities in various geopolitical state models.

Let's view all these issues and attempt to figure out their centrality to World Regional Studies. At the same time, I will try to point out which scholarly disciplines are adjacent to World Regional Studies and can be used in addressing these issues from any other perspective by means of methodological approaches.

8.2 MODERN WORLD SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE OF WORLD REGIONS

World Regional Studies, alongside other sociopolitical disciplines, views the world as an evolving, competitive political-economic system, which has passed numerous stages of geographic expansion, fragmentation and integration. The first agricultural revolution brought about a business pattern transition from hunting and gathering to agricultural mini-systems. The latter were based on reciprocity principles, which implied that every member of a community specializing in any business activity (livestock breeding, cooking, pottery, etc.) could freely exchange manufactured products that were surplus and made by another member of this agrarian mini-system. Such economic systems did not possess well-developed infrastructure and, as a result, their habitat area was restricted. However, in these disparate agrarian mini-systems from around seven to nine thousand years ago, *innovations* began to take place: slash-and-burn agriculture and the domestication of animals. These innovations entailed the following

long-term changes, which led to the evolution of the entire system of management and human way of life:

1. *Streamlining methods* in agriculture that were evoked by changes in business patterns, the rise in population density and the gradual spread of rural settlements;
2. *Social organization shifts*, which manifested themselves in the emergence of a system of property and resources, land and land tenure that ultimately predetermined regional specific traits in socio-economic processes;
3. The surplus of food staples allowed part of the population to focus on other kinds of agricultural activity and led to further *specialization in non-agricultural product manufacturing* (pottery, weaving, jewelry, armaments, etc.).
4. The specialization in *trade and barter systems*, which slowly encompassed larger territories.

A denser population rate increased the general amount of agrarian mini-systems. Neighboring systems consolidated into new sociopolitical and political-economic entities, which developed into world empires. They emerged from the new political system of redistribution, which provided wealth overflow from productive classes to elite groups by means of tribute and taxes. This redistribution was put into action either by military force and/or by religious belief. The world empires (Egypt, Greece, China, Byzantium and Rome) introduced new elements of social innovations: colonization and urbanization. The former was created by the inability of current economic systems to provide better intensive performance that called for the enlarging of resource bases by colonizing adjacent territories, firstly, and afterwards more remote territories. The expansion of resource potential demanded large-scale methods of improvements in land tenure. They needed the introduction of irrigation and drainage systems that was assured by the state as an instrument in the organization of a strong agricultural force. Some of the world empires established a particular form of economic despotism, which Karl Marx titled the "Asian mode of production." From the viewpoint of a series of scholars (Karl Wittfogel, and Russian historians Leonid Vasiliev, Oleg Nepomnin and others), this method brought about the first stage of regional variability in socio-economic order of societies (East/West), with several parameters pervading even up to the present time.

The employment of an enormous workforce on vast swathes of land called for urbanization and infrastructure development. In such a manner, the construction of military garrisons and towns, linked by ever more robust transport systems (roads, channels and aqueduct bridges) was set up. The geographic expansion of world empires and the rise in their number engendered the economic and social system of capitalism that reaped profit whilst conducting economic activity and control over means of production, distribution and goods exchanges based on the private property system (a famous concept by Marx in his “Das Kapital”). The capitalist form of property at the new historical phase of development was entitled “imperialism” (as elaborated in the early twentieth century by John Hobson, Nikolai Bukharin, Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and others). It created a world system (a term introduced by Immanuel Vallerstein), a single and interconnected system of states, developing through economic and political competition processes. New global technological and spatial structures, related to the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe, extended the world system and turned it into a global world system with a modern organizational structure. The most economically and politically developed nations were at its *core*, and other countries in the *semi-periphery* and *periphery*. A system of unequal economic development, consisting of sovereign nation-states, evolved at an uneven pace (the Westphalia system, named after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1644 between the major European powers). The relationships whereof followed, as it is considered in international relations, theoretically substantiated interactional principles.

Therefore, some issues central to World Regional Studies are analyzed within International Relations—in particular, its sub-fields such as history and theory of International Relations, World Politics and the new sub-fields of International and Global Political Economy. In this sense, the political segment of World Regional Studies whittles down to the establishment and functioning of the contemporary world system, the fundamental feature whereof is economic growth in modern economies. This brings up the issue of resource distribution and redistribution, technological change diffusion and support of economic development. It also helps correlate geopolitical changes, technological systems and infrastructure project development—a link between geopolitical, technological and social innovations. Every cycle of geopolitical change creates a fresh cluster of technological innovation and the respective infrastructure projects step up regional competitive advantages or trigger regional changes. They

thereby intensify or change the essence of geographic labor differentiation. Nevertheless, resource and technological potential are not the sole source of disparate economic development. Another important provision, which enhanced or changed the geographic differentiation of labor, was international trade. Its nature is defined by the two structural types of states: states with *trade blocs* (state groupings, trade relations formalized through a system of trade relations) and *autarchic* states (they do not participate or are not engaged in the trade bloc system). These days, the system of trade blocs has evolved into the World Trade Organization (WTO), inside which new trade spaces are being shaped with more transparent and specialized trade relations. There are disparate and shrinking autarchic states, which are falling out of the international trade system and constitute the most backward part of the world periphery. Relations and the principles of how new trade blocs function within the WTO are studied by IR sub-disciplines such as International/Global Political Economy. In this regard, one of the paramount issues is the detection of international models and economic development stages. The first model of economic development stages was suggested by the economist Walter Rostow. He believed that development was determined by movement from the traditional society via industrialization to post-industrial societies, characterized by the presence of diversified economic structures and quite a high level of economic development (Rostow 1960, 1971). According to Rostow, the periphery's backwardness is explained by the availability of traditional types of societies there—a considerable segment of societies with an archaic system of social access. A. G. Frank (1998) casts doubt on Rostow's model, noting that regions with a prevalent traditional system of business have to infinitely compete against regions with a superior stage of economic development, and the outcomes of such a rivalry are predetermined. As Frank put it, the evolution of some regions has always been accompanied by the "underdevelopment" of some other regions from the world system, evoked by unequal allocation of capital as well as technological and social innovations. Frank's arguments and China's experience point to the emergence of new political-economic terms. They help explain new methods of promoting economic growth, offering an opportunity to alter previous models of disparate economic performance: original advantages (forerunners in economic development always capitalize on benefits in a certain sphere), localized economies (economizing on the localization of a certain production type), functional interdependence (interdependence of various production types, building up interlinks in the sphere of manufacturing segments, warehousing premises, offices, etc.), and the so-called creative

de-industrialization (in definite regions the transfer of emphasis from industrialization to technologies, innovations or recreational industries).

New models of economic potential redistribution and the decline of obsolete economic inequality models were called a “cumulative causality” (a term coined by Gunnar Myrdal), making it possible by means of new economic tools to convert regional models of inter-relations (center-periphery) and to alter disparate regional economic growth. It is clear that all these mechanisms can be applied, provided the two points are available:

1. *Engagement in the international economic and financial system as a principal member*, rather than an autarchic state, separated from the world economic system by tariff barriers and legislative restrictions;
2. The *presence of high-skilled specialists with a sufficient level of practice* who understand how the modern international political-economic and finance-economic systems are run.

Thus, the political-economic and geo-economic component of World Regional Studies:

- Concentrates on how to increase the power of a modern state by governance and control over space, international and regional trade and informational networks that build world leadership, as a rule, without military power, relying on “soft power”/”smart power” and other non-violent methods, rather than intensifying military control over the territory;
- Maintains a balance of sovereignty parameters under economic flow growth, defying state control, but, at the same time, using government regulation methods;
- Does not rely upon traditional nation-states as natural spatial political-economic zones. Conversely, it depends on contemporary international regions and global regions, which overlap state territories, separate parts of nation-state territories or use transregional network structures for constructing functional highly integrated global regions as actors in the new international environment.

8.3 ENVIRONMENT-SOCIUM RELATIONSHIPS

One of the crucial issues in World Regional Studies has been the relationship between human society and environment. This discipline draws attention to how technologies, having been devised by mankind, affect

the natural environment and how, in its turn, the environment influences an individual (Radkau 2012). The issue of reciprocal influence between these two components—technological and environmental—has existed since mankind emerged. However, the accelerated growth technology in the past thirty to forty years has brought on a streak of ecological crises, exacerbating the agenda extraordinarily. On the one hand, the environment consists of physical and biological constituents, including a human one. On the other hand, it is, in its turn, a social construct that was called into existence by human activity itself. In other words, the natural environment is not only an object, but also a mirror of human philosophy of what a natural environment is. Such a sense of natural environment has brought about the term “biosphere,” which is an addendum of the “noosphere” (a term introduced by P. Teilhard de Chardin, Le Roy—its materialistic sense was given by Vladimir Vernadskiy). The natural environment was transformed by rational human activity with individuals themselves being part of it. Society articulates people’s belief about natural environment for a certain discrete historical time span and simultaneously the natural environment with its physical features influences the type of human society at this specific moment. The transformation of the natural environment by mankind has brought several scholars to the conclusion that in the modern world there is no pristine nature and it is all “socially produced” (a term first suggested by N. Smith and M. Fitzsimmons) by humanity. As social transformations of the natural environment assumed a global scope, this set of issues began to be taken seriously by a large set of scholarly disciplines. Let’s recall, for instance, earnest world scholarly debates on the “greenhouse effect,” “global warming” and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which imposed national quotas on atmospheric pollution from industrial exhaust fumes. This policy allowed the re-allocation of material wealth from one country to another proceeding from the account of industrial output in a certain country and damage to the environment incurred by it. Global warming is exposing the Atlantic coast countries to hurricanes (details and examples in Knox and Martson 2013, Chap. 6). As such, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 affected vast territories of the USA from Florida to Louisiana and inflicted colossal financial losses. Other examples in the interrelationship between human activity and changes in natural environment are many. For instance, 70 % of Bangladeshi territory lies below the sea level and 70 % of Egypt’s Delta (their main breadbasket) is also below sea level. The ocean level rise induced by global warming may spell disaster for several nations who will

be pushed to the brink of extinction. At the same time, climate warming may be positive for agricultural produce in other countries, for instance, Central Europe, Russia and North America. Such problems are gradually becoming a national security concern of certain countries, whereas for others it may lead to regional conflicts and thus is a theme for diplomacy and negotiations. For example, water scarcity in Africa, the Middle East or Central Asia has been an issue for a long time. However, it is less known that this issue plagues even some states in the USA (e.g., Kentucky and California) where water delivery to households is monopolized by international water corporations such as Suez and Veolia (previously known as Vivendi Environnement) in France and RWE in Germany, which has been trouble for the local population. In this case it is a theme mainly of internal politics, but in case of transnational corporations involved it may become an issue of international relations.

Another crucial and evident issue is the unevenness in the non-renewable (oil, gas, nuclear power) and renewable (biomass, solar, hydro-, water-, geothermal energy) resource security of countries. A principal power source in the contemporary economic system has been oil, and its volumes reckon and the so-called peak point (discovery of the maximal index of oil fields was achieved in 1961 and from then on the quantity of newly discovered oil fields has been constantly falling) of global petroleum production plays a crucial role in conceiving humanity's progress in science and technology. According to this viewpoint, from 1981 onwards mankind has been consuming more oil than oil fields have been discovered and developed. This means that in 1981, humanity passed the peak point of global oil production. At the same time, there are scholarly disciplines that claim oil is a renewable resource—it forms under constant high-grade compression processes inside the Earth's crust (Gavrilov 2015).

Cutting-edge technologies play a significant role in the discussions of humanity's future with energy. As such, even ten years ago nobody could imagine that shale oil and gas production technologies could become a momentous factor in the USA's energy self-sufficiency and would open up the possibility of US export of oil. However, these facts have also geopolitical consequences for a forecast of future international relations between global regions and also for certain regions like the Middle East, Eurasia or Eastern Asia, for example.

Apart from the industrial output and energy agenda, the prevailing methods of land tenure, which is determined by property, economic system, politics and law, are exerting pressure on the environment. Over the

course of land-use methods changes, *deforestation* may take place. One of the vivid examples of this is the Amazon jungle. Deforestation as a result of a regional power's endeavors to improve the economic situation of its population on account of planting coca bushes (in particular, Bolivia). Clear-cutting of Amazon forest and/or Siberian taiga—the modern “lungs of the planet”—through agricultural activity, re-industrialization or carrying out full-scale international energy projects is bringing on irreversible changes that may affect all countries. In the previous historical period of human economic activity, general forest areas have contracted by 25 %, which has already changed the climate drastically compared with the previous historical periods of human life. Other phenomena of this kind are exemplified by *desertification*, which is induced by the ill-considered agricultural activity of swamp drainage, which is deteriorating the water quality and transforming the ecosystem. Several phenomena may, in particular, have both regional and international consequences—for instance, the water diversion by China from the Irtys River heads on its territory, but streaming through a range of countries in Central Asia, and also including Russia. Consequences for regional geopolitics and international relations are already obvious.

Human business activity may trigger not only deforestation and desertification but also the *loss of biodiversity*. As such, in 1903, thirteen different species of asparagus were available, whereas by 1983 merely one species endured (a decrease of 97.8 %). The number of asparagus varieties should not bother countries like Russia, for which this plant is not traditional. However, the loss of biodiversity is a world trend. In 1903 there were 287 carrot varieties. Today, there are only 27 (a 92.7 % decrease). Currently, farmers in North America cultivate three types of potatoes though peasants in South America cultivate at least thirty types in each small village in the Andes. It may seem that the reduction of asparagus species, potatoes and carrot cultivars does not dramatically influence the way of life if cultivated in considerable amount based on mechanization and chemical fertilization; however, under the global scope of human impact on the environment there may be far-reaching consequences. A decline in varieties and cultivars of plants reduces their capacity to resist crop pests as a whole and is detrimental to the palatability traits and nutrient density that eventually may affect the quality and longevity of humanity generally and particularly in some regions. Local tribes' accumulated

experience in the treatment of diseases by certain herbs and vegetable drugs can be irretrievably lost both because of plant extinctions and loss of knowledge of their curative properties as local culture and customs die away (explained wonderfully by Sean Connory in “Medicine Man”, for example).

Further growth in the global economy and the globalization of world production is likely to increase the demand on fossil fuels, energy and other resources. The International Energy Agency (IEA) foresees a 50 % growth in energy consumption in years to come, but the reliance on hydrocarbons may be heavily reduced for some regions by using renewable energy sources, electric cars, “smart home” technologies, etc. So, technology may also become an instrument of geopolitics like oil in previous decades. The ongoing degradation of the socium-environment relationship in the periphery is becoming a global challenge to development. This has brought to life the concept of sustainable development, which is unfeasible, given the unequal allocation of economic activity across regions in the periphery. Thus, new forms of human-environment relationships are assuming a global scope and call for fresh international and interregional efforts to tackle the nascent challenges. In this regard, several researchers have definitely spoken of the emerging *global politics* phenomenon and thus of the “end of politics” (Segbers 2013). A global scale of external and internal human-environment relationships not only demands global concerted efforts but also narrows down the internationalization of politics. And at times it blurs national traits in the elaboration of the national policy of adjusting for globalization at the state level. National policy is no more national in the sense that it is forced to comply with the global trend imperative, which concede regional, rather than national, features in working out the contents of the policy. Conversely, there is the danger of “catch-up” development and countries can be pushed to the back of the world system. Policy contents overflow from the national to global sense. At the same time, globalization and the global politics phenomenon does not blur the cultural-civilizational distinct traits of countries and world regions. There is no need for forceful standardization. It is “just” a transition to a new objective step, improving competitiveness in global evolution, calling for new forms of correspondence with local distinctness to the global tendencies at least in the political and political-economic domain.

8.4 WORLD CULTURAL-CIVILIZATIONAL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL CULTURAL-CIVILIZATIONAL COMPLEXES

All the aforementioned issues appear to be exclusively material-technological in nature, but most are related to the existence of the cultural-civilizational systems and regional cultural-civilizational complexes. In a broad sense, by “culture” we mean an array of ideas and senses shared by people or certain groups of them, implemented via material or symbolical practices in every individual’s daily life. In effect, culture is too complicated to understand. There are plenty of definitions of this concept, but its contents are permanently changing due to its dynamic nature. Culture possesses spatial implications and features. It is prone to the impact of globalization and regionalization. Specific relations between culture and space are reflected in the notion of a “cultural landscape” (a term first introduced by Carl O. Sauer) as a distinct combination of complex interactions between humans and their environment. The introduction of the cultural landscape term *as a humanized version of a natural landscape* engendered the concept of the “cultural-civilizational complex.” The cultural-civilizational complex features a complicated entwinement of cultural traits and factors, characterizing the general culture of a certain group of people (Knox and Martson 2013). A cultural trait is one of the aspects in a complicated plexus of routine cultural practices, distinguishing one group of people from another. The cultural-civilizational complex notions are vital constituents in pinpointing the “cultural-civilizational region”—a certain place, territory or space wherein definite cultural practices, beliefs and values are worshiped by the majority of the population who dwell in this territory. Several interconnected cultural-civilizational complexes constitute a cultural-civilizational system, including cultural traits, territorial affiliation, common history, language (at times) and religious beliefs. For instance, the Christian cultural-civilizational system incorporates Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox and other cultural-civilizational complexes, which possess common cultural features, regional affiliations, common histories and foundations of religious notions. All Spanish-speaking peoples have associated history, common language, religious denomination and practices. They also represent a single cultural-civilizational system. The world civilization at its current stage of existence consists of several correlating regional cultural-civilizational systems, resting upon a single global economy and ever more globalizing policy, which is located, depending on the region, at various stages of transition from the world to global

politics. Cultural-civilizational complexes coupled with the emergence of regional security complexes and certain economic and political specifics lay the foundation for the appearance of a regional IR subsystem.

The globalization of politics, especially the globalization of cultural policy, is a phenomenon that was brought about by regionalization as a new trend in IR. Globalization facilitates the emergence of global principles, as well as state and regional arrangements, allowing them to successfully blend in with the new global world system. In order to be successful, global principles should be modified according to unique regional practices. The most successful regional models and their modifications convert some principles of global arrangement and themselves go global even for other states and regions.

Culture is closely connected with forms of social organization and is an essential element in identity and nation-building. In the two recent decades we have witnessed active discussions of the Westernization and Americanization phenomena as outstanding features of the nascent global culture. There is an evolving new trend of Asiatization now. The rise of some localized forms of nationalisms is a reflection of these global trends (African, Russian, or even within some European countries like Austria, etc.). In fact, there is a world culture, representing the best samples from regional and national cultures, and there is a global culture, which is not always the best, but a crucial part of world culture is that it's organized and operates on global trends. Furthermore, there are institutions for building up regional national culture, which nowadays are based upon general principles identical to the entire world. The presence and successful practice of these institutions can promote the best samples from regional and national cultures to a treasure chest of world culture. Some of them, living up to global requests, are likely to be incorporated into the global culture.

As such, it's well known that Hollywood is occasionally perceived as a tool for the distribution of American culture around the world and the establishment of world culture to a greater extent than European or Chinese centers of filmmaking. In fact, the finest pieces from Hollywood or European production constitute most of the world cinematography and much less of Chinese. Less known is Bollywood, which is a similar instrument used in the dissemination of Indian cinematography. Bollywood has been making a greater number of films than Hollywood, but for the Indian audiences in India and Bangladesh as well as the Indian Diaspora around the globe. Practically unknown in Europe, America, China or Russia is Nollywood, located in Lagos, Nigeria, which

brings out more than 1000 movies every year not only for Nigeria but also for other countries on the African continent, including numerous members of the African Diaspora. Nollywood makes as many movies as Hollywood, albeit they are cheaper and of lower quality but much more successful in African communities than the films made by Hollywood. All national cinematography institutions have similar functions, but to be global their organizational forms as well as content must be international. All of them play regional and international roles. All are parts of world culture. However, the cinematic products from each of them vary in quality and not all products of these national institutions of cinematography are incorporated into global culture. At the same time, it is important to mention that even Hollywood with its formidable financial, intellectual and cultural opportunities to disseminate its own cultural samples decided to respond to the emergence of Asian or African cinematic products incorporating and even fostering new genres—the so-called trash movies, pulp fiction, Spaghetti Westerns, etc. As such, the successful and most influential regional variants of culture, set up as successors of global principles, merge into the world and/or global culture. Other examples are Tarantino's movies, which changed the contents of traditional genres (*Pulp Fiction*, *Django Unchained*, etc.)

Another successful case of cultural transition from local and national to global is the distribution of hip-hop culture. It does not matter how insulting such a comparison to the advocates of “high culture” may be, hip-hop history is similar to that of La Grande Opera Italiana and its becoming a phenomenon of the world and at the same time a global culture. The Chinese are now trying to follow with their Peking Opera. Hip-hop went global when transnational musical corporations recognized the popularity of this style among youth. Hip-hop is reputed to have spread around the world as part of American youth culture. In fact, hip-hop culture has African roots and does not confine itself merely to music, but includes painting, graffiti and other genres (first and foremost, African ones) and protest culture. Hip-hop as a multi-genre phenomenon was influenced by Muhammad Ali (Cassius Clay), Bob Marley and Hugh Newton. This style even has its own theoretician—Murray Forman (Knox and Martson 2013, 148–149). Hip-hop absorbed reggae and fanksters music, and then it transformed into rap. As a large part of African male culture, hip-hop gained popularity in Latin America, but in the form of disco and break-dancing. After that emerged “female hip-hop” and “white rap.” It was Eminem who transformed hip-hop and popularized it to a large extent,

whereas Snoop Dog, Jay-Z and others revised it into so-called gangster rap. Rap artists became popular in Australia, Germany, France and even Russia (Russian performers like Timati have explored the fusion of rap with Russian pop and with Caucasian Muslim music), which never had anything similar to an authentic hip-hop genre. By the late twentieth century, hip-hop became part of the global youth culture and assumed touches of protest culture. Turkish rappers in Germany made it a protest genre against racism, Muslim rapper Aki Nawaz made it a genre oriented at the Western culture denunciation, and Sudanese rapper Emmanuel Jal created awareness about the oppressed peoples struggling for their lives in modern Africa. Thus hip-hop acquired a niche in political life and become an instrument of politics. In the early twenty-first century, sales of rap music have been showing signs of decline. Yet, hip-hop is a part of the global youth culture and is unlikely to fade away in the nearest future. Similar cases can be exemplified from other cultural spheres as well. Some attempts were unsuccessful, like the *Buranovskiy Babushki* (Grandmothers of Buranovsk)—local Russian singers who participated in the Eurovision Song Contest in 2012.

The influence of cultural factors on economic, political and religious activity, as well as on nation-building processes may have some impact on relationships within and between regions as a part of International Relations. The formation of a global culture and other similar processes are of the utmost interest to World Regional Studies, which obtains knowledge on cultural processes from Culture Studies, Cultural Geography, Comparative Political Science and other academic disciplines revealing the interlink between culture and place, culture and politics and culture and economics.

8.5 POLITICAL-GEOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION OF STATES AND REGIONS

Prominent Greek philosopher, and reputedly the first political geographer, Aristotle highlighted the primary factors in a geopolitical model for the construction of a state: climate, physical territory and correlation between territory and population. Later on, the political-geographic idea conceptualized these factors in terms of a triad: landscape, physical-geographic territory and regional demographic features. In the period from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries political geographers considered life of

a state to be determined by organic factors and cyclical processes, that a state enhances itself or collapses depending on a complicated combination of factors such as size and structure of population, agricultural production efficiency, territorial size of a state and a role of the town in its structure (Cresswell 2013). By the early twentieth century, the two major schools in Political Science branched out, with one emphasizing the correlation between population and territory and the other to spatial determinism. By the late nineteenth century in Political Science the third school had spun off into a separate discipline as well, which boiled down to Charles Darwin's theory of biological determinism. This theory regarded a state as a specific biological organism, which evolves or dies depending on how external and internal factors influence it. By the late nineteenth century, the idea of geopolitics had sprung up within these three schools in Political Science—a system of scientific and pseudo-scientific visions of how the state's power allows it to control space and state territory and to work out foreign policy. For the first time this model of a state was suggested by the German biologist Ratzel in the nineteenth century. To a large extent it was based on Social-Darwinist ideas. As such, boundary instability between states, according to Ratzel, was explained by volatile relations between the power of a specific state and its territory.

Borders make it possible to define and stipulate the territorial backbone of a state. They also enable it to cope with conflicts and rivalry with other states (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). Borders possess an *inclusiveness* quality—their aim is to “include into their range”—to regulate and control a certain amount of people and resources on a certain territory marked with boundaries. Any activity, placed on record within definite boundaries, can be supervised and regulated. Therefore, a delimited space, which is controlled by a state (de facto territory of a state) and which is acknowledged by other states as belonging to this state (de jure territory of a state) is given the title a “territory of a state” or “national domain.”

At the same time, boundaries possess a quality of *exclusiveness*. They can exclude anything from the state's body (Agnew et al. 2008). Thus, boundaries are designed to control external flows of people and resources as well, preventing their infiltration into the territory of a state. As such, borders of a state may regulate inflows of immigrants or goods and services imported. Borders between the municipalities and other entities inside a state may help to set apart various taxation systems inside a state; boundaries between ecosystem exploitation may regulate access to different business systems,

field boundaries or regulate livestock access to fields of different property types, etc. (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013)

Keen interest in how borders are arranged, equipped and run was induced by the terrorist attacks on 9/11 against the USA. The international terrorist attacks have helped in the buildup of facilities along boundaries and with ways of their crossing, and they have introduced new electronic technologies for boundary security system maintenance. The introduction of microchipped passports with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, biometric indices, and retinal and fingerprint scanning led to the emergence of the electronic boundary notion, which intensifies control over territorial units. Nowadays, electronic borders are an integral part of macro-region demarcation (e.g., the Schengen Area, US border).

Established borders can enhance spatial separation and differentiation, resulting in, as a rule, the adoption of new official instructions and laws, which have various forces across different territories. Boundaries can impose restraints on contact between people and speed up the emergence of various stereotypes about “other” peoples. Restraint of contact increases the role of boundaries in monitoring conflict, solving conflicts and the competition among various territorial groups. Therefore, borders can have the quality of *adjustable transparency*: they can completely separate one territory from the other with an impenetrable shield and are able to permit the free flow of people through boundaries, provided they abide by certain rules (Agnew et al. 2008).

Apart from the “boundaries” notion, the concept of a “frontier” is applied to World Regional Studies. A frontier is a border area or a region with obscurely marked boundaries. A frontier is distinct in the marginality of its territorial affiliation, rather than territoriality as a state. Frontiers mainly belong to the history of the nineteenth century: Australia, the Wild West in the USA, the Canadian North, and Africa south of the Sahara, Siberia, Altai, Xinjiang, Tibet, Yunnan, etc. Nevertheless, state affiliation and frontier jurisdiction began to be gradually pinpointed and stipulated by state boundaries, which could be impenetrable or permeable depending on the essence of relations between states or the evolution of general concepts on borders as cross-boundary cooperation zones. Currently, in its original sense, there is only one frontier on Earth—the Antarctic. It is marginal, not very developed and the territories are hard to get to. State affiliation there is not in fact controlled by a state. Borders are not guarded or monitored even today. The historical processes of drawing boundary lines between states still sparks interest not only because of the importance of boundary

formation between contemporary states (e.g., Russia and China, Russia and Ukraine, China and India, China and Japan, Japan and South Korea, islands in the South China Sea). In the modern world the principle of state territoriality is being transformed via the transparent borders concepts of boundaries-transformers and cross-border cooperation areas, but the territory notion still pervades *de jure*. The “territory *de jure*” is a swath of land with juridical affiliation that is unambiguously defined. At the same time, in the modern world territory *de jure* includes cluster hierarchies of the territory, as well as overlapping and superimposing territorial spaces, rather than just territories of states or regions. Territories *de jure* still remain at a basic level of political-geographic agenda analysis, and as governance and administration objects. As some territories are disputed, the political-geographic agenda carries on in the limelight of World Regional Studies, in particular, from the perspective of local and regional boundary issues influencing the world political structure.

As long as a state is a crucial self-sustained political actor with acknowledged borders—it regulates, maintains, challenges or legitimizes economic globalization processes to the most effective extent—the political science agenda continues to be the focus of World Regional Studies. If a “state” should indispensably possess territory, delimited with state boundaries (although part of these borders on any accounts can well be challenged by other national states), a nation does not need to dwell on a certain delimited territory. A “nation” has a common identity, several common cultural elements such as religion, language, history and political identity. There is a definition of a nation, which includes territorial affiliation, contrary to nationality, which is deprived of it. Generally, the nation concept appears to have been transformed and has been forfeiting its territorial affiliation by the same token as the sovereignty has been. That is why, a contemporary nation-state shows signs of discontinuity in the traditional state models of the pre-modern or early modern eras.

In the classical sense, “sovereignty” means the exercise of absolute state power over a population and territory. This right is recognized by other states and is stipulated in international law. At the same time, in the contemporary world, following a streak of historic events, the existing rights of states with regards to its citizens ceased to be acknowledged by the international community. As such, after World War II, repressions in the USSR and China and genocide in Cambodia, the idea of human rights was significantly extended. States no longer had the authority to do with its citizens everything it pleased—even their physical annihilation.

Also, the phrase “crimes against humanity” sprang up. At the start of the twenty-first century, the world witnessed the rise of such concepts as “humanitarian intervention” and “peace enforcement.” These concepts still have not been codified in international law, but they substantiate an opportunity for international/foreign intervention if there is genocide or crimes against humanity and, thus, de facto turning into a component in the global policy.

The idea of “citizenship” affiliates a person to a nation-state and this encompasses civil, political and public rights. Contrary to a monarchy, where political power rests on recourse to violence (at least initially), the Divine authority of power and the submission of subjects, the republican form of rule implies democratic engagement in steering a state and the widespread support by citizens. In the past, subjects in a state could be bereft of a common identity except for national and territorial affiliation, whereas in the modern world statehood represents an “imagined community” (the term was coined by the anthropologist Benedict Anderson)—an *overall civil identity* notwithstanding class, group or ethnic affiliation. Modern states are associated not only with the nation concept, but also nationalism—a national spirit, as well as a belief that a nation is eligible to build up itself on its own. However, nationalism may include not only different political, social and cultural trends, but can also denote a social movement, driven by a sense of superiority by certain races (racism, Asian racism and *Negritude*), or movements advocating for national independence, so also assuming a constructive or destructive nature. Understanding nationalism and methods of management in national restoration, evolution, boundaries between destructive and constructive nationalism, along with comparative study of nationalism cases in various states and regions of the world is also a focal point of World Regional Studies.

A state can be viewed not only under static conditions as a mechanism of defense and control over a territory and the population inside state boundaries, but also a collection of institutions, rules and regulating norms for public preservation and function. Thus, a state has an *ideological function* (to produce model citizens, who live up to the aspirations of a state’s historical form through educational, social and spiritual institutions as well as mass media) and a *repressive function* (to use power authorities such as judiciary establishments, police or the army to enforce laws and norms accepted by the state). Consequently, the goal of World Regional Studies is to construe and explain how various institutions in different regions and states of the world, and by which social and ideological means,

are educating citizens who are able to carry out state functions, maintain its existence and provide its development not only within the national but also global scope.

Still, these intrastate tasks are not alone within the range of World Regional Studies. Having researched the matter of how states function and develop, World Regional Studies explains and substantiates reasons for transnational and transregional political integration of states and regions of the world. The vibrant development of the United Nations after World War II unleashed new regional arrangements “inside” this organization that triggered the emergence of supranational organizations. Supranational and regional international organizations, consisting of separate states, united to solve a common economic or political objective or an array of them. The best known regional international organizations (formalized or not) are the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The most mature supranational one in integrational terms is the EU. The rise of regional international organizations and, especially supranational entities, attests to the transformation of the sovereignty notion; member states’ national sovereignty is delegated in favor of collective interests of the particular organization that are agreed upon by all parties of the organization. Certainly, with regional international organizations, the case at hand is about consensual harmonization of national interests for the attainment of a general regional economic or political objective rather than national sovereignty re-allocation. Because globalization brought about regional, geopolitical and economic restructuring, the nascence of international regional organizations has been calling for consensual harmonization of national interests within the regions, whereas emergence of the supranational organizations bears evidence to national sovereignties’ conversion into a new supranational essence. Thus arises the political issue of global governance, transnational network management and roles and functions of a state within this system of global and transnational governance.

At present, there are two active opinions about this process. The first one holds that a state as an institution based on the territoriality principle is unable to respond to transnational economic challenges. The second one believes that a state’s ability to transform itself is undervalued and, furthermore, the emergence of new actors in world politics, *macro-regions*, *international regions* and, in the long-run, *global regions* can tackle

transnational and transregional economic challenges. Apart from that, as it has already been mentioned, there is another more influential viewpoint according to which world politics is going global. In other words, politics has overgrown the nation-state level, as even from the perspective of their sovereign engagement in world politics, as well as the de facto global dimension assumption. As this point of view puts it, in the modern globalized world, a state appears to be a tool in political and economic to a less extent, on the contrary, ever more should it pay attention to transnational flows and networks in economic, trade and technological domains—global political, political-economic and finance-economic implications of their activity. Moreover, to a greater extent a state's capacity to compete in the contemporary world depends on the aptitude of its political and top-level elite. They need to master new skills and adjust to new rules, regimes and the environment of the global economy, transforming them evolutionary, so that they would maximally correspond to the interests of their population. They need to meet the demands of twenty-first century geopolitics, or 'critical geopolitics.' They necessarily play a role in the world hub for various transnational flows, rather than its abilities to perform economic and political activity on its sovereign territory. This is less and less determined by the traditional nineteenth century geopolitics. This is why World Politics and International/Global Political Economy studies have ever more been focusing on the international regime notion as an instrument in transnational manufacturing and supply chains, flows of goods, finance, technologies, information and workforce management.

If to proceed from this outlook on global development and the state's role in the modern world, then not only will geopolitical models of autarchic autonomous development gradually die away, but also geo-economic models of search for access to global income as a source of investment. They simply would not be able to provide adequate facilities any more to build into the global economy, manufacturing and technological chains and to compete with patterns of distribution and redistribution of global transnational flows. These operate within financial, commodity, technological and informational flows of a superior tier. In this case, the autarchic autonomous development models can rely merely on trade in raw materials (oil, gas, and other mineral wealth), not to give anybody a chance to access the global technologies and, obviously, foster ever more intensive migration of such countries to the world development periphery. Even routing and installing energy pipeline systems pale in comparison to the formation, establishment and redistribution of energy flows as economic

transactions. Surely, all modern theories pertaining to complex global transformations and world discussion in this realm are in the limelight of World Regional Studies.

8.6 HUMANITARIAN SYSTEMS AND LANDSCAPES

I have already noted that a place is constructed socially—it has various interpretations to different groups of people with diverse aims. Some consider a desire to have a sense of local affiliation inherent in all people. According to this stance, as it were, a human possesses a territorial instinct, like any other biological creature. “Place-affiliation” or “territoriality” is a sense of a human or their group belonging to a certain place or territory. There is a theory that specific combinations of genes relating to the adaptability to a certain territory are evolved in humans. A territory gives humans a sense of physical security. It can become the manifestation of their identity. The need to have one’s own place or territory is noted by psychologists as well; a human needs a certain place (private space) in an edifice or a public space (on a beach, for instance). If there are a lot of people somewhere, a human may feel inconvenienced or a sense of aggression may arise. And although a territoriality sense may become arduous to substantiate, the territoriality concept in the modern Social Sciences as an outcome of specific cultural symbols formation usually does not raise doubts.

Territoriality is not just the outcome of a certain essence of culture. It may reflect political relations as well, and be the result of definite cultural systems. Therefore, territoriality:

1. Regulates human’s social relations;
2. Administers social/political access (directly or indirectly) and access to resources;
3. Usually requires membership to social groups or to symbolize an identity. Territoriality can also represent power and authority to such a degree that they come out of personality and reflect relations between people. Laws and rules turn into norms recognized across certain spaces and territories, rather than to social or national groups (see, Knox and Martson [2013](#), 188–189).

Thus, a place and territory are in an uninterrupted process of *social design*. People dwelling in a particular place are gradually changing their

residence so that it reflects their interests and value system. People change so as to better adapt to the environment. Such a statement begs the question: how do people obtain information on the environment? What do they use? And how do they apply it? In which way does life experience influence people's outlook on the world? Does the outer environment matter for an individual and how does the environment change the conduct of a human?

Therefore, it is possible to conclude one more philosophical concept—a “landscape.” Yet, in World Regional Studies in contrast to geographic disciplines, a “landscape” means not so much a physical form of a territory but rather the cultural landscape. It is precisely the cultural landscape idea conceptualization as a cultural system of human-space and human-environment relationships that urges researchers to search for interdisciplinary approaches to explain and interpret these relationships applying a diverse range of sciences: Geography, Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology and History.

A “cultural landscape” (Barnes and Duncan 1992) suggests the need for a thorough analysis of the role of urban centers and cities, particularly in human history. Urbanization, or the development and creation of cities, addresses transport corridors and urban systems challenges. Urban systems relate to “cultural systems” that predetermine or influence their formation. Urban and cultural system ideas boil down to the “central place” concept—“junctional” settlements where certain products and services are rendered for the consumer (Agnew 1997). The idea of a “central place” originated in the writings by Christaller (1996) provides the rationale for paths of urban evolution in human history. Apart from that, it may assist in explaining the contemporary world system evolution alternatively: through the development of urban centers and not necessarily through the development of state.

As such, there is a concept, in accordance to which the world of global cities is instrumental in space organization wider than a nation-state territory. They have helped launch trade and build colonial, imperial and other world geopolitical strategies (Sassen 2012). As the contemporary world system evolves further, the globalization of the economy has engendered a global system of urbanized hubs. These came out centers of imperial strength, industrial or trade interests, but turned into centers for global and transnational corporations, banking and financial services. These centers harbored the headquarters of international and regional organizations. Therefore, *the global cities* have evolved from imperial might and

power, having buried nineteenth and twentieth centuries' geopolitics, into junctions and hubs, controlling transnational flows of information, finance, goods, culture, and complying with the economic environment of the twenty-first century.

In the modern world system, cities perform various functions and their combinations bind the world system with invisible links that are vital for its maintenance. These connections are not already bound with a geographic territory as they were throughout human history up until the twenty-first century. If in the primary regions of the world, which constitute a core of the modern world system, economic growth resulted in urbanization, then on the periphery it resulted in the rise of metropolitan areas preconditioned by demographic growth and economic development. In regions of the world system, a very low level of urbanization along with the tepid growth of new cities, stable urbanized systems have already been established there. Evidently, a considerable influence on the evolution of the new urbanized systems will be exerted by the demographic transition concept (a mathematical apparatus technique elaborated by Sergei Kapitsa)—a theory, which holds that a transition of an ever larger part of the world population over to the post-industrial stage brings on the decline of the general population growth and its stabilization. This circumstance, however, does not mean that the population in developing nations will not increase in fifteen to twenty years. That is a factor in further economic wealth distribution unevenness around the world (Knox and Martson 2013, Chap. 3) with its possible political consequences.

In the post-industrial world, the *deindustrialization* of metropolitan areas, wherein industrial activity has been closed (for instance, Manchester, Sheffield, Liverpool, Lille, Liege, Cleveland, Pittsburgh and other cities), there is now *counter-urbanization* (a population's cross flow to suburban districts) and *re-urbanization*. The latter is often related to an influx of immigrants (New York, London, Moscow) or a rethinking of a city's cultural role, striking new growth drivers (Paris, Chicago, Tokyo, Barcelona, Lille).

The redesign of global metropolises was induced by rethinking the role of transport corridors, the rejuvenation of the cultural-civilizational systems, and building the aptitude to launch and redirect transnational financial, informational, cultural and trade flows (Sassen 2012). These processes are speeding up and assuming qualitatively new shapes due to globalization. As such, in 1950, two-thirds of cities' global population

resided in central regions of the world economy, whereas by 2030, 80 % of the global population will live in the regions of the world periphery and semi-periphery. In 1950, twenty-one out of thirty of the largest agglomerations were located in the economic core of the world (eleven in Europe and six in North America). In 1980, nineteen out of thirty of the largest cities were located in regions of the global periphery or semi-periphery. By 2030, only two out of every three of the biggest cities will be situated on the periphery or semi-periphery of the world system. In this regard, the transformations in Asia will be the most crucial. By 2020, two-thirds of its population will live in cities. By 2015, the population of every city like Mumbai, Delhi (India), Mexico City, Dhaka (Bangladesh), Djakarta (Indonesia), Lagos (Nigeria), Sao Pãolo (Brazil) and Shanghai (China) will have climbed to more than 17 million people. In all these regions demographic growth precedes economic advance and the expansion of cities is related to the influx of an agrarian population. This is often because the federal and local authorities cannot provide employment in the countryside. An increase in labor productivity in agriculture is objectively pushing the rural population out to the cities. This population migrates to urban areas and cannot necessarily be employed in the services industry or construction sectors. How will the authorities support the population in these world cities? Will the Asian metropolises be able to turn into hubs for manufacturing, trade, finance and technologies? Will they manage to carve a niche in the global economy of transnational finance, commodity, informational and cultural flows? How will it affect modern nation-states, which may gradually become five to six mega-cities with a small amount of the rural population scattered over the rest of the territory? Will highly integrated global regions with centers in highly urbanized world cities as cultural/economic/political/technological hubs come into existence? How will such global cities and global regions be governed? How in general is the world system going to be changed? The next generation of specialists in World Regional Studies faces the conceptualization of all these questions. Nevertheless, it is clear that a merely local or national solution does not exist anymore. The *interdisciplinary essence* of World Regional Studies and the availability of a methodological opportunity to match its object field with segments of rejuvenating blocs of adjacent disciplinary fields offer hope that the majority of issues will be addressed and mankind will be able to evolve further.

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Fusion of Past and Future in the Space of Global Regions and Regional Subsystems of Converging Multiple Modernities

9.1 HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

If to speak about the East in general, from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century it was a colonial periphery of the world. The former taxonym of the East, the Orient, represents the colonial past of the East (Said 1977). Thus, Orientalism became the “imitation and emulation of the East that represented otherness” (Kuo Wei Tchen 1999, 292). The forerunners in the global system had been Europe (economically and politically) and the USA (economically since the late nineteenth century, and both economically and politically since the early twentieth century). Since the late nineteenth century, the USA’s strengthening economic leadership had been accompanied by weak, but ever more distinct political engagement in world political affairs (Woodrow Wilson and his League of Nations venture) by the middle of the first half of the twentieth century (Watson 1992). Upon withdrawal from the devastating World War II, the nascent US economic and political leadership converted from the hegemon into a world economic, political and military leader. This was the final stage of the world system’s bipolarity. Throughout the entire twentieth century the European theatre of activity had been in the limelight of world politics. It was primary, and the world’s fate was decided there. The East at that time played only a small part in the global process. It was the world’s

periphery; however, the initial “colonial model of modernization,” which had advanced in this segment of the world, gradually transformed it into the agrarian-market economic model and authoritarian political model. By the late nineteenth to early twentieth century this macro-region of the world started a crucial process called “Asia’s Renaissance”. It paved the way for the next stage—decolonization and political modernization (Istoriya Vostoka 1999; Smith 1996).

The proto-systems of international relations prior to the nineteenth century (Manchurian-Chinese, Islamic, Greek, Roman, Medieval proto-European) were arranged differently to the modern European system, which began its evolution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Watson 1992). The common principles in this newly emerging system, based on the evolving European rules (an open system of equal states, constituting an international community), were formulated after the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. This treaty *de jure* proclaimed sovereign equality and sovereign states nominally equal to each other with population under their complete authority under the slogan: “If I wish, I will take away the life of everyone in my state.” This order lasted until the late nineteenth century. Within this system, the Russian Imperial family and a considerable part of the nobility were tied by family and cultural bonds with Europe. They had endured sanguinary wars in the European theatre and the Petrine modernization and conquered the right to be Europe’s fully legitimate constituent part. However, by the late nineteenth century it had been playing an ever more conservative role of “Europe’s gendarme” both in foreign and internal policies. The foreign and internal political conservatism of the Russian Empire was offset by its “engagement” in Europe. After the tragic demise of the Emperor’s family, these family ties were cut off and a violent “nationalization” of the Soviet elite under Stalin and subsequent periods in the Soviet history and society took place. The country was ideologically opposed to the whole world and violently closed. Ultimately, these actions led to the build-up of the model of an economically and ideologically “closed state”—a state of “full-fledged” socialism. It began to form its own macro-regional subsystem in the name of the Warsaw Treaty. However, the efficiency and competitiveness of the Socialist system failed to withstand the test of time.

The primary principles of the modern global system have been under way since the turn of the twentieth century. The other previously existing non-European proto-systems were virtually detached from one another and were organized in opposition to the European system, relying on other

principles: they were either hierarchic hegemonies or imperial systems (Manchurian-Chinese, Islamic). At the heart of such regional proto-systems had always been the supreme ruler who served the function of the supreme power center, whereas all the rest of the world was viewed as periphery—local self-governing communities could exist, or virtually independent states. However, even the independent states in these non-Western regional proto-systems, using non-European rules, were in general unequal. They were reputed to have been a step behind in their development than the central states. They were reputed as such even if it was not the case (Watson 1992). Intriguingly and crucially, even if relations inside these non-European regional proto-systems were run on a contractual basis, the “equality” in the relations inside the parts of this system never existed—these were hierarchic systems, even if they had allowed concluding of treaties with the “periphery” states (the “affinity treaties,” “paternalist treaties” or the treaties between the “elder” and “younger” brothers) (Voskressenski 1996). Time and again, the regional system was reconstructed following the reproduction cycles—“leap forward,” stabilization, stagnation, wane, crisis/breakdown—up until the late nineteenth century. This system was steadily crowned by the agrarian-market authoritarian imperial model of cyclical reproduction in politics and economics of the “Oriental type” (the Ottoman and Qin empires), which was rapidly stagnating by the early nineteenth century.

Despite relatively consistent intellectual comprehension of the world and its historical evolution, the entire world system in its current sense, prior to the nineteenth century, did not exist. However, several separate but partially intertwining regional-civilizational world systems co-existed (the proto-European, Islamic, Manchurian-Chinese); among which, the European system was the most universal, open and single-valued. Due to its versatility it was the most appealing to all players in international affairs. The European system was attractive because it relied on a swiftly developing economic model—one that the modern pattern of life rested upon. By the early nineteenth century, inside the European tradition, the concept of a contemporary single international society of equal states had emerged (Watson 1992). It was added to in the middle of the twentieth century by the idea of these states evolving unevenly towards the system of fair and complete popular involvement in the governance of the welfare state. And modernization was based on purposefully elaborating massive scientific-technical innovations, representing commercialized scientific discoveries, changing the world technological behavior and creating surplus value.

This was fundamental in providing economic growth. Precisely these concepts have shaped the social profile of the modern world. Having emerged in the twentieth century, the prototype of the contemporary world system, based on the European rules, formed the contemporary international law concept, which *de jure* stipulated legitimate relations between sovereign states and articulated the notion of states and nations. All that took place in relying upon the European, rather than any other (Chinese, Islamic, African, Latin American) traditions. Therefore, Europe held a central, pivotal role for the entire world system including its peripheral parts. In such a manner the international community and the international system in their contemporary understanding began. This evolving European system, in general, has been open. It was gradually joined by the other peripheral states, which previously had been parts of the non-European, hierarchic regional systems that either illustrated their less competitiveness or were part of the European system on a subdued basis as colonies or semi-colonies. These countries joined the European system, accepting those principles of state interaction upon which the European system was founded, and started to modernize, albeit in a dependent and catch-up way.

The open nature of the core of the European international system and struggle against the totalitarian national alternatives in the second half of the twentieth century, evidently, led to the idea of an opportunity, and then, a necessity for the development of an open-access social-political system inside the internal (national) components. At that time, in the struggle against the right and left totalitarian alternatives, a notion sprang up that this system needed to be defended, even if it required military force. But the employment whereof in an open social-political access system is controlled by a civilian power that is elected by the whole people of this country, where the military component of the state is fully accountable.

After World War II, as Asia modernized at the decolonization stage, it had to opt for one of the two models—the authoritarian-planned model, which was based on cyclical alternation of mobilization, stabilization/stagnation, systemic crisis/political slight freezing and political thawing (the USSR version established in the socialist Eastern European countries and China) or the democratic, market-oriented model (the US and Western European version). Both were supported by the polar-oriented foreign political doctrines. In the course of World War II, the alliance that had come into existence between the coalitions of the combatant nations was a military alliance. It broke down shortly after World War II ended. As a result, a *de facto* bi-polar system emerged. Nevertheless, both types of

the international community, despite having been organized around various principles of internal structure, in general, belonged to the European system. But only one of them was based on the open-access principle, whereas the other was based on the principle of a covert ideology-driven system, protective in nature and on natural (limited) social and political access. In this way, the two variants of the basically European system were elaborated, centers whereof were located outside Europe itself—in the USSR and USA.

Formally, a single international society and international system existed; however, *de facto* it was divided into bipolar macro-regional subsystems militarily, economically and politically. Remarkably, upon achieving the approximate military parity, the decolonizing peripheral players were reputed to be primary, which could enhance or relinquish (the domino principle) each of the sub-systemic poles. Consequently, the decolonization process was encouraged by both superpowers because each subsystem believed that decolonized countries would choose and join their camp.

However, contrary to these beliefs at that time a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emerged among countries who did not wish to join either of the poles. Some were not content with the bipolar configuration of the world and the tightly stipulated capitalist/communist modernization alternative. During the confrontation between these tendencies, the contemporary anti-authoritarian and post-industrial development model came into being, and the East embarked on the political modernization stage—something still occurring today. At this stage, some of the non-Western countries (including the Eastern nations) managed to build up an open social access system, allowing them to avoid systemic crises and catch up with the Western nations, simultaneously preserving their cultural-national specific traits. Other countries have not still managed to leave the recurrent cycles of mobilization, stabilization, stagnation and crisis.

After the collapse of the bipolar system in world politics, two primary tendencies were crystallized—structural leadership and polycentricity. But at the same time a source of archaized political activity emerged. It rested upon tight hierarchy principles and traditionalism inherited from the obsolete non-European regional models, which existed prior to the second half of the twentieth century, and from the old, legally non-codified understanding of rules of international behavior. This shadow center was put up partially arbitrarily and partially purposefully. It was done forcefully so as to archaize the world-order model developing in the transitional period after the bipolar system collapse. The existing archaized system of

primitive/archaized natural social order did not allow adaptation to the rapid changes that had been blown in by globalization.

The old economic model had been practically phased out by the late twentieth century. Therefore, other non-Western countries, which once had opted for the Western model of market economy and competition, albeit with the national specific traits, worked out their own variants for modernization and were trying to overtake the world system leaders by a number of parameters. Several established regional versions of open access even attempted to challenge the Western model of post-industrial development, having introduced into it their own cultural parameters (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Singapore), apart from countries which laid down a model of authoritarian regulation of partially decentralized economy with partially restricted social-political access (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore). Such a model has proven its success, but several countries managed to take a step even further—towards a democratic society with open social-political access with or without national characteristics. This type of model, carried out at the initial stage and in restricted segments of the economic and social life of a society, had once been used in Soviet Russia under the New Economic Policy (NEP) period in the early 1920s. The NEP policy under the name of Deng Xiaoping's "socialism with Chinese characteristics" was later applied to Communist China and a certain number of Asian authoritarian nations (Vietnam and Cuba under Fidel, and especially under Raul, Castro). Yet its success was also questioned (Lane 1996, 83–112), as the issue arose of what the next development stage of these societies would look like. This has still not been determined.

Other countries that had failed to work out a national modernization model found themselves lagging behind. Due to this, a new movement was launched to establish the new rules for the world system with multiple modernities. These were to enter into force before a transition to a new economic pattern. Those who have coped with it seized an opportunity to rearticulate the rules for the world system in compliance with their interests rather than according to the interests of all, especially the underprivileged. Moreover, part of their political elites, which could not talk of success in economic and political advance, expressed a desire either to break the incumbent system or archaize its organization principles. This desire was strong among states that did not blend with the new states but also with the existent political-economic pattern. At the wind-up of the old and building up of the new technical-economic pattern, the prototypes of

the new political-economic space configuration models started to emerge. These had various chances to be put into practice, however, they were not yet given the finishing touches. As it were, the world got “stuck” at the stage of evolutionary transition to the new political-economic order and new science-technical pattern: the West stumbled over hyper-functioning/overstretching, rapid development and the inability of the extra-liberal democracy model advanced by a part of the Western elite in tight deadlines by means of the “melting pot” and/or multiculturalism concepts. This was because of the difficulties in “digesting” the migrating masses from other peripheral segments of the world system who were brought up on other cultural and political values and outlooks. Another new and urgent problem to be addressed was the issue of large financial misbalances. In the East, a new stage of uncompetitive authoritarian models die-back (events in North Africa in 2011) broke out and divided the continent into several non-contiguous parts. Africa experienced social-economic development hardships. The Greater Middle East was feud-torn and slowly integrating into the single whole traditionalist-oriented model. It was put together mostly by the single fundamental confessional beliefs (confessional nationalism). Development in Northeast Asia became “stuck” because of military security issues and power stand-offs. In this region the leadership system was formed but centralized around several grand regional powers with their own vision of a regional order and integrational processes. And in Southeast Asia, the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an integrated center under the consensual principle were not enough to ensure full prosperity.

The Latin America countries, in general, accepted the up-to-date political and economic development pattern. However, specific traits in their political culture were marked by a high degree of economic polarization, which impedes the consolidation process of democratic development and makes the leftist parties and political movements more shaped.

9.2 INTEGRATION OF THE WORLD SPACE AND THE FORMATION OF GLOBAL REGIONS

In one global region—the EU—stable integrational processes move on and, being supranational in nature, foster the establishment of Europe’s global region under the EU aegis. In another region—Southeastern

Asia—an international union was formed and the region was moving from the international-political to global status under the ASEAN aegis.

In the first case we deal with the advanced model of the supranational political and trans-regional economic space establishment. In the second case, the international form of integration does not inhibit carrying out a policy of separate legal norms unification. The states not party to this union have to join it, streamlining their internal legislation, improving investment and economic climate and taking part in the integrational processes in different ways. These two regional blocs can be viewed as the most successful global projects of economic and political integration in the world.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), on the contrary, has been an integrational entity that does not aspire to speed up integrational processes. The Free Trade Area Agreements (FTAs) are the most advantageous form of cooperation between the USA and Canada and Mexico. NAFTA's core is the USA and all processes of countries' further interdependence hinge on this relationship. Since the results of this integration are not so beneficial to the USA, there is ongoing debate on workforce and financial flows from the USA to Mexico and hence on the destiny of this union. This circumstance, as well as China's rising, ultimately brought about the desire to reformat integration "around" the USA into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The contours of this relationship are only starting to solidify. This integration mode is "centralized" around the USA and is almost completely defined by their vision of this process—its pace and intensity provides as many opportunities as possible for the nearby economically and technologically weaker countries.

The core of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the Russian Federation. The CIS certainly would like to push the pace of integration. However, in most cases everything ends up being signed as declarative documents. In general, the grouping is rather stable. The Eurasian integrational process has been given a push forward in recent times by the creation of the Eurasian Union (EAU) based on a concept of joint Eurasian economic space. Yet, economic and political constituents in this venture have not been finally determined so as to forecast its real implications. The two factions of the EAU co-exist. The first one wants to restore a certain imperial integrity based on historic precedents and models from the past. The second one would like to see Eurasia's gradual evolution as an international region and later as a global region.

Thus, in these three cases (the EU, NAFTA, and the CIS) the potential for political and economic integration is high and feasible. In the NAFTA case, US interests do not stretch for further integration. In the EU case, the supranational structures do not facilitate the association with other states should the EU participants fail to reach a consensus regarding this issue, which is becoming ever less likely (hence Brexit) under the Eurozone financial-economic crisis and the need to establish not only a monetary and military, but also a fiscal union. In the CIS case, the economic potential is extraordinarily humble, if to compare it with the politics that causes disparity between the real and formal steps towards the creation of a stable integrational grouping and, at the same time, prompt the maximally unbiased use of the already accumulated present experience. The development of a single customs and economic union within the EAU partially offsets this drawback; however, it leaves open the issue of the real political-economic capacity of this process.

In Eastern Asia integrational tendencies started fifteen to twenty years later than in Western Europe. Even accounting for the augmentation in historical time density factor and hypothetic opportunity of retrying experience of the Europeans; they are either at an earlier development stage, or are personified while breaking the EEC/EU integrational project cycles. Moreover, the very notion of “integration” is rapidly and considerably changing. This blurs the European integrational pillars, which twenty to thirty years ago seemed to be sacrosanct. Interpretations of integration have been absorbing experience of the non-European integrational core areas, and in this sense even the integration with the EU is becoming “less European,” or in any case, less West European—bearing in mind the original integrational visions and legal norms stipulated in late 1950s (Voskressenski 2014a, b).

Currently, the essence and contents of the Euro-Pacific space are undergoing changes: the new political-economic and social processes are moving ahead, allowing us to explore the trans-regional cooperation phenomenon. Its most vivid illustration in recent time is the “expansion” of the traditional regions, the emergence of the global regions, the new trans-regional groupings (BRICS [Brazil, Russian, India, China and South Africa]) and stronger interdependence of the trans-regional space. The latter factor is partially overlapped, partially coinciding and, at the same time, ever tighter conjugated via the interdependence of the trans-regional space regional segments, including networking interaction. Macro-regionalization and cross-regional cooperation are added by the new

phenomena in the sphere of regional identity construction, such as macro-regional projects like the EU expansion, the discussion about a “contingency” plan for the European and Russian, and Latin American and East Asian economic spaces, the establishment of an East Asian Community, the ASEAN+6 venture, the single Asian currency venture, etc. At the same time, the evolution of these trends is not linear and bumps against a bulk of hurdles on its way, which are down to the stance by both large outer-regional players and the availability of the intraregional controversies. Nevertheless, the analysis of the integrational processes in Europe and Asia empowers us with the opportunity to underscore the availability of significant typological similarity traits in the development of the integrational groupings in the Eurasian Union and Eastern Asia space that is paramount to Russia.

This similarity is traced in:

1. a set of initial motivations, among which is the fear of intraregional conflicts; the necessity for the increase in competitive power through the unification process in the face of larger extra-regional actors;
2. an orientation to simplification of the intraregional economic exchange conditions and arrangement of conditions for the integrational grouping competitive growth in general with regards to the “outside” states;
3. efforts to establish common identity symbols, relying on political myths of the universal historical-cultural heritage and common ground in historical and economic destinies in the future;
4. the mechanism, surveying and running the integrational process, which the emphasis on preponderance of the intergovernmental approach to the decision-making process is typical of, when comparing both groupings.

In the past, the heart of civilizational differences and inter-civilizational controversies were not so much economic as they were social, religious and cultural. Nevertheless, these were economic factors and economic modernization played an instrumental role in the current shift to the global environment. Shortly before World War II, all Asian and African countries, including Japan, lagged behind the West in all economic and social parameters. In the period after World War II, the situation changed significantly. Success in economic development, alongside a streak of political events (Korean, Vietnamese, Afghan and other wars), changed the

Afro-Asian peoples' attitude toward the Western civilization. In economic terms, the Eastern national states demonstrated the ability to compete and keep up a high pace of growth, including the GDP per capita. And from the military-political perspective, in the modern epoch, Western civilization's supremacy was relatively uncontested. In technical terms, Eastern countries have proven their ability not only to master imported cutting-edge technologies, but also to carry out research on their own. However, in this catch-up development process, the countries that attained success had set off on the path towards economic and political modernization. Some of the Eastern countries managed to set up democratic regimes and open-access social-political systems, which, notwithstanding their cultural-national specific features, were acknowledged by the Western nations, albeit with hefty arguments, as acceptable options for regional democratic development. This circumstance triggered the articulation of goals for political modernization as an integral part of the comprehensive political evolution (partnership in modernization) and a transition from the catch-up type of modernization to working out a self-sustained modernization model and streamlining national political-economic competitive power. Under these circumstances former abjections and adulations in front of the West vanished, whereas the contemporary life pattern, originally created by the Western countries, ceased to be perceived as a Western one. Life became bizarre to the modernity in its regional profile. Moreover, in the public opinion of the most advanced Eastern countries pervades a belief that in the foreseeable future they will be able to catch up and even emulate the USA and European economic success. They hope to create a competitive national or regional development model, relying on the business pattern that had been brought into these traditional societies by Western countries. However, these beliefs do not pertain to all countries.

Clearly, in Greater East Asia, an international region becoming more and more global, integrational trends are intensifying and the region itself is turning into the world's geopolitical and geo-economic activity hub. In other words, it is transforming gradually into a global region. Simultaneously, new regional configuration models of political-economic space and new global governance configurations have been on the rise, but have not yet been finalized. Russia is very interested in their establishment. The Greater East Asia region still remains divided in two parts: the first is a rigid realist vision of future conflict where security issues prevail—aggravation whereof will be used as a political-economic integration guide. The

second is one in which economic integration and state-of-the-art technological cooperation moves full steam ahead, dividing into the following:

- *Northeast Asia*: where security issues, rather than economic development, persist. A polycentric system has been evolving there, which is partially oriented toward the USA and several great powers (China, Russia, Japan and South Korea) with, mainly, a realist type of interstate cooperation (military balancing and latent military stand-off). In Northeast Asia every great regional power puts forward its own version of the regional order. These versions resist each other by a range of parameters; North Korea with the explosion-hazard nuclear issue is there with an economic integration model that does not move further or develops in a volatile manner. Recently, there has not been a common vector of economic development, and the political models are antagonistic and contrapositive.
- *Southeast Asia*: where ASEAN is the developing cooperation model in the center. The economic interdependence and complementary model has been elaborated there, without a vividly dominating center. The consensual economy-oriented development and integration path has been strengthening, with its consequences: multilateral economic cooperation, innovative economic models, growth triangles, free economic zones, free zones of ASEAN+1,2,3, free trade agreements, etc. This model has shown that the member-state economies are able to grow and provide for economic growth even under a global economic crisis. Political distinctiveness does not involve civilizational and confessional exclusiveness, impeding the achievement of compromise, without which concerted development of the cooperative type would become impossible. At the same time, it became known that the region had been expanding and its expansion potential, especially under the economic crisis, is considerable. The projects ASEAN+1 and +5 are good examples of how valiant expansion, the formation of a geographic macro-region and its possible transformation into an international/global region, but simultaneously emerges the possibility of a new bipolarity dead-end cycle brought on by rivalry between the USA and China. It might be able to draw the entire macro-region, or even the whole world, into a stand-off abyss.

For Russia, it is a strategic objective not to get bogged down in such a geopolitical configuration. Doing so would set it against the states, who have a higher innovation-technological level, and cut it off from the open-type social-economic integration model that prevails in the world, in reliance whereon a new quality of interdependence and conjugation of the global political-economic space regionally segmented. If bogged down in new bi-polarity, Russia wastes a chance on using an extensive regional and international resource for investment into the economic, social and innovation-technological evolution of the country and will be forced to further increase its expenditures on upholding the military parity with the overmatching military coalitions and 'ideological provision' of its 'new closeness' from the world. These pseudo-necessary military parities, cognized in the course of the obsolete realist interstate rivalry paradigm, may rebound the country's economic development and derail the people's "preservation" (*"sokhraneniye naroda"* as proclaimed by Russian philosopher Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Russian politician Vladimir Putin at the early-mid stage of his presidential career) and state modernization.

In other words, for Russia, the long-term target is to minimize gaps in the coherent political-economic and social-cultural space of Europe and East Asia. Russian political elite must place emphasis on the constructively progressing "unity" rather than "contraposition" or the expansion of a "separate identity" related to the single and coherent politics, economy and security space "via Russia." Russia has its maximal engagement in this nascent transnational space, and an internal policy objective—the development of infrastructure, the state's efficiency and the social-political access order. This will facilitate maximal conjugation and correlation of the Russian space with its Euro-Atlantic and Pacific traits, which are quite numerous in the political culture of contemporary Russia. World Regional Studies as an academic discipline offers ways and methods for governing the single, simultaneously differentiated and regionally segmented global space (social engineering of space and time as it is referred to in World Politics). It is oriented at the fulfillment of this political-economic objective in theoretical and practical terms.

9.3 ESSENCE AND FORMS OF THE “EASTERN RENAISSANCE” AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD

Since the late twentieth century the East has been experiencing a true religious renaissance with a subsequent steep rise in religion's influence on the state and government. Affected by the rise of nationalism, religion has been assuming militant shapes among an enlarging mass of the marginalized layers of population, particularly in several segments of the Islamic world. Russia also appears to have been touched by this process. Ultimately, this process affected the West as well by means of immigrants' influx from the East and rising nationalism among the autochthonic population. The restoration of traditional values and the alienation of the European civilization's numerous values has been caused by a series of reasons. They are: the existence of formidable population masses in the traditional relations system living below the income poverty line, especially in the large countries of the East; efforts by part of the elite to attain their political goals on account of intimidation using the foreign enemy image; euphoria from the first incontestable successful modernization cases in the East and complexities of its further implementation; public consciousness traditionalization and archaization, engendered by looming intricacies in the course of social transformations and/or incompatibilities of this process with the prevalent cultural archetypes; blurring of the European civilization's absolute supremacy; and difficulties in implementing the catch-up development model.

Having emerged, these processes carry on to self-reproduce. As a result, not only are multi-type national reproduction structures coming to the forefront, but also, at times purposefully, civilizational differences are becoming entrenched. The increased interdependence of the world seems to be affecting the economic and political environment represented by the globalization of economics and politics. The endogenic processes, especially in the cultural-civilizational sphere, are still distinct in their peculiarity. Although the ways to cultural-civilizational synthesis have been outlined, mankind in general has just embarked on this course. On a profound level across many regions of the world there is still no similarity in essence with what is accepted as the common basic norm of democracy (Chu Yun-nan et al. 2008). The political system provides the individual with political and economic freedom through open social-political access while law enforcement allows the society to self-organize, maintain stability and, simultaneously, intensively develop. An understanding of the

necessity for common norms, providing for human rights, is underway, in particular, via intensive build-up of a supranational regional reality. From the perspective of human rights, economics and politics, the Western nations are as previously perceived as an etalon. Although this etalon is actively challenged in the context of national forms, albeit without touching upon its essential, universal, characteristics.

The synthesis of the converging Western and Eastern values and realities in the trans-culturalism concepts, especially in recent decades, is moving on ever more intensively. The conservation of traditionalism and archaism, civilizational nationalism and, ultimately, backwardness in regimes of the restrained social-political access is bringing on further economic backwardness and deterioration in living standards. It cannot be downplayed in the informational epoch of transnational mass media, television and the Internet. In the West, a re-articulation of both “Western” modernization models—the American and European ones—is swiftly taking place. They include both polar ideas from presidential candidates from the Republican and Democratic parties in the USA, and new socialist ideas and right-leaning movements in various states of the European Union. Currently, Eastern Asia, in contrast, is the world’s crucial testing platform for working out a political modernization model, synthesizing democratic forms of rule and the autochthonic political culture performance features. This, subsequently, shows the models that have impressive economic growth of the non-mobilizational type (Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and later India and China) and are inspired by further expansion of the cross-regional cooperation area. By the late twentieth century, Eastern Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea, China) had discovered a successful form of economic and organic (non-violent) political modernization. They had shaken off inefficient, unviable and irrational components in the political system, simultaneously enhancing and speeding up the economic modernization process. They did this at first by constructing the economic foundations (with foreign aid or relying on its own forces depending on the specific environment in a country) and legislatively introducing economic liberalism. Then, they enforced rational norms and the application of constitutional liberalism ever more widely. Gradually and equally tightly, they encouraged a system of meritocracy and accountable open social-political access. They also established effective bureaucracy, afterwards carrying out further democratization depending on the political ability of a certain society to “digest” and master political changes and economically prosper in reliance on cross-regional cooperation. While

going through such a model, there is no sense in using violent mobilization or forceful coercion of the population. Mindful that the conducted reforms are economically liberating people, increasing their freedom and raising their quality of life, economically and politically for the foreseeable span of an active life within one generation. The entire population of these countries has turned into a “modernization agent” and the simple intensification of their economic activity within the rational course of modernization has made such a model successful.

The economic crisis shook up the world, but the global system has proved its elasticity and the crisis did not breed a menace of a new universal military conflict. Rather, it enhanced international cooperation to overcome the aftermath of a crisis. The world order withstood, but it should and will transform evolutionally. However, the political and social-economic transformations of the late twentieth to early twenty-first centuries brought the world to a new phase of non-West-centric evolution. This new stage of global evolution implies that:

1. Western nations are not alone anymore to determine the very parameters of social-political evolution, but also the scientific frameworks of its comprehension. The East has joined them in this path. At the same time, the theoretical comprehension of non-Western regions (Asia and Africa) and the particular traits from the comparative political analysis angle markedly lags behind an analysis of similar processes in the Western world. Such a situation has led to theoretical approaches based on Western realities automatically pertaining to the rest parts of the globe. It has, ultimately, brought about dramatic distortions in the interpretation of the political and economic processes in the East.
2. Attention is now focused on understanding the global economy (and not just a Western part of it), political structure and the dynamics of the whole system (including the Eastern and its, at least, Asian subsystem), rather than just its Western parts. Consequently, the opinions of those who insist on the inclusion of the non-Western agenda in the political and political-economic analysis of international affairs are becoming ever more convincing. Nevertheless, such a statement requires closer attention be paid to global governance issues, converging political processes and understanding the quality of these issues.

3. Bearing in mind the variation in global societies, we should also acknowledge the differences between the non-Western societies and the Western ones. Having agreed with a political culture pluralism, we can also admit the presence of various democracy modes—not only an American and European mode, but an Asian or African type as well. Other democracies are, evidently, able to differ greatly from the Western models but still keep a democratic essence, possibly better adjusted to tackling political issues in societies other than the Western one. Such an interpretation implies a comprehensive explanation of the transition issues from a natural to an open social-political access as a global requirement for successful development, but also as a compound and, possibly, protracted phase. It depends on the national conditions, and simultaneously the competition both in the transition to an open access social order and ways of building up the national versions of an open access social-political order. The process of transition to an open social-political access system has started to be perceived as the global constituent of the social-political processes progressive vector, being at the same time distinct in their own national traits, whereas those who rule out pursuing this path are the social-political losers.
4. A methodologically correct comparative political-economic analysis shows that more competitive and less competitive social-political systems coexist. Less competitive ones are viewed as backward in the historical perspective, even if the population is violently (periodically/cyclically) “urged” by the ruling elite. In various systems various institutions can implement similar functions; in different systems similar institutions can/will carry out different functions. These assumptions lead to the question of whether it is possible to build a non-Western democracy. Hence, one can find intriguing explanations for the complexities building up in the so-called democratic transit theories. The modern political pattern of various countries brings remarkable conclusions, having far-reaching practical political implications depending on the ability or inability of various segments in political elites from certain countries to conceive of these tendencies.

Such a methodological statement implies (or at least does not reject) that a free, democratic, effective and economically prosperous society can be achieved with its own particular social-political system. This would be

based on the understanding of common transformation models, taking into account the structural distinctness of this specific regional subsystem, in particular, its cultural-historical parameters and autochthonous cultural/historical/confessional constants. However, in every case, the manifestations of national distinction in the arrangement of political, economic and social life will call for an explanation and substantiation from all countries. Particularly, those that have already set up the well-established system of democratic rule and that have a political system that corresponds to the common beliefs about democratic rule and their tangible embodiment. In this regard, just the affirmation of this fact by any part of the national political elite will be insufficient. Democratic rule, based on a system of open and equal social-political access, in the historical perspective is more competitive and universal because it rests upon open and equal access by representatives from all social-political, ethnic strata of the society and confessional movements to governance. In this sense, it is a universal rule and common tendency rather than its partial (regional) manifestation. Thus, the goal of improving the regional and national form of statehood can be articulated as a need for striking such a balance between the common tendencies and distinct traits, which keeps national democratic rule developing in its specific cultural-historical forms, living up to common tendencies by its content. Alternatively, the regressive movement of a society, and then its political and economic system, will follow. Such a situation quite swiftly will be reflected in the sphere of foreign-policy cooperation that, in its turn, will exacerbate the backwardness of certain countries.

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Conclusion

In the context of the new disciplinary sub-fields of International Relations (IR)—World/Global Politics, International/Global Political Economy, and the newest one, World Regional Studies—the academic principles used to find a ratio between the common/universal and multiple/specific (regional/country-related) trends in the comparative study of world politics in conjunction with a domestic policy agenda is more profoundly understood. It allows substantiating the applied principles of a non-West-centric vision of the world, including the following:

1. The selection of an open, self-centered regional development model that includes capital accumulation and on the basis whereof is made an attempt to articulate their own development and modernization model. Simultaneously, this assumption will help to recognize the finite capacities of a “closed model” of the self-centered capital accumulation at the next phase of their evolution, calling for further political modernization based on trans-regionalism as a new phenomenon, speeding up social evolution.
2. A shift in the essence of cross-regional cooperation. If previously cross-regional partnerships were set up with the mediation of great powers and in reliance on the world system’s hegemon state, in the polycentric world one can lay emphasis on the elaboration of a multi-vector program—the constructive inclusion of the interrelatedness into the world economic and political space through the

partnerships of states belonging to approximately the same level of development and similar or equal level of the social-political access system. This may happen without indispensable reliance on the world system's hegemon/leader-state, but also without contraposition to it. Which type of social-political access and to what degree partners are friendly with the leader-state is left to the discretion of the political elite and diplomats in these states depending on certain conditions (economic and political) and strategic tasks of development. Such an approach implies the search not only for allies, but also strategic partners in modernization, upgrading a nation-state's technological and social aspects. Provided specific conditions, this allows the involvement of the world system's leader-state into partnerships for the sake of modernization and it accentuates world politics in a consensual constructivist direction. The aim being to constructively change the world order to a fairer and more mutually advantageous structure, rather than to military stand-offs and balancing;

3. A multi-vector program would be based on the amplification of cross-regional and macro-regional relationships via social engineering of national economic and social-political space and network collaboration. Labor division between national economies would be done mostly in terms of economic growth pace. It would contain mechanisms to level off benefits from cooperation and development stages of the partnerships;
4. Ideally, such a model would establish a progressive transnational (and further on, transregional) political-economic space of global regions cooperating as new actors in world politics. They would have their own cultural-historical distinctness and their existence and function would be based on formal and informal political rules and mechanisms. Their abidance would be bolstered by the community, albeit members whereof are formally divided by the state boundaries. These borders are transformers in global regional space with integrated economic activities, outlooks and progressive political values including open social-political access, mutual trust and intensive and diverse contacts throughout all human activity domains, rather than division lines. Despite the seeming idealism of this goal, its implementation is down to finding ways for regional spaces to blend and overlap inside and above the regional subsystems in such a way that the formation of trans-

national fields of global space would speed up and enhance. This would foster progressive human development, rather than slow it down.

These suppositions are not contrary to IPE assumptions though at the same time they are not completely within the mainstream Western IPE thought (Wallerstein 1974; Amin 2001; Boas et al. 2005; Goede 2006, O'Brien and Williams 2010; Capello and Dentinho 2012; Grigoriev 2014).

Nowadays, it is becoming clear that an analysis of various factors and combinations cannot provide a substantive determination and explanation for key development trends. Methodological synthesis of different factors to a more or less coherent and integral approach or provision of a common rationale for the different factors features the perplexing task of world political analysis much more comprehensively than the need to work out a Western and non-Western theory that analyzes and forecasts various regional realities. Consequently:

1. All of society should be substantiated in its aggregate structural context, rather than by the virtue of a subjective-historical set of factors, though prevalent due to crucial reasons at the current moment of history in the West or East;
2. The world social structures imply the construction or deconstruction process across all levels inside a single social-historical entirety and social hierarchies irrespective of the regional environment-specific traits, but they do not negate such a specificity;
3. Ideas, steps and social structures may not coincide with one other across various regional tiers, as the communities are constantly shaped by the actors and subjects, partially because of their intentions, but also due to the structural, objective processes. However, because the more universalist agenda survives, world convergence, not divergence, is the driver of progressive world economic and political development. Different ideas, steps, institutions and structures must be tested on their ability to help the consensual benign convergence and not the conflictual divergence before being implemented into real life by governments of countries or leadership of regional blocks;
4. The study of international-political reality and international relations as social relations is possible. Given one single comprehensive

approach, remarkably, the accepted approach will determine both kinds of the suggested holistic and segmented causal links and logic of the entire multitude of international affairs;

5. Subjectively historical “compression” or “collection” of factors are inapplicable to studying IR as an entirety, as the comprehensive/integral and multidisciplinary approach and a new framework of a de-Westernized analysis are needed, which could encompass both the systemic level on both its tiers: global as well as regional, and also the analysis entities level;
6. Differences should be drawn between the structure (defined and described according to both methods, quantitative as well as qualitative) as an entirety, on the one hand, and collaborating global, regional, national and intrastate actors on the other. At the same time, an emerging glocality, on the one hand, erases, and, on the other hand, does not completely cancel boundaries between them;
7. On system/entity tiers the reasons may differ from the subsystem/region tier, there is an opportunity to trace and evaluate the consequences of various reasons (global and regional) and, in particular, articulate the subsystemic reasons that build the notion of a regional subsystem;
8. The last two conclusions allow the conception of not only the nature of the interrelationships between different types of intrastate processes (in accordance with various types of social-political order) within the international, regional and interstate environment, but also their impact on the structure of regional and world political interactions both separately and in their entirety. They also lay down the methodological approaches of the integrative interdisciplinary type in World Regional Studies.

Such a statement involves the application and adaptation of methodologically impeccable “international” theories and approaches, which make it possible to elaborate common conclusions and different scientifically correct interpretations, including those pertaining to various regional/national realities. These include a Western/non-Western/Eastern reality or proceed from interpretations of one and the same reality depending on the perspective (from the “center,” “periphery” or structurally distinct segments of the world system) in conjunction with an understanding of certain historical stages and the respective social-political order. This is in contrast to constructing theories separately to explain differences in regional affairs. Such an understanding puts the issue of limited opportu-

nities for dreaming up the “non-Western” theory of IR into another platitude than the ones outlined by Acharya and Buzan (2010). I believe that a non-Western relations theory that will not comply with international reality and international norms that becomes commonly approved is doomed. The creation of a non-Western IR theory may be achieved using a focused structured comparison method applied to the non-Western reality held as a distinctive segment of the universal reality. While implementing an analytical method, “configured” by the discipline itself (i.e., a method, applying the common variables for description and evaluation of the particular case), the focused comparison method can assist in working out the non-Western IR theory. This would work if a researcher determines the events class appropriately, in relation to elaborating the “explaining” theory and if the approach to the study object is selective and focused in nature. In Social Sciences, a theory articulated with a focused comparison is usually “open.” In other words, it cannot be universal a priori, as the new scientific research results may discover new causal links of spatial layers that may have a specific structural relationship with time layers. New correlations between time and space are already and may be further found as independent and dependent variables through a focused structural comparison that may imply further application of other disciplinary methods (George 1993; George and Bennet 2005; Voskressenski 2003; Rozov 2005, 2009; Thierbach et al. 2014). They may help explain new rationales that will not be rationales pertaining to every single case. On the contrary, they will likely require the re-articulation of the theoretical presuppositions in global theories with a better and more precise understanding of universality characteristics that are not limited only to Western case studies. This approach further enables us to use a mixed method research strategy moving towards an interdisciplinary synthesis to look both forward and backward at space as an independent/dependent variable that is changed by humans over time, as well as time as an independent/dependent variable that may be changed within segments of space.

By taking into account the space multi-level phenomenon and time as a frame of reference defining regional/country-specific features, we must inevitably take note of three factors that characterize the relationship of the general and the particular in contemporary development. We must determine:

1. The distance that separates the most economically, socially and politically effective countries. This distance must be overcome in order to make national specifics more universal, and thus more successful for

- development. It determines the sequence and consistency of the approach toward resolving the issues of political modernization;
2. The specific interrelationships in the dominating ideology, government politics and national strategy of development within the particular governing space, which is socially constructed and geographically fixed;
 3. The particulars of political cultures, and how these influence the process of a political system. What are the roles of tradition and political culture, and how, directly or indirectly, do these factors influence the trajectory of the country's development?

These factors, taken into consideration, help to correlate a spatial-analytical scheme and framework for analysis with absolute and relational space-time and with the linear-dimensional characteristics of the system of socio-political access into a multidimensional spatial-analytical model of the global political process. If that is the case for the evolving non-Western IR theory, I will agree to it.

Synthesizing the structural, qualitative, quantitative, cartographic and interpretational methods within an integral coherent framework allows the elaboration of a theory that relies on analytical generalizations and that can be empirically assessed with a historical-comparative method, which helps to understand ways to coexisting but still different modernities. Inside this framework, one can apply the quantitative and qualitative methods of hypothesis verification or build up the quantitative or qualitative auxiliary theories correctly, regardless of whether they are applicable to the Western or non-Western reality or depending on the specific macro-regional reality (Voskressenski 2003; Rozov 2005, 2009; Baur et al. 2014).

Theories elaborated with this approach will be impossible to divide typologically into Western or non-Western, as they are based on the admittance of a differentiated and, at the same time, integrated glocal space existence. Under certain circumstances with specific international policy, it can be prone to both deeper differentiation up until the formation of regional subsystems, diverse in their nature, and simultaneously greater integration with the convergence of regional subsystems into a global international system. Thus the transformation of the international and global regions will enhance the overall degree of common integration—of the spatial-temporal field of the global interactions up until the development of ever stronger wholeness of the world. Yet, the construction and application of such theories requires both training for new unbiased spe-

cialists in the West and the non-West and the elaboration of a more refined theoretical apparatus. There needs to be further development of Social Sciences and International Relations as a constituent part that includes World Regional Studies as an IR sub-field and a framework that can help attest and compare social theories applicable to coexisting modernities but linking them simultaneously to appropriate methodologies and research practices within the converging glocal reality.

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